Wikipedia:WikiProject Military history/Academy/The effect of aging sources

During a diplomatic meeting about the Vietnam War, Henry Kissinger is said to have asked Zhou Enlai what he thought of the French Revolution. The Chinese leader was reported to have replied that it was too early to tell [what the impact or legacy was].

Similarly, sources that were once at the cutting edge of human knowledge may over time, become less reliable or superseded by other thought.

Articles on military, political or other topics sensitive to national security in particular are usually most affected by this. The most obvious reason for the aging of sources is because of new information coming to light, so that new secondary sources (such as textbooks and journals) have more data from which they can formulate their conclusion.

Release of primary sources

One way this occurs is due to the release of primary documents:

• Classified documents, such as those of national governments, cabinets, high-level religious organisations, armies, and intellgience agencies are opened up to the public over time.
• People involved in a dispute do not want to create drama while they and/or the others involved, whether they be enemies or allies. This can occur for various reasons, including the fear of opening up old wounds, attracting litigation, or to avoid questioning about whether their claims were inconsistent, nonsensical or hypocritical.

An example of the latter is Don Bradman and Bill O'Reilly (cricketer), who were feuding teammates in the Australian cricket team; the cause is usually attributed to religion. Both remained fairly discreet in their lifetime but recorded interviews and diaries etc. were stored in the National Library of Australia, which were kept secret until both had died. Bradman also penned letters to writers who were his confidants, stridently accusing the Catholics in the team of undermining him and being of bad character. Bradman was also a long-time member of the Australian Board of Control and was involved in many governance issues. After his death some of his colleagues spoke more openly about what happened in board meetings and the archives were opened up, which led to a new book with much new information regarding cricket governance. Bradman's colleagues were able to discuss things that they may have been uncomfortable in talking about during his lifetime, such as his reluctance to make a stand against apartheid by banning matches against South Africa.

More information about behind the scenes matters is always coming to light. As a result, the Pulitzer Prize-winning journalists David Halberstam, Neil Sheehan and Malcolm Browne had only partial knowledge of the planning and debate in the lead-up to the Arrest and assassination of Ngô Đình Diệm. At the time they did not know the identity of the CIA agent Lucien Conein who met with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam generals who plotted Diem's overthrow, in fact very little apart from what happened in public view.

Since then, the Pentagon Papers were leaked, and many documents were declassified. People can see which members of the Kennedy administration supported Diem's overthrow, and who did not, or if they were more involved than they claimed to be. For example, it was later revealed that the US Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. had objected to his chief of staff going to Gia Long Palace to escort Diem into safe passage into exile; Lodge only reported to Washington that he had spoken to Diem and offered to arrange transport and exile. Lodge's chief of staff later revealed that Lodge also sent a US aeroplane away on the day of the coup so that he could not provide safe transport. The chief of staff only recounted these events to an academic after Lodge's death.

All this extra information that typically comes out over time is a reason why—other things being equal—newer sources are likely to be better than older sources in terms of evaluating the legacy or long-term effects of a battle or a person. More information is available on a person's true involvement in a historical event.

Revelations about spying and its effects on the analysis of historical events

Another example is regarding the Vietnam War, which finished over 30 years ago. Despite this, some memoirs of involved combatants have only been released recently (and some will no doubt be released in the future). Recently, a high-ranking South Vietnamese military intelligence official published his memoirs, making a bevy of revelations, labelling certain high-ranking public figures and officials as communist spies. Why leave it so late when interest in the topic may wane with the sands of time? One reason is the safety of those who were involved in murky activities, who might be harassed by the public, arrested, assassinated or executed if such things came to light, or that the accused might sue.

An extreme example can occur when information about secret agents comes to light at a later date and can show that the original explanation for an agreed fact can be completely incorrect. Below is an excerpt from the FA on Pham Ngoc Thao, a colonel in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, who was shown to be a communist spy more than a decade after his death.

Thao was promoted to the post of chief of Kien Hoa Province, which the communists called Ben Tre Province. He covertly worked with the cadres of Nguyen Thi Dinh... The area was a traditional communist stronghold, and anti-government attacks had increased in recent times, but it suddenly became peaceful when Thao arrived. There were rumours that Thao and the communists had decided to cease fighting for their mutual benefit; the guerrillas could quietly strengthen themselves, while Thao would appear to be successful and he would be promoted to a more powerful position where he could cause more damage to Diem. The lack of fighting between Thao's forces and the Vietcong proved to beneficial to the communist cause. In a three-month period in 1963, the Vietcong were able to recruit 2,000 men in Kien Hoa and formed two more battalions. Thao was praised by ... [by people] who were unaware of his ruse. He received another promotion, and with it, more influence and contacts among the officer corps. The US ambassador Elbridge Durbrow described Kien Hoa Province as an "agricultural showplace" and advised journalists to travel there to see Thao's successful administration. The influential American journalist Joe Alsop changed his plans so that he could spend more time in Kien Hoa, saying that the province "particularly inspires hope". ... the Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist David Halberstam misinterpreted the lack of attacks in Kien Hoa, while other provinces were being ravaged, as proof that Thao was one of the few capable government officials in the Mekong Delta. Robert Shaplen wrote that "In all respects, Thao is one of the most remarkable Vietnamese around, being a conspiratorial revolutionary figure straight out of a Malraux novel and, at the same time, a highly sophisticated and astute man, whose talents, if only they were properly channeled, could profitably be used right now."

The fact that Thao's appointment was followed by a period of peace is not in doubt. However, earlier writers were unaware of Thao's ruse, so they concluded that he was an effective counterinsurgency pacifier, but newer sources know of his status, so they concluded that the lack of communist attacks was due to a stunt, rather than Thao's skill, and have disregard the conclusion reached by contemporary writers that Thao was a superior quality officer.

Observing long term effects

Another reason why newer sources are better at analysing the legacy or effects of something is simply because more time has passed, so that the resulting changes after an event can be studied more by data than hypothesis. Immediately after the deposal of Saddam Hussein, many news and political analysts predicted a quick upturn in the country's fortunes, and trumpeted the war as a success. Many hailed George W. Bush as a great leader and visionary. Since then, the number of people regarding it as a success has decreased and later accounts have a less charitable view of Bush's strategy. Likewise, many felt that the removal of Diem would improve South Vietnam's chances against the communists, and the press and analysts said as much. However, communist attacks and anti-communist losses mounted over the next 18 months, and later writing have superseded them, and they argue are of the opinion that the removal of Diem handicapped the war effort.

As a result, the use of sources in the Ziaur Rahman article (a former featured article) is not ideal, as the analysis of the success or failure of various policies were often based on work written soon after the events, thereby excluding long-term trends caused by his policies.

Disproven theories, incorrect facts and better technology

In some cases, newly released data can also completely debunk older material that was assumed to be black and white fact, while improvements in scientific techniques may allow more accurate calculations and measurements to be made, and from it, different conclusions may be reached. For example, the archaeological dating of military relics may become more accurate and provide evidence overturning a certain sequence of events, or simply that better technology has allowed excavators to locate hitherto missing war graves, sunken naval vessels or downed airplanes, which shed more light on the said objects.

Conclusion

In short, it is necessary to do a thorough review of the literature when researching for articles, not just to ensure that different viewpoints are represented fairly, but to see if some have been superseded by newer works that had access to more primary sources and other knowledge that their predecessors lacked. They also have more nuanced theoretical concepts to build on than their predecessors.

References

• Haigh, Gideon; Frith, David (2007). Inside Story: Unlocking Australian Cricket's Archives. Southbank, Victoria: New Custom Publishing. ISBN 1-921116-00-5.
• Halberstam, David; Singal, Daniel J. (2008). The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam during the Kennedy Era. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-0-7425-6007-9.
• Hickey, Gerald C. (2002). Window on a War: An Anthropologist in the Vietnam Conflict. Lubbock, Texas: Texas Tech University Press. ISBN 978-0-89672-490-7.
• Langguth, A. J. "Jack" (2000). Our Vietnam: the war, 1954–1975. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-0-684-81202-1.
• Moyar, Mark (2006). Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-86911-9.
• Tang, Truong Nhu (1986). Journal of a Vietcong (aka A Vietcong Memoir). London: Cape. ISBN 978-0-224-02819-6.
• Wyatt, Clarence R. (1995). Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-91795-5.