Anti-Russian sentiment

Anti-Russian sentiment, commonly referred to as Russophobia, is prejudice, fear or hatred against Russia, the Russians, and Russian culture.[1][2][3]

In the past, Russophobia has included state-sponsored mistreatment and propaganda against the Russians in France[4] and Germany.[5] Nazi Germany, at one point, deemed Russians and other Slavs, an inferior race and "sub-human" and called for their extermination.[6][7] In accordance with Nazi ideology, millions of Russian civilians and POWs were murdered during the German occupation in World War II.[8] Nazi Germany initially experienced great military successes in conquering the Soviet Union. However by 1943 the tide of the war turned against them and Nazi Germany collapsed following the capture of Berlin by the Soviets. In the event the Nazi campaign against the Soviet Union was successful, Adolf Hitler and other top Nazi officials were prepared to implement Generalplan Ost (General Plan for the East). This directive would have ordered the murder of over 100 million Russians alongside other ethnic groups that inhabited the Soviet Union as part of creating Lebensraum.[9]

Today, a variety of popular culture clichés and negative stereotypes about Russians exist, mainly in the Western world.[10] Some individuals may have prejudice or hatred against Russians due to history, racism, propaganda, or ingrained stereotypes and existing hatred.[11][12][13][14][15] Anti-Russian sentiment has largely followed a downward trend that started in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and continued until recently.

This trend was abruptly reversed after the beginning of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine; [16][17] following the start of the invasion, anti-Russian sentiment started to rise across the Western world and much of the international community to levels unprecedented in the 21st century.[18][19]

Statistics

Results of 2019–2020 YouGov Cambridge poll.
Views of Russia's influence by country[20]
Sorted by Pos-Neg
Country polled Positive Negative Don't know Pos-Neg
  Denmark
7%
70%
23%
-63
  United Kingdom
8%
68%
24%
-60
  Poland
13%
63%
24%
-50
  Sweden
15%
61%
25%
-46
  United States
16%
60%
24%
-44
  Japan
12%
54%
34%
-42
  Canada
19%
54%
27%
-35
  Germany
20%
54%
26%
-34
  Australia
24%
54%
22%
-30
  Spain
25%
49%
26%
-24
  Turkey
34%
48%
18%
-14
  France
28%
42%
30%
-14
  Italy
36%
34%
30%
+2
  Saudi Arabia
38%
29%
34%
+9
  South Africa
47%
36%
17%
+11
  Brazil
52%
31%
16%
+21
  Egypt
57%
19%
24%
+38
  Thailand
53%
14%
33%
+39
  Nigeria
64%
22%
14%
+42
  Mexico
61%
17%
22%
+44
  Indonesia
63%
12%
24%
+51
  China[a]
71%
15%
13%
+56
  India
73%
12%
15%
+61
Results of 2019 Pew Research Center poll.
Views of Russia by country[21]
Sorted by Pos-Neg
Country polled Positive Negative DK/no answer Pos-Neg
  Sweden
12%
83%
4%
-71
  Netherlands
23%
74%
3%
-51
  United States
18%
67%
14%
-49
  Japan
25%
69%
7%
-44
  United Kingdom
26%
68%
6%
-42
  Australia
26%
63%
11%
-37
  Lithuania
29%
64%
7%
-35
  Canada
30%
63%
12%
-33
  Spain
29%
62%
8%
-33
  France
33%
61%
6%
-28
  Poland
33%
59%
8%
-26
  Ukraine
32%
58%
11%
-26
  Czech Republic
34%
59%
7%
-25
  Germany
35%
57%
8%
-22
  Hungary
35%
47%
18%
-12
  Turkey
39%
47%
13%
-8
  South Africa
33%
40%
27%
-7
  South Korea
42%
47%
10%
-5
  Israel
45%
49%
6%
-4
  Italy
43%
47%
10%
-4
  Brazil
34%
35%
31%
-1
  Lebanon
43%
43%
14%
0
  Kenya
38%
27%
35%
+11
  Argentina
36%
26%
38%
+10
  Nigeria
41%
31%
28%
+10
  Tunisia
42%
30%
28%
+12
  Mexico
39%
27%
35%
+12
  Indonesia
39%
27%
34%
+12
  Philippines
56%
33%
11%
+23
  Greece
58%
34%
9%
+24
  Slovakia
60%
33%
7%
+27
  India
49%
14%
37%
+35
  Bulgaria
73%
19%
9%
+54

In October 2004, the International Gallup Organization announced that according to its poll, anti-Russia sentiment remained fairly strong throughout Europe and the West in general. It found that Russia was the least popular G-8 country globally. The percentage of population with a "very negative" or "fairly negative" perception of Russia was 73% in Kosovo[a], 62% in Finland, 57% in Norway, 42% in the Czech Republic and Switzerland, 37% in Germany, 32% in Denmark and Poland, and 23% in Estonia. Overall, the percentage of respondents with a positive view of Russia was only 31%.[22][23][19]

According to a 2014 survey by Pew Research Center, attitudes towards Russia in most countries worsened considerably following Russia's annexation of Crimea, the subsequent fomenting of the 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine and its intervention in the resulting War in Donbas. From 2013 to 2014, the median negative attitudes in Europe rose from 54% to 75%, and from 43% to 72% in the United States. Negative attitudes also rose compared to 2013 throughout the Middle East, Latin America, Asia and Africa.[24]

There is the question of whether or not negative attitudes towards Russia and frequent criticism of the Russian government in western media contributes to negative attitudes towards Russian people and culture. In a Guardian article, British academic Piers Robinson claims that "Indeed western governments frequently engage in strategies of manipulation through deception involving exaggeration, omission, and misdirection".[25] In a 2012 survey, the percentage of Russian immigrants in the EU that indicated that they had experienced racially motivated hate crimes was 5%, which is less than the average of 10% reported by several groups of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the EU.[26] 17% of Russian immigrants in the EU said that they had been victims of crimes the last 12 months, for example, theft, attacks, frightening threats or harassment, as compared to an average of 24% among several groups of immigrants and ethnic minorities.[27]

According to a 2019 study, the very term "Russophobia" has been used infrequently before 2014 and primarily to describe discrimination against ethnic Russians in former Soviet states. A significant increase in use of the term by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation starts from 2014, and is linked to Putin returning to presidency in 2012 and bringing in a new definition of "Russianness" and new approach towards "the West".[28]

History

 
1831 French engraving "Barbarism and Cholera enter Europe. Polish people fight, the powers make the protocols and France..." by Denis Auguste Marie Raffet, depicting Russian suppression of November Uprising in Poland in 1831.[29]

18th and 19th centuries

On 19 October 1797 the French Directory received a document from a Polish general, Michał Sokolnicki, entitled "Aperçu sur la Russie". This became known as the so-called "The Will of Peter the Great" and was first published in October 1812, during the Napoleonic wars, in Charles Louis-Lesur's much-read Des progrès de la puissance russe: this was at the behest of Napoleon I, who ordered a series of articles to be published showing that "Europe is inevitably in the process of becoming booty for Russia".[30][31] Subsequent to the Napoleonic wars, propaganda against Russia was continued by Napoleon's former confessor, Dominique Georges-Frédéric de Pradt, who in a series of books portrayed Russia as a power-grasping "barbaric" power hungry to conquer Europe.[32] With reference to Russia's new constitutional laws in 1811 the Savoyard philosopher Joseph de Maistre wrote the now famous statement: "Every nation gets the government it deserves" ("Toute nation a le gouvernement qu'elle mérite").[33][34]

Beginning from 1815 and lasting roughly until 1840, British commentators began criticizing the extreme conservatism of the Russian state and its resistance to reform efforts.[35] However, Russophobia in Britain for the rest of the 19th century was primarily focused related to British fears that the Russian conquest of Central Asia was a precursor to an attack on British-controlled India. These fears led to the "Great Game", a series of political and diplomatic confrontations between Britain and Russia during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[36]

In 1843 the Marquis de Custine published his hugely successful 1800-page, four-volume travelogue La Russie en 1839. Custine's scathing narrative reran what were by now clichés which presented Russia as a place where "the veneer of European civilization was too thin to be credible". Such was its huge success that several official and pirated editions quickly followed, as well as condensed versions and translations in German, Dutch, and English. By 1846 approximately 200 thousand copies had been sold.[37]

In 1867, Fyodor Tyutchev, a Russian poet, diplomat and member of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery, introduced the actual term of "russophobia" in a letter to his daughter Anna Aksakova on 20 September 1867, where he applied it to a number of pro-Western Russian liberals who, pretending that they were merely following their liberal principles, developed a negative attitude towards their own country and always stood on a pro-Western and anti-Russian position, regardless of any changes in the Russian society and having a blind eye on any violations of these principles in the West, "violations in the sphere of justice, morality, and even civilization". He put the emphasis on the irrationality of this sentiment.[38] Tyuchev saw Western anti-Russian sentiment as the result of misunderstanding caused by civilizational differences between East and West.[39] Being an adherent of Pan-Slavism, he believed that the historical mission of Slavic peoples was to be united in a Pan-Slavic and Orthodox Christian Russian Empire to preserve their Slavic identity and avoid cultural assimilation; in his lyrics Poland, a Slavic yet Catholic country, was poetically referred to as Judas among the Slavs.[40]

World War I and Interwar period

The term "Russophobia" returned into political dictionaries of the Soviet Union only in the middle 1930s.

Influential economist John Maynard Keynes wrote in his 1932 work A Short View of Russia that the mass murders which took place in the Soviet Union was a result of the country's "Russian and Jewish nature", claiming that there was a "beastliness on the Russian and Jewish natures when, as now, they are allied together", and that "out of the cruelty and stupidity of the Old Russia nothing could ever emerge, but... beneath the cruelty and stupidity of the New Russia a speck of the ideal may lie hid."[41]

World War II

 
Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels, in Das Reich, explained Russian resistance in terms of a stubborn but bestial soul.[42] Russians were termed "Asiatic"[43] and the Red Army as "Asiatic Hordes".[44]

In the 1930s and 1940s, Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party viewed the Soviet Union as populated by Slavs ruled by "Jewish Bolshevik" masters.[45]

Hitler stated in Mein Kampf his belief that the Russian state was the work of German elements in the country and not of the Slavs:

Here, Fate itself seems desirous of giving us a sign. By handing Russia to Bolshevism, it robbed the Russian nation of that intelligentsia which previously brought about and guaranteed its existence as a state. For the organization of a Russian state formation was not the result of the political abilities of the Slavs in Russia, but only an excellent example of the state-forming efficacity of the German element in an inferior race.[46]

A secret Nazi plan, the Generalplan Ost called for the enslavement, expulsion or extermination of most Slavic peoples in Europe. Approximately 2.8 million Soviet POWs died of starvation, mistreatment, or executions in just eight months of 1941–42.[47]

"Need, hunger, lack of comfort have been the Russians' lot for centuries. No false compassion, as their stomachs are perfectly extendible. Don't try to impose the German standards and to change their style of life. Their only wish is to be ruled by the Germans. [...] Help yourselves, and may God help you!"

— "12 precepts for the German officer in the East", 1941[48]

On 13 July 1941, three weeks after the invasion of the Soviet Union, Nazi SS leader Heinrich Himmler told the group of Waffen SS men:

This is an ideological battle and a struggle of races. Here in this struggle stands National Socialism: an ideology based on the value of our Germanic, Nordic blood. ... On the other side stands a population of 180 million, a mixture of races, whose very names are unpronounceable, and whose physique is such that one can shoot them down without pity and compassion. These animals, that torture and ill-treat every prisoner from our side, every wounded man that they come across and do not treat them the way decent soldiers would, you will see for yourself. These people have been welded by the Jews into one religion, one ideology, that is called Bolshevism... When you, my men, fight over there in the East, you are carrying on the same struggle, against the same sub-humanity, the same inferior races, that at one time appeared under the name of Huns, another time— 1000 years ago at the time of King Henry and Otto I— under the name of Magyars, another time under the name of Tartars, and still another time under the name of Genghis Khan and the Mongols. Today they appear as Russians under the political banner of Bolshevism.[49]

Heinrich Himmler's speech at Posen on 4 October 1943:

What happens to a Russian, to a Czech, does not interest me in the slightest. What the nations can offer in good blood of our type, we will take, if necessary by kidnapping their children and raising them with us. Whether nations live in prosperity or starve to death interests me only in so far as we need them as slaves for our culture; otherwise, it is of no interest to me. Whether 10,000 Russian females fall from exhaustion while digging an anti-tank ditch interest me only in so far as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished. We shall never be rough and heartless when it is not necessary, that is clear. We Germans, who are the only people in the world who have a decent attitude towards animals, will also assume a decent attitude towards these human animals.[50]

Cold War

The editors of the journal Kritika argue that an extreme interpretation of George F. Kennan's "X Article" was exploited by American politicians in the Cold War to advance aggressive "containment" policy towards Russia (in spite of Kennan later denouncing this interpretation). Russophobic stereotypes of an illiberal tradition were also favored by Cold War historiographers, even as scholars of early Russia debunked such essentialist notions.[51]

Further works by Russian academics, such as Igor Shafarevich's Russophobia[52] or the treaty from the 1980s falsely attributed the spread of "russophobia" to Zionists.[53]

Contemporary Russophobia

 
Monokov, activist who since 2022 has been touring Europe against the Russian-Ukrainian war and Russophobia[54]

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russophobia saw a significant global decrease. This trend started to reverse as a result of actions such as the Russian anexation of Crimea in 2014.

There was a sharp uptick in anti-Russian sentiment after the beginning of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine;[55][16] following the start of the invasion, anti-Russian sentiment started to rise across the Western world to levels unprecedented in the twenty-first century.[19][56][57][58][59] Since the invasion commenced, ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking immigrants from post-Soviet states are globally reporting rising instances of open hostility and discrimination towards them.[60][61] This hostility is not just towards Russian people, it has also been seen directed towards businesses as well.[62] Stolichnaya, one of Russia's most famous international exports, now produced by the Stoli Group in Latvia, announced they were changing their name to simply "Stoli" in March 2022. The name change was motivated by a companywide effort to distance the brand from its Russian origin.[63]

Researchers describe the present use of the term Russophobia by the Russian government to a political strategy that implies that other countries are enemies of Russia: "building up an image of Russophobic countries is a tool for shaping the neo-imperial political identity of Russia's citizens, of mobilising them in the face of real or alleged threats, and of restoring psychological comfort to them in the face of the failure of the Kremlin's actions (as in Ukraine)".[53]

By country

Within Russia

Northern Caucasus

In 2001, a Chechen man, Goychaev, was sentenced to death for murder, rape and robbery. His sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment. According to information from prosecutors, Goychaev's gang targeted Russians and murdered 10 in Chervlyonnaya (Shelkovskoy District, Republic of Chechnya) between 1997 and 1999.[64] Goyachev was charged with genocide, however the court did not find him guilty of genocide because genocide was understood to be a crime against the peace and safety of humanity.[65][66] Russian NTV channel journalist Yelena Masyuk, who was captured by Chechens, said in 2009 that she had not seen any signs of ethnic cleansing in Chechnya that had been rumoured.[67]

Journalist Fatima Tlisova released an article in 2009 discussing the frequent occurrences of Russian Orthodox crosses being sawed off buildings and thrown off mountains in Circassia, due to the cross being associated with the people who initiated the mass expulsions of Circassians.[68]

As a polemic device

The Kremlin and its supporters are sometimes criticised for using allegations of "Russophobia" as a form of propaganda to counter criticism of government policy.[69][53] In 2006, poet and essayist Lev Rubinstein wrote that similarly to the term "fascism", the term "Russophobia" has become a political sticker slapped onto people who disagree with words or actions of people or organizations who position themselves as "Russian ones" in the ideological, rather than an ethnic or geographical sense.[70]

Russian responses to outside anti-Russian criticism has intensified the growth of contemporary Russian nationalist ideology.[53][71] Sociologist Anatoly Khazanov states that there's a national-patriotic movement which believes that there's a "clash of civilizations, a global struggle between the materialistic, individualistic, consumerist, cosmopolitan, corrupt, and decadent West led by the United States and the idealist, collectivist, morally and spiritually superior Eurasia led by Russia."[72] In their view, the United States want to break up Russia and turn it into a source of raw materials. The West being accused of Russophobia is a major part of their belief.[73] In January 2018, during the International Holocaust Remembrance Day at Moscow's Jewish Museum and Tolerance Center, Russian President Vladimir Putin linked Russophobia to antisemitism.[74][75][76]

Also the European and Global Studies Journal, of the University of Turin, Funded by the European Commission found that “Until relatively recently the term ‘Russophobia’ was used infrequently in Russian discourse”, but that “over the last five or so years [up to 2018] there has been a rapid growth in charges of Russophobia and the term has become a fixture of political debate.” They also give a chart, using data from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website that shows the dramatic rise in the use of the term during that period. [77]

Transcaucasus

Armenia

After Nicholas II intensified russification policies and did not act following massacres by the Ottoman Empire against Armenians, anti-Russian sentiment among Armenian nationalist groups rose. After the Russian government confiscated Armenian Church lands in 1903, this led to attacks on Russian authorities and Armenians who cooperated with them by Armenians mobilised by the Dashnak party.[78]

In July 1988, during the Karabakh movement, the killing of an Armenian man and the injury of tens of others by the Soviet army in a violent clash at Zvartnots Airport near Yerevan sparked anti-Russian and anti-Soviet demonstrations.[79] In 2005, relations between Armenia and Russia were strained after the massacre of an Armenian family of 7 in Gyumri by a Russian serviceman stationed at the Russian base there.[80][81]

Azerbaijan

The 1990 Black January massacre prior to Azerbaijani independence and Russia's complicated role in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia increased the negative perception of Russia.[82] Under Abulfaz Elchibey's presidency in 1992–93, relations between Russia and Azerbaijan were damaged due to his anti-Russian policies,[83] however under Ilham Aliyev, relations instead improved.[84]

Georgia

According to a 2012 poll, 35% of Georgians perceive Russia as Georgia's biggest enemy, while the percentage was significantly higher in 2011, at 51%.[85] In a February 2013 poll, 63% of Georgians said Russia is Georgia's biggest political and economic threat as opposed to 35% of those who looked at Russia as the most important partner for Georgia.[86] The main reason behind this is due to events since the 1990s, when Russia supported the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, causing the Abkhaz–Georgian conflict, Georgian–Ossetian conflict and later war with Russia in 2008.[87] It was also followed by Georgian sympathy to the Chechens during the Chechen–Russian conflict of the 1990s.[88]

There has been increased animosity towards Russians in Tbilisi after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which has also been directed towards exiled Russians who recently fled their home country. It has included signs from businesses and posts from Airbnb hosts declaring “Russians not welcome”, anti-Russian graffiti found on many central streets, the famous Bassiani nightclub banning anyone with a Russian passport, and an online petition signed by thousands of locals demanding tougher immigration rules for Russians.[89][90]

Rest of Europe

Baltics

In 2015 the chairman of the Russian State Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee Aleksey Pushkov alleged that Russophobia had become the state policy in the Baltic states[91] and in 2021 Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov accused the Baltic states of being "the leaders of the Russophobic minority" in NATO and the European Union.[92]

Estonia

According to veteran German author, journalist and Russia-correspondent Gabriele Krone-Schmalz, there is deep disapproval of everything Russian in Estonia.[93] A poll conducted by Gallup International suggested that 34% Estonians have a positive attitude towards Russia, but it is supposed that survey results were likely impacted by a large ethnic Russian minority in the country.[22] However, in a 2012 poll only 3% of the Russian minority in Estonia reported that they had experienced a racially motivated hate crime (as compared to an average of 10% among ethnic minorities and immigrants in EU).[26]

According to Estonian philosopher Jaan Kaplinski, the birth of anti-Russian sentiment in Estonia dates back to 1940, as there was little or none during the czarist and first independence period, when anti-German sentiment predominated. Kaplinski states the imposition of Soviet rule under Joseph Stalin in 1940 and subsequent actions by Soviet authorities led to the replacement of anti-German sentiment with anti-Russian sentiment within just one year, and characterized it as "one of the greatest achievements of the Soviet authorities".[94] Kaplinski supposes that anti-Russian sentiment could disappear as quickly as anti-German sentiment did in 1940, however he believes the prevailing sentiment in Estonia is sustained by Estonia's politicians who employ "the use of anti-Russian sentiments in political combat," together with the "tendentious attitude of the [Estonian] media."[94] Kaplinski says that a "rigid East-West attitude is to be found to some degree in Estonia when it comes to Russia, in the form that everything good comes from the West and everything bad from the East";[94] this attitude, in Kaplinski's view, "probably does not date back further than 1940 and presumably originates from Nazi propaganda."[94]

Latvia

According to The Moscow Times, Latvia's fears of Russia are rooted in recent history, including conflicting views on whether Latvia and other Baltic states were occupied by the USSR or joined it voluntarily, as well as the 1940–1941 June and 1949 March deportations that followed and most recently the annexation of Crimea that fueled a fear that Latvia could also be annexed by Russia.[95] Russian-American journalist and broadcaster Vladimir Pozner believed the fact that many Russians who had migrated to the Latvian SSR did not learn Latvian and expected the local population to speak Russian also had contributed to an accumulation of anti-Russian sentiment.[96]

Ever since Latvia regained its independence in 1991 various Russian officials, journalists, academics and pro-Russian activists have criticised Latvia for its Latvian language law and Latvian nationality law and repeatedly accused it of "ethnic discrimination against Russians",[97] "anti-Russian sentiment"[98] and "Russophobia".[99] As early as 1993, Boris Yeltsin, President of Russia and Andrei Kozyrev, Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that Latvia is preparing for an ethnic cleansing[100] and even in 2019 co-chairman of the Latvian Russian Union and former MEP Tatjana Ždanoka likened the situation of Russians and Russian speakers and their alleged persecution in Latvia to Jews before the World War II.[101][102][103]

However, no Russians have ever been killed or even wounded for political, nationalistic or racist reasons in Latvia ever since it regained its independence[104][105][106] and in a 2012 poll only 2% of the Russian minority in Latvia reported having experienced a 'racially' motivated hate crime (as compared to an average of 10% among immigrants and minorities in EU).[26] An earlier 2004 research "Ethnic tolerance and integration of the Latvian society" by the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences found that Latvian respondents on average rated their relations with Russians 7.8 out of 10, whereas non-Latvian respondents rated their relationship with Latvians 8.4 out of 10. Both groups believed that the ties between them were satisfactory, had not changed in the last five years and were to either remain the same or improve in the next five years. 66% of non-Russian respondents said they would also support their son or daughter marrying an ethnic Russian. Respondents did mention some conflicts on an ethnic basis, but all of them were classified as psycholinguistic such as verbal confrontations.[107]

Russians in Latvia at times had been targeted by anti-Russian rhetoric from some of the more radical members of both the mainstream and radical right parties in Latvia. In 2010 Civic Union's internal e-mail correspondence between Minister for Foreign Affairs of Latvia Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis and Latvian American doctor and party member Aivars Slucis was leaked.[108] In one of the e-mails titled "Do Latvians Surrender?"[109] Slucis complained of the current situation in Latvia and being unable to return and work in Latvia, because he would not be able to treat Russians in the same way as Latvians.[109][110] Kristovskis agreed with his opinion and evaluation,[109] but warned against hysterical responses, cautioning party members to avoid discussions counterproductive to the party's political goals. After the leak the Civic Union ousted Slucis from the party for views unacceptable to the party and returned his financial contributions, while the opposition parties Harmony Centre and For a Good Latvia initiated an unsuccessful vote of no confidence against Kristovskis.[110][109]

On the other hand, the results of a yearly poll by the research agency "SKDS" show that the population of Latvia was more split on its attitude towards the Russian Federation. In 2008 47 percent of respondents had a positive view of Russia and 33% had a negative one, while the remaining 20 percent found it hard to define their opinion. It peaked in 2010 when 64 percent of respondents felt positive towards Russia, in comparison with the 25 percent that felt negative. In 2015, following the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, however, it dropped to the lowest level since 2008 and for the first time, the people with a negative attitude towards Russia (46%) surpassed people with a positive attitude (41%).[111] 43.5 percent also believed Russia posed a military threat to Latvia and even in 2019 that number had decreased only slightly and stood at 37.3 percent.[112]

Lithuania

Due to historical experiences, there is a fear prevailed in Lithuania that Russia has never stopped wanting to consolidate power over the Baltics, including fears of Russian plans for an eventual annexation of Lithuania as was seen in Crimea.[113] There are also concerns over Russia's increasing military deployment, such as in the Russian region of Kaliningrad, an exclave of Russia bordering Lithuania.[114][115]

Eastern Europe

Moldova

Ever since the independence of Moldova, Russia has been repeatedly accused by various local politicians and elected officials of meddling in Moldovan politics,[116] notably by Andrian Candu, a Moldovan senator.[117] Russia's involvement with pro-Russian separatists in Transnistria further strained the relations between Russia and Moldova, and Prime Minister of Moldova Pavel Filip demanded Russia to quit the region.[118]

In 2018, the Parliament of Moldova “unanimously” adopted a declaration condemning what it called Russian attacks on national informational security and meddling in internal politics.[119]

Romania

Anti-Russian sentiment dates back to the conflict between the Russian and Ottoman empires in the 18th and early 19th centuries and the ceding of part of the Moldavian principality to Russia by the Ottoman Empire in 1812 after its de facto annexation, and to the annexations during World War II and after by the Soviet Union of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia and the policies of ethnic cleansing, Russification and deportations that have taken place in those territories against ethnic Romanians. Following WWII, Romania, a former ally of Nazi Germany, was occupied by Soviet forces. Soviet dominance over the Romanian economy was manifested through the so-called Sovroms, exacting a tremendous economic toll ostensibly as war-time reparations.[120][121][122][123]

The emergence of anti-Russian sentiment in the Danubian Principalities, the precursors to unified Romania which became independent of the Ottoman Empire with the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople concluding the 1828-1829 Russo-Turkish War, arose from the post-1829 relationship of the Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia to Russia, and was caused by mutually economic and political grievances of two influential classes that were often odds also with each other. As per the 1829 treaty, Russia was named the protector of the two principalities, allowed to occupy them, and also drafted a quasi-constitution known as the Organic Regulations which formed a powerful assembly of 800 boyars (the local landowning economic elite) nominally under the authority of the less nominal prince, the document crafted with strong support from the boyars. The boyars, a "reactionary oligarchy" as described by Misha Glenny, stopped short any hint of liberal reform, and the growing urban elite began to associate Russia with the slow progress of reform and the obstacles they faced in building an industrial base. On the other hand, the boyars themselves began to sour on Russia during the 1830s and 1840s due to their economic conflict of interest with Russia. After the Ottomans withdrew from the three forts along the Danube basin, the boyars exploited the highly fertile land to drastically increase Romanian wheat production, such that eventually future Romania consisting of Wallachia unified with Moldavia would become the fourth-largest wheat producer in the world. Whereas before 1829 Wallachian and Moldavian wheat had been limited to Ottoman markets, Russia increasingly felt threatened by growing competition in its jurisdiction that it feared could drive down the price of Russian wheat. Accordingly, Russia exploited its role as protector of the Principalities to let the Danube silt up, sabotaging the possible market competitor. As a result of this as well as "Russian foot-dragging on the economy", the boyars too became increasingly resentful of Russian domination. The rapid erosion of public relations with Russia led to a revolution in 1848, in which the newly emerging Romanian intellectual and political class sought the help of the Ottomans, their old hegemon, to drive out Russian influence—although, after pressure applied by Russia, the Russian and Ottoman armies joined forces to squash the movement.[124]

Ukraine

In 2004, the leader of the marginal Svoboda party Oleh Tyahnybok urged his party to fight "the Moscow-Jewish mafia" ruling Ukraine.[125] For these remarks Tyahnybok was expelled from the Our Ukraine parliamentary faction in July 2004.[126] The former coordinator of Right Sector in West Ukraine, Oleksandr Muzychko talked about fighting "communists, Jews and Russians for as long as blood flows in my veins."[127]

In May 2009, a poll held by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in Ukraine said that 96% of respondents were positive about Russians as an ethnic group, 93% respected the Russian Federation and 76% respected the Russian establishment.[128]

 
Desecration of the flags of Russia and Poland by the UNA-UNSO nationalists in Lviv, Ukraine, 1997

In October 2010, statistics by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine said that positive attitudes towards Russians have been decreasing since 1994. In response to a question gauging tolerance of Russians, 15% of Western Ukrainians responded positively. In Central Ukraine, 30% responded positively (from 60% in 1994); 60% responded positively in Southern Ukraine (from 70% in 1994); and 64% responded positively in Eastern Ukraine (from 75% in 1994). Furthermore, 6-7% of Western Ukrainians would banish Russians entirely from Ukraine, and 7-8% in Central Ukraine responded similarly. This level of sentiment was not found in Southern or Eastern Ukraine.[129]

The ultranationalist party Svoboda (once very popular, but now marginal),[130][131][132] has invoked radical anti-Russian rhetoric[133] and has electoral support enough to garner majority support in local councils,[134] as seen in the Ternopil regional council in Western Ukraine.[135] Analysts explained Svoboda's victory in Eastern Galicia during the 2010 Ukrainian local elections as a result of the policies of the Azarov Government who were seen as too pro-Russian by the voters of "Svoboda".[136][137] According to Andreas Umland, Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy,[138] Svoboda's increasing exposure in the Ukrainian media has contributed to these successes.[139] According to British academic Taras Kuzio the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich (2010–2014) fabricated this exposure in order to discredit the opposition.[140] Since the Euromaidan revolution, the Svoboda party lost a lot of its support. In the 2019 Ukrainian parliamentary election Svoboda formed a united party list with the Governmental Initiative of Yarosh, Right Sector and National Corps.[141] The united list received only 2.15% of the votes, less than half of the 5% election threshold, and thus no parliamentary seats via the national party list.[142]

According to the Brookings Institution after Ukraine regained its independence, only a small minority of nationalists expressed strong anti-Russian views; the majority hoped to have good relations with Russia. In 2014, after the Russian annexation of Crimea, the attitude to Russia changed sharply. In April 2017, a poll by Sociological group "RATING" found that 57% of respondents expressed a "very cold" or "cold" attitude toward Russia while 17% expressed a "very warm" or "warm" attitude.[143] Sentiments due to the 2022 war have declined enormously.

Central Europe

Czech Republic
 
A caricature of a Russian traditional matryoshka doll as a negative symbol of communism; Prague, Czech Republic.

Russia remains continuously among the most negatively perceived countries among Czechs in polls conducted since 1991, and just 26% of Czechs responded that they had a positive opinion about Russia in November 2016.[144][145][146]

According to writer Tim Nollen in 2008, Russians in Czechia were almost universally disliked as a people due in part to the presence of Russian mafiosi, as well as the "arrogant hordes of Russian visitors that descend upon Prague and the Spas in Karlovy Vary".[147]

Following the start of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, anti-Russian opposition began to rise in the Czech Republic. Attacks targeted Russians in the country: some social media users made statements such as “It would be nice to somehow mark Russian citizens with a red star.” Russians were stigmatized and attacked just because they spoke their language: Martin Dlouhý, a professor at the Prague University of Economics and Business, wrote on Facebook on February 24, 2022, that he would not conduct, test, or correct the final thesis of Russian students “due to conscience and moral principles”; Dlouhý deleted the tweet after the backlash. Czech hotels refused to host Russians. Russian children were attacked in schools, and a woman was kicked out of a taxi just for speaking Russian. Maison de la Poutine restaurant said it received insults and threats after Russia invaded Ukraine—this was because the restaurant is exactly pronounced the same as Putin (Poutine).[148]

Poland

In 2005, The New York Times reported after the Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza that "relations between the nations are as bad as they have been since the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989."[149] Jakub Boratyński, the director of international programs at the independent Polish think tank Stefan Batory Foundation, said in 2005 that anti-Russian feelings have substantially decreased since Poland joined the EU and NATO, and that Poles feel more secure than before, but he also admitted that many people in Poland still look suspiciously at Russian foreign-policy moves and are afraid Russia is seeking to "recreate an empire in a different form."[150] According to Boris Makarenko, deputy director of the Moscow-based think tank Center for Political Technologies, much of the modern anti-Russian feelings in Poland is caused by grievances of the past.[150] One contentious issue is the Katyn massacre in 1940 as well as the Stalinist-era ethnic-cleansing operations including the deportation of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Poles, even though the Russian government has officially acknowledged and apologized for the atrocity.[151]

According to a 2013 BBC World Service poll, 19% of Poles viewed Russia's influence positively, with 49% expressing a negative view.[152] According to a Gazeta.pl report in 2019, some Polish hoteliers disliked Russian guests,[153] and the vice president of Poland's Chamber of Tourism admitted back in 2014 that some private guesthouses were rejecting Russian tourists.[154]

Hungary

Hungary's relations with Russia are shadowed by the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 which was crushed with the help of Russian troops[155] as well the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 which was brutally crushed by the Red Army and was followed by the mass arrest and imprisonment of Hungarians.[156][157][158] The current government of Viktor Orbán is seen as friendlier toward Russia.[159] According to a 2019 survey by Pew Research, 3% of Hungarian respondents had a favourable opinion of Russia, 32% had a somewhat favourable opinion, 31% had a somewhat unfavourable opinion and 16% had a very unfavourable opinion.[160]

Northern Europe

Norway

Norway's diplomatic and cultural ties with the West have complicated continuing relations with Russia.[161] A 2017 poll of Norwegians found that 58% believe that Vladimir Putin and Russia pose a security threat.[162]

Russian officials escalated the tensions. A Russian deputy foreign minister stated in Oslo that Russia views the October 2018 Trident Juncture NATO military exercises in Norway to be "anti-Russian" in nature.[163][164] Russian expansion in the arctic has contributed to increasing mutual distrust between Russia and Norway.[165] Norway's perceptions of Russian militarism and regional antagonism, as well as Norway's hosting of the US Marine Corps in the country, have contributed to the deterioration of relations between Norway and Russia.[166][164]

Finland
 
Edvard Isto's painting Attack (1899) symbolizes the beginning of Finland's Russification. The two-headed eagle of Russia is tearing away the law book from the Finnish Maiden's arms.

In Finland, anti-Russian sentiment has been studied since the 1970s. The history of anti-Russian sentiment has two main theories. One of them claims that Finns and Russians have been archenemies throughout history. The position is considered to have been dominated at least the 1700s since the days of the Greater Wrath. This view largely assumes that through the centuries, "Russia is a violent slayer and Finland is an innocent, virginal victim".[167]

The Finnish Civil War in 1918 between the Reds and the Whites—won by the Whites—left behind a popular wave of anti-Russian and anti-Communist feelings in Finland.[168] Hundreds of ethnic Russians were executed in 1918 in the city of Vyborg.[169]

According to polls in 2004, 62% of Finnish citizens had a negative view of Russia.[22] In a 2012 poll, 12% of Russian immigrants in Finland reported that they had experienced a racially motivated hate crime (as compared to an average of 10% of immigrants in the EU).[26] A 2012 report by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy said that job applicants with Russian or Russian-sounding names tended to have to send in twice the amount of applications as an applicant with a Finnish name.[170]

Western Europe

France

In the mid 18th century Voltaire gave French intellectuals a positive image, portraying Russia as an opportunity society, in which an all-powerful leaders such as Peter the Great could create a rational and enlightened society by decree. On the other hand, equally influential French enlightenment writers especially Denis Diderot portrayed Russia in dark colours, emphasizing the lack of an enlightenment tradition or a middle class, and a propensity toward harsh dictatorship.[171][172]

Relations between France and Russian during the 19th century oscillated between one of relative friendship to open conflict. French Emperor Napoleon established a military alliance with Russia, before unsuccessfully launching an invasion of the country in 1812 over Russia's refusal to abide by the Continental System. Russophobia in France grew during the 1830s over Russia's suppression of the November Uprising in Poland, with the French public fearing the expansion of a militarily strong "Asiatic" power into Europe. This national mood of Russophobia created support in France for going to war with Russia in 1854.[173][174][175] Fyodor Dostoyevsky noted in A Writer’s Diary (1873-1876):

Europeans do not trust appearances: “Grattez le russe et vous verrez le tartare”, they say (scratch a Russian and you’ll find a Tatar). That may be true, but this is what occurred to me: do the majority of Russians, in their dealings with Europe, join the extreme left because they are Tatars and have the savage’s love of destruction, or are they, perhaps, moved by other reasons?"[176]

According to a 2017 Pew Global Attitudes Project survey, 36% of French people have a favorable view of Russia, with 62% expressing an unfavorable view.[177] In return numerous French scholars and politics argue that France had a longstanding positive opinion about Russia and regret that France from the late 2000s tends to follow American positions against Russia blindly.[178][original research?]

Germany
 
CDU anti-Soviet poster in West Germany in 1953
 
Rudolf Hess, Heinrich Himmler and Reinhard Heydrich listening to Konrad Meyer at a Generalplan Ost exhibition, 20 March 1941.

Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party regarded Slavic peoples (especially Poles and East Slavs) as non-Aryan Untermenschen (subhumans).[179] As early as 1925, Hitler suggested in Mein Kampf that the German people needed Lebensraum ("living space") to achieve German expansion eastwards (Drang nach Osten) at the expense of the inferior Slavs. Hitler believed that "the organization of a Russian state formation was not the result of the political abilities of the Slavs in Russia, but only a wonderful example of the state-forming efficacity of the German element in an inferior race."[180]

After the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler expressed his plans for the Slavs:

As for the ridiculous hundred million Slavs, we will mold the best of them as we see fit, and we will isolate the rest of them in their pig-styes; and anyone who talks about cherishing the local inhabitants and civilizing them, goes straight off into a concentration camp![181]

Plans to eliminate Russians and other Slavs from Soviet territory to allow German settlement included starvation. American historian Timothy D. Snyder maintains that there were 4.2 million victims of the German Hunger Plan in the Soviet Union, "largely Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians," including 3.1 million Soviet POWs and 1.0 million civilian deaths in the Siege of Leningrad.[182] According to Snyder, Hitler intended eventually to exterminate up to 45 million Slavs by planned famine as part of Generalplan Ost.[183]

Influenced by the guidelines, in a directive sent out to the troops under his command, General Erich Hoepner of the 4th Panzer Army stated:

The war against Russia is an important chapter in the German nation's struggle for existence. It is the old battle of the Germanic against the Slavic people, of the defense of European culture against Muscovite-Asiatic inundation and the repulse of Jewish Bolshevism. The objective of this battle must be the demolition of present-day Russia and must, therefore, be conducted with unprecedented severity. Every military action must be guided in planning and execution by an iron resolution to exterminate the enemy remorselessly and totally. In particular, no adherents of the contemporary Russian Bolshevik system are to be spared.[184]

United Kingdom
 
The Russian menace, a British cartoon from 1877 showing Russia as an octopus devouring neighboring lands, especially the Ottoman Empire.

Though Anglo-Russian relations were traditionally warm since the 16th century, by the beginning of the 19th century Russophobia started to appear in the media.[185] Depictions of Russia by British travel writers and newspaper correspondents described the country "as a semi-barbaric and despotic country", an image which ingrained itself in the British public consciousness as such depictions were frequently published in the UK media; these depictions had the effect of increasing Russophobia in Britain despite growing economic and political ties between the two countries.[186] The Russian conquest of Central Asia was perceived in Britain as being a precursor to an attack on British India and led to the "Great Game", while the Crimean War between the two countries also had the effect of deepening Russophobia in Britain.[187][page needed]

In 1874, tension lessened as Queen Victoria's second son Prince Alfred married Tsar Alexander II's only daughter Grand Duchess Maria Alexandrovna, followed by a state visit to Britain by the tsar. The goodwill lasted no more than three years, when structural forces again pushed the two nations to the verge of war, leading to a re-emergence of Russophobia in Britain.[188] Large outbursts of Russophobia in Britain typically occurred during periods of tense political standoffs, such as the 1904 Dogger Bank incident, when the Baltic Fleet of the Imperial Russian Navy attacked a group of British fishing trawlers in the mistaken belief they were Japanese warships; outrage in Britain led to the Russian government paying compensation to the fishermen involved.[189]

British Russophobia also manifested itself in popular literature of the period; Bram Stoker's Dracula has been seen by some historians as depicting an allegorical narrative in which the eponymous character (representing Imperial Russia) is "destroyed by warriors pledged to the Crown."[187][page needed] However, by the tail end of the 19th century, Russophobia in Britain subsided somewhat as Russian literature, including works written by authors such as Leo Tolstoy and Fyodor Dostoevsky began to gain a level of popularity in Britain; positive views of the Russian peasantry also started to appear in British writing during this period.[190]

A May 2021 YouGov poll had 73% of British respondents expressing an unfavourable view of Russia, with no other country more negatively viewed in the UK except for Iran at 74% unfavourability.[191] Some Russians in the UK have reported experiences of hostility after the country's invasion of Ukraine.[18]

North America

A National Hockey League agent who works with most of the Russian and Belarusian players in the league has claimed that since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, many of his clients have faced extreme harassment because of their nationality and high prominence, including Nazi comparisons and death threats, as have those Russians and Belarusians who play in other professional North American leagues.[192][193]

Canada

On 28 February 2022, a Russian Orthodox Church in Calgary was vandalized with red paint.[194] On 4 March 2022, a parish of the Russian Orthodox Church in Victoria, British Columbia was painted blood red by vandals, possibly in response to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.[195][196] The next day, the colours of the Ukrainian flag were spray painted on the doors of a Vancouver Russian Community Centre.[197][198] The Calgary Police Service announced in March they were investigating reports of anti-Russian harassment on social media.[199]

United States

Up until the establishment of the Soviet Union, the United States had a cordial relationship with Russia. With the collapse of the Tsarist government, the relationship has turned into a hostile one. During the Cold War years, there was frequent confusion and conflation of terms "Russians" and "Communists"/"Soviets"; in 1973, a group of Russian immigrants in the US founded the Congress of Russian Americans with the purpose of drawing a clear distinction between Russian national identity and Soviet ideology, and preventing the formation of anti-Russian sentiment on the basis of Western anti-communism.[200] Members of the Congress see the conflation itself as Russophobic, believing "Russians were the first and foremost victim of international Communism".[201]

Polling has charted that at the end of the Cold War, American views of Russia warmed considerably, with 62% of Americans expressing a positive view of Russia in 1989 and 66% at the turn of the century, as opposed to 29% and 27% retaining negative views in those years.[202] Although Russia recovered from brief spikes in negative views in 1999, 2003 and 2008, in 2013 the formerly majority positive view of Russia among American respondents critically declined and this perception was replaced by a majority negative view of 60% by 2014. This time, instead of recovery, Russia's public image experienced progressively more severe deterioration. By 2019, a record 73% of Americans had a negative opinion of Russia as a country, and formerly dominant positive opinions had been cut from 66% down to 24%. In 2019, the share of Americans considering Russia to be a "critical" threat to national security reached a majority of 52% for the first time. Whereas in 2006 only 1% of Americans listed Russia as "America's worst enemy" by 2019 32% of Americans, including a plurality of 44% of Democrats, shared this view,[202] with a partisan split having emerged in 2017. The sharper distaste among the Democrat population stands in contrast to the prior history of American public opinion on Russia, as Republicans were formerly more likely to view Russia as a greater threat.[203]

According to a 2013 poll, 59% of Americans had a negative view of Russia, 23% had a favorable opinion, and 18% were uncertain.[204] According to a survey by Pew Research Center, negative attitudes towards Russia in the United States rose from 43% to 72% from 2013 to 2014.[24]

Recent events such as the Anti-Magnitsky bill,[205] the Boston Marathon bombing,[206] annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation,[24] the Syrian Civil War, the allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 United States elections, the mistreatment of LGBT people in Russia following the passage of a 2013 anti-LGBT propaganda law in the country, the seizure and destruction of banned Western food imports in Russia starting in August 2015, and the alleged collusion between Donald Trump's presidential campaign and Russia[207] are many examples of events which have been deemed to have caused a rising negative impression about Russia in the United States.

In May 2017, former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said on NBC's Meet The Press that Russians were "almost genetically driven" to act deviously.[208][209] Freelance journalist Michael Sainato criticized the remark as xenophobic.[210] In June 2017 Clapper said that "[t]he Russians are not our friends", because it is in their "genes to be opposed, diametrically opposed, to the United States and western democracies.[211]"

On 2 July 2020, the Lincoln Project, a group of anti-Trump Republicans, released Fellow Traveler, an ad saying in Russian with English subtitles that "Comrade Trump" had been "chosen" by Vladimir Putin and had "accepted the help of Mother Russia." The ad featured communist imagery such as the hammer and sickle, as well as photographs of Bolshevik revolutionary Vladimir Lenin and Soviet leaders from Stalin to Mikhail Gorbachev. Eliot Borenstein, Professor of Russian and Slavic Studies at NYU, has criticized the Lincoln Project's "Russophobic" ad, saying: "How would we feel about a two-minute video filled with Stars of David, men in Orthodox garb, sinister snapshots of Bibi, and soldiers in tanks, all to the tune of “Hava Nagila”? If that doesn't make you uncomfortable, I'm not sure what to tell you."[212]

In March 2022, Sean Hannity advocated the assassination of Vladimir Putin on The Sean Hannity Show as a resolution for the recent invasion of Ukraine, which according to Rachel VanLandingham of Southwestern Law School would instead escalate tensions, in addition to violating US law.[213] U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham was criticized for advocating Putin's assassination by Russians on Hannity's show and a tweet where he asked, "Is there a Brutus in Russia? Is there a more successful Colonel Stauffenberg in the Russian military?" Other Congresspeople, such as Brian Schatz and Marjorie Taylor Greene, lambasted the idea as overkill that would result only in catastrophic escalation, while Russian ambassador Anatoly Antonov remarked, "The degree of Russophobia and hatred in the United States towards Russia is off the scale."[214][215] The subsequent day, Graham retracted his previous statement during an appearance on Fox and Friends, instead advocating for Putin "to go to jail" for his war crimes.[216]

Hollywood and video games

Russians and Russian Americans are usually portrayed as ruthless agents, brutal mobsters and villains in Hollywood movies [217][218][219] and few video games. In a 2014 news story, Fox News reported, "Russians may also be unimpressed with Hollywood's apparent negative stereotyping of Russians in movies. The Avengers featured a ruthless former KGB agent, Iron Man 2 centers on a rogue Russian scientist with a vendetta, and action thriller Jack Ryan: Shadow Recruit saw Kenneth Branagh play an archetypal Russian bad guy, just to name a few."[220][221][222][223][224]

The video game Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 portrays Russian soldiers as over-the-top villains and contains a controversial mission titled "No Russian", which involves the player engaging in a mass shooting in a Russian airport. In Russia, the game sparked calls for boycotts and prompted live streamers to pull out of deals with publisher Activision, with online Russians also flooding Metacritic to vote down the game's user score.[225]

Media

In June 2020, Russian American professor Nina L. Khrushcheva wrote: "Normally, I would not side with the Kremlin. But I cannot help wondering whether the Russophobia found in some segments of America's political class and media has become pathological."[226]

Pacific

New Zealand

Russophobia in New Zealand dates back to the colonial era; early anti-Russian sentiment among New Zealanders was influenced by "the general Victorian dislike of Tsarist autocracy" and British immigrants to the colony who brought "with them the high level of anti-Russian sentiment at home." Polish, Hungarian and Jewish refugees fleeing Russia's suppression of various rebellions and outbreaks of anti-Jewish pogroms also influenced Russophobia in New Zealand. In the aftermath of the Crimean War, suspicion of a possible Russian invasion of New Zealand led the colonial government to construct a series of "Russian-scare" coastal fortifications along the coastline. However, during the First World War, anti-Russian sentiment subsided as New Zealand and Russia found themselves fighting on the same side against Imperial Germany and anti-German sentiment grew in its place. By late 1920s pragmatism moderated anti-Russian sentiment in official circles, especially during the Great Depression. Influential visitors to the Soviet Union, such as George Bernard Shaw, provided a sympathetic view of what they experienced.[227] The history of Russophobia in New Zealand was analyzed in Glynn Barratt's book Russophobia in New Zealand, 1838-1908,[228] expanded to cover the period up to 1939 in an article by Tony Wilson.[227]

Asia and Middle East

Iran

Rudi Matthee (Munroe Chaired Professor of History at the University of Delaware) noted in his book The Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran: Silk for Silver, 1600-1730, dealing with the Safavid period (1501–1736), that the Iranians "had long despised Russians for their uncouthness".[229] In the first half of the 19th century, Russia annexed large parts of Iranian territory in the Caucasus; With the Treaty of Gulistan (1813) and Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828), Iran was forced to cede what is present-day Azerbaijan, Armenia, eastern Georgia and southern Dagestan to Russia.[230] This fuelled anti-Russian sentiment which led to an angry mob storming the Russian embassy in Tehran and killing everyone in 1829. Among those killed in the massacre was the newly appointed Russian ambassador to Iran, Alexander Griboyedov, a celebrated playwright. Griboyedov had previously played an active role in negotiating the terms of the treaty of 1828.[231][232] Soviet involvement in the Azerbaijani and Kurdish separatist movements also fueled negative attitudes.[233]

In 2009, negative attitudes to Russia among the Iranian opposition was also observed due to Russian support of the Iranian government.[234]

India

Russian visitors to Goa make up one of the largest groups in the state and according to Indian media, there has been tension between them and the locals due to violence and other illegal activities committed by some visitors.[235][236][237] On February 2012, Indian politician Shantaram Naik accused Russians (as well as Israelis) of occupying certain coastal villages in Goa.[238] On August 2012, Indian politician Eduardo Faleiro rejected the Russian consul general's claim that there was no existence of the Russian mafia there, alleging "a virtual cultural invasion" was occurring in Morjim.[239] According to the Indian Express in 2013, Goan resentment of foreigners had been building, with anger particularly directed towards Russians and Nigerians.[240]

In 2014, after Goan taxi drivers protested against Russian tour operators allegedly snatching tourist transport services from them, Goa's ministry of tourism cancelled an Indo-Russian music festival, sparking criticism from a few Russian diplomats.[241] In 2015, the Russian information centre reportedly said India and Goa "were not considered as good destinations for Russian travellers".[242][243]

Japan

 
An anti-Russian satirical map produced in Japan during the Russo–Japanese War.

Many Japanese interactions with Russians as of 2009 occurred with seamen and fishermen of the Russian fishing fleet, therefore some Japanese carried negative stereotypes associated with sailors over to Russians.[244][245][246]

According to a 2012 Pew Global Attitudes Project survey, 72% of Japanese people view Russia unfavorably, compared with 22% who viewed it favorably, making Japan the most anti-Russian country surveyed.[247] A 2017 poll from the Japanese government found that 78.1% of Japanese said they felt little or no affinity to Russia, which was the second highest percentage out of 8 regions polled (behind China at 78.5%).[248]

In December 2016, protesters gathered in Tokyo demanding the return of islands in the Kuril Islands dispute.[249]

Kazakhstan

According to the Jamestown Foundation, while previously not known for being anti-Russian, Kazakhstan since independence has grown increasingly hostile to both Russia and China. Russian commentator Yaroslav Razumov alleges that "anti-Russian articles are a staple of the Kazakh media".[250] Recently, Kazakh nationalists have criticized people who prefer speaking in Russian than Kazakh despite being one of the two official languages in the country.[251] In 2014, ethnic Kazakhs were enraged with the statement of Russian president Vladimir Putin that "Kazakhs never had any statehood" before independence.[252][253]

China

Tensions between Russia and China began with the Sino-Russian border conflicts, which began in 1652 and lasted until 1689.[254] During the 19th century, when the Qing dynasty of China was distracted suppressing the Taiping Rebellion and fighting the Second Opium War, the Russian government annexed the region of Outer Manchuria through a series of unequal treaties.[255] Russia would continue to sponsor various groups, both pro and anti-Chinese, helping to destabilize China with the Dungan rebellion and Russian occupation of Ili.[256] Towards the collapse of the Qing dynasty, Russia invaded Manchuria and was among a major participant that crushed the Boxer Rebellion against European powers.[257][258]

With the collapse of the Tsarist Empire in Russia, the Soviet Union was founded. Nonetheless, tensions between the USSR and China remained high. The Soviet Union waged the 1929 war against China, which ended in Soviet victory.[259] The Soviet Union would continue following Imperial Russia's expansion of influence by sponsoring a number of various militia groups destabilizing China, especially in Xinjiang which resulted in the Kumul Rebellion, Soviet invasion of Xinjiang and followed by the Islamic rebellion and Ili Rebellion in 1937 and 1944.[260] The Soviet invasion and occupation of Manchuria in 1945 following Japanese control increased anti-Russian and anti-Soviet sentiment as a result of war crimes committed by Soviet troops, including rape and looting.[261][262][263][264][265][266]

Nowadays however, anti-Russian sentiment in China has greatly downgraded, due to perceived common anti-Western sentiment among Russian and Chinese nationalists.[267][268]

South Korea

A 2020 Gallup International poll had 75% of South Koreans viewing Russia's foreign policy as destabilizing to the world, which was the third highest percentage out of 44 countries surveyed.[269][270] A Morning Consult poll finished on February 6, 2022 had South Korean respondents holding a more unfavorable than favorable impression of Russia by a difference of 25% (the second highest percentage in the Far East).[271] Anti-Russia protests against the country's invasion of Ukraine were held in Seoul and Gwangju,[272] with one also planned in Busan.[273]

Turkey

According to a 2013 survey, 73% of Turks viewed Russia unfavorably against 16% with favorable views.[274] A 2011 SETA poll had 51.7% of Turks expressing a negative opinion of Russians compared to 20.7% expressing a positive opinion.[275] According to a 2012 report, hoteliers in Antalya viewed Russian tourists more negatively than tourists from the West.[276]

Historically, Russia and Turkey fought several wars and had caused great devastation for each nation. During the old Tsardom of Russia, the Ottomans often raided and attacked Russian villagers. With the transformation into Russian Empire, Russia started to expand and clashed heavily with the Turks; which Russia often won more than lost, and reduced the Ottoman Empire heavily. The series of wars had manifested the ideas among the Turks that Russia wanted to turn Turkey into a vassal state, leading to a high level of Russophobia in Turkey.[277] In the 20th century, anti-Russian sentiment in Turkey was so great that the Russians refused to allow a Turkish military attache to accompany their armies.[278] After the World War I, both Ottoman and Russian Empires collapsed, and two nations went on plagued by their civil wars; during that time Soviet Russia (who would later become Soviet Union) supported Turkish Independence Movement led by Mustafa Kemal, leading to a warmer relations between two states, as newly established Turkish Republic maintained a formal tie with the Soviet Union.[279] But their warm relations didn't last long; after the World War II, the Bosphorus crisis occurred at 1946 due to Joseph Stalin's demand for a complete Soviet control of the straits led to resurgence of Russophobia in Turkey.[280]

Anti-Russian sentiment started to increase again since 2011, following the event of the Syrian Civil War. Russia supports the Government of Bashar al-Assad, while Turkey supports the Free Syrian Army and had many times announced their intentions to overthrow Assad, once again strained the relations.[281] Relations between two further went downhill after Russian jet shootdown by Turkish jet,[282] flaring that Russia wanted to invade Turkey over Assad's demand; and different interests in Syria. Turkish media have promoted Russophobic news about Russian ambitions in Syria, and this has been the turning point of remaining poor relations although two nations have tried to re-approach their differences. Turkish military operations in Syria against Russia and Assad-backed forces also damage the relations deeply.[283]

Business

In May and June 2006, Russian media cited discrimination against Russian companies as one possible reason why the contemplated merger between the Luxembourg-based steelmaker Arcelor and Russia's Severstal did not finalize. According to the Russian daily Izvestiya, those opposing the merger "exploited the 'Russian threat' myth during negotiations with shareholders and, apparently, found common ground with the Europeans",[284] while Boris Gryzlov, speaker of the State Duma observed that "recent events show that someone does not want to allow us to enter their markets."[285] On 27 July 2006, The New York Times quoted the analysts as saying that many Western investors still think that anything to do with Russia is "a little bit doubtful and dubious" while others look at Russia in "comic book terms, as mysterious and mafia-run."[286]

View of Russia in Western media

Some Russian and Western commentators express concern about a far too negative coverage of Russia in Western media (some Russians even describe this as a "war of information").[287][288] In April 2007, David Johnson, founder of the Johnson's Russia List, said in interview to the Moscow News: "I am sympathetic to the view that these days Putin and Russia are perhaps getting too dark a portrayal in most Western media. Or at least that critical views need to be supplemented with other kinds of information and analysis. An openness to different views is still warranted."[289]

In February 2007, the Russian creativity agency E-generator put together a "rating of Russophobia" of Western media, using for the research articles concerning a single theme—Russia's chairmanship of G8, translated into Russian by InoSmi.Ru. The score was composed for each edition, negative values granted for negative assessments of Russia, and positive values representing positive ones. The top in the rating were Newsday (−43, U.S.), Financial Times (−34, Great Britain), The Wall Street Journal (−34, U.S.), Le Monde (−30, France), while editions on the opposite side of the rating were Toronto Star (+27, Canada) and "The Conservative Voice"[290] (+26, U.S.).[291][292]

California-based international relations scholar Andrei Tsygankov has remarked that anti-Russian political rhetoric coming from Washington circles has received wide echo in American mainstream media, asserting that "Russophobia's revival is indicative of the fear shared by some U.S. and European politicians that their grand plans to control the world's most precious resources and geostrategic sites may not succeed if Russia's economic and political recovery continues."[293]

In practice, anti-Russian political rhetoric usually puts emphasis on highlighting policies and practices of the Russian government that are criticised internally – corruption, abuse of law, censorship, violence and intervention in Ukraine. Western criticism in this aspect goes in line with Russian independent anti-government media (such as Dozhd, Novaya Gazeta, Echo of Moscow, The Moscow Times) and opposition human rights activists (Memorial). In defence of this rhetoric, some sources critical of the Russian government claim that it is Russian state-owned media and administration who attempt to discredit the "neutral" criticism by generalizing it into indiscriminate accusations of the whole Russian population – or Russophobia.[53][294][295] Some have argued, however, that the Western media doesn't make enough distinction between Putin's government and Russia and the Russians, thus effectively vilifying the whole nation.[296][297]

Glenn Greenwald of The Intercept wrote in February 2017 that the "East Coast newsmagazines" in the United States are "feeding Democrats the often xenophobic, hysterical Russophobia for which they have a seemingly insatiable craving."[298] Yuliya Komska in The Washington Post took note of a Russiagate-awareness media project featuring Morgan Freeman and James Clapper and wrote that its "hawkish tenor stokes blanket Russophobia that is as questionable as the Russian state media's all-out anti-Americanism."[299]

Russian response

According from Russian researcher Anatoly Khazanov in 2002, as tensions between Russia and the West rose since 2000s, there is a significant surge in Russian nationalist sentiment, believing that Russia is engaged in a clash of civilisation between "global struggle between the materialistic, individualistic, consumerist, cosmopolitan, corrupt, and decadent West which is led by the United States and the idealist, collectivist, morally and spiritually superior Eurasia which is led by Russia" where the West is viewed as trying to tear Russia up so it can use its natural resources to satisfy its own interests and needs.[300]

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stressed about the Western attempt to breakup Russia, as well as accusing the West of waging war against Russia both politically, economically and culturally.[301]

See also

Annotations

a.   ^ The political status of Kosovo is disputed. Having unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008, it is formally recognised as an independent state by 97 UN member states (with another 15 recognising it at some point but then withdrawing recognition), while Serbia continues to claim it as part of its own sovereign territory.

Notes

  1. ^ 2019 data

References

  1. ^ Smith, Samuel F. (May 2011). "Examining Cultural Stereotypes Through Russian and American Voices". Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects. University of Tennessee. Archived from the original on 6 February 2022. Retrieved 6 February 2022.
  2. ^ "Russophobia". thefreedictionary.com. Retrieved 6 March 2018.
  3. ^ "Russophobia". The American Heritage Dictionary. Retrieved 27 December 2020.
  4. ^ McNally, Raymond T. (1958). "The Origins of Russophobia in France: 1812-1830". Slavic Review. 17 (2): 173–189. doi:10.2307/3004165. JSTOR 3004165.
  5. ^ Williams, Robert C. (1966). "Russians in Germany: 1900-1914". Journal of Contemporary History. 1 (4): 121–149. doi:10.1177/002200946600100405. JSTOR 259894. S2CID 154477120.
  6. ^ Historical Dictionary of the Holocaust - Page 175 Jack R. Fischel - 2010 The policy of Lebensraum was also the product of Nazi racial ideology, which held that the Slavic peoples of the east were inferior to the Aryan race.
  7. ^ Jill Stephenson (31 December 2006). "4 Racial Health and Presecution". Hitler's home front : Württemberg under the Nazis. A&C Black. p. 135. ISBN 1-85285-442-1. Archived from the original on 26 October 2021. Retrieved 16 December 2020.
  8. ^ Jones, Adam (2010). Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (2nd ed.). Routledge. p. 271. ISBN 978-0415486194. The large majority of POWs, some 2.8 million, were killed in just eight months of 1941–42, a rate of slaughter matched (to my knowledge) only by the 1994 Rwanda genocide.
  9. ^ Mineau, André (2004). Operation Barbarossa: Ideology and Ethics Against Human Dignity. Rodopi. p. 180. ISBN 978-9042016330.
  10. ^ Basulto, Dominic (2015). Russophobia: How Western Media Turns Russia Into the Enemy. ISBN 978-0988841956.
  11. ^ "Submission to the United States Committeee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination". Human Rights Documents Online. doi:10.1163/2210-7975_hrd-9211-20180082.
  12. ^ Macgilchrist, Felicitas (21 January 2009). "Framing Russia: The construction of Russia and Chechnya in the western media". Europa-Universitat Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder). Retrieved 5 April 2015.
  13. ^ Le, E´lisabeth (2006). "Collective Memories and Representations of National Identity in Editorials: Obstacles to a renegotiation of intercultural relations" (PDF). Journalism Studies. 7 (5): 708–728. doi:10.1080/14616700600890372. S2CID 59404040.
  14. ^ Mertelsmann, Olaf. "How the Russians Turned into the Image of the 'National Enemy' of the Estonians" (PDF). Estonian National Museum. Archived from the original (PDF) on 24 May 2013. Retrieved 14 October 2012.
  15. ^ Luostarinen, Heikki (May 1989). "Finnish Russophobia: The Story of an Enemy Image". Journal of Peace Research. 26 (2): 123–137. doi:10.1177/0022343389026002002. JSTOR 423864. S2CID 145354618.
  16. ^ a b Floudas, Demetrius A. (14 March 2022). "Ukraine-Russia conflict: 'Forced to take sides?' Interview". BBC TV (Video). Archived from the original on 16 March 2022. Retrieved 15 March 2022.
  17. ^ Lourgos, Angie Leventis. "Russian Tea Time restaurant in downtown Chicago was founded by Ukrainians. Now it faces misplaced backlash". chicagotribune.com. Retrieved 2022-03-14.
  18. ^ a b Jack, Andrew (2022-03-08). "'This is Putin's fault': Russian diaspora feels growing distress over Ukraine war". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 2022-04-22.
  19. ^ a b c "Survey: Respondents' Views on Other Countries Shift or Remain Static". Transatlantic Trends. Archived from the original on 14 December 2014. Retrieved 5 April 2015.
  20. ^ "Globalism 2019/20" (PDF). YouGov. 27 December 2020.
  21. ^ "Pew Research Center, Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey" (PDF). Pew Research Center. 7 December 2020. Archived (PDF) from the original on 26 March 2021.
  22. ^ a b c Helsingin Sanomat, 11 October 2004, International poll: Anti-Russian sentiment runs very strong in Finland. Only Kosovo has more negative attitude
  23. ^ "World Doesn't Like Russia or the U.S., Survey Shows". The Moscow Times. 13 October 2004. Archived from the original on 26 November 2014. Retrieved 9 June 2014.
  24. ^ a b c "Russia's Global Image Negative amid Crisis in Ukraine". Pew Research Center. 9 July 2014. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
  25. ^ Robinson, Piers (2 August 2016). "Russian news may be biased – but so is much western media". The Guardian.
  26. ^ a b c d Pressrelase and Fact sheet Archived 21 June 2019 at the Wayback Machine for the study "Hate crime in the European Union" by EU Fundamental Rights Agency November 2012
  27. ^ EU-MIDIS, European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey: Minorities as Victims of crime (PDF). European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2012. Retrieved 20 October 2016.
  28. ^ Robinson, Neil (27 January 2020). "Russophobia in official Russian political discourse". De Europa. 2. doi:10.13135/2611-853X/3384.
  29. ^ Lloyd S. Kramer (2000). Lafayette in Two Worlds: Public Cultures and Personal Identities in an Age of Revolutions. p. 283. ISBN 9780807862674.
  30. ^ Neumann, Iver B. (2002). Müller, Jan-Werner (ed.). Europe's post-Cold War memory of Russia: cui bono?. Memory and power in post-war Europe: studies in the presence of the past. Cambridge University Press. p. 132. ISBN 978-0-5210-0070-3.
  31. ^ McNally, Raymond T. (April 1958). "The Origins of Russophobia in France: 1812-1830". American Slavic and East European Review. 17 (2): 173–189. doi:10.2307/3004165. JSTOR 3004165.
  32. ^ Neumann (2002), p. 133.
  33. ^ Latham, Edward (1906). Famous Sayings and Their Authors: A Collection of Historical Sayings in English, French, German, Greek, Italian, and Latin. Swan Sonnenschein. p. 181.
  34. ^ Bartlett's Roget's Thesaurus. Little Brown & Company. 2003. ISBN 9780316735872.
  35. ^ John Howes Gleason (5 February 1950). The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain: A Study of the Interaction of Policy and Opinion. Harvard University Press. pp. 16–56. ISBN 9780674281097. Retrieved 9 November 2005.
  36. ^ Barbara Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814–1974 (1974) p 200
  37. ^ Fisher, David C. "Russia and the Crystal Palace 1851" in Britain, the Empire, and the World at the Great Exhibition of 1851 ed. Jeffery A. Auerbach & Peter H. Hoffenberg. Ashgate, 2008:pp. 123-124.
  38. ^ Ширинянц А.А., Мырикова А.В. «Внутренняя» русофобия и «польский вопрос» в России XIX в. Проблемный анализ и государственно-управленческое проектирование. № 1 (39) / том 8 / 2015. С. 16
  39. ^ Ширинянц А.А., Мырикова А.В. «Внутренняя» русофобия и «польский вопрос» в России XIX в. Проблемный анализ и государственно-управленческое проектирование. № 1 (39) / том 8 / 2015. С. 15
  40. ^ Odesskii, Mikhail Pavlovich (2015). Антропология культуры [Anthropology of culture] (in Russian) (3rd ed.). LitRes. pp. 201–202. ISBN 978-5-457-36929-0. Retrieved 20 October 2016.
  41. ^ Keynes, John Maynard (1932). A Short View of Russia. London. pp. 297–312. ISBN 978-0-19-821927-9.
  42. ^ "The So-Called Russian Soul"
  43. ^ R. J. Overy (2004). The dictators: Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia. W. W. Norton. p. 537. ISBN 978-0-393-02030-4.
  44. ^ Wette, Wolfram (2009). The Wehrmacht: history, myth, reality. Harvard University Press. p. 171. ISBN 978-0-674-04511-8.
  45. ^ Müller, Rolf-Dieter, Gerd R. Ueberschär, Hitler's War in the East, 1941–1945: A Critical Assessment, Berghahn Books, 2002, ISBN 1-57181-293-8, page 244
  46. ^ Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Volume One - A Reckoning, Chapter XIV: Eastern Orientation or Eastern Policy
  47. ^ Adam Jones (2010), Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (2nd ed.), p.271. – "'" Next to the Jews in Europe," wrote Alexander Werth,' "the biggest single German crime was undoubtedly the extermination by hunger, exposure and in other ways of . . . Russian war prisoners." The murder of at least 3.3 million Soviet POWs is one of the least-known of modern genocides; there is still no full-length book on the subject in English. It also stands as one of the most intensive genocides of all time: "a holocaust that devoured millions," as Catherine Merridale acknowledges. The large majority of POWs, some 2.8 million, were killed in just eight months of 1941–42, a rate of slaughter matched (to my knowledge) only by the 1994 Rwanda genocide."
  48. ^ Russian: Политика геноцида, Государственный мемориальный комплекс «Хатынь»
  49. ^ Stein, George H (1984). The Waffen SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War, 1939–1945. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. p. 126. ISBN 978-0-8014-9275-4.
  50. ^ "Remarks By Heinrich Himmler"
  51. ^ David-Fox, Michael; Holquist, Peter.; Poe, Marshall. (2001). "Russophobia and the American Politics of Russian History". Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History. 2 (3): 465–467. doi:10.1353/kri.2008.0106. ISSN 1538-5000.
  52. ^ Shafarevich, Igor (Mar 1990). Russophobia. Joint Publications Research Service.
  53. ^ a b c d e Darczewska, Jolanta; Żochowsky, Piotr (October 2015). "Russophobia in the Kremlin's strategy: A weapon of mass destruction" (PDF). Point of View. OSW Centre for Eastern Studies (56). ISBN 978-83-62936-72-4. Retrieved 11 November 2016.
  54. ^ ""Rosjanie to nie Putin". Młody Rosjanin jedzie rowerem przez Europę, protestując przeciwko wojnie w Ukrainie i rusofobii". bialystok.wyborcza.pl. Retrieved 2022-05-16.
  55. ^ Beardsworth, James (4 March 2022). "Russians Abroad: Blamed for a Regime They Sought to Escape". The Moscow Times. Archived from the original on 6 March 2022.
  56. ^ Floudas, Demetrius A. (8 March 2022). "Ukraine War: Russians in Britain are facing some difficult choices". BBC News (Interview). Retrieved 11 March 2022. {{cite web}}: Check |archive-url= value (help)CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  57. ^ "Russophobia in US nears Cold War levels, 80% see Russia as enemy: Poll". WION. Retrieved 10 March 2022.
  58. ^ "Russian-owned businesses in US face discrimination, vandalism over Ukraine invasion". Fox 6 News Milwaukee. Retrieved 2022-03-14.
  59. ^ Lourgos, Angie Leventis. "Russian Tea Time restaurant in downtown Chicago was founded by Ukrainians. Now it faces misplaced backlash". Chicago Tribune. Retrieved 2022-03-14.
  60. ^ "As Ukraine war intensifies, some Russian speakers far from Moscow are feeling hostility". The Washington Post. 3 March 2022.
  61. ^ "Anti-Russian hate in Europe is making chefs and school children out to be enemies". Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2022-03-28.
  62. ^ Matusek, Sarah (10 March 2022). "Russian Americans face misdirected blame for war in Ukraine". The Monitor.
  63. ^ Pomranz, Mike (7 March 2022). "Stolichnaya Vodka Officially Changes Its Name to 'Stoli' Outside of Russia". Food & Wine. Retrieved 10 March 2022.
  64. ^ Chechen terrorist Goychaev sentenced to death (Archive) // Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 April 2001.
  65. ^ Bandits were killing Russians // Kommersant, № 206 (2336), 10 November 2001 (in Russian)'
  66. ^ The first death sentence for five years Archived 31 October 2019 at the Wayback Machine // Gazeta.Ru, 18 April 2001 (in Russian)
  67. ^ Total Albatz show Archived 6 December 2019 at the Wayback Machine, Echo of Moscow, 13 December 2009
  68. ^ Tlisova, Fatima (21 August 2009). "The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church in the North Caucasus". Eurasia Daily Monitor. 6 (162). Archived from the original on 26 December 2010. Retrieved 22 November 2009.
  69. ^ Umland, Andreas (21 January 2016). "The Putinverstehers' Misconceived Charge of Russophobia: How Western Apology for the Kremlin's Current Behavior Contradicts Russian National Interests". Harvard International Review. Archived from the original on 11 November 2016. Retrieved 11 November 2016.
  70. ^ Lev Rubuinstein, "РуСССкие на марше" ("RuSSSians are Marching"), Grani.ru]
  71. ^ Horvath, Robert (2005). The legacy of Soviet dissent: dissidents, democratisation and radical nationalism in Russia. Psychology Press. p. 262. ISBN 978-0-415-33320-7.
  72. ^ Khazanov, Anatoly (2012). "Contemporary Russian Nationalism between East and West". Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen. Retrieved 26 May 2016.
  73. ^ Khazanov, Anatoly M. (2003). "A State without a Nation? Russia after Empire". In Paul, T.V. (ed.). The nation-state in question. G. John Ikenberry, John A. Hall. Princeton University Press. pp. 96–97. ISBN 978-0691115092.
  74. ^ "PA Chairman Abbas to meet Russia's President Putin". Israel National News. 12 February 2018.
  75. ^ "Netanyahu lashes out at Iran in talks with Putin". Hürriyet Daily News. 30 January 2018.
  76. ^ "Putin Speaks Against Holocaust Denial and Anti-Semitism". The Moscow Times. 30 January 2018.
  77. ^ Robinson, Neil (2019). ""Russophobia" in Official Russian Political Discourse" (PDF). DeEuropa. Retrieved 25 April 2022.
  78. ^ Batalden, Stephen K.; Batalden, Sandra L. (1997). The Newly Independent States of Eurasia: Handbook of Former Soviet Republics (2nd ed.). Phoenix: Oryx. p. 99. ISBN 9780897749404.
  79. ^ Cohen, Ariel (1998). Russian Imperialism: Development and Crisis. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 135. ISBN 9780275964818. At his funeral, the Armenians erupted in anti-Russian and anti-Soviet demonstrations.
  80. ^ Nikoghosyan, Alina (13 January 2015). "Shock and Questions: Gyumri mourns murders as it looks for reasons". ArmeniaNow. Archived from the original on 14 January 2015.
  81. ^ Grigoryan, Armen (16 January 2015). "Murder of Armenian Family by Russian Soldier Severely Strains Moscow-Yerevan Relations". Eurasia Daily Monitor. Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation.
  82. ^ "Betwixt and between: the reality of Russian soft-power in Azerbaijan". Böll SOUTH CAUCASUS.
  83. ^ Cornell, Svante (1 December 2000). Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9780203988879. Retrieved 29 September 2016 – via Google Books.
  84. ^ "Official web-site of President of Azerbaijan Republic - NEWS» Receptions Ilham Aliyev received Deputy Chairman of Council of Federation of Russian Federal Assembly and chairman of People's Assembly of Dagestan". en.president.az. Retrieved 15 November 2017.
  85. ^ Kempe, Iris, ed. (17 June 2013). "The South Caucasus Between The EU And The Eurasian Union" (PDF). Caucasus Analytical Digest. Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, Bremen and Center for Security Studies, Zürich (51–52): 20–21. ISSN 1867-9323. Retrieved 12 November 2016.
  86. ^ "Georgian National Study February 18 – 27, 2013" (PDF). International Republican Institute, Baltic Surveys Ltd., The Gallup Organization, The Institute of Polling And Marketing. February 2013. p. 35. Retrieved 12 November 2016.
  87. ^ Levy, Clifford J. "Russia Backs Independence of Georgian Enclaves".
  88. ^ "Caucasus: Georgians, Chechens Take Stand Against Russia Over Pankisi". RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty.
  89. ^ Inna Lazareva (April 3, 2022). "Russians in Tbilisi, Georgia, face public anger despite their anti-Putin activism". The Washington Post.
  90. ^ "Georgia, a bleak new home for Russian exiles". France 24, Agence France Presse. 2022-03-08.
  91. ^ "Duma Committee Chairman hits out at Baltic "Russophobia"". The Baltic Times. 10 November 2015. Retrieved 1 July 2018.
  92. ^ "Russia will never turn the other cheek in foreign policy matters, top diplomat says". TASS. 21 May 2021. Retrieved 7 August 2021.
  93. ^ Krone-Schmalz, Gabriele (2008). "Zweierlei Maß". Was passiert in Russland? (in German) (4 ed.). München: F.A. Herbig. pp. 45–48. ISBN 978-3-7766-2525-7.
  94. ^ a b c d Subrenat, Jean-Jacques, ed. (2004). Estonia: Identity and Independence. Rodopi. p. 273. ISBN 978-90-420-0890-8. Retrieved 12 November 2016.
  95. ^ "Latvia's Russia Fears Rooted in History". The Moscow Times. 14 June 2015. Retrieved 1 July 2018.
  96. ^ "Posner explained the anti-Russian sentiment in Latvia". The Quebec Post. 8 July 2018. Archived from the original on 9 July 2018. Retrieved 8 July 2018.
  97. ^ Tsygankov, Andrei (2009). Russophobia: Anti-Russian Lobby and American Foreign Policy. Palgrave MacMillan. p. 58. ISBN 978-0-230-61418-5.
  98. ^ "Aven: no anti-Latvian sentiment in Russia, but anti-Russian sentiment can be observed in Latvia". The Baltic Times. 20 July 2017. Retrieved 1 July 2018.
  99. ^ "Latvia blamed for Russophobia". Baltic News Network. 22 March 2012. Retrieved 1 July 2018.
  100. ^ Latvia; Yeltsin Accuses Latvia of Preparing for 'Ethnic Cleansing'; Talks BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 April 1993
  101. ^ "Security Service starts case over Ždanoka's remarks in EP discussion". Public Broadcasting of Latvia. LETA. 6 March 2019. Retrieved 10 March 2019.
  102. ^ "State Security Service starts criminal procedure over Zdanoka's remarks in European Parliament discussion". The Baltic Times. 6 March 2019. Retrieved 10 March 2019.
  103. ^ "Vaidere turns to State Security Service over Zdanoka's statements during an EP discussion". The Baltic Times. 25 February 2019. Retrieved 10 March 2019.
  104. ^ Human Rights and Democratization in Latvia. Implementation of the Helsinki Accords. United States Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 1993. p. 6. Russian officials, including Yeltsin and Kozyrev, have even used the term "ethnic cleansing" to describe Latvian and Estonian policies, despite the total absence of inter-ethnic bloodshed.
  105. ^ Rislakki, Jukka (2008). The Case for Latvia: Disinformation Campaigns Against a Small Nation. Rodopi. p. 37. ISBN 978-90-420-2424-3. Not a single Russian or Jew has ever been wounded or killed for political, nationalistic or racist reasons during the new independence of Latvia.
  106. ^ Clemens Jr., Walter C. (2001). The Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory and European Security. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. p. 130. ISBN 978-08-476-9858-5. But no one died in the Baltics in the 1990s from ethnic or other political fighting, except for those killed by Soviet troops in 1990–1991.
  107. ^ "Ethnic tolerance and integration of the Latvian society" (PDF). Baltic Institute of Social Sciences. 2004. Retrieved 1 July 2018.
  108. ^ Wodak, Ruth; Mral, Brigitte; Khosravinik, Majid (2013). Comparing Radical-Right Populism in Estonia and Latvia. Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse. London/New York: Bloomsbury Academic. p. 242. ISBN 978-1-78093-245-3.
  109. ^ a b c d "Standing by their man". The Baltic Times. 10 November 2010. Retrieved 1 July 2018.
  110. ^ a b Strautmanis, Andris (10 November 2010). "Doctor at center of political scandal faces repercussions in Minnesota". Latvians Online. Retrieved 1 July 2018.
  111. ^ "Latvians' Negativity Toward Russia Reaches 7-Year High". The Moscow Times. 19 October 2015. Retrieved 1 July 2018.
  112. ^ "Survey: Latvians slightly less apprehensive about Russia than they were". Public Broadcasting of Latvia. 15 March 2019. Retrieved 26 May 2019.
  113. ^ Graham-Harrison, Emma; Boffey, Daniel (3 April 2017). "Lithuania fears Russian propaganda is prelude to eventual invasion". The Guardian.
  114. ^ "Lithuania: Russia permanently stationing Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad". 5 February 2018.
  115. ^ "Lithuania: Russia deploying more missiles into Kaliningrad". 5 February 2018.
  116. ^ "Can Merkel End Russian Meddling in Moldova?". Carnegie Europe.
  117. ^ "Senior Official Accuses Russia Of Meddling In Moldovan Politics". RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty.
  118. ^ "Moldovan PM Renews Call For Russia To Quit Transdniester". RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty.
  119. ^ "Moldova Parliament condemns Russia's attacks on national informational security, meddling in internal politics - Moldova.org". www.moldova.org. 8 February 2018.
  120. ^ Olga Popescu: Ion Iliescu pentru presa rusa: Nu stim cine a tras la Revolutie, este o enigma. Probabil au fost oameni extrem de devotati lui Ceausescu"
  121. ^ George Roncea: Realitatea TV, ecoul Moscovei în România contra lui Băsescu Archived 17 June 2011 at the Wayback Machine
  122. ^ Popa, Liliana (22 January 2010). "Traian Basescu tuna impotriva Rusiei, dar apropiatii sai obtin contracte grase de la Gazprom" [Traian Basescu thunders against Russia, but his friends get fat contracts from Gazprom] (in Romanian). Fin.ro. Archived from the original on 20 July 2011. Retrieved 26 January 2010.
  123. ^ Dan Tapalaga: Cortina de vorbe goale (in Romanian)
  124. ^ Glenny, Misha (1999). The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999. Pages 60-63.
  125. ^ The Ukrainian Nationalism at the Heart of ‘Euromaidan’, The Nation (21 January 2014)
  126. ^ (in Ukrainian) Олег Тягнибок, Ukrinform
    Yushchenko Finally Gets Tough On Nationalists, The Jamestown Foundation (3 August 2004)
  127. ^ "Blind eye turned to influence of far-right in Ukrainian crisis: critics". Global News. 7 March 2014.
  128. ^ "Россияне об Украине, украинцы о России - Левада-Центр". Archived from the original on 27 June 2009. Retrieved 5 April 2015.
  129. ^ "Institute of Sociology: Love for Russians dwindling in Western Ukraine". zik. Archived from the original on 9 August 2011. Retrieved 21 October 2010.
  130. ^ The Christian Science Monitor (28 September 2007). "Ukraine's orange-blue divide". The Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved 5 April 2015.
  131. ^ Sewall, Elisabeth (16 November 2006). "David Duke makes repeat visit to controversial Kyiv university". Kyiv Post. Archived from the original on 19 April 2008.
  132. ^ "Tiahnybok considers 'Svoboda' as the only right-wing party in Ukraine", Hazeta po-ukrainsky, 6 August 2007. edition Archived 18 November 2008 at the Wayback Machine, edition
  133. ^ UKRAINIAN Appeals to Anti-Semitism in Election Win, Internet Centre Anti-Racism Europe (4 November 2010)
  134. ^ (in Ukrainian) Вибори: тотальне домінування Партії регіонів, BBC Ukrainian (6 November 2010)
  135. ^ (in Ukrainian) Генеральна репетиція президентських виборів: на Тернопільщині стався прогнозований тріумф націоналістів і крах Тимошенко, Ukrayina Moloda (17 March 2009)
  136. ^ Nationalist Svoboda scores election victories in western Ukraine, Kyiv Post (11 November 2010)
  137. ^ (in Ukrainian) Підсилення "Свободи" загрозою несвободи, BBC Ukrainian (4 November 2010)
  138. ^ On the move: Andreas Umland, Kyiv – Mohyla Academy, Kyiv Post (30 September 2010)
  139. ^ Ukraine right-wing politics: is the genie out of the bottle?, openDemocracy.net (3 January 2011)
  140. ^ Kuzio, Taras (23 June 2015). Ukraine: Democratization, Corruption, and the New Russian Imperialism: Democratization, Corruption, and the New Russian Imperialism. ABC-CLIO. p. 183. ISBN 978-1-4408-3503-2.
  141. ^ (in Ukrainian) Yarosh, Tyagnibok and Biletsky have all formed a single list for the elections (Ярош, Тягнибок та Білецький таки сформували єдиний список на вибори), Glavcom (9 June 2019)
  142. ^ CEC counts 100 percent of vote in Ukraine's parliamentary elections, Ukrinform (26 July 2019)
    (in Russian) Results of the extraordinary elections of the People's Deputies of Ukraine 2019, Ukrayinska Pravda (21 July 2019)
  143. ^ How Ukraine views Russia and the West, Brookings Institution (18 October 2017)
  144. ^ Milan Tuček. Sympatie české veřejnosti k některým zemím – listopad 2016 (in Czech). CVVM. Published on 5 January 2017.
  145. ^ "In Eastern Europe, Pact With Russians Raises Old Specters". The New York Times. 7 April 2010.
  146. ^ "Rusové přicházejí!" (the title is the popular phrase "The Russians are coming!"), Oskar Krejčí, 26 February 2008
  147. ^ Nollen, Tim (15 September 2008). CultureShock! Czech Republic: A Survival Guide to Customs and Etiquette. Marshall Cavendish International Asia Pte Ltd. p. 65. ISBN 978-981-4435-63-5.
  148. ^ Çokyaman, Hicran (2022-04-12). "Russophobia Spreads Following the Russia-Ukraine War". Politics Today. Retrieved 2022-04-13.
  149. ^ Bernstein, Richard (4 July 2005). "For Poland and Russia, old enmity persists". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 2 August 2005.
  150. ^ a b Radio Free Europe. Eastern Europe: Russian-Polish Tensions Rise Over Attack On Russian Children In Warsaw, by Valentinas Mite. 3 August 2005; last accessed on 14 July 2007
  151. ^ The Saint Petersburg Times. Lingering Bitterness Over 9 May. 26 April 2005. retrieved on 14 July 2007
  152. ^ "BBC 2013 World Service Poll: Views of China and India Slide While UK's Ratings Climb: Global Poll" (PDF). BBC. 22 May 2013. Retrieved 20 October 2016.
  153. ^ Ewa Jankowska (August 5, 2019). "New tourists from abroad visit Poland. Norwegians, Chinese, Saudi sheikhs". Gazeta.pl (in Polish). Archived from the original on January 19, 2020.
  154. ^ "Rosjanie (nie)mile widziani w Polsce? "Polacy z natury są bardzo tolerancyjni"". TVN24 (in Polish). July 23, 2014.
  155. ^ "The Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848-1849". www.5percangol.hu.
  156. ^ "Introduction: The 1956 Hungarian uprising". Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.
  157. ^ Szelke, László (6 October 2020). "Vér és megtorlás 1849-ben: így jutottunk el a szabadságharc tragédiájáig". multkor.hu. Múlt-kor történelmi magazin.
  158. ^ "Orosz fogság. Hadifoglyok, kényszermunkások, politikai elítéltek". rubicon.hu. Rubicon Kiadó.
  159. ^ Szabolcs, Panyi (23 November 2018). "Lord of War in Budapest: The DEA busted two Russian arms dealers, and Hungary extradited them to Moscow".
  160. ^ "Pew Research Center, Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey, February 7, 2020 Release" (PDF). Pew Research. 7 February 2020.
  161. ^ Holtsmark, Sven G. (22 September 1988). "Between "russophobia" and "bridge-building": the Norwegian government and the Soviet Union, 1940-1945". Institutt for forsvarsstudier – via Google Books.
  162. ^ "Norwegians Believe Vladimir Putin Is Threat to World Peace". The Nordic Page. 18 July 2017. Retrieved 20 November 2018.
  163. ^ Clem, Ralph. "Today, NATO begins a huge military exercise. Here's what you need to know". Washingtonpost.com. Amazon. Retrieved 17 November 2018.
  164. ^ a b Luhn, Alec (25 October 2018). "Nato holds biggest exercises since Cold War to counter Russia's growing presence around the Arctic". The Telegraph. Archived from the original on 12 January 2022. Retrieved 17 November 2018.
  165. ^ Wintour, Patrick (13 March 2017). "Troubled waters: Norway keeps watch on Russia's Arctic manoeuvres". The Guardian.
  166. ^ Knudsen, Camilla (17 November 2018). "Russia vows consequences after Norway invites more U.S. Marines". Reuters. Thomson Reuters.
  167. ^ Osmo Kuusi; Hanna Smith; Paula Tiihonen (eds.). "Venäjä 2017: Kolme skenaariota" (in Finnish). Eduskunnan tulevaisuusvaliokunta. Archived from the original on 20 May 2013. Retrieved 15 February 2008.
  168. ^ Jussi M. Hanhimäki (1997). Containing Coexistence: America, Russia, and the "Finnish Solution". Kent State UP. p. 4. ISBN 9780873385589.
  169. ^ The Finnish Civil War 1918: History, Memory, Legacy. BRILL. 2014-08-14. p. 166. ISBN 978-90-04-28071-7.
  170. ^ Viimaranta, Hannes; Protassova, Ekaterina; Mustajoki, Arto (2019-02-11). "Russian-Speakers in Finland". Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest. N° 4 (4): 95–128. doi:10.3917/receo1.494.0095. ISSN 0338-0599.
  171. ^ Ezequiel Adamovsky, Euro-orientalism: Liberal Ideology and the Image of Russia in France (c. 1740-1880) (Peter Lang, 2006) pp. 36, 83
  172. ^ Michael Confino, "Re-inventing the Enlightenment: western images of eastern realities in the eighteenth century." Canadian Slavonic Papers 36.3-4 (1994): 505-522.
  173. ^ McNally, T. (1958). "The Origins of Russophobia in France: 1812 - 1830". American Slavic and East European Review. 17 (2): 173–189. doi:10.2307/3004165. JSTOR 3004165.
  174. ^ On the "Tatar" theme see Ezequiel Adamovsky, Euro-orientalism: Liberal Ideology and the Image of Russia in France (c. 1740-1880) (Peter Lang, 2006).
  175. ^ "Иностранцы против России" [Foreigners Against Russia]. arzamas.academy (in Russian). Arzamas. Retrieved 10 December 2020.
  176. ^ "Fyodor Dostoyevsky "My Paradox" (Extract)". russianuniverse.org. 16 April 2015. Retrieved 15 December 2020."7 aphorisms that are essential to understanding Russian civilization". rbth.com. Russia Beyond. June 19, 2017. Archived from the original on 2020-09-20. Retrieved 15 December 2020. Grattez, they would say, lе russе еt vouz vеrrеz lе tartаrе, and so it continues still. We have become part of a proverb for them.
  177. ^ "Publics Worldwide Unfavorable Toward Putin, Russia". Pew Research Center. 30 November 2017.
  178. ^ Jourdan, Alain (11 September 2016). "Chevènement dénonce la "russophobie" ambiante". Tribune de Genève – via www.tdg.ch.
  179. ^ Longerich, Peter (2010). Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. p. 241. ISBN 978-0-19-280436-5.
  180. ^ Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, 1925
  181. ^ H. R. Trevor-Roper; Gerhard L. Weinberg (18 October 2013). Hitler's Table Talk 1941-1944: Secret Conversations. Enigma Books. p. 466. ISBN 978-1-936274-93-2.
  182. ^ Snyder (2010), Bloodlands,p. 411. Snyder states "4.2 million Soviet citizens starved by the German occupiers"
  183. ^ Snyder (2010), Bloodlands, p. 160
  184. ^ Burleigh, Michael (2001). The Third Reich: A New History. Pan Macmillan. p. 521. ISBN 978-0-330-48757-3.
  185. ^ John Howes Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain: A Study of the Interaction of Policy and Opinion, 1971, p.1
  186. ^ Iwona Sakowicz, "Russia and the Russians opinions of the British press during the reign of Alexander II (dailies and weeklies)." Journal of European studies 35.3 (2005): 271-282.
  187. ^ a b Jimmie E. Cain Jr. (15 May 2006), Bram Stoker and Russophobia: Evidence of the British Fear of Russia in Dracula and The Lady of the Shroud, McFarland & Co Inc., U.S., ISBN 978-0-7864-2407-8
  188. ^ Sir Sidney Lee (1903). Queen Victoria. p. 421.
  189. ^ Peter Hopkirk. The Great Game, Kodansha International, 1992, pg.38 ISBN 4-7700-1703-0
  190. ^ Martin Malia, Russia Under Western Eyes (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2000)
  191. ^ "YouGov / Eurotrack Survey Results" (PDF). YouGov. May 25, 2021.
  192. ^ Goldberg, Rob (1 March 2022). "NHL Agent: Russian Clients Harassed to 'Disturbing Levels' After Ukraine Invasion". Bleacher Report. Retrieved 14 March 2022.
  193. ^ "Ukraine Crisis Spurs Anti-Russian Hate Around the World". Time. 10 March 2022. Retrieved 14 March 2022.
  194. ^ "Photos of Russian Orthodox Church vandalism suspect released by Calgary police". CTV News. 1 March 2022. Retrieved 8 March 2022.
  195. ^ "Vandalism at Russian church may be hate crime: Victoria police". Vancouver Island. 4 March 2022. Retrieved 8 March 2022.
  196. ^ "Jack Knox: As vandals hit church, Victoria Russians oppose invasion". Victoria Times Colonist. Retrieved 8 March 2022.
  197. ^ "Vancouver Russian Community Centre vandalized with blue and yellow paint | Globalnews.ca". Global News. Retrieved 8 March 2022.
  198. ^ "Police investigate after Russian Community Centre in Vancouver vandalized". CBC News. 5 March 2022. Retrieved 7 March 2022.
  199. ^ "Calgary police investigate reports of online hate speech targeting Russian-Canadians - Calgary | Globalnews.ca". Global News. Retrieved 8 March 2022.
  200. ^ Steven Ferry (1995). Russian Americans. Benchmark Books. p. 42. ISBN 9780761401643. Retrieved 15 August 2017.
  201. ^ "History". 20 June 2015.
  202. ^ a b Saad, Lydia (27 February 2019). "Majority of Americans Now Consider Russia a Critical Threat". GallupALLUP News.
  203. ^ "Climate Change and Russia Are Partisan Flashpoints in Public's Views of Global Threats". Pew Research Center. Pew Research Center. 30 July 2019.
  204. ^ "BBC World Service poll: Views of China and India Slide While UK's Ratings Climb: Global Poll" (PDF). BBC. 22 May 2013. Archived from the original (PDF) on 26 September 2013. Retrieved 4 October 2013.
  205. ^ Russia blacklists more U.S. citizens from entry under "anti-Magnitsky" bill 19 January 2013
  206. ^ What Boston Bombers' Chechen Ties May Mean for U.S.-Russia Relations 9 April 2013
  207. ^ "Why the Russia Story Is a Minefield for Democrats and the Media". Rolling Stone. 8 March 2017.
  208. ^ "James Clapper on Trump-Russia Ties: 'My Dashboard Warning Light Was Clearly On". NBC News. 28 May 2017.
  209. ^ "James Clapper Tells NBC's Chuck Todd That Russians Are 'Genetically Driven' to Co-opt". Yahoo News. 30 May 2017.
  210. ^ "James Clapper Tells NBC's Chuck Todd That Russians Are 'Genetically Driven' to Co-opt". The Observer. 30 May 2017.
  211. ^ "SPEECH - Professor James Clapper AO address to the National Press Club". ANU. 2017-06-08. Retrieved 2021-03-12.
  212. ^ Borenstein, Eliot (2 July 2020). "The Lincoln Project's Red Scare". New York University Jordan Center. Archived from the original on 3 July 2020.
  213. ^ "Sean Hannity suggested assassinating Putin. Experts say that's illegal — and a bad strategy". Washington Post. 3 March 2022. Retrieved 8 March 2022.
  214. ^ "Outcry after US senator Lindsey Graham suggests Putin's assassination". The Guardian. 4 March 2022. Retrieved 8 March 2022.
  215. ^ "Ukraine invasion: US Republican senator Lindsey Graham calls on Russians to assassinate Vladimir Putin". Sky News. 4 March 2022. Retrieved 8 March 2022.
  216. ^ "Lindsey Graham walks back call for Putin's assassination and instead says he 'needs to go to jail'". Yahoo! News. 4 March 2022. Retrieved 8 March 2022.
  217. ^ "Hollywood stereotypes: Why are Russians the bad guys?". BBC News. 5 November 2014.
  218. ^ "5 Hollywood Villains That Prove Russian Stereotypes Are Hard to Kill". The Moscow Times. 9 August 2015.
  219. ^ "Will the cliche of the 'Russian baddie' ever leave our screens?". The Guardian. 10 July 2017.
  220. ^ "Russian film industry and Hollywood uneasy with one another." Fox News. 14 October 2014
  221. ^ Khruscheva, Nina (27 August 2014). "As if things weren't Badenov: Even in good times, Russians are villains in Hollywood". Reuters. Archived from the original on 31 August 2014.
  222. ^ Kurutz, Steven (17 January 2014). "Russians: Still the Go-To Bad Guys". The New York Times. Retrieved 18 January 2014.
  223. ^ Queenan, Joe (14 November 2014). "Comrades in arms: why big-screen bad guys are always Russian". The Guardian.
  224. ^ Donald, Ella (28 July 2017). "From Russia, With Love: the Sudden Resurgence of the Soviet Villain". Vanity Fair.
  225. ^ Alex Horton (November 5, 2019). "The new Call of Duty game casts Russians as villains. It sparked an online revolt". The Washington Post.
  226. ^ "Russian derangement syndrome". The Japan Times. 2 June 2020.
  227. ^ a b Tony Wilson, Russophobia and New Zealand-Russian Relations, 1900s to 1939, New Zealand Slavonic Journal, (1999), pp. 273-296
  228. ^ Barratt, Glynn (1981). Russophobia in New Zealand, 1838-1908. Dunmore Press. ISBN 978-0-908564-75-0.
  229. ^ Matthee 1999, p. 221.
  230. ^ Kazemzadeh 1991, pp. 328–330.
  231. ^ See Hopkirk, Peter. The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia. New York: Kodansha Globe, 1997, ISBN 1-56836-022-3
  232. ^ Bitis, Alexander (30 November 2006). The Origins and Conduct of the Russo-Persian War, 1826–1828. doi:10.5871/bacad/9780197263273.001.0001. ISBN 9780197263273.
  233. ^ "Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946". Foreign Affairs. 28 January 2009.
  234. ^ For Iran's Opposition, ‘Death to Russia’ Is the New ‘Death to America’, 20 July 2009
  235. ^ Naik, Keshav (19 December 2011). "Meet the latest colonizers". The Times of India.
  236. ^ "In Goa Russians, French, Iranians guides are "robbing the daily bread" of Indian guides". India Today, Indo-Asian News Service. 26 April 2013.
  237. ^ "From Russia with love? Well, not really". The Times of India. 25 February 2010.
  238. ^ "Russians, Israelis have 'occupied' Goa's coastal villages: Congress". Deccan Herald. 21 February 2012.
  239. ^ "Russia's 'no mafia in Goa' claim is false: Eduardo". The Times of India. 15 August 2012.
  240. ^ Shaikh, Zeeshan (24 November 2013). "The Shrinking Goa: State caught between clash of cultures,dependence on tourism". The Indian Express.
  241. ^ "Goa cancels Indo-Russian music fest , sparks diplomatic row". Deccan Herald. 1 February 2014.
  242. ^ "Russia strikes off Goa, India from its list of safe travel destinations". Firstpost. 29 November 2015.
  243. ^ "Goa Off Russia's List Of 'Safe' Travel Destinations". HuffPost. 29 November 2015.
  244. ^ Debito Arudou (August 30, 2017). ""Japanese Only" signs come down in Monbetsu, Hokkaido. Finally. It only took 22 years".
  245. ^ Tsuneo Akaha; Anna Vassilieva (2005). Crossing National Borders: Human Migration Issues in Northeast Asia. Monterey Institute of International Studies: United Nations University Press. p. 110. ISBN 978-92-808-1117-9.
  246. ^ Letman, Jon (31 March 2000). "Russian visitors boiling over Japanese bathhouses". Vladivostok News. Archived from the original on 30 September 2007.
  247. ^ "Opinion of Russia". Pew Research Center. 2012. Retrieved 12 August 2013.
  248. ^ "Overview of the Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy (page 4)" (PDF). Public Relations Office, Government of Japan. December 2017. Archived (PDF) from the original on 1 March 2021.
  249. ^ "Anti-Russian protest". Japan Today. 2016. Archived from the original on 17 September 2017.
  250. ^ Goble, Paul. "Kazakhs Increasingly Hostile to Both Russians and Chinese". The Jamestown Foundation (24 July 2018). Archived from the original on 25 July 2018.
  251. ^ "Ukrainian nationalism splashes out on Kazakhstan". Pravda.ru (9 November 2018). 9 November 2018.
  252. ^ "Kazakhstan's troubles switching from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet". TRT World (7 February 2019). Archived from the original on 7 February 2019.
  253. ^ "Putin Downplays Kazakh Independence, Sparks Angry Reaction". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (3 September 2014).
  254. ^ "Sino-Russian border conflicts". www.onwar.com. Archived from the original on 25 February 2019. Retrieved 25 February 2019.
  255. ^ Denisov, Igor. "Aigun, Russia, and China's "Century of Humiliation"". Carnegie Moscow Center.
  256. ^ Kim, Kwangmin (28 March 2018). "Xinjiang Under the Qing". Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History. 1. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.013.13. ISBN 9780190277727 – via oxfordre.com.
  257. ^ Eskridge-Kosmach, Alena N. (12 March 2008). "Russia in the Boxer Rebellion". The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. 21 (1): 38–52. doi:10.1080/13518040801894142. S2CID 143812301.
  258. ^ Kamalakaran, Ajay (30 March 2017). "How a Russia-China political game resulted in Mongolian independence". www.rbth.com.
  259. ^ "The 1929 Sino-Soviet War". kansaspress.ku.edu.
  260. ^ "The Soviets in Xinjiang (1911-1949)". www.oxuscom.com. Archived from the original on 23 October 2008. Retrieved 25 February 2019.
  261. ^ Jones, FC (1949). "XII. Events in Manchuria, 1945–47" (PDF). Manchuria since 1931. London, Oxford University Press: Royal Institute of International Affairs. pp. 224–5 and pp.227–9. Archived from the original (PDF) on 19 December 2013. Retrieved 17 May 2012.
  262. ^ Christian Science Monitor, 12 October 1945, Japanese armies were guilty of appalling excesses, both in China and elsewhere, and had the Russians dealt harshly with only Japanese nationals in Manchuria this would have appeared as just retribution. But the indiscriminate looting and raping inflicted upon the unoffending Chinese by the Russians naturally aroused the keenest indignation.
  263. ^ Pakula, Hannah (2009). The last empress: Madame Chiang Kai-Shek and the birth of modern China. Simon & Schuster. p. 530. ISBN 978-1-4391-4893-8. Retrieved 28 June 2010.
  264. ^ Heinzig, Dieter (2004). The Soviet Union and communist China, 1945–1950: the arduous road to the alliance. ME Sharpe. p. 82. ISBN 978-0-7656-0785-0. Retrieved 28 November 2010.
  265. ^ Lim, Robyn (2003). The geopolitics of East Asia: the search for equilibrium. Psychology Press. p. 86. ISBN 978-0-415-29717-2. Retrieved 28 November 2010.
  266. ^ Spector, Ronald H (2008). In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle for Postwar Asia. Random House. p. 33. ISBN 978-0-8129-6732-6. Retrieved 28 November 2010.
  267. ^ "Russia and China's anti-West partnership threatens global order". Nikkei Asia.
  268. ^ "Russia and China present a united front to the west – but there's plenty of potential for friction".
  269. ^ "VOICE OF THE PEOPLE Annual Global End of Year Surveys (page 123)" (PDF). Gallup International Association. December 2020.
  270. ^ George Metakides (November 23, 2021). Perspectives on Digital Humanism. Springer Nature. p. 221. ISBN 9783030861445.
  271. ^ "Tracking Global Opinion on the Russia-Ukraine Crisis" (PDF). Morning Consult. February 2022.
  272. ^ 황장진 (2022-02-28). "(LEAD) S. Korean civic groups hold anti-Russia protests, call for peace in Ukraine". Yonhap News Agency.
  273. ^ "[단독] "우크라 전쟁 반대" 부산 러 총영사관에 50대 난입 시도". Hankook Ilbo (in Korean). 2022-02-28.
  274. ^ Poushter, Jacob (31 October 2014). "The Turkish people don't look favorably upon the U.S., or any other country, really". Pew Research Center.
  275. ^ "Türkler kimi sever kimi sevmez?". Vatan (in Turkish). September 29, 2021. Archived from the original on March 13, 2022.
  276. ^ Moufakkir, Omar; Reisinger, Yvette (2012). The Host Gaze in Global Tourism. CABI. p. 58. ISBN 978-1-78064-114-0.
  277. ^ "Russo-Turkish wars | Russo-Turkish history". Encyclopedia Britannica.
  278. ^ Towle, Philip (1980). "British Assistance to the Japanese Navy during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5". The Great Circle: Journal of the Australian Association for Maritime History. Australian Association for Maritime History. 2 (1): 44–54.
  279. ^ "Soviet Financial Aid to Turkey during Independence War | History Forum". Historum.com. 15 May 2013. Retrieved 22 September 2018.
  280. ^ "7 August 1946: Turkish Straits crisis reaches its climax - MoneyWeek". 7 August 2014.
  281. ^ Stack, Liam. "Turkey Shelters Anti-Assad Group, the Free Syrian Army".
  282. ^ "Turkey's downing of Russian warplane - what we know". BBC News. 1 December 2015.
  283. ^ "Turkish troops have entered Syria in a major operation to support anti-Assad rebels". The Independent. 9 October 2017. Archived from the original on 2022-05-07.
  284. ^ Nikolaeva, Evgenia (26 June 2006). Как закалялась "Северсталь" [How "Severstal" was hardened] (in Russian). Izvestija. Archived from the original on 2 July 2006.
  285. ^ Russian: Председатель Госдумы Борис Грызлов, комментируя пропагандистскую кампанию против слияния российской "Северстали" и европейской "Arcelor", заявил, что Россию не хотят пускать на мировые рынки, by Rossijskaya Gazeta 27 June 2006
  286. ^ Russian Politicians See Russophobia in Arcelor's Decision to Go With Mittal Steel, by The New York Times 27 July 2006
  287. ^ "Pravda" on Potomac Archived 29 December 2005 at the Wayback Machine, by Edward Lozansky, Johnson's Russia List, December 2005
  288. ^ Why are the American media, both liberal and conservative, so unanimously anti-Russian? Archived 26 January 2005 at the Wayback Machine, by Ira Straus, Johnson's Russia List, January 2005
  289. ^ Interview with David Johnson Archived 11 February 2009 at the Wayback Machine by the Moscow News, April 2007
  290. ^ "The Conservative Voice". conservativevoice.us. Archived from the original on 30 May 2013.
  291. ^ Belousov, Konstantin; Natalia Zelianskaia (27 February 2007). Рейтинг русофобии: "Newsday" опережает "The Financial Times" на 9 очков [Rating Russophobia: "Newsday" ahead of "The Financial Times" by 9 points] (in Russian). e-generator.ru. Archived from the original on 9 May 2007.
  292. ^ Matveeva, Anna (13 December 2008). "Anna Matveeva: The western media must not spoil the vital relationship between Russia and the west". The Guardian. London.
  293. ^ Tsygankov, Andrei. "The Russophobia Card". Archived 10 October 2008 at the Wayback Machine Atlantic Community. 19 May 2008. Retrieved 17 August 2009.
  294. ^ "Kremlin's Campaign against Russophobia Threatens both Russia and the West, Polish Experts Say". www.interpretermag.com. Retrieved 15 November 2015.
  295. ^ "Four Types of Russian Propaganda". Aspen Institute. Archived from the original on 10 March 2016. Retrieved 11 March 2016.
  296. ^ Bruk, Diana (19 June 2017). "Russophobia Isn't Just Hurting Donald Trump—It's Helping Vladimir Putin". Observer.
  297. ^ Lind-Guzik, Anna (7 June 2017). "American Russophobia is real—and it's helping Putin". Medium.
  298. ^ Greenwald, Glenn (28 February 2017). "The New Yorker's Big Cover Story Reveals Five Uncomfortable Truths About U.S. and Russia". The Intercept.
  299. ^ Komska, Yuliya (29 September 2017). "Morgan Freeman is educating Americans on Russia. That's a problem". The Washington Post.
  300. ^ "Contemporary Russian Nationalism between East and West".
  301. ^ "UK sanctions 65 more individuals and entities – as it happened". The Guardian. 26 March 2022.
  • Senn (1966), p. 32

Sources and further reading

  • Adamovsky, Ezequiel. Euro-orientalism: Liberal Ideology and the Image of Russia in France (c. 1740-1880) (Peter Lang, 2006).
  • Ambrosio, Thomas. "The rhetoric of irredentism: The Russian Federation’s perception management campaign and the annexation of Crimea." Small Wars & Insurgencies 27.3 (2016): 467–490.
  • Ardeleanu, Constantin. "Russophobia, Free Trade and Maritime Insecurity." in The European Commission of the Danube, 1856-1948 (Brill, 2020) pp. 29–49.
  • Buzogány, Aron. "Europe, Russia, or both? Popular perspectives on overlapping regionalism in the Southern Caucasus." East European Politics 35.1 (2019): 93–109. online
  • Feklyunina, Valentina. "Constructing Russophobia." in Ray Taras, ed. Russia's Identity in International Relations (Routledge, 2012). 102–120. online
  • Gleason, John Howes. The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain (1950) online; argues it was product of manupulation by a small group who falsely charged Russia wanted India
  • Grybkauskas, Saulius. "Anti-Soviet protests and the localism of the Baltic republics’ nomenklatura: Explaining the interaction." Journal of Baltic Studies 49.4 (2018): 447-462.
  • Kakachia, Kornely, Salome Minesashvili, and Levan Kakhishvili. "Change and Continuity in the Foreign Policies of Small States: Elite Perceptions and Georgia’s Foreign Policy Towards Russia." Europe-Asia Studies 70.5 (2018): 814–831. online
  • Kazemzadeh, Firuz (1991). "Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921". In Avery, Peter; Hambly, Gavin; Melville, Charles (eds.). The Cambridge History of Iran (Vol. 7). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521200950.
  • Kim, Taewoo. "The Intensification of Russophobia in Korea from Late Chosŏn to the Colonial Period: Focusing on the Role of Japan." Seoul Journal of Korean Studies 31.1 (2018): 21–46.
  • Lieven, Anatol. "Against Russophobia." World Policy Journal 17.4 (2000): 25–32; a review of a modern Russophobia in international politics. online
  • Luostarinen, Heikki. "Finnish Russophobia: The story of an enemy image." Journal of Peace Research 26.2 (1989): 123–137.
  • McNally, Raymond T. "The Origins of Russophobia in France: 1812-1830." American Slavic and East European Review 17.2 (1958): 173–189. online
  • Matthee, Rudolph P. (1999). The Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran: Silk for Silver, 1600–1730. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-64131-9.
  • Mettan, Guy. Creating Russophobia: From the Great Religious Schism to Anti-Putin Hysteria (Clarity Press, 2017)
  • Nitoiu, Cristian. "Towards conflict or cooperation? The Ukraine crisis and EU-Russia relations." Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16.3 (2016): 375–390. online
  • Resis, Albert. "Russophobia and the 'Testament' of Peter the Great, 1812–1980." Slavic Review 44.4 (1985): 681–693; a forgery—fake plan for Russia to win world domination through conquest of the Near and Middle East; designed to cause Russophobia.
  • Taras, Raymond. "Russia resurgent, Russophobia in decline? Polish perceptions of relations with the Russian Federation 2004–2012." Europe-Asia Studies 66.5 (2014): 710–734.
  • Tsygankov, Andrei. Russophobia: Anti-Russian lobby and American foreign policy (Springer, 2009).
  • Wilson, Tony. "Russophobia and New Zealand-Russian Relations, 1900s to 1939." New Zealand Slavonic Journal (1999): 273–296. online

Other languages

  • (in Polish and Russian) ed. Jerzy Faryno, Roman Bobryk, "Polacy w oczach Rosjan — Rosjanie w oczach Polaków. Поляки глазами русских — русские глазами поляков. Zbiór studiów" - conference proceedings; in Studia Litteraria Polono-Slavica; Slawistyczny Ośrodek Wydawniczy Instytutu Slawistyki Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Warszawa 2000, ISBN 83-86619-93-7.

External links

  Media related to Anti-Russian sentiment at Wikimedia Commons   Quotations related to Anti-Russian sentiment at Wikiquote