Korean People's Army
The Korean People's Army (KPA; Korean: 조선인민군; MR: Chosŏn inmin'gun, lit. "Korean People's Military") is an institution of the Workers' Party of Korea,[not verified in body] and constitutes the de facto military forces of North Korea. Under the Songun policy, it is the central institution of North Korean society. Kim Jong-un is its Supreme Commander and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. The KPA consists of five branches: Ground Force, the Navy, the Air Force, the Strategic Rocket Forces, and the Special Operation Force.
|Korean People's Army|
|Founded||25 April 1932|
|Current form||8 February 1948|
|Service branches|| KPA Ground Force|
KPA Air Force
KPA Naval Force
KPA Strategic Force
KPA Special Operation Force
|Headquarters||Pyongyang, North Korea|
|Commander-in-Chief||Marshal Kim Jong-un|
|Minister of the Armed Forces||General No Kwang-chol|
|Chief of the General Staff||Vice Marshal Ri Yong-gil|
|Active personnel||950,000 (ranked 5th)|
|Budget||US$1.6 billion (2018)|
|Percent of GDP||4.9% (2018)|
|Ranks||Comparative military ranks of Korea|
|Korean People's Army|
|Revised Romanization||Joseon Inmingun|
The KPA considers its primary adversaries are the South Korean military and United States Forces Korea, across the Korean Demilitarized Zone, as it has since the Armistice Agreement of July 1953. As of 2016[update], with 5,889,000 paramilitary personnel, it is the largest paramilitary organization in the world. This number serves as 25% of the North Korean population.
Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese guerrilla army, the Korean People's Revolutionary Army, was established on 25 April 1932. This revolutionary army was transformed into the regular army on 8 February 1948. Both these are celebrated as army days, with decennial anniversaries treated as major celebrations, except from 1978 to 2014 when only the 1932 anniversary was celebrated.
In 1939, the Korean Volunteer Army (KVA), was formed in Yan'an, China. The two individuals responsible for the army were Kim Tu-bong and Mu Chong. At the same time, a school was established near Yan'an for training military and political leaders for a future independent Korea. By 1945, the KVA had grown to approximately 1,000 men, mostly Korean deserters from the Imperial Japanese Army. During this period, the KVA fought alongside the Chinese communist forces from which it drew its arms and ammunition. After the defeat of the Japanese, the KVA accompanied the Chinese communist forces into eastern Jilin, intending to gain recruits from ethnic Koreans in China, particularly from Yanbian, and then enter Korea. By September 1945, the KVA had a 2,500 strong force at its disposal.
Just after World War II and during the Soviet Union's occupation of the part of Korea north of the 38th Parallel, the Soviet 25th Army headquarters in Pyongyang issued a statement ordering all armed resistance groups in the northern part of the peninsula to disband on 12 October 1945. Two thousand Koreans with previous experience in the Soviet army were sent to various locations around the country to organize constabulary forces with permission from Soviet military headquarters, and the force was created on 21 October 1945.
The headquarters felt a need for a separate unit for security around railways, and the formation of the unit was announced on 11 January 1946. That unit was activated on 15 August of the same year to supervise existing security forces and creation of the national armed forces.
Military institutes such as the Pyongyang Academy (became No. 2 kPa Officers School in Jan. 1949) and the Central Constabulary Academy (became KPA Military Academy in Dec. 1948) soon followed for the education of political and military officers for the new armed forces.
After the military was organized and facilities to educate its new recruits were constructed, the Constabulary Discipline Corps was reorganized into the Korean People's Army General Headquarters. The previously semi-official units became military regulars with the distribution of Soviet uniforms, badges, and weapons that followed the inception of the headquarters.
The State Security Department, a forerunner to the Ministry of People's Defense, was created as part of the Interim People's Committee on 4 February 1948. The formal creation of the Korean People's Army was announced on four days later on 8 February, the day after the Fourth Plenary Session of the People's Assembly approved the plan to separate the roles of the military and those of the police, seven months before the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was proclaimed on 9 September 1948. In addition, the Ministry of State for the People's Armed Forces was established, which controlled a central guard battalion, two divisions, and an independent mixed and combined arms brigade.
Conflicts and eventsEdit
Before the outbreak of the Korean War, Joseph Stalin equipped the KPA with modern tanks, trucks, artillery, and small arms (at the time, the South Korean Army had nothing remotely comparable either in numbers of troops or equipment). During the opening phases of the Korean War in 1950, the KPA quickly drove South Korean forces south and captured Seoul, only to lose 70,000 of their 100,000-strong army in the autumn after U.S. amphibious landings at the Battle of Incheon and a subsequent drive to the Yalu River. On 4 November, China openly staged a military intervention. On 7 December, Kim Il-sung was deprived of the right of command of KPA by China. The KPA subsequently played a secondary minor role to Chinese forces in the remainder of the conflict. By the time of the Armistice in 1953, the KPA had sustained 290,000 casualties and lost 90,000 men as POWs.
In 1953, the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) was able to oversee and enforce the terms of the armistice. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), made up of delegations from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland, carried out inspections to ensure implementation of the terms of the Armistice that prevented reinforcements or new weapons being brought into Korea.
Soviet thinking on the strategic scale was replaced since December 1962 with a people's war concept. The Soviet idea of direct warfare was replaced with a Maoist war of attrition strategy. Along with the mechanization of some infantry units, more emphasis was put on light weapons, high-angle indirect fire, night fighting, and sea denial.
Commission and leadershipEdit
The primary path for command and control of the KPA extends through the State Affairs Commission which was led by its chairman Kim Jong-il until 2011, to the Ministry of People's Armed Forces and its General Staff Department. From there on, command and control flows to the various bureaus and operational units. A secondary path, to ensure political control of the military establishment, extends through the Workers' Party of Korea's Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea.
Since 1990, numerous and dramatic transformations within the DPRK have led to the current command and control structure. The details of the majority of these changes are simply unknown to the world. What little is known indicates that many changes were the natural result of the deaths of the aging leadership including Kim Il-sung (July 1994), Minister of People's Armed Forces O Chin-u (February 1995) and Minister of People's Armed Forces Choi Kwang (February 1997).
The vast majority of changes were undertaken to secure the power and position of Kim Jong-il. Formerly the State Affairs Commission, from its founding in 1972 (originally the National Defence Commission), was part of the Central People's Committee (CPC) while the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces, from 1982 onward, was under direct presidential control. At the Eighteenth session of the sixth Central People's Committee, held on 23 May 1990, the SAC became established as its own independent commission, rising to the same status as the CPC (now the Cabinet of North Korea) and not subordinated to it, as was the case before. Concurrent with this, Kim Jong-il was appointed first vice-chairman of the State Affairs Commission. The following year, on 24 December 1991, Kim Jong-il was appointed Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army. Four months later, on 20 April 1992, Kim Jong-il was awarded the rank of Marshal and his father, in virtue of being the KPA's founding commander in chief, became Grand Marshal as a result and one year later he became the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, by now under Supreme People's Assembly control under the then 1992 constitution as amended.
Almost all officers of the KPA began their military careers as privates; only very few people are admitted to a military academy without prior service. The results is an egalitarian military system where officers are familiar with the life of a military private and "military nobility" is all but nonexistent.
Within the KPA, between December 1991 and December 1995, nearly 800 high officers (out of approximately 1,200) received promotions and preferential assignments. Three days after Kim Jong-il became Marshal, eight generals were appointed to the rank of Vice-Marshal. In April 1997, on the 85th anniversary of Kim Il-sung's birthday, Kim Jong-il promoted 127 general and admiral grade officers. The following April he ordered the promotions of another 22 generals and flag officers. Along with these changes, many KPA officers were appointed to influential positions within the Korean Workers' Party. These promotions continue today, simultaneous with the celebration of Kim Il-sung's birthday and the KPA anniversary celebrations every April and since recently in July to honor the end of the Korean War. Under Kim Jong-il's leadership, political officers dispatched from the party monitored every move of a general's daily life, according to analysts similar to the work of Soviet political commissars during the early and middle years of the military establishment.
Today the KPA exercises full control of both the Politburo and the Central Military Commission of the WPK, the KPA General Political and General Staff Departments and the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces, all having KPA representatives with a minimum general officer rank. Following changes made during the 4th session of the 13th Supreme People's Assembly on 29 June 2016, the State Affairs Commission has overseen the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces as part of its systemic responsibilities. All members of the State Affairs Commission have membership status (regular or alternate) on the WPK Political Bureau.
Conscription and terms of serviceEdit
North Korea has universal conscription for males and selective conscription for females with many pre- and post-service requirements. Article 86 of the North Korean Constitution states: "National defense is the supreme duty and honor of citizens. Citizens shall defend the country and serve in the armed forces as required by law."
KPA soldiers serve three years of military service in the KPA, which also runs its own factories, farms and trading arms.
The Young Red Guards are the youth cadet corps of the KPA for secondary level and university level students. Every Saturday, they hold mandatory 4-hour military training drills, and have training activities on and off campus to prepare them for military service when they turn 18 or after graduation, as well as for contingency measures in peacetime.
Under the Ministry of People's Security and the wartime control of the Ministry of People's Armed Forces, and formerly the Korean People's Security Forces, the Korean People's Internal Security Forces forms the national gendarmerie and civil defense force of the KPA. The KPISF has its units in various fields like civil defense, traffic management, civil disturbance control, and local security. It has its own special forces units. The service shares the ranks of the KPA (with the exception of Marshals) but wears different uniforms.
Budget and commercial interestsEdit
The KPA's annual budget is approximately US$6 billion. In 2009, the U.S. Institute for Science and International Security reported that North Korea may possess fissile material for around two to nine nuclear warheads. The North Korean Songun ("Military First") policy elevates the KPA to the primary position in the government and society.
According to North Korea's state news agency, military expenditures for 2010 made up 15.8 percent of the state budget. Most analyses of North Korea's defense sector, however, estimate that defense spending constitutes between one-quarter and one-third of all government spending. As of 2003, according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, North Korea's defense budget consumed some 25 percent of central government spending. In the mid-1970s and early 1980s, according to figures released by the Polish Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, between 32 and 38 percent of central government expenditures went towards defense.
North Korea sells missiles and military equipment to many countries worldwide. In April 2009, the United Nations named the Korea Mining and Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) as North Korea's primary arms dealer and main exporter of equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. It also named Korea Ryonbong as a supporter of North Korea's military related sales.
Historically, North Korea has assisted a vast number of revolutionary, insurgent and terrorist groups in more than 62 countries. A cumulative total of more than 5,000 foreign personnel have been trained in North Korea, and over 7,000 military advisers, primarily from the Reconnaissance General Bureau, have been dispatched to some forty-seven countries. Some of the organisations which received North Korean aid include the Polisario Front, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, the Communist Party of Thailand, the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Zimbabwean Fifth Brigade received its initial training from KPA instructors. North Korean troops allegedly saw combat during the Libyan–Egyptian War and the Angolan Civil War. Up to 200 KPAF pilots took part in the Vietnam War, scoring several kills against US aircraft. Two KPA anti-aircraft artillery regiments were sent to North Vietnam as well.
North Korean instructors trained Hezbollah fighters in guerrilla warfare tactics around 2004, prior to the Second Lebanon War. During the Syrian Civil War, Arabic-speaking KPA officers may have assisted the Syrian Arab Army in military operations planning and have supervised artillery bombardments in the Aleppo area.
People's Ground ForceEdit
The Korean People's Navy is organized into two fleets which are not able to support each other. The East Fleet is headquartered at T'oejo-dong and the West Fleet at Nampho. A number of training, shipbuilding and maintenance units and a naval air wing report directly to Naval Command Headquarters at Pyongyang. The majority of the Navy's ships are assigned to the East Fleet. Due to the short range of most ships, the two fleets are not known to have ever conducted joint operations or shared vessels.
People's Army Air Force and Air Defence ForcesEdit
The KPAF is also responsible for North Korea's air defense forces through the use of anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air (SAM) missiles. While much of the equipment is outdated, the high saturation of multilayered, overlapping, mutually supporting air defense sites provides a formidable challenge to enemy air attacks.
People's Strategic Rocket ForcesEdit
The Korean People's Strategic Rocket Forces is a major division of the KPA that controls the DPRK's nuclear and conventional strategic missiles. It is mainly equipped with surface-to-surface missiles of Soviet and Chinese design, as well as locally developed long-range missiles.
Special Forces (11th Sniper Brigade)Edit
The special forces of the Korean People's Army are asymmetric forces with a total troop size of 200,000. Since the Korean War (North Korea: the Korean War of Liberation), it has continued to play a role of concentrating infiltration of troops into the territory of the Republic of South Korea and conducting sabotage.
After the Korean War, North Korea maintained a powerful, but smaller military force than that of South Korea. In 1967 the KPA forces of about 345,000 were much smaller than the South Korean ground forces of about 585,000. North Korea's relative isolation and economic plight starting from the 1980s has now tipped the balance of military power into the hands of the better-equipped South Korean military. In response to this predicament, North Korea relies on asymmetric warfare techniques and unconventional weaponry to achieve parity against high-tech enemy forces. North Korea is reported to have developed a wide range of technologies towards this end, such as stealth paint to conceal ground targets, midget submarines and human torpedoes, blinding laser weapons, and probably has a chemical weapons program and is likely to possess a stockpile of chemical weapons. The Korean People's Army operates ZM-87 anti-personnel lasers, which are banned under the United Nations Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons.
Since the 1980s, North Korea has also been actively developing its own cyber warfare capabilities. As of 2014, the secretive Bureau 121 – the elite North Korean cyber warfare unit – comprises approximately 1,800 highly trained hackers. In December 2014, the Bureau was accused of hacking Sony and making threats, leading to the cancellation of The Interview, a comedy based on the assassination of Kim Jong-un. The Korean People's Army has also made advances in electronic warfare by developing GPS jammers. Current models include vehicle-mounted jammers with a range of 50 kilometres (31 mi)-100 kilometres (62 mi). Jammers with a range of more than 100 km are being developed, along with electromagnetic pulse bombs. The Korean People's Army has also made attempts to jam South Korean military satellites. North Korea does not have satellites capable of obtaining satellite imagery useful for military purposes, and appears to use imagery from foreign commercial platforms.
Despite the general fuel and ammunition shortages for training, it is estimated that the wartime strategic reserves of food for the army are sufficient to feed the regular troops for 500 days, while fuel and ammunition – amounting to 1.5 million and 1.7 million tonnes respectively – are sufficient to wage a full-scale war for 100 days.
The KPA does not operate aircraft carriers, but has other means of power projection. Korean People's Air Force Il-76MD aircraft provide a strategic airlift capacity of 6,000 troops, while the Navy's sea lift capacity amounts to 15,000 troops. The Strategic Rocket Forces operate more than 1,000 ballistic missiles according to South Korean officials in 2010, although the U.S. Department of Defense reported in 2012 that North Korea has fewer than 200 missile launchers. North Korea acquired 12 Foxtrot class and Golf-II class missile submarines as scrap in 1993. Some analysts suggest that these have either been refurbished with the help of Russian experts or their launch tubes have been reverse-engineered and externally fitted to regular submarines or cargo ships. However GlobalSecurity reports that the submarines were rust-eaten hulks with the launch tubes inactivated under Russian observation before delivery, and the U.S. Department of Defense does not list them as active.
A photograph of Kim Jong-un receiving a briefing from his top generals on 29 March 2013 showed a list that purported to show that the military had a minimum of 40 submarines, 13 landing ships, 6 minesweepers, 27 support vessels and 1,852 aircraft.
The Korean People's Army operates a very large amount of equipment, including 4,100 tanks, 2,100 APCs, 8,500 field artillery pieces, 5,100 multiple rocket launchers, 11,000 air defense guns and some 10,000 MANPADS and anti-tank guided missiles in the Ground force; about 500 vessels in the Navy and 730 combat aircraft in the Air Force, of which 478 are fighters and 180 are bombers. North Korea also has the largest special forces in the world, as well as the largest submarine fleet. The equipment is a mixture of World War II vintage vehicles and small arms, widely proliferated Cold War technology, and more modern Soviet or locally produced weapons.
North Korea possesses a vast array of long range artillery in shelters just north of the Korean Demilitarized Zone. It has been a long-standing cause for concern that a preemptive strike or retaliatory strike on Seoul using this arsenal of artillery north of the Demilitarized Zone would lead to a massive loss of life in Seoul. Estimates on how many people would die in an attack on Seoul vary. When the Clinton administration mobilized forces over the reactor at Yongbyon in 1994, planners concluded that retaliation by North Korea against Seoul could kill 40,000 people. Other estimates projects hundreds of thousands or possibly millions of fatalities if North Korea uses chemical munitions.
The KPA possess a variety of Chinese and Soviet sourced equipment and weaponry, as well as locally produced versions and improvements of the former. Soldiers are mostly armed with indigenous Kalashnikov-type rifles as the standard issue weapon. Front line troops are issued the Type 88, while the older Type 58 assault rifle and Type 68A/B have been shifted to rear echelon or home guard units. A rifle of unknown nomenclature was seen during the 2017 'Day of the Sun' military parade, appearing to consist of a grenade launcher and a standard assault rifle, similar to the U.S OICW or South Korean S&T Daewoo K11. It is however more likely that the "grenade launcher" (the large tube present under the rifle) is actually a large helical magazine, similar to that used by the Bizon SMG. North Korea generally designates rifles as "Type XX", similar to the Chinese naming system. On November 15, 2018, North Korea successfully tested a “newly developed ultramodern tactical weapon”. Leader Kim Jong Un observed the test at the Academy of Defense Science and called it a “decisive turn” in bolstering the combat power of the North Korean army.
North Korea has tested a series of different missiles, including short-, medium-, intermediate-, and intercontinental- range, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Estimates of the country's nuclear stockpile vary: some experts believe Pyongyang has between fifteen and twenty nuclear weapons, while U.S. intelligence believes the number to be between thirty and sixty bombs. The regime conducted two tests of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of carrying a large nuclear warhead in July 2017. The Pentagon confirmed North Korea's ICBM tests, and analysts estimate that the new missile has a potential range of 10,400 kilometers (6,500 miles) and, if fired on a flatter trajectory, could be capable of reaching mainland U.S. territory.
On 9 October 2006, the North Korean government announced that it had unsuccessfully attempted a nuclear test for the first time. Experts at the United States Geological Survey and Japanese seismological authorities detected an earthquake with a preliminary estimated magnitude of 4.3 from the site in North Korea, proving the official claims to be true.
North Korea also went on to claim that it had developed a nuclear weapon in 2009. It is widely believed to possess a stockpile of relatively simple nuclear weapons. The IAEA has met Ri Je Son, The Director General of the General Department of Atomic Energy (GDAE) of the DPRK, to discuss nuclear matters. Ri Je Son was also mentioned in this role in 2002 in a United Nations article.
On September 3, 2017, the North Korean leadership announced that it had conducted a nuclear test with what it claimed to be its first hydrogen bomb detonation. The detonation took place at an underground location at the Punggye-Ri nuclear test site in North Hamgyong Province at 12:00 pm local time. South Korean officials claimed the test yielded 50 kilotons of explosive force, with many international observers claiming the test likely involved some form of a thermonuclear reaction.
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