Wikipedia

Saudi Arabia–Turkey relations

(Redirected from Turkey–Saudi Arabia relations)

Saudi Arabia and Turkey relations have long fluctuated between cooperation and alliance to enmity and distrust. Since the 19th century, the two nations have always had a complicated relationship. While Turkey and Saudi Arabia are major economic partners,[1] the two have a tense political relationship, stemming partially from the historic enmity.

Saudi Arabian–Turkish relations
Map indicating locations of Saudi Arabia and Turkey

Saudi Arabia
Turkey

Saudi Arabia has an embassy in Ankara and a consulate general in Istanbul, and Turkey has an embassy in Riyadh and a consulate general in Jeddah. Both countries are members of the World Trade Organization, G20 and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.

According to a 2013 Pew global opinion poll, 26% of Turks express a favourable view of Saudi Arabia while 53% express an unfavourable view.[2] In recent years, tensions between Saudi Arabia and Turkey have mounted and an increasing proxy conflict has begun to emerge between the two states.[3]

Historical background

edit

Historically, the relationship between Turkey and Saudi Arabia has always varied between cooperation and distrust to uncertainty and rapprochement. This is because of the historical enmity between the two nations dated from the Ottoman era.

In the 19th century, the Ottomans entered into a serious conflict with House of Saud, the first Saudi state which resulted in the Ottoman–Saudi War. The war is seen in Saudi Arabia as the first attempt to create an independent state from the Ottoman Empire, while in Turkey, it is often considered to be the war against the Salafi movement. This led to a brutal military reprisal by the Ottoman rulers, which saw the destruction of the First Saudi State and the executions of many religious leaders of the Saudis. For this reason, there is an eternal enmity between the Turks and the Saudis, which is reflected by recent revisionist campaigns in both countries.[4][5][6][7] The Ottoman Empire's collapse following the World War I would eventually lead to the Saudi resurgence and future establishment of modern Saudi Arabia.

The Hashimite rulers of the Hejaz pledged allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan in 1517 following the Ottoman conquest of Egypt, placing the holy cities of Mecca and Medina under Ottoman Protection until the Arab revolt in 1916 when Sharif Hussayn of Mecca expelled them with the aid of Britain. This success was short-lived however, and soon the Saudis expelled the Hashemites from both cities and most of the Hejaz; reducing Hashemite's hegemony to the modern Kingdom of Jordan (though Hashemite monarchs ruled Iraq for several decades in the mid 20th century).

Modern history

edit

Early beginning

edit

Relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia began in 1932, after the creation of the new Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. At the first stage of the relations, Saudi Arabia and Turkey shared a cordial relationship as Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was interested in keeping Turkey safe and friendly with the international community, and tried to avoid religious discord.[8] Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia did not join the World War II and instead maintained neutrality.

In the 1950s, during the Cold War, Turkey joined the short-lived Baghdad Pact, an anti-communist military alliance, while Saudi Arabia, despite also sharing similar anti-communist stance, declined to participate and criticized the pact for its ineffectiveness to deal with Soviet Union.[9]

With the eruption of Iranian Revolution in 1979 and subsequent Iran–Iraq War, both Turkey and Saudi Arabia were the main supporters of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, albeit Turkey quietly supported Iraq and was skeptical to the Shia clergy ruling Iran despite maintaining a neutral face, while Saudi Arabia openly supported Iraq with lethal weapons and finance.[10][11][12] In April 1979, Saudi Arabia provided financial assistance ($250 million) to Turkey to help the latter's attempts to overcome the ongoing economical and financial crisis.[13]

In 1991, with the outbreak of Gulf War, Turkey and Saudi Arabia supported the United States against Iraq, although Turkey didn't participate in the coalition, Ankara opened its air space to aid the coalition, while Saudi Arabia was part of the coalition.[14][15] Also in the 1990s decade, Turkey and Saudi Arabia were sympathetic to the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria against Russia, but did not recognize it.[16][17]

Both Ankara and Riyadh were not friendly to Saddam's Iraq. In 2003, however, both Turkey and Saudi Arabia openly opposed the invasion of Iraq.[18][15]

Since 2010s

edit

From friend to foe

edit

Turkey and Saudi Arabia initially found themselves in alliance when the Arab Spring erupted, mostly because of the Syrian civil war as Ankara and Riyadh were openly opposing Bashar al-Assad, and thus Saudi Arabia and Turkey both financed various anti-Assad forces in the conflict hoping to drive the Syrian dictator out.[19][20][21] However, Turkey also demonstrated support for Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which was opposed by Saudi Arabia, and this had created an uneasy sentiment among Riyadh. In 2013, the Egyptian coup broke out when MB member and then-President of Egypt, Mohamed Morsi, was forcibly removed by pro-Saudi Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Turkey had condemned the move, but it was the first sign of divergence between Ankara and Riyadh.[22][23]

In October 2014, Saudi Arabia successfully campaigned against a Turkish bid for non-permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council due to Saudi opposition to the Turkish stance on the MB.[24]

Qatar diplomatic crisis and the beginning of the tensions

edit

Due to the 2017 Qatar diplomatic crisis, the relationship between Turkey and Saudi Arabia faced problems, with Turkey supporting Qatar against Saudi Arabia in the ongoing diplomatic dispute.

Geoeconomics expert M. Nicolas J. Firzli has argued that the Turkish government has sought to use the crisis to its own advantage, by advancing an expansionist Neo-Ottoman agenda at the expense of the Gulf Cooperation Council:[25]

Turkey and a resurgent Iran for their part are cynically using the festering crisis to advance a distinct agenda: rebuilding military and economic beachheads along the ‘eastern flank’ of the Arabian Peninsula from Oman to Southern Iraq, a part of the world from which they were forced out by the Royal Navy in 1917, precisely one hundred years ago. The local chess board is getting crowded with too many avid players, at a time when many British and American policy makers seem to have lost interest in that part of the world: this doesn’t bode well for the long-term stability of the MENA.

Saudi Arabia, in response, has threatened to impose sanctions against Turkey, and has conducted discussions with the UAE on the topic of curbing "Turkish expansionist policy". In turn, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan accused Saudi Arabia of being non-Islamic and heretics. Furthermore, Turkey has deployed troops to defend the government of Qatar from an attempted coup by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.[26]

On 1 March 2018, Saudi Arabia's MBC channels stopped broadcasting Turkish soap operas dubbed in Arabic to achieve the highest Arab interest.[27]

In March 2018, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman referred to Turkey as part of a "triangle of evil" alongside Iran and Muslim Brotherhood.[28][29]

In August 2018, Turkey backed Saudi Arabia in its dispute with Canada, rejecting the Canadian actions as a "form of interference in other countries’ internal affairs".[30]

Murder of Jamal Khashoggi

edit

On 2 October 2018, Saudi journalist and The Washington Post writer Jamal Khashoggi was killed in the Saudi Arabian consulate in Istanbul; the move was considered as a turning point on the future hostility between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. It has been widely alleged that he was killed by the Saudi government, including by Erdogan, although he has refrained from criticizing Saudi Arabia directly and has instead suggested the blame lies with Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman.[31][32]

After the incident, Prince Mohammad rejected the concept of a rift with Turkey, stating, "Many are trying to … drive a wedge between Saudi Arabia and Turkey. … They will not be able to do it as long as there is a King Salman, a Mohammad bin Salman and a President Erdogan."[33]

Almost a month after Khashoggi's death, Erdogan directly accused the Saudi government of murdering the journalist. Erdogan said, "We know that the order to kill Khashoggi came from the highest levels of the Saudi government." He also said that "the puppet masters behind Khashoggi's killing" would be exposed.[34] Yasin Aktay, a Turkish official and adviser to Erdogan believes Khashoggi's body was dissolved in acid after being dismembered. He said, "The reason they dismembered Khashoggi's body was to dissolve his remains more easily. Now we see that they did not only dismember his body but also vaporised it."[35]

Further deterioration

edit

Turkey and Saudi Arabia also clash for influence regarding other Muslim countries, notably Sudan. Sudan was once a former ally of Iran, but has cut off relations with Iran since 2015 to support Saudi Arabia's war efforts in Yemen. However, Sudanese fear of Saudi Arabian influence facilitated then-dictator Omar al-Bashir to get closer to Turkey, resulting in the lease of Suakin to Turkish contractors.[36][37] According from Turkish media, Saudi Arabia has been deeply skeptical over Turkish presence in Sudan, out of fear that Turkey is attempting to take Sudan away from Saudi influence and threaten Saudi Arabia's security.[38]

Saudi Arabia condemned the 2019 Turkish offensive into north-eastern Syria.[39] In response, Erdogan criticised the death toll in the Saudi-led intervention in the Yemeni civil war.[40]

The movie Kingdoms of Fire, aired by MBC in 2019, was partially financed by Saudi Arabia, further exacerbated by the portrayal of the Ottoman Turks as violent, ruthless and uncivilized people. This had drawn criticism in Turkey.[41][42]

The 2020 Baghdad International Airport airstrike, where Iranian general Qasem Soleimani was assassinated by the United States, had revealed the complicated nature of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Turkey, with both countries secretly approving the airstrike with hope to remove a grave threat from Iran to both countries' ambitions in the Middle East.[43][44][45]

In February 2020, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir accused Turkey of financing and sponsoring the "extremist militias" in Somalia, Libya and Syria,[46] Saudi Arabia also moved to block all Turkish websites in Saudi Arabia. In response, Ankara announced it would block all Saudi and Emirati websites in the country.[47]

In September 2020, during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Saudi Arabian TV channel Al Arabiya had broadcast the speech of Armenian President Armen Sargsyan accusing Turkey and Azerbaijan of inflaming the conflict.[48] In response, Turkish leader Erdoğan accused Arab countries of destabilising peace in Middle East and Caucasus, causing anti-Turkish sentiment to spread in Saudi Arabia as Saudi officials called for boycott against Turkish goods.[49] This was rebutted by the Saudi who said they were committed to international treaties relating to trade. But the boycott seemed to have caused serious inflictions into the trade, as Maersk advised his clients to be aware of the Saudi ban on Turkish goods, and also Turkish business associations in Turkey appealed to the Turkish Government to find a solution for the conflict. It appeared that not only Turkish goods are targeted but also products "Made in Turkey" from foreign companies.[50]

Armenian genocide

edit
See also: Armenian genocide

Saudi Arabia had traditionally supported Turkey over the Armenian genocide. However, due to the increasing deterioration of Saudi–Turkish relations, Saudi Arabia has started to raise the Armenian issue. In 2019, Saudi Arabia agreed to sponsor recognition of the genocide in the United States Congress, whereby Saudi Princess Reema bint Bandar Al Saud, Saudi Arabia's first female ambassador to the United States, condemned Turkey.[51] The genocide has been formally recognized by the United States in statements, resolutions, and legal submissions several times, including in 1951, 1975, 1984, and 1996, before being officially recognized in a resolution in both houses in 2019 United States resolution on Armenian Genocide.[52]

Anti-Turkish coalition

edit

In August 2020, Mossad's chief Yossi Cohen, on his statement to the Saudi, Egyptian and Emirati counterparts, had openly named Turkey as a new threat for the peace of the region, and even further single out a number of allies Turkey would gain potential support like Azerbaijan and Qatar, the former has strong relations with Israel since 1990s.[53] Both Saudi Arabia, Israel, Greece, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have viewed Turkish expansionism under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan represent a new danger for the Middle East since 2018, due to ongoing conflicts with Turkey in Syria, Iraq, Sudan and Libya, with Saudi expert Saud al-Sarhan viewing it as mirroring the Ottoman pan-Islamist policies in World War I.[54]

Palestine

edit

In an interview in October 2020, Saudi Prince and former Saudi ambassador to the United States, Bandar bin Sultan Al Saud, blasted the Palestinian leadership for its incompetence as well as singling Turkey, alongside Iran, accusing Ankara of abusing the Palestinian cause for Turkish profits.[55][56] The Turkish government of Erdoğan has recently lashed out Saudi Arabia and other Arab states for betraying Palestine.[57]

Reconciliation

edit

Following the election of Joe Biden as president of the United States in November 2020, Saudi Arabia, whose government had been given a free hand by the Donald Trump administration, and Turkey, whose economy had been additionally hit by Saudi Arabia's unofficial trade embargo on Turkish goods, appeared to make tentative attempts at rapprochement.[58][59][60][61][62] However, Turkey's support of the Muslim Brotherhood combined with Saudi Arabia's emerging alliance with Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, the two fellow Arab nations that had been openly hostile to Turkey, and also with Israel, Cyprus and Greece, were said to make prospects of such rapprochement dubious.[58][59][63][64] Azerbaijan relations with Saudi Arabia also deteriorated but Azerbaijan relations with Turkey remain close.

In the beginning of 2021, Turkey's leadership was especially concerned and alarmed by rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Greece, Turkey's arch-enemy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey's hopes for reconciliation with Saudi Arabia were believed to have been dashed in mid-March 2021, as Saudi F-15C fighter jets landed in the Greek island of Crete to participate in a training exercise with Greece, a move being seen as Saudi Arabia's response in kind to Turkey's policies in Saudi Arabia's neighbourhood.[65]

According to CNN, Turkey's president Erdogan said in January 2022 that his first visit to Saudi Arabia since 2017 will be in February 2022. President Erdogan visited Saudi Arabia on 23 June 2022 and met Mohammed bin Salman and they want to boost their economic relations. Emirati-Turkish reconciliation in 2021, followed by Turkey's decision to move Khashoggi case to the Saudi judicial system and lack of support from Biden administration to Saudi Arabia, paved a way for Saudi-Turkish reconciliation efforts.[66][67] Following the talks between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan in June, the two countries said they discussed improving relations and investment in sectors from energy to defence among others.[68] Saudi Arabia pledged to increase its assistance and boost Turkish economy aftermath of the 2023 Turkey–Syria earthquake.[69][70]

Turkish Super Cup controversy

edit

The Turkish Football Federation reached an agreement with Saudi Arabia to host the 2023 Turkish Super Cup between Galatasaray and Fenerbahçe.[71] The match was scheduled to take place at the Al-Awwal Park in Riyadh, in December 2023. This decision, however, sparked significant backlash from Turkish fans as they strongly advocated for the intercontinental derby, recognized as the biggest football match in Turkey, to be played in Turkey in commemoration of the 100th Anniversary of the Republic of Turkey.[72]

Fenerbahçe and Galatasaray, requested to warm up wearing t-shirts featuring Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and carrying banners with his quotes such as "Peace at Home, Peace in the World" and "How happy is the one who says I am a Turk", in the opening ceremony. However, Saudi Arabian officials, citing international regulations and agreements previously made with the Turkish Football Federation, refused to incorporate these requests into the existing protocol before the match.[73] In response to this disagreement, both sides refused to play, resulting in the cancellation of the match. The clubs' decision not to play received widespread support across Turkey.[74][75][76]

Views towards Iran

edit

Turkey has played a very edgy role in the Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict.[77] Turkey is engaged in a separate proxy conflict with Iran, which backs anti-Turkish forces in Syria, Iraq, Libya, the South Caucasus, and other regions. Saudi Arabia and Turkey are both nearly completely Sunni, but their experiences over the Salafist movement, rivalry over leadership of the Islamic world, and a recent neo-Ottoman outlook in Turkey has caused extreme distrust between the two countries. Turkey has rejected Saudi requests to join the Yemeni Civil War.[78][79] Turkey and Saudi Arabia often fluctuate between antagonism and alliance. During the Syrian Civil War, Turkey and Saudi Arabia support the Syrian opposition against the Iranian-backed President Bashar al-Assad, but Turkey has sought to back the moderate forces, and Saudi Arabia has supported the radicals in the opposition and so tensions are caused between both countries.[80][81] The Russian intervention forces Turkey and Saudi Arabia to have a level of compromise, but mutual distrust has hampered the process.

Outside Syria and Yemen, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have also clashed vying for influence in the Libyan Civil War. Turkey has been throwing significant support to the Islamist-backed Government of National Accord in Tripoli, but Saudi Arabia, along with Egypt and the UAE, has supported Khalifa Haftar's House of Representatives in Tobruk.[82][83] The Turkish action has gained support from Iran, which deepened the mistrust with Saudi Arabia.[84]

Turkey has been traditionally refrained from funding Islamic schools, but since the 2010s, it has increasingly funded Islamic schools and resulted in the Saudi perception that Turkey is attempting to eradicate Saudi-funded madrasah.[85] Turkey is attempting to limit Iranian influence but also similarly dislikes Saudi influence.

Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has been neutral toward the Iranian–Turkish proxy conflict but initially supported Turkey against Iran because of the Sunni bond until the blockade of Qatar.[77] Turkey has complex relations with Iran, but Saudi Arabia has had no relations with Iran since the 2016 attack on the Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran; both have a proxy conflict with each other. Saudi Arabia also attempts to maintain relations with Azerbaijan, Turkey's closest ally, but the bond was severely hampered by the Saudi tacit support for Armenia during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.

Resident diplomatic missions

edit
  • Saudi Arabia has an embassy in Ankara and a consulate-general in Istanbul.
  • Turkey has an embassy in Riyadh and a consulate-general in Jeddah.

See also

edit

References

edit
  1. ^ Saudi Arabia/Turkey: Turkish Trade Minister commends Saudi-Turkish relations International Islamic News Agency, 8 February 2010
  2. ^ Saudi Arabia’s Image Falters among Middle East Neighbors Pew Research Global Attitudes Project
  3. ^ "The coming proxy wars between Turkey and Saudi Arabia". BrandeisNOW.
  4. ^ Muhammed Nafih Wafy (24 June 2020). "Why Saudi Arabia's revisionist erasure of its Ottoman history will backfire". alaraby.
  5. ^ "Turkish propaganda ignores Ottoman violations| Arab Observer". 23 July 2020.
  6. ^ "Our humanity obliges us to reject the Turks' early servitude of the Arabs". Al Arabiya English. 30 July 2020.
  7. ^ "Saudi Arabia changes Ottoman 'Empire' to 'occupation' in school textbooks". Middle East Monitor. 29 August 2019.
  8. ^ Turkey-GCC Relations: trends and outlook The Oxford Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies Forum. 2015. Retrieved 1 May 2021
  9. ^ The probable consequences US adherence or non-adherence to the Baghdad Pact CIA 1956. Retrieved 21 May 2021
  10. ^ "Turkey keeps a cautious, neutral eye on Iran-Iraq war". Christian Science Monitor. 31 August 1983.
  11. ^ Turkey and the Middle East Threats and Opportunities
  12. ^ Gerd Nonneman. (2004).The Gulf States and the Iran-Iraq War: Pattern Shifts and Continuities In Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War. Retrieved 21 May 2021
  13. ^ Hearings, Reports and Prints of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (1789-1975). U.S. Government Printing Office. p. 81.
  14. ^ Clyde Haberman (20 January 1991). "War in the Gulf: Turkey's Role in Air Assault Sets Off Fear of Retaliation". The New York Times.
  15. ^ a b Cameron S. Brown (1 March 2007). "Turkey in the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003". Turkish Studies. 8 (1): 85–119. doi:10.1080/14683840601162054. S2CID 144751433 – via Taylor and Francis+NEJM.
  16. ^ Matthew Hedges. (May 2013).Strategic Balancing and Power Play in the North Caucasus - International Implications of the Rise of Chechnya Under Kadyrov
  17. ^ Vakhit Akaev. "Religious–Political Conflict in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria". CA&C Press. Retrieved 1 May 2021.
  18. ^ Madyson Hutchinson Posey. "How Saudi Arabia Is Laying the Foundation for Improved Relations With Iraq". The Heritage Foundation.
  19. ^ Christopher Phillips (11 January 2017). "Eyes Bigger than Stomachs: Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar in Syria". Middle East Policy. 24 (1): 36–47. doi:10.1111/mepo.12250. S2CID 58078499 – via Wiley Online Library.
  20. ^ Liam Stack (27 October 2011). "In Slap at Syria, Turkey Shelters Anti-Assad Fighters". The New York Times.
  21. ^ Saudi Arabian Diplomacy
  22. ^ David Hearst (20 August 2013). "Why Saudi Arabia is taking a risk by backing the Egyptian coup". the Guardian.
  23. ^ Mehmet Yegin (3 July 2016). "Turkey's reaction to the coup in Egypt in comparison with the US and Israel". Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies. 18 (4): 407–421. doi:10.1080/19448953.2016.1196010. hdl:11693/36593. S2CID 148138268 – via Taylor and Francis+NEJM.
  24. ^ "Turkey Loses U.N. Security Council Seat in Huge Upset". Newsweek. 16 October 2014.
  25. ^ M. Nicolas Firzli (17 June 2017). "The Qatar Crisis and the Eastern Flank of the Arab World". Al-Sharq Al-Awasat. Retrieved 18 July 2017 – via Al Sharq Al Awsat www.academia.edu.
  26. ^ "Saudi, UAE coup attempt in Qatar foiled by Turkey". Yeni Şafak. 3 August 2019.
  27. ^ "MBC stops all Turkish TV drama". www.aljazeera.com. March 2018.
  28. ^ "Iran dismisses Saudi talk of 'triangle of evil' as 'childish'". Al-Monitor. 8 March 2018.
  29. ^ "Saudi prince says Turkey part of 'triangle of evil': Egyptian media". Reuters. 7 March 2018.
  30. ^ "Turkish, Saudi foreign ministers discuss ties". Anadolu Agency. 10 August 2018.
  31. ^ Zia Weise (26 October 2018). "Erdoğan's risky Saudi strategy". POLITICO.
  32. ^ Patrick Wintour (23 October 2018). "Erdoğan's Khashoggi speech poses tough questions for Bin Salman". The Guardian.
  33. ^ "MBS chats with Erdogan as Khashoggi leaks flow". Al Monitor. 24 October 2018.
  34. ^ "Khashoggi murder: Turkish leader blames Saudi state directly". BBC News. 2 November 2018. Retrieved 3 November 2018.
  35. ^ "Khashoggi murder: Body 'dissolved in acid'". BBC News. 2 November 2018. Retrieved 2 November 2018.
  36. ^ sabah, daily (26 April 2019). "Turkey to remain on Sudan's Suakin Island for civilian purposes". Daily Sabah.
  37. ^ "Why is Sudan's Suakin island important for Turkey?". Why is Sudan's Suakin island important for Turkey?.
  38. ^ Merve Şebnem Oruç (10 May 2019). "Who is disturbed by Turkey's presence on Sudan's Suakin island?". Daily Sabah.
  39. ^ "Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt condemn Turkey's aggression on Syria". english.alarabiya.net. 9 October 2019.
  40. ^ https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-turkey-erdogan/turkeys-erdogan-lambasts-critics-of-syrian-assault-in-fiery-speech-idUSKBN1WP1EM/ [bare URL]
  41. ^ Yasin Aktay. "Who will 'Kingdoms of Fire' fool? Will it be able to outshine Turkish TV series?". Yeni Şafak (in Turkish). Retrieved 12 October 2020.
  42. ^ Ahmed Megahid. "TV drama challenges historical narrative of Ottoman conquest in the Arab world". The Arab Weekly. Retrieved 12 October 2020.
  43. ^ Cengiz Çandar (8 January 2020). "Is Turkey 'big winner' after Soleimani killing?". Al-Monitor. Retrieved 12 October 2020.
  44. ^ "Saudi Arabia and the Soleimani assassination". TRT World.
  45. ^ Baydar, Yavuz (16 January 2020). "Soleimani's death offers Erdoğan a precious opportunity with Trump". Ahval. Retrieved 12 October 2020.
  46. ^ "Saudi Arabia accuses Turkey of supporting extremist militias in three Arab countries". Middle East Monitor. 14 February 2020. Retrieved 12 October 2020.
  47. ^ "Turkey blocks Saudi and Emirati state news websites". Al Jazeera.
  48. ^ "President of Armenia: Turkey supports Azerbaijan with F-16 fighters". Adarpress. Retrieved 12 October 2020.
  49. ^ "Azerbaijan-Armenia war: Saudi Arabia calls for boycott of Turkish goods, Israel urges NATO action against Turkey". News 24 Hindi. 6 October 2020. Retrieved 12 October 2020.
  50. ^ Laura Pitel; Siemon Kerr (12 October 2020). "Informal Saudi ban on Turkish goods hits global fashion retailers". www.ft.com. Retrieved 12 October 2020.
  51. ^ "Saudi Arabia will financially sponsor Armenian Genocide resolution in U.S." www.aravot-en.am.
  52. ^ "US Senate defies Trump in unanimous vote to recognize Armenian genocide". The Guardian. 12 December 2019. Retrieved 7 October 2020.
  53. ^ Roger Boyes (18 August 2020). "Mossad thinks Turkey is a bigger menace than Iran" – via www.thetimes.co.uk.
  54. ^ "Erdoğan and the Last Quest for the Greenmantle". ICSR. 23 May 2019.
  55. ^ "Saudi Arabia's Prince Bandar bin Sultan calls out Palestinian leaders over peace deal". Al Arabiya English. 5 October 2020.
  56. ^ "Erdogan's 'hypocrisy' over Israel's land grab in Palestine". Arab News. 26 May 2020.
  57. ^ "Turkey's Erdogan criticizes Arab silence over U.S. Middle East plan". Reuters. 31 January 2020 – via www.reuters.com.
  58. ^ a b "Biden Presidency, Economic Realities Spur Turkey-Saudi Rapprochement". Voice of America. 30 November 2020.
  59. ^ a b "Egypt remains skeptical of new Turkish-Saudi rapprochement". Ahval. 24 November 2020.
  60. ^ "Saudi King Reaches Out to Erdogan by Phone as Tensions Simmer". Bloomberg. 21 November 2020.
  61. ^ "Saudi foreign minister: relations with Turkey 'good, amicable'". Reuters. 21 November 2020. Archived from the original on 21 November 2020.
  62. ^ "Saudi Arabia says it seeks a way to end dispute with Qatar". www.aljazeera.com.
  63. ^ Pinar Tremblay (20 October 2020). "Turkey' fears further downward spiral in relations with Saudi Arabia". Al Monitor.
  64. ^ "Report: Israel to allow Saudi to run charities in East Jerusalem to curb Turkey's influence". Middle East Monitor. 25 November 2020.
  65. ^ "Riyadh forges alliance with Greece to face Turkish muscle -flexing, Iran threat". The Arab Weekly. 15 March 2021.
  66. ^ "Erdoğan hosts MBZ as Turkey, UAE seek to repair bilateral ties". Daily Sabah. 24 November 2021.
  67. ^ "Mr. Erdogan Goes to Jeddah, With Brotherly, Neo-Ottoman Hat in Hand". The Arab Gulf States Institute. 6 May 2022.
  68. ^ "Turkey, Saudi Arabia determined to start new period of cooperation - statement". Reuters. 22 June 2022.
  69. ^ "Saudi Arabia drops $5 billion in Turkey's central bank to help its struggling economy". CNBC. 6 March 2023.
  70. ^ "Türkiye, Saudi Arabia sign multiple deals as relations improve". Daily Sabah. 20 March 2023.
  71. ^ "Turkcell Süper Kupa 30 Aralık'ta Suudi Arabistan'da Oynanacak". Turkish Football Federation (in Turkish). 20 October 2023. Retrieved 30 December 2023.
  72. ^ "'Süper Kupa' Suudi Arabistan'da oynanacak! TFF'nin kararına sosyal medyada tepki yağdı: 'Cumhuriyetin 100. yılında...'". Cumhuriyet (in Turkish). 20 October 2023. Retrieved 30 December 2023.
  73. ^ "Galatasaray vs Fenerbahce 'cancelled' before kick-off in Saudi Arabia as teams refuse to play". Daily Mirror. 29 December 2023. Retrieved 29 December 2023.
  74. ^ "Galatasaray - Fenerbahçe Süper Kupa maçında kriz çıktı! Kulüpler destek oldu..." Fanatik (in Turkish). 30 December 2023. Retrieved 31 December 2023.
  75. ^ "Süper Kupa'nın iptali kararına siyasilerden destek geldi". Sözcü (in Turkish). 29 December 2023. Retrieved 31 December 2023.
  76. ^ "Süper Kupa ertelendi, kulüplerden destek paylaşımı yağdı". beIN Sports (in Turkish). Retrieved 31 December 2023.
  77. ^ a b "Enemies or Allies in the New Middle East? Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia | Wilson Center".
  78. ^ "Turkey repeating Ottoman Empire's crimes against Arabs". Arab News. 21 July 2020. Retrieved 1 March 2023.
  79. ^ "How to read Turkey's stance on the Yemen crisis". Al Arabiya English. 29 March 2015.
  80. ^ Bayram Balci. "Turkey's Relations with the Syrian Opposition". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  81. ^ "Saudi Arabia's Motives in the Syrian Civil War". Middle East Policy Council. 7 December 2017.
  82. ^ "Saudis 'gave Libya's Haftar millions of dollars before offensive'". www.aljazeera.com.
  83. ^ "Turkey reaffirms support for Libya's Tripoli government". Anadolu Agency. 6 July 2019. Retrieved 29 October 2020.
  84. ^ "Iran FM voices support for Turkey-backed Libya government". Middle East Monitor. 17 June 2020.
  85. ^ Evangelos Venetis (February 2014). "The Struggle between Turkey & Saudi Arabia for the Leadership of Sunni Islam" (Working Paper). The Middle East Research Project. Retrieved 1 May 2021.
edit
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Saudi_Arabia–Turkey_relations&oldid=1254016657"