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The whole "Galbraith and Holbrooke" bit doesn't make any sense. ie "Regardless of the instructions, Holbrooke and Galbraith considered that the changing situation on the ground allowed them to act otherwise." Do you mean that they changed their minds, that they intended to urge him to stop offensive ops, but then decided that a continuation would be beneficial to the peace process, or what?Y
Thank you very much for the review. I re-read the sentence you pointed out and it is indeed unclear. As far as I can tell from the source on the matter (Galbraith's words on the subject, published by the Guardian) "Washington" (not clear who - the President, Secretary of State or someone else) instructed Holbrooke to ask Tuđman to halt the offensive. From the text, it seems that the message was meant to request HV to cease offensives immediately, but this is just implied as no date or other such indication is given. Knowing that Mistral 2 effectively ended on 13 September - i.e. three days before Holbrooke arrived in Zagreb, I assume this was actually meant to be a request that no further offensives be undertaken (but nothing like that is written in the source at all). According to Galbraith, Holbrooke "saw the advantages – and inherent justice" in VRS losing Banja Luka, and assumed that it would "end for Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic and his bloodthirsty army chief, Ratko Mladic" but were also concerned about civilian losses and refugees if HV indeed captured Banja Luka, implications on Croatian willingness to negotiate/relinquish control after such an event etc. Regarding the change of mind, Galbraith said "While Holbrooke had his instructions, he also felt that the fast evolving situation on the ground in Bosnia gave him enough scope to move in a different direction." The other source used in the paragraph (Marijan) indicates explicitly Holbrooke urged Tuđman to capture Sanski Most, Prijedor and Bosanski Novi/Novi Grad but not Banja Luka. The passage in the source (p.318) itself is referenced to Holbrooke's "To End a War", p. 164-165 edition published in Sarajevo in 1998. Unfortunately I don't have access to the Holbrooke's book right now though.
I made some modifications to the passage in an attempt to make this clearer, hope that works.--Tomobe03 (talk) 13:42, 19 September 2014 (UTC)