Wikipedia:Reference desk/Archives/Science/2018 April 18

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April 18

domestic or wild

Are humans considered domestic or wild animals? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 188.159.34.230 (talk) 08:25, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

Domestic, definitely. We live in homes. Or, maybe not, because no one has breed us selectively (consciously or not) for a specific purpose.

On the other hand, I wonder whether the question makes sense. We define domestic/wild in relationship to humans.--Doroletho (talk) 09:01, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

Humans possess a number of genetic markers of domestication. Abductive (reasoning) 09:18, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

Sure, humans undergo neoteny too. --Doroletho (talk) 10:54, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

This is the "is water wet?" type of question. It's ultimatly an arbitrary semantic distinction that depends on how precisely, and with what definition, you define your terms to start with. The best answer is probably Doroletho's first answer, which is " wonder whether the question makes sense. We define domestic/wild in relationship to humans?" Any attempt to generate a more rigorous answer is likely to generate lots of pointless all-caps writing between two camps who insist they are each right. --Jayron32 12:48, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

See feral child. 92.19.169.232 (talk) 15:43, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

And maybe ponder homeless people. InedibleHulk (talk) 23:57, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

Poul Anderson was very clear on the question, or at least one of his protagonists was. I'm not sure if it was Dominic Flandry or Nicholas van Rijn. Probably Flandry because I don't remember the speech being in broken English. But in any case the answer was "wild", and moreover that that was what they ought to be. --Trovatore (talk) 00:23, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

Agree that this is a mostly nonsensical distinction for humans, but modern people do meet most of the considerations laid out here. Matt Deres (talk) 14:20, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

FYI, in addition to this being an obvious invitation to debate, the OP is now blocked. ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 17:48, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

To clarify, this is no reflection on the OP. The IP has been automatically blocked as a proxy, but then many of the IPs in public libraries are proxies. 92.19.169.232 (talk) 18:03, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

Sure. A public library in Teheran. ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 18:29, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

Google finds "about 175" places matching that description. "About 104" for New York City. One for Scranton, apparently more properly known as a building. InedibleHulk (talk) 05:40, 22 April 2018 (UTC)

See self-domestication. 169.228.147.129 (talk) 03:07, 20 April 2018 (UTC)

How to dissuade conspiracy theorists?

Is there a way to dissuade conspiracy theorists from their conspiracy theories? I've debated conspiracy and fringe theorists before - everything from 9/11 truthers, to anti-vaxxers to climate change deniers. I've been able to occasionally dissuade someone on a particular subpoint, but not the overall theory. Have any psychologists studied this and come up with any effective techniques? Or conspiracy theorists a lost cause? A Quest For Knowledge (talk) 14:12, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

Reasoning will never make a man correct an ill opinion, which by reasoning he never acquired... Jonathan Swift, 1720. If a person has an unreasonable opinion, by definition, that person does not use facts, reason, and logic to arrive at their own opinions. They will be impervious to any attempt to use facts, logic, and reason to get them to change their opinion. It's a lost cause; our role in society should be to marginalize and minimize the effect of such people on the minds of those who may be influenced by them. If they cared about using reason and facts to arrive at their opinions, they already would have done so. --Jayron32 14:24, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

The tendency to search for, interpret, favor, and recall information in a way that confirms preexisting beliefs is called confirmation bias or belief perseverance. It is present to some extent in everyone's thinking. It is probably an adaptive behavior, as taking time to think through every new piece of information from scratch would be dangerous ("What is that stripy thing ? Could it be a tiger ? It certainly looks like a tiger. But maybe it is an illusion. Or maybe I am dreaming ..."). Our article on confirmation bias is very informative. Gandalf61 (talk) 14:31, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

Not an answer but an observation: despite the fact that, as the previous two editors have righly stated, and is in fact widely known, people do not buy into conspiracy theories based on reasoning (how exactly people "fall into" those beliefs has probably been the object of numerous books, dissertations and articles, maybe it resembles the way people join cults and religions, and maybe even some forms of mental disease) nevertheless it is remarkable that conspiracy theories masquerade as logical constructs, pretend to be rational theories (in constrast to cults and religions). I find this remarkable in view of the fact we know that the primary motivation is not rational. I have my own conjecture as to why this is so, but that would be simply stating an opinion which we're not supposed to do here. Basemetal 16:14, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

The issue is that conspiracy theories use acceptable logic protocols (like the scientific method or formal logic or other valid decision making protocols) and flip them on their head. These logical constructs are unidirectional. The start with the null hypothesis (tabula rasa, blank slate, etc.) and then use evidence to provide conclusions regarding truth. That is, you start with a question "Does X happen" and then you gather all available evidence without prejudice, assess the evidence using neutral methods of assessments for reliability, and draw conclusions regarding your initial hypothesis. Conspiracy theorists do this BACKWARDS. They start with the conclusion "What I believe is true", THEN they assess evidence based on whether or not it supports the conclusion THEN they develop questions that lead inexoribly only to their conclusions. That's not reason, that's cherry picking and exactly wrong. The thing about conspiracy theories is they all fail the basic test of falsifiability; in the sense that they have assumed that their conclusion could never be proven wrong because it has already been accepted as right, and then they work backwards to gather "proof". Valid reason works the other way, it starts with a proposition which could actually be wrong as much as it could be right, and then willingly accepts that if it is proven wrong, it is wrong. --Jayron32 16:35, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

Yes Jayron, everything you say is true, except... you misunderstood my point. Note I said those "theories" masquerade as rational theories. That masquerade is precisely what you so well characterized in your reply. However my question was different, namely, why the need to masquerade? What role does that masquerade play in the process of acquiring believers, since we know those believers do not come to that belief based on rational arguments? Are you saying that those people come to those beliefs because they are deluded by the pretense of rationality of those theories and do not notice their logical flaws? I doubt it. I believe they want to be deluded and choose to ignore those flaws when they are pointed out to them. But then why go to all that trouble. Again, what role does that masquerade play? Two of Karl Popper's favorite examples of non-falsifiable pseudo-scientific theories were Psychoanalysis and Marxism, two theories that insist loudly on how scientific they are. I don't think you can call Marxism or Psychoanalysis conspiracy theories. Here I think we know how people come to buy into them. Those people are in general rational, intelligent, honest people that can be genuinely misled by the pretense of rationality and do not see the logical flaws that you mention until after it's too late. Does that work the same in genuine conspiracy theories such as 9/11, Holocaust as a hoax, flat earth, hollow earth, reptilian space invaders or what have you? My question was simply what role does that rational masquerade play in attracting believers, since we know it is not strictly the logic, flawed or not, that brings them there. I guess every conspiracy theory is different and every conspiracy theorist has their own motivation but it'd be interesting to understand the process, conspiracy theory by conspiracy theory. Basemetal 19:43, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

I was expanding on your point, not refuting it. I'm sorry that wasn't clear; I thought that by agreeing with you that would have helped make it obvious. Sorry about that. --Jayron32 23:55, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

No, I didn't suggest you were refuting what I had said, as you in fact analyzed the pseudo-logical structure of those theories extremely well, just that you left one point out, which is of particular interest to me, namely the question why are they structured that way? how does it help them gain adherents? when we know reasoning and argumentation has nothing to do with it. Of course no one is under any obligation to answer all the questions everbody asks, but I was hoping to hear something about that. Ok, so I'll state my conjecture, which is strictly OR. I'm hoping to hear some sourced data in response if anybody has any: my guess is that their pseudo-logical structure is a kind of weaponization. They are structured like this not so much to convince their adherents, as to give their adherents arguments to answer those who debate them. It doesn't matter that those arguments are flawed, it still gives them something to say in a debate. It may have to do with the fact that we live in a world where the rational, scientific paradigm has gain such preeminence that even they are forced to acknowledge it and disguise their theories as logical constructs (of course we know, as you characterized them, very flawed ones). This is how creationism, that meant simple blind adherence to the words of the Bible, became "intelligent design", supposedly an alternative scientific theory. I assume a conspiracy theory in the 17th century did not need to do that. In fact we would not even call it a conspiracy theory. But in the 20th century they have willy nilly to conform to the main paradigm (even though they in some sense deny it). Anyway, that is strictly OR as I said, I'm hoping to hear some real data from you or anyone who's run into reliable rigorously researched stuff on this question. Basemetal 00:49, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

We scientists categorically suffer a deficency in formal study of rhetoric; we presume - with neither evidence nor proof! - that the best method of persuasion is a method that relies on correctness. Our equally-intelligent peers who spend just as many years specializing in the social sciences and liberal arts will often trump our case by relying on the defeasible argument - things that we would like to debase as "logical fallacies" or "invalid arguments". Viz., contrast two cases for and against a simple fact: "the earth is ROUND and we have collected of a plethora of observational evidence," opposed against the perhaps more convincing counter-argument, "the earth is flat and I will punch you." The latter argument does not depend on being correct, or reasonable; you cannot win that argument by disagreeing and proving; you cannot win that argument even by accepting the opposing case; as a rhetorical method, it depends on no assumptions; as a means of persuasion, it is faster, more efficient, and more robust than almost any other reasonable method. If we apply academic deconstruction to the argument's rhetorical style, or try to parse whether our opponent's use of the logical conjunction was unintentional, we are punched before we even establish the premises, and long before we follow the premises to their illogical conclusion.

The moral of this story, perhaps, is that we - as scientists - should not immediately assume we will triumph simply because we are correct. If our objective is to be correct, our scientific methodology and its logical underpinnings are our most powerful armament. If our objective is to win, we may often have no recourse except to rely on "incorrect" methods.

Nimur (talk) 16:52, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

...and when we adopt this wisdom and its methodology, we may defeat our opponent without consequence, because even though though it is incorrect to punch somebody - most places have laws against assault! - the legal system is not held to the same standards of "completeness and correctness" that we demand in, say, a proof of a theorem of abstract algebra. Nimur (talk) 17:07, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

The simple answer is NO. For example, no amount of evidence will make a flat-earther change his mind about the earth being flat. And the nature of the earth is one of the more easily demonstrable facts. ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 17:52, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

The OP didn't ask for a method using evidence. They asked 'Is there a way to dissuade conspiracy theorists from their conspiracy theories?'. And there are ways to do that. It is very difficult though - you have to gain their trust and respect and the people they respect are people who are on the same wavelength as them. Dmcq (talk) 20:35, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

There are all kinds of cognitive biases (here is an extensive list of cognitive biases which are worth studying, avoiding and/or exploiting) and a quick google search on the term "influence" brings up psychologist's Robert Cialdini's book Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion and he also wrote Influence: Science and Practice. Just how deluded, incompetent, intelligent, informed and receptive any audience is, is going to vary a great deal. Moreover, you can't easily influence or "convince" trolls who don't care or likely know that they get it all wrong or probably wrong, because they are getting rewarded in some way (money, attention, humor, esoteric "expertise", etc) regardless of how absurd their dress-it-up make-it-up crack-pottery they espouse is. Then there are the large number of incompetents (that seem to be over-represented in most areas) that don't know or barely know any of the science. Add to that wide-spread preconceptions, misconceptions, and group think, better (saner) explanations might be perceived as flawed, therefore cranks will go to great lengths to gloss over gaping holes in order to maintain their paradigms. Obviously it can be hard to combat that if they are deluded too, but it is possible to be persuasive, and Cialdini has written several books on this topic. -Modocc (talk) 21:25, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

As fabled BS artist and sketchy limousine explosion survivor Vince McMahon once (allegedly) reasoned "I can't be on TV if I'm dead." That's not to say you should blow up their limos, only that it (in theory) would make them forget everything they think they know about everything forever. Not great for persuasional pursuits, though, which are the better ideas in the long run.

To that end, I suggest simply empowering and assuring them. Sounds like a dumb idea, but my crazy friend here says kooks like conspiracy because they have too little of one and not enough of the other. Perhaps with more confidence, they could find the strength to admit they're wrong about a less important lie they had to cling to before. Or perhaps they could turn into ultraconfident superloons with the potential to trump Trump. Latter's less likely, in my own humble opinion. InedibleHulk (talk) 23:01, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

That link squares with what I've observed over the years: Believers in these goofy theories generally feel powerless. By latching onto one or more conspiracy theories, they feel like they have some sort of "inside" knowledge that the general public is oblivious to, and hence have more power. ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 23:22, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

Powerless and uncertain. Many powerful people believe things simply for not knowing them as well as they feel they should. But when you know the truth, you don't need to convince anyone about "the truth", especially online. InedibleHulk (talk) 23:44, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

Yes, which is why it's pointless to debate conspiracy theorists except when they try to impose their wacko theories on Wikipedia. The debate over the moon landing stuff still burns in my memory. ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 00:48, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

Uv dat dey ain’t no doubt. InedibleHulk (talk) 01:21, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

• From what I've read, counting racism as one of the most vile conspiracy theories out there, it takes a lot of patient and kind interaction with the hated ethnicity. There may be an "AHA!" moment where it finally clicks that all humanity deserves love, but it's still not an overnight thing.

There's also young earth creationists who advocate a conspiracy theory that evolution is atheist propaganda. Regular, calm, and patient interaction with co-religionists who also happen to accept evolution takes a lot of the bite out of their arguments. They might still occasionally push that we should "teach the controversy" and insist that the world is only 6000 years old, but they throw far fewer hissy-fit tantrums over evolution being the mainstream scientific consensus than YECers who are convinced that evolution is a religious doctrine.

I've also seen that a lot of conspiracy theorists are using the conspiracy theory to displace their worry. Worried about not getting a date? Imagine that some sort of feminazi conspiracy is out to emasculate alpha males, instead of considering reasons why women may not want to date you. Worried about keeping a steady job? Blame immigrants instead of automation shifting the job market from manufacturing to service to... whatever will be left once AI takes off. Helping them make themselves aware of what their real worries are, helping them make themselves aware that their understanding of the "other side" is really a rage totem constructed to enforce a group identity, and helping them learn what similarities they have with the "other side"* to see them as allies (even if they still disagree with them) are all tricky but the surest way to make them give up on these conspiracy theories in these cases. Unfortunately, it's entirely dependent on catching a Teachable moment and knowing how to phrase things so they like what they hear and interpret it as their own realization.

^*

Except Nazis, because the only thing that distinguishes Nazis from any other fascist or nationalist ideology is successful genocide.

Ridicule is a double edged sword. Someone who is open to conspiracy theories might be dissuaded from looking further into that particular conspiracy theory. Devout believers, however, will view it as persecution and triple their volume. Ian.thomson (talk) 23:27, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

Regarding your comment about the Nazis, they were hardly the only ideology to successfully commit genocide -- Islam has done the same, and so did communism, so you should apply the same yardstick to all of them and by your own standards conclude that there can therefore be no common ground with them either! 2601:646:8E01:7E0B:792F:2CDD:A29B:FC67 (talk) 01:29, 20 April 2018 (UTC)

The Armenian genocide was a specific combination of religion and politics. There's a variety of forms of Islam that haven't engaged in genocide, so blaming Islam for that would be like blaming Christianity for the Holocaust. The deaths resulting from Communism are not as inherent to the ideology as they are for Naziism (where genocide was a goal), but the result of Stalin's and Mao's desire to maintain power. Blaming all political philosophies that could be called Communist would be like blaming Democracy for the slavery in the US and treatment of Native Americans. If you want to blame Stalinism, Maoism, Jacksonian Democracy, etc... that's almost closer to the point (except, again, destruction of non-"Aryans" was a goal of Naziism). Ian.thomson (talk) 02:25, 25 April 2018 (UTC)

Basemetal asks "why". Why? There are probably as many reasons at their are conspiracy theorists, but a few stick out pretty often: 1) Because they are the last believers in an ordered universe, where everything happens according to someone's plan, and since evil things happen, that someone must be evil, and the plan must be very bad; 2) Because there is a certain joy in knowing a secret that no one else does; related, 3) There is a certain joy in being special, in being smarter than all the sheep who can't see what is real; 4) Because however someone arrived at a belief, they have an absolute pathological aversion to ever admitting they might be wrong, building ever more elaborate explanations to avoid the ignominy of having to admit a mistake; and related, 5) some people legitimately suffer from persecutory delusions, in which they believe that anyone who wrongs them for any reason (including such simple things as simply pointing out a mistake they made) must be part of a grand conspiracy against them. That is why they start with the premise, "I am right", and then from there it's just motivated reasoning in an effort to convince themselves that is still the case. Someguy1221 (talk) 01:05, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

Hence the popularity of this oldie:[1] ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 01:14, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

LOL. (Or sigh). Thank you Someguy. I did ask "why". But not "why are there conspiracy theorists, conspiracy theories and people who believe in them?". There's no doubt these are extremely interesting questions but this was not my question. I asked why something else. I tried to be as clear as I could but apparently I failed. Basemetal 02:15, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

Oh right, well, to get to the "why" that you actually asked, it's very simple: cognitive dissonance. Or more specifically, it's a means to cope with it. Cognitive dissonance itself is merely the act of believing two contradictory things at the same time. The exciting bit is how people do this. You need a way to protect your brain from the pain of contradiction by convincing yourself that the two facts do not contradict one-another. It often surprises people to find out that a lot of conspiracy theorists are actually highly intelligent. Some are even successful businessmen, scientists or engineers. How and why would a person like this believe something so ludicrous as the Sandy Hook conspiracies, for instance? The answer, I think, starts with something from the list I gave above, and then proceeds through cognitive dissonance. Take a smart person who simultaneously believes that A) He is a smart person who makes decisions based on a rational, logical, explicable thought process; and B) alien lizard people comprise a secret jewish islamic atheist deep state that is out to destroy Donald Trump and take away mah guns so that everyone will be gay. The arguments for thought 'B' have to masquerade as scientific, or else the theorist can't believe thought 'A' in his head. He has to render the theory so intricate and convoluted that it simultaneously appears to be scientific but is actually unfalsifiable, so he can pretend it's science without ever having to face being wrong. It has to be complicated enough that he can fool himself. You know, that, or he's actually just insane. It can be hard to tell, and sometimes it seems like one can lead to the other. Someguy1221 (talk) 03:06, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

Asking detailed questions and letting the believer in the conspiracy theory do most to the talking, may work. This method can also be used more in general where someone believes in something that's inconsistent with the evidence, take e.g. a believer in homeopathy or astrology. Most people are capable of rationally analyzing a problem, they are able to apply rational reasoning to their pet theories and come to the conclusion that it's all nonsense, but for various reasons mentioned in this thread, they choose to not do that. If you then talk to such a person not by lecturing why what they believe in is wrong, but instead ask questions about issues that don't seem to add up and let them just go on explaining that in detail, they can't go on the defensive and invoke the usual conspiracies anymore. So, it's then not about what their opponents are supposedly doing, but it's purely about what they themselves believe in. Count Iblis (talk) 04:29, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

I can see that falling into accidental indoctrination, though. If you ask a hardcore believer about the things that don't add up, they'll reply that either:

• the evidence is wrong or a forgery by the conspirators,
• the evidence doesn't really contradict the conspiracy theory in the light of this other part of the conspiracy theory,
• the mainstream "account" contains mistakes too and scientists don't know everything, so therefore it's not an issue if the conspiracy theory does not yet explain every facet of reality.

Softcore believers could very well decide "ok, this does seem ridiculous," but this could also become an opportunity for them to start studying the conspiracy theory even more.

Most conspiracy theorists (the ones who didn't need to be on serious medication) I've encountered use conspiracy theories to displace some other fear that they'd feel powerless to change (or else would have to drop some deep-seated personality trait). Without that situation changing, they're less likely to abandon that paranoid mental crutch. Ian.thomson (talk) 05:02, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

Btw, that is called the Socratic method. Someguy1221 (talk) 04:42, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

I know people talk about being in an in-group and countering fear. However I wonder if a lot of it isn't an exaggerated form of needing an explanation. One thing a lot of people do is just go for an explanation even if they don't have enough evidence of anything, they just don't seem able to say I don't know yet. Combine that with needing to defend their oown explanations and you're halfway towards a conspiracy theory. Dmcq (talk) 08:42, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

When reading this abstract one will encounter a misspelling. A missing symbol strongly associated with love and persecution complexes... it's mind-blowing, even insane, or at least entertaining, how events are movers of thought and vice versa. Like NPR's Wait Wait Don't Tell Me's entertaining Bluff the Listener. Some listeners are simply better at distinguishing what is a real scoop or not than others and karma rocks. InedibleHulk's reference states "We are constantly fabricating or “discovering” stories that seem to explain the world." So yes we are doing that, and I cringe when people are unfairly targeted and scapegoated... Damn the grocery store tabloids and the doomsday cults. Sadly.... history.. is replete.... with people that have conspired to jail and kill dissidents, plunder them, nuke, behead and otherwise destroy their enemies, assault each other, mob one another, pillage and subjugate the vanquished (take away their guns as well as enslave them), cheat the suckers, lie incessantly, corrupt the government with insane experiments and tweet propaganda about it. And the gerrymandering and racketeering and the bloody operations and conspiracies, or the mundane comedians are not even wacky stories... sniff. <sigh> The 1977 study with the misspelling I linked to asserts that any truth that involves correlations and/or contingencies can be difficult to process thus our minds take short-cuts, but can get them wrong. Moreover, I very recently read a study that showed that intuitive people are better on average at discovering patterns in images. That's useful if people can filter those patterns appropriately and are thus able to better explore, discover and learn... or become paranoid theorists in their old age if they have impaired executive functions. --Modocc (talk) 14:37, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

I can't help but notice you mispelled three ellipses in two entirely distinct ways there. Was that some sort of political statement? Or is it a code? InedibleHulk (talk) 22:36, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

In my mind's eye it represents placing and removing the football. So the answer to both your questions is yes. Modocc (talk) 03:25, 20 April 2018 (UTC)

I think it is a lost cause. In my opinion, a "conspiracy theory" is what we used to call a "paranoid delusion". Bubba73 ^{You talkin' to me?} 17:21, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

I google imaged the old joke "Just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they're not out to get you." Hundreds of variations of it exist, as prints, T-shirts, whatever. That's the philosophy of the typical conspiracy theorist. ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 17:46, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

People are still free to have paranoid delusions without any semblance of conspiracy. Monsters at the foot of the bed, for instance, are usually lone wolves. Figuratively, of course. They're literally more closely related to bats. The point is, they're terrifying for their own sakes and their perceivers', nobody else's business. Same with the idea that these beasts are born when a tree falls in the forest and nobody's around to disprove it; they don't kill your dogs and enter your shack late at night for any convoluted reason that could gain traction online, they're just scared, too. Boring and true, I tell ya! InedibleHulk (talk) 22:51, 19 April 2018 (UTC)

My feeling is that there "conspiracy theories" and disinformation are intimately related. If a lot of people are saying something crazy, there's a fair chance there's a conspiracy behind that. For example, the whole idea of manganese nodule mining started out as a massive CIA conspiracy to lie about a sunken nuclear submarine. [2] Many nasty stories about political figures were distributed during COINTELPRO. In cases like that you can scarcely tell what's going on because the stories were very plausible; by contrast there was the "Roswell UFO crash" where some low-level military guy was apparently given the advice to 'tell them anything' about one of those Mylar weather balloons used to spy on the Soviets. Some of the more popular conspiracy theories don't have fingerprints, but they certainly seem to have political utility to someone. Focusing on "second gunmen" in the JFK assassination is a distraction from the fact that Lee Harvey Oswald had a Communist background and was a defector to the Soviet Union, who plausibly might (or might not) have been ordered by Soviet authorities to carry out the attack. Focusing on explosives inside the World Trade Center might be a distraction from the question of whether an international military-industrial complex might have connived some agreement with bin Laden to encourage him to start decades of war. The "chemtrail" conspiracy idea distracts from the fact that there are chemical tanks on every airplane, i.e. fuel tanks, which emit geoengineering-worthy levels of unregulated sulfur dioxide that authorities don't crack down on (despite causing more than a thousand deaths annually) because it might cool the planet by about six months' worth of global warming. Etcetera. For every valid idea there are crazy interpretations (though never so often as in physics...), and it is even possible that behind every crazy notion is some primordial germ of valid truth. Wnt (talk) 16:21, 21 April 2018 (UTC)

You mean that many conspiracy theories have themselves been created for the express purpose of disinformation (9/11 conspiracy theories being a case in point!) 2601:646:8E01:7E0B:0:0:0:9A39 (talk) 02:13, 25 April 2018 (UTC)

C4

Any idea why C4 is called C4? Did there where yet in history bombs called C1, C2, C3 which weren't so effective like the 4th Generation or did it where called C4 since the invention of it? --Saegen zeugen des sofas jehovas (talk) 20:29, 18 April 2018 (UTC)

C4 is short for "Composition C4", part of the Composition C family of explosives (and yes, there was C1, C2 and C3). C4 is the only member of this family still in military service. Composition C was itself preceded by compositions B and A (see RDX). Someguy1221 (talk) 20:49, 18 April 2018 (UTC)