Wikipedia:Reference desk/Archives/Humanities/2007 October 26

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October 26

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I received a really good answer to a legal question above. Now I want to know where on Wikipedia can I find elements of a crime or some other wording that means the same thing. That phrase is in several articles I have written but I cannot find a list or and explanation to link that phrase to.

For example: An ultimate issue in criminal law refers to a legal element of a crime... Thanks! --Mattisse 01:02, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Every crime is going to have slightly different elements, which may differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. An example is "robbery consists of [1] the taking and carrying away [2] of property of another [3] by force or fear [4] with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property." Generically, the elements usually fall into the classification of actus reus, a voluntary act or omission, and mens rea, the intent to commit (or omit) that act. Our articles at those names should suffice to further confuse you :) - Nunh-huh 10:39, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]
Yes. I guess you guys go to law school for a reason. The article I am working on is about how Rule 704(b) in the Federal Rules of Evidence is restricting forensic mental health experts from addressing "ultimate issues" which, apparently also include the "elements of a crime" besides the usual competence/sanity stuff. So you are saying, basically "it depends" on the specific case what is at issue.
I'm getting it now, I think. Thanks, --Mattisse 18:15, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]
Hey! Watch it with the "you guys"! :) Ultimate issue covers some of this, and you might want to take a look at the notes on 704(b). - Nunh-huh 23:57, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, but if you check the history of the ultimate issue article, you may see a familiar name appear :P GeeJo (t)(c) • 10:56, 28 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

A different path?

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I was wondering if the Soviets could have taken a different path in the 1920s, if there was a realistic alternative to Stalin? Zinoviev4 05:57, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Well, of course there was. There are always loads of alternatives. Do you mean if Stalin's rise to power could have been stopped or what would have happened if there had been no Stalin? Or do you mean, irrespective of that, who would have been a better/realistic alternative? DirkvdM 12:01, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

We move in ever decreasing circles! Your question, Zinoviev reminds me of a response to something similar back in May. So, here is a copy of the answer I gave then, which you, above all others, have a right to know! Clio the Muse 22:17, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

This reminds me of the many hours I spent grappling with twentieth century Russian history as an undergraduate, particularly the political struggles of the 1920s, my very favourite period, when, beneath the outward calm of the long summer of the New Economic Policy, some of the most intense and dramatic contests were being fought out within the ranks of the Communist Party. Never warming to the brilliant, but mercurial Leon Trotsky, my own personal favourite, by far, was 'the darling of the party' Nikolai Bukharin. I think I can hazard a fair guess that the professor who has set your assignment has taken the theme from Stephen Cohen's book Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: a Political Biography, 1888-1938. Consider this from the introduction to the Oxford paperback edition:

Just as there are is no historical inevitability, there are always historical alternatives. And yet when I began work on this book in the mid-1960s, the writing of Soviet history in the west as well as in the USSR, was based largely on the axiom that there had been no alternative to Stalinism. Both Western and Soviet historians adhered, though in different ways and for different reasons, to variations of this axiom. Either Stalin's policies, from the forcible collectivization of the peasantry in 1929-33 to the twenty-one year system of mass terror and prison camps, had grown inevitably from the nature of the Bolshevik Party and its revolution, or they had been necessary for the modernization of a backward peasant society. Western and Soviet scholars were captives of a historigraphy without alternatives even though the idea of a non-Stalinist alternative actually had a long tradition in Communist politics. (Oxford paperback ed., 1980 p, xv)

Cohen goes on to explore this question at length in his introduction and the rest of the book; so, your first task is to get hold of a copy at the earliest opportunity. It's a good argument and, in a sense, Bukharin and the Right Opposition was, indeed, the only real alternative to Stalin, not Trotsky, Zinoviev and the others in the Left Opposition, commonly assumed by Isaac Deutscher and others to be the antithesis of the Stalinist path. Why? Because the policies of collectivisation and industrialisation being argued for by Trotsky and his allies in the 1920s were the very things that Stalin implemented in the 1930s. Bukharin's 'socialism at a snail's pace' and co-operation with the independent peasantry, which Stalin adhered to in the mid-1920s for opportunistic reasons, did represent a real alternative, in political and economic terms, to the interpretation of Marxism most favoured by Leninism.

What you now have to ask yourself is would this path have been practicable; would it have been possible for Soviet Russia, in other words, to have continued to operate the NEP system to the eve of the Second World War? Even before the introduction of mass collectivisation, grain deliveries to the state were beginning to drop significantly, which placed the Soviet economy as a whole in a high degree of risk. Beyond that one has to consider the political hostility of the so-called kulaks to the whole Soviet system. The emphasis of the Five Year Plans, especially the second, was on military investment, which enabled the Soviets, in the end, to counter German aggression. Would this have been possible if Russia's capital programme was still moving at a snail's pace on the eve of Barbarossa?. Anyway, some food for thought. Get a hold of Cohen's book and also Stalin: the Court of the Red Tsar by Simon Sebag Montefiore. Taken together, these should provide sufficient information for you to produce a superb answer to your question. The very best of luck. Clio the Muse 14:04, 1 May 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Efficiency in Europe vs the US

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Dutch population pyramid
(in % of total population)
% Male Age Female %
0.36
 
85+
 
1.05
0.60
 
80-84
 
1.18
1.14
 
75-79
 
1.74
1.55
 
70-74
 
1.95
1.93
 
65-69
 
2.13
2.30
 
60-64
 
2.33
2.77
 
55-59
 
2.69
3.73
 
50-54
 
3.60
3.65
 
45-49
 
3.54
3.93
 
40-44
 
3.81
4.27
 
35-39
 
4.08
4.25
 
30-34
 
4.05
3.63
 
25-29
 
3.54
3.04
 
20-24
 
2.93
2.96
 
15-19
 
2.83
3.11
 
10-14
 
2.97
3.20
 
05-09
 
3.06
3.11
 
00-04
 
2.98
Data: International Data Base (2000)


 
US population pyramid

In an above thread someone accused Europeans of being inefficient. Which of course will not do. :) So how do we compare efficiencies? Let me compare GDP per capita per hour worked in the US and the Netherlands. In the Netherlands a standard working week is 32 hours. Suppose a standard working week in the US would be just over 40 hours. That would be about 30% more. But the GDP per capita in the US is only about 12% higher. Which suggests the Dutch are much more efficient. Are these numbers and reasoning correct? DirkvdM 10:30, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

The "accusation" was an implication that the European way of solving problems tends to be solid – and thereby perhaps a bit less efficient than light-way approaches that work most of the time. But why do you equate "European – not European" with "European – US"? Also, for a comparison of productivity, one question is whether the comparison should be based on output per person in the total population (which is what you get for GDP per capita) or output per worker (which is the usual measure). The 2006 statistics of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor indicate for both measures a US output that is 19% higher, so it is not a big deal, but for comparisons between other pairs of countries this may be a major point. Another question is whether productivity is the best indicator for efficiency. Usually, efficiency means useful work per quantity of energy. Perhaps Europeans pack much more energy in an hour of work than non-Europeans.  --Lambiam 12:38, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]
I didn't reduce it to Europe - US, but to Netherlands - US. I picked the Netherlands because that's my country and the US because there aren't that many non-European countries that have an income level comparable to Europe and I don't know what hours people make in the other countries. So I picked the examples I have most knowledge of.
Efficiency is effect per effort, and the only reliable way I can think of measuring effort is hours worked. As for 'per person' vs 'per worker', you've got a point there - it's not about the efficiency of European countries, but of Europeans. So we'd have to compare unemployment rates. According to List of countries by unemployment rate it's 4.8% for the US and 5.5% for the Netherlands, so that's no big factor. At least not considering the vague indications that I used. However, if anyone has more precise data ...
Ah, I've found it. (And it wasn't too hard to find - can't remember what I looked for the first time.) Working time#Differences among countries and recent trends. Annual working hours are 1777 in the US and 1309 in the Netherlands. So people in the US make 36% more hours than the Dutch. My estimate wasn't too far off. Combine that with the GDP per capita and you get:
US: 44,765 / 1777 = 25.2 $/hr.
Nl: 38,252 / 1309 = 29.2 $/hr.
The slight difference between the unemployment rates isn't enough to compensate. Of course I'd have to do this for all European countries and average them out and do the same for US, Canada, Australia, NZ, Japan and the like, but I can't be bothered right now. :) (it's late) Note, though, that the Western European countries are almost all at the bottom of the list (I bet Finland and Iceland would be there too if they were on the list) and that the second are all in the top. So hurrah for us relaxed and efficient North West Europeans. :) Eastern European countries are at the top, but that doesn't surprise me considering their lower incomes (money makes money, so if you have less of that you have to compensate). But Spain does surprise me. However, that county also has a lower per capita GDP than I expected. The low income and high working hours of NZ also surprises me - they're way too relaxed for that in my experience.
Another factor, of course, is natural resources, and NZ doesn't have too many of those, afaik. Factoring that in would be a lot more difficult. DirkvdM 19:02, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]
It seems to me that your reasoning is flawed. You're assuming the relationship between hours worked and output is linear--an extra hour worked should result in a proportional increase in output. However, according to the Law of Diminishing Returns, an extra hour (or extra whatever) will have a diminishing effect throughout time. So, for example, whereas one extra hour worked might enable you to create two more widgets, an extra hour on top of that might only allow you to create one additional widget. In other words, the extra hour will yield a lesser and lesser result. In this case it's mostly because humans get tired and can't continuously work. So, according to the law of diminishing returns, 30% more time worked does not mean that GDP will increase by the same percentage. Therefore, your example doesn't seem to show that Dutch workers are more efficient than Americans. Hope this helps. —Preceding unsigned comment added by GreatManTheory (talkcontribs) 20:35, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]
You're merely giving a reason for the inefficiency. You're saying that working more hours than your body can take leads to inefficiency. But it's still inefficiency. DirkvdM 10:03, 27 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Americans have more kids, and so more non-working "capitas", which skews the numbers a lot if you're looking at efficiency. Wrad 05:39, 27 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

I've added the US and the Dutch population pyramid here, and I don't see much difference. But yeah, that's a factor too. As is the 65+ age group. Alas, the two pyramids aren't quite the same. For the latter factor, note that the Dutch pyramid has one extra level, for 85+, so that should be combined with the 80-85 group before it to make them more comparable. A visually better comparison can be made by following the link under the Dutch pyramid, replacing the 'NL' in the url with 'US' and then going back and forth between those pages. Alas, the bureau hasn't standardised its figures (why not make it all percentages?), but the comparison is still easier. DirkvdM 10:03, 27 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Tudor supremacy

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By what political means did the Tudor's achieve dominance in England? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 217.42.104.197 (talk) 12:29, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Have you read our article on Henry VII? NB "Tudors" shouldn't have an apostrophe if you mean the plural of Tudor --Dweller 13:17, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]
That's Henry VII of England. Read also Wars of the Roses, especially Wars of the Roses#Henry Tudor and the following. Corvus cornix 17:28, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Well, to begin with, they came to the throne of England at just the right time. Henry VII was far from being the strongest claimant, but the fractious English nobility had bled itself close to death in the thirty years prior to his victory at Bosworth Field, allowing him to establish the monrchy on an entirely new basis, imperial, one might almost say, rather than republican. Henry, a shrewd and careful man, built up the powers of the lesser magnates, those who depended on the crown for their advancement, and loping off the heads of any remaining in the premier league who came to challenge or threaten his authority.

Henry VIII was, if anything, even more rutheless in this regard, emerging as possibly the most absolute monarch England has ever had, making changes in church and state that none of his predecessors would have dared to attempt. His actions with regard to the succession was to benefit his successors, particularly his two daughters, who might otherwise have faced a serious male contendor. In 1553, as the Tudor male line expired, the only alternative to Mary came from yet another female, Lady Jane Grey, so obviously a tool of her father-in-law's ambition that few rallied to her cause. In the end the true measure of Henry's success in reducing the English succession by several heads was fully demonstrated in 1603, at the very end of the dynasty, when the English, for the absence of an alternative, were oblighed to accept a Scotsman!

The other main factor in explaining Tudor success is that they centralised government and politics, creating a modern state apparatus in much the same fashion as Louis XI had in France. Henry VIII ended the diffusion of power, first, by absorbing Wales into England, thus seriously curbing the dangerous independence of the marcher lords; and second, in becoming King rather than Lord of Ireland. But it was the reign of Elizabeth that saw the final triumph of Tudor absolutism, with all of the leading political figures of the day owing their position and influence to the favour of the Queen, rather than to their landed estates. Altogether a remarkable transformation. Clio the Muse 23:37, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

It also helped that Henry VII married Elizabeth of York, daughter of Edward IV, thus coopting the strongest opposition into his family. His son Arthur, and after the death of Arthur, Henry VIII, was, in fact, the sole surviving heir of the York Dynasty as well as the nouveau riche Tudors. Corvus cornix 01:34, 27 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Stephen Gardiner

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What role did Stephen Gardiner play during the reign of Mary Tudor? 217.42.104.197 13:22, 26 October 2007 (UTC) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 141.238.69.103 (talk) 14:25, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Perhaps it might be appropriate to offer a word or two in Gardiner's defence, as he is most often associated with the Marian burnings. While it is true that he was an early exponent of the need for firm action against heresy, he was also among the first to see that Protestant martyrdom was politically counter-productive for the government. Even John Foxe, high among Gardiner's critics, was to write that the bishop realised "that cruelty in this case would not serve his expectation, and gave over the matter as utterly discouraged, and from that day meddled no more in such condemnations." In essence he had hoped that a few examples of frightfulness in the law would serve to 'discourage the others.' When this so clearly failed to work he attempted to persuade Mary to give up the burnings in favour of fines and civil disabilities. There is even evidence that he protected Roger Ascham, a leading Protestant intellectual and tutor to Princess Elizabeth. Clio the Muse 01:30, 27 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Comic Books and Law

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REMOVED.

No double posting please. Lanfear's Bane | t 15:39, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Daniel Halévy-the politics of disillusion

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I would like to know, please, in what manner the career of Daniel Halévy, a former supporter of the Dreyfus cause, can be said to illustrate the drift away from republican values during the course of the Third Republic in France? My apologies, for I do not think I have expressed my question well, though I hope it is capable of answer. Pere Duchesne 14:41, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Yes, absolutely. Halévy is indeed an interesting case, a baromoter, one might say, of the political health of the Third Republic. He was born into a the Parisian haut-bourgeois, into a family with liberal and Orleanist traditions. The Dreyfus Affair was to be the great turning point of his life. Convinced of the officer's innocence, Halvéy started to define himself as a Socialist, though of a uniquely French variety, identifying with small producers, the artisans and the peasants, rather than the industrial proletariat. His chief political influence here was Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, the defender of, as Halvéy believed, of the 'old artisanal France.' He initially looked to advance the cause of the small producer through syndicalism; but by the 1930s the steady marginalisation of the traditional occupations in the face of modern economic forces turned him increasingly towards an attitude of cultural pessimism. He now saw saw some virtue in the radical right, even in people like Charles Maurras, the founder of the reactionary Action Française, and a representative of the anti-Dreyfusard tradition in French politics. Halvéy turned his talents to the production of anti-republican polemics, in books like Décadence de la liberté and La République des comités, denouncing the political style of the Republic and its alleged reliance on Masonic committees. In 1940 he was one of the first to welcome Vichy as the saviour of the old France. Clio the Muse 00:16, 27 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]
Very many thanks, Clio. Pere Duchesne 17:25, 30 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Kent miners' strike of 1942

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I'm trying to carry out some background research on the 1942 miners' strike in the English county of Kent, but so far have uncovered very little. Can anyone help? Some more background information together with published references would be really useful. Cheers, Simon. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.151.240.136 (talk) 18:03, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

You might find the following useful (all related to the Betteshanger Colliery strike of 1942) - [1] [2] [3] and [4] Foxhill 19:09, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]
Also - [5] and [6] Foxhill 19:16, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]
Troubles began in December of 1941 when sixty workers at Betteshanger Colliery, unable to negotiate a rate for working on a difficult seam, began a 'go-slow'. Management ordered them out, other workers followed in sympathy and following a ruling in favour of management by a binding arbitration tribunal on 9 January 1942 4,000 went out on strike. The strike was illegal under the 1940 Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order and it was an indictable offence to "instigate or incite… any strike among persons engaged in the performance of essential services".
The courts handed down an unexpectedly severe judgement, three local union leaders were jailed and over one thousand workers fined between £3 and £5. After protests from miners and their families, and talk of sympathy strikes elsewhere, the government and management backed down, acceded to the workers demands and released the three imprisoned leaders. The strike lasted a total of nineteen days. Morgan, D., & Evans, M. (1993). The Battle for Britain: citizenship and ideology in the Second World War. pp. 51-3. OCLC 25630471
see also: Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations 1965-68, appendix 6, pp. 340-1, and Knowles, K. G. J. C. (1952). Strikes; a study in industrial conflict, with special reference to British experience between 1911 and 1947. OCLC 21497486
There is another dimension to this issue. Many of the miners had joined the Home Guard, with collieries forming their own platoons, an important part of the county defences. The miners' platoons, moreover, were made up of fit young men, all in a reserved occupation, rather than those normally too old for service in the regular forces. This was an entirely voluntary effort on their part; for being in a reserved occupation normally exempted men even from home defence duties. So the miners had the kind of patriotic credentials that made it difficult for their opponents to denounce them, or for the government-mindful that Kent was still in the front line-to be too severe in the action taken against them. Disruption of coal production, coupled with the dislocation of local defences, was simply too much to bear. To Eric's sources I would add the following: Deal and Districts at War by David Collyer (1995); Frontline County by Andrew Roots; Kent at War by Bob Ogley; and Miners Unions and Politics, 1910-1947 ed. by Alan Campbell et al. Clio the Muse 00:49, 27 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Nazi studies

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What is the difference between intentionalism and structuralism in the study of Hitler's Germany? Bel Carres 18:17, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

See Functionalism versus intentionalism. Random Nonsense 18:40, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Assault

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Hiya, about 6 years ago I was having a drinK in my local with some friends when i was ordered outside, as some one had a problem with me. Now I dont Know why, but i was unable to hit bacK, even though I was given ample oppertunity, such as "get up and fight liKe a man...ill give you a free shot...why wont you hit me?" yada yada yada, i got my arse KicKed, several of my friends were watching, I assume they did not want the same treatment, and so did not jump in, any how theyre not my friends any more. Now, what I would liKe to Know is firstly, why could I not fight bacK? As teenage boys we always used to joKe about what we would do if we got into a fight, but when it came to the crunch, i got "bitch slapped" for 2 or 3 hours, it was a whole nights entertainment for the drinKers. and no one did anything to help. So, the questions: why could I not protect my self? And also, 6 years on why i am still thinKing about it? How can I cope with this? It has changed my social life considerably, I can no longer feel comfortable in a pub or club and this irritates my friends who just dont understand. How can i picK up a girl in a club and have a meaningful relationship, if everytime i go near a pub or club i panic? Your help is greatly appreciated. ThanK you. Dough. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.3.149.242 (talk) 21:02, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

  • Sorry, wikipedia does not give medical advice. But perhaps fear was what prevented you from acting, and the repercussions may be why you are thinking about it still; for further advice, I'd suggest you go and see a doctor, who could refer you to a therapist. Hope you find a solution --Hadseys 21:15, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for your response, how ever, rather than medical advise i am more interested in the Fight or Flight response verses the Deer in the headlights phenomenon. Thanks —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.3.149.242 (talk) 21:43, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]
Then we have an article that can help with that: Fight-or-flight response, note specifically the section called Negative effects of the stress response in humans. However, the relevance of this response to your particular situation can only be ascertained by a professional. Rockpocket 22:38, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]
Start training Krav Maga, nothing boosts a young man's ego like the thought that you have been trained to kill with your bare hands if such action will be necessary to protect yourself, your family or friends. If that does not help consult a psychologist.Mieciu K 21:49, 28 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

megans law

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what exactly is megans law?

See Megan's Law. Corvus cornix 22:25, 26 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]