War of the Spanish Succession
The War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) was a European conflict of the early 18th century, triggered by the death in November 1700 of Charles II, who died without a direct heir. The closest heirs were members of the Austrian and French ruling families but union of an undivided Spanish Empire with either threatened the European balance of power.[c]
Charles left his throne to Philip of Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV but on condition he renounce his claim to the French throne. The decision by Louis to ignore this led to war with the anti-French Grand Alliance whose candidate was Charles, the younger son of Emperor Leopold I.
By 1710, the war was deadlocked, Allied victories in the Low Countries and Italy offset by failure in Spain and unpopular in Britain due to its cost and lack of clear objectives. When Emperor Joseph I died in 1711, Charles succeeded him as Emperor; the British were equally opposed to a potential union of Spain and Austria and effectively withdrew from the war in early 1712.
Without their support, the other Allies were forced to make peace and the war ended with the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, followed by those of Rastatt and Baden in 1714. Phillip renounced the French throne and was confirmed as King of Spain, retaining Peninsular Spain and Spanish possessions outside Europe with their European territories divided between Austria, Britain and Savoy. Longer term impacts included Britain's emergence as the leading European maritime and commercial power, the decline of the Dutch Republic as a major European power, the creation of a centralised Spanish state and the acceleration of the break-up of the Holy Roman Empire.
The most important theme of European politics in the 17th and early 18th centuries was the rivalry between the Habsburgs of Austria and Spain and Bourbon France. In 1665, Charles II became the last male Habsburg King of Spain; the unfortunate product of repeated consanguineous marriages among the Spanish Habsburgs, he was "short, lame, epileptic, senile and completely bald before 35, always on the verge of death but repeatedly baffling Christendom by continuing to live."
While no longer the dominant global power it once was, the Spanish Monarchy [d] included possessions in Italy, the Spanish Netherlands, the Philippines and large areas of the Americas. It proved remarkably resilient and when Charles died in 1700 remained largely intact. Possession of an undivided Monarchy by either Austria or France would change the European balance of power in their favour.
Preventing a potential union between Habsburg Austria and Spain formed part of Louis' thinking for decades. The Nine Years' War showed France was not strong enough to achieve its objectives on its own; the 1697 Treaty of Ryswick was the result of mutual exhaustion and France's need for allies in anticipation of a contest over the succession. Emperor Leopold initially refused to sign since the Treaty left this issue unresolved; he reluctantly did so in October 1697 but it was viewed only as a pause in hostilities.
The Spanish SuccessionEdit
Unlike France or Austria, the Spanish Monarchy could be inherited by or through a woman. Charles had two sisters; Maria Theresa (1638-83) married Louis XIV, their son Louis, Dauphin of France being heir to the French throne. Margaret Theresa (1651-1673) married her Habsburg cousin Leopold; their daughter Maria Antonia 1669-1692 had a son Joseph Ferdinand with Maximillian Emanuel of Bavaria.
When Maria Antonia married Maximilian, her rights to the Spanish throne were transferred to Leopold's sons from his third marriage, her half-brothers Joseph and Charles. This was a measure of dubious legality but the reality was neither Austria and France could allow the other to acquire an undivided Spanish Monarchy while the Spanish saw no reason why their Empire should be partitioned to suit the needs of two foreign powers.
Leopold's intransigence over the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 created an alliance of convenience between Louis and his long-standing opponent William III. William's dual role as Stadtholder and King obscured the diverging commercial, strategic and political interests of England and the Dutch Republic; these would re-emerge on his death but gave Louis a short-term opportunity to solve the issue by negotiation.
Attempts at a diplomatic compromiseEdit
The 1698 Treaty of the Hague made Joseph Ferdinand heir to the bulk of the Spanish Monarchy and divided its European territories between France and Austria. When Joseph died of smallpox in February 1699, the 1700 Treaty of London replaced him with Leopold's younger son Archduke Charles and split Spanish possessions between France, Savoy and Austria. The details of the territorial division are complex but irrelevant since neither Spain nor Austria signed.
The Spanish devised their own solution, its central principle being an undivided and independent Empire. Under the influence of his pro-Austrian second wife Maria Anna of Neuburg, Charles originally named Archduke Charles as his heir but in May 1700 this was altered in favour of Louis' grandson Philip, Duke of Anjou. The Spanish hoped this would be acceptable since the Dauphin and his older brother stood between Philip and the French crown; if he refused, next in line was his younger brother the Duke of Berry, followed by Archduke Charles.[e]
When Charles died on 1 November 1700, the Spanish offered the throne to Philip, giving Louis and his Council a difficult choice. The duc de Beauvilliers advised rejecting the offer in favour of the Treaty of London; while this would put Archduke Charles on the throne, it required territorial concessions Leopold had already refused. If he did so again, Louis could call on England and the Dutch Republic to enforce the Treaty, potentially isolating Austria and allowing Philip to gain the throne without fighting.
The Foreign Minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert and the Grand Dauphin argued war with Leopold was certain regardless, in which case it was preferable to already be in control of the disputed lands, while England and the Dutch Republic would prefer peace and any solution that kept the French and Spanish crowns separate. On 16 November 1700, Louis' grandson became Philip V of Spain, a decision accepted with varying degrees of enthusiasm by the other European powers.
Prelude to warEdit
Having achieved most of his aims by diplomacy, Louis' subsequent actions threatened vital interests of the Grand Alliance's primary members - Habsburg Austria, the Dutch Republic and England. None was catastrophic individually but in combination made war inevitable.
The Tory majority in the English Parliament would not fight a war to install an Austrian on the throne of Spain or for the Dutch Republic.[f] Lack of support forced William to accept Philip as King in early 1701 but French threats to English commercial and strategic interests then eroded that opposition.
In early 1701, Louis reiterated the doctrine of divine right which recognised Phillip's place in the French line of succession and the possibility of uniting the French and Spanish thrones in contradiction of Charles' will. In February, the French then occupied the Dutch-held 'Barrier' fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands with the agreement of the Viceroy, Max Emanuel of Bavaria. This threatened the Dutch frontiers and the monopoly over the Scheldt granted by Spain in the 1648 Peace of Münster. As the primary outlet for European trade, this was an extremely valuable asset which appeared unlikely to be renewed by a Bourbon-controlled Spain. Award of the lucrative Spanish Asiento concession to a French company shortly afterwards was a further blow to Dutch and English hopes of trading rights in the Spanish Empire.
As Louis had calculated, the Dutch States General now recognised Philip but French control of the Scheldt and the ports of Antwerp and Ostend also posed a strategic threat to England. Preventing this had been their primary European policy objective for over a century.[g] At the same time, the Imperial duchies of Milan and Mantua in Northern Italy which Leopold viewed as essential to the security of Austria's southern border accepted French garrisons and declared for Philip. Max Emmanuel formed an initiative to align Imperial German states in Swabia and Franconia with France; these challenges to Habsburg interests could not be ignored.
In combination, these moves led to to the Treaty of The Hague in September reforming the Grand Alliance. The ag principle of a separate Spanish state was central to the agreement but it did not commit to making Archduke Charles King of Spain, merely stating Leopold would receive an 'equitable and reasonable' outcome.
Shortly afterwards, the exiled James II died in France on 16 September and Louis proclaimed his son James Francis Edward as King of England and Scotland. This violated his recognition of William as King in the Treaty of Ryswyck and threatened the Act of Settlement making the Protestant Electress Sophia of Hanover and her children heirs to James' younger daughter Anne. Securing the Protestant succession in England and Scotland became a primary aim for the Grand Alliance and ensured Tory support.
William died on 19 March 1702 and was succeeded by Anne who promptly confirmed her intent to ensure the Protestant succession and reduce the power of France. Since even William's Dutch opponents viewed French control of the Spanish Netherlands as a threat to their survival, his policies were continued by his successors and the Grand Alliance declared war on France on 15 May 1702. While some members of the Empire followed Bavaria in supporting France, the majority backed Leopold, although Frederick, Elector of Prussia negotiated a clause recognising him as King in Prussia. The Imperial Diet then declared war on 30 September.
Key Strategic DriversEdit
While this was a dynastic war, the importance of economics is often underestimated; Louis XIV's ambassador to Madrid, Amelot de Gournay, was a former commissaire in the French Council of Commerce and his focus as much commercial as diplomatic. Contemporaries viewed Dutch and English support for the Habsburg cause as being primarily driven by a desire for access to the Spanish American markets.
The economic theory of Mercantilism is essential to interpreting strategy in this period. While modern economics generally assumes a constantly growing market, mercantilism viewed it as static and so Increasing your own market share meant taking it from someone else. The government's role was to help that process by restricting trade to its own citizens and using its military resources to destroy or capture that of others.
The armies engaged in the Nine Years War often exceeded 100,000 men, too large for the pre-industrial economies of its participants and were primarily focused on siege warfare. Those of 1701-1714 were considerably smaller, averaging about 50,000 - 60,000, and more flexible but dependence on water-borne transport accentuated the importance of rivers eg the Rhine and Danube or ports like Alicante. A reliance on the local countryside for supplies limited operations in poor areas like Northern Spain, which meant fighting was confined to the same general areas.[h]
War aims; Major PartiesEdit
Britain (England and Scotland pre-1707) General agreement on the need to reduce the power of France and secure the Protestant succession masked differences on how to achieve them. The Tories and powerful commercial interests in the City of London favoured a mercantilist strategy of using the Royal Navy to attack French and Spanish trade while protecting and expanding their own; land commitments were viewed as both expensive and primarily of benefit to others. The Whigs argued a Continental strategy was essential since France could not be defeated by seapower alone while control of Northern Flanders would allow them to blockade the English Channel. Britain's financial strength allowed it to fund a variety of strategies and multiple fronts against France but their continental strategy required close co-operation with the Dutch Republic.
Dutch Republic William's death and Britain's economic power meant the Dutch accepted Marlborough as Allied commander in the Low Countries, with strategy subject to their approval. While Marlborough argued 'one battle was worth twelve sieges,' the Dutch were nearly over run in 1702 and losing a battle in the Low Countries could have fatal consequences. Their priorities were to re-establish the Barrier fortresses and retain control of the Scheldt estuary; one alleged reason for the lack of coordination in the 1703 campaign in the Spanish Netherlands was their reluctance to open the Scheldt to anyone, including the English. The Dutch provided the bulk of the manpower for the campaigns in the Low Countries and the huge financial effort meant that by 1713 they were essentially bankrupt.
Austria and the Holy Roman Empire Austrian and Imperial interests were not always the same. For much of the war, Leopold focused on securing Austria's southern borders by controlling Northern Italy and suppressing the Hungarian revolt known as Rákóczi's War of Independence. Placing Archduke Charles on the Spanish throne was not explicitly stated as a Grand Alliance objective; since it had no significant navy of its own, the all important campaign in Spain was reliant on Portugal and the Maritime Powers of Britain and the Dutch Republic.
The 30 Years War formalised religious divisions within the Holy Roman Empire and weakened its integrity. By 1700, states like Bavaria, Hanover, Saxony and Brandenburg-Prussia were pursuing their own policies; Bavaria allied with France while Augustus of Saxony was more focused on the Great Northern War in his dual role as King of Poland. The price demanded by Frederick of Prussia for supporting Leopold was recognition as King in Prussia and being made an equal member of the Grand Alliance. Hanover was a more reliable ally since Elector George was in line for the British throne but the suspicion remained that the interests of Hanover came first. Many of the minor German states and neutrals like Denmark hired out troops to the Allies; the 1704 Blenheim campaign was delayed by the late arrival of Danish troops due to arguments over rates and pay.
France Under Louis XIV, France had become the single most powerful unitary state in Europe whose revenue-generating capacities far exceeded its rivals. Its central position provided enormous tactical flexibility, unlike Austria it had its own navy and as the campaigns of 1708-10 proved, even under severe pressure it could defend its borders. This made it far better placed than Austria to impose or defend a French candidate, a consideration that was a key element in the Spanish selection of Philip. The Nine Years War had shown France could not impose its objectives without support but the support of Spain and Bavaria made a successful outcome far more likely. Apart from the purely defensive strategy of denying Spain to others, Louis' objectives were to secure and extend his borders with Germany and increase French commercial strength by access to the Americas trade.
Spain As far as possible, Spanish objectives were to retain an undivided and independent Monarchy but they recognised this could not be done without support. In the years after 1648, a series of exhausting and costly wars with France over the Spanish Netherlands drained their military and financial resources, while the economy experienced long periods of low productivity and depression. Weak central control made it hard to collect taxes and combined with economic depression meant government finances were in perpetual crisis; the Spanish Crown declared bankruptcy nine times between 1557 to 1666, including 1647, 1652, 1661 and 1666.
In addition, 'Spain' was actually two separate kingdoms under the same monarch, the Crown of Castile and Crown of Aragon.[i] The two had very different political cultures and traditions; with the exception of the Kingdom of Naples which backed Philip, the bulk of the Crown of Aragon supported Archduke Charles. Spanish policy was initially driven by France but as the war progressed Philip followed a much more independent course and by 1714 there was clear separation between Spain and France.
War, politics and diplomacyEdit
The bulk of the fighting took place in Northern Italy around the Duchies of Milan and Mantua, whose possession was key to Austria's southern border, with the Duchy of Savoy playing the same role for France. The formerly powerful states of Genoa, Tuscany and Venice were now too weak to play any significant part in the war. Central Italy was dominated by the so-called Papal States ruled by Pope Clement XI which tended to be pro-French due to centuries of arguments between the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor. The Spanish-ruled Kingdom of Naples in the South was the only major part of the Crown of Aragon to support Philip rather than Charles.
Technically members of the Holy Roman Empire, in February 1701 Milan and Mantua accepted French garrisons and declared for Philip. Victor Amadeus II, Duke of Savoy signed an alliance with France in April, receiving subsidies for allowing French troops free passage through Savoy, while Philip married his 13-year-old daughter Maria Luisa. However, the Duke of Savoy had already earned a reputation for unreliability and Louis refused to make any territorial concessions.[j]
In May 1701, an Austrian army moved into Northern Italy to expel the French, led by Prince Eugene of Savoy.[k] Following the battles of Carpi, Chiari and Cremona, by February 1702 the French had retreated behind the Adda river although they retained Milan. The unexpectedly strong showing by the Austrians made Victor Amadeus more cautious about his alliance with France.
Vendôme replaced Villeroi, captured at Cremona and his army was substantially reinforced. Eugene managed a draw at the Battle of Luzzara but shortages of money and supplies meant Vendôme quickly recovered most of the territory lost the year before. In June 1703 he was ordered into the Tyrol to link up with an army led by the Bavarian Elector, Max Emmanuel but refused, rightly suspecting Savoy was about to change sides. In October, Victor Amadeus declared war on France, largely due to their inability to win a conclusive victory in Italy.
In the short-term, the French used his defection to capture most of Savoy, aided by Leopold's death in May 1705 and replacement by his son Joseph I. By mid-1706, French victories at Cassano and Calcinato forced the Austrians into the mountains around Lake Garda and Turin was besieged. At this point, the disastrous defeat at Ramillies in May 1706 meant Vendôme and all available forces were sent to hold France's northern frontier. Strengthened by German mercenaries financed by the Maritime Powers, in July Eugene moved south across the river Po and linked up with Victor Amadeus. After defeat at the Battle of Turin in September, the French withdrew into France, with a small force under the Count of Medavy isolated in the east. Although Medavy won a minor victory at Castiglione, he was too weak to undertake offensive operations.
Tensions within the Alliance now emerged over the resources allocated by the Austrian Hapsburgs to Italy and suppressing Rákóczi's uprising in Hungary, rather than defeating France. In March 1707, Joseph signed the Convention of Milan with France ending the war in Italy; the Austrians gained control of Milan and Mantua, while Louis was allowed to withdraw his remaining forces and redeploy them elsewhere. Rather than supporting the campaign in Spain, Joseph now sent an army to seize the Kingdom of Naples and by the end of September, Austria was the dominant power in Italy and Archduke Charles proclaimed King of Naples.[l]
By taking Milan and securing Spanish territories in Italy, the Austrian Habsburgs had fulfilled their major war objectives but alienated their Allies. To assuage them, in July Eugene and Victor Amadeus attacked the major French naval base of Toulon; while ultimately unsuccessful, the French were forced to burn their ships, leaving the Anglo-Dutch fleet in control of the Western Mediterranean.
The long-running contest between the Hapsburgs and the Papacy now erupted in a dispute over the Duchy of Parma which was claimed by both sides. By mid-1708, the Austrians occupied most of the Papal States, forcing Pope Clement XI to capitulate and recognise Archduke Charles as Charles III of Spain.[m] This brought fighting in Italy to a close, apart from unsuccessful attempts by Victor Amadeus to recover the trans-Alpine territories of Nice and Savoy.[n]
Low Countries, Rhine and DanubeEdit
The alliance between France, Max Emmanuel of Bavaria and his younger brother Joseph Clemens, ruler of the Prince-Bishopric of Liège and Electorate of Cologne made securing the Dutch frontiers the primary Allied objective in this theatre for 1702. This was achieved by the capture of the Barrier fortresses lost in 1701 and cities governed by Joseph Clemens, including Kaiserswerth, Venlo, Roermond and finally Liège in late October. The 1703 campaign was less successful; conflicts over strategy and lack of co-ordination meant the Allies failed to take Antwerp, while Dutch defeat at Ekeren on 30 June led to bitter recriminations.
The Imperial commander Louis of Baden adopted a largely defensive posture on the Upper Rhine, the exception being capturing Landau in September 1702. Victories by Villars at Friedlingen in October and the fall of Kehl in March 1703 threatened Vienna and northern Italy. Max Emmanuel of Bavaria took a series of strongholds along the Danube, linking up with Villars in May. Together they defeated an Imperial force at Höchstädt in September but Marsin then replaced Villars due to his poor relationship with Max Emmanuel. The French and Bavarians maintained momentum; Tallard took Breisach in September, defeated the Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel at Speyerbach on 15 November and recaptured Landau.
Max Emmanuel and Tallard continued their steady advance during the first part of 1704, yet another anti-Habsburg Hungarian revolt placing Leopold under increased pressure. To relieve this, Marlborough marched up the Rhine from the Low Countries in May, linked up with Louis of Baden and Egg of Savoy and on 2 July crossed the Danube. On 13 August, the Allied army defeated a slightly larger Franco-Bavarian army under Max Emmanuel and Tallard at the Battle of Blenheim.[o] Blenheim made Marlborough's reputation and was a decisive defeat for Bavaria; in the November Treaty of Ilbersheim Max Emanuel was humiliated by being 'restored' as Viceroy of the Spanish Netherlands with Bavaria placed under Austrian rule.[p]
Allied attempts to exploit victory at Blenheim foundered on poor co-ordination, tactical disputes and command rivalries. They made little progress in 1705, while Leopold's predictably ruthless approach to ruling Bavaria caused a brief but vicious peasant revolt. In May 1706 a decisive Allied victory at the Battle of Ramillies shattered the French army and led to the rapid capture of the entire Spanish Netherlands. This was restored as a buffer zone and ruled by the Maritime Powers in the name of Archduke Charles for the duration of the war.
Ramillies forced French onto the defensive but prevented the Allies making progress in the campaign of 1707. Popular discontent meant the Maritime Powers lost control of large parts of the Spanish Netherlands although this was restored by their victory at Oudenarde. In August, the Allies besieged Lille; it was accepted no fortified place could hold out indefinitely, their primary purpose being to absorb the energy of the attackers for as long as possible. The French commander Boufflers performed this task admirably; Lille finally surrendered on 9 December but yet again the Allies were unable to fully exploit a resounding victory.[q]
Spain and PortugalEdit
The despatch of an Anglo-Dutch expeditionary force to Spain in 1702 was a continuation of William III's policy, using the navy to open the Strait of Gibraltar, secure Allied naval power in the Mediterranean, and cut off Spain's transatlantic economy. The Austrians also clamoured for early naval support, claiming the sight of an Allied fleet in the Mediterranean would inspire the anti-Bourbon nobles in Naples, overawe the Francophile papacy, and encourage the Duke of Savoy to change sides. The need for a base between England and the Mediterranean was therefore essential, but the attack on Cádiz in September ended in failure and looting. However, the Allies recovered some prestige when they destroyed the Spanish treasure fleet and their French escorts anchored in Vigo Bay on 23 October. The attack did not yield as much silver as hoped, but it was to have wide implications. For King Peter II of Portugal, whose country's economy depended on oceanic trade with the Americas, the demonstration of Allied naval dominance in the Atlantic played a decisive part in persuading him to abandon his nominal alliance with France and Spain. Although most of his ministers preferred neutrality, Peter II signed with the Allies the Treaty of Defensive Alliance and the Treaty of Offensive Alliance on 16 May 1703.
The Portuguese alliance began a new era in political and commercial relations with England. However, of more immediate benefit to the Allies was the port of Lisbon, which would provide year-round naval access to the Mediterranean, as well as support from the Portuguese army to fight for the Grand Alliance in Spain. As part of the agreement Peter II had demanded that Archduke Charles be sent in person to Portugal. In the King's estimation the presence of the Archduke would help facilitate an anti-Bourbon rising in Spain, but it would also guarantee that the Allies would not leave him in the lurch once he had forfeited his French alliance. To Queen Anne's ministers replacing the Duke of Anjou with Archduke Charles appeared a good way to break Spain's trade monopoly in its colonial empire, knowing that Habsburg control over Spanish America was in England's commercial interest; moreover, it satisfied the Grand Strategic concept of pressing Louis XIV across multiple fonts. However, the agreement also meant the Allies were now committed to a war to secure the whole Spanish inheritance for the Austrian Habsburgs. At first the Emperor had been hesitant as his immediate goals were in Italy not Spain. Nevertheless, it was the weight of English gold and diplomacy which prevailed, and on 12 September 1703 Archduke Charles was crowned Charles III of Spain in Vienna. He arrived in Lisbon, via London, in early March 1704.
The war now moved to the Iberian Peninsula in earnest. In May 1704 the Franco-Spanish army of approximately 26,000 men under the Duke of Berwick, accompanied by Philip V, advanced on Portugal and scored several minor victories against the disorganised Allies under the Marquis of Minas, the Duke of Schomberg, and the Dutch Baron Fagel, whose combined strength of 21,000 men fell far short of their treaty obligations. For their part, Allied successes that year were achieved and sustained by their navy, and in early August George Rooke and Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt captured Gibraltar. Two attempts were made to retake the place that year: the first by sea, leading to the indecisive Battle of Málaga on 24 August (the only full-dress naval engagement of the war); then by land when Tessé and Villadarias besieged the Rock before abandoning the attempt after six months in April 1705. Gibraltar remained in Allied hands, but attempts to garner support for Charles III amongst the populace of Spain largely failed.
On the whole the people of the Crown of Castile had rallied to support Philip V, but in the autonomous Crown of Aragon there had arisen centres of discontent. In the Principality of Catalonia, as in other parts of the peninsula, the people had differing opinions about supporting the Duke of Anjou or Archduke Charles, but there was a strong anti-French feeling rooted in recent experience, especially the attack on Barcelona in 1697. In early June 1705 a small number of Catalans – in return for men, weapons, and support for their own constitutional liberties, or Catalan constitutions – committed themselves to support Charles and the Allied cause. This new allegiance encouraged the English to prepare an expeditionary force to Spain's Mediterranean provinces, thereby opening a two front war in the peninsula: Das Minas, the Huguenot Earl of Galway (Schomberg's replacement), and Baron Fagel attacking from Portugal; and the Earl of Peterborough and Charles III campaigning in the north-east. The arrival of the Allied fleet off the Mediterranean coast not only influenced disaffected Catalans, however. In the Kingdom of Valencia there was strong anti-French feeling based on trade rivalry, but there was also repercussions of a recent peasant rebellion against the Valencian nobility, which was never fully extinguished and which the Allies were able to exploit. In the Kingdom of Aragon there was also strong Francophobia, based largely on commercial rivalry and proximity, but Philip V's attempts to raise taxes for the war effort without the approval of the Catalan Courts, to appoint a Castilian viceroy, and to move and quarter French and Castilian troops within the kingdom, were also causes of friction, which went against the spirit of their own Constitutions.
The internal divisions in the Crown of Aragon prepared the way for early Allied victories in the region in 1705, culminating with Peterborough taking Barcelona on 9 October, and Juan Bautista Basset y Ramos capturing the city of Valencia on 16 December. The defeats in the north-east provinces were a major set-back to the Bourbon cause; a problem exacerbated when Philip V and Tessé failed to retake Barcelona in May 1706. Moreover, the concentration of French forces in the north-east had enabled the Allies under Das Minas and Galway to make progress on the Portuguese front, where they quickly captured several towns. Berwick could not halt a mainly Portuguese-allied army advance led by Das Minas, and on 25 June, Portuguese, Dutch, and British forward elements entered Madrid; by the time they took Saragossa on the 29th, they controlled the four chief cities of Spain. But the gains were illusory. Although several nobles joined the Habsburg cause the majority of Castile remained loyal to Philip V, and the Allied army, far from its supply ports, could not maintain their position so deep within the country. When Charles III and Peterborough moved to join Das Minas and Galway they failed to take decisive action, and after Berwick received French reinforcements the Allies retreated to Valencia, allowing Philip V to re-enter Madrid in early October. Although the Allies captured the key Valencian town of Alicante, and Leake took the islands of Ibiza and Majorca in September, the Allied retreat from Castile brought forth the reversal of Philip V's fortunes in the peninsula, and softened the blows of Ramillies and Turin. By the time Cartagena fell to Franco-Spanish forces in November, the territories of Castile, Murcia, and the southern tip of Valencia had returned to Bourbon obedience.
In an attempt to regain the initiative in 1707, Galway and Das Minas led the main Allied army of 15,500 Portuguese, English, and Dutch troops into Murcia, prior to advancing once again on Madrid. Opposing them stood Berwick who, reinforced with troops released from the Italian front, now commanded 25,000 men. When Berwick advanced towards the Allies on 25 April Galway accepted the challenge. The result was the Battle of Almansa and complete defeat for the main Allied army. With the Allies in full retreat the Duke of Orléans, newly arrived from Italy to take command in Spain, now joined with Berwick to retake much of what had been lost in the earlier campaigns: Valencia city and Saragossa fell in May, d'Asfeld reduced Xátiva in June, and Lleida fell in November. Most of Aragon and Valencia returned to the obedience of Philip V, and the Allies were pushed back to Catalonia and beyond the line of the Segre and the Ebro. The Bourbons also made gains on the Portuguese front, notably the Marquis of Bay's recovery of Ciudad Rodrigo on 4 October. Young King John V had been on the throne in Portugal for less than a year following the death of Peter II, but his country was exhausted and in danger of defeat if the Allies could not make progress in the Crown of Aragon.
Following the Habsburg victory in Italy the Emperor could at last send Charles III assistance in early 1708. Joseph I's resources remained limited and he was still unwilling to assign a high priority to the war in Iberia. Nevertheless, the Austrians agreed to send reinforcements, as well as Guido Starhemberg to assume supreme Allied command in the peninsula. James Stanhope – the English envoy to Charles III – became the new British commander in Spain, and in September he and Admiral Leake captured Menorca and the key harbour, Mahón. This success followed hard on Leake's capture of Sardinia in the name of Charles III in August. However, Philip V's generals on the Spanish mainland continued their advance on Charles III in Barcelona. Orléans took Tortosa in mid-July, while on the Valencian coast d'Asfeld re-captured Dénia in mid-November, and Alicante (though not its citadel) in early December.
From the start of the war the Dutch priority had been to secure their Barrier fortress system as stipulated – though unspecified – in the Grand Alliance treaty; they also had concerns on their eastern German border (from Cleves in the south to East Frisia in the north) where their once political and economical dominance had come under threat from the Prussians. As a consequence, Spain had become largely irrelevant to the States General, and they had increasingly looked favourably on a deal with France based on partition of the Spanish inheritance between Archduke Charles and the Duke of Anjou. As early as 1705 Louis XIV had approached the Allies with peace feelers, attempting to split the Dutch from the Alliance and achieve a partition of Spain. The defeat at Ramillies in 1706, and the defeat at Oudenarde and loss of Lille in 1708, had further encouraged Louis XIV to abandon the principle of Spanish integrity. Yet for dynastic and strategic reasons Joseph I and his ministers in Vienna were unwilling to grant Philip V compensation in Italy, while Charles III in Barcelona, after years of struggle, sincerely believed in his rightful claims to the whole of Spain and its dependencies. The British supported the Habsburgs in opposing partition, in part to protect their Mediterranean trade: they were already pressing for the cessation of Menorca and the strategically important Port Mahón for themselves, and they were determined to prevent the Duke of Anjou acquiring Sicily and Naples, thereby limiting French maritime influence in the region. In desperation, therefore, Louis XIV sent the president of the Parlement of Paris, Pierre Rouillé, to meet with Dutch ministers in March 1709 at Moerdijk, confident that they at least were willing to accept some token partition. However, British and Austrian intransigence, and a whole raft of conditions from their allies, scuppered any chance of a compromise. The Dutch, unwilling to treat without British support, were compelled once again to put their faith in the strength of the Grand Alliance.
After the collapse of the talks with Rouillé on 21 April, the Allies prepared to resume hostilities, but for Louis XIV this represented an unacceptable risk. Not only was the Anglo-Dutch army fighting on French soil, the whole of France had recently suffered a severe winter, resulting in widespread crop failure and famine; a hardship exacerbated by a British naval blockade of grain imports. In early May Louis XIV sent his Foreign Minister, Torcy, to deal with the Allied negotiators at The Hague, principally Eugene, later assisted by Count Sinzendorf, for the Emperor; Marlborough and a Whig leader, Charles Townshend, representing Queen Anne; and Heinsius, Willem Buys, and Bruno van der Dussen, for the Dutch. Prussian, Savoyard, Portuguese, and German representatives were also present. The French had hoped to reduce the demands presented to Rouillé in April, but recognising Louis XIV's weakness the Allies adhered to particularly harsh conditions, and on 27 May they presented Torcy the forty articles of the Preliminaries of The Hague, the most important of which was the Anglo-Habsburg demand that required Philip V to hand over the entire Spanish Monarchy to Charles III without compensation. In return, the Allies offered a two-month truce. Within that time Louis XIV was to withdraw his troops from Spain and procure Philip V's renunciation of the Spanish throne. At largely Dutch insistence – though supported by the British – Louis XIV was to hand over three French and three Spanish 'cautionary' towns to guarantee his grandson's compliance. If Philip V refused to surrender his claims peacefully the French were to join with the Allies and forcibly drive the Bourbon claimant from the peninsula or face a renewal of the war in Flanders, though now without the towns they had surrendered. To Dutch ministers these stipulations ensured France could not reap the benefits of peace and recover its strength while the Grand Alliance continued fighting in Spain.
Louis XIV had been willing to accept the bulk of the demands, including relinquishing several fortresses to provide for the Dutch Barrier, ceding Strasbourg and many of his rights in Alsace to accommodate a Reichsbarriere on the Empire's western frontier, and recognising the Protestant succession in England, but he could not agree to the terms regarding Spain, and in early June the King publicly rejected the Preliminaries, calling on his subjects for new efforts of resistance. Nevertheless, with French forces under pressure on other fronts Louis XIV was willing to manoeuvre for peace at Philip V's expense, and after the Preliminaries had been rejected he withdrew much of his army from Spain to encourage his grandson's voluntary abdication. However, by now Louis XIV had far less influence over Philip V than the Allies realised, and surrendering Spain was not something the Spanish king, now firmly established on his throne and enjoying the support of the majority of his subjects, would countenance.
Grand Alliance faltersEdit
Believing that Louis XIV was only stalling for time in order to recuperate his army, the ministry in London prepared to act vigorously on all fronts in 1709, hoping to draw the French back to the negotiating table. Central to both sides was the situation in Flanders. Here, Villars replaced Vendôme as commander of the French army and set about building a new defensive line from Aire to Douai (the Lines of Cambrin, or la Bassée, later extended) to block the line of advance from Lille to Paris. Due to the harshness of the previous winter and the scarcity of stores and provisions, Marlborough had initially recoiled from a full-scale invasion of France in preference to a conservative policy of siege warfare. The Allies invested Tournai in July (the citadel did not fall till 3 September), before moving to attack Mons. Given a free hand from Louis XIV to save the city Villars, commanding perhaps 75,000 men, entrenched his army centred around the tiny village of Malplaquet. Confident that one last set-piece battle would result in the final destruction of the main French army and force Louis XIV to accept peace on Allied terms, Marlborough and Eugene, leading some 86,000 men, accepted the challenge and attacked the French position on 11 September. The Battle of Malplaquet was nominally a victory for the Allies, but a stern French defence and faults in the execution of the battle-plan prevented the Allies from winning decisively, and they suffered major losses. Although Mons subsequently fell in October, Villars and his co-commander Boufflers, had kept the French army intact.
The Allies were now lodged in the northern French provinces depriving Louis XIV of vital resources, but Villars' resistance had provided a boost to French morale. There was also French success in Spain in 1709: Alicante's citadel fell in April, and on 7 May the Marquis of Bay defeated Fronteira and Galway at the Battle of La Gudina on the Portuguese border. However, Louis XIV's greatest advantage lay in his enemy's political disunity, exacerbated as it was by the appalling Allied losses at Malplaquet (particularly the Dutch) and the strategic indecisiveness of the battle. The Tories – whose Land Tax was funding the war – sought to make political gain by demonstrating that the Whigs and their friends at the Bank of England were benefiting from the ongoing conflict to the detriment of their compatriots. But there was also anger from the Dutch who, since April, had been pressing British ministers to accept their latest Barrier project. Talks had reached deadlock, but in August the Dutch had learnt of the secret territorial and commercial concessions the Habsburgs had yielded Britain, concessions at odds with the Treaty of Grand Alliance, which had promised an equal division of the Spanish spoils. To appease their allies the Godolphin ministry now proposed its own concessions. By the Barrier Treaty of 29 October, Townshend, without consulting Vienna, promised the Dutch an extensive Barrier fortress system, as well as commercial advantages in the Spanish Netherlands and an equal share of any advantages secured from Spain's empire; the Treaty also granted the Dutch Upper Guelders, to which the Prussians laid claim. In return, the States General offered concessions of their own, primarily to provide armed help in repelling any future foreign attempt to overthrow the Protestant succession in Great Britain. From the outset, however, Joseph I, Charles III, and the Tories who saw the Dutch primarily as commercial rivals, considered the agreement prejudicial to their own economic and strategic interests.
The Grand Alliance had failed to make the decisive breakthrough in 1709, but Louis XIV was far from confident: his finances were in a mess and the famine lingered. At Geertruidenberg from March through July 1710 the French envoys, Marshal d'Uxelles and the Abbé Polignac, sought to modify the harsh Hague Preliminaries. Against Joseph I's wishes – whose objective remained the entire Spanish inheritance – the Dutch had suggested Philip V could retain Sicily, and perhaps receive Sardinia as compensation for vacating Spain. Yet the Allies now went even beyond the demands specified at The Hague. Prompted by their distrust of Louis XIV and convinced of France's exhaustion, the Dutch insisted Louis XIV take sole responsibility, in men and money, for driving Philip V from Spain if he refused to leave voluntarily. This was flatly rejected. Louis XIV had already recalled much of his army from Spain to promote the peace process, and he was even willing to pay a large subsidy to assist the Allied campaign in the peninsula. But he would not send French troops to depose his grandson while his enemies watched from afar.
In Britain, the Whigs remained strongly in favour of the war, and Allied negotiators had been spurred on by Marlborough and Eugene passing the Lines of Cambrin, before taking the pré carré fortress of Douai on 25 June 1710. However, calls for peace were growing: the war was profitable for some, but the general populace had become overburdened, and dissatisfaction set in against Godolphin and his government. Due to their support for the continental strategy (and other measures such as supporting the political union of England and Scotland, which the High Tories opposed), Godolphin was beholden to the Whigs, particularly the Whig Junto who had long been demanding greater power in the Cabinet Council. The first major crisis had come in 1706 when Godolphin and the Duke and Duchess of Marlborough compelled the highly reluctant Queen to accept a member of the Junto, the Earl of Sunderland, as Secretary of State. The appointment further damaged the Queen's already barbed relationship with the Duchess, and it estranged Anne from Godolphin. Consequently, the Queen turned to the moderate Tory Robert Harley, Sunderland's fellow Secretary of State, who had long reviled the Junto and who now set himself up in opposition to the ministry. As early as 1707 Harley was voicing doubts about the hard-line Whig policy in Spain, and in opposing the Junto he had the Queen's sympathy, but with Godolphin and the victorious Marlborough presenting a united front it was Harley who lost the initial power struggle, and he was forced from office in February 1708. The subsequent General Election in May proved very favourable to the Whigs, who became champions of a belligerent war policy which they were determined to see through at any cost. However, by 1710 domestic party strife, war-weariness, and the disappointment of Malplaquet, all led to political upheaval in England, and Harley encouraged Anne, herself tired of the endless war and the hated Whig Junto, to change her ministry. In June Anne dismissed Sunderland. In August, shortly after the collapse of the Geertruidenberg talks, she dismissed Godolphin, who was followed in September by the rest of the Whig Junto. Following the General Election in October Harley led a new largely Tory ministry, alongside the Whig moderate, the Duke of Shrewsbury, and the highly partisan Henry St. John, who became the principal Secretary of State.
Harley came to power advocating peace – a just peace for Britain and all its allies. However, the other members of the Grand Alliance, as well as the Whig directors of the Bank of England, had viewed with apprehension Anne's new government, and interpreted the fall of the Whigs as signifying a shift in war policy. To avoid a credit crisis at home and to dispel Allied fears abroad – thereby forestalling Vienna and The Hague rushing to make their own separate arrangements – the Harley government at first returned to the war strategy undertaken by the previous administration to secure from a position of strength an advantageous settlement. Marlborough remained at the head of the Anglo-Dutch army in Northern France, and by the end of the 1710 campaign the Duke and Eugene had added to their earlier success by capturing Béthune, Saint-Venant, and in early November, Aire-sur-la-Lys, thereby penetrating the second line of the pré carré. Yet these sieges had been costly and time consuming, and there had been no decisive breakthrough; moreover, between Marlborough and Paris still lay several fortresses and a new defensive line.
Other fronts in 1710 produced little, but in Spain the dispute over who would rule in Madrid was finally settled. Due to Louis XIV withdrawing much of his army from Spain, Philip V took to the field bereft of French generals and troops. In contrast, Joseph I at last fully committed himself to the Iberian front, hoping to dispel Tory resentment of his reputed half-hearted prosecution of the war. Thus reinforced, Starhemberg and Stanhope defeated Villadarias and Philip V at the Battle of Almenar on 27 July 1710, followed by victory against de Bay (Villadarias' replacement) at the Battle of Saragossa on 20 August. The Allies had regained control of Aragon, and at the end of September Charles III entered Madrid, albeit to a hostile reception. With Barcelona, Madrid, and Saragossa in Allied hands Philip V's position looked precarious, but again they failed to secure the backing of the Spanish people; moreover, with the collapse of the Geertruidenberg talks Louis XIV could return to support his grandson. Vendôme passed through the Pyrenees and took control of the main Franco-Spanish army, while the Duke of Noailles attacked Catalonia from Roussillon. Facing this new threat and unwilling to winter in the hostile territories of Castile, Starhemberg retired eastward. Vendôme pursued, and on 8/9 December he captured Stanhope and the British rearguard at Brihuega. When Starhemberg turned the main army to offer assistance, Vendôme attacked him at Villaviciosa on the 10th. Although Starhemberg kept the field, the Allies were subsequently forced into a precipitous retreat back to Catalonia, reduced to the region between Tarragona, Igualada, and Barcelona, where they would largely remain till the end of the war.
Preliminary peace talksEdit
The new Harley ministry in London sought the same goals for Great Britain as had the Godolphin ministry, that is, to ensure the country's safety, prevent outside interference in its internal affairs, and secure its trade abroad. But there was one big difference – their readiness to commit to peace. As early as August 1710 the Tories had initiated secret talks with the French, seeking mutual ground whereon Great Britain and France could dictate peace to the rest of Europe. Initially, Harley and Shrewsbury conducted these talks through the Jacobite Earl of Jersey, and through Torcy's London agent, François Gaultier, who between them sketched out the broad outline of a peace agreement. At first the Tories had offered no concrete concessions to the French, but when news of the Allied retreat from Madrid and the defeat at Brihuega reached London in December, Anne's ministers finally resolved to abandon Spain and the Indies to Philip V (provided the thrones of France and Spain remained separate) in return for exclusive territorial and trade advantages. To this end they were aided by the sudden death in April 1711 of Holy Roman Emperor Joseph I. Joseph I's brother, Archduke Charles (Charles III of Spain), was his sole male heir, yet if Charles III was to succeed to the Austrian inheritance as well as that of Spain, the balance of power in Europe would once again be overthrown, this time in favour of the Austrian Habsburgs. For the Tories, the threat of a dominant Habsburg empire was no more desirable than a Bourbon one, but for now the need for the Grand Alliance remained: peace was necessary, yet in order to strengthen their negotiating position Queen Anne's ministers stood by the basic strategy of attacking Louis XIV across multiple fronts. In 1711 this was to include a revival of an earlier plan to seize the French stronghold of Quebec in North America.
Up till now the war in North America had been a relatively minor affair fought between English, Spanish, and French colonists who rallied their Indian allies to attack frontier settlements for trade and territorial advantage. The French were aware of the danger of their position between Rupert's Land in the north and the British colonies to the south, but the expansion of French settlements from Louisiana, along the Mississippi River to the Great Lakes and the Saint Lawrence River in Canada, threatened to encircle the British settlers. For the most part the English in North America had been left to their own devices, but the growing power of France had persuaded the new Tory ministry to take direct action to secure the colonies and its commerce for Britain. Regular troops were taken from Flanders for the Quebec campaign, but the naval expedition against the French stronghold in August 1711 ended in disaster.
The campaign in North America did nothing to shake the common Whig belief that America was to be won by defeating France in Europe. However, the failure at Quebec was somewhat compensated by Marlborough's final victory in the field. Anne's Captain-General no longer had the influence he enjoyed under the Godolphin ministry: his wife's relationship with the Queen had ended acrimoniously and he was now under the influence of Harley, now the Earl of Oxford and Lord High Treasurer. Nevertheless, Marlborough still commanded the Anglo-Dutch forces in northern France, and in August he outmanoeuvred Villars and crossed the formidable Ne Plus Ultra lines, before capturing Bouchain on 12 September. The campaign was not decisive, however. Arras, Cambrai, Le Quesnoy, and Landrecies still stood between the Duke and Paris, and it would take at least one more campaign to secure their capitulation.
On 27 September Charles III reluctantly left Barcelona to take possession of the Austrian hereditary lands and the Imperial crown, leaving behind his wife Elizabeth as a pledge to the Spanish. In order to facilitate the Imperial election at Frankfurt – and keep the electors loyal to the Habsburgs – Eugene and the troops still in Austrian pay (no more than 16,000 men) had already moved from Flanders to the Rhine where the French were massing for a new offensive (or to at least disrupt the Imperial election). In the event Eugene's campaign proved uneventful and in October, shortly after his embarkation at Genoa, Archduke Charles was elected Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI. Yet even before he had left Barcelona Charles knew the Allies were on the point of making peace and that Spain was no longer within the dynasty's grasp. Vendôme sought to hasten the Allied departure from Catalonia by moving on Tarragona and Barcelona; several small towns fell as a prelude, but Starhemberg fought back, and the Bourbons were unable to secure a military solution that year. Meanwhile, on the Spanish-Portuguese border Vila Verde had replaced Fronteira as commander of the Portuguese army, and the Earl of Portmore succeeded Galway as British commander. However, the campaign against de Bay proved uneventful as it became clear that the momentum was now with the peace negotiations.
Oxford (Harley) had refused to make a separate treaty between Britain and France, but ultimately he had excluded the Dutch from negotiating the preliminary articles of peace, which together with French ministers he would present to the States General as a done deal. After much cross-Channel diplomacy the final proposals were agreed. First, there were the vague public preliminaries made by Britain on behalf of itself and the Allies, namely: French recognition of Queen Anne and the Act of Settlement; a guarantee that the French and Spanish crowns would remain separate; a restoration of international commerce; protective 'barriers' for the Dutch Republic, Austria, and the Holy Roman Empire against future French aggression; and a secret agreement that France would cooperate in securing for the Duke of Savoy – Britain's close ally – those parts of Italy which the British deemed necessary to counter Habsburg domination. On top of these general concessions were the secret articles pertaining only to Britain, including negotiations for an Anglo-French commercial treaty, and the demolition of the privateer base of Dunkirk. There were also the advantages which Britain had previously hoped to gain by supporting the Habsburg cause in Spain and which were now to be granted by Philip V, including the cession of Gibraltar, Menorca, and the Asiento (slaving contract) for 30 years. The agreement was laid down as the Preliminary Articles of London, signed on 8 October 1711 (N.S.) by St. John and the Earl of Dartmouth for Great Britain, and Nicolas Mesnager for France.
For the British, there now remained the problem of convincing their allies to accept those Preliminary articles that had been made public as a basis for a future peace congress. However, the court in Vienna were dissatisfied with Britain's evident change in policy, and were suspicious that Anne's government had already consigned Spain and the Indies to the Bourbons. Consequently, Charles VI at first rejected the idea of a peace conference, but once the Dutch were pulled into line by Britain's threat to abandon them and force them to fight on alone, the Emperor reluctantly consented. George Louis, Elector of Hanover, also thought the Tories were betraying the Grand Alliance and their cause, and as heir to the British throne he was concerned that if the Bourbons were established in Spain they would actively support James Edward Stuart's claim to succeed Queen Anne. His ambition to raise his electorate to the status of a kingdom also necessitated his continuing support for the Emperor, and although he accepted the principle of a peace congress, the Elector refused to abandon Charles VI's claim to the Spanish succession. In Britain, there was also opposition in the House of Lords, notably from the influential Tory, the Earl of Nottingham, whose motion that "no peace was safe or honourable to Great Britain or Europe if Spain and the West Indies were allotted to any branch of the House of Bourbon", was carried on 7 December (Julian calendar (O.S.)).
To rouse public feeling against the Whigs and their European allies the Tories had turned to propaganda, notably Jonathan Swift's The Conduct of the Allies. In his pamphlet (composed with ministerial assistance) Swift protested against Allied intransigence at The Hague and Geertruidenberg peace talks, and he reminded the public of the original Treaty of Grand Alliance where no mention was made of driving Philip V from Spain. Swift lamented that the early Allied victories had led to hubris and intransigence, and he rejected the preoccupation with the security of the Low Countries at the expense of a naval and colonial war. He also denigrated Marlborough, a leading member of the former administration and opponent of the new ministry's direction who, now that the Preliminaries had been unilaterally agreed with France, was no longer needed. To further discredit the Duke charges of financial corruption during the war were lodged against him in Parliament, leading to his dismissal at the end of 1711.
Tory propaganda was built in part on a foundation of anti-Dutch and anti-Habsburg xenophobia, but Britain was being drained of its resources, and many thought the country had borne too much of the burden pursuing their allies' interests while being denied any advantage for itself. Domestically, Oxford had the backing of the Queen, the war-weary public, the House of Commons; support from the House of Lords was secured by the expedient of the Queen creating 12 new Tory peers. Nevertheless, the Whigs and some Tory Lords refused to accept the possibility of Philip V remaining in Spain, and persisted in supporting the Habsburg bloc as a counterbalance to powerful France. To others, Charles VI's succession as Holy Roman Emperor and inheritor of the Habsburg lands meant supporting his claim to the Spanish succession had long ceased to be politically desirable. The danger of too much power accumulating to Austria had convinced many, including Daniel Defoe, the chief Whig propagandist, to re-think Grand Strategy.
Peace of Utrecht and the final campaignsEdit
The congress at Utrecht convened on 29 January 1712. However, within weeks of the talks opening the Bourbons in France had suffered a series of royal deaths, and soon all that was standing between Philip V and the French crown was a sickly two-year-old boy, Louis. To safeguard against the unification of the French and Spanish thrones under one monarch – and therefore prevent a collapse of the negotiations – Philip V was pressed to choose between the two crowns. Louis XIV was receptive to Oxford's plan whereby Philip V, on choosing France, would immediately hand over Spain and Spanish America to the Duke of Savoy. In return, Philip would receive Savoy's lands, plus Montferrat and Sicily as a kingdom for himself; if and when the young Louis died, Philip would ascend the French throne, and the Italian territories (except Sicily which would go to the Habsburgs) would be absorbed into the kingdom of France. However, Philip V, comfortable in his adopted country and with no guarantee young Louis would die, rejected the plan, and renounced his claim to the French throne in favour of staying in Spain. His response did not promote the Duke of Savoy to the position which the Tories had hoped, and it would make a resolution with the Emperor more difficult. Nevertheless, the renunciation was seen in London as an acceptable basis on which to press for peace.
The congress at Utrecht had not been accompanied by an armistice, yet Oxford and St John were determined not to fight another costly and potentially damaging campaign in Flanders. Even before Philip V gave his answer to the 'Savoy plan', Queen Anne had issued Marlborough's successor, the Duke of Ormonde, his 'Restraining Orders' (21 May), forbidding him to use British troops against the French. In effect, Anne's ministers had abandoned their allies in the field and made a separate deal with France, but they were convinced they had reached the best agreement possible, not just for themselves, but also for the other members of the Grand Alliance who were asked to join the Anglo-French suspension of arms. However, the Dutch – who had received no guarantees for their strategic and commercial interests – were inclined to fight on; as was Prince Eugene who was determined to breach the remaining fortresses guarding northern France and compel Louis XIV into making substantial concessions. On 4 July 1712, Eugene took Le Quesnoy; on the 17th he invested Landrecies, the last pré carré fortress between himself and Paris. British troops had by now pulled back to Ghent and Bruges, and in conformity with the agreement with France they also occupied Dunkirk. Nevertheless, the majority of Ormonde's German and Danish auxiliaries went over to Eugene who, following the Treaty of Szatmár and end of Rákóczi's revolt, also received reinforcements from Hungary, giving the Austrian commander a numerical advantage. Yet Villars, encouraged by Britain's withdrawal, decided to take the initiative. Feinting against the besiegers at Landrecies the French commander struck out for Denain and defeated the Earl of Albemarle's Dutch garrison on 24 July. The victory was pivotal. The French subsequently seized the Allies' main supply magazine at Marchiennes on 30 July, before reversing their earlier losses at Douai, Le Quesnoy and, in early October, Bouchain. The pré carré had been restored.
On 19 August 1712, Britain, Savoy, France and Spain agreed to a general suspension of arms. The British now began to draw back their troops from Catalonia and reduce the regiments in Portugal. When Portugal agreed an armistice with France and Spain on 8 November, Starhemberg was deprived of all but his Catalan allies. By the end of the year Charles VI's German ministers were in agreement that Austria would have to make peace: the Emperor could not fight Louis XIV and Philip V without the Maritime Powers, but the Dutch, following the collapse of their public finances, could not carry on the war without Britain. To draw the States General into a general peace the Tories offered new terms regarding the Barrier in the Spanish Netherlands, supplanting the former Whig agreement which had since been repudiated by the British Parliament. The new treaty, signed on 29 January 1713, maintained the principle of the Barrier, but it now comprised fewer fortresses than the one promised by the Whigs, though better than the one the Dutch held at the beginning of the war. Trade interests in the region were to satisfy both Maritime Powers, but the agreement was still subject to Austrian approval.
Austria's inability to impose a military solution in Spain or Flanders had strengthened the French and British negotiating positions at Utrecht. Consequently, in March 1713, Count Sinzendorf, the Emperor's representative at the congress, signed a convention for the evacuation of Imperial troops from Catalonia: the Empress departed Barcelona on 19 March, followed in July by Starhemberg. Charles VI had been willing to make unpalatable concessions to end the war, but last minute demands by Louis XIV's diplomats at Utrecht – including the cession of Luxembourg to the Elector of Bavaria, the immediate formal recognition of Philip V as King of Spain, and a guarantee the Austrians would not extend their rule in northern Italy to Mantua and Mirandola – proved a step too far. As a result, Charles VI resolved to fight on, but for other key members of the Grand Alliance the war was over.
On 11 April 1713, Great Britain, Prussia, Savoy, Portugal, and after midnight, the Dutch Republic, signed the treaties at Utrecht to secure peace with France – a peace built around a framework pre-established by French and British diplomats, and on the principle of a European balance of power. The treaty secured Britain's main war aims: Louis XIV's acknowledgement of the Protestant succession as regulated by Parliament, and safeguards to ensure that the French and Spanish thrones remained separate. In North America, Louis XIV ceded to Britain the territories of Saint Kitts and Acadia, and recognised Britain's sovereignty over Rupert's Land and Newfoundland (less some rights for French coastal fishermen). In return, Louis XIV kept the major city of Lille on his northern border, but he ceded Furnes, Ypres, Menin, and Tournai to the Spanish Netherlands; he also agreed to the permanent demilitarisation of the naval base at Dunkirk. The Dutch received their restricted Barrier – with French amendments – in the Spanish Netherlands, and a share of the trade in the region with Britain; Prussia gained Upper Guelders, and international recognition of the disputed Orange succession lands of Moers, Lingen, and Neuchâtel; and Portugal won minor concessions in Brazil against encroachments on the Amazon from French Guiana. Nice and the Duchy of Savoy was restored to Victor Amadeus who, at British insistence, also acquired Sicily to act as a counter-weight to the Habsburg's political and commercial dominance in Italy. Louis XIV also ceded the district of Pragelato and the fortresses of Exilles and Fenestrelle to act as part of an alpine barrier; to compensate, Amadeus ceded the Barcelonnette valley to France. Above all, though, Louis XIV had secured for the House of Bourbon the throne of Spain, with his grandson, Philip V, recognised as the rightful king by all signatories.
Spain made peace with the Dutch in June, and with Savoy and Britain on 13 July 1713. To Britain, Spain ceded Gibraltar and Menorca, recognised the Protestant succession, and confirmed the March agreement to grant Britain the Asiento slaving contract for 30 years (besides other trade advantages for the newly formed South Sea Company); in return, Spain and the Spanish Indies were guaranteed to Philip V, who reaffirmed his renunciation of the French throne. The Spanish-Dutch treaty changed little, however: Dutch trade was put on 'most favoured nation' basis, but they had to abandon trade with the Spanish Indies. Spain and Portugal came to terms in February 1715. Spain ceded Colonia del Sacramento in South America, and confirmed the mutual restitutions already settled between France and Portugal, but there were to be no Portuguese gains in Extremadura or Galicia as promised by the Allies in 1703.
Emperor Charles VI and the Elector of Hanover were to fight a final campaign on the Rhine before they and the Holy Roman Empire would submit. The numerically superior French under Marshal Villars captured Landau in August 1713, and Freiburg in November. With Austrian finances exhausted and the German states reluctant to continue, Charles VI was compelled to enter into negotiations. Louis XIV too required peace, and on 26 November Eugene and Villars initiated talks, culminating in the Franco-Austrian Treaty of Rastatt on 7 March 1714. The treaty was largely built on what had already been agreed at Utrecht before the Emperor pulled out of the talks, but by fighting on for another year Charles VI had gained some advantages: he was not asked to renounce his claim to Spain formally, and he had forestalled the French attempt to limit his influence in Italy. Ultimately, therefore, the Emperor now controlled Milan, Naples, Mantua, the Tuscan ports (State of Presidi), Sardinia (which was promised to Bavaria at Utrecht), and most of the Spanish Netherlands (known henceforth as the Austrian Netherlands). Louis XIV yielded all French conquests on the east bank of the Rhine (Breisach, Kehl, Freiburg), and ended his support of Rákóczi's cause in Hungary. Strasbourg and Alsace remained French, however, and the Emperor ceded Landau to Louis XIV, and agreed to a full reinstatement of the Electors of Bavaria and Cologne. The Holy Roman Empire became part of this treaty at Baden on 7 September.
There remained the struggle in Catalonia. At no stage in the war had there been a unanimous or even majority support for Archduke Charles (Charles III) in the principality, but the existence of a rebel group inside the province, together with a superior Allied military and naval presence in Barcelona, forced many towns to decide – often reluctantly – for the Archduke's cause. Nevertheless, those who wished to continue fighting could point to the fact that the Kingdoms of Aragon and Valencia, as well as those in Castile, were subject to a regime that had forced them to change their laws and historic constitutions, and at no stage since his victory at Almansa and the subsequent abolition of the fueros in Aragon and Valencia in 1707, had Philip V shown any intention of respecting Catalonia's privileges. In consequence, Barcelona decided to resist, but there would be no Allied help. After the peace agreements between the major powers neither Austria nor Great Britain could return to a war footing. To compound the issue, Tory diplomatic efforts with Philip V to secure Catalan liberties were half-hearted, and Bolingbroke made no protest when, in early July 1714 – after a year of guerrilla warfare in the region – Berwick returned to Catalonia to formally besiege Barcelona. Antoni de Villarroel put up a stout defence of the city, but with little hope of relief the Catalan capital surrendered on 11 September (which is since remembered as the National Day of Catalonia). Cardona soon followed. Majorca held out for nine months until its surrender in July 1715.
With Germany and Italy providing a buffer with France, the Austrian Habsburgs had maintained what was crucial to their security and interests. Together with the recent Balkan conquests, Charles VI now ruled an extensive Habsburg empire. Austria had confirmed its position as a major power, yet the Habsburg dynasty had fallen short of its full war aims: Spain had been lost to Philip V and Sicily lost to the Duke of Savoy. Although Sardinia was exchanged for Sicily in 1720 the island, together with the acquisitions of the Spanish Netherlands and Naples, extended the Monarchy's responsibilities beyond their traditional interests and commitments – an overextension which made the Habsburg territories more vulnerable at their periphery, particularly without the assistance of the Maritime Powers. In Germany, the Imperial army had been unable to recover the lost lands in Alsace and Lorraine, and the Holy Roman Empire itself made no gains, and even lost territory (Landau). This was largely due to the fact that Vienna's principal concern had been to establish a secure Danubian state, and the Emperor and his ministers had been unwilling to put German interests before those of Italy and Hungary. The Habsburgs would make further gains when Prince Eugene once again defeated the Ottomans in the Austro-Turkish War of 1716–18, but Vienna's influence within the Empire declined, not least because the rulers of Hanover, Saxony, and Prussia had territorial claims beyond Germany, and now had royal titles they considered equal to the Emperor.
On 1 August 1714 (O.S.) Queen Anne of Great Britain died. Despite Jacobite machinations, the Act of Settlement ensured a smooth Protestant succession and the Elector of Hanover ascended the throne as George I of Great Britain and Ireland. The first warrant signed by George reinstated Marlborough as Captain-General of the army, and from London the Duke helped organise the defeat of the Jacobite rising of 1715. However, the new King and the Whigs in general never forgave those Tories accused of abandoning the Grand Alliance and the part they played in concluding the Peace of Utrecht. Rather than face impeachment Bolingbroke fled to France in April 1715 (N.S) to join the Pretender, as did Ormonde who followed in August. Oxford remained in England and was imprisoned in the Tower of London for two years, never again to hold office. The Tory party, leaderless and riven by faction, did not survive intact, and their decline paved the way for the eventual rise of Robert Walpole and decades of Whig domination in early Georgian Britain – a country which emerged from the war as a world power, and one which had learnt to utilise its financial muscle to harness European allies for its own strategic interests.
Although the War of the Spanish Succession was not to be the last in which the Dutch Republic fought as a major power, it was however the beginning of the end; despite its talented merchants, bankers, and diplomats, the country of just three million people was burdened with debt. Exhausted after its supreme efforts, the Republic could no longer compete with Great Britain; the Dutch navy could not match the British fleet, which had now secured a foothold in the Mediterranean with the annexation of Gibraltar and Menorca. Nevertheless, the Dutch had achieved their principal war aim: the Austro-Dutch Antwerp treaty of 15 November 1715 assured the Dutch their coveted barrier fortress defence system in the Austrian Netherlands. The agreement also included the closure of the river Scheldt to maritime commerce, thereby restoring Dutch commercial and trade domination. The Dutch oligarchs would henceforth pursue a more defensive, and even neutralist, policy and by the mid-century the Netherlands was a much reduced force in European politics.
On 1 September 1715 Louis XIV died, bringing an end to his long reign that had made France the supreme power in Europe. Louis's five-year-old great-grandson and heir survived his precarious childhood and, including the eight-year regency of the Duke of Orléans, reigned in France as Louis XV until his death in 1774. Louis XIV had ended the war with some minor adjustments along France's eastern borders, but the final settlement had been far more favourable than what the Allies had offered in 1709/10: France had resisted the Allied demand of 'no peace without Spain', and Louis XIV could claim dynastic victory in Spain, thereby avoiding Habsburg encirclement. In North America France lost territory, and the French settlers were vastly outnumbered by the British in their colonies. Nevertheless, the French held on to Canada, Louisiana, Cape Breton Island, and Prince Edward Island, and thus control of the St Lawrence; thousands more remained in Acadia, and they still held the vast territory to the west between French Canada and Louisiana in the south. However, the war had stretched Louis XIV's finances beyond its limits, and France was left with a massive burden of debt. The kingdom remained inherently strong, but it could not maintain its former dominance and suffered a relative decline in military and economic terms.
On 14 February 1714 the Spanish queen, Marie Luisa, died; on 16 September Philip V married, by proxy, Elisabeth Farnese, niece of the Duke of Parma. Farnese' ejection of Madame des Ursins and Jean Orry from Spain, and her reliance on a new favourite, Giulio Alberoni, the envoy to the Duke of Parma, signalled the end of French dominance in Madrid, and brought forth a new direction of Spanish policy. Italian politics and culture became highly influential, but Philip V had lost his Italian territories, which together with the losses of Gibraltar and Menorca had deprived the king his power in the western Mediterranean. However, the territorial losses had enabled the King and his ministers to concentrate on internal reform and centralisation. For the provinces of the Crown of Aragon this meant the end to much of their political autonomy as they were united into a Castilian Spanish state ruled from Madrid. These steps were problematic and painful, particularly in Catalonia where, despite the survival of Catalan private law and the Catalan language, resentment would linger.
The Basques – Kingdom of Navarre and the Basque Provinces ("Biscay") – had supported the king against the Habsburg pretender, and initially retained their home rule (fueros). However, the centralising drive of the Spanish Crown did not spare them. In 1718, following Philip V's attempt to suppress home rule by bringing customs to the coast and the Pyrenees, Basques in Gipuzkoa and the seigneury of Biscay rose up in arms across coastal areas. Philip V sent over troops and the uprising (matxinada) was quelled in blood. Despite his military success, eventually Philip V backed down on his decision, brought customs back to the Ebro river (1719). The Basques managed to keep their traditional institutions and laws.
Nevertheless, Spain eventually grew in strength under Philip V's and Farnese's leadership, and the country would return to the forefront of European politics. With neither Charles VI nor Philip V willing to accept the Spanish partition, and with no treaty existing between Spain and Austria, the two powers would soon clash in order to gain control of Italy, starting with a brief war in 1718. However, the War of the Spanish Succession brought to an end a long period of major conflict in western Europe: the partition of the Spanish Monarchy had secured the balance of power, and the conditions imposed at Utrecht helped to regulate the relations between the major European powers over the coming century.
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- The 1707 Acts of Union united England and Scotland
- Subsidiary conflicts in North America and elsewhere were the continuation of ongoing struggles for colonial territories unrelated to the issues in Europe.
- The Habsburgs were rulers of Austria and Hungary in their own right; the position of Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire was technically an elected position but had been held by the Habsburgs since 1438. The term 'Austria' or 'Empire' are used for the same basic unit.
- The Spanish used the term 'Monarchy' rather than Empire.
- The high mortality rate of the period meant Louis XIV was ultimately succeeded by his 4 year old great-grandson Louis XV.
- Scotland's support made doing so easier but its lack of economic or naval power meant it was not a limiting factor in that decision.
- It continued to be so eg the 1839 Treaty of London guaranteeing Belgium or the 'scrap of paper' that took Britain into war in 1914-18.
- Similar to the North African campaigns of 1940-42 where the British and German/Italians fought along the same coastal strip.
- The Crown of Aragon was divided into the Kingdoms of Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, Majorca, Naples, Sicily, Malta and Sardinia.
- Savoy joined the Nine Years War on the side of the Grand Alliance before switching to the French.
- His title was unconnected to the Duchy of Savoy itself
- Without significant naval forces of its own, Austria could not retain Naples and it was recaptured by Spain in 1734.
- The treaty was signed on 15 January 1709, though Clement's formal acceptance was not forthcoming until October.
- These became part of France in 1860.
- Tallard was captured; recognised as one of the best French commanders, he was not exchanged until 1711.
- Whiel Bavaria was no longer officially in the war, Max Emmanuel remained a French general, fighting in many of the battles of 1705-08.
- Boufflers conducted a similar and renowned defence of Namur in 1695.
- "Statistics of Wars, Oppressions and Atrocities of the Eighteenth Century (the 1700s)".
- Duffy, Christopher (1987). The Military Experience in the Age of Reason. Wordsworth Military Library. p. 320. ISBN 0710210248.
- Gonzalo Alvarez; Francisco C. Ceballos; Celsa Quinteiro (15 April 2009). "The Role of Inbreeding in the Extinction of a European Royal Dynasty". PLoS ONE. 4 (4): e5174. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005174. PMC . PMID 19367331. Retrieved 16 September 2013.
- Durant, Ariel, Durant, Will (1963). Age of Louis XIV (Story of Civilization). TBS Publishing. ISBN 0207942277.
- Storrs, Christopher (2006). The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665-1700. OUP Oxford. pp. 6–7. ISBN 0199246378.
- McKay and Scott: The Rise of the Great Powers, 54; Ingrao: The Habsburg Monarchy, 105
- Meerts, Paul Willem (2014). Diplomatic negotiation: Essence and Evolution. http://hdl.handle.net/1887/29596: Leiden University dissertation. p. 168.
- Wolf: Louis XIV, 493
- Ingrao: The Habsburg Monarchy, 105; McKay and Scott: The Rise of the Great Powers, 55
- Frey, Linda (ed), Frey, Marsha (ed) (1995). The Treaties of the War of the Spanish Succession: An Historical and Critical Dictionary. Greenwood. p. 389. ISBN 0313278849.
- Clark: From the Nine Years' War to the War of the Spanish succession, 382–3; McKay and Scott: The Rise of the Great Powers, 54–5; Wolf: The Emergence, 59–60
- Clark: From the Nine Years' War to the War of the Spanish Succession, 393
- McKay and Scott: The Rise of the Great Powers, 55; Ingrao: The Habsburg Monarchy, 106; Spielman: Leopold I, 172–4
- Kamen: Philip V, 3; Spielman: Leopold I, 176
- Clark: From the Nine Years' War to the War of the Spanish Succession, 396–7; Wolf: Louis XIV, 503–4
- Falkner, James (2015). The War of the Spanish Succession (Kindle ed.). 508-568: Pen and Sword. ISBN B0189PTWZG Check
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- Falkner, James (2015). The War of the Spanish Succession 1701-1714 (Kindle ed.). 96: Pen and Sword. ISBN 9781473872905.
- Gregg: Queen Anne, 126; Wolf: Louis XIV, 510–1
- Thompson, RT (1973). Lothar Franz von Schönborn and the Diplomacy of the Electorate of Mainz:. Springer. p. 157. ISBN 9024713463.
- Wolf: The Emergence, 62; Ingrao: Habsburg Monarchy, 108
- Hattendorf: Alliance, Encirclement, and Attrition, 17
- McKay: Eugene, 56; Spielman: Leopold I, 186
- Thompson, RT (1973). Lothar Franz von Schönborn and the Diplomacy of the Electorate of Mainz:. Springer. pp. 158–160. ISBN 9024713463.
- Ostwald: Creating the British Way of War, 106, 113; Burton: The Captain-General, 18–9
- Hattendorf: Alliance, Encirclement, and Attrition, 17–8; Wolf: Louis XIV, 515
- Gregg: Queen Anne, 152; Trevelyan: England, I, 163
- Veenendaal: The War of the Spanish Succession in Europe, 415; Trevelyan: England, I, 165
- Wolf: Louis XIV, 514
- Hattendorf: Alliance, Encirclement, and Attrition, 27
- Hanotin, Guillaume (2011). Serving two kings; Amelot de Gournay and the Union of the Crowns (Doctoral Thesis ed.). Sorbonne. Retrieved 16 April 2018.
- Schmidt Voges, Inken (ed), Solana Crespo, Ana (ed) (2017). New Worlds?: Transformations in the Culture of International Relations Around the Peace of Utrecht (Politics and Culture in Europe, 1650-1750). Routledge. p. 2. ISBN 1472463900.
- Rothbard, Murray. "Mercantilism as the Economic Side of Absolutism". Mises.org. Good summary of the concept. Retrieved 7 April 2018.
- Childs, John (1991). The Nine Years' War and the British Army, 1688-1697: The Operations in the Low Countries (2013 ed.). Manchester University Press. p. 2. ISBN 0719089964.
- Shinsuke, Satsuma (2013). Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth Century. Overview of arguments used: Boydell Press. p. 37 passim. ISBN 1843838621.
- Ostwald, James, Murray & Sinnreich (ed) (2014). Creating the British way of war: English strategy in the War of the Spanish Succession. in; Successful Strategies: Triumphing in War and Peace from Antiquity to the Present: Cambridge University Press. pp. 100–129. ISBN 1107633591.
- Ostwald: The 'Decisive' Battle of Ramillies, 664
- Ingrao: In Quest, 39–40; Veenendaal: The War of the Spanish Succession in Europe, 410–1
- Francis: Peninsular War, 30. Denmark signed a Treaty of Alliance with England and the States General on 15 June 1701 promising Danish neutrality.
- Storrs, Christopher. "The Decline of Spain in the Seventeenth Century" (PDF). State Papers Online. Gale;Cengage Learning. Retrieved 7 April 2018.
- Jon Cowans (2003). Modern Spain: A Documentary History. U. of Pennsylvania Press. pp. 26–27. ISBN 0-8122-1846-9.
- Symcox: Victor Amadeus, 134–5, 138–9; McKay: Eugene, 57; Ingrao: In Quest, 103
- Dhondt, Frederik, De Ruysscher, Capelle, K et al. (eds.) (2015). Historical Exempla in Legal Doctrine: Vattel and Réal de Curban on the War of the Spanish Succession. in Legal history, moving in new directions: Maklu. pp. 16–17. ISBN 9789046607589.
- Spielman: Leopold I, 184; McKay: Eugene59–63; Symcox: Victor Amadeus, 139–40
- McKay: Eugene, 64–6; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 276–7
- Falkner, James (2015). The War of the Spanish Succession 1701-1714 (Kindle ed.). 1302: Pen and Sword. ISBN 9781473872905.
- Sundstrom, Roy A (1992). Sidney Godolphin: Servant of the State. EDS Publications Ltd. p. 196. ISBN 0874134382.
- McKay: Eugene, 101–2; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 310
- McKay: Eugene, 102–8; Veenendaal: War of the Spanish Succession in Europe, 433
- Ingrao: In Quest, 99–116; Stoye: The Austrian Habsburgs, 594–5.
- Symcox, Geoffrey (1985). Victor Amadeus; Absolutism in the Savoyard State, 1675-1730. University of California Press. p. 155. ISBN 0520049748.
- Burton: The Captain-General, 30–7; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 275; Jones: Marlborough, 63–6
- Veenendaal: The War of the Spanish Succession in Europe, 416; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 280–1; Burton: The Captain-General, 40–8
- Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 276; Chandler: Marlborough, 105
- Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 283–4; Chandler: Marlborough, 124.
- Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 284; Burton: Captain-General, 52
- Ingrao: In Quest, 123; McKay: Eugene, 73
- Chandler: Marlborough, 123–52; Jones: Marlborough, 79–100; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 286–94
- Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 298–9; Burton: The Captain-General, 83–9
- Ostwald: The 'Decisive' Battle of Ramillies, 666–77; Veenendaal: The War of the Spanish Succession in Europe, 427–8; Israel: The Dutch Republic, 977
- Burton: The Captain-General, 134–42; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 320–3; Chandler: Marlborough, 223–39
- Afflerbach, Holger (ed), Strachan, Hew (ed) (2012). How Fighting Ends: A History of Surrender. OUP. p. 159. ISBN 0199693625.
- Rodger: The Command, 165–6; Hattendorf: Alliance, Encirclement, and Attrition, 20
- Most of the silver had already been unloaded from the ships before the attack.
- Francis: Peninsular War, 59–81; Ostwald: Creating the British Way of War, 114. Beyond financial and military aid, the English representative, John Methuen, promised Peter II territorial concessions in Galicia and Extremadura, including Badajoz. Spain was also to renounce its claim to the north shore of the river Plate (Godinho: Portugal and Her Empire, 525–6).
- A third treaty on 27 December 1703 opened up Portuguese markets to English cloth, and English markets to Portuguese wine.
- Peter II was to provide a regular army of 15,000 foot and horse, and an auxiliary force of 13,000 men, paid for by the Maritime Powers. The Allies were to provide an army of 12,000 men, but all fell short of their treaty obligations (Francis: Peninsular War, 75).
- Stoye: The Austrian Habsburgs, 591; Veenendaal: The War of the Spanish Succession in Europe, 419; Spielman: Leopold I, 190
- Francis: Peninsular War, 91; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 295
- Hugill: No Peace, 87–146; Veenendaal: The War of the Spanish Succession in Europe, 419; Trevelyan: England, I, 302–3
- The so-called 'Pact of Genoa' was signed on 20 June 1705 by the English representative Mitford Crowe, and the two Catalan delegates, Antoni de Peguera i Aimeric and Dominic Perera. They by no means spoke for all Catalonia.
- Kamen: War of Succession, 242–308; Kamen: Philip V, 42–7; Francis: Peninsular War, 198–9
- Francis: Peninsular War, 171–94; Hugill: No Peace, 156–93
- Francis: Peninsular War, 222–41; Hugill: No Peace, 202–43; Kamen: Philip V, 53–8; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 311
- Francis: Peninsular War, 238–46; Hugill: No Peace, 247–62; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 316
- Francis: Peninsular War, 247–9; Hugill: No Peace, 263–70; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 316
- Francis: Peninsular War, 249; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 316
- Hugill: No Peace, 271–84 Rodger: Command, 172–3; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 324–5
- Israel: The Dutch Republic, 970, 974
- Ingrao: In Quest, 165–78, 197; Pitt: The Pacification of Utrecht, 446–51; Burton: Marlborough, 142; Wolf: Louis XIV, 559
- Ingrao: In quest, 178–81; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 325–6; Trevelyan: England, II, 399
- Ingrao: In Quest, 182; Pitt: The Pacification of Utrecht, 452–3; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 325–6
- Hussey and Bromley: The Spanish Empire under Foreign Pressures, 374; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 326; Kamen: Philip V, 70–2;
- Burton: Marlborough, 146–59; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 329–35; Jones: Marlborough, 172–84; McKay: Eugene, 123–6. Army strengths taken from Lynn. The size of Villars' army is unclear.
- Hill: Robert Harley, 124; Chandler: Marlborough, 275
- Veenendaal: The War of the Spanish Succession in Europe, 434, 438–9; Ingrao: In Quest, 197–9; McKay: Eugene, 129
- Ingrao: In Quest, 204–8; Veenendaal: The War of the Spanish Succession in Europe, 439, 456; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 336–7; Wolf: Louis XIV, 569, 573
- Trevelyan: England, III, 33–5, 45; Pitt: The Pacification of Utrecht, 457
- Gregg: Queen Anne, 218–32; Hill: Robert Harley, 104–6. Sunderland was the Duke of Marlborough's son-in-law.
- MacLachlan: The Road to Peace, 200
- Gregg: Queen Anne, 254–9; Hill: Robert Harley, 114–17; Burton: The Captain-General, 119–20
- Gregg: Queen Anne, 298–319; Hill: Robert Harley, 126–31; Simms: Three Victories, 57–8
- Quote from Torcy in Kamen Philip V, 77
- Hattendorf: Alliance, Encirclement, and Attrition, 25; MacLachlan: The Road to Peace, 203
- Chandler: Marlborough, 278–82; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 337–8
- Hugill: No Peace, 301–18; Ingrao: In Quest, 211-2; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 339–40
- Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 340–1; Kamen: Philip V, 77
- Gregg: Queen Anne, 334–8; Pitt: The Pacification of Utrecht, 459; Trevelyan: England, III, 176–82
- MacLachlan: Road to Peace, 202–3; Hattendorf: Alliance, Encirclement, and Attrition, 26; Hill: Robert Harley, 151
- Simms: Three Victories, 62–4; Hattendorf: England in the War, 344; Trevelyan: England, III, 143–6
- Chandler: Marlborough, 286–99; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 341–5; Burton: The Captain-General, 181–2
- Stoye: The Austrian Habsburgs, 596; Francis: Peninsular War, 355
- McKay: Eugene, 133
- McKay: Eugene, 133–4; Francis: Peninsular War, 356
- Hugill: No Peace, 334–5, 341–5; Francis: Peninsular War, 342–4
- Hill: Robert Harley, 162–5; Wolf: Louis XIV, 581; Pitt: The Pacification of Utrecht, 460; Trevelyan: England, III, 182–5
- Hill: Robert Harley, 167; Pitt: The Pacification of Utrecht, 460
- Hill: Robert Harley, 168; Hattendorf: England in the War, 365; Trevelyan: England, III, 187, 189–90
- Gregg: Queen Anne, 347
- Jones: Marlborough, 219; Simms: Three Victories, 58–62; Trevelyan: England, III, 192
- MacLachlan: The Road to Peace, 199–200; Hill: Robert Harley, 168–73; McKay & Scott. The Rise of the Great Powers, 64
- McKay, Prince Eugene, 141
- Louis XIV's only living son, the Grand Dauphin, had already died in April 1711; on 18 February 1712 the Dauphin's eldest son and successor, the Duke of Burgundy, also died. Burgundy's eldest son followed his father to the grave in March, leaving Louis as the one surviving heir to the crown.
- Wolf: Louis XIV, 582–7; Hill: Robert Harley, 180–4; Gregg: Queen Anne, 355
- Hattendorf: England in the War 375–9; Hill: Robert Harley, 182–5
- McKay: Eugene, 139–41; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 351–4
- Francis: Peninsular War, 349–50; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 354–5, 361–2
- McKay: Eugene, 141–2; Pitt: The Pacification of Utrecht, 477; Veenendaal: The War of the Spanish Succession in Europe, 444
- McKay: Eugene, 143–4; McKay & Scott: The Rise, 65
- James Stuart was expelled from France to Lorraine in February.
- Pitt: The Pacification of Utrecht, 470; Wolf: The Emergence, 89–91; McKay and Scott: The Rise of the Great Powers, 65
- Symcox: Victor Amadeus, 160, 164. Lacking a fleet the Austrians had been unable to conquer Sicily; British trade routes to the Levant passed near Sicily.
- Symcox: Victor Amadeus, 166
- Storrs: War, Diplomacy, 4; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 356; Trevelyan: England, III, 224–6
- Godinho: Portugal and Her Empire, 528; Kamen: Philip V, 80; Pitt: The Pacification of Utrecht, 475–6
- Pitt: The Pacification of Utrecht, 473; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 357–8; Ingrao: In Quest, 219; McKay: Eugene, 146
- Kamen: Philip V, 85. Kamen writes: '… there was no general movement of rebellion; the image, cultivated later by romantic historiography, of a national uprising against Castile, has no foundation in reality'.
- Hugill: No Peace, 354–7; Kamen: Philip V, 85, 87–8; Trevelyan: England, III, 226–8
- Hugill: No Peace, 370–87; Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 358; Francis: Peninsular War, 379–80
- Ingrao: In Quest, 220; Ingrao: The Habsburg, 121; Hatton: George I, 114
- Ingrao: The Habsburg, 120; McKay: Eugene, 147; McKay & Scott. The Rise of the Great Powers, 99
- Hatton: George I, 105
- Ostwald: Creating the British Way of War, 129; Gregg: Queen Anne, 399; Holmes: Britain, 231–5
- Van Nimwegen: De Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden als Grote Mogendheid – Buitenlandse politiek en oorlogvoering in de eerste helft van de achttiende eeuw en in het bijzonder tijdens de Oostenrijkse Successieoorlog (1740 – 1748); 2002 De Bataafsche Leeuw, Amsterdam.
- Israel: Dutch Republic, 960, 985–6; Trevelyan: England, III, 229; Hatton: George I, 114
- By the terms of the Peace of Münster (1648) Spain had guaranteed the permanent closure of the Scheldt in order to benefit Dutch trade. In return the Dutch had promised to provide military help against French incursions into the Spanish Netherlands.
- Israel: The Dutch Republic, 978; Veenendaal: The War of the Spanish Succession, 445; McKay & Scott. The Rise of the Great Powers, 100
- Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 359
- Named Île St Jean and Île Royale respectively, at the time.
- Lenman: Britain's Colonial Wars, 41
- Lynn: Wars of Louis XIV, 361–2; McKay and Scott: The Rise of the Great Powers, 98
- Hussey and Bromley: The Spanish Empire under Foreign Pressures, 380; Kamen: Philip V, 80–1, 97
- The Nueva Planta decrees (New Plan) for Catalonia was formally issued on 16 January 1716 and followed the lines of the New Plan given to Aragon in April 1711 by preserving existing civil law. There followed subsequent decrees in July 1717 and October 1718.
- Kamen: Philip V, 125
- Kamen: War of Succession, 390–4; Kamen: Philip V, 112–6; Hussey and Bromley: The Spanish Empire under Foreign Pressures, 379–80
- Ingrao: The Habsburg, 119; Kamen: Philip V, 80–1
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