Ulster loyalism is a political ideology found primarily among working class Ulster Protestants in Northern Ireland, whose status as a part of the United Kingdom has remained controversial. Most Ulster Protestants are descendants of settlers from Great Britain in the 17th and 18th centuries. Like unionists, loyalists are attached to the British monarchy, support the continued existence of Northern Ireland, and oppose a united Ireland. Ulster loyalism has been described as a kind of ethnic nationalism and "a variation of British nationalism". It is strongly associated with paramilitarism.
Ulster loyalism emerged in the late 19th century, as a response to the Irish Home Rule movement, and the rise of Catholic Irish nationalism. Although most of Ireland was Catholic, in the province of Ulster, Protestants were the majority. Ulster was also more industrialized than other parts of Ireland and was heavily dependent on trade with Britain. Loyalism began as a self-determination movement among Ulster Protestants who did not want to become part of an autonomous Ireland. While some Irish Catholics were also unionist, loyalism emphasized a Protestant and British heritage. These movements led to the partition of Ireland in 1921; most of Ireland became an independent state, while about two-thirds of Ulster remained within the United Kingdom as a self-governing territory called Northern Ireland. Loyalists often use 'Ulster' as an alternative name for Northern Ireland.
Since partition, most loyalists have supported upholding Northern Ireland's status as a part of the United Kingdom, i.e. unionism. Historically, the terms 'unionist' and 'loyalist' were often used interchangeably; however, since the resurgence of loyalist paramilitarism in the 1960s (during the start of The Troubles), a distinction between the two is made more often. The term 'loyalist' is now usually used to describe working class unionists who are willing to use, or tacitly support, paramilitary violence to defend the Union with Britain. Loyalists are also described as being loyal primarily to the Protestant British monarchy rather than to the British government and institutions. Garret FitzGerald argued that loyalists are loyal primarily to 'Ulster' rather than to 'the Union'. A small minority of loyalists have called for an independent Ulster Protestant state, believing that they cannot rely on the British government to prevent Irish reunification (see Ulster nationalism).
In Northern Ireland there is a long tradition of militaristic loyalist Protestant marching bands. There are hundreds of such bands who hold numerous parades each year. The yearly Eleventh Night (11 July) bonfires and The Twelfth (12 July) parades are strongly associated with loyalism.
Upon the partition of Ireland in 1921, six of the nine counties in the province of Ulster did not join the newly independent Irish Free State (later the Republic of Ireland) and remained a part of the United Kingdom. Academically cited records from 1926 indicate that at that stage 33.5% of the Northern Ireland population was Roman Catholic, with 62.2% belonging to the three major Protestant denominations (Presbyterian 31.3%, Church of Ireland 27%, Methodist 3.9%).
Tensions between Northern Ireland's Catholic population (which mostly supported Irish reunification) and its Protestant population (which mostly supported remaining part of the UK) led to a long-running bloody conflict known as the Troubles from the late 1960s to the late 1990s.
- Active parties
- Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), which is linked to the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Red Hand Commando (RHC)
- Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) and factions of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)
- Former parties
- Protestant Coalition (2013-2015)
- Ulster Democratic Party (1981–2001)
- Ulster Vanguard (1972–1978)
- Volunteer Political Party (1974)
- Ulster Protestant League (1930s)
In Great Britain, a number of small far-right parties have and still do express support for loyalist paramilitaries, and loyalism in general. This includes the British National Front (who registered to stand in Northern Ireland), the British People's Party and Britain First.
Bigger and more moderate right-wing unionist parties like the Ulster Unionists (UUP) or Democratic Unionists (DUP) usually seek to distance themselves from loyalist paramilitary activity. However, Ian Paisley and his Democratic Unionist Party have been involved with Ulster Resistance and worked alongside loyalist paramilitaries such as the Ulster Defence Association in the 1974 Ulster Workers' Council Strikes and the 1977 Loyalist Association of Workers strike.
Paramilitary and vigilante groupsEdit
Loyalist paramilitary and vigilante groups have been active since the early 20th century. In 1912, the Ulster Volunteers were formed to stop the British Government granting self-rule to Ireland, or to exclude Ulster from it. This led to the Home Rule Crisis, which was defused by the onset of World War I. Loyalist paramilitaries were again active in Ulster during the Irish War of Independence (1919–22), and more prominently during the Troubles (late 1960s–1998). The biggest and most active paramilitary groups existed during the Troubles, and were the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA)/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF). They, and most other loyalist paramilitaries, are classified as terrorist organizations.
During the Troubles, their stated goals were to combat Irish republicanism – particularly the Irish Republican Army (IRA) – and to defend Protestant loyalist areas. However, the vast majority of their victims were Irish Catholic civilians, who were often killed at random in sectarian attacks. Whenever they claimed responsibility for attacks, loyalists usually claimed that those targeted were IRA members or were helping the IRA. M. L. R. Smith wrote that "From the outset, the loyalist paramilitaries tended to regard all Catholics as potential rebels". Other times, attacks on Catholic civilians were claimed as "retaliation" for IRA actions, since the IRA drew most of its support from the Catholic community. Such retaliation was seen as both collective punishment and an attempt to weaken the IRA's support; some loyalists argued that terrorizing the Catholic community and inflicting a high death toll on it would eventually force the IRA to end its campaign.
The modus operandi of loyalist paramilitaries involved assassinations, mass shootings, bombings and kidnappings. They used sub machine-guns, assault rifles, pistols, grenades (including homemade grenades), incendiary bombs, booby trap bombs and car bombs. Bomb attacks were usually made without warning. However, gun attacks were more common than bombings. In January 1994, the UDA drew up a 'doomsday plan', to be implemented should the British Army withdraw from Northern Ireland. It called for ethnic cleansing and re-partition, with the goal of making Northern Ireland wholly Protestant.
Some loyalist paramilitaries have had links with far-right and Neo-Nazi groups in Britain, including Combat 18, the British National Socialist Movement, and the British National Front. Since the 1990s, loyalist paramilitaries have been responsible for numerous racist attacks in loyalist areas. A 2006 report revealed that of all reported racist attacks in the previous two years, 90% occurred in loyalist areas.
In the 1990s, the main loyalist paramilitaries called ceasefires. Following this, small breakaway groups continued to wage violent campaigns for a number of years, and members of loyalist groups have continued to engage in sporadic violence.
Young Citizen Volunteers (youth wing)
Merged into the Ulster Volunteers in 1914
|Ulster Protestant Association||UPA||1920–1922||Disbanded|
|Ulster Imperial Guards||UIG||1921–1922||Disbanded|
|Ulster Protestant Volunteers||UPV||1966–1969||Disbanded|
|Ulster Volunteer Force
Red Hand Commando
Young Citizen Volunteers (youth wing)
|Officially on ceasefire since 1994
Officially ended campaign in 2007
|Ulster Defence Association
Ulster Freedom Fighters
Ulster Young Militants (youth wing)
|Officially on ceasefire since 1994
Officially ended campaign in 2007
|Ulster Resistance||UR||1986–?||Uncertain since 2007|
|Loyalist Volunteer Force
Young Loyalist Volunteers (youth wing)
|Officially on ceasefire since 1998
Officially ended campaign in 2005
|Orange Volunteers||OV||1998–present||Uncertain since 2009|
|Red Hand Defenders||RHD||1998–present||Active|
|Real Ulster Freedom Fighters||Real UFF||2007–present||Active|
- Other paramilitary-style groups
- Ulster Protestant Action (UPA), 1956–1966
- Ulster Special Constabulary Association (USCA), 1970–c. 1975
- Down Orange Welfare (DOW), 1972–?
- Orange Volunteers (OV), 1972–1980s
- Ulster Volunteer Service Corps (UVSC), 1972–1974
- Ulster Service Corps (USC), 1976–?
- Umbrella groups
- Ulster Constitution Defence Committee (UCDC), 1966–1969
- Ulster Army Council (UAC), 1973–1974
- Ulster Loyalist Central Co-ordinating Committee (ULCCC), 1974–1976
- Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC), 1991–1998
The name Protestant Action Force (PAF) was also occasionally used by loyalists during the Troubles. It has been suggested that PAF was a covername used by a semi-independent group (or groups) within the UVF who were carrying out attacks on their own initiative or without the sanction of the UVF leadership.
Collusion with the security forcesEdit
There were incidents of collusion between the British security forces (the British Army and RUC) and loyalist paramilitaries. This included soldiers and policemen taking part in loyalist attacks while off-duty, giving weapons and intelligence to loyalists, not taking action against them, and hindering police investigations. The De Silva Report found that, during the 1980s, 85% of the intelligence loyalists used to target people came from the security forces. The security forces also had double agents and informers within loyalist groups who organised attacks on the orders of, or with the knowledge of, their handlers. Of the 210 loyalists arrested by the Stevens Inquiries team, 207 were found to be state agents or informers.
The British Army's locally recruited Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) was almost wholly Protestant. Despite the vetting process, some loyalist militants managed to enlist; mainly to obtain weapons, training and intelligence. A 1973 British Government document (uncovered in 2004), Subversion in the UDR, suggested that 5–15% of UDR soldiers then were members of loyalist paramilitaries. The report said the UDR was the main source of weapons for those groups, although by 1973 UDR weapons losses had dropped significantly, partly due to stricter controls. By 1990, at least 197 UDR soldiers had been convicted of loyalist terrorist offences, including 19 convicted of murder. This was only a small fraction of those who served in it, but the proportion was higher than the regular Army, the RUC and the civilian population.
Initially, the Army allowed soldiers to be members of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). Despite its involvement in terrorism, the UDA was not outlawed by the British Government until 1992. In July 1972, Harry Tuzo (the Army's GOC in Northern Ireland) devised a strategy to defeat the IRA, backed by Michael Carver, head of the British Army. It proposed that the growth of the UDA "should be discreetly encouraged in Protestant areas, to reduce the load on the Security Forces", and suggested they "turn a blind eye to UDA arms when confined to their own areas". That summer, the Army mounted some joint patrols with the UDA in Protestant areas. In November 1972 the Army ordered that a soldier should be discharged if his sympathy for a paramilitary group affected his performance, loyalty or impartiality. Within three years, 171 soldiers with UDA links had been discharged.
During the 1970s, the Glenanne gang—a secret alliance of loyalist militants, British soldiers and RUC officers—carried out a string of attacks against Catholics/nationalists in an area of Northern Ireland known as the "murder triangle". It also carried out some attacks in the Republic of Ireland. Lethal Allies: British Collusion in Ireland claims the group killed about 120 people, mostly uninvolved civilians. The Cassel Report investigated 76 murders attributed to the group and found evidence that soldiers and policemen were involved in 74 of those. One member, RUC officer John Weir, claimed his superiors knew of the collusion but allowed it to continue. The Cassel Report also said some senior officers knew of the crimes but did nothing to stop it. Attacks attributed to the group include the Dublin and Monaghan bombings (1974), the Miami Showband killings (1975) and the Reavey and O'Dowd killings (1976).
In 1977, the Army investigated a UDR battalion based at Girdwood Barracks, Belfast. The investigation found that 70 soldiers had links to the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), that thirty soldiers had fraudulently diverted up to £47,000 to the UVF, and that UVF members socialized with soldiers in their mess. Following this, two were dismissed. The investigation was halted after a senior officer claimed it was harming morale. Details of it were uncovered in 2011.
The Stevens Inquiries found that elements of the British security forces had used loyalists as "proxies". Through their double-agents and informers, they helped loyalist groups to kill people, including civilians. It concluded that this had intensified and prolonged the conflict. The Army's Force Research Unit (FRU) was the main agency involved. Brian Nelson, the UDA's chief 'intelligence officer', was a FRU agent. Through Nelson, FRU helped loyalists target people for assassination. FRU say they helped loyalists target only republican activists and prevented the killing of civilians. The Inquiries found evidence only two lives were saved and that Nelson/FRU was responsible for at least 30 murders and many other attacks – many on civilians. One victim was solicitor Pat Finucane. Nelson also supervised the shipping of weapons to loyalists in 1988. From 1992 to 1994, loyalists were responsible for more deaths than republicans, partly due to FRU. Members of the security forces tried to obstruct the Stevens investigation.
A 2007 Police Ombudsman report revealed that UVF members had been allowed to commit a string of terrorist offences while working as informers for RUC Special Branch. It found that Special Branch had given informers immunity and had blocked weapons searches. Ombudsman Nuala O'Loan said this led to "hundreds" of deaths and said senior British Government officials pressured her into halting her investigation. UVF brigadier Robin 'the Jackal' Jackson has been linked to between 50 and 100 killings, although he was never convicted of any. It has been alleged by many people, including members of the security forces, that Jackson was an RUC agent. According to the Irish Government's Barron Report, he was also "reliably said to have had relationships with British Intelligence".
Other incidents of alleged collusion between loyalists and the security forces include the McGurk's Bar bombing, the 1972 and 1973 Dublin bombings, the Milltown Cemetery attack, the Cappagh killings, the Sean Graham bookmakers' shooting, the Loughinisland massacre, and the murders of Robert Hamill, Rosemary Nelson, and Eddie Fullerton.
Fraternities and marching bandsEdit
In Northern Ireland there are a number of Protestant fraternities and marching bands who hold yearly parades. They include the Orange Order and Apprentice Boys of Derry. These fraternities, often described as the "Loyal Orders", have long been associated with unionism, and loyalism in particular. There are also hundreds of Protestant marching bands in Northern Ireland, many of whom hold loyalist views and use loyalist symbols. Yearly events such as the Eleventh Night (11 July) bonfires and The Twelfth (12 July) parades are strongly associated with loyalism. A report published in 2013 estimated there were at least 640 marching bands in Northern Ireland with a total membership of around 30,000, an all-time high.
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