Talk:Syrian Kurdistan/Archive 4

Latest comment: 3 years ago by Paradise Chronicle in topic Related RMs
Archive 1 Archive 2 Archive 3 Archive 4 Archive 5

"Kurdistan"

The article Kurdistan defines "Kurdistan" in the lead sentence as a roughly defined geo-cultural territory in Western Asia wherein the Kurdish people form a prominent majority population and the Kurdish culture, languages, and national identity have historically been based. Does anyone object to using that phrasing in this article, or this altered form: a roughly-defined geo-cultural area in Western Asia inhabited by Kurds? Levivich harass/hound 22:06, 30 November 2020 (UTC)

The problem with having that quote about an area in Syria is that other sources show that to be heavily disputed, specially in regards to "historically been based". --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 05:01, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
Supreme Deliciousness, would adding that it's disputed make it work for you? Something like "a roughly defined geo-cultural territory in Western Asia wherein the Kurdish people form a prominent majority population and the Kurdish culture, languages, and national identity are prominent; the historical implications are disputed." Implications isn't the right word, and that puts prominent in there twice, but I haven't had enough coffee yet. —valereee (talk) 13:13, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
I think that the current lead is good and does not need to be changed.--Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 15:14, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
My support you have for such phrases. I have started a similar discussion called What reliable source opposes that there exists a Syrian Kurdistan. Maybe the discussion there can give you some insights what the possible answers could be.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 01:24, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
Levivich, as you say, Kurdistan is "roughly defined", meaning every map will be different, different in space and time. The Treaty of Sevres map shows the proposed state of Kurdistan by the WWI allies. The demographics in Kurdistan have dramatically shifted/still shifting. See this book for a description of Diyarbakir province in the late 19th century. It talks about the demographic distribution of the across the different areas of the province My point is that that city (and province to a great extent), now considered by some as the capital of Kurdistan, had a three way population split, Armenians, Kurds and Arabs. One has to be careful when describing a specific geographical area from an ethnic standpoint (sorry, I might be echoing Fiveby here). Cheers, Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 06:02, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
That it is about a geo-cultural region and not! of a political entity like the Kurdistan Eyalet or a hypothetical Kurdistan as portrayed in the Treaty of Sevres. This I tried to explain several times already arguing that -stan after Kurdi = Kurdistan simply denotes that it is the "land of Kurds". Lets just go with the hundreds (English, French etc.) of sources that describe a division of Kurdistan into 4 different countries out of which Syrian Kurdistan, Turkish Kurdistan, Iranian Kurdistan and Iraqi Kurdistan arose.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 09:18, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
عمرو بن كلثوم, The Treaty of Sevres's Kurdish state was not a representation of Kurdistan but just the part of Turkish Kurdistan that would not be part of the big Armenian state that also never eventually existed. There is no relevance to Syrian Kurdistan because it was projected to be under French control just as Iraqi Kurdistan was under British, as eventually happened. East Kurdistan, being already part of Iran and no part of the partition of the Ottoman Empire, it also nowhere mentioned by the Sevres Treaty, which has, ultimately, very little to do with this subject. GPinkerton (talk) 13:54, 1 December 2020 (UTC)

Exactly, the Treaty of Sevres didn't talk about a a Syrian Kurdistan because there was no such thing. Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 17:30, 1 December 2020 (UTC)

عمرو بن كلثوم, Indeed, in those days it was just West Kurdistan. There was no Syria either. GPinkerton (talk) 17:35, 1 December 2020 (UTC)

Per the text you added, West Kurdistan refers to Diyrabakir. Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 17:38, 1 December 2020 (UTC)

عمرو بن كلثوم, Not true. The source (and the text I added) says Diyarbakir is in West Kurdistan. The idea "West Kurdistan" could ever be a synonym for a single city is logically impossible as well as linguistically and geographically absurd. GPinkerton (talk) 17:40, 1 December 2020 (UTC)

Again asking for opinions, this time about this formulation:

  1. Before the Syrian Civil War, "West Kurdistan", "Western Kurdistan", and "Rojava Kurdistanê‎" (lit. "Kurdistan where the sun sets"), shortened to "Rojava", referred to the western part of Kurdistan (a Kurdish-inhabited area in central Asia), including Kurdish-inhabited areas of Syria ("Syrian Kurdistan") as well as the western part of Kurdish-inhabited areas of Turkey ("Turkish Kurdistan"), as shown (roughly) on this map (originally published in 1993).
  2. Since the Syrian Civil War, "West Kurdistan", "Western Kurdistan", "Rojava Kurdistanê‎", and "Rojava" refer to Kurdish-inhabited areas of Syria ("Syrian Kurdistan") (and not to Turkish Kurdistan) as shown (roughly) on these Syrian Kurdistan maps at Commons, including AANES as shown (roughly) on the lead map at that article.

I'm not proposing this for the lead, just wondering if editors agree or disagree that this is an accurate summary of what the RS say. Levivich harass/hound 20:55, 1 December 2020 (UTC)

Levivich, according to historical sources. "Western kurdistan" is not in Syria. See this text in the article: "The late 19th-century Chambers's Encyclopaedia referred to "west Kurdistan" as bordering Iran in its entry on that country.[19] A German gymnasium text book from Sorau (modern Żary) describes Diyarbakır as being "on the upper Tigris, in West Kurdistan"." So referring to an area in Syria as "Western Kurdistan" has no historical basis and is a newly invented idea held by some people.--Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 06:34, 2 December 2020 (UTC)
Levivich, I think the "West" nomenclature is a confusing and imprecise distraction. I'm not wholly sure the map in 1.) is representative of the same divisions; I think the seven principal divisions there are linguistic boundaries distinct from the fourfold geopolitical division referred to in most of the literature. And, no the meaning of Syrian Kurdistan and "Western Kurdistan" has not changed since the previous century, except as to be interchangeable with the Kurdish-led administration of the area emerging since 2011. GPinkerton (talk) 21:05, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
@GPinkerton: Meaning, at all times, "Rojava" referred to Kurdish-inhabited areas of Syria, and not any areas of Turkey? Levivich harass/hound 21:26, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
Levivich, I can't answer on the usage in Kurdish in particular, but certainly "Western Kurdistan" has been synonymous with Syrian Kurdistan in English long before the war. The source above refers to our meaning of the names on p. 200 as the three fragments of Kurdistan along Syria's northern and northeastern borders with Turkey and Iraq and as "Syrian Kurdistan" on p. 17; I think the "western Kurdistan" Izady refers to is a different one which is off-topic and possibly his own classification. (But does include both Diyarbakir and Syrian Kurdistan!) GPinkerton (talk) 21:40, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
GPinkerton, what do you make of Ismet Cheriff Vanly, writing in 1993 (pp. 139-140), describing Iraqi Kurdistan: Kurdistan in Iraq is often referred to as Southern Kurdistan but in fact it occupies a more or less central position in the Kurdish territories. It is the link between what is variously known as Turkish, Northern or Western Kurdistan to the north and north-west, and so-called Eastern or Iranian Kurdistan to the east and south-east, and it also borders on the mainly Kurdish areas of the Syrian Jezireh. Vanly also seems to be referring to Turkish Kurdistan as part of Western Kurdistan? Levivich harass/hound 21:56, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
Levivich, technically that book is from the 1970s, the English translation was from the 1990s. On the face of it, it adds to the case that the "western" label is confusing and much more ambiguous that the "Syrian" option. It's also certainly true that most of Syrian Kurdistan is contiguous with the Turkish side so it would make sense that culturally it would be lumped together as one. (See my comments in the section below regarding Bin Xhet and Ser Xhet.) GPinkerton (talk) 22:05, 1 December 2020 (UTC)

Levivich, the text you just quoted above clarifies exactly what we are advocating here. There are Kurdistan parts in Iraq, Turkey and Iran, but in Syria they are refered to "Kurdish-inhabited areas". Per Fiveby, saying Kurdish-inhabited areas in Syria has many ethno-nationalistic implications. The situation in Syria is and has always been different the the other three countries. Western Kurdistan is around Diyarbakir in Turkey. In Syria on the eve of WWI there was not enough Kurds to justify the use of Syrian Kurdistan, per Vanly above. Remember this is another Kurdish activist, same as Izady, and the maps presented by Izady go against all other ethnographic maps of the area (mostly British) or French mandate demographic description/statistics. Cheers, Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 22:07, 1 December 2020 (UTC)

عمرو بن كلثوم, No, there are contiguous "Kurdish-inhabited areas" in four states, and the areas in Syria are called "Syrian Kurdistan". GPinkerton (talk) 22:08, 1 December 2020 (UTC)

"-stan"

That -stan denotes a land and Kurdi before -stan gives Kurdistan I have tried to explain several times. More descriptive 5 times between the 13 and 25 of November. You can review the diffs here,

[here],
here,
here,
here on the 23rd and 25th November 2020, I added the comment that I haven't received an answer yet on this, and this stood this way. I am actually still waiting for an argument which refutes this -stan argument. Can I assume there is no opposition to this then on the Syrian Kurdistan article talk page and Kurdistan was therefore divided between Syrian, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran giving way to Syrian Kurdistan, Turkish Kurdistan, Iranian Kurdistan and Iraqi Kurdistan which is actually described in multiple academic sources on the topic.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 09:18, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
Paradise Chronicle, we are going around in circles and I am really fatigued of this right now. In 1939 the french census of the Jazira region showed the bulk of the population being Arabs/Assyrians/Armenians and a minority being Kurds. We have several sources describing how kurds came in waves after waves from Turkey to Syria. We have several sources saying "Syrian Kurdistan" is not real. How can Wikipedia then possibly claim that in the 1920s a "Syrian kurdistan" existed in Syria that was divided? This claim is only a belief held by some people. This is a kurdish narrative that some people go along with. And other do not. It is not a historical fact. It is highly disputed, and it must therefor be presented as a disputed belief in the article. --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 09:39, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
That Kurd Dagh is Kurdish since centuries and not only after the French Mandate and that Bohtan span over parts of Northern Syria is stated here in the discussion it is so stated also in their respective articles. The Barazi Tribal confederation who wanted an autonomy for the Kurdish region around Jarabulus in Syria was also Kurdish. This denial comes from SD, who wanted to move the article Syrian Kurdistan to Kurdish occupied Regions in Syria in the midst of a the Siege of Kobane by ISIL (also known as ISIS) The Kurds have mainly (I don't know of any battle the YPG or SDF had against non-Jihadist factions in which they captured localities) captured localities from Jihadists and ISIS and haven't attacked the Syrian Governments positions which holds significant and tolerated enclaves within the Autonomous Administration. Call this attempted Move the POV you like, but sources for this can mainly be found in ISIS and other Jihadi outlets or Assadist or Turkish state propaganda.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 10:54, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
Supreme Deliciousness, I am glad that you are tired of repeating this incorrect claim. We have already seen that it is contradicted by the reliable sources, so repeating it further is unlikely to be fruitful. We have already read that The northeastern corner of Syria ... has been Kurdish majority since official records began in the last century. (O’Leary, op. cit.) so unsourced claims to the contrary like these are not going to be considered, as it has already been proved it was a malicious fiction dreamt up by Arab nationalists to claim that there is no such thing as Syrian Kurdistan. As we have read, Kurds have been inhabiting northern Syria for centuries but their numbers were increased even more by refugees from the various wars waged against them in Turkey, this situation regarding the Turkish origin of some Syrian Kurds provided the Syrian rationale for the disenfranchisement of many of these Kurds in modern Syria, which began with the French mandate under the League of Nations following the First World War and the removal of the short-lived rule of Faisal as king. After much acrimony, a French-Turkish agreement arbitrarily made the Baghdad railway line that ran between Mosul in Iraq and Aleppo in Syria the present border between most of Turkey and Syria after it crossed the Iraqi-Syrian boundary. Indeed even today many Kurds in Turkey and Syria who live on either side of the border do not refer to themselves as coming from those states. Rather, for the Kurds of Turkey, Syria is Bin Xhet (below the line), and for the Kurds of Syria, Turkey is Ser Xhet (above the line). and The situation regarding the Turkish origin of some of the Syrian Kurds described in Chapter 1 provided the Syrian government’s rationale for the disenfranchisement of many of these Kurds in modern Syria. Never mind the fact that before the Sykes-Picot Agreement artificially separated the Kurds of the Ottoman Empire into three separate states after the First World War (Turkey, Iraq and Syria) all of these Kurds had lived within a single border. Gunter, Michael (2014). Out of Nowhere: The Kurds of Syria in Peace and War. London: C. Hurst and Co. pp. 9, 19. ISBN 978-1-84904-531-5. GPinkerton (talk) 13:50, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
Source for that kurds were a minority in 1939 French census is CADN, Cabinet Politique, Box 505, no. 204/DJ, from the High Commissariat de la République Française en Syrie et au Liban, Délégation de la Haute Djézireh to Monsieur le LT. Colonel Inspecteur Délégué, 8 February 1939 and can be accesed in Algun, S., 2011. Sectarianism in the Syrian Jazira: Community, land and violence in the memories of World War I and the French mandate (1915- 1939). Ph.D. Dissertation. Universiteit Utrecht, the Netherlands. Page 11 Link --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 14:59, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
Supreme Deliciousness, actually the source says the opposite, so your comment is wholly mistaken. The totals are actually given on page 12. They state:
  • Kurds: 53,315
  • Kurdo-Christians: 2,181
  • Yazidis: 1,602
  • Arabs: 29,769
  • Christians: 27,316
  • Armenians: 4,200
  • Assyrians: 8,767
As can clearly be seen, the Kurds (even when counted separately to Yazidis and "Kurdo-Christians") are by far the majority in the area, almost twice the size of any other surveyed group. It's obviously not necessary to discuss this irrelevant point any further, since it is clear that the claim: kurds were a minority in 1939 French census is both completely wrong and refuted utterly by the source alleged to support the claim. GPinkerton (talk) 16:53, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
Kurds/Kurdo-Christian: 53.315 + 2181= 55,496 kurds. Arabs/Nomads/Christian/Armenian/Assyrian: 29.769 + 25.000 + 27.316 + 4200 + 8767 = 95.052 Non-kurds (Did not ad 1602 Yeezidis to either side as their origin is disputed). --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 18:33, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
Supreme Deliciousness, Correct. As you can see, the Kurds are a clear majority. GPinkerton (talk) 18:36, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
Non-kurds are the majority.--Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 18:40, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
Supreme Deliciousness, "non-Kurds" is not a demographic. Kurds are the majority.

majority, n.
Being greater; the greater part.
- OED

Adding up all the minorities does not make the minorities a majority. The "greater part" of the population were Kurds, just as all the reliable sources say. GPinkerton (talk) 18:45, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
In 1939 kurds were the largest minority but they were not the majority. The majority, the greater part were Non-kurds. --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 18:48, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
Supreme Deliciousness, that's not how the word majority works. What you describe as "largest minority", without any group larger than itself, is in fact the majority, being the "greater part" of the population. QED. GPinkerton (talk) 19:11, 1 December 2020 (UTC)
GPinkerton, actually that would be the "plurality". —valereee (talk) 14:05, 2 December 2020 (UTC)
>50% is a majority. If there are three or more groups, one can instead have a plurality. 50% Kurds, if they're the largest of three or more groups, would form a plurality and are not correctly called a majority. —valereee (talk) 14:13, 2 December 2020 (UTC)
Valereee, No, that's a false dichotomy. A plurality is a kind of majority. e.g. Hilary Clinton won the majority of votes in the 2016 US presidential election: 48.2%. This kind of majority is called a plurality. Majority ≠ ≥50%. GPinkerton (talk) 14:57, 2 December 2020 (UTC)
GPinkerton: Majority, second paragraph of lead. —valereee (talk) 16:23, 2 December 2020 (UTC)
SD, if you check the demographic info of each district (also on page 12) and not just the whole Governorate the Kurds are a large majority of almost 100% in at least two of the 4 districts.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 00:42, 2 December 2020 (UTC)
Valereee yes they are a plurality in the whole Governorate, but they have near 100% majority of 2 of the 4 districts in the table. I assume that there are other localities in the region that would be similarly populated by Kurds to come to the 55.000+ Kurds in the Governorate displayed in the table. Also look at the CIA report of 1948 which includes a CIA Kurdistan map on page 17. Syrian Kurdistan covers most of the northern strip of the Syrian Turkish border and is quite different as the CIA map of 2002.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 15:18, 2 December 2020 (UTC)
Paradise Chronicle, yes, I was just discussing terminology, not the content. —valereee (talk) 17:05, 2 December 2020 (UTC)
GPinkerton HEre is a more neutral account about northern Syria and Kurds, compared to the POV sources you cite. This is again, ANOTHER evidence about the origin of Kurds in northeastern Syria from a declassified CIA report in 1948.
The Kurds constitute a relatively small minority in Syria and Lebanon. Kurdish communities of long standing are located in the Kurd Dagh area of northwestern Syria, but the largest concentration is in the Jazirah section of northeastern Syria, where a considerable number of Kurdish immigrants settled after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Small but politically active Kurdish communities exist in Damascus and Beirut.
The Kurds, along with other minorities, are accorded equal rights and privileges with the majority groups in Syria and Lebanon. They have parliamentary representation and generally concede that they have received fair treatment in such matters as road-building, construction of schools, and administration of justice. Nevertheless, many of them feel that their integrity as a group is in jeopardy. This feeling is most noticeable in Beirut and Damascus, which have become centers of Kurdish nationalist propaganda, and among the non-native immigrant Kurds, who have retained their traditional hatred of alien domination. The immigrant group has provided most of the leaders of the Syrian and Lebanese Kurds, notably the Badr Khan family, Dr. Ahmad Nazif, and Hassan Hajo Agha.
The intensive Kurdish immigration continued after the mandate authorities left. David McDowall states the following[1]: Arab nationalists had good reason to be paranoid about internal and external enemies. Nowhere was the Syrian Arab cause less assured than in the north where so many non-Arab communities lived, particularly in al-Hasaka governorate. The population had grown rapidly, and it was the growth since 1945 that gave cause for Arab concern. In its own words, the government believed that 'At the beginning of 1945, the Kurds began to infiltrate into al-Hasakeh governorate. They came singly and in groups from neighbouring countries, especially Turkey, crossing illegally along the border from Ras al'Ain to al-Malikiyya. Gradually and illegally, they settled down in the region along the border in major population centres such as Dirbasiyya, Amuda and Malikiyya. Many of these Kurds were able to register themselves illegally in the Syrian civil registers. They were also able to obtain Syrian identity cards through a variety of means, with the help of their relatives and members if their tribes. They did so with the intent of settling down and acquiring property, especially after the issue of the agricultural reform law, so as to benefit from land redistribution.' Official figures available in 1961 showed that in a mere seven year period, between 1954 and 1961, the population of al-Hasakah governorate had increased from 240,000 to 305,000, an increase of 27 per cent which could not possibly be explained merely by natural increase. The government was sufficiently worried by the apparent influx that it carried out a sample census in June 1962 which indicated the real population was probably closer to 340,000. Although these figures may have been exaggerated, they were credible given the actual circumstances. From being lawless and virtually empty prior to 1914, the Jazira had proved to be astonishingly fertile once order was imposed by the French mandate and farming undertaken by the largely Kurdish population.... A strong suspicion that many migrants were entering Syria was inevitable. In Turkey the rapid mechanisation of farming had created huge unemployment and massive labour migration from the 1950s onwards. The fertile but not yet cultivated lands of northern Jazira must have been a strong enticement and the affected frontier was too long feasibly to police it.
In addition to McDowall (1998), McDowall (2004), de Vaumas, Gibert and Fevret, Sykes map (1907) (and many more) this should conclude our discussion about the origins of Kurds in northeastern Syria (i.e. the majority of them (if not all) immigrated from Turkey). When you claim these areas are "part of Kurdistan", what does that make of the native population (majority) living on their lands before Kurds arrived? Trespassers? Does that sound fair to you? Cheers, Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 06:05, 2 December 2020 (UTC)
Amr ibn Kulthoum, thank you for bringing this important and valuable information about kurds infiltrating from turkey into Syria. This must be added into the article. --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 06:26, 2 December 2020 (UTC)
Supreme Deliciousness, certainly it belongs in the article, although definitely not with the ridiculous misinterpretation that it proves the Ba'athist lie that the Kurds were not a majority in Syrian Kurdistan. It does not, and indeed the fact that even after all this discussion no source has bee produced which states what you have claimed speaks volumes about the credibility of this long-debunked and nationalistic claim. GPinkerton (talk) 12:57, 2 December 2020 (UTC)
عمرو بن كلثوم, You appear to be labouring under the false impression the wall of text you have posted above supports your claim that the majority of them (if not all) immigrated from Turkey, a claim which is rejected by reliable sources which all state was a lie invented by the racist Syrian government. It does not. I do not see why you keep referring to Sykes; he states quite unambiguously that Deir az-Zor was majority Kurdish in 1907. The idea Kurds are not native to Syria is malicious lie and it is unfortunate that you persist in repeating it as though it could be countenanced as anything more than ahistorical propaganda. The phrasing the non-native immigrant Kurds clearly differentiates these Kurds from the Kurds native to the area, as do all the otehr sources, a fact which it is impossible to hand-wave away with the ludicrous claim that they are just the POV sources you cite. Please find some actual source that states what you claim, or give up claiming it. Please. GPinkerton (talk) 12:55, 2 December 2020 (UTC)
Your words such as a lie invented by racist Syrian government. and The idea Kurds are not native to Syria is malicious lie do not help and are aggressive/rude. Which one of my sources is a Syrian or even an Arab source? All sources are French or British and are reporting on the French mandate era using French statistics. Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 18:44, 2 December 2020 (UTC)
عمرو بن كلثوم, I'll ask you to start learning to write short. I know that's difficult, especially when as I assume you aren't writing in your first language. No one wants to read more than a few sentences, and many won't bother to read it at all if it's longer than it needs to be. Draft your argument, then go back and edit mercilessly, removing everything that isn't absolutely crucial to making your primary point. It takes a lot longer to write short, but it's a critical skill in persuading other editors. —valereee (talk) 19:05, 2 December 2020 (UTC)
Hi Valereee, since I used quotes, I didn't want to take things out of context, but bolded the most important stuff. This is why my quotes were long, sorry. Now, I hope an admin will be dealing with the renewed personal attacks and aggressive language from GPinkerton addressed at Supreme Deliciousness at myself (or anyone who disagrees with them):
  • ridiculous misinterpretation that it proves the Ba'athist lie
  • malicious lie and it is unfortunate that you persist in repeating it
  • You appear to be labouring under the false impression the wall of text you have posted

Thanks, Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 20:18, 2 December 2020 (UTC)

عمرو بن كلثوم, I do get that. It's tempting to write more, in order to be very clear. But it's counterproductive, and it's actually considered perfectly reasonable for editors, who are all volunteers, to ignore walls of text as time-wasters. You can collapse the extra stuff that you feel is needed to provide background; that way people who want to can get your reasoning. But if you don't make your main points in a few sentences, few people will want to spend the time. —valereee (talk) 20:36, 2 December 2020 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ McDowall, David. Modern History of the Kurds, I. B. Tauris & Company, Limited, 2004. pp. 473-474.

Dec 12 lead paragraph draft

Without cites, links, formatting, etc.:

Syrian Kurdistan is a Kurdish-inhabited area in northern Syria surrounding three noncontiguous enclaves along the Turkish and Iraqi borders: Afrin in the northwest, Kobani in the north, and Jazira in the northeast. It is the Syrian part of Kurdistan, a roughly-defined Kurdish-inhabited area spanning several sovereign states in Central Asia. Originally a collection of medieval principalities, Kurdistan was part of the Ottoman Empire until it was partitioned by the Allied Powers following World War I. The three enclaves were placed in the French Mandate for Syria, while the rest of Kurdistan was divided between what became the modern states of Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, among others. Syrian Kurdistan is thus sometimes called Western Kurdistan (Rojava Kurdistanê‎, lit. "Kurdistan where the sun sets"), one of the four "Lesser Kurdistans" that comprise "Greater Kurdistan", alongside Iranian Kurdistan (Kurdish: Rojhilatê Kurdistanê‎, lit. 'Kurdistan where the sun rises'), Turkish Kurdistan (Bakurê Kurdistanê‎, 'Northern Kurdistan'), and Iraqi Kurdistan (Başûrê Kurdistanê‎, 'Southern Kurdistan').

Thoughts? I don't think it's particularly well written, but I'm mostly curious if it has all the right parts in the right order with the right terminology. Is it complete (for a first paragraph)? Is it neutral? Levivich harass/hound 08:54, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

No it is not the right terminology. The suggested text is presenting "Syrian Kurdistan" as being a real name for an area in Syria, which it isn't. The text is also claiming that before WW1 there was a "Kurdistan" that was divided and placed within Syria, which is also historically inaccurate. Current lead is better where "Syrian Kurdistan" is presented as a pov from some people which is the accurate situation and terminology.--Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 10:57, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

Maybe-Can this be verified? I mean the historical part? The principalities constituting Kordistan and conquered by Selim I did not include these Syrian regions. This paragraph is inaccurate as it gives the impression that these regions are part of historical Kurdistan, but no historical source supports this. Also, no comtemporary source from 1918 mentions that these regions are part of the Kurdistan partitioned between allies. What are these information based on? I would be okay with it if this historical background that does not apply to Syrian Kurdistan is removed. This is not part of the historical Kurdistan, yet it is Kurdistan today as a result of several demographic and military and political changes. Its better not to mix history with modern developments. I would make it the following:

Syrian Kurdistan is a Kurdish-inhabited area in northern Syria surrounding three noncontiguous enclaves along the Turkish and Iraqi borders: Afrin in the northwest, Kobani in the north, and Jazira in the northeast. Syrian Kurdistan is sometimes called Western Kurdistan (Kurdish: Rojava Kurdistanê, lit.'Kurdistan where the sun sets'), as one of the four "Lesser Kurdistans" that comprise "Greater Kurdistan", alongside Iranian Kurdistan (Kurdish: Rojhilatê Kurdistanê‎, lit.'Kurdistan where the sun rises'), Turkish Kurdistan (Kurdish: Bakurê Kurdistanê, lit.'Northern Kurdistan'), and Iraqi Kurdistan (Kurdish: Başûrê Kurdistanê, lit.'Southern Kurdistan').

I hope both parties can see the compromise in my wording: it present Syrian Kurdistan as existing, without qualification, but does not go into the wild historical accounts of Kurdish nationalists that have no support in actual HISTORICAL sources. If everyone can give up a little, we can bring peace to this article (and ourselves).--Attar-Aram syria (talk) 12:33, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

Attar-Aram syria, your suggestion is not good because it presents "Syrian Kurdistan" as a real entity in Syria, instead as a pov. Also, kurdish nationalists have different vies of what is "Syrian kurdistan" and they include larger parts of Syria, not just 3 enclaves. --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 16:29, 12 December 2020 (UTC)
Supreme Deliciousness: it is a real thing, and thats a reality. It was established by the Kurds, so it exist now. Presenting it as a Kurdish POV while Kurds are in control of the land isnt realistic. We cant keep fighting here forever!--Attar-Aram syria (talk) 17:07, 12 December 2020 (UTC)
What was "established by the kurds" ? The kurds who are currently controlling the area call it the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 18:14, 12 December 2020 (UTC)
Thanks to both Levivich and Attar Aram syria for the drafts. @Levivich, I'd leave the historical part out of the lead and insert it in another specific historical section/paragraph. For now, I would just focus on "what it is" in the lead. I support Attar Aram syrias version. Let's find peace for the article and ourselves.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 15:57, 12 December 2020 (UTC)
Why would we ad a historically inaccurate text in another specific historical section? Wouldn't it just be better if we don't include the inaccurate text in the article? --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 16:29, 12 December 2020 (UTC)
Agree, that makes sense. Attar-Aram's version looks good to me. Thanks! I still think the lead needs to explain what "Kurdistan" is (specifically, that it isn't a sovereign state), but that can be done later in the lead section (in a different paragraph), and we can defer the discussion of history until then. @Attar-Aram syria: I hope you don't mind, I added some markup to your draft so we can see what it will look like "live". The only thing I didn't link was Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira. I'm not sure what to link it to. I think it should be linked to the region articles (e.g. Afrin Region) but something tells me not everyone would agree with that :-) (If we don't reach consensus on a link target, then let's just leave it unlinked for now?) Levivich harass/hound 17:04, 12 December 2020 (UTC)
Thanks Levivich and Paradise Chronicle. Im fine with any historic background as long as sound secondary sources based on historical primary sources support it.--Attar-Aram syria (talk) 17:07, 12 December 2020 (UTC)
Yeah, we'll have to dig into sources to discuss the history formulation. One other thing: should we strike the word "as" in the sentence: "Syrian Kurdistan is sometimes called Western Kurdistan (Kurdish: Rojava Kurdistanê, lit.'Kurdistan where the sun sets'), as one of the four "Lesser Kurdistans""? Levivich harass/hound 17:08, 12 December 2020 (UTC)
Sounds good to me.--Attar-Aram syria (talk) 17:10, 12 December 2020 (UTC)
Thanks Attar and Levivich for your attempts. However, with all due respect, I think the current lead, developed by Applodion after discussions on the Talk page, better describes the issue at hand. It is not a universally accepted terms. I can come up with hundreds of sources that refer to the area by "Kurdish-inhabited region in Syria". Simply presenting the area as "Syrian Kurdistan" means that the majority of the population, which are non-Kurdish, are living on the land of Kurds, not on their own land. This is simply "adopting" the narrative of the Kurdish nationalists. Thanks. Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 17:11, 12 December 2020 (UTC)
The way I read both mine and Attar's revision, they say that Syrian Kurdistan is part of Syria (a sovereign state), and part of Kurdistan (a geographic area, but not a sovereign state). So I don't think anyone reading that would think that Syrian Kurdistan is land that legally belongs to the Kurds, as opposed to land that legally belongs to Syria where Kurds live. ("Land of the Kurds" could mean either Kurdish-owned or Kurdish-inhabited.) That said, would it change your mind if the paragraph was more explicit that Syria is a sovereign state and Kurdistan is not? (This is the reason I had included some sentences about history in my original draft: to explain that Kurdistan is not a sovereign state. I wonder if a second paragraph about history would make the first paragraph clearer, as it were.) Levivich harass/hound 17:20, 12 December 2020 (UTC)
"Syrian Kurdistan" or "kurdistan" does not exist in Syria as a factual entity, it is only a disputed belief held by some people, and therefor it must be presented as such.--Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 18:18, 12 December 2020 (UTC)
I do not understand what you mean by "factual entity". "Syrian Kurdistan" isn't a belief, it's a place. It's not an imaginary or fictional place like Atlantis: Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira are real places on Earth. Levivich harass/hound 19:06, 12 December 2020 (UTC)
Levivich, can you see page 19 of this introduction to a recent work by Jordi Tejel? Unfortunately i don't have access to the full chapter. It is a fluid concept, as a place it is ill-defined and it is and has been a belief. Can you really not see how simplistic it is to assert 'Syrian Kurdistan' is a 'place', 'region', or 'area' while ignoring the implications? It's a term that has meant different things at different times, and has different meanings for different people. It is both a real place and it does not exist depending on the context. What it most certainly is not is Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira. fiveby(zero) 23:02, 12 December 2020 (UTC)
Yes, on p. 19 Cimino summarizes the argument made by Tejel in Chapter 11 of that book. I think it's very important to see the context and not, as it were, "cherry pick" quotes. So here are some long-ish quotes:
From p. 19 (linked above), Cimino's introduction:

... In The complex and dynamic relationship of Syria's Kurds with Syrian borders: Continuities and changes (Chapter 11), Jordi Tejel questions the discourses and spatial representations of "Greater Kurdistan": How was this notion created? What is the spatial ideology carried by the PYD in Syria? Are the Syrian Kurds working to restore "historical" Kurdish territory and, more specifically, do they envisage secession from Syria? By relying on unpublished maps and school books, dating from the sixteenth century to the present day, Tejel demonstrates that the Kurdish territorial imagination, comprising myths, mobilizing stories and political ambitions, is relatively plastic and fluctuating. Recently established, "Rojava" (Syrian Kurdistan) is part of a mythology of pan-Kurdish unity which does not constitute a political objective for the Syrian Kurds in itself, but is rather a "cultural abstract". For the author, "like Arab nationalists in Syria, the Kurdish movement has produced a political discourse that combines pan-Kurdist references intertwined with local patriotism and limited territorial claims".

Yet the author shows that this imagined community is nevertheless very well documented: from the Sharafnama map of 1596 (which displays "extreme expansionist tendencies, in particular to the south") to the Paris conference in 1919, where the Kurdish representative submitted Kurdish territorial claims, the representation of "Greater Kurdistan" is diverse and heterogeneous and is altered according to political contexts and the audiences for which it is intended. After the mandate period ... [it goes on to describe Tejel's chapter].

We should also look at what Tejel writes in Chapter 11.
On p. 243, Tejel introduces his chapter by writing: However, the tensions between the two de fact Kurdish autonomous territories controlled by two competing Kurdish movements since 2011 (Rojava or Western Kurdistan in Northern Syria and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Northern Iraq)...
On p. 244:

... I shall analyze the maps as well as school textbooks elaborated during the French Mandate and in the post-2011 context ... I shall argue that Kurdish populations and local political actors have developed a complex and dynamic relationship with the Syrian-Turkish and Syrian-Iraqi borders. Like Arab nationalists in Syria, the Kurdish movement has produced a political discourse that combines pan-Kurdish references intertwined with local patriotism and limited territorial claims. The map of Greater Kurdistan reproduced in different formats (including textbooks) definitely forges a sense of common Kurdish identity beyond international borders and Kurdish nationalism. It offers a 'historic territory' which, in turn, implies a narrative of conquest, defense, liberation and loss in which certain 'Others' play a role. In this respect, it is difficult to separate the feelings of national identity and geopolitical visions. Nevertheless, I shall demonstrate that Greater Kurdistan does not constitute an actual political goal for Syria's Kurds. It provides a cultural abstract that supports local political claims and strategies without questioning Syria's borders.

On p. 250 Tejel writes: ... while some visual representations remain relatively constant (Greater Kurdistan), others such as "Syrian Kurdistan," "Rojava" have varied over the time due to new developments and shifting power dynamics on the ground.
And on p. 261 he describes the depiction of Kurdistan and Rojava in PYD textbooks:

PYD-sponsored textbooks portray Kurdistan as an ancient country and nation ... Terms with pan-Kurdish connotations are used, such as Northern or Bakur (Eastern Turkey), Southern or Bashur (Northern Iraq), Eastern or Rojhilat (North-Eastern Iran) and Western Kurdistan or Rojava (Northern Syria) ... Unsurprisingly, Kurdistan's boundaries in Syria are more generous and suggest a territorial (and ethnic) continuity between the three traditional Kurdish enclaves in Northern Syria (Kurd Dagh, Kobane and the Upper Jazira), as opposed to the maps produced in the 1930s and 1940s ... in Rojava's textbooks towns such as Afrin and Qamishli deserve as much attention as larger cities (Erbil, Urfa, Diyarbakir) in Iraq and Turkey. Interestingly, while Western and Kurdish media outlets refer to Rojava as a precise de facto autonomous region, in Rojava's textbooks there is no map representing this region in detail ...

Tejel is making the argument that Syrian Kurdistan as Rojava or "Western Kurdistan", i.e. Syrian Kurdistan as part of a "Greater Kurdistan", is a construct, recently popularized, but not actually a political goal for (all of? most of?) Syria's Kurds. Tejel argues, basically, that Syrian Kurds want a Syrian Kurdistan that is part of Syria. I think this view should be included in the article. I don't think we should say it in wikivoice; it should be attributed to Tejel. Cimino expressly attributes these views to Tejel, after all.
(Note, BTW, the prominence of the French Mandate and 2011 as two important points in time for Syrian Kurdistan. Our lead should mention those as well.) Levivich harass/hound 00:06, 13 December 2020 (UTC)
Supreme Deliciousness, speaking as an administrator trying to keep an eye on this discussion, that is POV-pushing, which is disruptive. —valereee (talk) 20:16, 12 December 2020 (UTC)
Valereee, Really? So its not pov-pushing presenting a highly controversial and disputed nationalist claim with zero historical evidence as a real location in Syria and presenting this as an indisputable fact? Valereee, if I'm not mistaken you said before you didn't have any knowledge in the subject, so you can not possibly know what is pov and what is not pov. --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 08:14, 13 December 2020 (UTC)
Supreme Deliciousness, I don't need to have knowledge of the subject in order to recognize statements like "Syrian Kurdistan" or "kurdistan" does not exist in Syria as a factual entity, it is only a disputed belief held by some people, and therefor it must be presented as such and Can you really not see how simplistic it is to assert 'Syrian Kurdistan' is a 'place', 'region', or 'area' while ignoring the implications? are POV-pushing. —valereee (talk) 14:56, 13 December 2020 (UTC)
There has been plenty of sources brought up here that shows my comment to be correct, including by Öcalan himself. But to disregard all of this and only to present the kurdish nationalist narrativ without historical evidence and to present this as an undisputable truth, thats how things should be done? How is that neutral? --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 16:49, 13 December 2020 (UTC)
SD, I'm not going to get into content, here. What I am telling you is that arguing Syrian Kurdistan simply does not exist because some people dispute the fact is POV-pushing. It's fine to argue that we must include the fact its very existence is disputed if we can find sources the consensus find reliable who are saying that. But arguing that because some dispute it, it must be presented as a "belief" rather than a place is pushing one POV over another. Wherever you are right now is a place, and if enough RS are calling that place by a name -- even if that name isn't an official government designation -- we will have an article on it and call it by that name, even if you don't like it. If you push hard enough to try to argue that's not its name, we will consider that POV-pushing, and we will find that disruptive. —valereee (talk) 19:44, 13 December 2020 (UTC)
Valereee, Then, that goes both ways, so lets say: "arguing Syrian Kurdistan simply does exist because some people claims it does is POV-pushing. It's fine to argue that we must include the fact its very existence is claimed if we can find sources"... I support having both views inside the article, the current lead is neutral and does that.--Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 08:27, 14 December 2020 (UTC)
Supreme Deliciousness, I don't think I've seen anyone arguing that the article shouldn't include discussion of dispute. What I'm seeing is argument over how to present it, at what length, and where. I can tell you that if most recent independent scholarly works are referring to something as a place, it's a place. The person you want to be discussing this with is Levivich, who seems to be providing lots of evidence below. What I am telling you is that if you keep insisting none of recent scholarship proves anything, then you are simply here to POV push. —valereee (talk) 12:52, 14 December 2020 (UTC)
Supreme Deliciousness from my perspective you and Valereee are talking past each other with different concepts of place. We have articles for Iparralde and Hegoalde, North and South Basque Country. These have a great deal of history and you can draw boundaries around them that pretty much everyone would accept. We sort of have an article for Serbian lands, there's are great deal history here, used in context to describe various medieval states. In the '90s this term was used in a much different manner. As you can see from it's actual location and the talk page EN really does not like saying 'Serbian lands', SR more comfortable with it. There's quite a bit of disagreement over some boundaries, you couldn't draw a border that everyone would accept. Maritime Serbia (sr:Српско приморје) is a place, because enough people call it a place, even though most people would say Dalmatia or Upper Dalmatia (it should probably be a redirect because there is not much for content, but it's still a place). We don't need an accepted boundary or any official recognition, we would still talk about Cajun Country regardless of whether the Louisiana Legislature officially recognized 'Acadiana'. All of these are places, because enough people think of them as places. For Syrian Kurdistan, no one can really draw a good boundary, there is not so much history as some other ethnic regions, there are a number of issues with the name which require explanation and careful editing, not the ham-fisted approach above. I understand what you mean when you say it doesn't exist, and that a whole lot of people living in what some here want to say outright is Syrian Kurdistan would not agree, but it is still a place because enough people think of it and write about it as a place. fiveby(zero) 14:26, 14 December 2020 (UTC)
Fiveby I understand what you are saying, but I think the current lead is really good and represents both povs, and the new suggested leads only represents one side. We can ad more info to the lead but I don't think anything in the lead should be removed. --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 14:37, 14 December 2020 (UTC)
Term vs. place? In wiki voice, Iranian Kurdistan is an 'unofficial name', Iraqi Kurdistan is a 'part of Kurdistan', Turkish Kurdistan is a 'term', Syrian Kurdistan is now a 'term' but proposed to be a 'Kurdish-inhabited area', French Basque Country is a 'region', Southern Basque Country a 'term'. fiveby(zero) 15:37, 14 December 2020 (UTC)
Looks to be some degree of how well the boundary can be drawn and how closely it matches some formal place as to whether WP calls it a term/name vs. place/region. I don't know if that is intentional or if that is a good approach or not. fiveby(zero) 16:12, 14 December 2020 (UTC)
Levivich Thanks for taking the effort and time to get these quotes from Tejel. As you implied, Tejel represented the Kurdish POV in this "Syrian Kurdistan" concept, which is what we/I have been talking about all the time, i.e., the concept of "Syrian Kurdistan" is a Kurdish irredentist/nationalist imagination (regardless of their political ambition within vs. w/o Syria) pushed forward especially during the Syria civil war power vacuum and the rise of PYD and its military militia (YPG/SDF). As Tejel and many others (McDowall, Balanche, etc.) say rightly, there are Kurdish pockets in Syria, where in a cluster of villages Kurds represent the majority, but never at the level of a province, for example. This is a big difference b/w Kurdish areas in Syria (or "Kurdish enclaves in Northern Syria" as Tejel calls them) and Kurdistan. The main flagrant different is that Kurds are not the majority outside separate clusters of villages, as you said before: Afrin, Kobani, northeastern part of upper Jazira (al-Hasakah Governorate). The second big difference is that most of the Kurdish population here immigrated from Turkey (as discussed elsewhere on this Talk page), according to French mandate statistics and reports, not Syrian, not Baathist, not Arab nationalist, not ISIS, etc. as two users here have falsely claimed before. The third and most important difference, is that there is no historical account that says these enclaves used to be part of a Kurdistan. I echo the concerns of user:Fiveby, that although the term might sound normal, innocent, etc., however, it is charged with political meanings and ambitions that are widespread on Kurdish propaganda websites and repeating this here as if it is neutral would be misleading and wrong, to say the least. Besides some books that use the term and mostly present the Kurdish POV, it's hard to find other third party sources that use the term (e.g., news outlets, states, international organizations, international political figure, etc.). To summarize, it's fine to have the term but we should make it clear that it is mostly used from a Kurdish nationalist POV (which is somewhat implied in the current lead) , and retroactively in most cases. To be followed. Cheers, Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 01:58, 13 December 2020 (UTC)
عمرو بن كلثوم, Wikipedia doesn't actually care whether any term is politically charged. We don't care where or with whom the term originated, or whether the people originating it had a political agenda. What we care about is what term the preponderance of recent independent scholarship is using. —valereee (talk) 13:24, 14 December 2020 (UTC)
We should care a great deal when a term is politically charged, where and with whom the term originated, and about the political agenda, because all that needs to be explained for the reader. fiveby(zero) 15:27, 14 December 2020 (UTC)
Fiveby, absolutely, such explanations are often appropriate for inclusion in an article, again with reliable sourcing, which in this case means recent scholarly works. My point was that we don't decide whether to even use a term because of any of those things. —valereee (talk) 16:52, 14 December 2020 (UTC)
Couldn't agree more with Fiveby. Presenting something the is the pure imagination of nationalist claims as an undisputed facts has no place on an encyclopedia. Again, it's fine with me to use the term, and Levivich is showing enough notability for the term, but most of the quotes above, if not all, come from pro-Kurdish authors, so the context is even more important than the term itself, especially if we take into account that most Syrian Kurds originated in Turkey.

The majority of the Kurds in Syria are originally Turkish Kurds, who left Turkey in the 1920s in order to escape the harsh repression of the Kurds in that country. These Kurds were later joined in Syria by a new large group that drifted out of Turkey throughout the interwar period during which the Turkish campaign to assimilate its Kurdish population was at it highest.[1] This is like the population of Algerian descent in Marseille claiming that southern France is Northern Algeria. People can claim anything, but we have to attribute claims to their original authors. I am seeing a consensus developing around this, am I wrong? Cheers, Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 16:46, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

If there are any specific authors/editors/publishers/works that anyone thinks are not reliable and should be excluded, it should be taken up at WP:RSN. I disagree that there is really any such thing as "pro-Kurdish" or even "pro-Syrian Kurdish"... Kurds and even Syrian Kurds do not all have one viewpoint/opinion on anything... if there is one thing that everybody agrees on, it's that's Kurds do not agree on any one thing. I also disagree that any of the authors are "pro-Kurdish" or biased in a way that impugns their reliability, but I could be wrong about that. If we want to exclude authors/works from consideration, that probably needs consensus at RSN. Otherwise, we have to summarize the reliable sources even if we think they're pro-Kurdish. Levivich harass/hound 19:19, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

The history paragraph

In the previous #Dec 12 lead paragraph draft section the question was asked if the history I wrote in the draft can be verified, and I think yes it can, but to reduce the text and scope of discussion, I want to list out the separate parts and ask which parts exactly are [citation needed] and which parts are uncontroversial:

The first 4 are taken from the article Kurdistan
  1. The word 'Kurdistan', which translates as 'Land of the Kurds', is first attested in 11th century Seljuk chronicles
  2. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, several Kurdish principalities emerged in Central Asia
  3. Kurdistan in the Middle Ages was a collection of semi-independent and independent emirates
  4. In the 16th century, after prolonged wars, Kurdish-inhabited areas were split between the Safavid and Ottoman empires
    The rest are "new" (Levivich's summary)
  5. What is now the modern state of Syria used to be part of the Ottoman Empire (Ottoman Syria)
  6. What is now the geographic area called "Kurdistan" used to be part of the Ottoman Empire
  7. The three areas "Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira" (more accurately described as "areas near/around Afrin, Kobani, and northern Jazira") used to be part of the Ottoman Empire
  8. After World War I, the Ottoman Empire was partitioned
  9. The three areas (Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira) became part of the French Mandate for Syria
  10. Other parts of Kurdistan were divided between Turkey, the British Mandate for Iraq (now Iraq), Persia (now Iran), and the Soviet Union (now parts of Armenia and Azerbaijan)
  11. After World War II, the French Mandate for Syria eventually became the modern state of Syria, including the three areas (Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira)
  12. In 2011, the Syrian Civil War began
  13. In 2012, Kurdish militia gained control of at least parts of Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira
  14. In 2014, Afrin Canton, Kobani Canton, and Jazira Canton were declared autonomous under the Constitution of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES)
  15. In 2016, a new constitution was formed for AANES, reorganizing the Cantons into Afrin Region, Euphrates Region, and Jazira Region, plus 4 other regions in northern Syria
  16. Since 2016, Turkish occupation of northern Syria, including Afrin and parts of Euphrates Region

I'm of course not suggesting all of this should be in the lead. I am curious what people think is accurate/not accurate, neutral/not neutral, complete/incomplete, etc., and which parts are important enough to mention in the lead section (any paragraph). We can then "go to the sources" on the parts in dispute and start drafting maybe a second paragraph for the lead on history. Levivich harass/hound 19:01, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

A quick response here. The Kurdistan page is a can of worms on its own, which will need some attention from the larger community, but that's besides the point for now. I agree with all the points mentioned above except for 7, 9, 15 and 16. For point #7, the Jazira area was grazing land used mostly for Arab tribes to herd their sheep (I have provided sources and maps earlier on this page and can do that again), so it was not even a Kurdish enclave at all. Consequently, the same observation is valid for no. 9. No. 10 is debatable, but outside my interest for now. No. 11 is the same as 7 and 9 above, this is projecting retroactively given the demographic changes that happened after WWI and the establishment of the Turkey-Syria border. No. 15, this is adopting the narrative of a Syrian civil war belligerent making claims of administrative divisions that in principle are not different from ISIL claiming their Al-Barakah province. These Kurdish administrative claims included large swaths of overwhelmingly Arab areas (Raqqa, Tel Abyad, Manbij, Tel Rifaat, etc.), so have no value from a Kurdish claims standpoint. No. 16, Turkey has not attacked Kobani. Cheers, Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 02:16, 13 December 2020 (UTC)
@عمرو بن كلثوم: Quick response to your quick response: if the word "enclave" was removed from #7, #9, and #11... so it just said Afrin/Kobani/Jazira was part of Ottoman Empire, then French Mandate, then Syria... would you agree? All I mean to say is that those three geographic locations were part of Ottoman Empire, then French Mandate, then Syria (regardless of who lived there or what they were at the various times... just talking about those geographic latitudes and longitudes). Levivich harass/hound 02:21, 13 December 2020 (UTC)
Yes, you are definitely right. These areas were all part of the Ottoman empire, regardless of who lived there. Cheers, Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 03:08, 13 December 2020 (UTC)
OK I changed "enclaves" to "areas". Also I reworded #16 and added links. Levivich harass/hound 03:34, 13 December 2020 (UTC)
There's a whole lot between #'s 11 and 12 that i think would be appropriate for the reader, pan-Arabism, Ba'ath Party, Iraqi Kurdistan, etc., but to me much of the history content is written as attempting to legitimize or de-legitimize the name, ending up with silly content such as the paragraph about 'west Kurdistan'. I think the article should be about how Kurds think and feel about the place, acknowledge the perspective and then describe it. fiveby(zero) 18:26, 14 December 2020 (UTC)
Yeah there's like 65 years of relevant history between 11 and 12. I'm afraid it might take us 65 years to agree on a summary of it. :-) Levivich harass/hound 18:46, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

edit issue?

This edit did something to the page -- lost sections, not sure how. Can anyone figure it out? —valereee (talk) 17:01, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

weirdly, I can see it in vis ed, just not in source. —valereee (talk) 17:09, 14 December 2020 (UTC)
عمرو بن كلثوم, it was an edit of yours -- maybe try reverting yourself, then try again? —valereee (talk) 17:16, 14 December 2020 (UTC)
Fixed. It was a missing / in a closing </ref>. Levivich harass/hound 17:22, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

"Syrian Kurdistan"

"Syrian Kurdistan" table

Use of "Syrian Kurdistan"
Author Date Title Publisher Quotes
Jordi Tejel 2020 "The Complex and Dynamic Relationship of Syria's Kurds with Syrian Borders: Continuities and Changes" in Matthieu Cimino, ed. Syria: Borders, Boundaries, and the State Springer
  • while some visual representations remain relatively constant (Greater Kurdistan), others such as "Syrian Kurdistan," "Rojava" have varied over the time due to new developments and shifting power dynamics on the ground (p. 250)
  • From Cimino's introduction (p. 19): By relying on unpublished maps and school books, dating from the sixteenth century to the present day, Tejel demonstrates that the Kurdish territorial imagination, comprising myths, mobilizing stories and political ambitions, is relatively plastic and fluctuating. Recently established, "Rojava" (Syrian Kurdistan) is part of a mythology of pan-Kurdish unity which does not constitute a political objective for the Syrian Kurds in itself, but is rather a "cultural abstract". For the author, "like Arab nationalists in Syria, the Kurdish movement has produced a political discourse that combines pan-Kurdist references intertwined with local patriotism and limited territorial claims". Yet the author shows that this imagined community is nevertheless very well documented...
Güneş Murat Tezcür, ed. 2020 A Century of Kurdish Politics: Citizenship, Statehood and Diplomacy T&F ...in 2012, a fracturing of the central state in Syria gave rise to a system of local self-government in this Kurdistan region. Thus, in both southern (Iraqi) Kurdistan (Basur) and western (Syrian) Kurdistan (Rojava) the weakness of the central power enabled new entities to emerge. The aims of the Kurdish actors and the nature of the entities that emerged, however, differed greatly. The Kurdistan region in Iraq today can be considered a proto-state or statelet, while the Kurdistan region in Syria is quite different, with a self-identity, political system and further aspirations toward a non-statist, confederated form of locally based self-administration. (Introduction)
Massoud Sharifi Dryaz [1] 2020 "Non-State Actors and Governance: Kurdish Autonomy in Syria" in David Romano, Mehmet Gurses, and Michael Gunter, eds., The Kurds in the Middle East: Enduring Problems and New Dynamics Lexington Books
  • ... [after 1921] Syrian Kurds remained in contact with their relatives on the other side of the border [with Turkey], and they used their trans-border networks for commercial trade and smuggling, an important source of income in underdeveloped regions like Syrian Kurdistan. (p. 100)
  • Syrian Kurds were often involved in supplying their compatriots in Iraq and Turkey, though in practice the various and often fragmented Kurdish political parties in Syria have never managed to establish and build a generalized movement capable of expressing political demands by the people of Syrian Kurdistan. (p. 103)
  • The PYD was founded on September 20, 2003 ... Shortly after its founding, the PYD opened its first head office in Qamishli ... In Syrian Kurdistan, where more than fourteen Kurdish organizations were active, the PYD progressively increased its activites. Its propaganda activities appeared to upset Syrian authorities, who started to arrest, detain, torture, kidnap, and kill pro-PYD activists beginning in 2004. (pp. 106-107)
  • Also in the same book, Ozum Yeslitas, "Continuity and Change in Syrian Kurdistan: The Rojava Revolution and Beyond", p. 130: Thepurpose of this chapter is to shed light on the dynamics of continuity and change in Syrian Kurdistan in the context of the still-unfolding Syrian crisis. The chapter first provides a brief historical overview of the trajectory of Kurdish nationalism in Syria, then focuses on a number of themes to address continuity and change in Syrian Kurdistan...
Sirwan Kajjo [2] [3] 2019 "Syrian Kurds: Rising from the Ashes of Persecution" in Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen, Nir T. Boms & Sareta Ashraph, eds., The Syrian War: Between Justice and Political Reality Cambridge
  • By the 1990s, former PKK members and other activists who had broken away from KDP-S started to form their own parties, believing there was a need for independent voices in Syrian Kurdish politics ... They promoted the concept of Syrian Kurdistan but with key constraints. (p. 275)
  • Though vigorously supportive of the Syrian government, Iran hedges its bets on Syrian Kurdistan. (p. 284)
Various authors 2018 Sebastian Maisel, ed., The Kurds: An Encyclopedia of Life, Culture, and Society ABC-Clio (authorship of chapters is not always available via free preview but the list of contributors to this book is available on Amazon's free preview, p. 365 [link is on the table of contents]; pages not linked to Google previews are viewable on Amazon's free preview, search for "Syrian Kurdistan" and use the results list)
  • Selcuk Aydin, "Geography"
    • The coldest area of Kurdistan is the northern part ... Central and southern Kurdistan are warmer ... And for the other parts of Kurdistan in southern Turkey, all parts of Syrian Kurdistan, and half of central Kurdistan in Iraq, they are the warmest part... (p. 23)
    • Therefore, it is crucial to discuss the differentiation of political dimensions across Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi, and Syrian Kurdistan as the result of different experiences of Kurds across these countries. (p. 28)
  • In "Life and Work", p. 125 Despite such environmental concerns, cotton remains an important crop for Kurdish communities even today in Rojava, Syrian Kurdistan and p. 126 Hostilities against Kurds also deepened as a consequence of the civil war in Syria, which had provided Syrian Kurdistan (Rojava) with an opportunity to declare its regional autonomy.
  • Ozlem Belcium Galip, "Literature"
    • p. 163 Kurdish literature developed late compared to that of other nations, has suffered from bans and obstacles, and is divided between several regions and alphabets (the Latin alphabet in Turkish Kurdistan and Syrian Kurdistan, an adapted version of the Persian-Arabic alphabet in Iraqi and Iranian Kurdistan, and the Cyrillic alphabet is also used in the former Soviet Union [FSU]).
    • p. 176-177, section heading "Syrian Kurdistan" There was short-term cultural and linguistic freedom in Syrian Kurdistan during the period between the two World Wars ... With the de facto rule of PYD ... [p. 177] over three Kurdish areas, Afrin (Efrin in Kurdish), Kobani, and Jazira (Cezire)...
    • p. 177 Then, after the 1980 military coup in Turkey, Sweden and Germany witnessed a striking increase in the publication of Kurmanji literature, especially among political refugees from Syrian Kurdistan (in particular after 2000).
    • p. 178 The group of writers, particularly from Syrian Kurdistan, who migrated to Europe after 2000 includes...
    • pp. 178-179 Along with those in Iraqi Kurdistan, a number of Kurdish poets emerged in other Kurdish regions as well [p. 179] such as Jila Huseni (1964-1996) from Iranian Kurdistan, Fatma Savci (b. 1974) from Turkish Kurdistan, and Diya Ciwan (b. 1953) from Syrian Kurdistan.
  • In "France" p. 221 Furthermore, in recent years, there has also been an increase of Kurdish refugees from Rojava (Western/Syrian Kurdistan) and Bashur (Southern/Iraqi Kurdistan).
  • Katharina Lange, "Syria"
    • p. 285, In July 2012, the Syrian regime ceded control over most parts of Syrian Kurdistan (Efrin, Kobani, and the Kurdish quarters Sheikh Meqsud and Ashrafiyya in Aleppo, as well as the Kurdish areas in the Jazira with the exception of some strategic points in Qamishli) to the PYD...
    • p. 286, In January 2014, the previously mentioned three regions were declared to be three separate "cantons" making up Syrian Kurdistan, which has been popularly referred to by the PYD and its sympathizers in Syria as well as outside of it as "Rojava"—Western (Kurdistan). This name was hardly used as a self-reference by Syrian Kurds before 2011 and was dropped again as official self-designation in favor of "Democratic Federal System of Northern Syria" in December 2016. The successive name changes did not indicate significant changes at the administrative level, however.
  • Gulistan Gurbey and Vedat Dayan (a PhD candidate at Gurbey's university per contributor list at p. 366), "Turkey", p. 289 Kurmanji is the most widespread dialect that is spoken by Kurds in Bakur (Turkish Kurdistan or Northern Kurdistan). Kurmanji is furthermore spoken in Rojhilat (Iranian Kurdistan or Eastern Kurdistan), in the northern part of Bashur (Iraqi Kurdistan or Southern Kurdistan), and in Rojava (Syrian Kurdistan or Western Kurdistan).
  • Vera Eccarius-Kelly, "United States"
    • p. 309, Most recently, a solidarity group for Syrian-Kurdistan was formed in New York...
    • p. 310 The dramatic siege of Shingal (Sinjar), a mountain top to which thousands of Yezidi Kurds fled after ISIS attacked them, and the ferocious battles for the town of Kobani in Syrian-Kurdistan created opportunities for Kurdish activists in the United States.
    • p. 311 In Syrian-Kurdistan, Kurds are sometimes identified as trustworthy regional allies, but only as long as they pursue an agenda that is approved by the Pentagon.
Various authors 2018 Michael Gunter, ed., Routledge Handbook on the Kurds T&F (The free preview has no page numbers, this is from multiple chapters by multiple contributors) Modern Kurdish poetry in Syrian Kurdistan in the first place represents itself in Cigerxwin's (1903-1984) poetry. His revolutionary poems have inspired the masses, especially in western and northern Kurdistan. Some other Kurdish poets from Syrian Kurdistan, such as Jan Dost, Ahmad Hosseini and Axin Welat, have published their poems in exile ... Likewise the novels published by Kurdish novelists from Syrian Kurdistan, such as Halim Yusifand Jan Dost... By the same token, Syria relinquished part of its sovereignty, particularly in its relations with the PKK. Physically, PKK's militants took de facto control over a few small portions of Syrian territory, notably in Kurd Dagh...portraits of Ocalan and Barzani replaced those of Hafiz al-Assad...The most obvious political consequence of these dynamics was the adoption by some Kurdish parties of the expression "Syrian Kurdistan" or "Rojava", referring to Northern Syria, as opposed to the moderate, "Kurdish regions of Syria".
Brendan O'Leary 2018 The Kurds, the Four Wolves, and the Great Powers (PDF) The Journal of Politics
  • The PYD, with the YPG as its armed fist, has sought to establish a political monopoly in Syrian Kurdistan ...
  • The PYD has reversed Öcalan’s previous stance—whatever the daily changes in verbiage—and now stands for territorial autonomy for Syrian Kurdistan and equal citizenship rights for Kurds.
Harriet Allsopp 2016 The Kurds of Syria: Political Parties and Identity in the Middle East Bloomsbury The idea that the KDP was seeking influence amongst the Syrian Kurds and in a post-Assad 'Kurdistan Region of Syria' was raised in several reports. Analysists explained the part played by Barzani in terms of an attempt to make a bid for leadership of the pan-Kurdish nation. This prompted some to suggest that Syrian Kurdistan had become an arena for PKK-KDP cooperation. Any power struggle between the two parties could result in the split of the region between the two spheres of influence, increasing inter-Kurdish conflict and limiting the influence of the KDP to Syria's eastern Kurdish regions.
David L. Phillips 2015 The Kurdish Spring: A New Map of the Middle East Transaction Publishers France divided its mandate into six entities ... Syria's population was about three-quarters Arab. The balance included minorities such as Kurds ... Kurds were the largest ethnic minority in Syria. Kurds reside on a patchwork of territories, which they call Rojava. Syrian Kurdistan encompasses regions in northern Syria such as Kobani, near Jarablus, and Afrin, whose plains extend to the Turkish border. Kurds predominate in Jazira province, Hasakah Governorate, and the cities of Qamishli and Hasakah. There are also Kurds in Syria's northeast. (p. 38)
Michael Gunter 2014 Out of Nowhere: The Kurds of Syria in Peace and War Hurst
  • Among pan-Kurdish nationalists, Syrian Kurdistan is often referred to as Western Kurdistan or Rojava (the direction of the setting sun). (p. 7)
  • Qamishli—with a population of 184,231 according to the 2004 census, but now much larger—is the largest Kurdish city in Syria and, as noted in the Introduction, is often considered the de facto capital of Western (Syrian) Kurdistan. (p. 8)
  • Thus, it was not until 14 June 1957 that the first modern Kurdish political party was formed, the Kurdish Democracy Party in Syria (KDPS). Even so, the KDPS maintained a Syrian national agenda that did not call for the liberation of a Syrian Kurdistan. Rather, it was concerned with the improvement of Kurdish socio-economic conditions. Indeed, it is revealing that none of the numerous Kurdish parties currently use the sensitive term Kurdistan in their names, for fear that it might incite government fears of secession. (p. 25)
Robert Lowe 2014 "The Emergence of Western Kurdistan and the Future of Syria" in David Romano, Mehmet Gurses (eds.), Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East Palgrave Macmillan (see also Amazon preview)
  • page 225, The instability of the Syrian Civil War has enabled Kurdish political and military actors to take control of parts of northern Syria, marking the emergence of the nascent political entity of Kurdistana Rojava (West Kurdistan). This de facto autonomous Kurdish zone has developed politically, administratively, and militarily to the point that in November 2013 the largest Kurdish party there felt able to declare a transitional administration. Western Kurdistan was previously a vague concept rarely used by most Kurds, and this new political structure is fragile and underdeveloped. Nevertheless, it has become an important feature of the Syrian and Middle Eastern geopolitical landscape, and its future, and that of the wider Kurdish population in Syria, is a key factor in the future of the war-torn country.
  • page 228, In theory, the SKC is a de facto interim administrative body for Syrian Kurdistan that represents all the Kurdish parties and communities, holds authority for political and civic organization, and has control of the Kurdish militias.
  • page 236,

    Until 2012, the Kurdish national movement in Syria had barely flirted with the idea of devolved or autonomous government for Kurdish areas. The prospect was wholly unrealistic and any expression of interest in the idea attracted the harsh attention of the authorities. Despite the shining success of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and proposals explored for the government of Kurdish areas in Turkey, the concept of Syrian Kurdistan or Western Kurdistan received very little attention. Even the term was rarely used and then mostly only by the PYD and some more radical nationalist groups operating from abroad.

    The war has changed everything. The vacuum of authority in the north of the country, the vulnerability felt by the Kurdish territorial pockets, and the sharp opportunism of the PYD have created both a physical entity (or entities) controlled by Kurds and the more nebulous but increasingly tangible idea of Western Kurdistan...

  • page 237,

    The course of the war may shift and if the Islamists or the regime gain power in the north, Western Kurdistan could be snuffed out. But while the YPG is successfully defending the "liberated" areas, something called "Rojava" exists and hence Kurdish ideas for its development need to be considered. A return to the pre-war status quo is now utterly unacceptable to Kurds, and while some may be content to gain improved rights in Syria, others, notably including those with guns, are now wedded to the idea of autonomy in Rojava ...

    Two other ideas may be ruled out. An independent Western Kurdistan is neither desired nor remotely viable. Rojava lacks sufficient population numbers, contiguity, and internal unity, and also has significant non-Kurdish populations and an economy that is completely dependent on the rest of Syria. A pan-Kurdish independent state is also not possible (and very probably not desired), given severe differences between the political elites of the different parts of Kurdistan as well as linguistic and cultural differences. The only option remaining the would satisfy the wishes of many of the Kurdish population is for some form of self-determination settlement within a new Syrian state structure ...

    ... For example, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria favors a full federal state and in the summer of 2012 began using the term "Syrian Kurdistan" for the first time.. This model would establish a federal Syria with other communities...Qamishli would be the capital of a noncontiguous Kurdish region that [p. 238] would include the three northern pockets. Following a census, minorities within the region would receive a share of seats in the regional government...

  • pp. 239-240, A settlement of the question of self-determination and decentralized government, the issue of what has become called "Rojava", will be far more copmlicated. Politicians involved in negotiations between the Kurds and [p. 240] the Arab opposition acknowledge that this is the key sticking opint. In general, Syrian Sunni Arabs are deeply opposed to Western Kurdistan and any form of devolution or federation in Syria. The Kurds are unclear and disunited on the issue. Western Kurdistan is riddled with internal weaknesses and sits in a deeply hostile environment.
  • In the same book, Eva Savelsberg, "The Syrian-Kurdish Movements: Obstacles Rather Than Driving Forces for Democratization", p. 92 In several ways, the al-Qamishli revolt (serhildan) is different from earlier protests in the Kurdish areas of Syria ... For the first time in the history of contemporary Syria, the protest movement touched all Kurdish territories, thus reinforcing the symbolic unity of the Syrian-Kurdish arena—"Syrian Kurdistan."

Discussion of "Syrian Kurdistan"

  • I bolded "Syrian Kurdistan" in the quotes. The above is not an exhaustive list, please feel free to add to it. I only included post-2011 sources from academic publishers (modern scholarship). I didn't list Izady, although he uses the term. Granted, not every source from an academic publisher in this time period uses the term, but I think enough do to support calling "Syrian Kurdistan" the Kurdish-inhabited areas of northern Syria. Levivich harass/hound 07:01, 13 December 2020 (UTC)
    • Are you proposing that be the entire scope of the article, "Kurdish-inhabited areas of northern Syria"? No doubt that is how the term is sometimes used and understood in context. Let me ask this way, are you choosing a title and thereby defining the topic and scope, or choosing the scope and topic (Kurdish-inhabited areas of northern Syria) and then placing at the most appropriate title? fiveby(zero) 17:16, 13 December 2020 (UTC)
      I don't really understand what you're asking. I'm not proposing anything, and I'm neither choosing nor defining the title or the scope. The title is "Syrian Kurdistan" and I assume the scope is "Syrian Kurdistan" and I don't believe this is in dispute? The point of this table is to collect quotes from modern scholarship using the term "Syrian Kurdistan" (mostly to rebut arguments that either this term is not in widespread use, or it's only used by nationalists, or it's only used to refer to an idea and not a place). Levivich harass/hound 17:24, 13 December 2020 (UTC)
Thanks Levivich for the huge effort of putting these together. Now, reading you last sentence, do you feel the quotes achieve the objectives you listed? To me, they clearly portray "Syrian Kurdistan" from the Kurdish nationalist perspective, hence support what we are talking/concerned about. As for the widespread use, I have listed below other names for the areas with their google hits:
  • "Kurdish region" and "Syria": About 245,000 results
  • "Kurdish area" and "Syria": About 44,400 results
  • "Kurdish inhabited" and "Syria": About 10,700 results
  • "Syrian Kurdistan": About 78,400 results

Also, below are some major news outlets and the term they use for the area with examples:

  • CNN: Kurdish region. Syria grants citizenship to thousands in the Kurdish region[2]
  • BBC: Kurdish region. On our way to Qamishli, the largest Kurdish city in northern Syria, we see a US military convoy escorted by fighter jets heading east towards the Iraqi border. They are leaving the Kurdish region.[3]
  • Reuters: Border between Iraqi Kurdistan and Syrian Kurdish region closed...[4]
  • NYT: A recent trip by a reporter through the Kurdish area of Syria revealed ...[5]
  • WP: The Kurdish area of Syria is relatively secure ...[6]
  • WSJ: The Kurdish region of Syria ...[7]
  • Al-Jazeera: Kurdish areas of Syria ...[8]

I realize there could be other names (e.g., "east of Euphrates" getting >115,000 hits). Given these results, I think we should have a discussion about the common name for the area per WP:COMMONNAME. Cheers, Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 01:55, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

The Google results or "hits" are unreliable for the reasons explained in WP:HITS (those numbers of results at the top of the search results page are not accurate). Popular press is OK to cite for breaking news, but it's not as reliable as scholarship (and really not very reliable at all); because scholarship is available for this topic, we should use scholarship and not news outlets. Specifically, modern scholarship, i.e. post-2011, the newer, the better. Ultimately, this article should be summarizing what scholars say about the topic in 2020. So I have no problem with a discussion about common name, this article title, or even a broader discussion about how all of these related articles are titled and arranged, but I think all content discussions around this topic should be based on modern scholarship first and older scholarship second. Top-level news (like you've listed: BBC, NYT, etc.) should only be used for any recent events not yet covered by scholarship. Levivich harass/hound 06:28, 14 December 2020 (UTC)
Would you please focus on topic. The constant change of direction and inability to come to an end of at least one the discussions begun since the lock of the page is confusing for us and probably also for the not so much involved admins who are the only ones who can edit the page now and of which we probably have lost Girth Summit. We (at least I) would all like to get to an end of the dispute and the page was created only a few months ago by an other Admin.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 07:53, 14 December 2020 (UTC)
Paradise Chronicle, are you replying to Levivich? —valereee (talk) 13:10, 14 December 2020 (UTC)
The Edit summary says answer to Amr Ibn.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 23:40, 14 December 2020 (UTC)
Paradise Chronicle, yes, but the indent says answer to Levivich. :) —valereee (talk) 12:14, 15 December 2020 (UTC)
Levivich: In the Savelsberg quote you added above, I read: "For example, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria favors a full federal state and in the summer of 2012 began using the term Syrian Kurdistan for the first time". This is what this discussion is all about. The PYD/Kurdish narrative is/has been the driving force of this "Syrian Kurdistan" term. As long as we include this fact in the article I am happy with anything you suggest. Cheers, Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 22:52, 14 December 2020 (UTC)
Levivich Eva Savelsberg is not a good source, but others are. Amr Ibn and I were involved in long discussions about KurdWatch, which Amr Ibn defended (an article Amr Ibn created) and for which she was the "content manager", at the Tell Abyad page. She attends Forums organized by the SETA and listen how she talks about freedom of press in the AANES.[1] Press outlets can report from within the AANES and many reliable press outlets also have. Once again, the article is not about a recognized political entity Syrian Kurdistan, but a cultural region called Syrian Kurdistan in which of course are also active Kurdish political parties and movements.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 01:36, 15 December 2020 (UTC)
Eva Svalsberg's role has been to talk about human right violations by all parties, including Kurdish militias. I wonder whether that's enough reason for you to say "she is not a good source". Most (maybe all?) of the other sources mentioned in the list are pro-Kurdish anyway, so it's nice to have some diversity. The same issues Eva talks about were also raised by HRW, Amnesty, Roy Gutman, Fabrice Balanche, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and many others including countless respected media reports, so she is not an outlier. Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 05:23, 15 December 2020 (UTC)
A few thoughts:
I saw Svalsberg is Chair of the European Center for Kurdish Studies at Free University of Berlin (FUB). Otherwise, I am not at all familiar with her so I have no opinion on her reliability as a source.
The quote "the Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria favors a full federal state and in the summer of 2012 began using the term Syrian Kurdistan for the first time" is from Robert Lowe's chapter in that 2014 book, not Svalsberg's chapter.
For what it's worth, Balanche 2018 (published by WINEP) uses "Syrian Kurdistan" multiple times (mostly talking about possible scenarios for political states or statelets in the region), including in a section called "Syrian Kurdistan under the PYD".
In my view, scholarship published by universities is more reliable than papers by think tanks/advocacy organizations (with a few exceptions, like Pew Research Center), but I'm not sure if that's just my view or if that view has consensus. Also, I think academics are more reliable than journalists (with some exceptions as well, of course). Levivich harass/hound 05:51, 15 December 2020 (UTC)
Levivich, pretty sure in general even the most reliable advocacy groups should be both directly quoted and attributed and only for supporting their own opinions. One high-profile example: Southern Poverty Law Center. RSNP says The Southern Poverty Law Center is considered generally reliable on topics related to hate groups and extremism in the United States. As an advocacy group, the SPLC is a biased and opinionated source. The organization's views, especially when labeling hate groups, should be attributed per WP:RSOPINION. —valereee (talk) 12:21, 15 December 2020 (UTC)

Dec 12 lead paragraph draft follow up discussion

Levivich and Attar-Aram syria have made a large effort for finding a lead and their co-production here seems to have found the best reasonable feedback so far. It's the version of Attar Aram syria with the "as" deleted before one of the four "Lesser Kurdistans".

Syrian Kurdistan is a Kurdish-inhabited area in northern Syria surrounding three noncontiguous enclaves along the Turkish and Iraqi borders: Afrin in the northwest, Kobani in the north, and Jazira in the northeast. Syrian Kurdistan is sometimes called Western Kurdistan (Kurdish: Rojava Kurdistanê, lit.'Kurdistan where the sun sets'), one of the four "Lesser Kurdistans" that comprise "Greater Kurdistan", alongside Iranian Kurdistan (Kurdish: Rojhilatê Kurdistanê‎, lit.'Kurdistan where the sun rises'), Turkish Kurdistan (Kurdish: Bakurê Kurdistanê, lit.'Northern Kurdistan'), and Iraqi Kurdistan (Kurdish: Başûrê Kurdistanê, lit.'Southern Kurdistan').

Does anyone have some improvements to add to this lead?The following discussion was mixed with confusing edits for a solution finding process, so I begin a new discussion.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 10:58, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

This suggested text is one sided and not neutral and does not take into consideration the sources that disputes the claim that a Kurdistan exists in Syria.--Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 13:28, 17 December 2020 (UTC)
Supreme Deliciousness, can you suggest an addition, sourced to current scholarly work, that will improve it in your eyes? —valereee (talk) 14:33, 17 December 2020 (UTC)
Valereee, as I have said before, the current lead is the most neutral version as it doesn't take a side to only one (disputed) perspective but presents both sides. The text Paradise Chronicle suggested takes only one side and presents it as an undisputed truth. And the other side is no where to be found. I can show sources but it will be a wall of text. The sources I can bring forward have also already been shown at this talkpage above and in the archives by me, Amr ibn Kulthoum and Levivich. Do you want me to do a compilation of them? --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 16:22, 17 December 2020 (UTC)
Supreme Deliciousness, the current lead is being objected to by editors here on talk as containing non-neutral statements. Per policy, the onus is on the editors who want to include the disputed information, so if there's information not included that you want included, can you suggest at least wording. I don't think anyone wants a compilation, no wall of text needed, just for a starter the name of the source where it's coming from probably, and then if other editors think that source needs discussion, that can happen. But first maybe suggest what wording you want added to the above? —valereee (talk) 16:35, 17 December 2020 (UTC)
Valereee, the first line of the article should read: ""Syrian Kurdistan" is a modern and disputed name used by some Kurds and journalists for Kurdish-inhabited areas in northern Syria." Sources: "Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East" p 236, 225. "Syrian Kurds: Rising from the Ashes of Persecution" p 275, "Syria: Borders, Boundaries, and the State p 19.--Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 17:16, 17 December 2020 (UTC)
None of those three books (all quoted in the source table) say that Syrian Kurdistan is "used by some Kurds and journalists".
The first book (Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East) is Lowe 2014. That's the one where Lowe says "The war has changed everything". Lowe explains in very explicit language ("...something called 'Rojava' exists...") that before the war, few people used the term (because of fear of the Syrian government), and after the war, basically everyone uses the term, even the KDP-S (who had not used the term since its founding in the 1950s). Lowe is not saying "some Kurds and journalists", he is saying almost the opposite: everybody uses this term since the war. "The war has changed everything".
The second book (Syrian Kurds: Rising from the Ashes of Persecution) is Kajjo 2019, who mentions the use of the term Syrian Kurdistan by some Kurdish parties in the 1990s. Kajjo also uses the term, in his own voice, to refer to the area (p. 284) "...Iran hedges its bets on Syrian Kurdistan". That Kajjo is a journalist born in northern Jazira doesn't mean we can point to his book and say "used by some Kurds and journalists". That's WP:SYNTH. Kajjo needs to say "some Kurds and journalists" in order for us to cite him for the proposition. We can't use him as an example of a Kurdish journalist, and extrapolate from that example into "some Kurds and journalists".
The third book (Syria: Borders, Boundaries, and the State) is Tejel 2020 edited by Cimino. Tejel 2020 is quoted extensively above. He also explicitly says that he is concerned with "Greater Kurdistan", not the Syria-Turkish border, and that terms like "Syrian Kurdistan" and "Rojava" have changed over time. He doesn't say it's used by "some Kurds and journalists". Also, Tejel (in Gunter 2018) is the same person who says some Kurdish parties started using the term after the 1999 cease fire. Tejel supports the proposition that some Kurds used the term before the 2011 war, but he says nothing about its use after the war. And FWIW, Tejel is neither Kurdish nor a journalist. What he says is a "myth" is the notion of Syrian Kurdistan as part of a pan-Kurdish nation state (e.g., he's saying Syrian Kurdistan is not and was never Western Kurdistan), but even in this, he is the outlier, and he admits it. "I shall argue..." means he knows he is making a novel argument, not representing the scholarly consensus. And aside from all of that, Tejel isn't at all saying "Western Kurdistan"/"Rojava"'s use is limited to "some Kurds and journalists". He implicitly acknowledges that its use is widespread; he is arguing that the use is inaccurate; he is not arguing that it doesn't exist or isn't used. (FWIW Cimino equates "Rojava" and "Syrian Kurdistan" in his introduction summarizing Tejel, but Tejel actually never equates those two terms.) Levivich harass/hound 17:53, 17 December 2020 (UTC)
Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East p 236, 225: "Until 2012, the Kurdish national movement in Syria had barely flirted with the idea of devolved or autonomous government for Kurdish areas. The prospect was wholly unrealistic and any expression of interest in the idea attracted the harsh attention of the authorities. Despite the shining success of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and proposals explored for the government of Kurdish areas in Turkey, the concept of Syrian Kurdistan or Western Kurdistan received very little attention. Even the term was rarely used and then mostly only by the PYD and some more radical nationalist groups operating from abroad." "in November 2013 the largest Kurdish party there felt able to declare a transitional administration. Western Kurdistan was previously a vague concept rarely used by most Kurds"
Syrian Kurds: Rising from the Ashes of Persecution p 275 "They promoted the concept of Syrian Kurdistan but with key constraints."
Syria: Borders, Boundaries, and the State p 19 "By relying on unpublished maps and school books, dating from the sixteenth century to the present day, Tejel demonstrates that the Kurdish territorial imagination, comprising myths, mobilizing stories and political ambitions, is relatively plastic and fluctuating. Recently established, "Rojava" (Syrian Kurdistan) is part of a mythology of pan-Kurdish unity which does not constitute a political objective for the Syrian Kurds in itself, but is rather a "cultural abstract". For the author, "like Arab nationalists in Syria, the Kurdish movement has produced a political discourse that combines pan-Kurdist references intertwined with local patriotism and limited territorial claims". Yet the author shows that this imagined community is nevertheless very well documented..."
So we have reliable sources describing "Syrian Kurdistan" as a "concept", "Kurdish territorial imagination", "imagined community" and "comprising myths". Where are these facts in Paradise Chronicles suggested lead? --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 11:28, 18 December 2020 (UTC)
You misrepresent sources. The first source you quote, Lowe, the very next line after your quote ("Even the term was rarely used...") is "The war has changed everything.". This is what I pointed out in my last response and again you quote the passage before, and after, that part, while skipping the part where he says "war has changed everything" and "something called 'Rojava' exists". I've already quoted this section in full, twice (in this thread, and in the table), and you're totally ignoring it.
Lowe uses the terms Syrian Kurdistan, Rojava, and Western Kurdistan to refer to the place like a zillion times in that book (more Rojava and WK than SK). First of all, Lowe's Chapter 11 in the book is titled "The Emergence of Western Kurdistan and the Future of Syria." He write: "In theory, the SKC is a de facto interim administrative body for Syrian Kurdistan that represents all the Kurdish parties..." The section "The Establishment of Self-Rule in Rojava" is where he talks about the PYD's takeover of the three enclaves. Here are some examples where Lowe refers to the place, which he explicitly says exists, as Rojava or Western Kurdistan: "Rojava faces massive threats to its stability and existence...A fundamental weakness is geography as unlike Kurdistan-Iraq, Western Kurdistan lacks both the contiguity, which provides political coherence, and the mountains, which provide defense...following the 2012 takeover the regime continued to pay the salaries of civil servants in Rojava...The surrounding neighborhood does not give much encouragement for Western Kurdistan's future...A greater obstacle to the establishment of self-government in Western Kurdistan is what may be called 'non-Kurdish Syria', that is, the 85-90 percent of Syrians who are not Kurds...the KRG is unlikely to prove sufficiently strong or committed to Western Kurdistan should the Syrian civil war truly engulf Kurdish areas...[Then comes the section you've been incompletely quoting, entitled "Devolved Government for Kurdish Areas"]...The PYD took control of Kurdish towns in 2012; it is the leading party in designing and administrating Rojava, and is the only part to run a militia of any strength...The part is not interested in Western Kurdistan emulating models set by Kurdistan-Iraq or Scotland....Western Kurdistan also provides strategic depth to the wider PYD/PKK struggle...A settlement of the question of self-determination and decentralized government, the issue of what has become called "Rojava," will be far more complicated...In general, Syrian Sunni Arabs are deeply opposed to Western Kurdistan and any form of devolution or federation in Syria...Western Kurdistan is riddled with internal weaknesses and sits in a deeply hostile environment...the consolidation of some form of a representative-devolved administration in Western Kurdistan would help Syria to become more democratic...The inclusion of non-Kurdish minorities in Western Kurdistan is important...This commitment remains to be fully test in Rojava..."
It's just dishonest to claim that Lowe is saying Syrian Kurdistan is a concept and not a place when he says the very opposite, and it's dishonest to pick out one quote that supports that while omitting the quotes before and after that contradict it. It's dishonest to quote a part where Lowe is discussing pre-2011 and suggest it applies post-2011, even when Lowe specifically makes this point about the war changing everything. And I use the word "dishonest" because while someone could certainly make this mistake innocently, after it's been pointed out to you at least twice by me (and before me, others pointed this out, too), I don't see how you can continue to make this mistake innocently after all these quotes are on the page. You know Lowe is saying that SK is a place and not a concept, at least not since the war. I'm not going to spend time responding to #2 and #3, given your misrepresentation of #1, and because they've been addressed before (including in my previous post). You are massively wasting my time by making me have to "correct the record" like this.
BTW this is a little off topic for this post, but Lowe thinks Savelsberg, Tejel, and Allsopp are legit. While I'm typing all this other stuff from Lowe, let me type this part: "Eva Savelsberg and Jordi Tejel argue that there is no prospect of the Kurdish transition leading to democracy in the short term...Harriet Allsopp acknowledges the deep problems posed by the PYD but offers a more optimistic assessment..." If we're going to accept Lowe as an RS (which of course we must), then we should also accept Savelsberg, Tejel, and Allsopp as RSes. Levivich harass/hound 17:50, 18 December 2020 (UTC)
Levivich, the quote I added said "Until 2012" so its self-explanatory that according to the author the situation changed after that point of time. But even if we look at the rest of the quote: "The war has changed everything. The vacuum of authority in the north of the country, the vulnerability felt by the Kurdish territorial pockets, and the sharp opportunism of the PYD have created both a physical entity (or entities) controlled by Kurds and the more nebulous but increasingly tangible idea of Western Kurdistan..."... have I said that kurds aren't controlling areas in Syria? Have I said that Western kurdistan isn't an idea? I only looked at the text in the template above as I don't have access to all the sources. --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 18:48, 18 December 2020 (UTC)
So true or false: today, the areas around Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira are called "Syrian Kurdistan", "Western Kurdistan", or "Rojava", by Lowe, Kajjo, Tejel, and all other scholars? Levivich harass/hound 19:02, 18 December 2020 (UTC)
"all other scholars" ? No. "some authors" would be correct. And some authors do not. Some publications say "Kurdish region", "Kurdish area", "kurdish inhabited" see: [4] Some say "Syria" BBC:[5] I support showing several views and different sides and opinions in the article, not only one. Does the United Nations and the international community recognize a "Syrian Kurdistan" in Syria? I don't think so. So why should Wikipedia present "Syrian Kurdistan" as an undisputed and official name for an area in Syria? --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 19:28, 18 December 2020 (UTC)
That's not the question. It's not about "authors", "publications", the BBC, the UN, or the Syrian government; it's about scholars and scholarship. (We just went over this with fiveby yesterday.)
So let's get one thing clear first. True or false: the areas around Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira are called "Syrian Kurdistan", "Western Kurdistan", or "Rojava", by Lowe, Kajjo, and Tejel (the three examples you cited in this thread)?
Second, if you disagree with me saying all scholars, then which scholars in the last 5-10 years do not call the areas around Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira "Syrian Kurdistan", "Western Kurdistan", or "Rojava"? Levivich harass/hound 19:40, 18 December 2020 (UTC)
Here is a scholarly book that uses: "Qamishli in Syria" The Religion of the Peacock Angel: The Yezidis and Their Spirit World by Garnik S. Asatrian and Victoria Arakelova published by Routledge. "Surviving the War in Syria" by Justin Schon, Cambridge University Press says: "Kurds never expressed any interest in controlling Syria. Instead, they stayed within Kurdish-inhabited areas in the north and northeast" p 53 [6]."Out of Nowhere: The Kurds of Syria in Peace and War" by Michael Gunter says "remains one of the three distinct and separate Kurdish areas in Syria, while Kobani (Ain alArab) in the north central area of Syria and Hasaka (Hesice) or Jazira.." I don't have access to the page so there is more info I cant see.[7] Gunter also uses "Syrian Kurdistan" in the book. If you look at the lead Pardise Chronicle suggested above, a more accurate and neutral lead would say something like "Kurdish-inhabited area in northern Syria.....sometimes called Syrian Kurdistan or Western Kurdistan" presenting it as an alternative name used by some people and not an official name for an area in Syria. --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 08:28, 19 December 2020 (UTC)
OK yes those are examples of scholarship. But... The Religion of the Peacock Angel: The Yezidis and Their Spirit World is a book about Yezidis, not Kurds, and though there is some dispute on the issue, this book is one that treats Yezidis as a separate ethnoreligious group from Kurds. It's scholarship about Yezidis; not a good source for an article about Kurds.
Surviving the War in Syria — OK, that's scholarship about Syria that doesn't refer to the Kurdish-inhabited areas in northern Syria as "Syrian Kurdistan". It also doesn't mention "Kurdistan" at all, except in reference to the names of parties. (The book has the word "Kurdistan" in it only twice, on p. 48 and p. 54, apparently.) I admit that really surprises me: someone is writing a book in 2020 about the civil war in Syria and doesn't even mention the idea of "Kurdistan". Why? Well, it's a book about civil war refugees, more than about the war itself. It's written by a post-doc research associate (not a professor), which is splitting hairs a bit. The most telling thing for me was that the author of the book never went to Syria. He only interviewed Syrian refugees in Turkey, Jordan, Kenya, and the US. So a book about the Syrian civil war where the author never went to Syria... hmm. It was good enough for Taylor & Francis to publish. OK, that's one recent scholarly work that doesn't use the term Syrian Kurdistan. (BTW, despite that this book uses as a source Gunter 2014 and other works on the source table.)
Gunter 2014, yeah, in that quote he talks about Kurdish areas in Syria, but Gunter uses "Syrian Kurdistan" regularly. In fact, Gunter 2014 is the book that says "Among pan-Kurdish nationalists, Syrian Kurdistan is often referred to as Western Kurdistan or Rojava (the direction of the setting sun)", which is explicitly saying "Western Kurdistan" and "Rojava" are the pan-Kurdish nationalist terms for Syrian Kurdistan; i.e., he's distinguishing between nationalist names (Western Kurdistan and Rojava), and a non-nationalist (i.e. neutral) name (Syrian Kurdistan). Gunter supports "Syrian Kurdistan is a Kurdish-inhabited area in northern Syria...".
I really don't see how "Syrian Kurdistan is a Kurdish-inhabited area in northern Syria ..." in any way is saying or implying it's an official name.
We aren't going to call this article "Kurdish-inhabited area in northern Syria". That
The only names for the Kurdish-inhabited areas in northern Syria are:
  1. Syrian Kurdistan
  2. Western or West Kurdistan
  3. Rojava Kurdistane ("Kurdistan where the sun sets" = Western Kurdistan)
  4. AANES (which used to be the Kurdish-inhabited area in northern Syria, but has since expanded to include other areas)
There are no other names that anybody uses to describe this area, are there? "Kurdish-inhabited area in northern Syria" is not a realistic option for the title of this article, because it fails WP:AT on multiple levels (concision, preciseness). An WP:RM to move to "Kurdish-inhabited area in northern Syria" has no chance IMO.
Of the list above, AANES is a poor choice because it includes areas beyond Afrin/Kobani/northern Jazira. It includes areas that are not Kurdish-inhabited areas in northern Syria. Western Kurdistan and Rojava are, per sources, the pan-Kurdish nationalist terms for the Kurdish-inhabited areas in northern Syria. That leaves "Syrian Kurdistan" as the most neutral, concise, precise, and common name for the Kurdish-inhabited areas in northern Syria, among the names we have to choose from.
Thus, if the article is entitled "Syrian Kurdistan", which I don't think is in dispute (haven't seen an RM yet?), then the lead sentence must (per WP:LEAD) begin with "Syrian Kurdistan is..." and be followed by a definition for the term.
Writing "Syrian Kurdistan is a name for a Kurdish-inhabited area in northern Syria" is the same exact thing as "Syrian Kurdistan is a Kurdish-inhabited area in northern Syria...". "The name for" is totally unnecessary. Omitting it doesn't imply "Syrian Kurdistan" is an official name.
We can't write "Syrian Kurdistan is an unofficial name for..." because it implies that there is an official name for this place (which there isn't).
The two words "Syrian Kurdistan" refer to the Kurdish-inhabited area in northern Syria. Nobody in the entire world has ever (AFAIK) used those words to refer to anything else other than the Kurdish-inhabited area in northern Syria. In my mind, the alternative to "Syrian Kurdistan is a Kurdish-inhabited area in northern Syria" is "Syrian Kurdistan is a Syrian-inhabited area in west Kurdistan". Obviously the latter is not supported by the scholarly sources; but the former is.
I think the weight of the scholarship rather clearly supports the "Levivich/Attar proposal". In addition to Schon, I'm aware of three books about Syrian Kurds that don't call it "Syrian Kurdistan": Kaya 2020, Allsop & van Wilgenberg 2019, and Abboud 2015; all three refer to the area as Rojava or Western Kurdistan. Schon is the first I've seen that uses none of those three terms.
So TLDR, "Syrian Kurdistan" is, of the available names, the most neutral, and the most widely-used by scholars (even if it's not 100%, it's the most common term). "Syrian Kurdistan is a Kurdish-inhabited area in northern Syria..." is well supported by all the sources that use "Syrian Kurdistan", and I don't think it implies that it's the "official" name. Levivich harass/hound 18:58, 19 December 2020 (UTC)
The Religion of the Peacock Angel: The Yezidis and Their Spirit World is written by Garnik S. Asatrian who studies and teaches Kurdish culture at Yerevan State University. If you look at his Wikipedia article its clear he is an expert on Kurds. What is clear from the sources I brought is that several names are used for the area and that "Syrian Kurdistan" is a name used by some kurds and some authors. But other reliable sources do not use this name. "Syrian Kurdistan" is not an official or historical name for the area. The lead of the article should therefore reflect this reality and not present "Syrian Kurdistan" as an undisputed official name for an area in Syria. The current lead: "Syrian Kurdistan or Western Kurdistan (Kurdish: Rojavayê Kurdistanê‎), often shortened to Rojava, is regarded by some Kurds[1][2][3] and some regional experts as the part of Kurdistan in Syria." is reflecting the situation in an accurate and neutral way without taking sides. --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 10:04, 20 December 2020 (UTC)
Supreme Deliciousness, I'd like to have editors productively arguing from a variety of points of view at this talk page, as I think it's healthy. But honestly the arguments I'm seeing are all just POV-pushing. If you want to stay here and continue to argue, you are going to need to take a big step into listening to reliable scholarly sources and representing them not as you wish they were but as they are. We need diverse points of view, but not POV-pushers. Do you think you can make that step? —valereee (talk) 18:17, 18 December 2020 (UTC)
Valereee See my comment above: [8] that small text I didn't ad didn't dispute anything I have said, it actually even supported what I said, I want this article to show all views and all sides.--Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 19:02, 18 December 2020 (UTC)
Supreme Deliciousness, you have plenty of experience here in Wikipedia. I'm sure you understand the concept of due weight? The editors here will need to balance showing all views and all sides with that concept. Speaking generally, not trying to address this article, the simple fact there is a dispute does not mean anything about how or even whether that dispute needs to be presented. That means that depending on consensus, the first sentence or first paragraph or lead or even article may not include a particular dispute; I'm not saying it won't in this case, just that the simple fact there is a dispute about a subject has to be balanced with the amount of weight that dispute should receive in an article. —valereee (talk) 22:29, 18 December 2020 (UTC)
Neither enclave nor ethnic enclave would be correct. What would Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira link to? fiveby(zero) 16:18, 17 December 2020 (UTC)
What do you mean it would not be correct? What sources say it's not correct to call those enclaves? Levivich harass/hound 16:26, 17 December 2020 (UTC)
What sources say it's not correct to call those enclaves? is not really the way to decide on wording. An enclave, as you can see by the article mostly implies some formal territory. This leads to confusion with Rojava and when areas were more enclaves in this sense. Ethnically or culturally part of Kurdistan would not be an enclave, it's contiguous with the rest. fiveby(zero) 17:10, 17 December 2020 (UTC)
Looking at the sources is exactly how we decide on the wording. I'm pretty sure that each and every single source I've posted uses the word "enclave" to describe "Syrian Kurdistan", specifically the three enclaves in/around Afrin, Kobani and Jazira. Do you have any sources that use some other word, or that say the word "enclave" is not correct? It doesn't matter what the word implies; if the sources use it, we use it, implications and all. Levivich harass/hound 17:24, 17 December 2020 (UTC)
WP:ONUS. WP:LEDE. The current summary in the article is the part of Kurdistan in Syria and i feel that is a better summary than emphasizing enclaves. For the first time in the history of contemporary Syria, the protest movement had touched all of the Kurdish territories, thus reinforcing the symbolic unity of the Syrian Kurdish arena - “Syrian Kurdistan.” (Tejel 2009, p. 108) Above you emphasized reading sources in context and not cherry-picking. fiveby(zero) 18:27, 17 December 2020 (UTC)
Let me ask you this: Does Tejel use the word "enclaves" or not? Levivich harass/hound 18:53, 17 December 2020 (UTC)
He does on that very same page of course. "northern Syrian Kurdish enclaves". How in the hell is it disruptive to try and avoid confusion with this, or this for example? fiveby(zero) 19:16, 17 December 2020 (UTC)
Slate?? It's disruptive to bring Slate into this conversation. WTF? Academic sources. Get "on the level" here. What we're doing here is summarizing academic sources.
Also WTF, the book you're quoting from uses "enclaves" so it is disruptive to claim that this book supports not using enclaves, when that word is all over that book (and all over the other books too).
For everyone else, just one example, here is the same book fiveby was quoting from, page 8: The Kurdish populations placed under French Mandate occupy three narrow zones, isolated from one another, all along the Turkish fronteir: Jazira, Jarablus, and Kurd Dagh. These three Kurdish enclaves constitute the natural extension of Kurdish territory into Turkey and Iraq. (bold added). So to hell with the Tejel argument! :-) Levivich harass/hound 19:25, 17 December 2020 (UTC)
Slate, as an example of recent usage of enclave in an sense meaning Kurdish controlled territory is not disruptive. fiveby(zero) 19:44, 17 December 2020 (UTC)
Fiveby, I'm afraid it really is, in an article that has plenty of scholarly sources to use. We don't use the media in such a case, a policy that has been explained. —valereee (talk) 19:49, 17 December 2020 (UTC)
Fiveby, Levivich is correct. If reliable sources, in this case modern scholars, use a term, that's the term Wikipedia uses. I've explained this policy multiple times here. Refusing to understand this policy or accept it is disruptive. If you are not familiar with our policies, you should not be editing at this talk or the talk of any other contentious article. —valereee (talk) 17:44, 17 December 2020 (UTC)
WP:ONUS. WP:LEDE. I understand WP policy very well, and that using administrative tools and threats to shut down discussion or exclude editors you don't like is also against policy. fiveby(zero) 18:27, 17 December 2020 (UTC)
Fiveby, I am not trying to shut down discussion, I am trying to moderate it by preventing disruptive behavior at an article talk that has a history of being extremely contentious and plagued by disruptive behavior to the point other editors don't want to come in and help. I'm going to ignore the personal attack. —valereee (talk) 18:38, 17 December 2020 (UTC)
To PC's OP: I agree with this lead as an improvement over the current lead. Yes, I think it could be improved further, but really the best improvement would be expanding it from one paragraph to a full four-paragraph lead. So as far as the first paragraph goes, this is good with me for now, and maybe it's better to talk about the other lead paragraphs and then later re-visit the first paragraph? Levivich harass/hound 22:07, 17 December 2020 (UTC)
Levivich, I see and understand your reasoning, to achieve a four paragraphs would be a huge accomplishment. But viewing the amount of edits and time we spend on finding a consensus, I would support the inclusion of the first paragraph to begin with, and add the other paragraphs after the following discussion on them.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 21:46, 18 December 2020 (UTC)

Arbitrary break

So there have been a lot of words expended on this version of the lead, but as I see it, no substantive suggestions for improvement. Might I suggest that the involved parties either proclaim their support, or provide their own version of a first lead paragraph (keep your comments short and snappy please)? Some consensus must be found here. I think this version could be workshopped a bit more, but a formal RfC on whether to keep the current version or replace it with this workshopped one seems the next step that should happen soon. CaptainEek Edits Ho Cap'n! 05:30, 21 December 2020 (UTC)

Support the proposed version — Levivich harass/hound 06:32, 21 December 2020 (UTC)
Support current version as being the most neutral and accurate. And that's all I have to say. I'm not going to engage in any edit war over the article.--Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 06:40, 21 December 2020 (UTC)
Support the proposed version which is a co-production by Levivich and Attar Aram syria.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 06:54, 21 December 2020 (UTC)

Related RMs

FYI: Talk:Rojava conflict#Requested move 10 December 2020, Talk:Kobanî#Requested move 16 December 2020, and Talk:Kurdish separatism in Iran#Requested move 10 December 2020 Levivich harass/hound 00:44, 20 December 2020 (UTC)

Levivich, ugh. We really are going to need an arb case. Ivanvector, Guerillero. What should we do? I have no experience with this, but I'm willing to offer time. —valereee (talk) 04:48, 21 December 2020 (UTC)
Valereee No, there is no need for an arb case. The article and talkpage are calm and everyone is discussing in a normal manner at the talkpage. I will not participate in any edit war. --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 06:35, 21 December 2020 (UTC)
It's not for this case, SD. It's for the entire topic. Correcting ping to El C, as the forwarding fooled me when I previewed lol... —valereee (talk) 12:13, 21 December 2020 (UTC)
Hello, avalanche! Absolutely, topic area is long overdue for a mechanism that provides enhanced scrutiny and censure, be it in the form of a GS or DS (with the latter preferred). BTW, Val, my understanding is that you need a new sig+timestamp to re-ping (i.e. I did not receive a ping here and only noticed the attempt in passing). El_C 18:38, 21 December 2020 (UTC)
El C, dammit, you didn't even receive the second ping that I did to correct the screwed-up first one? I thought I opened a new edit, pinged, signed... Hm. I have zero excuses. —valereee (talk) 18:44, 21 December 2020 (UTC)
It is accepted that WP:GS/SCW exist. I suppose the next question is whether anyone needs to be placed under restrictions. The partial blocks only apply to specific talk pages. A WP:TBAN would be wider. At present we do appear to have 'teams', where there are sets of people who show up to discussions with closely aligned views. If people have shown they can participate in RfCs in good faith that might weaken the case for restrictions. Though it does require some patience to set up RfCs. EdJohnston (talk) 18:58, 21 December 2020 (UTC)
No excuses, Valcompetence is required. I hope you're open to recall!  Anyway, Ed, even though the first two articles (RMs) fall under the SCW GS, while the third one falls under the post-1978 IRANPOL one, there are nonetheless many pages which would fall through the cracks, even though they suffer from the same ethno-national tension. I'm sure Semsûrî could cite many of these instances (especially in the realm of linguistics). In any case, a more Kurdish-focused sanctions regime would probably amount to a path of least resistance, as far as both reporting and enforcement are concerned. El_C 19:06, 21 December 2020 (UTC)
I also support an Arb Com case, I have opened a [discussion] on it at the Levivich talk page. I'm fine with discussing there, but maybe there is a better place for a preparatory discussion for the case where the discussion finds more attention by other editors? I agree on, that a Kurdish-related Arb Com case could solve several issues, but I guess a preparatory discussion on what issues the ArbCom case should/could address, would be helpful.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 19:59, 21 December 2020 (UTC)

GS action on tag bombing

I have edited the protected page (though now I see the protection expires in a few hours anyway) to remove all of the tags save the {{npov}} one. It's not just that the links to sections in this talk page provided within these tags no longer work, but even if they did, it would probably fragment the discussion unnecessarily. Also, it isn't really appropriate to tag bomb as a means to emphasize that the page is super-disputed or whatever. The sensory overload is too much, in any case. Please note that this is an administrative action which invokes the mandate provided by the SCW GS. El_C 18:28, 21 December 2020 (UTC)