Talk:Soviet–Afghan War/Archive 5

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Drafting. US role cont. =

(I have taken the liberty of moving this to a separate section) Guccisamsclub (talk) 15:42, 10 October 2016 (UTC)

I have done a new revision of my edit:

In the mid-1970s, Pakistani intelligence officials began privately lobbying the US and its allies to send material assistance to the Islamist insurgents. Shortly after the Herat uprising, United States National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski pushed a decision through the National Security Council (NSC) to provide non-lethal assistance to the guerrillas. During the meeting, the NSC contemplated "sucking the Soviets into a Vietnamese quagmire" The US government was eager to step up involvement in South Asia not only because of Soviet policy, but because they had recently lost Iran as a key ally the region. Numerous scholars also view the action as following from Brzezinski’s aspiration of using Islamic fundamentalism to counter the global leftand destabilize the Soviet Union. Brzezinski later claimed that, “We didn’t push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.”

In May 1979, US officials secretly began meeting with rebel leaders through Pakistani government contacts. A former Pakistani military official claimed that he personally introduced a CIA official to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar that month (Freedom of Information Act requests for records describing these meetings have been denied). Direct US aid began modestly with $500,000 worth of non-lethal assistance in July 1979. Robert Gates wrote that this aid, in conjunction with the Saudi and Pakistani contributions, meant “the stage was set for the vast future expansion of outside help, all run by CIA.”

...And you're STILL carelessly misusing primary source quotes from Gates and Brzezinski—while ignoring the actual context in which those statements were made, the declassified record, and the only scholars that have personally interviewed them (Riedel and White). As mentioned above, a neutral version would look something like this. However, given that (in the words of Lawrence Freedman) "In 1979, the United States was at most a bit player in a local drama with its script written elsewhere," it's highly doubtful that this topic deserves such extensive coverage here.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 23:54, 9 October 2016 (UTC)

The part about "destabilizing the Soviet Union" needs to be deleted from the sentence starting with "Numerous scholars." Since the abstract desire to "destabilize" the USSR is axiomatic and not worth mentioning, this language can only imply that the goal of this operation was to use Afghanistan to somehow destabilize the USSR: either by laying the "bear trap" or by bringing Islamism closer to the Soviet border, with the expectation that it would catch on with the Muslim-majority republics. The first theory is highly contentious for reasons already described, while the second theory is out on a limb: even Zbig did not have the gall to pretend that he saw the breakup of the USSR coming (nobody back then did, at least no one who mattered ). When the breakup came, it had virtually nothing to do with Islamism (which barely existed), much less an Islamism that was encouraged by US policy. For example, Fred Halliday the foremost expert on the Middle East,noted that when in the late 1980's riots broke out in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the CIA had no intelligence other than photographs. So if we mention either of those theories, they should not stand unchallenged, or be presented as the opinion of "of numerous scholars". Other than that, I'm fine with your edit. Guccisamsclub (talk) 15:32, 10 October 2016 (UTC)

Regarding Islamism through Soviet borders, there isn't a consensus among scholars one way or the other. For instance an essay by AH Sinno, in a book edited by Ali Riaz, says:

As resistance commanders in the north of Afghanistan gained confidence, assistance from Pakistan's ISI, and military expertise, they…performed incursions into Soviet Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, such as the March 1987 bombing of the Soviet Tajik town of Pyandzh. Armed with weapons and Korans, the Afghans had substantial influence over their co-religionists across the border, as demonstrated by the immediate spread of Islamist activities after the Soviet collapse, particularly in Tajikistan…

The book quotes an ISI commander referring to "scores of attacks" and "Sometimes Soviet citizens joined in these operations." The intention of the wars planners are even more relevant. Zia ul-Haq is quoted on his intentions:

“[Pakistan] took risks as a frontline state, and we won’t permit [Afghanistan] to be like it was before, with Indian and Soviet influence there and claims on our territory. It will be a real Islamic state, part of a pan-Islamic revival that will one day win over the Muslims in the Soviet Union, you will see.”

And ZB has said that "as early as 1978, President Carter approved proposals prepared by my staff to undertake, for example, a comprehensive, covert action program designed to help the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union pursue more actively their desire for independence - a program in effect to destabilize the Soviet Union. We called it, more delicately, a program for the 'delegitimization of the Soviet Union.'" So this cannot easily be dismissed.

With that said, I would be alright with changing it from "numerous scholars" to "some scholars." GPRamirez5 (talk) 02:13, 11 October 2016 (UTC)

The Zbig quote is a primary source and the conclusion you draw from it is original research (in current form at least). It's a worthwhile source to bring up for discussion on the talk page, but ultimately it does not overrule someone like Fred Halliday stating that this plan to "help the non-Russian nations" (Muslim-majority ones??) was a bunch of baloney. Zbig does talk about this "plan" in the same interview in which he discusses Afghanistan, but it is not clear from his remarks that this has much to do with the covert aid. If you look at the broader picture in terms of WP:TRUTH, it's hard to argue that Halliday is wrong and that Zbig is engaging in anything more than self-aggrandizement (maybe Kissinger's style rubbed off on him). So I think a cleaner solution would be to delete it from the sentence. We could add a sentence summarizing the sources for and against the "bear trap theory." (I think it's mostly against) Note that we are talking about the planning in 1979, not the planning after the Soviets went all in. By the mid-80's the "bear trap" was basically Afghanistan 101 for US policy-makers. Guccisamsclub (talk) 02:38, 11 October 2016 (UTC)

Guccisamsclub, I can't access the Halliday essay. Can you post a relevant excerpt here? GPRamirez5 (talk) 03:09, 11 October 2016 (UTC)

Here's the link http://mil.sagepub.com/content/26/2/529.extract (it's just a book review, not terribly important—if you dont have library access you's have to use something like sci(dash)hub(dot)cc). Anyway: As far as aid to anti-communist forces is concerned, the US role varied. It provided substantial aid in the Third World ‘Reagan Doctrine’ case, to limited financial and political assistance in the case of some Eastern European states, most notably Poland, and virtually nothing as far as nationalist groups inside the Soviet Union itself was concerned. When nationalist rioting broke out in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan in the late 1980s, the CIA had excellent photographs of the demonstrations, but no political intelligence on what the demonstrators were saying. Gates ascribes a significant role to the cultural, economic, and diplomatic offensive waged by both the Carter and Reagan administrations. Still, something like this easily undermines the Zbig quote you just gave, though it may not undermine more serious sources (not that I know of any on the issue of Zbig and Soviet southern republics). You have to consider that politicians are not always telling it like it is. Guccisamsclub (talk) 03:38, 11 October 2016 (UTC)

Although I don't want to be too dismissive of this narrative. The fact that Pakistan doing this stuff seems indisputable, according to the sources you gave. Guccisamsclub (talk) 03:58, 11 October 2016 (UTC)

I'm also not impressed by GPRamirez5's OR regarding "non-Russian nations" (in the same interview, Brzeinski also notes "that was a rather unusual decision") and his conflation of Pakistani activities in 1987 with American decision-making in 1979. That said, if GPRamirez5 were to incorporate his revised text—minus the objectionable bit singled out by Gucci—into "Foreign involvement and aid to the mujahideen" (anything more than a sentence earlier in the article would only serve to derail the broad historical overview), I would not revert him. After all, with MVBW no longer participating and my own patience wearing thin, there would be little basis to purge his edit outright; the blatant misrepresentations he attempted to introduce earlier have been removed. However, in that case, I will have no choice but to respond by adding an equally large amount of material refuting his claims.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 04:11, 11 October 2016 (UTC)

Which ones? There is nothing to "refute" aside from the "destabilize the USSR" bit. And even that could be play both ways, thus turning into a whole debate-paragraph. At most you could add two neutrally worded sentences saying that while some believe Zbig was laying the bear trap based on (...), others believe he wasn't based on (...). Anything else is POV-pushing. Guccisamsclub (talk) 04:24, 11 October 2016 (UTC)

Well, I certainly can't let the Slocombe quote stand without mentioning Slocombe's later comments clarifying the discussion.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 04:43, 11 October 2016 (UTC)

Oh yeah I missed that. I can be part of the summary of the bear trap theory. The way it's presented in the lede of the paragraph is not quite appropriate. Guccisamsclub (talk) 05:10, 11 October 2016 (UTC)

• This is pushing fringe view that the war started because of the CIA, not because of the Soviet aggression. Responding by adding more refuting materials is not the way. This should not be included at the first place. My very best wishes (talk) 04:45, 11 October 2016 (UTC)

This is not pushing any view other than the fact that US involvement in Afghanistan began before the Soviet invasion. Close US ally Pakistan was involved 100% well before that. Together with Pakistan's involvement and the promise of much more to follow, this was not a minor factor.Guccisamsclub (talk) 05:10, 11 October 2016 (UTC)

"Well, I certainly can't let the Slocombe quote stand without mentioning Slocombe's later comments clarifying the discussion."

Most scholars I've seen employ the Slocombe quote without citing his later remarks. Let's be careful that we are not employing primary sources for a disproportionately conservative emphasis. Also, note that I've found another mainstream historian, Andrew Bacevich, who also thinks it was a clear case of provocation. GPRamirez5 (talk) 04:40, 13 October 2016 (UTC)

I can appreciate your frustration that it is more difficult for tenured radicals to rewrite history in real time when the primary sources are still alive and people have access to the Internet, but your use of Gates's memoir constitutes WP:OR and WP:SYNTH; moreover, any and all secondary sources that support your interpretation of the Slocombe quote recounted by Gates are by definition perpetuating citogenesis, which Wikipedia would be wise to avoid. To keep your heavily misleading edit intact—but merely add Gates's and Slocombe's actual stated position, since we're citing them already—is a compromise more generous than your fringe theory truly deserves.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 05:02, 13 October 2016 (UTC)

"Tenured radicals" like Bacevich, who's an army colonel--careful TTAC, this is how Joe McCarthy got into trouble. GPRamirez5 (talk) 06:52, 13 October 2016 (UTC)

Alright, here is revision which removes the destabilization theory, and adds a concise paragraph on the scholarly debate:

In the mid-1970s, Pakistani intelligence officials began privately lobbying the US and its allies to send material assistance to the Islamist insurgents. Shortly after the Herat uprising, United States National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski pushed a decision through the National Security Council (NSC) to provide non-lethal assistance to the guerrillas. During the meeting, the NSC contemplated "sucking the Soviets into a Vietnamese quagmire" The US government was eager to step up involvement in South Asia not only because of Soviet policy, but because they had recently lost Iran as a key ally the region.Brzezinski later claimed that, “We didn’t push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.”

In May 1979, US officials secretly began meeting with rebel leaders through Pakistani government contacts. A former Pakistani military official claimed that he personally introduced a CIA official to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar that month (Freedom of Information Act requests for records describing these meetings have been denied). Direct US aid began modestly with $500,000 worth of non-lethal assistance in July 1979. Robert Gates wrote that this aid, in conjunction with the Saudi and Pakistani contributions, meant “the stage was set for the vast future expansion of outside help, all run by CIA.”

The full significance of the US sending aid to the mujahideen prior to the invasion is debated among scholars. Some assert that it directly, and even deliberately, provoked the Soviets to send in troops. Others are skeptical of this view.

GPRamirez5 (talk) 07:03, 13 October 2016 (UTC)

Honestly, your edit is mostly fine, but the sentence on the bear trap theory is worse than nothing. While many sources claim Carter's decision in 1979 provoked the Soviets, even intentionally, to send troops, we need to avoid the implication that they would not have do so otherwise. Most of the sources you cite would probably not make that claim and would probably say that that was one of the things that prompted the Soviet action. So the language you inserted can (and is IMO) be misleading, while at the same time being narrowly accurate. By the same token we need to avoid Times' implication that American policy had absolutely nothing to do with the Soviet decision. The latter is even worse, since it's largely unsourced. Furthermore, those citations are too many—not all of them provide evidence to back their claim in equal measure. Not all of them are of equal quality. So it's citekill. Much better to just summarize the main facts, instead of stringing on citations. I'll rewrite your section today or tomorrow and submit it here for review. Guccisamsclub (talk) 11:42, 13 October 2016 (UTC)

That cite kill (all citogenesis of a single fake quote), with one source for the opposing view, is hilarious! It also completely misrepresents the nature of the evidence, since all declassified documents and all former U.S. officials support the latter claim, and the only evidence for the former is a single fake quote. I'll never give that sentence my approval.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 13:01, 13 October 2016 (UTC)

Well again, citation overkill is not a proper guideline. "Citekill" becomes necessary in the face of editorial aggression. Here we have a situation where the provocative nature of US aid to the guerrillas was classified as a "hoax", or at least of being marginal. I have demonstrated that this interpretation is a respectable share of the mainstream thinking, and may be the majority interpretation.

Guccisamsclub you're telling me the citations are problematic because "not all of them provide 'evidence' to back their claim in equal measure. Not all of them are of equal quality." Yet even according to the essay, not all the citations are supposed to be of identical quality, it is preferable that they are "a good mix of types of sources."

Will holding that sentence down to six citations, as the essay urges, still protect it? Frankly, I have doubts. I suspect there are many more people out there who are sadly deluded, or consciously spinning, on this issue, from conservatives who don't believe there's such a thing as US imperialism to liberals who want to think Jimmy Carter was a saint. The best suggestion in the essay was to bundle the citations in single footnote.GPRamirez5 (talk) 05:12, 14 October 2016 (UTC)

I can tell you from personal experience working on Featured and Good Articles such as Sega Saturn and Dreamcast that it is always frowned upon to cite more than three sources for the same sentence.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 05:22, 14 October 2016 (UTC)

GPRamirez5: Thanks for the revision. The combined footnote is not a bad idea. But the sentence itself can be made more informative. The Slocombe quote should probably be augmented. Give me til tomorrow to make some revisions. TheTimesAreAChanging, can you summarize in 3-4 sentences, your version of the "opposing" view. (warning: I'll condense it to 1-2 sentences, I just need some elbow room. ). Guccisamsclub (talk) 16:24, 14 October 2016 (UTC)

• Once again, this all is only remotely relevant to the subject of this page (as already stated above). I do not think anyone should make revisions of something that should not at all be included. My very best wishes (talk) 16:37, 14 October 2016 (UTC)

We heard your opinion the first time. Guccisamsclub (talk) 16:44, 14 October 2016 (UTC)

Despite agreeing with MVBW, in the interest of compromise I was prepared to accept something like GPRamirez5's edit, plus the following additions (in italics):

• In the mid-1970s, Pakistani intelligence officials began privately lobbying the US and its allies to send material assistance to the Islamist insurgents. Pakistani President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's ties with the U.S. had been strained during Carter's presidency due to Pakistan's nuclear program and the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in April 1979, but Carter told National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as early as January 1979 that it was vital to "repair our relationships with Pakistan" in light of the unrest in Iran. Shortly after the Herat uprising, Brzezinski pushed a decision through the National Security Council (NSC) to provide non-lethal assistance to the guerrillas through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence.[1] During the meeting, according to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official Robert Gates, U.S. Department of Defense representative Walter B. Slocombe "asked if there was value in keeping the Afghan insurgency going, 'sucking the Soviets into a Vietnamese quagmire?'" When asked to clarify this remark, Slocombe explained: "Well, the whole idea was that if the Soviets decided to strike at this tar baby [Afghanistan] we had every interest in making sure that they got stuck." Brzezinski later claimed: "We didn't push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would."[12][13] According to Brzezinski, he became convinced by mid-1979 that the Soviets were going to invade Afghanistan regardless of U.S. policy due to the Carter administration's failure to respond aggressively to Soviet activity in Africa, but—despite the risk of unintended consequences—support for the mujahideen could be an effective way to prevent Soviet aggression beyond Afghanistan (particularly in Brzezinski's native Poland). In May 1979, US officials secretly began meeting with rebel leaders through Pakistani government contacts. A former Pakistani military official claimed that he personally introduced a CIA official to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar that month (Freedom of Information Act requests for records describing these meetings have been denied).[1] Direct U.S. aid began modestly with $500,000 worth of non-lethal assistance in July 1979. Gates wrote that this aid, in conjunction with Saudi and Pakistani contributions, meant "the stage was set for the vast future expansion of outside help, all run by CIA."[14][15] Some scholars assert that U.S. policy directly, and even deliberately, provoked the Soviets to send in troops. [It might be nice to quote a couple of the "scholars" here instead of the cite kill, although I realize they are all hacks lacking anything original to say.] Bruce Riedel, however, believes that the U.S. aid was intended primarily to improve U.S. relations with Pakistan, while Steve Coll asserts: "Contemporary memos—particularly those written in the first days after the Soviet invasion—make clear that while Brzezinski was determined to confront the Soviets in Afghanistan through covert action, he was also very worried the Soviets would prevail. ... Given this evidence and the enormous political and security costs that the invasion imposed on the Carter administration, any claim that Brzezinski lured the Soviets into Afghanistan warrants deep skepticism." Carter himself has stated that encouraging a Soviet invasion was "not my intention." Gates recounted: "No one in the Carter Administration wanted the Soviets to invade Afghanistan and no one, as I can recall at least, ever advocated attempting to induce them to invade ... Only after the Soviet invasion did some advocate making the Soviets 'bleed' in their own Vietnam."TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 02:41, 15 October 2016 (UTC)

• Lotta text, but gonna try to rework it soon. stay tuned. Guccisamsclub (talk) 07:15, 16 October 2016 (UTC)

You'll want to be careful, a factual error has been carried over from a previous version: According to Gates, Slocombe's "Vietnamese quagmire" quote was not made at an NSC meeting, but at a Special Coordinating Comittee(SCC) meeting on March 30, 1979. The first aid package to the rebels was granted by Carter only after a further SCC meeting on July 3. Regardless, I don't really see the significance of this quote, as it was just a suggestion being thrown in for consideration, and not a statement of policy... --Raoulduke47 (talk) 22:23, 16 October 2016 (UTC)

No factual error. The SCC was a subsidiary component of the NSC established by President Carter. It's already mentioned under the history of the US NSC article (which we can link to), so I don't see any need to mention it here and muddy the waters further. And as I've documented repeatedly, numerous scholars have quoted it and believe that it was a statement of policy.GPRamirez5 (talk) 18:49, 18 October 2016 (UTC)

Just fyi, I haven't forgotten about reworking the text—will do so. Guccisamsclub (talk) 19:01, 18 October 2016 (UTC)

The factual error is GPRamirez5's implication that the Slocombe quote is from the same meeting at which Brzezinski got the aid approved. In fact, the Slocombe quote is from March 30, 1979; the aid was not approved until after two additional SCC meetings on April 6 and July 3.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 21:01, 18 October 2016 (UTC)

I don't think I ever said otherwise. In any case, the early date only further demonstrates the amount of premeditation there was of beginning the quagmire, so thanks for the clarification.GPRamirez5 (talk) 21:29, 18 October 2016 (UTC)

You did say otherwise: "United States National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski pushed a decision through the National Security Council (NSC) to provide non-lethal assistance to the guerrillas.[1] During the meeting, the NSC contemplated 'sucking the Soviets into a Vietnamese quagmire.'" Moreover, your latest response only compounds this misrepresentation. According to Gates, what was discussed on April 6 was "the risk ... that a substantial U.S. covert aid program could raise the stakes and induce the Soviets to intervene more directly and vigorously than otherwise intended" (p. 145)—hence why the aid approved on July 3 was so minuscule. (Why would Gates write that if the goal was a massive Soviet invasion all along?) As with your earlier conflation of Amin's nonexistent CIA ties with the aid to the mujahideen, you are either being dishonest or careless—and, if merely careless, it is noteworthy that all of your "mistakes" advance the same POV.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 21:40, 18 October 2016 (UTC)

What you lack as a historian, TTAa-C, you almost make up for as a copyeditor. Bravo! But the chronology here comes from the secondary source of Galster at the National Security Archive, who considers a Brzezinski NSC/SCC meeting "weeks after the Herat Uprising" of early March to be the beginning of covert action, not the July Carter memo:

...CIA and State Department documents seized by Iranian students during the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November 1979, reveal that, starting in April 1979, eight months before the Soviet intervention and immediately following Brzezinski’s SCC decision, the United States had, in fact, begun quietly meeting rebel representatives. Although most of the cables and memoranda released to date show that U.S. officials politely turned down rebel requests for U.S. assistance, others reveal CIA support for anti-DRA demonstrations and close monitoring of Pakistani military aid for rebel parties based in Pakistan’s NWFP.

It pays to look at independent sources, rather than just CIA officials who worked for ZB like Riedel. GPRamirez5 (talk) 03:03, 20 October 2016 (UTC)

Your edit ("Shortly after the [March 1979] Herat uprising, United States National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski pushed a decision through the National Security Council (NSC) to provide non-lethal assistance to the guerrillas. ... Direct US aid began modestly with $500,000 worth of non-lethal assistance in July 1979.") confuses the March SCC decision to be "more sympathetic to those Afghans who were determined to preserve their country's independence," whatever that means, with the $500,000 aid program approved on July 3. "Quietly meeting rebel representatives" and "monitoring ... Pakistani military aid for rebel parties" while "politely turn[ing] down rebel requests for U.S. assistance" is not the same as the $500,000 aid program approved on July 3. Here is a partial list demonstrating that virtually all reliable sources emphasize the $500,000 aid program approved on July 3:

• "The meeting was finally held on July 3, 1979, and ... Jimmy Carter signed the first finding to help the mujahiden covertly."—Gates, p. 146
• "After consultations with his national security team on July 3, 1979, Carter authorized a limited CIA covert action to start providing non-lethal assistance to the Afghan mujahideen."—Riedel, p. 99
• "On July 3, 1979, Carter scrawled his name on a Presidential 'finding' ... (that) authorized the CIA to spend just over $500,000 on propaganda and psychological operations, as well as to provide radio equipment, medical supplies, and cash to the Afghan rebels."—Coll, p. 46
• "In July 1979, Carter, advised by Brzezinski, began secret aid to the anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the mujahideen."—Kearns, cited by GPRamirez5, p. 226 (not that I would call this a particularly good source)
• "In the summer Carter authorized the CIA to spend $500,000 helping the Afghan rebels."—Braithwaite, cited by GPRamirez, p. 114
• "In a secret finding in July 1979, President Carter authorized the CIA to fund the resistance to the Afghan government."—The Real News, "The Afghan war and the 'Grand Chessboard' Pt2"
• "President Carter had already signed a secret 'finding' in July 1979 authorizing covert aid to the Afghani opponents of the Taraki-Amin regime."—National Security Archive's Svetlana Savranskaya, "The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Russian Documents and Memoirs"

If you read Galster more carefully, you would have found additional evidence refuting the absurd lie that U.S. officials sought to "induce" an invasion: "U.S. observers argued that the global balance of power, particularly the geostrategic balance in South Asia, had shifted in favor of the Soviet Union. ... This view was best summed up in a Defense Intelligence Agency report issued days after Soviet troops entered Afghanistan: 'The key motivation that propelled Moscow's move was to bring its long-standing strategic goals closer within reach. Control of Afghanistan would be a major step toward overland access to the Indian Ocean and to domination of the Asian sub-continent.' ... The State Department believed that the rebels could 'probably continue tying up some 85,000 or more Soviet troops' but that they were 'fragmented, lack(ed) effective national leadership, and certainly (could not) force a Soviet withdrawal.' After minimal deliberation at the White House, Carter opted for a two-track approach, supporting moderate levels of covert aid while seeking a forum for a negotiated settlement." (Given that the aid program approved in July 1979 was in fact no secret, one must also wonder what the relevant Congressional officials thought they were approving—then again, maybe not, considering the low evidentiary standard that is the hallmark of the conspiracist mentality.)TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 07:18, 20 October 2016 (UTC)

I would say Galster is the most factually reliable because he is an independent academic source who is not working for the national security state. TTAaC, you just approvingly cited three sources that describe the presidential finding as "secret" and then claimed the aid "was in fact no secret"; Your attitude towards the sources is far more contradictory than mine, so I'm afraid I have to regard this as yet another diversionary tactic, not a serious critique.

Guccisamsclub, I hope these interference plays aren't the reason your revision is taking so long. GPRamirez5 (talk) 03:31, 23 October 2016 (UTC)

"Your attitude towards the sources is far more contradictory than mine." I don't see that. You're the one who argued the covert aid began in March, even though none of your sources say that, and approvingly cited Galster, even though he doesn't support any aspect of your "induced" conspiracy theory. Now you're describing Coll, Kearns, Braithwaite, Paul Jay, and the NSA's own Savranskaya as "working for the national security state." That's a rather bizarre outburst, but whatever.

With regard to the notion that the aid was "secret," see Coll, who explains how U.S. covert operations are approved: "If the CIA intended to undertake 'special activities' designed to influence political conditions abroad—as opposed to its more routine work of espionage, or stealing secrets—the president had to 'find' or declare formally and in writing that such covert action promoted American national security. The president also had to notify a handful of congressional leaders of his decision." See also Leslie H. Gelb: "I thought everybody knew about the covert aid, quite frankly. It was done even at that early stage (1979) fairly non-covertly. The policy was to keep it secret, but it wasn't a secret. The Soviets knew about it. They all knew what was going on." Technically, the U.S. plausibly denied involvement throughout the entire duration of the war, but according to Riedel "Congress was very involved in the management of the war, as Hollywood would later recall dramatically in the movie Charlie Wilson's War." Calling the aid to the mujahideen a "secret" is simply yellow journalism, even if the public wasn't aware of U.S. involvement prior to early 1980. I assumed that everyone here had a basic understanding of how U.S. covert operations are approved, but clearly I expected too much from you. (In the same way, an informed observer might say that the U.S. bombing of Cambodia was no "secret," because Congress was apprised from the beginning and it was widely reported in the media for well over 90% of the time that it went on—hence why bombing a neutral country was not among the list of offenses for which Congress planned to impeach President Nixon.) Not taking sources literally when they use that sort of language is just basic common sense—something no degree can instill in a man, I'm afraid.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 04:24, 23 October 2016 (UTC)

BTW, I don't know why you care to pretend that the aid began a few months before all RS—including your own—say it did; it obviously makes near-zero difference to our broader historical understanding. If, like Chomsky, you think America needs to be de-Nazified, then appreciating how widely the aid was known about in both the Executive and Legislative branches of the U.S. government only enhances your case—provided, of course, you can bring yourself to believe that the relevant Congressional officials, like the relevant officials in the White House, were eager to sacrifice millions of "ragheads" to play geopolitical games with Moscow (as opposed to supporting the aid for other reasons).TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 04:39, 23 October 2016 (UTC)

Lol, Leslie H. Gelb. You've proven my point. Not only is he a crony of the national security state, he has a direct conflict of interest regarding the history being discussed: "He was an Assistant Secretary of State in the Carter Administration from 1977 to 1979, serving as director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs..."

If he's an independent source, then so is Cyrus Vance who said he never believed the Soviets were headed to the Persian Gulf, and that Brzezinski was a duplicitous provocateur determined to undermine detente. GPRamirez5 (talk) 19:02, 23 October 2016 (UTC)

Guccisamsclub, I hope these interference plays aren't the reason your revision is taking so long.. No GPRamirez5, I just got lazy. OK will do it today Meh, sorry, give it another day (busier than expected). Guccisamsclub (talk) 04:38, 24 October 2016 (UTC)

I hate to suggest cutting Gucci out of the equation, but I think my revision of GPRamirez5's edit is very close to where we would like to be. If it were introduced into the article as proposed, my only objections would be that GPRamirez5 should replace the cite kill with quotes from his top three sources, and we should focus on the July 3 Presidential finding rather than conflating it with meetings with rebel leaders as early as March.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 01:35, 30 October 2016 (UTC)

References

Minor grammar fix request

Hello, great Wikipage. Very small point, can we please change, "and hostile populous to outsiders" to, "and hostile populace to outsiders." Or better yet, "and populace hostile to outsiders." Since "populous" is an adjective it's incorrect; the noun "populace" fits here. Thank you so much. Freethinnker (talk) 02:44, 28 December 2016 (UTC)freethinnker 27 Dec 2016Freethinnker (talk) 02:44, 28 December 2016 (UTC)

2 million Afghan civilians were killed by the Soviets from 1979 to 1989?

So the Soviets invaded Afghanistan to kill 2 million civilians? Is there a reliable source to back this nonsense? About the rape, there has never been a single report about Russians raping Afghan people. Where did this come from? --Zako.deen (talk) 03:20, 5 January 2017 (UTC)

The New York Times is a reputable source. Jim1138 (talk) 03:26, 5 January 2017 (UTC)

Ok, that entire NYT article just mentions on guy stating: "And I've heard of Afghan women being raped." He is not a reliable source, people invent lies and hear a lot of lies. Suppose I say I raped your mother, would you believe me?--Zako.deen (talk) 03:32, 5 January 2017 (UTC)

That's disgusting, and you should be glad I saw that after I blocked you for edit warring. Note that the 2 million number comes from a book published by a university press. Drmies (talk) 04:53, 5 January 2017 (UTC)

Does the book say "civilians"? - the other source (Khalidi) cited for the figures does not, [1], anywhere - and in part it is re-analyzing the data and the figures from that book by Sliwinski. Based on that, I find the usage of the word civilians in this article to be unclear and extremely problematic. There is seemingly weasel-written content in the article intended to avoid mention that the lower Khalidi estimate was produced later than the higher Sliwinski estimate and is based on a reexamination of the data used by Sliwinski. Tiptoethrutheminefield (talk) 22:17, 9 January 2017 (UTC)

I suspect there is a large quantity of anti-Soviet US-originated cold war propaganda embedded in this article (the rape allegations objected to by Zako.deen is probably an example of it - sounds like pure "babies-thrown-out-of-incubators" stuff to me). Tiptoethrutheminefield (talk) 23:02, 9 January 2017 (UTC)

I lived in Afghanistan, the Soviets were just like present-day NATO forces. This article is trying to make them like NAZI army or the army of Genghis Khan or Pakistan's army fighting in Bangladesh where Pakistan's army raped women. The mission of the Soviets was to win hearts and minds (public support), train and assist the Afghan government against misguided rebels who were trained by Pakistanis. It is common knowledge that there is everything in Pakistan except truth. All teachers in Pakistan brainwash students with lies and pro-Pakistan propaganda. For example, you'll not meet a single Pakistani teacher to accept that Islam came to their land from Afghanistan in the 10th century. They all claim that an Arab (Muhammad bin Qasim) in the 7th century made Pakistan an Islamic nation. They strictly reject anything to the contrary. The Soviets never killed or raped civilians. Pakistan used propaganda to justify sending rebels, and the only ones getting killed were these anti-Afghan rebels coming from Pakistan. They included Pakistanis, Arabs and other radical Muslims who had no clue about what was happening inside Afghanistan. All the major cities, especially Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-e Sharif, were very secured, the fighting took place near the Pakistan border. Russia accomplished its mission in 1989 and it left a stable Afghanistan, with millions of refugees returning. It was the civil war between April 1992 to late 2001 that destroyed Afghanistan, the mass killing and rapes occurred in those years. Most people are clueless, they assume that the Soviets killed millions of Afghan civilians, this is a major misconception based on anti-Communist anti-Afghan propaganda.--Zako.deen (talk) 18:17, 3 February 2017 (UTC)

The books you guys rely upon are just theories made up by Pakistanis. That's like listening to a Pakistani guy you meet in the street and he expresses his personal views about the Soviet war in Afghanistan. These books do not qualify as reliable sources.--Zako.deen (talk) 18:21, 3 February 2017 (UTC)

I forgot to mention the important point. The Afghan civilians, mainly in the major cities, were neutral. They were minding their own business, continuing with their normal life. They neither supported the Soviets and neither fought them. Religion was not banned. Everybody went to pray and do everything else that Islam allows. Afghanistan's population was 15 million, most Afghans live in the above major cities. So if nothing happened in these cities, then where did the 2 million Afghan civilians die? In a village? An average Afghan village is made up of about 100 to 200 people, and the villages are very far from each other. So yeah man, it is pure nonsense to believe the BS that some uneducated book writer wants us to believe.--Zako.deen (talk) 18:49, 3 February 2017 (UTC)

Should add one more comment. Most of the BS is based on what Afghan asylum seekers told immigration officials in Western countries (the usual BS, the Soviets came and bombed our entire village... killed everyone except me and my family). And these officials were forced to believe that BS. Use common sense, why would Soviets do that? If they wanted to eradicate Muslims, they would have done that in their own country first (the Soviet Union). No such thing ever took place, around 10% of Russia is Muslim today. Can you actually believe that well educated Russian soldiers would carry out mass killings of poor villagers? Is that logical in any way?--Zako.deen (talk) 19:20, 3 February 2017 (UTC)

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Libya?

Gaddafi supported the Mujahideen.--95.113.206.142 (talk) 16:36, 2 August 2017 (UTC)

Participation of Soviet Allies

The claims that Soviet allies participated in this war were not supported by reliable source. One was effectively unverified claims made in a newspaper and not confirmed at any time since. The other was on quite a different subject and mentioned it only in passing. Considering that there no known casualties of any of those countries and there are sources explicitly denying their participation (for example here), much better sources should be found for this information to be reinserted in the article. Kostja (talk) 21:46, 2 October 2017 (UTC)

Their source is the 1984 Cold War action-thriller Red Dawn. GPRamirez5 (talk) 00:29, 3 October 2017 (UTC)

Recent edit inaccurately asserts that the U.S. armed the mujahideen in September 1979; all available evidence suggests the U.S. did not send arms until after the Soviet invasion

GPRamirez5 recently asserted that "lethal aid begins in September (1979)": "By September 1979, Zia Al-Huq had applied further pressure for US military aid, and the CIA complied, sending lethal equipment to the mujahideen via Pakistani officials. President Carter then amended his July directive to include weaponry." However, after carefully reading through GPRamirez5's source, it has become apparent that this shocking claim—which many scholars have long sought to verify, and which is found nowhere in seminal works on this topic such as Steve Coll's Ghost Wars—is almost certainly false. There are several gaping holes in GPRamirez5's theory:

• First, GPRamirez5's source—Kyle Tadman writing for the Western Illinois Historical Review—states that Carter's July presidential finding was modified in late December, presumably after the Soviet invasion, rather than in September: "According to the authoritative work of author Steve Coll and his book, Ghost Wars, President Carter's still classified July 3, 1979 'Presidential Finding' was not only meant to help the Resistance Movement, but it also intended to deter any further Soviet aspirations in Third World countries. So with some of the constraints on conducting covert warfare promptly removed by the stroke of President Carter's pen just weeks before leaving office, the American intelligence network was free to secretly ship weapons to the Mujahidin by using the word 'harassment' as a cover to describe their goal of raising the 'costs' of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. ... Coll's work draws attention to how Carter amended his earlier July 3, 1979 'Presidential Finding' in late December of that year because the administrative had 'collectively' come to the conclusion that the Mujahidin forces could not win a war against the Soviet's military without the United States providing weaponry to them in some form or fashion."
• Elsewhere, Tadman asserts: "The revelations of Robert Gates go on to further reveal that by the end of August Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq had applied enough pressure on the United States for arms and other advanced equipment, that then CIA Director [Stansfield] Turner responded with having communications gear, and most significantly, lethal equipment sent to the insurgents via Pakistani handlers." If true, this may have violated Carter's July order, but it appears that Tadman based this allegation on a careless misreading of his source, Gate's From the Shadows pp. 146–147, which actually states: "By the end of August, Pakistani President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq was pressuring the United States for arms and equipment for the insurgents in Afghanistan. ... Separately, the Pakistani intelligence service was pressing us to provide military equipment to support an expanding insurgency. When Turner heard this, he urged the DO [Directorate of Operations] to get moving in providing more help to the insurgents. They responded with several enhancement options, including communications equipment for the insurgents via the Pakistanis or Saudis, funds for the Pakistanis to purchase lethal military equipment for the insurgents, and providing a like amount of lethal equipment ourselves for the Pakistanis to distribute to the insurgents." Significantly, and contrary to both Tadman and The Real News, Gates does not elaborate on which, if any, of these "enhancement options" were ultimately approved. However, Gates goes on to strongly suggest that no arms were sent until after the Soviet invasion: "On Christmas Eve and Christmas Day, 1979, the Soviets intervened massively in Afghanistan. A covert action that began six months earlier funded at just over half a million dollars would, within a year, grow to tens of millions, and most assuredly included the provision of weapons." Later in the same article, Tadman contradicts himself: "The Politburo's decision to invade Afghanistan ... offered the Carter administration an opportunity to enhance their initial efforts by eventually supplying lethal aid to the Mujahidin forces once the war began."
• In response to Paul Jay of The Real News perpetuating the same misrepresentation, Brzezinski emphatically denied that any U.S. arms were sent to the mujahideen until after the Soviet invasion:
  • Jay: "So US support for the mujaheddin only begins after the Russians invade, not before?"
  • Brzezinski: "With arms? Absolutely afterwards. No question about it. Show me some documents to the contrary."
• Finally, as it happens, the head of the DO's Near East and South Asia Division at the time, Charles Cogan, has explained in detail how the first U.S. arms intended for the mujahideen reached Pakistan on January 10, 1980—again, shortly following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: "There were no lethal provisions given to the Afghans before the Soviet invasion. There was a little propaganda, communication assistance, and so on at the instigation of the ISI. But after the Soviet invasion everything changed. The first [U.S.] weapons for the Afghans arrived in Pakistan on the tenth of January, fourteen days after the invasion. Shortly after the invasion, we got into the discussions with the Saudis that you just mentioned. And then when [William J.] Casey became DCI under Reagan at the beginning of 1981, the price tag went through the ceiling." —Source: Blight, James G.; et al. (2012). Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979-1988. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. p. 66. ISBN 978-1-4422-0830-8.

What should we make of this discrepancy? Tadman appears to have misread Gates—possibly influenced by Jay's earlier error, given that Tadman cites The Real News interview with Brzezinski as one of his sources, in which case we are dealing with textbook citogenesis. Meanwhile, both the leading architect of the Carter administration's Afghan policy at the NSC (Brzezinski) and the CIA officer directly responsible for implementing that policy (Cogan) are adamant that no arms were provided until January 1980, which is consistent with Coll's observation that Carter amended his earlier finding to finally include lethal provisions in late December 1979. Tadman doesn't notice that his claims are contradictory, whereas GPRamirez5's assertion that Carter's finding was amended in September is flat-out false—or, at least, not supported by Tadman, leaving it unclear where GPRamirez5 is getting his information. Of course, in the unlikely scenario that GPRamirez5 can produce this September 1979 revised presidential finding supposedly disproving Brzezinski, Cogan, and Coll, I will happily accept the correction. Otherwise, Tadman's WP:EXCEPTIONAL claim should certainly not stand unchallenged, and I think the best course of action would be to remove the sentence entirely.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 18:00, 12 October 2017 (UTC)

TheTimesAreAChanging, do not try to challenge peer-reviewed secondary sources with primary material. This constitutes OR. You've been suspended for this nonsense before and it looks like you'll be headed for another extended--possibility permanent--vacation if you persist.GPRamirez5 (talk) 14:57, 13 October 2017 (UTC)

A.) Your own source contradicts your edit by stating that no arms were provided until after Carter revised his presidential finding in late December 1979. B.) Your claim that Carter revised his presidential finding in September is completely unsourced. C.) Steve Coll, who also says that no arms were provided until after Carter revised his presidential finding in late December, is not a "primary" source. The only source suggesting that anyone in the Carter administration even considered sending arms prior to the Soviet invasion is Robert Gates, who most assuredly is a primary source. D.) Primary sources such as Cogan, when deemed credible by academic publishers such as Rowan & Littlefield, are not inherently unreliable and should not be flippantly dismissed (and your objection to primary sources is highly selective). Indeed, most secondary sources on this matter still cite primary sources because a great deal of information on American decision-making remains classified. E.) Your edit warring violates WP:BRD. The WP:BURDEN is on you to get consensus for this disputed material. Until you do so, it can and will be reverted. (If you feel that there are not enough eyes watching this talk page, you can try dispute resolution or start an RfC, which will enable us to reach a binding decision.) F.) Threats and appeals to authority are not an argument. I could easily respond in kind, but I'd rather not stoop to your level. G.) WP:OR doesn't apply to talk pages.

Look, why not just admit that you're wrong and you misread Tadman? No-one's denying that the "non-lethal" American aid was ultimately aimed at advancing the mujahideen's war effort, and therefore that this whole debate is largely semantic, but do you have any regard for historical fact? It seems perfectly obvious that you were cherrypicking both the source (Tadman of the Western Illinois Historical Review) and the bits from the source that you personally liked, without much regard for accuracy. Coll is not alone; here are two other academic sources affirming that no U.S. arms were sent until January 1980:

• Harrison, Selig (1995). "Soviet Occupation, Afghan Resistance, and the American Response". Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal. Oxford University Press. p. 53. ISBN 9780195362688. Within days of the invasion, President Carter made a series of symbolic gestures to invoke American outrage ... No longer skittish about a direct American role in providing weapons support to the Afghan resistance, Carter also gave the CIA the green light for an American–orchestrated covert assistance program to be financed in part by congressional appropriations and in part with Saudi Arabian help.
• Riedel, Bruce (2014). What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979–1989. Brookings Institution Press. p. 106. ISBN 978-0815725954. As the president was jogging on February 12, 1980, his press secretary, Jody Powell, interrupted his run to tell him that the Washington Post had a story in the works about the CIA's operation to feed arms to the mujahideen rebels through Pakistan. In short, less than a month after the first arms arrived in Karachi, the secret was about to be published by the media. As Carter noted, the Pakistanis 'would be highly embarrassed.' Secretary Vance appealed to the Post to hold the story, but it ran a few days later, watered down a bit.

Do you doubt that these sources are mainstream and reliable?TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 17:26, 13 October 2017 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 6 February 2018

The article about the Soviet-Afghan war claims :

"The government's Stalinist-like nature and brutality[38] - vigorously suppressing opposition, executing thousands of political prisoners and ordering massacres against unarmed civilians, led to the rise of anti-government armed groups"

The only reference reported to justify this, is this one: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-babrak-karmal-1313192.html

This reference does not prove anything. Is an opinion piece for an obituary of one Afghan leader. It is not a primary nor even a peer-reviewed nor academic nor actually consistently journalistic source that could provide factual support for the claim.

I merely ask the "[reference needed]" tag to be put at the end of this claim, as there is no reference that proves this claim. Thank you. 130.223.86.252 (talk) 13:59, 6 February 2018 (UTC)

 Done The source mentions the Stalinism of the regime, and the claim statement has been altered to reflect that, without the additional terms unused by the source. Spintendo ᔦᔭ 12:57, 8 February 2018 (UTC)

West-Germany as Belligerent?

There is only a newspaper source (!) and even that says that Germany only tried to get soviet wapons.

Please add a source or delete.

--92.196.32.125 (talk) 12:21, 31 May 2018 (UTC)

I assume you mean East Germany, not West, and please read the book cited in the infobox. —Compassionate727 ^(T·C) 14:35, 2 June 2018 (UTC)

Name of the article

The article's name is misleading, it was not a war between the Soviet Union and Afganistan but a military intervention in support of its leadership. Here is the introduction of the Russian version of the article: "Afgan war (1979 — 1989) (Soviet war in Afganistan) — military conflict on the territory of Democratic Republic of Afganistan (Republic of Afganistan from 1987) between the government forces of Afganistan with support from Limited contingent of Soviet troops from one side and armed formations of Afgan mujahideen ("dushmans") that were using political, finance, material and military support of leading NATO states and conservative Islamic world from the other side". --178.69.111.32 (talk) 01:34, 4 June 2018 (UTC)

You are misinformed. Soviet forces killed the Afghan leadership on 27 December 1979.-- Toddy1 (talk) 05:08, 4 June 2018 (UTC)

He/she has the general idea correct. However, Soviet-Afghan War is the most common name, so we run with that. It's sort of like how the French and Indian War was not between Frenchmen and Native Americans, but we all call it that anyway. —Compassionate727 ^(T·C) 20:58, 4 June 2018 (UTC)

URL contains a non-ASCII character

The title of this article, "Soviet–Afghan War," contains a Unicode character for an en-dash, U+2013, which displays in text boxes as %E2%80%93 . I'm opposed to using non-ASCII characters in URL names, as they mess up linking and make readability more difficult. The name should have used an ordinary hyphen. Pooua (talk) 23:33, 22 July 2018 (UTC)

A Commons file used on this page has been nominated for deletion

The following Wikimedia Commons file used on this page has been nominated for deletion:

• Afghan village destroyed by the Soviets.jpg

Participate in the deletion discussion at the nomination page. —Community Tech bot (talk) 08:33, 7 January 2019 (UTC)

"Murdered" should be "assassinated"

"Taraki was murdered" I think should be "Taraki was assassinated".

--100.4.144.104 (talk) 13:03, 9 February 2019 (UTC)

So many volunteers

"However, despite suffering heavily, the mujahideen were able to remain in the field, mostly because they received thousands of new volunteers daily, and continued resisting the Soviets."

Really? Thousands per day? Source?

Where were they all going if "thousands per day" were coming in? Desertion?

63.155.53.122 (talk) 14:16, 18 February 2019 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 12 February 2019)

The existing text under one of the images says "Charlie Wilson (D-TX), 2nd from the left, dressing in Afghan clothing (armed with AK-47) with the local Afghan mujahideen." The rifle that Charlie Wilson is holding is actually an AKS-74U (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AK-74#AKS-74U). This can be seen by comparing the muzzle device on the end of the barrel to those of AK47s and AKS-74Us in the above linked article. TheGreatBamboozle (talk) 06:56, 12 February 2019 (UTC)

 Done. Rob3512 _chat? ^{what I did} 01:15, 1 March 2019 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 2 April 2019

the following statement is wrong," According to political scientist Gilles Kepel, the Soviet intervention or "invasion" was "viewed with horror" in the West, considered to be a "fresh twist" on the geo-political "Great Game" of the 19th Century in which Britain feared that Russia sought access to the Indian Ocean and posed "a threat to Western security", explicitly violating "the world balance of power agreed upon at Yalta" in 1945. " the great game is a reference to the 19th century, thus the 1800's not the 20th century, the picture associated also shows the listed conference at Yalta, or close enough, that did happen in the 20th. 2602:30A:2EDE:A380:9519:7CBD:B644:8BBA (talk) 08:16, 2 April 2019 (UTC)

 Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. MrClog (talk) 19:17, 2 April 2019 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 5 April 2020

{{subst:trim|1=

{{Infobox military conflict |conflict = Soviet–Afghan War |partof = the Cold War and the continuous Afghanistan conflict |image = |caption = Mujahideen fighters in the Kunar Province of Afghanistan in 1987 |date = December 24, 1979 – February 15, 1989
(9 years, 1 month, 3 weeks and 1 day) |place = Afghanistan |result = Mujahideen victory

• Soviet failure to quell the Afghan mujahideen insurgency
• Geneva Accord (1988)
• Withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan
• Continuation of the Afghan Civil War without Soviet troops and Mujahideen victory in 1992

|combatant1 = Soviet Union
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

Supported by:

• East Germany
  Humanitarian aid:

  • India

|combatant2 = Sunni Mujahideen:

Factions:

• Jamiat-e Islami
  • Shura-e Nazar
• Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin
  • Maktab al-Khadamat
• Hezb-e Islami Khalis
• Ittehad-e Islami (IULA)
• Harakat-i-Inqilab (IRM)
• Jebh-e Nejat-e Melli (ANLF)
• Mahaz-e Milli (NIFA)

Supported by:

• Pakistan
• Saudi Arabia
• Egypt
• United States
• United Kingdom
• China
• West Germany
• Indonesia

203.78.120.191 (talk) 11:11, 5 April 2020 (UTC)

 Not done. Unclear request. El_C 11:21, 5 April 2020 (UTC)

References

Semi-protected edit request on 5 April 2020

China 203.78.120.191 (talk) 11:19, 5 April 2020 (UTC)

 Not done. Unclear request. El_C 11:22, 5 April 2020 (UTC)

References

"Perception in the former USSR" should be renamed "Perception of Russian Federation"

Section "Perception in the former USSR" should be renamed "Perception of Russian federation" as it does quote only Russian politicians and decisions of Russian parlament. Only official stance of Russia is represented. No oppinions from other parts of former USSR are represented nor from Russian general public. --Kyng (talk) 11:37, 25 May 2020 (UTC)

A bit long

The Background section tends to repeat itself several times. I'm tempted to give it a good hard edit so it forms a single narrative. Dan100 (Talk) 22:20, 27 June 2020 (UTC)

In fact I think it's worst article I've seen, it's an impenetrable mess of text Dan100 (Talk) 22:33, 27 June 2020 (UTC)

It is a victory for the Mujahideen

"Despite having failed to implement a sympathetic regime in Afghanistan, in 1988 the Soviet Union signed an accord with the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and agreed to withdraw its troops. The Soviet withdrawal was completed on February 15, 1989, and Afghanistan returned to nonaligned status." britannica There are communists trying to change history, soviets who lost a war and did not win, withdrawal means loss, like the Vietnam War, which is a victory for the vet Kong. Uryon988 (talk) 11:38, 2 November 2020 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 14 November 2020

In the second paragraph of "Factions inside the PDPA", there is a typo. Please change "Through" to "Though" 107.77.200.94 (talk) 04:36, 14 November 2020 (UTC)

 Done Danski454 (talk) 14:53, 14 November 2020 (UTC)

"Mujahideen victory" in the infobox

This war did not end with a "Mujahideen victory", as the article has claimed for a couple of years because somebody changed it from "stalemate", as it said before, to "Mujahideen victory". The Mujahideen did win the Afghan civil war in 1992, but the article has decided to limit the timeframe of this war from 1979-1989 (the Soviet phase), and the Mujahideen did not win in 1989. On the contrary, the government they were fighting to overthrow remained in power and it remained so for three more years (it actually lasted longer than the Soviet Union did). They were also able to win the Battle of Jalalabad in 1989 and keep control over the main cities for a couple of years. If this war was a Soviet/DRA defeat, the Iraq War and the US Afghan War would also be considered US defeats. This is obviously incorrect - if you withdraw from a country in which you have troops, you have not necessarily been defeated (although you have not won either if the war continues). While we can't use counterfactuals on Wikipedia, the Najibullah government would likely have survived even longer if the Soviet Union had not dissolved, as the fall of the USSR led to a halt of supplies to the government (e.g. the Afghan Air Force didn't even have fuel by January 1992). If the timeframe had been extended to 1978-1992 in a manner similar to the Vietnam War article (which dates the war as 1955-1975, although the phase of active US involvement only lasted from 1964 to 1973), it would have been a Mujahideen victory, but as long as the article considers only the Soviet phase of the war to be war, this is clearly incorrect. Neither the Afghan Army nor the Soviet Union had lost in 1989. For sure, most of the countryside and even parts of Kandahar and Herat were under Mujahideen control, but otherwise all the big cities were controlled by the government. The government in Kabul was pretty safe. The way the Soviet withdrawal was arranged clearly did not indicate defeat. The withdrawal was part of a plan and was conducted gradually in order to give the Afghan Army time to adapt. The USSR also increased aid to the Afghan government in order to make it more able to defend itself. They also conducted several offensives during the withdrawal. Operation Magistral was one of the largest operations of the war, involving 20 000 Soviet troops and 8000 Afghan Army troops, and it managed to clear the road from Gardez to Khost in order to ease the deliveries of supplies to Khost. If the Soviets had been defeated, they would not have carried out such an offensive at the same time as they were withdrawing. They continued to deliever supplies to Najibullah until the August coup. The government's early campaigns after the Soviet withdrawal were also quite successful, surprising the US who expected a soon Mujahideen victory. The Najibullah government was even able to survive for 8 months after the Soviet coup which resulted in a complete stop of Soviet aid.

So I suggest that this midleading claim is changed, as it is clearly incorrect. In 1989, the DRA and the USSR were absolutely not defeated although they had failed to quell the uprising. The Mujahideen victory didn't come before 1992. Stalemate, as the article said before, would be more correct. The Mujahideen could be said to have gained a strategic victory, but by the time this war is said to have ended (1989), it was still very unclear what would happen in the long term. Najibullah remained firmly in power and the Soviets were backing him, refusing to see its buffer zone to anti-Soviet countries like China, Pakistan and Iran disappear. --Te og kaker (talk) 18:27, 23 May 2020 (UTC)

I changed it to "stalemate" based on a Guardian source. Koopinator (talk) 14:30, 25 May 2020 (UTC)

That's like saying the Vietnam War ended in a stalemate in 1973. Mikrobølgeovn (talk) 12:40, 27 July 2020 (UTC)

It did, but Wikipedia sets the timeframe for the Vietnam War to 1955–1975. If Wikipedia had chosen to limit the timeframe of the Vietnam War to the "American phase" (that is, until 1973), the war would be a stalemate. However, Wikipedia has chosen to limit the timeframe of the Afghan War to 1979–1989 (that is, the phase with Soviet involvement). That phase of the war ended with a stalemate. If the question was only strategic victory, the Mujahideen indeed won. But, on the other hand, in terms of a tactical military victory, the Soviets would be the victor. Overall, this phase of the war was inconclusive. But if the whole DRA vs Mujahideen conflict was considered to be one single war (as I would agree that it indeed was, although that is contrary to the common perception) it would have been a Mujahideen victory. But the timeframe might be decisive in some cases, as it was here. The Soviets were not defeated in 1989, but the Najibullah government was defeated in 1992. Furthermore, the downfall of Najibullah was a result of the fall of the Soviet Union (which was not a direct result of this war) and if the Soviets had continued to back Najibullah, he might have stayed in power for a lot longer. In military terms, the Soviets were definitely not defeated. --Te og kaker (talk) 23:34, 9 October 2020 (UTC)

This is a clear bias. The Soviets failed to control Afghanistan and suffered heavy losses. This is called victory for the mujahideen Ryuan9iu98 (talk) 20:55, 25 October 2020 (UTC)

The Soviet objective was never to control Afghanistan directly. Their aim was to keep the DRA government in power and prevent a government hostile to the USSR to gain power (in line with the Soviet/Russian policy of maintaining a "buffer zone" along its borders). And the government did manage to keep themselves in power for the whole duration of this war, and even to maintain power until after the fall of the USSR. If this war was a "Mujahideen victory", the 2001–2014 Afghan war was a Taliban victory as well. Indeed the war might be said to have been a strategic victory for the Mujahideen as they defeated the government in the subsequent Afghan Civil War (1989–1992), but the result of the war was still inconclusive as of 1989 which the article considers to be the end of the war.

Suffering heavy losses in a war is not the same as winning, and in addition, the losses of the Mujahideen were far larger than those of the USSR. The USSR lost 15 000 soldiers, if we believe the official numbers. Some other estimates (I don't know whether they are accurate) claim that they lost far more, but the Soviet losses were still far lower than those of the Mujahideen – the estimate cited in the article estimates that probably 75–90 000 Mujahideen were killed, so the Mujahideen losses were at least three times higher than those of the Soviets, and most likely more, so that is not an argument which favors the "Mujahideen victory" narrative. Furthermore, the Soviets were rarely defeated on the battlefield during this war, even if they failed to keep the whole country under DRA control. --Te og kaker (talk) 21:26, 26 October 2020 (UTC)

Steele, Jonathan (2011). Ghosts of Afghanistan. The Haunted Battleground. Counterpoint. p. 112–114. ISBN 978-1-58243-787-3.

MYTH NUMBER FOUR:
The USSR suffered a massive military defeat in Afghanistan at the hands of the mujahedin.
This is one of the most persistent myths of Afghan history. It has been regularly trumpeted by every former mujahedin leader, from Osama bin Laden and Taliban commanders to the warlords in the current Afghan Government. It is also accepted unthinkingly as part of the Western narrative of the war, repeated by politicians in Europe and the United States as well as analysts like Zbigniew Brzezinski. [...] The reality is that the Afghan mujahedin did not defeat the Soviets on the battlefield. [...] Just as the mujahedin failed to beat the Soviets, the Soviets did not defeat the mujahedin. The Soviets left Afghanistan when they calculated that the war had become a stalemate and was no longer worth the high price in money, men and international prestige that they were having to pay to keep it going.

In asymmetric conflicts the weaker sides wins politically if the stronger side fails to achieve a military victory. So militarily it was not a defeat for the Soviet Union, but politically it was, of course, a major defeat. --Jo1971 (talk) 20:30, 4 April 2021 (UTC)

You are wrong, the Viet Kung losses are higher and they won the war, the Russians lost 30,000 soldiers and many fighting vehicles even though they are superior militarily compared to the Mujahideen. Imagine that an army that defeated Germany was defeated by some of the peasants with AK-47 machine guns. I think you do not know what victory and defeat are. In a war, in order to achieve victory, you must destroy your enemy to become incapable of fighting. This did not happen in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and even America lost a war because it could not eliminate the Taliban. Uryon988 (talk) 10:31, 2 November 2020 (UTC)

Also, the Soviets did not lose a battle on a land because it was a guerrilla war, the Communists lost this war, and you cannot rewrite history because you are in love with Stalin Uryon988 (talk) 10:42, 2 November 2020 (UTC)

I think both of you misunderstood the meaning of victory and defeat. The victory in battle and war are different of course. As famous phrase from De Gaulle - "we had lost the battle, but we didn't lose the war", war and battle cannot have same results for all the times. "In order to achieve victory, you must destroy your enemy to become incapable of fighting" is victory of battle, not victory for war. For example, during Pacific War, Japan could still threaten Allies in Japan homeland campaign, and war could be continue until 1947. Emperor Hirohito intervened and ordered the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War to accept the terms the Allies had set down in the Potsdam Declaration for ending the war. This events mean that war can be ended with political effects, and results of war cannot be "only" judged by whether to destroy enemy or not. Why we categorized this war as "Victory for Mujahideen" is that many reliable resources and references says that it is victory for Mujahideen. We cannot change the major historical perspective, until there are other materials that this perspective is wrong -- Wendylove (talk) 05:40, 5 April 2021 (UTC)

The title of the article

I'm sure this has been discussed already, but I'd like to express my opinion, too: the title comes across as subjective and a bit misleading. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan regime was internationally recognized, and had a seat in the UN. Hence 'Soviet-Afghan War' sounds odd, because Soviets merely offered strong support for an increasingly unpopular but technically legitimate regime. They never attacked Afghanistan as its recognized government had been begging for Soviet help for many months, contrary to what the current title would imply. Wouldn't Soviet war in Afghanistan be a better fit (I selected the title that Afghans (Pushtus, Tajiks) themselves use, cf. Persian wiki: جنگ شوروی در افغانستان=Soviet War in Afghanistan). Thoughts? Can we discuss this?--Potugin (talk) 20:08, 12 June 2021 (UTC)

Looks like back in 2015, the reverse happened, it was moved from Soviet war in Afghanistan to Soviet-Afghan War ([2]). I would oppose the page move, firstly because it would conflict with the name of the category, template, and other articles on the war, and secondly because I would argue that Soviet-Afghan war is the WP:COMMONNAME. Google Books shows that Soviet-Afghan war is the more popular name by a considerable margin, and SemanticScholar gives 1.15 million results for Soviet-Afghan War, versus 2100 for Soviet War in Afghanistan. I'd also suggest checking WP:RM#CM so that this section's properly formatted. Loafiewa (talk) 21:03, 12 June 2021 (UTC)