Talk:Operation Market Garden/Archive 3

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Allied Operational Failure... And????

This statement is correct, but Operation Market Garden was not only an Allied Operational Failure, but a German Tactical Victory. The Dutch resistance informed previously the Allied Command that the 2nd SS Panzer Division was there, and they simply ignored it, thus leading all Allied forces to a tactical nightmare, specially the British Paratroopers. "Allied Operational Failure" is just another way to Americans hide their shame. They took a beating. German Tactical Victory. For some reason there was a Battle of the Bulge, don't you think? --Prtgl93 (talk) 19:10, 14 April 2010 (UTC)Prtgl93

Shame has nothing to do with it considering a mixture of sources all related the same outcome. Additionally it was the II SS Panzer Korps, made up of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, not the 2nd SS Panzer Division. But if you wanted to look at the tactical picture; German frontline was breeched, German counterattacks were halted and their penetrations of the corridor repulsed. They lost control of all strategic points along the highway save were they retook full control of Arnhem bridge; how did they win tactically? Seems more along the lines of indesisive.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:34, 14 April 2010 (UTC)

total destruction of enemy "elite" division? Blablaaa (talk) 14:56, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

Point? Relevence?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:02, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

u talked about tactical issue. u claim strategic points were captured. none of them were used. in this direction nothing happend after market garden. so there are no strategic points. the only tactical outcome which i can see i the destruction of an entire elite unit. this was relevant. all your points were not. Blablaaa (talk) 15:05, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

But Mr Blablaaa do you remember the discussion on the 12th SS? Elements of the 1st Airborne escaped, like elements of the 12th SS ... so what was destroyed? ;)

Nothing happened after Market Garden ... REALLY?

My points were not relevent... how can one claim a tactical German victory when they were defeated everywhere bar at Arnhem? Yes Mr one sided explain that to me please...--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:19, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

how much came away of 1st airboren 2,500 for nothing ??? from 12 SS 10.000 for mass effect over months ?? the tactical victory is inflicting heavy casualteis especially on enemy elite units while beeing 4:1 outnumbered and dening the enemy his objectivs with far inferior ressources. What was the next operation of allies in this area? when ? with using all the elite units against heavy outnumbered unprepared enemies and not achieving anything important? how can this happen without losing on tactical scale. my question to u..... Blablaaa (talk) 16:14, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

Taking such formidable force against a shattered and dizzy enemy and than such irrelevant outcome. is it even possible without tactical defeats? we both like this discussion but i will stop here i only wanted to give input. i do not claim that anything should be changed on the article.Blablaaa (talk) 16:18, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

Can I suggest that anyone who thinks the area captured during Operation Market Garden was not further used read the section of the article titled 'Subsequent combat in the Netherlands' which states that there were several operations launched from the territory? --Shimbo (talk) 11:42, 16 April 2010 (UTC)

Indeed the German line was breeched. But the failure on Market Garden forced the Allies to find another way to Germany, which ended up being Belgium. The Germans actually pushed the Allies out of the area. So for me it's not just an "Allied Operational Failure". About the subsequent combats, I must say that those combats are not included in Operation Market Garden. They are attacks from different orders of battle. I think that someone is mistaking Operation Market Garden with other different attacks ("subsequent combats"). Thank you all. --Prtgl93 (talk) 15:36, 20 April 2010 (UTC)Prtgl93

The attacks across the Rhine were not just from Belgium and France, I suggest that you review Operation Plunder which was launched across the Rhine originally from Netherlands territory, though they had to cross part of Germany before they reached the Rhine itself. Dabbler (talk) 19:23, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

Recent study

D’Este’s bio Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life (Henry Holt, New York, 2002) has Chapter 48 pp 610-624 on Market Garden (planned by Montgomery, Brereton and Browning), he says it was a “disaster waiting to happen”. Also that it “needn’t have been a failure” as neither general (Dempsey or Horrocks) galvanised their tank units while there was still time to have seized and held Arnhem bridge. D’Este says Eisenhower only admitted privately in 1960 that Market Garden had “miserably failed”. D’Este also says that Sosabowski was made a scapegoat for Browning’s ineptitude. Hugo999 (talk) 04:23, 21 January 2010 (UTC)

Does D'Este have anything to say about the failure of the 82nd Airborne Division? That it was US air commanders who squelched the coup de main for the Arnhem bridge? If not, why not?Keith-264 (talk) 08:26, 21 January 2010 (UTC) Will check when the bio is back in the library Hugo999 (talk) 05:44, 30 January 2010 (UTC)

I fear that D'Este is too obliging of publishers who are more interested in controversy to shift books, than scholarly exactitude.Keith-264 (talk) 11:03, 30 January 2010 (UTC)

Re the 82nd Airborne, D’Este says that “the British (Guards Armoured Division) failed to exploit the 82nd Airborne’s hard-fought triumph by thrusting through the disrupted German defences and releiving the beseiged force at Arnhem bridge” ; based on conversations in the early 1980s with Lt-Gen James Gavin the divisional commander of the 82nd Airborne; who had “never forgiven” the British Guards ... (page 616 & Note 22 page 793.) D’Este notes a crucial mistake of Brereton who though that flying two lifts in one day was too much for his pilots, though it had been done during (Operation) Dragoon without incident. And he notes that the Germans found a copy of the plan on the corpse of an American officer who should not have carried it into combat, so could anticipate each Allied move (page 616) Hugo999 (talk) 12:48, 7 March 2010 (UTC)

I lost a lot of confidence in D'Este after S A Hart exploded his theory that Churchill deliberately withheld troops in England when they were needed in France (see 'Colossal Cracks').Keith-264 (talk) 10:18, 9 March 2010 (UTC)

I dont have a source to hand but wasnt there a big hoo har over the claim the Guards sat on their backsides and did nothing after the bridge was captured i.e. their was a valid reason why the push forward could not happen.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 17:17, 9 March 2010 (UTC)

There's been one ever since recriminations began about M-G. Neillands weighs in here 'The Battle for the Rhine: The Battle of the Bulge and the Ardennes Campaign, 1944'.

Actually if you read the book A Bridge Too Far by Cornelius Ryan you will get a reasonably un-biased account of the situation during Market Garden and it becomes fairly obvious that the root cause of the failure of Market Garden was that the Son bridge was allowed to be blown, delaying the advance of XXX Corps. Ryan was an Irishman (later American) and unlikely to be pro-British in his account. The Son bridge wasn't a British responsibility, and it wasn't them who failed to capture it intact, although this fact is given almost no prominence in many accounts. The plan of Market Garden required all three bridges to be captured intact so that XXX Corps could then advance into Arnhem, the most technically difficult bridge to capture, the Arnhem one, being allocated to the British 1st Airborne Division as they were the most experienced of the Allied airborne forces and less likely to cock-it-up. So, of the three bridges, the UK captured theirs (the most difficult one, as it was in a town and more easily defended) while of the other two bridges, one was captured, the other was blown-up, so, who's fault for the failure of Market Garden does it appear to be now? If the Son bridge had been captured (as it was supposed to be) then XXX Corps, an armoured corps, would have been able to meet up with the 1st Airborne Division holding the Arnhem bridge, and relieve them. The delay caused by the failure to capture the Son bridge meant that the defending Germans were able to organise themselves, which wasn't intended in the original plan, XXX Corps being intended to 'motor' down the road to Arnhem against the little opposition that could then have been arranged in the short time this was all due to occur. This never happened because the Son bridge was blown and the Germans then had time to mount an organised defence, the extra time allowing them to discover what was happening and then to plan their defence accordingly, which they were particularly adept at doing. The additional German forces that were in the area would have been dealt with by the tanks of XXX Corps if they had been able to reach Arnhem which is why the operation was allowed to go ahead even after the additional recuperating German armour was discovered. Market Garden was meant to be a Blitzkrieg style of surprise attack, fast and without the defending forces being given time to recover, and although the plan was risky, due to it depending on the use of a single road, it was possible, but the delay caused by the Son bridge being blown caused it to grind to a halt. That wasn't the fault of either Montgomery or the British.

Oh, and BTW, it was called Operation Market Garden because of the large number of greenhouses and market gardens that were located in and around the Arnhem area.—Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.112.47.119 (talk) 12:48, 8 August 2010 (UTC)

Sorry, but I think you paint a far too simplistic version of events. From top to bottom, Ryan doesn't portray Son as the sole reason for the failure as you imply, and he also makes quite a few mistakes in his account. The plan required a whacking six rivers/ canals to be crossed - 5 bridges across 5 of these were American responsibility, the last watercourse and 3 bridges over it were the British responsibility. The Brits were the least experienced unit, having never fought as a complete division before (whilst both the 82nd and 101st landed on D-Day), and failed to capture any of their bridges (although they did secure 1 end of the road bridge). XXX corps were horrifically slow (as most historians agree), they stopped at night and hadn't even reached Eindhoven on day 1, well short of the schedule. Enigma makes the point above about the Guards not doing anything after Nijmegen - this is true but it was because the plan required Wessex to take over at that point (which took a day I think). This inflexibility is one of the many criticisms levied at XXX Corps. I've never seen a single account that lays the blame solely at the 101st's door and I don't expect to find one. Ranger Steve (talk) 16:09, 8 August 2010 (UTC)

Hmmm ... so what do you think would have happened if the Son bridge HAD been captured intact? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.112.75.216 (talk) 09:58, 12 August 2010 (UTC)

Until I publish a critically acclaimed book on the operation, what I think isn't relevant to this article. But it's probably worth noting that capturing Son bridge intact wouldn't have made a huge amount of difference. XXX Corps would still have been behind schedule when they reached it, it's doubtful that the 82nd would have been able to capture Nijmegen bridge any sooner and even if they had, its highly unlikely that XXX Corps could have reached Arnhem in time to swing the battle at the bridge. The events at Son had no influence on 82nd's or 1st Airborne's problems. It was a massive combination of problems that caused the operation to fail - Son was one of them, but not the sole reason by a long shot. Ranger Steve (talk) 10:15, 12 August 2010 (UTC)

This discussion raises a bunch of questions for me (Some are probably completely outside the scope of the article and hopefully some of them are answered in the article alas my skiving time in work is limited XD):

1. While I do not know how the armour was utilised during the pursuit across France; was it not, in general, standard operating procedure for the armour to halt at night due to the hazards of driving at night?
2. If the halting of the Guards was to allow the Wessex to pass through; it sort of begs the question why things had been done “reverse of normal”? i.e. why had the infantry not led the operation and allowed the Guards to role on through afterwards (i.e. how the armour was ‘’supposed’’ to be used during Epsom)
3. While it may have been to plan to complete a switch around mid operation (i.e. as seen in Normandy during “colossal cracks”) why did they not exploit the situation and delay the switch – as in push the Guards on?
4. 30 Corps developed a reputation during Normandy of stickiness; poor performances in Perch and Bluecoat saw a purge of the staff; why was this Corps selected to launch the operation and the likes of VIII (apparently the main striking force of Second Army when you look at the operations they undertook) not redeployed to launch the op?
5. Why was the Guards chosen for the role considering the 11th was considered the finest armoured unit?
6. Considering the inexperience of the 1st AB, when compared to the Yanks, why was the 6th not used and reinforced with elements of the 1st to make up for casualties?

Sorry if ive just pushed this towards open forum than article disucssionEnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:24, 12 August 2010 (UTC) Ahem, XXX Corps was back on schedule when it reached Nijmegen. The advance beyond Nij when the bridges had been belatedly captured didn't begin immediately due to the five tanks of Gds Armd which crossed the rail(?) bridge being a bit busy reinforing the paras.Keith-264 (talk) 15:34, 12 August 2010 (UTC)

Date format

Since Operation Market Garden (OMG, hehe) was a multi-national effort led by the British, shouldn't the date format be day-month-year instead of month-day-year? Granted, I'm an American and in my opinion, the latter just rolls of the tongue, but most of the world uses the former. Pyro721 (talk) 04:35, May 28, 2010 (UTC) Quite agree.Keith-264 (talk) 18:31, 8 August 2010 (UTC)

Untitled

adding

Dude Germany casuailities is lighter than Allies. German army are much smaller and the casualities you put in is larger than the total number of german soldier.

It's all nice and sound, but where are the German's perspective? We can't only take Alli's words. we need also look into German side of the story. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 60.251.182.68 (talk) 05:20, 7 January 2011 (UTC)

First Independent Parachute Brigade Group

Does anybody have any more information about the dropping of this group? I know that 41 of the 114 planes turned back from the 21 September drop but what was the cause for this? This source says "To the great dismay of Gen. Sosabowski almost one third of the Brigade’s strength was missing! (Their fate was explained only later: after take-off a radio message was sent to all aircraft by Air Transport Command ordering them to return to England? 41 pilots turned back and landed in England)."
But this source says "Almost immediately after getting airborne, one flight group mistook a radio message for an abort signal and returned to base. Others saw their return and followed. Still other planes emerged from the fog base and low cloud alone and assumed the mission had been canceled."
This source is the diary of a crew chief on a 61st Troop Carrier Squadron plane and says of the Polish drop on 21 September "September 21, 44 I don't like this deal at all. We finally took off and had to climb to 8,000 feet to break through the fog and clouds. Only nine planes broke through behind us, but we continued on our way to the Continent. Our small group continued on till we received some unintelligible radio messages. Our radio operator had been given the wrong codes for the day. We had reached the enemy-held territory and the weather was still bad, so the pilot wisely turned back. It was a hard decision to make, but I think he did rightly. Those that did go through with their drop had a tough time and got the hell shot out of them." (emphasis added).
This source seems the most comprehensive and states "Conditions were so poor, in fact, that the aircraft first struggled to gain altitude, then they were ordered to return to their bases because it became clear to those on the ground that, by the time the aircraft returned from the drop, landing conditions would be dangerous. A coded message, ordering the recall, was transmitted to the airborne armada, however the aircraft had been issued with the wrong codes and so it was left to the judgement of individual crews as to whether or not they were indeed being asked to abort. As a result of this confusion, forty-one aircraft, returned to their bases but, due to the poor conditions, most put down at the first airfield they could find; one aircraft became so lost that it landed in Ireland."

I think that at least some of this should be put into the article but which bits? Does anybody have any further info? Varsovian (talk) 09:37, 9 June 2010 (UTC)

Off the top of my head, the last is the most accurate and is supported by Millbrook and Waddy. I believe that some of the aircraft had the wrong codes (not all of them), thus not everyone got the transmission and many just carried on. I also recall reading somewhere that of those who did understand the order, some pressed on anyway. The men who returned to Britain landed at Nijmegen a day or two later. Ranger Steve (talk) 16:32, 8 August 2010 (UTC)

Casualties

Recent edits of the infobox have changed the German casualty figure from "3300-8000" to "22315-29000". Fair enough. However, the Ryan p. 457 and Notes on the operations of 21 Army Group 6 June 1944 - 5 May 1945, p. 32 citations have not changed. Can this be so? I have neither so cannot check. Will someone do the necessary please? Stephen Kirrage ^{talk - contribs} 09:46, 13 October 2010 (UTC)

Recent casualties edits

Ok, what is this all about? EnigmaMcmxc you are an expericend wiki-editor, why do you have to do this? There are 3 sources of different historians who all three give the same estimation of complete casualties for the Germans in a range of 6400-13300. You just cant take a fourth source which is even a primary source and sum its somehow dubious number of 16000 prisoners up with the already complete numbers of the other sources. Thats just plain OR, as you dont know how these numbers are related. Its very unlikely that those expert historians just ignored your source. The same sources are used for the complete allied figures without such strange summing up.

Beside this, 16000 prisoners would be a whole division the Germans lost, which seems more than unrealistic, as there was no German unit trapped somewhere. I unfortunetely cant check the source, but according to this http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/jscsc/jscsc-library/bibliographies/campaign-and-battle-studies/ArnhemInternet.pdf it is not held in very high regard. So please dont let this become a senseless edit war... StoneProphet (talk) 18:00, 18 November 2010 (UTC)

Lets stop having the conversation in the edit summaries. Can somebody tell me which sources say what please (the edit history is a bit thick to wade through). Cheers, Ranger Steve ^Talk 19:08, 18 November 2010 (UTC)

StoneProphet am sorry but your argument is somewhat stopped dead in its tracks by the fact the information you added does not include prisoners it precisely mentions wounded and dead only. An independent source provides the figures for those captured by the Army Group during the campaign (one should remember that VIII, XII, and XXX Corps were all in action). It is not original research since the source specifically notes prisoners only and sources such as your own specifically state what casualties are being counted (Reynolds work, as quoted, talks of those killed alone). To remove it because you do not know why historians have not used it (purely speculation; i've seen pretty respected historians use said document and is how i got onto it in the first place), and because you do not agree with it goes against everything this project stands for.

As for the evidence brought forth to debunk the source, am sorry but a work that says it covers the campaign in “general terms” is not the same as “not [being] held in very high regard”. The source is a 59 page document covering the actions of an Army Group from D-Day to the end of the war, it CANT go into detail. How exactly does 16,000 men seem unrealistic; this is the same campaign that saw most of the 1st Airborne Division surrender (wasnt precisely surrounded), not to mention a campaign that punched a 50 mile (off the top of my head) hole in the German lines and was on the back of a campaign and advance that had taken half a million prisoners. The numbers captured do not seem that unrealistic when smaller operations in Normandy took impressive figures for just a 2-3 days work, and battles elsewhere of the same length of time took even more prisoners. Unless we have definite proof that the source is wrong, that another source provides prisoner information this source cannot be removed as the article then presents an a-historical, inaccurate reflection of the losses on both sides of the operation – one that includes everything and one that includes only those killed and wounded.

Other than that i agree, this should not become a senceless edit warEnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:32, 18 November 2010 (UTC)

Steve, the source in question is 'Notes on the operations of 21 Army Group 6 June 1944 - 5 May 1945'. While i have a pdf of the original document, or at least a pdf of a copy of the original, the report has since been reprinted here. While it might just be the prublishers tooting their own horns to sell books they note "This report is a short but very detailed account of all operations carried out by 21 Army Group from 6 June 1944 to 5 May 1945."

Regards, EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:45, 18 November 2010 (UTC)

If this source says that the Germans lost 16,000 men as prisoners only, what does it says about general casualties (dead and wounded)? And are you really sure that those 16,000 are only for the Market Garden operation, only from 17–25 September and only in this small area? 16,000 prisoners -> 30,000 overall casualties out of about 80,000 means that entire units of the Germans must have ceased to exist (especially if some divisions were also understrenght before the operation), but this is nowhere mentioned. 30,000 overall casualties against 15,000 allied casualties would also make this operation not a failure for the Allies, it would make it a desastrous tactial defeat for the Germans, something which even Montgomery didnt claimed (as far as i know). Could you uploaded the pdf somewhere please? I would appreciate that.

And a last point: The same sources are also used for the allied casualties, so i should guess that they are missing the prisoners too?

@ Steve 2 of the 3 other sources (Ryan and Badsey) are available @ google books and the precise numbers are also in the notes section at note 10. StoneProphet (talk) 21:04, 18 November 2010 (UTC)

Ok i just looked into Kershaws book and he is definitely speaking about "total casualties" and not only about dead and wounded. He even has a list which includes casualties for every participated German unit. The same is for Ryans book who is also speaking about "lost men" (killed, wounded and missing). Therefore you cant assume that those authors are only talking about dead and wounded while ignoring captured soldiers and thats why it is not justified to just sum their numbers with those 16,000 from this 1944 paper up and present this as total German casualties. StoneProphet (talk) 23:45, 18 November 2010 (UTC)

Right, lets get to the bottom of all this. Re-consulting the sources Ryan notes “complete German figures remain unknown but in Arnhem ... admitted casualties came to 3,300 including 1,300 dead. ... no figure breakdown is available for the number of enemy killed, wounded and missing, from the breakout ... [fighting along corridor] ... i would conservatively estimate that Army Group B lost at leasy another 7,500-10,000 men of which perhaps a quarter were killed”.

Reynolds notes: “Precise details of German casualties do not exist but they totalled about 6,400. Robert Kershaw(40) estimates that, in addition to some 2,565 lost north of the lower Rhine, including 1,240 men of the Hohenstaufen, the Germans may have lost another 3,750 men in the fighting around the XXX Corps corridor, including 750 men from the Frundsberg.”

Source 40 = Kershaw, It never snows in September, pp. 339-40

We have the information you provided: “Stephen Badsey states that "other calculations place [German losses] at 2,000 dead and 6,000 wounded".[110]”

Ellis provides no information than already discussed, Hasting appears not to provide any figure for the Germans, i have another source on Market Garden (forget its name though!) on order but has yet to arrive and we are still somewhat stuck with a 1946 Army Group report that states 16,000 men were hauled in as prisoners during the campaign. However I do agree that, on relooking at the sources, the information is too ambiguous to be able to provide a range like we can do with other sources.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 00:15, 19 November 2010 (UTC)

(e/c) My books are in boxes at the moment, but Ryan was on top. Although he isn't clear I believe he is talking about POWs as well as killed and wounded. Harclerode is vague (50% casualties?!), Badsey suggests 2000 killed, 6000 wounded. Kershaw might be talking about POWs, but only uses 'missing' once in his list of units. It s worth noting that in the entire Arnhem area (in which this example is included)it seems unlikely that any of the missing Germans became POWs - save the hundred or so who were captured but left behind when the British withdrew (I doubt they are included in the list). It is therefore hard to say whether the Market Garden corridor figures reflect POWs either. This is all roughly in line with the article's note (although Kershaw does say possible figures of over 8000), but what is common through all of these sources is the understanding that records are incomplete, patchy and vague. This doesn't seem to be well reflected in the article yet, and the losses section could definitely use some expansion to explain this.

As for the 21st Army group source, I don't doubt it. What is possible is that this more accurately reflects the actions of VIII and XII Corps as well, whereas modern texts largely ignore them. Again, expanding the losses section could help clarify all of this (with appropriate sources). Just a thought before I go to bed after spending too long packing! Ranger Steve ^Talk 00:20, 19 November 2010 (UTC)

The two books that comprises XXX Corps "official history" speak nothing when it comes to stats, while VIII Corps' history claims 1,100 POWs picked up during their supporting operations. 15th Scottish provide no info on their role in the battle, 7th Armour claim either 200, or 400 POWs in a short space of time towards the end of the campaign as well inflicting heavy losses once again the wording very ambigious but does not deserters and lots of them in the tallys; so nothing concrete on XII Corps role, in addition i dont even know if the Corps even has any sort of official campaign history.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 00:43, 19 November 2010 (UTC)

Yes the German casualties numbers are incomplete in every source and we may never know them. Nevertheless most sources agree on a particular range. Ryan estimates them at 3,300 + 7,500-10,000. Badsey at 8,000. Kershaw gives a detailed estimation (but admits its incomplete) for every german unit which participated in the battle and concludes with (on page 339-340 - dont seems to be in the article) "2,565 or 5,175" at Arnhem + 3,750 at the corridor = "6,315 or 8,925" and is definitely talking about total casualties. Ryan is also talking about total casualties on p. 599: "While no figure breakdown is available for the number of enemy killed, wounded and missing" ... "I would conservatively estimate that Army Group B lost at least another 7,500-10,000 men of which prehaps a quarter were killed." More sources are not available to me, but it obviously seems that there is some kind of consensus within those historians and you will never find a source which places German casualties above 15,000 or so. I Think this army paper, i dont know what it contains, gives wrong numbers, or more likely, is not limited to those 8 days in this particulary area. The losses section and the infobox so maybe should reflect the problem of the incomplete data, but it nevertheless should be based on the consensus all sources do agree on - the 6.400-13,000 range, because there is just no source which places the casualties above this range - and definitely not at 30,000.StoneProphet (talk) 00:48, 19 November 2010 (UTC)

I had a quick look last night at the OH, VIII Corps history and a book on OB West reports and couldn't throw any more light on this I'm afraid.Keith-264 (talk) 19:14, 19 November 2010 (UTC)

I editet the losses sections according to the sources and just put everything in. I hope you agree on this. StoneProphet (talk) 23:46, 19 November 2010 (UTC)

With nothing removed from the article and everything included, seems fine.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 12:41, 20 November 2010 (UTC)

'To C.-in-C. West, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, September 27, 1944' from Field Marshal Model has a paragraph beginning 'During the period between September 1 and 25, our heavy losses were about 75,000 men; during the same period we received only 6,500 men as replacements. "Army of the West The weekly reports of German army group B from Normandy to the West Wall" J.A. Wood (Ed) p. 224 (2007) so 16,000 prisoners isn't an outrageous number for M-G.Keith-264 (talk) 19:11, 20 November 2010 (UTC)

Medal of Honor Vanguard

In the game Medal of Honor Vanguard the third level is Operation Market Garden. Even the MOH Vanguard page says that. So I feel that it should be mentioned here because the other MOH games are mentioned in the media section. 72.240.109.158 (talk) 02:12, 3 March 2011 (UTC)

"He [Model] made a mad dash for a safer location"

Hasn't this been debunked? I first read this claim in Cornelius Ryan, and it is repeated in the 1977 movie. 'It Never Snows in September' makes the point that, despite his supposed 'mad dash', Model took the time to clear every trace of his staff's presence from the hotel he was in. Allied troops took it over and themselves used it as an HQ without once noticing that hours earlier it had been a German field marshal's HQ. Model meanwhile remained in command and control, and co-ordinated what proved to be a successful defence.

This doesn't sound like a self-centred man running in panic, as Ryan, the movie and this article suggest. It sounds like he worked out what the paratroopers were after, realised they would probably find the current building as useful as he had, and would be heading his way imminently. So he decamped not in a mad panic but only after first quite properly making sure everything of value to the enemy, including the knowledge that he had been there, was removed or erased.

When you consider that some cretin of an allied officer landed with - and lost - the entire operational plan in a briefcase, it seems like a misplaced cheap shot to try to claim the victor of the battle ran away in a panic. Can we have a cite for this? Otherwise I will remove it. Tirailleur (talk) 10:36, 10 May 2011 (UTC)

I'll have a look in Kershaw later to see how well he describes it. Either way, there are a plethora of sources that state Model's departure was a fairly hurried affair. The Allies didn't take over his HQ; Model was at the Tafelberg, the Allies took over the Hartenstein, which was used to accommodate some of his staff. If you can find a source for anything you've written above, feel free to add it, but I've not seen nothing that supports it. Ranger Steve ^Talk 11:04, 10 May 2011 (UTC)

Actually you're pretty near the mark, although Kershaw does say that Model left immediately and left his staff to clear up. Waddy, who was treated there, noted that there was no evidence of it being a HQ, so they presumably did a good job. Model does appear to have got out straight away though, but feel free to amend the section. I tip my hat. (PS. One amendment to my comment above, I meant the Allies didn't take over his HQ as their HQ, obviously they did occupy it). Cheers, Ranger Steve ^Talk 19:28, 10 May 2011 (UTC)

unsuccessful?

The opening of the article says that that the operation was unsuccessful. Is this wholly accurate? Wouldn't it be more accurate to say "partially unsccessful"? Two of the three major target bridges were captured. Montalban (talk) 04:12, 11 November 2011 (UTC)

No their objective was to capture all the bridges, Arnhem being the most important. Remember the intention was to then sweep around behind the German forces on the North German plain. Without the final bridge the land captured led nowhere, and Arnhem was not liberated until just before the end of the war.Jim Sweeney (talk) 07:46, 11 November 2011 (UTC)

Yes, I get that, but as they got 2 out of 3 then it's not wholly unsuccessful

Montalban (talk) 09:12, 11 November 2011 (UTC)

Given that for the operation to be successful all the major bridges had to be captured and held, the failure to secure the bridge at Arnhem led to the failure of the entire operation. Pretty much every account of this battle I've read assesses it as being a failure for the Allies as the end result was heavy casualties to their elite units and an almost useless and difficult to hold salient. Nick-D (talk) 09:39, 11 November 2011 (UTC)

Didn't Monty call it 90% successful? Montalban (talk) 04:11, 12 November 2011 (UTC)

The opinions of objective historians should count higher than Monty or any other person who had a horse in the race. Binksternet (talk) 05:23, 12 November 2011 (UTC)

Montgomery, faced with the failure of the operation and loss of face to Churchill and Eisenhower, had to try to spin it the best that he could. The object of the plan was to get over the Rhine and invade Germany - that didn't happen, for various reasons - bad intelligence being one of them. History has judged the operation as a failure - this does not reflect on the bravery of the men involved or the earnest intentions of its planners.HammerFilmFan (talk) 04:32, 10 March 2012 (UTC)

Date inconsistency

The section on Allied intelligence mentions: "On 16 September ULTRA decrypts revealed the movement of 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions to Nijmegen and Arnhem, creating enough concern for Eisenhower to send his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, to raise the issue with Montgomery on 10 September". Considering it's hard to raise an issue 6 days before it was discovered one of these dates must be incorrect. I suspect the first one should be 6 instead of 16, but don't have the sources to back it up. - Curry684 (talk) 00:38, 15 November 2011 (UTC)

Location

The info box says Location: The Netherlands and Germany, but I've never read of any action taking place on the German side of the border during Market or Garden. I've checked the german, dutch and french wiki pages and their info boxes say either "Eindhoven-Arnhem corridor [in the Netherlands]" or simply "Netherlands".

The German WP page mentions (without citation) that:

"Ein kleiner Trupp der 82. (US-Luftlandedivision) marschierte auf direktem Weg zu seinem Sammelpunkt. Da das Operationsgebiet nahe der deutsch-niederländischen Grenze lag und die Grenzführung dort bis heute sehr irreführend geregelt ist, überquerten die Soldaten dieses Trupps bei Weeze als erste Alliierte die deutsche Grenze; sie verließen das Reichsgebiet nach etwa hundert Metern wieder, ohne Feindkontakt gehabt zu haben. Von dieser Begebenheit existieren keine Bilder und niemandem des Trupps war es wohl bewusst; auch die Deutschen schienen es nicht bemerkt zu haben, es fiel erst nach dem Krieg auf."

Basically it says that a small group of US paratroopers crossed 100 meters of German territory on the way from their landing point to their collection point.

While this seems to have been the first crossing of the German border by Allied combat troops, I feel it's nevertheless misleading to say that the Market Garden Operation took place partially in Germany. Scartboy (talk) 23:53, 3 December 2011 (UTC)

B-class review

This article is currently at start/C class, but could be improved to B-class if it had more (inline) citations. --_{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk to me} 18:07, 8 May 2012 (UTC)

Operation Varsity Footnote

" e.^ Operation Varsity in 1945 involved more planes, gliders, and troops on D-Day than in Market, but additional airborne troops flown in on subsequent days made Market Garden the larger operation.[17]"

Operation Varsity wasn't part of D-Day. I'm not sure if I'm missing something here, but I think the mention of D-Day should be removed. It should probably say more troops etc. on a single day than in Market. Also the citation says 17, the popup text if for 8, and links to 15. Could someone with beter knowledge of the subject please update this? Isolater (talk) 02:00, 16 January 2013 (UTC)

D-Day probably refers to the day of the operation being launched, rather than 6 June. See D-Day (military term). Can someone who edits the article more frequently, confirm?EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 02:37, 16 January 2013 (UTC)

Germaansche SS in Nederland

Why was this mainly political organization mentioned as a belligerent? By that time most of its members were in the Waffen-SS. Fnorp (talk) 10:41, 20 February 2013 (UTC)

You've got red on you

Repaired the unlinked references and moved unreferenced links to further reading.Keith-264 (talk) 19:49, 23 August 2013 (UTC)

Bridge that "should have been" captured?

The sentence at issue currently reads "The boats were requested for late afternoon but did not arrive at that time. Once again XXX Corps was held up in front of a bridge which should have been captured before they arrived."

It might be fairer to write that "Once again XXX Corps was held up in front of a bridge which planners had expected to have been captured before they arrived." In writing "should have been", there is the implication that the airborne unit tasked with its capture had shown a lack of courage or initiative, that the air transport command had dropped them in the wrong place, or something like that.

In war, it often happens that undetected enemy reserves intervene, that the enemy acts with a degree of courage and initiative beyond the expectations of the operation's planners, or even that the enemy just gets lucky. All these things can lead to reverses that were not expected. Historygamer (talk) 21:53, 11 November 2013 (UTC)

Intelligence (German) section

Quote: ' The left wing would cover the Army's northern flank by moving up to the Waal near Nijmegen and isolating the German 15th Army situated on the Dutch coast.[91][92]'

Nijmegen is not anywhere near the Dutch coast. It's necessary to elaborate upon how taking ground around Nijmegen would have isolated German forces on the coast; (and which 'coast' is being referrred to?)188.29.126.66 (talk) 17:18, 2 January 2015 (UTC)

Popular culture

Not sure if it's an appropriate piece of information to include given the serious tone of this article, but I thought it might be worth mentioning that Operation Market Garden featured in the video game, Medal of Honor: Vanguard.

Perhaps worth mentioning this in a new section entitled, 'In popular culture' or similar?

Any thoughts on this would be appreciated.

R3troSim (talk) 16:48, 26 February 2015 (UTC)

Personally, I would argue no to videogames (inclusion would render the question of what should be included since there are tons of games that are based on the op, or use it as inspiration) although I think a better case can be made for movies due to larger impact they have (in terms of viewing and cultural impact).EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 18:23, 26 February 2015 (UTC)

Popular culture pah! The article is about the Arnhem gig not Mickey Mouse pac-man games. I mean this with empathy of course....;O) Keith-264 (talk) 19:31, 26 February 2015 (UTC)

No, that's fine, understood. Said section suggestion isn't appropriate for inclusion in this article because it doesn't add to the weight or meaning of it, as well as being completely off tone. Thanks for the comments anyway though :-) R3troSim (talk) 18:14, 1 March 2015 (UTC)

Nothing but the best for the Wikiworkers! ;O)Keith-264 (talk) 22:38, 1 March 2015 (UTC)

We could create a separate article (dedicated to games, movies, books, monuments etc) and put a link in the see also section, considering the subject does seem to come up often via edits. Such a move would allow the outlet for trivia and keep this article focused.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 01:59, 2 March 2015 (UTC)

Good idea. Keith-264 (talk) 07:10, 2 March 2015 (UTC)

Second that. Just to clarify, a separate article for, say, World War Two related trivia, so that the main related articles aren't distracted or cluttered by them? I'd be interested in working on something like that. :) R3troSim (talk) 20:53, 2 March 2015 (UTC)

We've tried that already. Spin off a trivia article and pack it full of all the useless stuff. Then nominate it for deletion. Hawkeye7 (talk) 19:54, 3 March 2015 (UTC)

I see. Perhaps something not worth pursuing at the moment. R3troSim (talk) 22:46, 3 March 2015 (UTC)

Infobox

What is wrong with it? Well other than pretty much no other article does this and there is a dedicated article for this, per Template:Infobox military conflict: "A military conflict infobox (sometimes referred to as a warbox) may be used to summarize information about a particular military conflict (a battle, campaign, war, or group of related wars) in a standard manner" (my emphasis).

The template also highlights "units1/units2/units3 – optional – the units or formations involved. If a large number of distinct formations is present, it may be better to reference an order of battle in the body of the article than to include the entire list in this field. The units3 field can only be used if the combatant3 field is set" (my emphasis). EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 22:37, 22 August 2015 (UTC)

I agree - this is much too detailed, especially as we also have an Operation Market Garden order of battle article. Nick-D (talk) 22:54, 22 August 2015 (UTC)

that's where i got the details, which are vastly more expansive. i only added the main units SyriaWarLato (talk) 23:15, 22 August 2015 (UTC)

The main units (ignoring several incorrect divisional titles) included VIII and XII Corps, who played only a peripheral role? The main units included most of the German divisions in the Netherlands, most of whom - on the list - are not mentioned within the article and their own articles mentioned practically nothing on the operation?EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 23:37, 22 August 2015 (UTC)

then that's an issue with the OOB that has to be corrected on the page and infobox. SyriaWarLato (talk) 23:55, 22 August 2015 (UTC)

No. Your argument was you have only transposed the main units into the infobox. My argument is that you have copied the entire order of battle over for several armies, which is way to detailed. Your own response acknowledges a level of ignorance on what the main units actually were for this battle (that is not an issue for the detailed OOB page).EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 00:25, 23 August 2015 (UTC)

Infoboxes are not meant to have anything like the current level of detail: please note that the guidance for this field at Template:Infobox military conflict says that "If a large number of distinct formations is present, it may be better to reference an order of battle in the body of the article than to include the entire list in this field". I've reverted your change pending further discussion here. Nick-D (talk) 00:01, 23 August 2015 (UTC)

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Possible copyright violation

I have removed a paragraph from Il Silenzio (song) and Operation Market Garden because of possible copyright violation. This paragraph seems to be originally added to these articles in this and this edit in 2014. I was unable to find (using a web search) the original source, but this content has been around the Internet at least since 2010 and it's clear that this removed paragraph was copy pasted from unknown source (maybe from this?) Politrukki (talk) 14:48, 21 November 2015 (UTC)

Edithbridge ?

"Wijchen

At 09:50 the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment was going forward to Wijchen, to attack the Edithbridge from its south end. The bridge was secured. After this fierce engagement they pushed on to the traffic bridge south of Wijchen. Another fierce engagement followed and this bridge was secured. "

Where/what is Edith bridge? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.146.107.64 (talk) 14:16, 19 January 2016 (UTC)

It's the railroad bridge over the Maas between Ravenstein and Niftrik. Fnorp (talk) 09:34, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

Too much detail in a couple of the Nijmegen sections

I have tagged two of the Nijmegen sections to be summarized. Although the extra detail being added is well sourced, it's too detailed for this article. (Hohum ^@) 15:51, 5 January 2016 (UTC)

I have concerns regarding the whole tone of the Nijmegen sections, there seem to be a number of quotes implying that the failure by the 82nd Airborne to immediately seize the Nijmegen Bridge instead of the Groesbeek heights was the cause of XXX Corps' delay and hence the failure of the operation. Having just returned from there and read up on the battle in preparation for my visit, I understand that the Groesbeek Heights were highly strategic and failure to secure them would have made capture of the Nijmegen bridge tenuous as was shown by the repeated German attacks on Groesbeek over the following days.Mztourist (talk) 08:29, 10 April 2016 (UTC)

The failure of the 82nd Airborne at Nijmegen was indeed, and indubitably, the prime cause of the failure of Market Garden. They needed to put men on the Groesbeek heights, but their objective was the road bridge on the Waal. To put two whole regiments at Groesbeek and do nothing about the bridge was an obvious and culpable failure. At 15:00 on 17 September, by Badsey's account, 'Model and Bittrich agreed that the key to the battle was not Arnhem, but Nijmegen road bridge. If the Allied drive could be stopped on the Waal, any success farther north became irrelevant.'

Quite right, and the Germans knew that, but the 82nd Airborne, whose prime objective was that very bridge, weren't interested. At the time of that conference between Model and Bittrich the paratroopers had been on the ground for two hours and, though they'd got the canal bridge at Heumen, they'd let the Germans blow the other two canal bridges and they'd done nothing about Nijmegen or even apparently thought about it, because they were busy 'consolidating' (minding their own backs) at Groesbeek. The whole point of using airborne troops was the speed and suddenness of their arrival, and the bridges had to be taken at once by coups de main, but the 82nd just didn't do anything.

Only after dark was one company of 1st 508th sent to look for the Nijmegen bridge. They were driven off by Kampfgruppe Henke, 'an improvised battalion of soldiers, airmen and railway guards' which the Germans had drummed up while the elite paratroopers were just not doing anything. The article is quite wrong to say (in a conveniently unsourced paragraph) that the 82nd were stopped by SS. There were no SS in Nijmegen that night. The SS could not get through because John Frost's 2 Para had correctly secured their objective, the north end of the Arnhem bridge, and it took many hours for the SS to improvise a ferry at another point. The 82nd were essentially stopped by a bunch of railway ticket collectors.

The next day, the 18th, the 82nd did use two battalions, the 1st and 3rd 508th, and three times they claimed they had taken the bridge, but they hadn't. The SS, up at Arnhem, were still dealing with the ferry problem, and the US paratroopers had, again, been seen off by ticket-collectors. And it just didn't get any better after that. Khamba Tendal (talk) 19:18, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

Apologies. Looking it up, I'm reminded that some SS did visit Nijmegen that night, but they didn't fight there. The recce battalion of 9th SS, with about 400 men in 40 Schwimmwagens, motorcycles, armoured cars, half-tracks and trucks, had just crossed Arnhem bridge in the evening as Frost's 2 Para were arriving. They were scouting on behalf of 10th SS (as the rest of 9th SS was being sent off for a refit), and were told to check as far as Nijmegen for more Allied landings. A while after they went by, the advance guard of 10th SS itself tried to cross and got into trouble with Frost. The 9th SS recce battalion, under Viktor Graebner, who had won the Knight's Cross in Normandy, probed south to Nijmegen, where Graebner found that the scratch Kampfgruppe Henke, the battalion of local odd bods organised since the 82nd Airborne touched down at Groesbeek, was holding the great bridge on the Waal all right and nothing much was happening. Graebner then heard on the radio of his captured British Humber armoured car that 10th SS had a problem back at Arnhem, so he headed off. (Meaning that the 82nd weren't presenting any problem at Nijmegen that the SS even needed to worry about.)

Graebner left some of his cannon-armed half-tracks as a picket at Elst, halfway back from Nijmegen, took the remaining 22 armoured vehicles and trucks to Arnhem and waited for daylight. He then tried to force a passage north across the bridge. Famously, this attempt came to grief, and 2 Para destroyed almost all the vehicles with a 6-pdr and PIATs and killed 70 of the 300 SS including Graebner. This gives a practical illustration of what would happen to even a well-equipped, well-trained, highly experienced SS unit if it ran into an Allied paratroop battalion with the advantage of position.

Which is why the 82nd, who had just been easily seen off by Kampfgruppe Henke (not literally ticket-collectors, but just railway sentries and suchlike), should have moved sooner. The reason they didn't was partly due to Browning's poor orders -- he told Gavin only to move on the Waal bridge when the Grave bridge, the canal bridges and Groesbeek were secure -- and partly due to Gavin's slowness to modify those orders in the light of circumstances. At least one battalion should have been detailed to the bridge in advance, but Gavin only sent one company when the humble second-line local Germans had already reacted, organised and got ready. So the article's still wrong to say that the 82nd were stopped by SS, even though some sources mistakenly make that claim. Khamba Tendal (talk) 17:55, 22 April 2016 (UTC)

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Obscure references maligning brave soldiers

Removing some of the bias against minor figures involved in the operation. It was an English operation, and a mess at that. Responsiblity for the mess is being passed to others such as the Poles and Americans who are not even listed in the commanders section. You can be sure that had it been a victory, the English would have taken full credit. Wallie (talk) 19:13, 26 June 2014 (UTC)

That's correct. But this is nothing new.. Another example: Everybody knows the battle of Waterloo, Wellington and the british victory. Nobody remembers Blücher, his prussian troops and the decisive role they played in that battle. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 93.192.32.5 (talk) 18:04, 8 October 2014 (UTC)

Please learn the difference between "English" and "British". Also, please become aware of the fact that the First Allied Airborne Army, the USSAF, and RAF planned the airborne element of this operation. That is several multinational forces all playing a major role in the planning and carrying out of drop zones, objectives, flying troops in, and conducting the actual fighting. 21st Army Group, who conducted the ground portion of the advance, was also multi-national with British Second Army comprised of Belgian, English, Irish (both from the north and those who had crossed over from the Republic to fight against Nazism), Scots, Welsh, and Germans (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/8635541.stm). So drop the sarcastic racist attitude, and bring a constructive and sourced argument to the table.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:51, 26 June 2014 (UTC)

LOL, racist. British is a race now, is it? <ignore> Both of you, knock it off. This is a controversial article, not at all aided by the massive amount of American vs. British finger-pointing that has dogged the topic for more than half a century. You both look very embarrassing in the year 2014 when you spout 1940s nationalism.

That said, I would note that the general historical consensus has now turned against the plan itself, while retaining a secondary appreciation for the smaller impact created by bad tactics: the American 508th PIR and the British XXX Corps both now come out of the mess looking quite crappy due to their lack of aggression compared to the other airborne units that were desperately fighting to make good on their parts of the plan. Even Gavin was regretful he didn't send his A-team to handle the bridge at Nijmegen, and Monty hated Adair (commander XXX Corps) and had wanted him replaced months ago. BUT....neither of these units decided the battle. The battle was lost before it was started. Regardless of what Patton (all tactical and 0% strategic) thought, it takes a hell of a lot of good tactics to rescue a bad strategy, but any good strategy includes an expectation of a certain amount of bad tactics. Monty's plan had zero wiggle room for bad tactics, bad weather, bad intel or bad anything else. It was a bad plan because it was a tightrope walk based on unverified expectations and unresearched assumptions. If he had not been stomping his feet so hard for a chance to rehabilitate his image as strategic master after Caen and the Falaise Gap, Ike would have rejected it and they would have done something else. He even admitted as much in his post-war writings. But Monty had pull and a flair for the dramatic and Ike had a soft spot for politics, and THAT is why current historical consensus stands where it does. No need to make the matter personal. Vintovka Dragunova (talk) 04:35, 10 July 2014 (UTC)

Adair commanded Guards Armoured Division, not XXX Corps (which was commanded by Brian Horrocks). And Market Garden wasn't 'Monty's plan', it was a plan wished on him, mostly by Washington, where Marshall and Hap Arnold wanted to see their 'star' airborne divisions in dramatic action (see for instance Stephen Badsey, Arnhem 1944: Operation Market Garden, Osprey, 2003, p.9). And it failed because the only possible breakthrough route was too vulnerable, because Browning and Brereton weren't very good and Brereton in particular did nothing, because British 1st Airborne were dropped too far from the target and because US 101st and 82nd Airborne failed to secure the bridges at Son and Nijmegen on time or, indeed, to secure them at all. After Normandy, there was also a rather arrogant expectation by planners that the enemy wouldn't do anything, which, given the enemy were the Germans, was less than clever. 80.189.200.29 (talk) 19:53, 1 July 2015 (UTC)

Have we got a reliable source for Operation Market Garden being planned in Washington? I am not aware of any ETO operation being planned by OPD. Hawkeye7 (talk) 04:12, 2 July 2015 (UTC)

I would think the cited author, Stephen Badsey, is himself a reliable source in Wikipedia terms, as he's a reputable author and a lecturer at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, and his Arnhem book is in the article's bibliography. What he says, and the article seems to reflect this, is: 'Under pressure from Washington, where Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall and General Henry "Hap" Arnold, commanding the Army Air Forces, both wanted a major airborne operation mounted in Europe before the end of the war, Eisenhower placed First Allied Airborne Army under 21st Army Group control.' (Eisenhower had himself created that formation under Brereton a few weeks earlier.) 'As the Allied supply crisis and dispute over strategy worsened, it was from this tangle of conflicting interests that an airborne solution, Operation "Market Garden", started to emerge.' The suggestion is not that people in Washington did the detailed operational planning, but that Washington indicated to Eisenhower that an airborne spectacular was favoured, so if Monty wanted resources from Ike for his 'northern thrust' then an airborne spectacular with the 82nd and 101st involved was what he had to do. Don't know what Badsey's sources are, but, if they're primary documents, those are not considered 'reliable' by Wikipedia -- you have to go with the published secondary sources. The airborne part of Market Garden, the 'daring' part which was supposed to win plaudits, was mainly American in terms of troops and aircraft and was under an American commander, Brereton, who has become almost invisible due to the blame-shifting game: you could be forgiven for imagining that it was Browning's show and that his US superior never existed, even though it was Brereton's order to ground the Allied tactical air forces during the resupply lifts that conceded air superiority over the battlefield to the enemy for the only time in the Northwest Europe campaign, a fairly astounding achievement for an Allied commander, and this may have had at least as much influence on the battle as the well-known problems with the weather and 1st Airborne's radios.

Considering the controversial subject, the article doesn't seem too bad at the moment, and someone has kindly headed off an attempt to blame Capt Lord Carrington MC, as if he could actually have taken on the whole of Bittrich's II SS-Panzer Korps with four Shermans. Khamba Tendal (talk) 18:17, 22 December 2015 (UTC)

As an instance of the American input on the planning, there is Eisenhower's directive of 29 August to Bradley and Montgomery, the relevant parts being:--

'The Commander-in-Chief Northern Group of Armies [i.e. Monty at 21st Army Group], in conjunction with the Commanding General First Allied Airborne Army, will plan and direct the employment of the entire Airborne force which is made available to the Northern Group of Armies to expedite the accomplishment of its assigned missions... The First Allied Airborne Army, in conjunction with the Northern Group of Armies, will plan and prepare for launching an airborne assault to insure the destruction of the retreating enemy forces. Planning and initial employment, in co-ordination with the Allied Naval and Air Commanders concerned, will be as directed by the Commander-in-Chief Northern Group of Armies. After their employment as indicated above, the airborne troops must be rapidly assembled in preparation for future operations to the north.' (Shaef SGS file 381, ff 338-361 [HS/SHAEF/297/3], cited in Ellis, Victory in the West Vol. I, Cabinet edition, pp.475-6.)

Eisenhower agreed with Monty that the northern thrust by 21st Army Group should have priority, and the Airborne Army's transport aircraft in England had limited range and could only be committed to 21st Army Group, so Monty was assigned the Airborne Army and was expected to do something with it. As to what he should do... on 29 August the plan was to drop Airborne Army on Tournai in Belgium, just across the French border, and this was cancelled because of the speed of the British armour's advance, 200 miles in a week, with Horrocks making 30 miles to Amiens on the night of 30-31 August and reaching Antwerp on 4 September.

Monty then had the problem of the Scheldt estuary, where the Germans were digging in on Walcheren island and South Beveland to stop the Allies opening Antwerp to shipping. So he proposed Operation Infatuate, with Airborne Army dropped on Walcheren and South Beveland and Horrocks hooking left to follow on. Brereton at Airborne Army refused to do that because of the flak on Walcheren and South Beveland, plus he said the terrain was too boggy, so that was off. Then, since Antwerp wouldn't be so important if the war could be won in the next few weeks, Monty proposed a right hook to Cleve, Goch and Wesel, with Airborne dropped in advance and Horrocks following on again, and Brereton refused to do that because he didn't like the flak in the Ruhr, so that was off too.

Since Brereton wouldn't let Monty go either left or right, Monty could only go up the middle, and there was only one road he could use, from Joe's Bridge to Eindhoven, Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem. So he proposed -- economically, without trying to burn up the whole Airborne force at once -- Operation Comet, a drop by British 1st Airborne and 1st Polish Para Brigade on Nijmegen and Arnhem, with Horrocks and XXX Corps (who'd proved they could advance at shattering speed) to follow on. That was on 7 September, and Sosabowski of 1st Polish said, 'But the Germans, general! The Germans!' and on reflection Monty had to take into account the Germans' amazing powers of recuperation, even though Ike said they were finished, so instead he proposed Market Garden, with the whole of Airborne Army in play the way Ike wanted. From 8 September there was added urgency, because the first V-2s landed on London, and on 9 September Brooke as CIGS signalled Monty that he'd need to overrun those rocket sites soonest, and that was agreed by Ike and Monty at their infamous 10 September meeting at Brussels airfield. So Market Garden was on.

And it should have worked, except that Brereton made that strange order to ground 2nd Tactical Air Force during his lifts and cede air superiority to the enemy, and his sidekick Brig Gen Paul Williams of IX Troop Carrier Command insisted on only one lift per day instead of the two that the British wanted, because Williams said American pilots and ground crew weren't used to working that hard and it might be too much for them. The Germans rapidly identified the inexplicably lazy single-lift policy, forcing the Airborne to fight at half strength for days and nullifying the shock effect, as the Allies' greatest mistake. Khamba Tendal (talk) 18:42, 27 April 2016 (UTC)

The original Market Garden plan was for the airborne lifts to commence on the first day and operate continuously throughout the succeeding days and nights but Brereton's transport and glider crews couldn't fly at night (which the RAF crews could) so the lifts were staged over several days during daylight hours instead. The RAF crews could also operate in bad weather so why they didn't continue the lifts, guided by Rebecca, which all RAF Dakotas were by then fitted with, when the weather worsened I don't know.

Market Garden was a risky operation that needed more than its fair share of good luck to succeed. Unfortunately for the Allies it didn't get it.

BTW, it wasn't the British who allowed one of the three bridges necessary for the operation's success to be blown up, nor did they then go around blaming the people who did allow the bridge to be blown up. Nor for that matter did they go around appointing blame on the bunch of incompetents responsible for the Ardennes Debacle, either.— Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.173.52 (talk) 14:33, 8 December 2017 (UTC)

16 september 1944

Hello, I have a question about the 16 september bombing off the dutch railway station Den Bosch (older name is " 's Hertogenbosch ") https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%27s-Hertogenbosch_railway_station https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Station_%27s-Hertogenbosch#Het_tweede_station

Is this bombing part off Market-Garden? My family lived ON that area since my grandfather worked for the National Railways of the netherlands. Its reasonable to think that such a bombing might clear the way for eg Garden troops although they mostly flew over this area. Maybe its a "common" war act, which aims to destroy all means off an proposed enemy. 85.149.83.125 (talk) 19:01, 3 January 2018 (UTC)

A small problem...

"On 16 September ULTRA decrypts revealed the movement of 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions to Nijmegen and Arnhem, creating enough concern for Eisenhower to send his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, to raise the issue with Montgomery on 10 September..."

Obviously, an error was made with one (or both, I suppose) of these dates. Alas, I don't have a copy of the cited source or particular familiarity with the details of Market Garden to substitute the correct ones myself.

-B.A. 96.83.187.70 (talk) 17:17, 7 August 2017 (UTC)

Crosswell's biography of him concludes that the visit to Montgomery did not actually take place. Aber~enwiki (talk) 08:02, 28 May 2018 (UTC)

"It was fought in the Netherlands and Germany" ?

Where exactly in Germany was this operation fought? -Chumchum7 (talk) 12:51, 17 September 2018 (UTC)

In the Klever Reichswald, in the 82nd Airborne Division sector. (Parts of the ground battle were also fought in Belgium.) Hawkeye7 (discuss) 00:05, 19 September 2018 (UTC)

Wasn't that Operation Veritable ? -Chumchum7 (talk) 11:43, 22 September 2018 (UTC)

It was too, with XXX Corps advancing from the Nijmegen area. If you look at the map, you will see how close the Reichswald was to Nijmegen. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 00:58, 23 September 2018 (UTC)

Piston problems

The article says:

The situation was exacerbated by the fact that 1,400 British three-ton trucks were found to be useless because of faulty pistons in their engines – they could have moved 800 tons per day, enough for two divisions.

But the source says:

During this intense period of activity the maintenance of vehicles inevitably had to be reduced, but partly due to the majority of vehicles being new no serious ill effects ensued. A major fault occurred in the engines of K-5 4x4, three-ton Austins, 1,400 of which, as well as all the replacement engines, were found to be defective and to have piston trouble.

It does not say that the vehicles were unserviceable, just that they gave trouble.

Hawkeye7 (discuss) 21:16, 12 January 2018 (UTC)

The trucks were fixed in the field with even Austin mechanics sent over. They did not make that much difference in supply overall. 2A01:4B00:881D:3700:1D82:23E3:4278:6353 (talk) 11:35, 13 April 2019 (UTC)

== Merge? ==

In common parlance Operation Market Garden is synonymous with the Battle of Arnhem, and the sources such as the new Beevor book don't distinguish the two conceptually, i.e. he calls it the latter while covering the former. There's massive overlap between our two articles, and it's confusing for the general reader. Experts know how to distinguish between the two, and clearly they have done so here, but Wikipedia's mission is not to serve experts. Could I have a show of hands please to check how much support there is for a merge?

• Support.

-Chumchum7 (talk) 05:11, 17 September 2018 (UTC)

• Oppose. I don't accept the premise about 'common parlance'. MrDemeanour (talk) 06:12, 17 September 2018 (UTC)
• Oppose The two topics are quite separate. Market Garden is the entire airborne operation and ground advance (the airborne drops at Arnhem and other locations were code-named Market, and the ground advance Garden). This involved many major battles, of which the Battle of Arnhem was one. As such, Battle of Arnhem is a sub-element of Market-Garden. If the articles' structure is confusing at present, this should be fixed through editing them. From a quick look though, the Battle of Arnhem article seems quite focused on its topic. Nick-D (talk) 10:35, 17 September 2018 (UTC)

I concur that the topics are distinguishable. What I see as potentially confusing is a lack of the sort of overview you have just provided here, in a nutshell. So, this article could be improved by specifically naming these "major battles" in the lede; for example we refer to Arnhem in the lede but to my mind it would help the general reader for us to refer to the Battle of Arnhem instead - and others. -Chumchum7 (talk) 11:08, 17 September 2018 (UTC)

• Oppose Given the size of the operation, the intent some years back was that we would have separate articles covering different aspects of the operation, with Battle of Arnhem covering the actions of the British 1st Airborne Division. At least four editors were involved. The plan was to write separate articles covering Garden, the aerial operations, and the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. (I think we were going to call the one on the 101st's part the Battle of Hell's Highway.) But the project stalled in 2011, and was never completed. Battle of Arnhem is the common name for the British battle; it is not synonymous with Market-Garden. Americans might be surprised (after watching Band of Brothers) that many accounts scarcely mention the Americans at all. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 11:54, 17 September 2018 (UTC)

Thank you for the account of how we got to here. Let's leave it then. There's plenty of expansion still possible in the sections here. I dare say my additions of links to the Battle of Arnhem solve much of my issue in any case. -Chumchum7 (talk) 12:51, 17 September 2018 (UTC)

It should not be called the Battle of Arnhem. It was a subconflict of Market Garden. Battle of Arnhem sounds like a massive stand alone battle. It should be titled, The Arnhem Battle. 2A01:4B00:881D:3700:1D82:23E3:4278:6353 (talk) 11:35, 13 April 2019 (UTC)

How it went

• All crossings were denied to the Germans at the end of d-day, except one, the Nijmegen bridge. The US 82nd failed to move onto the bridge immediately, losing the element of surprise, failing to seize the bridge.
• XXX Corps entered Nijmegen just ahead of schedule on d-day+2 expecting to run over the bridge onto Arnhem relieving the British paras.
• XXX Corps found the Nijmegen bridge still in German hand with German SS infantry all over the town. Something had gone wrong.
• XXX Corps then seized the Nijmegen bridge themselves.
• The 36 hr delay meant the British paras at Arnhem had been over-run, causing the operation to not make a foothold over the Rhine.
• XXX Corps moved over 60 miles into enemy territory.
• XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong, having to seize the Nijmegen bridge themselves which was not one of their objectives, and construct a Bailey bridge at Son.
• The failure point was Gen Gavin of the US 82nd not seizing the Nijmegen bridge immediately. This delayed the operation 36 hours, too long for the British paras to hang onto the Arnhem bridge. They capitulated just as XXX Corps sent 5 tanks over the bridge as they seized it. XXX Corps did their job and even more, the 101st did their job and the British paras did their job. The 82nd failed.

The operation failed to be a 100% success by a whisker, being considered a 90% success for the benefits the salient created.

The above is quite simple to understand, yet the article is all confused full of POV and inaccuracies. 2A01:4B00:881D:3700:1D82:23E3:4278:6353 (talk) 15:42, 13 April 2019 (UTC)

That is not correct. The bridge at Zon in the 101st zone was demolished by the Germans. XXX Corps was delayed by German resistance, and did not reach it on the first day. The bridge at Zon then had to be rebuilt. There was not one bridge at Nijmegen but two - a road bridge and a railway bridge. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 19:05, 13 April 2019 (UTC)

I gave an outline, which is correct. The 12 hour time delay at Son, waiting for a Bailey bridge to be run over the canal, was made up with XXX Corps entering Nijmegen just ahead of schedule - now anout 6 miles from the final Arnhem bridge, having covered 60 miles. The Bailey bridge at Son was completed at 06:00 hr on d-day+2, having being built overnight. XXX Corps' tanks were waiting to run over it. The prime reason for not being a 100% success was the US 82nd not moving immediately to seize the Nijmegen road bridge (prime target), one of the largest bridges in Europe, which allowed German SS infantry to pour south into Nijmegen town also reinforcing the bridge, which only had 18 guards on it. Reading my bullet points above anyone can get it, yet reading the article it is not so easy, it is all over the place. 2A01:4B00:881D:3700:4C85:5058:F72:6EC6 (talk) 09:56, 14 April 2019 (UTC)

Far too many What if's

The article has too many hypotheticals. 2A01:4B00:881D:3700:4C85:5058:F72:6EC6 (talk) 11:18, 14 April 2019 (UTC)

Myths

A lot of this article is unsourced, inaccurate and myth. 2A01:4B00:881D:3700:1D82:23E3:4278:6353 (talk) 15:05, 13 April 2019 (UTC)

Removed the passage saying there was armour in Arnhem when none was there. Ref by RAF given, who state:

"the composition of the German forces at Arnhem was far more complex than most published histories of Market Garden had tended to suggest. The two SS panzer divisions had been operating far below their full strength on the eve of the operation and, while 1st Airborne was ultimately confronted by armour in considerable strength, hardly any tanks were actually present in the Arnhem area on 17 September. The vast majority deployed from Germany or other battle fronts after the airborne landings"

- ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY by the RAF 2A01:4B00:881D:3700:4C85:5058:F72:6EC6 (talk) 11:23, 14 April 2019 (UTC)

There was in fact almost no effective serviceable German armour in Arnhem at the time of the airborne drop, no. The Dirk Bogarde character in A Bridge Too Far (supposedly Boy Browning) is quite right about that, though the American screenwriter William Goldman wishes to suggest otherwise. The powerful German forces that defeated 1st Airborne were not present on 17 September but were railed in from all over Germany in the following days, because Hitler made the defeat of 1st Airborne the absolute national priority. Allied bombers had hitherto dealt with the northern French rail network and had not got to grips with the inner German railways yet. Khamba Tendal (talk) 18:40, 25 September 2019 (UTC)

Brian Urquhart sent home??

I thought this was an invention of the film A Bridge Too Far. Can this be verified one way or the other? FilthiestOfPeasant (talk) 22:20, 20 September 2019 (UTC)

Brian Urquhart is a real person (in the article the name is link to an article about him) and he was at least told to leave.

In Cornelius Ryan's A Bridge Too Far, Urquhart gets reports of armoured units in the Arnhem area and arranges for a photo-recce plane to take obliques shots (to look for tanks, etc, hidden under trees, etc). He takes the images that do show tanks to Browning, who dismisses them as probably not serviceable. Shortly after the Corp medical officer visits Urquhart and tells him that he is exhausted and should go on leave. FerdinandFrog (talk) 18:38, 7 November 2019 (UTC)

The operation was not a failure

A failure is zero. Market Garden was deemed a 90% success by the head of the 21st army group. Allied forces created a salient 60 miles into enemy territory. They reached Arnhem, with only the width of a narrow river between them and German forces in Arnhem. Market Garden was a partial success:

• It created a 60 mile buffer between Antwerp and German forces. Antwerp was the only port taken intact. This buffer proved itself in the German Bulge attack right through US lines.
• It created a staging point to move into Germany at Nijmegen, which happened.
• It eliminated V rocket launching sites aimed at London.
• It isolate the German 15th army in Holland.
• They reached the Rhine.
• The salient was fleshed out.
• The Germans never retook one mm of ground taken.

It was the longest allied advance in the 1944/45 time period. . 2A01:4B00:881D:3700:54EC:968B:FFC3:A48D (talk) 12:22, 15 April 2019 (UTC)

Let us critically examine this:

1. The corridor as such did not create a buffer because at the end of September the Germans, occupying the west of North Brabant, were still very close to Antwerp. Eventually this area was taken but this could have been done at very low cost in the beginning of the month, followed by a quick advance into Zealand, freeing the Western Scheldt for allied shipping. Market Garden only detracted from this more essential objective.
2. This is true. The positions at Groesbeek dominated the Reichswald and eventually allowed to turn the Westwall. But it was a failure of the operation not to exploit this immediately which, again, could have been done at relatively low cost.
3. Those V-2 sites are largely a myth. The corridor area was never used for V-2 launches and launches from Zealand would not have been practical on the longer term. The Germans successfully kept using Holland proper as a launch area.
4. No, it allowed 15th Army to move into North Brabant and it wasn't isolated until March 1945.
5. They reached the Lower Rhine but were driven from this position. They also reached the Waal but to little benefit. They did not cross there in 1945.
6. Indeed, but such a conquest could have been accomplished earlier and at much lower cost without the complex and vulnerable air landings. German forces in the area were very weak and a slow broad front advance by infantry could have reached the lower Maas over its entire length between 5 and 17 September with minimal losses and little logistical support.
7. Ultimately not as they lost the war. At the time though, they recaptured the positions around Arnhem and repeatedly broke the corridor.
8. Disregarding the Eastern Front and the Pacific, the advance from Normandy to Antwerp was considerably longer and swifter. Or did you include this into Market Garden?--MWAK (talk) 07:00, 31 July 2019 (UTC)

Do the great majority of *sources* declare it a success? If they do, then we must follow the sources -- case closed, and editors' opinions don't matter. If they don't, then we must follow the sources -- case closed, and editors' opinions don't matter. --A D Monroe III^(talk) 23:25, 31 July 2019 (UTC)

War is not a sport.

War is not a sport. This was a defeat for the United States and Britain. They set very ambitious goals- "end the war by Christmas" and gain political dominance in Germany and Europe after the war. This they failed to achieve. They suffered heavy losses, and the Germans repulsed the attack. It was a German victory. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 178.155.64.26 (talk) 06:02, 11 February 2020 (UTC)

Aftermath

What a load of tripe. It's biased articles like this that undermine Wikipedia. What happened to the 'Article Policy' of neutral point of view? Honest to heavens "Allied operational failure"!! Why doesn't it just say plain and simple "German victory". The Allies had all those aircraft and soldiers and tanks and guns and faced a beaten enemy - yet that enemy prevented this huge force from achieving it's objective. No wonder young people are turning away from Wikipedia. And in the Aftermath section itself there is not a single reference to the German army being the reason for this 'Allied operational failure'. I mean, it's obvious. The only force opposing the Allies were the Germans. If there had been no Germans opposing them then the outcome would not have been an 'Allied operational failure' Yet this is not discussed anywhere in the Aftermath section. Quite frankly and honestly, this is pathetic. It's like the Germans were an irrelevance. If it hadn't been for the radios or the weather or the faulty intelligence then everything would've been OK. Incredible arrogance. Somebody please do something to improve this dreadful and biased article which pays not the slightest attention to Wikipedia's Article policy of neutrality. 81.152.120.96 (talk) 17:36, 27 October 2018 (UTC)

The operation was partial success - 90% in fact. A failure is zero. Saying the operation was a failure is also wrong. It not being a 100% success was nothing to do with the German army. It was because Gavin of the US 82nd did not seize the Nijmegen bridge immediately allowing German troops to pour into Nijmegen reinforcing the bridge. If the Nijmegen bridge was taken on d-day, XXX Corps, who arrived in Nijmegen just a ahead of schedule, would have reached the British paras at Arnhem and made a bridgehead over the Rhine - operation a 100% success. 2A01:4B00:881D:3700:1D82:23E3:4278:6353 (talk) 14:04, 13 April 2019 (UTC)

You have reliable sources which say it's a German victory? (Hohum ^@) 20:03, 27 October 2018 (UTC)

Hardly a German victory, since the Allies stuck a 50-mile salient into German lines in just a few days and later used that salient to launch the successful Rhineland campaign. Arnhem, by itself, was a German victory, but, since the Germans had to concentrate most of their army in the West, including fresh tank battalions with new-built King Tigers, to subdue a single British airborne division that lacked ammunition, water, food or medical supplies, and it still took them about a week... well, y'know. 'Allied operational failure' is a better description. Khamba Tendal (talk) 18:30, 25 September 2019 (UTC)

Conversely!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Conversely. My opinion is that it was an operational victory for the United States and Britain and a strategic failure for them. For Germany, this was an operational failure, but a strategic victory. The United States and Britain failed in their attempt to cross the Rhine, reach the operational expanse, and capture Central Germany, thus ending the war. They suffered significant losses and captured a small territory. On the part of the Germans was a strategic victory, they lost a small territory, but thwarted the enemy's far-reaching plans. 178.155.64.26 (talk) 10:01, 11 February 2020 (UTC)

NPOV and OR

I know this subject generates a lot of passion. But at the moment – and without taking a position on who, if anyone, is right – the article and particularly the Debate on Allied strategy and tactics is a mess of PoV statements and original research, some sourced and some not. To maintain NPOV are we not supposed to give the source of opinions?

For example, the section below is not sourced and gives a PoV ("lack of guts") without attributing it (except vaguely to "both the British 1st Airborne and the U.S. 82nd Airborne") and the unsourced "Hypothetically" suggests OR as well:

"Hypothetically, had XXX Corps pushed north, they might have arrived at the south end and secured it (had the Guards Armoured sent more than five Sherman tanks across the bridge and had they not been later stopped by the German position at Ressen), leaving the way open for another crossing to the north at some other point. There was the smaller possibility of arriving with Frost's force intact. This perceived "lack of guts" caused some bitterness at the time among members of both the British 1st Airborne and the U.S. 82nd Airborne. As it was, XXX Corps did not resume the drive to Arnhem that night, but rather eighteen hours later."

My point is not whether this is correct or not - it's that it's not NPOV and it's OR.

I'm unsure how to proceed, as I don't want to delete large chunks of the article without discussion, given the sensitivity.

--Shimbo (talk) 13:34, 30 November 2019 (UTC)

The debate exists on whether this operation was a success or not, as most of these talk discussions attest. The typical measure of success is against the strategy set beforehand. Tactics involve who did what, and how much or how little, which is important for assigning blame. These debates started during the operation, quickly gained momentum afterwards, and remain in the present. So, yes, the section is petty, but the ongoing debate centers on these issues, petty or not. The section can certainly be improved, but it's stable for the moment. If removed, I suspect it will restart a lot of POV edits. Handle with care. --A D Monroe III^(talk) 01:05, 12 February 2020 (UTC)

I don't think that really addresses the point. Yes of course there has been much debate for many years over the blame for the failure of Market Garden, but Wikipedia is not a forum for debate. Wikipedia aspires to be NPOV and to only have reliably sourced information. Many reliable sources have participated in the debate and could be referenced, but aren't. Wikipedia is not supposed to present Wikipedian's opinion as fact, nor is it supposed to contain original research. This article includes both currently, IMO. My question is how to resolve that, which leaving the POV and OR in will not do. --Shimbo (talk) 11:42, 12 February 2020 (UTC)

One comment on the opening sentence that states this a "failed...military operation". It was certainly not a "failure" from the German point of view. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2600:6C50:7008:200:C912:C8E2:6D18:1801 (talk) 06:06, 31 July 2020 (UTC)

I agree that how to resolve this is a question; my point is I don't know how. Previous attempts at bringing sources for this (here and related articles) were beaten back with accusations of NPOV and other drama. At least the article is not currently a battlegound. Thus my only advice: precede with care. --A D Monroe III^(talk) 22:29, 12 February 2020 (UTC)

Anything that is not sourced can be removed, and cannot be restored without a proper reference. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 23:18, 12 February 2020 (UTC)