Talk:HMS Victoria (1887)

Latest comment: 2 years ago by Mr Serjeant Buzfuz in topic TA

90 degree turn

edit

A very interesting and well written article. However, as a landlubber myself, I don't understand why a 90 degree turn is more dangerous and requires more space than a 180 degree turn (this seems counter intuitive to me!). Would it be possible to include a diagram showing how this incident occurred? twitter 13:38, 31 August 2006 (UTC)Reply

The 90-degree turn was a tactical maneuver that realigned two parallel columns into a single battle line. The lead ship in each column would simultaneously turn 90 degrees (to port, for example). As each pair of ships in the two lines reached their respective turning points, they too would simultaneously execute the same 90-degree turn. In the meantime, however, the lead ship of the starboard column would be bearing down on the turning point of the port column. Therefore, the columns had to be far enough apart so that all the ships in the port column could execute the turn before being rammed by the lead ship in the starboard column. If the columns were properly spaced, then the lead ship of the starboard column would automatically be in the correct position behind the last ship of the port column, creating a single line. TDJ 15:53, 17 October 2006 (UTC)Reply

that's not how I read your description of a 90 degree turn to port. It would result in a single column 90 degrees to port, with alternate ships from the original port and starboard column. The danger in the turn would be of the ship of the port column ramming the ship ahead in the starboard column before it had steamed to port by more than the distance between the 2 columns. Rcbutcher (talk) 06:25, 24 August 2008 (UTC)Reply

Ah now I understand. Thanks very much. twitter 14:44, 10 November 2006 (UTC)Reply

Grammar

edit

This paragraph:

She was the first battleship to be propelled by triple expansion steam engines and also the first Royal Navy ship to be equipped with a steam turbine, which was used to power a dynamo.

The 'also' is unnecessary and It's ambiguous as to whether Victoria was the first HM Ship to be equipped with steam turbines or a turbo/electric ship. The mixed precedents first battleship, first Royal Navy Ship seem contrived and make it look though the paragraph's been edited down from something more verbose.--87.114.68.69 14:02, 1 January 2008

Calculation of the turning circle

edit

"the normal "tactical" turning circle of the ships had a radius of around 800 yards (730 m) each (and a minimum of 600 yards (550 m), although standing orders required "tactical rudder" to be used in fleet manoeuvres), so if they were less than 1,600 yards (1500 m) apart then a collision was likely." ?? If the minimum turning circle radius was 800 yards, then the ship needed 1600 yards clear space in the direction of the turn : i.e. the diameter of its turning circle was 1600 yards : twice the radius. Hence the columns needed to be 3200 yards apart. Rcbutcher (talk) 06:32, 24 August 2008 (UTC)Reply

According to Hough, Tryon and his staff commander hawkins-Smith discussed the maneuvre before it was begun. Tryon stated he wanted 6 cables between the two columns of ships, but Hawkins-smith said at lest eight cables would be needed to conduct it safely. presumably this must come from evidence given to the enquiry afterwards, and Tryon would not have been able to confirm or deny the conversation, although it sounds as though the flag-captain Bourke was also present. Anyway, It would appear Tryon agreed eight cables was needed, and that in general the three (or two) agreed eight cables was a barely safe distance. So, approximately 4 cables, 800 yards was needed for a 180 degree turn by each ship, which would thus be decribing a circle radius 400 yards. I think the radius stated in the article should read 'diameter', which is consistent with figures stated in it elsewhere. It would appear that Victoria turned tighter than did Camperdown.Sandpiper (talk) 13:03, 9 June 2009 (UTC)Reply

Further, according to Hough, Hawkins-Smith ordered 'extreme helm'. I'm not sure, but this might imply he ordered maximum possible helm and therefore a possible turning circle of 600 yards. This might explain how come Victoria turned faster, and markham hit her? Sandpiper (talk)

Quoted from the report on the disaster by William Henry White;

"When the signal to turn inwards 16 points was hauled down, the helm of the Victoria was put hard to starboard (35 degrees), which corresponded to a tactical diameter of abont 600 yards. At the same moment the helm of the Camperdown was put at 23 degrees to port, which corresponded to a tactical diameter estimated at about 800 yards. Had the helm of the Camperdown been put hard to port, the tactical diameter would have been reduced about 20 per cent." --Simon Harley (talk | library | book reviews) 08:34, 2 July 2009 (UTC)Reply

Tryon and the sinking of HMS Victoria

edit

moved from User talk:Toddy1#Tryon and the sinking of HMS Victoria

Hi. Dont know if you know anything about ship handling and turning? I was thinking about what happened when Camperdown rammed Victoria and why, starting from the premise that Tryon was a competent and innovative admiral who liked to challenge his men with intricate maneuvers. Thus, he must have had in mind a way he expected the turn to work out safely. Camperdown was ordered to make a standard helm turn inwards. Victoria, by contrast, made a tighter maximum helm turn. The natural effect of this would be that by the time victoria and Camperdown met roughly 2/3 the way around the turn, Victoria would be ahead. Markham took avoiding action and tried to turn faster, in fact disobeying the order as given. My question, if I can find someone who understands ship handling, is whether Tryon might in fact have made a reasonable command which ought to have resulted in Camperdown passing just behind Victoria, rather than ramming her side. Intuitively it seems to work and would explain all the circumstances perfectly. The only difficulty would be why no one else has suggested it, or why they have dismissed it. Sandpiper (talk) 22:11, 12 February 2010 (UTC)Reply

Have you read the minutes of the Victoria court martial? Its full title was Minutes of the Proceedings at a Court-Martial Held on Board Her Majesty's Ship "Hibernia," at Malta, on Monday, the Seventeenth day of July 1893; and by Adjournment, Every Day Afterwards (Sunday Excepted) to the Twenty-seventh day of July 1893, to Enquire into the Loss of Her Majesty's Ship "Victoria", published HMSO, 1893. If you do not have a copy of this book, then you can buy it second hand (try AJ Simmonds bookshop +44-(0)-20-8692-1794), or read it at the Public Record Office, at Kew.
You should look at the evidence giving by Captain Arthur William Moore, the captain of the Dreadnought, on pages 76-9. (The Dreadnought was the third ship in the first division.) His evidence is not compatible with your theory. He said, "the Camperdown appeared to be making a bad turn", and when asked to explain said: "I was watching the leaders and it appeared to me that the Victoria was turning quicker than the Camperdown, and that the Camperdown's circle was larger than I would have expected in the circumstances."
He also said that the Dreadnought could have made the turn within the distance by a combination of full helm (34°) and altering the speed of the two screws. Normal manoeuvring limits were 12 to 15 degrees of helm; the Dreadnought had 15° helm at the time. He was asked what he did to avoid a collision and replied: "I ordered the helm hard-a-starboard, full astern with the port engine, and when the head of the ship was clear of the Nile, full speed astern both, and stopped her way."--Toddy1 (talk) 07:31, 13 February 2010 (UTC)Reply
By the way - if the helm is starboard, the ship will turn to port.--Toddy1 (talk) 11:19, 13 February 2010 (UTC)Reply

I think you suggested the report before? Yes I am interested, but also since being impecunious always on the look out for a bargain. Don't get to Kew very often: it would probably be cheaper to buy one. I am becoming more interested so my budget allocation goes up!

As to Moores comments, I'm not sure how that works out. In theory the two ships were supposed to start side by side, 3 cables apart, at the same speed pointing the same way. Thy ought to have kept the same speed through the turn and the same rate of turning if they had been following standard procedure. I read, must have been in Houghs book, that Victoria turned at full maximum helm, presumably meaning she would have turned quicker than Camperdown had Camperdown followed standard procedure. This would accord with the first part of what Moore said. As to the second bit, at first reading it sounded to me as if Camperdown was turning slower than the normal standard rate, but what does he mean by 'in the circumstances'. Does he mean that in the circumstances of having to turn in a shorter distance than his ship could manage just under helm Moore would have expected her to do something extra so as to turn faster, but he only saw her do a normal turn? So he might be saying he saw victoria turn tight but Camperdown turn standard, which was not what he expected in the circumstances?

As far as I know no one suggested that crossing the lines was a possible solution? So either 1) they thought it was possible but hushed it up, 2) they thought it was impossible, perhaps 3) it did not even occur to them to consider it. If 2 or 3 then presumably Moore, watching, would be expecting Camperdown to turn very fast, which she did not. From the wording it does not sound as though he considered the possibility Camperdown might turn very slow and therefore pass entirely outside the column headed by Victoria.

I also need to try to find exactly when and what last minute avoiding action Camperdown took. There seems to have been some confusion about this, something about orders not being carried out immediately. As a comspiracy theorist, or at least an onlooker to a boatload of men trying to shift the blame, I can see that their testimony might not have been the most accurate over this. From Hough, clearly they lied at the hearing over precisely when they decided what to do. So it might be impossible to determine what Camperdown really did towards the end. That should not affect a theoetical analysis of whether the ships would have been in the right positions for the lines to cross if they had just stayed on course. If Tryon had calculated that the exercise ought to work automatically this explains why he apparently paid so little attention to it. Victoria was turning fast, which presumably he would have noted, and Camperdown turning normal, which would have been exactly to plan. He could probably have sneaked a few looks to check as things progressed. SOme fine tuning might be expected at the end. In fact, Camperdwon was just about 1 ships length wrong in its position, and in exactly the direction you might expect from last minute attempts to turn faster. The maneuvre very nearly worked. What I like about this explanation is that it explains how a competent admiral could have been apparently so disinterested as his ships went into peril and ignore the various objections from his officers.

If I went a bit further, I might suggest that since Tryon was dead, a lot of people might have felt it better for the blame to rest with him. The prosecutor was prevented from following certain lines of enquiry which he believed would incriminate Markham. Maybe everyone thought the less said the better about how it should have worked out. I read Fitzgerald's biography of Tryon. He said he wrote it because he thought Tryon had been unfairly treated. Maybe he didnt dare say exactly what he really thought. Come to think about it, he rather glosses over the sinking details. Not willing to lie in print?

Yeah, I am going to have to get the report. Sandpiper (talk) 14:04, 14 February 2010 (UTC)Reply

>3 cables apart, at the same speed pointing the same way. Thy ought to have kept the same speed through the turn

  • They were 6 cables apart (1216 yards).
  • Ships lose speed when turning

--Toddy1 (talk) 19:31, 14 February 2010 (UTC)Reply

sorry about the distance: I thought that about the speed, but then again they must be practiced at keeping station and spacing in line while going through evolutions. The navy seemed to do a lot of that.Sandpiper (talk) 20:20, 14 February 2010 (UTC)Reply

>Victoria turned at full maximum helm

  • Standard procedure for the Victoria was 30° helm before she became Tryon's flagship; Tryon changed this to 28°. The reason for 30° helm was to give the Victoria the same turning circle as the worst vessels in the fleet when their helms were hard over - the Colossus and Edinburgh. In late 1893, the Colossus and Edgar had the worst turning circles in the fleet. (Minutes page 40)
  • The decision to use full helm was not standard procedure and was made by the Staff Commander on his own initiative. (Minutes pages 40-41) Tryon was not aware that the Victoria was using extreme helm and not standard helm. (Minutes page 48)
  • If the Victoria had turned using screws and helm, her turning circle would have been 400 yards. (Minutes page 48). With full helm only the turning circle was just under 600 yards. (Minutes page 34 & 47) The turning circles were the same at speeds from 6 to 10 knots. (Minutes page 45) The speed of the fleet was 8.8 knots. (Minutes page 34) The turning circle of the Camperdown was practically the same as that of the Victoria under ordinary manoeuvring helm. (Minutes page 34)
  • If you read Hough's 1959 book Admirals in Collision, pages 158-9 criticise the Camperdown as "neither a smart ship nor very competently handled" (these quotations were taken from Enigmas by Cdr RT Gould). Interesting to compare this with Captain Moore's comment that "the Camperdown appeared to be making a bad turn". When Moore was asked to elaborate on this, he appeared to be unaware that the Victoria was using more helm than usual.

Regarding explanations, there are two convincing explanations:

  1. Tryon made a mistake, various people on the Victoria queried the order at the time it was given (the account of the accident given by Hough is a summary of the details in the minutes of the Victoria court martial).
  2. Tryon intended the 2nd Division to turn outside the 1st Division, preserving the order of the fleet. Hough makes a believable case for this on pages 164-6 of his book. If this interpretation is correct, it would be wrong to say that Markham disobeyed Tryon's order; he misunderstood it. It is clear what the minutes of evidence that Markham did not understand what Tryon intended, and only obeyed the order after receiving the signal "what are you waiting for".

--Toddy1 (talk) 21:14, 14 February 2010 (UTC)Reply

My scenario calls for Tryon to have been of sound mind, competent and testing his men. He didnt explain what he intended, but for this to be self-consistent, he wouldnt. What he would need to do is arrange the circumstances without tipping anyone off. If it was Hawkins-Smith who set the degree of turn, this was after he and Tryon had discussed what was to happen. What would be necessary was for Tryon to be confident of what Hawkins Smith would do, not for Smith to be given a particular command. Without reading the context, its not clear to me how anyone knew Tryon was not aware of the degree of turn. I got the impression from somewhere that Markham was aware of her degree of turn from watching the ship, possibly from reading her navigation signals? If he knew why would Tryon not?
I think Markham et al's statement they believed Victoria would turn outside them is extremely difficult to credit. Given they were watching her doing a sharp turn it was impossible for them to turn inside Victoria's line. They could turn alongside, turn outside, or got through (or collide, of course). The correct interpretation would seem to be that Markham obeyed the command at face value until he (or someone) finally decided it definitely was not going to work, and tried to dodge. By that point it was too late, of course. From my point of view I would say that Markham disobeyed Tryon's standing order that any commander's prime responsibility in peacetime was to safeguard his ship, by deliberately carying out an order he believed would lead to disaster. I think Markham expected the order to work out somehow, if followed at face value, and this was why he did it. Which brings me back to the question of whether it could have worked, which it seems to me it could, and whether it had a good probability or certainty of working safely, which is unclear. I find it extremely difficult to credit Tryon having made a mistake which he stuck to in the face of so many queries, and since he had a year or more to think about it since setting the same scenario to Tracey in previous maneuvres. Sandpiper (talk) 00:40, 15 February 2010 (UTC)Reply
one of either massie or gordon quotes a letter from another of the captains (Paris?) saying that if anyone except who it was had been captaining Camperdown then the collision would not have happened. Which begs the question of what the chap concerned thought someone more competent would have done instead.Sandpiper (talk) 00:40, 15 February 2010 (UTC)Reply

We know what Tryon and the Staff Commander said to each other, because it is in the Minutes. We also know what distance the Staff Commander thought the two divisions ought to have been apart for the manoeuvre to have been safe, because that too is in the minutes.--Toddy1 (talk) 06:29, 15 February 2010 (UTC)Reply

strictly, we only know one version of the conversation. What is missing is Tryon's version. To address this as a detective, we also need to consider whether the witnesses might have had any reason to lie to protect themselves or others (again, Tryon being dead was not likely to disagree). I do not believe Tryon would necessarily be straight with his officers, because he was setting a test. According to Fitzgerald, that was his habit: explain afterwards. Having a debate about what he intends to do seems to be out of character in itself, though Fitzgerald might not have been in a position to know what Tryon normally discussed with his closest officers.
The staff commanders view of how close the ships should be was based on his understanding of what was to happen. I think he said Tryon agreed with him? ie Tryon agreed that for the manoeuvre the staff commander expected, 4 cables minimum was needed. But Tryon still ordered 3.... It is very hard to read this as a simple mistake. Either he was off his head or he intended something unexpected. Sandpiper (talk) 20:20, 15 February 2010 (UTC)Reply
  1. Read the minutes before you leap to judgement. If you do you will find matters completely different from your understanding.
  2. Given that you keep saying 3 cables and 4 cables, to mean 6 cables and 8 cables, I don't see how you can make comments like "It is very hard to read this as a simple mistake. Either he was off his head or..." You have no time pressures on you at all, and keep stating the wrong distances - and carry on doing so even when I corrected you.
  3. Wikipedia has a policy of no original research. This means that even though your opinion is that the witnesses lied at the court martial, you cannot put this in the article. You can only put information from sources. Given that you admit you don't know about ship handling and you admit you do not know what the witnesses said at the court martial (because you have not read the minutes), I am a bit baffled why you think you are in a position to know that some or all of them lied.
  4. Actually, if the Staff Commander had been able to say that Markham did not do what Tryon intended him to do, it would have got the officers of the Victoria off the hook. If the position was, as you think it was, then the Staff Commander would have had every incentive to say so. The position was that, just like everybody else, the Staff Commander did not understand how Tryon's orders could be implemented safely. The Staff Commander testified that he did not even think that 8 cables was a safe distance for the manoeuvre.

--Toddy1 (talk) 21:24, 15 February 2010 (UTC)Reply

well, 1) I'm not a sailor. If I had suddenly been spirited into Tryons body that might explain what happened, but I havn't been yet. He had a reputation for understanding this stuff. 2) I have no plans to put this into the article, which is why we were having the discussion on a private talk page rather than posting it here as you have now done. 3) The court-martial was hand picked to produce the right result. Markham was never tried despite the prosecutors objections that he would be convicted and Markham was talked out of insisting upon a courtmartial. No one wanted him convicted, so if there was a conspiracy it was to put the best gloss on everything, not just get the Victoria survivors off. 88.105.101.135 (talk) 17:41, 17 February 2010 (UTC)Reply

Wreck

edit

Rusalka and Victoria both sank in the same year, and both ended up in this strange vertical position. Is this coincidence or was there some technical reason that caused ships in this era to sink this way? Mmartins (talk) 22:55, 15 December 2008 (UTC)Reply

Also, how could the propellers have continued to work after capsize and submergence? Mmartins (talk) 22:57, 15 December 2008 (UTC)Reply
The front of the ship flooded (the hole from the collision was towards the front) while bulkheads kept the water away from the engines and boilers. Thus the engines were still running, and still manned, when the ship sank. The front flooded and pulled the rear down. Sandpiper (talk) 12:29, 9 June 2009 (UTC)Reply

Gold coins on Battle Ship?

edit

why so many gold coins on this battle ship, and where did it come from? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.137.150.223 (talk) 23:02, 3 February 2009 (UTC)Reply

article discrepancies

edit

I have noticed one or two discrepancies between our account and that of Hough/Admirals in collision. Which doesn't mean they are wrong, but needs sorting.

Hough says the exhibit at the chicago exhibition had a note pinned on saying the ship had sunk, and rapidly became the biggest draw, whereas we say it was draped in black cloth.(hough p.107)

We say a cofferdam was built on the deck of camperdown.

Kind Hearts and Coronets

edit

The reference in this article was uncited, and the reference made on page 304 of The Rules of the Game was also uncited. It also flies in the face of Alec Guinness, quoted in Brian Lavery's recent book In Which They Served: The Royal Navy Officer Experience in the Second World War as saying that the character of Lord D'Ascoyne was based upon an officer Guinness knew when he was under Royal Navy officer training during the Second World War. --Simon Harley (talk | library | book reviews) 11:29, 10 June 2009 (UTC)Reply

To be fair the article never stated that Guinness based Admiral D'Ascoyne on Tryon, but rather that the incident in the film was based on the ramming and sinking of Victoria. Also try The Summer the Archduke Died by Louis Decimus Rubin. If we have sources saying that the incident was inspired by Camperdown/Victoria, and others that Guinness's portrayal of the admiral was based on someone he knew, the two are hardly incompatible. Benea (talk) 15:55, 10 June 2009 (UTC)Reply
When the source in question (the NMM website) can't even get Tryon as quoted by Lord Gillford correct, then I'd hardly call it reliable. --Simon Harley (talk | library | book reviews) 16:04, 7 July 2009 (UTC)Reply

Hawkins-Smith

edit

This person is never introduced to the reader. What was his rank or function? Chris the speller (talk) 05:24, 28 March 2010 (UTC)Reply

Captain Thomas Hawkins Smith (1845 - 1904) was a Staff Commander in the Navigating Branch of the Royal Navy at the time of the disaster and was the Victoria's navigating officer, specially chosen by Tryon for the position. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 15:27, 28 March 2010 (UTC)Reply
Thanks much. I have added the surname, rank and function to the article. Chris the speller (talk) 15:34, 28 March 2010 (UTC)Reply
at the court martial he kept answering saying he didnt know this or that because he had not been long in the the ship. Sandpiper (talk) 22:20, 5 April 2010 (UTC)Reply

other details

edit

I'm MRINA but not a seaman but certain other thoughts occur to me having read both Houghs book and the article.

On the evidence presented the "Victoria" was probably meant to pass the "Camperdown" on the outside. ie port to port and in opposite directions.

Could some other manouver been considered? What about the manouver that the Royal Horse Artillery carries out called, I think, the scissors? Could the "Camperdown" have been meant to cross the wake of the "Victoria"? Wouldn't this also "preserve the order of the fleet"?

I'm also suspicious that none of the other captains understood the manouver intended and were waiting to see what the two Admirals did before taking any action themselves.

As the only known existing ironclad are there any plans to raise the "Victoria"? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 212.93.199.154 (talk) 12:43, 13 June 2010 (UTC)Reply

The possibility intrigues me too. Its quite tight, the articlr diagram is roughly to scale (maybe ships are too big) and there is about 280 yards clear between ships 120 yards long, but it could be done. If camperdown had arranged to pass just behind victoria it should have worked. What we need is someone experienced with fleet handling who could give a view on whether it would work. I think what actually happened to the other ships after the collision shows it would have been possible for the two columns to turn inwards very tight without colliding or crossing, but only by taking extreme measures (ie turning by reversing one screw). Victoria seems to have signalled she was doing a tight turn without engines (there were signaling devices to indicate if engines were reversed). Markham seems to have started off with a textbook standard turn and then panicked too late, trying to turn faster. I thinkat the time the suggestion that the lines might have crossed was dismissed, but then, would a court-martial made up of the people involved have come to the conclusion that there was a simple workable solution which would have avoided the sinking. What I like most about the scissors is its elegance, it is so in keeping with Tryons style.
Its not quite true to say the captains did nothing. There is testimony that some at least made preparation for a very tight screw turn, but their job was to follow the ship in front.Sandpiper (talk) 19:27, 7 July 2010 (UTC)Reply
Scissors These days we have radar, GPS and datalinks so we can know exactly where ships are and what speed they are doing. Even so, no-one attempts the kind of scissors manoeuvre Sandpiper suggests. In 1893 locations and speeds were estimated; Sandpiper's proposed scissors manoeuvre was infeasible - it could not have been attempted safely with two columns of moving ships.
You do not appreciate just how difficult it is to control and manoeuvre two columns of ships. I think it would be better to constrain discussion to that that is mentioned by the sources.--20.133.0.13 (talk) 08:05, 9 July 2010 (UTC)Reply
Its quite correct I dont know how difficult it is to control two columns of ships in 1890. Does anyone now? I do know that the navy drilled in keeping its ships in line formation at the correct spacing and at constant speed even when executing turns. It was the sort of spit and polish show-off exercises they obsessed about. I remember reading something about an officer discussing the need to adjust engine revolutions during a turn to maintain the correct speed which otherwise would be lost while turning. Might be in the trial transcript. It is a big mistake to assume experienced sailors were incapable of keeping station very well indeed on a clear day in calm weather with whatever technology was available to them. I really think that if Tryon had seen cavalry executing the manoeuvre on a parade ground he would want to do it with his ships. Sandpiper (talk) 19:49, 9 July 2010 (UTC)Reply
Two points. One, station keeping, and the ability to effectively manœuvre one's ship, is still extremely important today for the naval officer. Entering and leaving harbour, docking, and going alongside other ships at sea all require skill which it is expected that the average watch-keeping officer should possess.
As to the sort of "spit and polish show-off exercises they obsessed about", as Matthew Allen makes clear in his demolition of Gordon's views on tactics in the 19th Century, fleet evolutions were designed to drill crews into the necessary manœuvring skills which they would need in action, and upon which actual tactics were based. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 13:09, 10 July 2010 (UTC)Reply
whichever way you look at it, Tryon seems to have been exactly the person to push the envelope and do something extra difficult. Reading the minutes, I think the real problem was that everyone thought the orders could not be executed at face value, but they all had different ideas what exactly to do. WHatever he planned, if he had explained better then there would not have been a sinking, But I think he was customarily deliberately obscure to make people think for themselves. Markham started by Trusting Tryon's judgement, but then half way through decided he had to do something different without knowing what to do. Bourke got Tryons consent to reverse engines. It says he did not ordinarily ask for this, and also that Tryon would not ordinarily have been standing there to be asked. Bourke knew something strange was happening, and wanted to be sure that if he changed course it would not conflict with what was supposed to happen. I dont know how much people were covering their own backs at the trial. It occurred to me that these officers were brought up on sailing ships, and controlling the speed/position of a steam ship must seem easy compared to keeping position by trimming sail.Sandpiper (talk) 09:17, 11 July 2010 (UTC)Reply

Gold coins

edit

At the time of the "Victoria" sinking, wages on board HM Ships were paid in the usual currency of gold sovreigns and half sovreigns. Perhaps the Fleet paymaster kept all his currency on board the flagship. If there were gold coins found on the "Victoria" this is the probable explanation.

It was only in 1916 that Winston Churchill stopped the use of gold for regular wage payouts "as a temporary measure only for the duration of the present war". —Preceding unsigned comment added by 212.93.199.154 (talk) 12:52, 13 June 2010 (UTC)Reply

Burial ground near Tripoli

edit

Do we know the exact location of the exact location of the burial ground near Tripoli, are there any pictures of it, and does it still exist? DuncanHill (talk) 23:47, 6 November 2010 (UTC)Reply

It's a tended Commonwealth War Grave site, the TRIPOLI (VICTORIA) NAVAL CEMETERY. Rumiton (talk) 16:43, 12 January 2011 (UTC)Reply
Many thanks, the CWGC page for it is here. DuncanHill (talk) 15:46, 12 February 2011 (UTC)Reply

Caption

edit

The weight of the guns contributed to instability of the ship and the low forecastle design. Does this mean that the forecastle was designed low to prevent the ship's centre of gravity from rising too high? Rumiton (talk) 15:43, 12 February 2011 (UTC)Reply

Confusion

edit

I did read an account somewhere that due to the considerable weight of the 110 ton guns the forecastle had to be lower than ideal to prevent the ship being top heavy. The Naval Constructors department had long demonstrated that they were aware of scientific principles since the disaster of the "Captain".

Regarding the collision could this be a simple misunderstanding. Was Tryon referring to 200 cables as a RADIUS for turning and everybody else thought he meant 200 cables DIAMETER. The 200 cables RADIUS becomes 400 cables DIAMETER and could have given a reasonably easy turn under rudder only.

The "Victoria" would then have turned outside the "Camperdown" and the "Camperdown" would turn in the opposite direction and observe the naval custom of not crossing the bow of the flagship. Had each ship then followed in turn the order of the fleet would have been preserved but all heading in the reverse direction.

Perhaps at the last moment Tryon may have realised that he hadn't made it clear that he meant 200 cables RADIUS and the order had been interpreted incorrectly. Could this be the remark "Its all my fault (for not specifying RADIUS"?

I suggest this as in the accounts that I have read nobody seems to make it clear whether Radius or diameter was being referred to on the bridge of the "Victoria".

Does anybody else have any thoughts about this as I'm not a seaman?AT Kunene (talk) 12:46, 24 December 2011 (UTC)Reply

I don't think the concept of turning radius would ever enter the mind of a seaman. In turning onto a reciprocal course you want to know how far your new course is displaced from your current one, which is the diameter of the turn. Tryon screwed up, like everyone does from time time, which is why we need other eyes and ears keeping watch with us. Rumiton (talk) 01:18, 17 September 2012 (UTC)Reply

Engine cylinder size can't be right

edit

“had cylinders of diameters 3 in (76 mm), 62 in (1,600 mm) and 96 in (2,400 mm)”

The first cylinder size mentioned here can’t be right, if the second and third ones are correct, I would guess something like 40 inches (1,016 mm) for the first one. Tupelo the typo fixer (talk) 00:44, 17 September 2012 (UTC)Reply

3 in is definitely wrong. Rumiton (talk) 01:20, 17 September 2012 (UTC)Reply
It's 43 in, per this. I changed it. Rumiton (talk) 13:18, 19 September 2012 (UTC) The link didn't work. Try this. http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/39457438 Rumiton (talk) 13:22, 19 September 2012 (UTC)Reply

An Additional Resource

edit

It seems no one has used Enigmas: Another Book of Unexplained Facts by Rupert T. Gould as a resource. He devotes a good thirty pages to the Victoria, and it might be a good source for another take on Tryon's intentions. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.71.71.120 (talk) 19:27, 2 April 2013 (UTC)Reply

Wreck location?

edit

Does anyone know the coordinates? It would be a good addition to the article. --98.246.156.76 (talk) 02:39, 21 May 2013 (UTC)Reply

TA

edit

Does anyone have a source that tells us what this stood for? Rumiton (talk) 02:36, 23 December 2015 (UTC)Reply

I came in to ask this same question. There are references to a "TA system", but it is never explained, as far as I can tell? Mr Serjeant Buzfuz (talk) 22:42, 17 March 2022 (UTC)Reply

wrong side of the road

edit

Reading Hough's book this seems the most likely explanation.

It seems very similar to say a British and American driver on opposite sides of the road. The British is expecting the American to move over to the left, the American expects the British to move over to the right. Both are confused as to what the other is going to do on a tight turn and do nothing until far too late. AT Kunene 123 (talk) 13:58, 5 June 2018 (UTC)Reply

Except driver Tryon had been told beforehand that he was going to be on the wrong side of the road and didn't care. —Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 14:42, 5 June 2018 (UTC)Reply

Spurious accuracy in conversion of distances

edit

Other ships came to a stop 200 yards and 100 yards away respectively. The conversion tag gives these as 180m and 91m. In point of fact the distances are surely certain to have been given as one cable and half a cable respectively. They would be rough distances only, and they are appropriately converted to 200m and 100m. Otherwise we suggest that someone was measuring to the nearest 50 cm the distance between these ships! Springnuts (talk) 13:06, 15 November 2019 (UTC)Reply

Well, they gave the distances in yards. You find a source that states that it was measured in cables and you can put that in. To people who use metric, a yard is usually found behind one's house. I have a better idea what 180 metres is than a "cable length" or a "yard". 200 metres is definitely not 200 yards. Llammakey (talk) 14:17, 15 November 2019 (UTC)Reply
Do you accept the spurious accuracy point about 91m? Springnuts (talk) 08:32, 16 November 2019 (UTC)Reply
No. I'd rather go for accuracy than rounded numbers. 100 yards is not 100 metres. Find a source that says 100 metres and we will convert that into yards. Llammakey (talk) 20:14, 16 November 2019 (UTC)Reply
For this purpose, 100 is perfectly good for either (the accuracy of the canonical number isn't any better). In which case, we don't need the conversion. Andy Dingley (talk) 20:23, 16 November 2019 (UTC)Reply
As a first step I found a link to the court-martial document. I will add that, then look to put the distances in cables as the primary measure where they are so given, since this official document must be an archetypal RS. I note that ships’ turning circles are generally given in yards, (always to a an exact multiple of 100 yards, and with a recognition that turning circles are not an exact science), but distances between ships given in cables, even down to a quarter of a cable. But is it safe to assume general understanding of how long a cable is, or that measuring distances between ships at sea involves approximation, even when done, as (sometimes) in this case, by measuring angles? So in this instance would something on the lines of eg “one cable (approximately 200 metres/yards)” be appropriate? Springnuts (talk) 09:32, 18 November 2019 (UTC)Reply
  • I think cables and yards would be appropriate. Some would recognise cables, and there's value to using them if that's the likely unit for comparisons with other contemporary documents. But far from "everyone" or "general understanding". Andy Dingley (talk) 11:14, 18 November 2019 (UTC)Reply
I don't understand? If measurements at sea are approximate and that is what you are looking for, why not put the word "approximately" in front of 200 yards? Why all this roundabout way to eliminate the 91 metres? I disagree on the 100 being perfectly good. 100 yards is not 100 metres. Do not introduce intentional factual inaccuracy. It's one thing for the source to be inaccurate but for editors to then double down and introduce even more inaccuracy because you like rounded numbers...I'd have to bring this up for review if that were the case. Llammakey (talk) 12:59, 18 November 2019 (UTC)Reply
  • "Approximately 200 yards" is good. "Aproximately 200 yards (approximately 200 m)" is pointless. "Aproximately 200 yards (approximately 180 m)" would be worse, as it implies an extra digit of precision that we can't justify. Andy Dingley (talk) 15:59, 18 November 2019 (UTC)Reply
Uh no. Approx 200 yards makes metric users learn imperial measurements just because, and 200 yards (180 m) is not approx 200 metres. That is a variance of 40 metres because 200 yards is 220 metres. That is 120 feet if you cannot do the metric math, roughly half the length of the ship. That is not approximately. Llammakey (talk) 16:21, 18 November 2019 (UTC)Reply
Thanks for the correction. Now I feel OK about ignoring you. Andy Dingley (talk) 16:36, 18 November 2019 (UTC)Reply
Great, ditto. I will also have to go about checking your work for factual inaccuracies now. Good stuff. Llammakey (talk) 12:38, 19 November 2019 (UTC)Reply
As that's a clear threat to WP:HOUND [1] [2], I will insist that you at least get your arithmetic right this time. Andy Dingley (talk) 15:00, 19 November 2019 (UTC)Reply
Please reread WP:HOUND. Once again, you introduced a factual error. "Correct use of an editor's history includes (but is not limited to) fixing unambiguous errors or violations of Wikipedia policy, or correcting related problems on multiple articles". Llammakey (talk) 16:42, 19 November 2019 (UTC)Reply
"a factual error" Which was? Andy Dingley (talk) 19:05, 19 November 2019 (UTC)Reply
You know what, I apologize. I let my pride and anger get in my way. I will not hound you or otherwise follow you around. You are a good editor, and I shouldn't have let the red mist descend. I hope you have a good day. I'm sorry once again. Llammakey (talk) 14:09, 21 November 2019 (UTC)Reply

Snipe Point

edit

Would anyone happen to know the exact location of "Snipe Point near Platea on the Greek coast" where the grounding of 1892 took place? As far as I can ascertain, the nearest harbour near Plataea (which is several miles inland) is in the vicinity of this point. Contemporary reports are similarly unforthcoming.

I found a photo of the anchorage here: The Vulcan, Royal Sovereign and Thetis at Plataea Harbour c.1900.

An admittedly classical survey of Boetia says that "Creusis is not the port of Plataea and no real route joined them.[102] The harbour of Plataea probably lay at Aghios Vasilios, about three kilometres to the southeast of Creusis, at the terminus of an overland route that avoids the rigours of the Oeroe valley." A History of Boetia by Robert J Buck, NB PDF pp 4, 14 (nos. 39 & 40) and 28.

The article pic taken from Tryon's biography p. 282 appears to show just such a place, but it is otherwise devoid of useful information.

Any ideas? MinorProphet (talk) 20:55, 16 September 2020 (UTC)Reply