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Ottoman Tunisia, also known as the Regency of Tunis, refers to the Ottoman presence in Ifriqiya from the 16th to the 19th century, when Tunis was officially integrated into the Ottoman Empire as the Eyalet of Tunis. Ottoman presence in the Maghreb began with the takeover of Algiers in 1516 by the Ottoman Turkish corsair and beylerbey Aruj (Oruç Reis), eventually expanding across the entire region except for Morocco. The first Ottoman conquest of Tunis occurred in 1534 under the command of Khayr al-Din Barbarossa, the younger brother of Aruj, who was the Kapudan Pasha of the Ottoman Fleet during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent. However, it was not until the final Ottoman reconquest of Tunis from Spain in 1574 that the Turks permanently acquired the former territories of Hafsid Tunisia, retaining it until the French occupation of Tunisia in 1881.
Eyalet of Tunis
|Status||Eyalet of the Ottoman Empire|
|Common languages||Tunisian Arabic, Ottoman Turkish, Judeo-Tunisian Arabic, Berber|
|13 September 1574|
• Janissary Deys rise to power
• Muradid dynasty begins
• Husainid dynasty begins
• French protectorate established
|12 May 1881|
|Today part of||Tunisia |
Tunis was initially under Ottoman rule from Algiers, but the Ottoman Porte soon directly appointed a governor (pasha) supported by janissary forces. Before long, however, Tunisia, in effect, became an autonomous province under the local bey, sometimes known as the Beylik of Tunis. Algiers challenged this status change from time to time but failed. During this era, the governing councils controlling Tunisia remained primarily composed of a foreign elite, who continued to conduct state business in the Ottoman Turkish language.
Barbary pirates attacked European shipping, primarily from Algiers but also from Tunis and Tripoli. However, after a long period of declining raids, the growing power of the European states finally forced an end to the practice after the Barbary Wars. Under the Ottoman Empire, the boundaries of Tunisia contracted; it lost territory to the west (Constantine) and the east (Tripoli). In the 19th century, the rulers of Tunisia became aware of the ongoing efforts at political and social reform in the Ottoman capital. The Bey of Tunis then, by his lights but informed by the Turkish example, attempted a modernizing reform of institutions and the economy. Tunisian international debt grew unmanageable, which became the reason or pretext for French forces to establish a Protectorate in 1881.
Mediterranean rivalries edit
In the 16th century, control of the western Mediterranean was contested between the Spaniards and the Turks. Both were confident due to recent triumphs and subsequent expansion. In 1492, Spain completed her centuries-long Reconquista of the Iberian Peninsula, followed by the first Spanish settlements in America. Spain then formulated an African policy: a series of presidios in port cities along the African coast. The Ottoman Turks had fulfilled their long-term ambition of capturing Constantinople in 1453, then successfully invaded further into the Balkans (1459–1482), and later conquered Syria and Egypt (1516–1517).
Turkish Barbary corsairs became active from bases in the Maghreb. Spain captured and occupied several ports in North Africa, including Mers-el-Kebir (1505), Oran (1509), Tripoli (1510), and Bougie (1510). Spain also established treaty relations with a half dozen others. These agreements included Algiers (1510), which provided Spanish occupation of the off-shore island Peñón de Argel. Spain also reached agreements with Tlemcen (1511), a city about 40 km. Inland and with Tunis, whose Spanish alliance lasted on and off for decades. Near Tunis, the port of Goletta was later occupied by Spanish forces, who built a large and strong presidio there. They also constructed an aqueduct to Tunis for use by the kasbah.
The Hafsid dynasty had since 1227 ruled Tunisia, enjoying prestige when it was the leading state of the Maghreb or barely surviving in ill-favored times. Extensive trade with European merchants continued over some centuries, an activity that led to state treaties. However, the Hafsids also harbored corsairs who raided merchant shipping. During the 15th century, the Hafsids employed a Christian force of hundreds, nearly all Catalans, as bodyguards. In the 16th century, the Hafsid rule grew weak, often limited to Tunis. The last three Hafsid sultans, al-Hasan, his son Ahmad, and his brother Muhammad made inconsistent treaties with Spain.
The cross-cultural Hafsid alliance with Spain was not as unusual as it might seem, given the many Muslim-Christian treaties, despite recurrent hostilities. Indeed, during the early 16th century, France allied with the Ottomans against the Spanish Emperor Charles V. As an indirect result of Spain's African policy, a few Muslim rulers encouraged Turkish forces to enter the region to counter the Spanish presence. The Hafsid rulers of Tunis came to see the Turks and their corsair allies as a greater threat and entered an alliance with the Spanish, as also did the Sa'dids of Morocco. Nonetheless, many Maghrebi Muslims strongly preferred Islamic rule, and the Hafsid's decades-long Spanish alliance was not generally popular and was indeed anathema to some. On the other hand, the Saadi dynasty sultans of Morocco successfully played off Iberian against Turk, thus remaining both Muslim-ruled and independent of the Ottoman grasp.
In this naval struggle, the Ottoman Empire supported many Barbary pirates, who raided European commercial shipping in the Mediterranean. The corsairs later would make Algiers their principal base. The "architects of Ottoman rule in the Maghrib" were Aruj (c.1474–1518) and his younger brother Khayr al-Din (c.1483–1546). Both were called Barbarossa ("red beard"). The Muslim brothers hailed from obscure origins in the Greek island of Medelli or Mytilene [ancient Lesbos].
After acquiring fighting experience in the eastern Mediterranean (during which Aruj was captured and spent three years at oars in a galley of the Knights of St. John before being ransomed), the two brothers arrived in Tunis as corsair leaders. By 1504 they had entered into a privateer agreement with the Hafsid sultan Mohammad b. al-Hasan (1493–1526). Under the agreement, the 'prizes' (ships, cargoes, and captives) were to be shared. The brothers operated from Goletta]] [Halq al Wadi]; they ran similar operations from Djerba in the south, where Aruj was governor. During these years in Spain, those who remained non-Christian were required to leave, including Muslims; at times, Aruj employed his ships to transport many Moorish Andalucians to North Africa, especially Tunisia. For these efforts, Aruj won praise and many Muslim recruits. Twice, Aruj joined the Hafsids in unsuccessful assaults on Bougie, held by Spain. Then the brothers set up an independent base in Djidjelli, east of Bougie, which attracted Hafsid hostility.
In 1516 Aruj and his brother Khayr al-Din, accompanied by Turkish soldiers, moved further west to Algiers, where he wrestled control away from the shaykh of the Tha'aliba tribe, who had entered into a treaty with Spain. By political cunning, in which the tribal chief and later 22 notables were killed, control of Algiers passed to the Barbarossa brothers. The Turkish brothers were already Ottoman allies. In 1518, when Aruj led an attack against Tlemcen, then held by a Spanish ally (since 1511), Aruj was killed by Muslim tribal forces and the Spanish.
His younger brother Khayr al-Din inherited control of Algiers but left that city for some years and was based to its east. After returning to Algiers in 1529, he captured from Spain the offshore island Peñón de Argel whose guns had controlled the port; by constructing a causeway joining these islands, he created an excellent harbor for the city. Khayr al-Din continued to direct large-scale raids on Christian shipping and against the coastlands of Mediterranean Europe, seizing much wealth and taking many captives. He won several naval battles and became a celebrity. In 1533 Khayr al-Din was called to Constantinople, where the Ottoman sultan made him Pasha and the Turkish navy admiral [Kapudan-i Derya]; he acquired control over many more ships and soldiers. In 1534 Khayr al-Din, "taking advantage of a revolt against the Hafsid al-Hasan," invaded by sea and captured the city of Tunis from Spain's allies.
The following year Emperor Charles V (r.1516–1556) he organized a fleet under Andrea Doria of Genoa, composed predominantly of Italians, Germans, and Spaniards, which recaptured Tunis in 1535, following which the Hafsid sultan Mawlay Hasan was reinstated.  However, Khayr al-Din escaped. After that, as supreme commander of Ottoman naval forces for the Ottoman Empire, Khayr al-Din was largely preoccupied with affairs outside the Maghrib.
Establishment of Ottoman rule edit
A few decades passed until, in 1556, another Turkish corsair Dragut (Turgut), ruling in Tripoli, attacked Tunisia from the east, entering Kairouan in 1558. In 1569, Uluj Ali Pasha, a renegade corsair,[sentence fragment] Now the successor to Khayr al-Din as the Beylerbey of Algiers advanced with Turkish forces from the west and seized the Spanish presidio Goletta and the Hafsid capital, Tunis. After the key naval victory of the Christian armada at Lepanto in 1571,[sentence fragment] In 1573, Don Juan de Austria retook Tunis for Spain, restoring Hafsid's rule. A large Ottoman expedition returned in 1574 under the command of Sinan Pasha and captured Tunis permanently. The last ruler of the Hafsid dynasty was then sent by ship to the Ottoman sultan, imprisoned.
Absent the entry of the Turks into the western Mediterranean, the political situation favored the Christian north. In overall strength, the various European powers led by Spain continued to increase their lead. Among the local Maghrebi states, business was in decline and their governments were weak and divided. The long-term future seemed to present the possibility, or probability, of an eventual 'reconquest' of North Africa from the north. Accordingly, the intervention by another rising foreign power, co-religionists from the east, namely the well-armed Ottoman Turks, appeared crucial. It tipped the scales in the Maghreb, allowing for several centuries of continued rule by the older Muslim institutions, as redone by the Turks. Furthermore, the successful but questionable tactic of corsairs raiding European commercial shipping fit well enough into the Mediterranean strategy pursued by the Ottoman Porte at Constantinople.
"Turkey was frequently combated by native North African rulers and never gained any hold over Morocco. But the Turks were nonetheless a powerful ally for Barbary, diverting Christian energies into eastern Europe, threatening Mediterranean communications, and absorbing those forces which might otherwise have turned their attention to reconquest in Africa."
So for the first time, the Ottomans entered the Maghrib, eventually establishing their governing authority, at least indirectly, along most of the southern coast of the Mediterranean. During the 16th and subsequent centuries, their empire was widely recognized as the leading Muslim state in the world: Islam's primary focus. The Ottoman Empire was "the leader of all Islam for nearly half a millennium." The Turkish sultan became the caliph.
The Spanish-Ottoman truce of 1581 quieted the Mediterranean rivalry between these two world powers. Spain kept a few of its Maghrebi presidios and ports (e.g., Melilla and Oran). Both the Spanish and Ottoman Empires had become preoccupied elsewhere. The Ottomans would claim suzerainty over Tunisia for the next three centuries; however, its effective political control in the Maghreb would be short.
Ottoman pashas edit
After Tunisia fell to the Ottoman Empire, the Porte appointed a pasha to govern. "Pasha" (Turkish: paşa, lit. 'head, chief') was an Ottoman imperial title designating a high office, a holder of civil or military authority, such as the governor of a province. When Uluj Ali, the beylerybey of Algiers, died in 1587, the Ottoman sultan discontinued the office, in effect normalizing the administration of the Maghrebi provinces in acknowledgment of an end to the long struggle with Spain. In its place, for each province (present-day Algeria, Libya, Tunisia), the office of pasha was established to oversee the provincial government.
Thus in 1587, a pasha became the Ottoman governor of Tunisia. Under the Pasha served a bey, among whose duties was the collection of state revenue. From 1574 to 1591, a council (the Diwan), composed of senior Turkish military (Trk: buluk-bashis) and local notables, advised the Pasha. The language used remained Turkish. With permanent Ottoman rule (imposed in 1574), the government of Tunis acquired some stability. In the prior period, they had been made insecure and uncertain by the fortunes of war.
However, the new Ottoman Pasha's grip on power in Tunisia was of short duration. Four years later, in 1591, a revolt within the ranks of the occupying Turkish forces (the janissaries) thrust forward a new military commander, the Dey, who effectively took the pasha's place and became the ruling authority in Tunis. The pasha remained a lesser figure, who nonetheless continued to be appointed from time to time by the Ottoman Porte. Within a few decades, however, the bey of Tunis added to his office the title of pasha; soon after that, the bey's growing power began to eclipse that of the day. Eventually, the day of Tunis became the sole ruling authority. The beys of Tunis always kept well apart from any Ottoman attempts to compromise their political grip on power. The deys as Muslim rulers were also dignified by the honor and prestige associated with the title of pasha, directly connected to the Ottoman Caliph, whose religious significance included being the 'Commander of the Faithful' (Arb: Amīr al-Mu'minīn).
Janissary Deys edit
Until 1591, the corps of janissaries in Tunisia was considered to be under the control of the local Ottoman Pasha. In 1591 janissary junior officers (deys) overthrew their senior officers, forcing the Pasha to acknowledge the authority of one of their men. This new leader was called the Dey, elected by his fellow deys. The Dey took charge of law and order in the capital and military affairs, thus becoming "the virtual ruler of the country." The change defied the Ottoman Empire, although, from the Tunisian perspective, political power remained under the control of foreigners. The existing state diwan (council) was dismissed, but to appease local opinion, some Tunisian Maliki jurists were appointed to some key positions (yet the Ottoman Hanafi jurists still predominated). The janissary Dey enjoyed broad discretion, being relatively free to exercise his authority, yet his reach was initially limited to Tunis and other cities.
Two very effective Deys were 'Uthman Dey (1598–1610) and his son-in-law Yusuf Dey (r. 1610–1637). Able administrators displayed tact, enhancing the dignity of the office. Neither being fond of luxury, treasury funds were made available for public projects and new construction (e.g., a mosque, fortress, barracks, and repair of aqueducts). Rebellious tribes were subdued. An extended period of chronic social turbulence in Tunisia was brought to a close. The resulting peace and order allowed for some measure of prosperity. The Dey's ruling authority was supported by and relied upon the Qaptan of the Corsair fleet and the Bey, who collected taxes.
However, under Yusuf Dey, various interest groups emerged and maneuvered to outflank his ruling strategies. Many such were Tunisian, e.g., the local military, the urban notables including the disbanded diwan, and most rural tribes; at least to some extent, the distant sultan in Constantinople was included. During the 1620s and 1630s, the local Turkish Bey managed to enlist these social forces, thus augmenting his authority and coming to rival the Dey, then overtaking him. That the political reign of the Dey and his janissaries had slowly evaporated was demonstrated when in an attempt to regain power, their uprising of 1673 failed.
Muradid Beys edit
The Bey (Turkish: gazi commander) in Tunisia was the leading officer who "supervised the internal administration and the collection of taxes." In particular, the Bey's duties included controlling and collecting taxes in the tribal, rural areas. Twice a year, armed expeditions (mahallas) patrolled the countryside, showing the arm of the central authority. For this purpose, the Bey had organized, as an auxiliary force, rural cavalry (sipahis), mostly Arab, recruited from what came to be called "government" (makhzan) tribes.
Ramadan Bey had sponsored a Corsican named Murad Curso since his youth. After Ramadan died in 1613, Murad followed his benefactor into the office of Bey, which he exercised effectively (1613–1631). Eventually, he was also named Pasha, by then a ceremonial post, yet his position as Bey remained inferior to the Dey. His son Hamuda Bey (r.1631–1666), with the support of the local notables of Tunis, acquired both titles, that of Pasha and that of Bey. Under his title as Pasha, the Bey enjoyed the social prestige of connection with the Sultan-Caliph in Constantinople. In 1640, at the death of the Dey, Hamuda Bey maneuvered to establish his control over appointments to that office. Consequently, the Bey then became the supreme ruler in Tunisia.
Under Murad II Bey (reigned 1666–1675), son of Hamuda, the Diwan again functioned as a council of notables. In 1673, the Janissary days rose in revolt, seeing their power ebbing. During the consequent fighting, the janissaries and urban forces commanded by the days fought against the Muradid Beys, supported by largely rural parties under tribal shaykhs and with widespread support from city notables. As the Beys secured victory, so did the rural Bedouin leaders and the Tunisian stars, who also emerged triumphant—the Arabic language returned to local official use. However, the Muradids continued to use Turkish in the central government, accentuating their elite status and Ottoman connection.
At Murad II Bey's death, internal discord within the Muradid family led to an armed struggle, known as the Revolutions of Tunis or the Muradid War of Succession (1675-1705). The Turkish rulers of Algeria later intervened on behalf of one side in this struggle born of domestic conflict; these Algerian forces remained after the fighting slowed, which proved unpopular. Tunisia's unfortunate condition of civil discord and Algerian interference persisted. The last Muradid Bey was assassinated in 1702 by Ibrahim Sharif, who then ruled for several years with Algerian backing. Hence, the dynasty of the Muradid Beys may be dated from 1640 to 1702.
A gradual economic shift occurred during the Muradid era (c. the 1630s–1702), as corsair raiding decreased due to European pressure. Commercial trading based on agricultural products (chiefly grains) increased due to an integration of the rural population into regional networks. Mediterranean trade, however, continued to be carried by European shipping companies. To derive the maximum advantage from the export trade, the Beys instituted government monopolies that mediated between the local producers and foreign merchants. As a result, the rulers and their business partners (drawn from foreign-dominated elites well-connected to the Turkish-speaking ruling caste) took a disproportionate share of Tunisia's trading profits. This precluded the development of local business interests, whether rural landowners or wealthy merchant strata. The social divide persisted, with the important families in Tunisia identified as a "Turkish" ruling caste.
Husainid Beys edit
After 1705, the office of the Bey was held by the Husaynid dynasty, which effectively ruled Tunisia as a hereditary monarchy from 1705 to 1881. Formally, the beys of Tunis remained vassals of the Ottoman Empire until the 19th century, but they could act with a large degree of independence and often conducted their own foreign affairs.: 230, 271–275, 305
The dynastic founder, Husayn ibn Ali (r. 1705–1735), an Ottoman cavalry officer (agha of the spahis) of Cretan origin, managed to acquire the sovereign power in 1705. His military units were included in those Tunisian forces that fought and defeated the then Algerian invasion. The Turkish janissary then selected their own Dey as the new ruler. Husayn ibn Ali, however, opposed the Dey and sought the backing of Tunisian khassa (notables), the ulama and the religious, as well as local tribes. Thus, though also a Turkish-speaking foreigner, he worked to obtain native loyalties against the Turkish soldiery and eventually prevailed. Accordingly, as ruler he sought to be perceived as a popular Muslim interested in local issues and prosperity. He appointed as qadi a Tunisian Maliki jurist, instead of an Hanafi preferred by the Ottomans. He also restricted the legal prerogatives of the janissary and the Dey. Under Husayn b. Ali as Bey of Tunis support was provided to agriculture, especially planting olive orchards. Public works were undertaken, e.g., mosques and madrassa (schools). His popularity was demonstrated in 1715 when the kapudan-pasha of the Ottoman fleet sailed to Tunis with a new governor to replace him; instead Husayn Bey summoned council, composed of local civil and military leaders, who backed him against the Ottoman Empire, which then acquiesced.
In 1735 a succession dispute erupted between his nephew Ali (r. 1735–1755) and his son Muhammad (r. 1755–1759) who challenged his cousin. A divisive civil war was fought; it ended in 1740 with Ali's uncertain victory. This result was reversed in 1756 after ten more years of fighting, but not without further meddling by Algeria.
Early Husaynid policy required a careful balance among several divergent parties: the distant Ottomans, the Turkish-speaking elite in Tunisia, and local Tunisians (both urban and rural, notables and clerics, landowners and remote tribal leaders). Entanglement with the Ottoman Empire was avoided due to its potential ability to absorb the Bey's prerogatives; yet religious ties to the Ottoman Caliph were fostered, which increased the prestige of the Beys and helped in winning approval of the local ulama and deference from the notables. Janissaries were still recruited, but increasing reliance was placed on tribal forces. Turkish was spoken at the apex, but use of Arabic increased in government use. Kouloughlis (children of mixed Turkish and Tunisian parentage) and native Tunisians notables were given increased admittance into higher positions and deliberations. The Husaynid Beys, however, did not themselves intermarry with Tunisians; instead they often turned to the institution of mamluks for marriage partners. Mamluks also served in elite positions. The dynasty never ceased to identify as Ottoman, and thereby privileged. Nonetheless, the local ulama were courted, with funding for religious education and the clerics. Local jurists (Maliki) entered government service. Marabouts of the rural faithful were mollified. Tribal shaykhs were recognized and invited to conferences. Especially favored at the top were a handful of prominent families, Turkish-speaking, who were given business and land opportunities, as well as important posts in the government, depending on their loyalty.
The French Revolution and reactions to it negatively affected European economic activity leading to shortages which provided business opportunities for Tunisia, i.e., regarding goods in high demand but short in supply, the result might be handsome profits. The capable and well-regarded Hammouda Pasha (r. 1782–1813) was Bey of Tunis (the fifth) during this period of prosperity; he also turned back an Algerian invasion in 1807, and quelled a janissary revolt in 1811.
After the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Britain and France secured the Bey's agreement to cease sponsoring or permitting corsair raids, which had resumed during the Napoleonic conflict. After a brief resumption of raids, it stopped. In the 1820s economic activity in Tunisia took a steep downturn. The Tunisian government was particularly affected due to its monopoly positions regarding many exports. Credit was obtained to weather the deficits, but eventually the debt would grow to unmanageable levels. Tunisia had sought to bring up to date its commerce and trade. Yet different foreign business interests began to increasingly exercised control over domestic markets; imports of European manufactures often changed consumer pricing which could impact harshly on the livelihood of Tunisian artisans, whose goods did not fare well in the new environment. Foreign trade proved to be a means by which European influence became entrenched.
Establishment of French colonial rule edit
In 1881 the French invaded Tunisia, using a border skirmish as a pretext.: 326–327 With the signing of the Treaty of Bardo later that year, a French protectorate was imposed over the country, lasting until 1956. The Ottoman sultan officially rejected the Bardo Treaty, but made no attempt to stop the French takeover. During this period of colonial rule, the beylical institution was retained; the Husaynid Bey served as titular head of state but it was the French who actually ruled the country. After achieving its full independence, Tunisia declared itself a republic in 1957; the beylical office was terminated and the Husaynid dynasty came to an end.
Ottoman cultural influence edit
This Ottoman contact enriched Tunisia with its distinctive culture and institutions, which differed markedly from the familiar Arab world—for more than half a millennium, Islamic doctrines had filtered through Turkish experience, whose ethnic origin lay in Central Asia, resulting in unique developments and new perspectives. For example, Turks wrote their gazi sagas of frontier warfare, no doubt following Islamic traditions of early Arab conquests, yet informed by legends derived from life on the steppes of Central Asia. Due to the difficulties of rule and its large geographic jurisdiction, the Ottoman state took the lead in Muslim legal developments for centuries. Sources of imperial law included Islamic fiqh, inherited Roman-Byzantine codes, and "the traditions of the great Turkish and Mongol empires of Central Asia." The Turkish jurist Ebu us-Suud Efendi (c.1490–1574) was credited with the harmonization for use in Ottoman courts of the qanun (regulations of the secular state) and the şeriat (sacred law).
Ottoman popular literature and much of the learning of its elites was expressed in the Turkish language. Turkish became the idiom for state business in Tunisia, and its unique flavors percolated throughout Tunisian society. After Arabic and Persian, it is the third language of Islam and for centuries has "played a vital role in the intellectual life" of Muslim culture. In addition, the Turks brought their popular customs, such as their music, clothing, and the coffee house (kahvehane or "kiva han").
The new energy of Turkish rule was welcome in Tunis and other cities, and the clerical ulama appreciated the regime's stability. Although the Ottomans preferred the Hanifi school of law, some Tunisian Maliki jurists were admitted into administrative and judicial positions. The rule remained one of a foreign elite. In the countryside, efficient Turkish troops managed to control the tribes without compromising alliances, but their rule was unpopular. "Ottomans' military prowess enable them to curb the tribes rather than alleviate them. An image of Turkish domination and Tunisian subordination emerged everywhere."The rural economy was never brought under effective regulation by the central authority. For revenues, the government relied primarily on Barbary corsair raids against shipping in the Mediterranean, an activity more profitable than trade. With a Spanish-Ottoman accord in 1581, Spain's attention turned away, and corsair activity increased. Peaceful trade and commerce suffered.
The introduction into Tunisia of a Turkish-speaking ruling caste, whose institutions dominated governance for centuries, indirectly affected the lingering divide between Berber and Arabic in the settled areas. The 11th-century invasion of the Arabic-speaking Banu Hilal had reactivated this bipolarity of linguistic culture. Subsequently, Arabic gained ascendancy, and the use of Berber gradually eroded. The presence of a Turkish-speaking elite seemed to hasten the submergence of Berber speech in Tunisia.
The Ottomans first garrisoned Tunis with 4,000 janissaries taken from their occupying forces in Algiers; the troops were primarily Turkish, recruited from Anatolia. Janissary corps were under the immediate command of their Agha (Trk: "master"). The junior officers were called deys (Trk: "maternal uncle"); each commanded about 100 soldiers. The Ottoman Porte did not after that maintain the ranks of the janissaries in Tunis, but it appointed pasha for Tunisia himself to begin to recruit them from different regions.The janissaries (yeni-cheri or "new troops") were an elite institution peculiar to the Ottoman state, though deriving from earlier practice. Christian youth recruited through a practice called devshirme [Trk: "to collect"], often from Greece and the Balkans, were impressed into military training and compelled to convert to Islam; when mature, they provided an elite corps of soldiery. Kept apart in their barracks and forbidden marriage, they were under a strict code of toilet and dress and regimented by rules of the Hurufi sect (later the Bektashi Sufi). Begun in the 15th century as a type of slavery, the janissaries later came to enjoy privileges and could rise to high positions. A well-known symbol of their collective force was the huge Kazan [Trk: "kettle"], beside which they ate and talked business. Eventually, Muslims became members; the janissaries gained the right to marry and evolved into a powerful caste. They were then liable to riot and loot if not appeased, and "not less than six Sultans were either dethroned or murdered through their agency." At first, a small elite of 10,000, by the 19th century, when the institution was terminated, "the number on the [Ottoman] payroll had reached... over 130,000."
In the Maghreb, under Ottoman control, the janissaries were originally Turkish or Turkish-speaking. Some rivalry existed between the janissaries and the pirates, composed mainly of Christian renegades. Also, the janissaries were viewed with suspicion as potential enemy combatants, the local tribal forces, and the Maghreb militias. Called collectively the ojaq [Trk: "hearth"], the janissary corps maintained high unity and élan.
"They possessed a high sense of group solidarity and egalitarian spirit in the ranks, and elected their commander-in-chief, the agha, and a diwan [council] which protected their group interests. Being Turkish, they enjoyed a privileged position in the state: they were not subject to the regular system of justice in the regency and were entitled to rations of bread, meat, and oil, to a regular salary, and a proportion of the yields of piracy."
Piracy may be called "an ancient if not always honorable activity," but various peoples widely practice it at different times and locations. A pirate (or privateer) may be distinguished from a pirate because the former operates under explicit government authority, while the latter carries no papers. The Mediterranean region during the late Middle Ages and Renaissance became the scene of wide-scale piracy (and privateering) practiced both by Christians (aimed more at Muslim shipping in the east) and by Muslims (more active out of the Barbary Coast in the west, with its many targets of Christian merchant ships).
The first "great age of the Barbary corsairs" occurred in the 16th century, between 1538 and 1571. Ottoman sea power in the Mediterranean was supreme during these decades following their naval victory at the Preveza. Ottoman supremacy, however, was effectively broken at Lepanto, although Ottoman sea power remained formidable. In the early 17th century, corsair activity again peaked. After that, Algiers began to rely more on 'tribute' from European nations in exchange for safe passage rather than attacking merchant ships one by one. Ottoman Empire's treaties with European states added a layer of conflicting diplomacy. Lastly, during the wars following the French Revolution (1789–1815), Barbary corsairs activity briefly spiked before ending abruptly.
In 16th-century Algiers, under the new Ottoman regime, the customs and practices of the pre-existing Barbary corsairs were transformed and made into impressive institutions. The activity became highly developed, with modes of recruitment, corps hierarchies, peer review, private and public financing, trades and materials support, coordinated operations, and resale and ransom markets. The policies developed in Algiers provided an exemplary model of Corsair business (often called the life reisi, or "board of captains"), a model later followed by Tunis and Tripoli and independently by Morocco.
Crews came from three sources: Christian renegades (including many famous or notorious captains), foreign Muslims (many Turkish), and a few native Maghrebis. Seldom did a native attain high rank, except Reis Hamida, a Kabyle Berber during the last years of the corsair age. The ship's owners selected captains from a list made by a few of the Riesi, an authoritative council composed of all active Corsair captains. Also regulated was the location of residence. "Captains, crews, and suppliers all lived in the western quarter of Algiers, along the harbor and docks."
Private capital generally supplied the funds for Corsair's activity. Investors bought shares in a particular Corsair business enterprise. Such investors came from all levels of society, e.g., merchants, officials, janissaries, shopkeepers, and artisans. The financing made money available for the capital and expenses of ship and crew, i.e., naval stores and supplies, timbers and canvas, and munitions.
"Because of the potential profits from Corsair prizes, the underwriting of expeditions was an attractive proposition. Shareholding was organized like that of a modern stock company, with the return to individuals dependent on their investment. This type of private investment peaked in the seventeenth century, the 'golden age.'"
After the pirate "golden age," the state of Algiers, mainly under the control of its Turkish janissaries, came to own many of the Corsair vessels and finance many of their expeditions. Strict rules governed the division of the prizes captured at sea. First came Algiers as the state representative of Allah; next came the port authorities, the customs brokers, and those who kept the sanctuaries; then came to that portion due to the ship owners and the captain and crew. The merchant cargo seized was sold "at auction or more commonly to European commercial representatives resident in Algiers, through whom it might even reach the port of its original destination."
Ransom or selling captured prisoners (and auction of cargo) was the main source of private wealth in Algiers. Payment for captives was financed and negotiated by religious societies. The conditions of the captivity varied, most being worked as slave labor. Often, the Muslim masters granted these Christians some religious privileges. During the early 17th century in Algiers, more than 20,000 Christian prisoners were held from more than a dozen countries. "To the people of Barbary captives were a source of greater profit that looted merchandise." In Tunis, corsair activity never became paramount as it long remained in Algiers.
After the establishment of Ottoman authority in the region, architecture in both Tunisia and Algeria was blended with Ottoman architecture, especially in the coastal cities where Ottoman influence was strongest. Some European influences were also introduced, particularly through the importation of materials from Italy such as marble.: 215
In Tunis, the Mosque complex of Yusuf Dey, built or begun around 1614–15 by Yusuf Dey (r. 1610–1637), is one of the earliest and most important examples that imported Ottoman elements into local architecture. Its congregational mosque is accompanied by a madrasa, a primary school, fountains, latrines, and even a café, many of which provided revenues for the upkeep of the complex. This arrangement is similar to Ottoman külliye complexes and it was the first example of a "funerary mosque" in Tunis, with the founder's mausoleum (dated to 1639) attached to it. While the hypostyle form of the mosque and the pyramidal roof of the mausoleum reflect traditional architecture in the region, the minaret's octagonal shaft reflects the influence of the "pencil"-shaped Ottoman minarets. In this period, octagonal minarets often distinguished mosques following the Hanafi maddhab (associated with the Ottomans), while mosques which continued to follow the Maliki maddhab (predominant in the Maghreb) continued to employ traditional square (cuboid) minarets.: 219–221
Hammuda Pasha (r. 1631–1664), one of the Muradid Beys, built his own funerary was responsible for starting in 1629 a major restoration and expansion of the Zawiya of Abu al-Balawi or "Mosque of the Barber" in Kairouan. This complex, further modified, exemplifies the use of underglaze-painted Qallalin tiles for decoration, a feature characteristic of this period. These tiles, generally produced in the Qallalin district of Tunis, are painted with motifs of vases, plants, and arches and use predominant blue, green, and ochre-like yellow colours which distinguish them from contemporary Ottoman tiles.: 223–224 The artistic height of these tiles was in the 17th and 18th centuries.
It wasn't until the end of the 17th century that the first and only Ottoman-style domed mosque in Tunisia was built: the Sidi Mahrez Mosque, begun by Muhammad Bey and completed by his successor, Ramadan ibn Murad, between 1696 and 1699. The mosque's prayer hall is covered by a dome system typical of Classical Ottoman architecture and first employed by Sinan for the Şehzade Mosque (c. 1548) in Istanbul: a large central dome flanked by four semi-domes, with four smaller domes at the corners and pendentives in the transitional zones between the semi-domes. The interior is decorated with marble paneling and Ottoman Iznik tiles.: 226–227
Husayn ibn Ali (r. 1705–1735), the founder of the Husaynid dynasty, expanded the Bardo Palace, the official residence of rulers in Tunis since the 15th century. He transformed it into a large complex enclosed by a fortified wall and including a mosque, a madrasa, a hammam, and a market next to the palace. It underwent further modifications and expansion by later beys and up the early 21st century. It now houses a national museum and the National Assembly.: 229–231
Flag of Tunisia in 1685.
Flag of Tunisia according to the Flag Chart of B.Lems in 1700.
See also edit
Reference notes edit
- Abadi, Jacob (2013). Tunisia Since the Arab Conquest: The Saga of a Westernized Muslim State. Ithaca Press. ISBN 978-0-86372-435-0.
- Moalla, Asma (2005). The Regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte, 1777-1814: Army and Government of a North-African Eyâlet at the End of the Eighteenth Century. RoutledgeCurzon. ISBN 978-1-134-42983-7.
- Blili, Leïla Temime (2021). The Regency of Tunis, 1535–1666: Genesis of an Ottoman Province in the Maghreb. American University in Cairo Press. ISBN 978-1-64903-049-8.
- In the formulation of an African policy for Spain, the clergy had argued for attempting a complete conquest; however, King Ferdinand eventually decided on limited objectives: strong forts in a string of port cities. Henry Kamen, Empire. How Spain became a world power 1492–1763 (New York: HarperCollins 2003) at 29–31. After the reconquest, several such port cities, e.g., Oran, were favorable to Spanish influence. Kamen (2003) at 29–30.
- J. H. Elliot, Imperial Spain. 1469–1716 (New York: St. Martin's 1963; reprint Meridian 1977) at 52–55.
- Wayne S. Vucinich, The Ottoman Empire: Its record and legacy (Princeton: C. Van Nostrand 1965) at 15–18.
- Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge University 1976) at volume I: 55–66, 83–85.
- Henry Kamen, Empire. How Spain became a world power 1492–1763 (New York: HarperCollins 2003) at 30–31 (Mers-el-Kebir), 32–33 (Oran), 31–32 (Bougie and Tripoli), 32 (Algiers).
- Charles-André Julien, Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord (Paris: Payot 1931, 1961), translated as History of North Africa. From the Arab conquest to 1830 (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul 1970) at 279, 294 (Tlemcen), 282–284, 297–300 (Tunis).
- William Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (University of Oklahoma 1976) at 15–17, 22.
- Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). . Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 27 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 392. La GouGoletta was occupied by the Spanish long after its use by the Turkish brothers Aruj and Khayr al-Din (see below).
- Julian, History of North Africa (1961; 1970) at 148 (corsairs), 153 (Catalan bodyguard), 158 (European merchants).
- Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (Cambridge University 1971) at 148 (14th-century corsairs: Christian and Muslim), 148–149 (15th-century Hafsid's suzerainty over Tlemcen), 163–165 (early Spanish treaties), 177 (last three Hafsid sultans in the 16th century).
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (1976) at 11 (commercial treaty between Tunis and Aragon), 15 (piracy: European and North African), 17 (Hafsid early hub facilitating Turkish corsairs).
- The 11th-century Spanish leader Ruy Díaz de Bivar was known to have fought alongside Muslims, even on the side of Muslims against Christians, e.g., for Almutamiz against García Ordóñez. His epithet El Cid meaning "lord" is derived from Siyyidi an Arabic expression. Cf., Poema de Mio Cid (Madrid: Ediciones Rodas  1972) at 58–62 and 15 note.
- During the years 1538–1540 King Carlos of Spain negotiated with Khayr al-Din Pasha (the younger Barbarossa). Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 165, 169.
- Fernand Braudel, La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à l'Epoque de Philippe II (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin 1949, 2d ed. 1966), translated as The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (New York: Harper & Row 1973, 1976) at II: 1144–1165. This flexible Spanish attitude continued into the 16th century, e.g., Philip II of Spain (r. 1556–1598) "for his part had always maintained diplomatic relations with the Turks." This Spanish King eventually treated the Ottoman Empire. Braudel at 1143 (quote).
- Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge University 1976) at I: 91, 102–103.
- There was more than merely anti-Spain provisions in the Franco-Ottoman agreements. France also gained trading privileges in the East and a protectorate over Christian pilgrimage destinations there. Lucien Romier, L'Ancienne France: des Origenes a la Revolution (Paris: Hachette 1948), translated and 'completed' by A.L.Rouse as A History of France (New York: St. Martin's Press 1953) at 198–199.
- Cf., Kenneth J. Perkins, Tunisia. Crossroads of the Islamic and European worlds (Boulder: Westview 1986) at 51–52, 53–54.
- Abdallah Laroui, L'Histoire du Maghreb: Un essai de synthèse (Paris: Libraire François Maspero 1970), translated as A History of the Maghrib. An interpretive essay (Princeton University 1977) at 250–251. Spain managed a tacit alliance with Sa'did Morocco circa 1549.
- The Spanish alliance with Sa'did Morocco was renewed in 1576, and again with Ahmad al-Mansur (1578–1609). Henri Terrasse, Histoire du Maroc (Casablanca: Editions Atlantides 1949–1950), translated as History of Morocco (Atlantides 1952) at 120–124.
- Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 162–163. Yet Prof. Abun-Nasr here states:
The author earlier had attributed this Maghriban mood of intolerance, both popular and scholarly, to 1492 fall of Granada to Spanish forces and its consequences (immigration of Moorish Andalusians, loss of the 'buffer state' of Granada). Abun-Nasr (1971) at 157–158.
"[T]he religious mood of the Muslims in the Maghrib at the turn of the sixteenth century was one of intolerance towards non-Muslims; and as their rulers could not protect them against the Christians, they welcomed outside Muslim help. By exploiting the religious sentiments of the Maghriban Muslims, the Barbarossa brothers were able to establish a foothold in the Maghrib from which they gradually extended into the interior their control, as well as the authority of the Ottoman sultan, which they came to accept. But it would be wrong to assume that the Turks were readily or voluntarily accepted as rulers in any of the eastern and central Maghrib countries they came to control." Abun-Nasr (1971) at 162–163.
This enmity continued due to a bitter combination of European attacks, corsair raiding, and "by linking it to Ottoman championing of the cause of Islam." Abun-Nasr (1971) at 158.
"[T]his situation infused into Magriban theology an uncompromising strain comparable to the strictness of the Kharijite doctrine. [One well-known theologian] went to the extent of pronouncing infidels the Andalusians who thought that life in Spain was preferable to... the Magrhib, because a true Muslim should always prefer to live under a Muslim prince. Muslim theologians would have condemned these standpoints during periods of strength and prosperity."
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 54.
- Henri Terrasse, Histoire du Maroc (Casablanca: Editions Atlantides 1949–1950), translated as History of Morocco (Atlantides 1952) at 120–124. The Ottoman efforts to control Morocco failed when the sultan they backed, although successful in gaining power, quickly entered into a Spanish alliance to counter Turkish designs. Terrasse (1952) at 121.
- Thus, Ottoman corsairs were denied use of Morocco's ports on the Atlantic. Later, the English approached Morocco, seeking an anti-Span treaty. Julien, A History of North Africa (Paris 1931, 1961; London 1970) at 230–232, 235.
- Piracy was then almost common across the entire Mediterranean, there being both Muslim and Christian corsairs. Fernand Braudel, La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à l'Epoque de Philip II (Librairie Armand Colin 1949, 2d ed. 1966), translated by Siân Reynolds as The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (Wm. Collins/Harper & Row 1973, reprint 1976) at II: 865–891.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 163.
- Arrudj and Khayruddin is the style used by Prof. M. H. Cherif of the Faculté des sciences humaines et sociales, Tunis. Cherif, "Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya", 120–133, at 123, in General History of Africa, volume V (UNESCO 1992, 1999).
- The younger but more renowned Khizr [Khidr] received the epithet 'kheireddin' ("gift of God"). Aruj was known to his crew as 'baba Aruj' ("father Aruj"), which might be the origin of the nickname 'Barbarossa'. They were raised Muslim. Their father may have been either a pirate, a renegade, or a janissary, their mother either a Greek priest's daughter or an Andalusian taken captive. Wm. Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (University of Oklahoma 1976) at 17–19. Other Muslim sailors also were attracted by the opportunities in the Maghrib.
- There exists a 16th-century anonymous manuscript written in Arabic, Ghazawat 'Aruj wa Khair al-Din, which was translated into French in 1837. Cited by Spencer (1976) at 20–21, 174.
- Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1931, 1961; London 1970) at 278.
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (1976) at 18–19.
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (1976) at 19.
- Understandably, the Andalucian Mudéjars and Moriscos expelled from Spain could be "uncompromising in their hatred of the Christians" and often "engaged in piracy against the Christians, especially the Spaniards." Cf., Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 238.
- Cf., Richard A. Fletcher, Moorish Spain (New York: Henry Holt 1992) at 166–169. The Muslim corsair raids long afflicting Spain's coastal residents led Spaniards to view their Morisco (and Mudéjar) neighbors with suspicion.
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (1976) at 19–22.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 163–164.
- Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1931, 1961; London 1970) at 279–280.
- Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1931, 1961; London 1970) at 280–281.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 164–165.
- Abdallah Laroui, The History of the Maghrib (Paris 1970; Princeton 1977) at 249 (italics added).
- Rinehart, "Historical Setting" 1–70, at 21–22, in Tunisia. A country study (3d ed., 1986), ed. by Nelson. "The Hafsid sultan, Hassan, took refuge in Spain, where he sought the Habsburg king-emperor Charles V's aid to restore him to his throne. Spanish troops and ships recaptured Tunis in 1535 and reinstalled Hassan. Protected by a large Spanish garrison at La Goulette, the harbor of Tunis, the Hafsids became the Muslim ally of Catholic Spain in its struggle with the Turks... ."
- R. Trevor Davies, The Golden Century of Spain. 1501–1621 (London: Macmillan 1937; reprint NY: Harper 1961) at 92–102, 105 (versus the Ottomans), 94–97 (Tunis 1535).
- Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge University 1976) at I: 96–97.
- Henry Kamen, Empire. How Spain became a world power 1492–1763 (New York: HarperCollins 2003) at 72–74 (Barbarossa escapes).
- Abu-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (Cambridge University 1971) at 164–165.
- In foreground (by the pictured Ottoman fleet) the Spanish presidio of Goletta (Arb: Halk el Oued [or Halk el Wadi], "Throat of the River"). Behind it lies the Lake of Tunis (Arb: El Bahira). At the top of the drawing, the city of Tunis spreads out in the back of the lake and green fields.
- Abdallah Laroui, The History of the Maghrib (Paris 1970; Princeton: 1977) at 251.
- Uluj Ali, also spelled Ochiali, was a Christian renegade of Italian (Neapolitan, Calabrian) origin. Later the Ottoman Sultan gave him the name Kilij [Turkish for "sword"] so that he might also be known as Kilij Ali. J.P.D.B.Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries. The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire (New York: Wm. Morrow, Quill 1977) at 271.
- Uluj Ali's most commonly used epithet, "Uluj" signifies "renegade." Abdallah Laroui, A History of the Maghrib (Paris 1970; Princeton University 1977) at 251, n.19.
- Miguel de Cervantes called Uluj Ali "el Uchalí" in his El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quíjote de la Mancha (Madrid: Juan de la Cuesta 1605; reprint Barcelona: Editorial Ramón Sopena 1981), at chapters XXXIX and XL. El Uchalí's escape from the Ottoman defeat at Lepanto in 1571 is mentioned, and his later 1574 capture of Tunis is described by Cervantes, who was once his captive. About el Uchalí the Spanish author writes, "Era calabrés de nación, y moralmente fue hombre de bien, y trataba con mucha humanidad a sus cautivos... ." ["He was Calabrian by birth, and morally a good man, who treated with much humanity his captives... ."] Chapter XL, first page of prose.
- Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (Paris 1949, 1966; New York 1973, 1976) at II: 1066–1068. Here Uluj Ali is called Euldj 'Ali.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 173.
- The combined fleets of various Christian powers, including Spain as well as Venice and Genoa, under the leadership of Don Juan de Austria (half-brother of Philip II of Spain) met and defeated the Turkish fleet off the coast of western Greece. Algerian ships under Uluj Ali escaped. J. Beeching, The Galleys at Lepanto (New York: Scribner's 1982) at 184–187, 219, 233–234.
- Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 177.
- Abu-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (Cambridge University 1971) at 169-170.
- Robert Rinehart, "Historical Setting" 1–70 at 22, in Tunisia. A country study (Washington, D.C.: American University 3rd ed. 1986), edited by Harold D. Nelson.
- Abdallah Laroui, The History of the Maghrib (Paris 1970, Princeton 1977) at 215–223, 227–228.
- Cf., Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge University 1976) at I: 96–97.
- Wm. Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (University of Oklahoma 1976) at 47.
- Jane Soames Nickerson, A Short History of North Africa. Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco from Pre-Roman days to the present (New York: Devin-Adair 1961) at 72.
- Muslim Egypt was conquered by the Ottomans in 1516–1517. The figurehead caliph of Egypt, Mutawekkil, last of the Abbasids, before he died in 1538, bequeathed "his title and rights to the sultan of Turkey." The legitimacy of it has been questioned, but "the sultans of Turkey have been the de facto caliphs of the greater part of orthodox Islam ever since" [i.e., until 1922, 1924]. Stanley Lane-Poole, A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages (London: Methuen 1901) at 355.
- Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1961; London 1970) at 300–301.
- Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (Paris: 1949, 1966; New York 1973, 1976) at 1161–1165. Braudel opines that Spain did not walk out on her allies by this treaty, as Spain continued to protect Italy. Braudel at 1165.
- During this long back-and-forth contest, the two powerful Empires were also otherwise engaged. The Spanish contended with an ongoing Protestant challenge, including the later Dutch Revolt, with several Muslim insurgencies in Spain, e.g., the Morisco Revolt, and of course, with America. The Ottomans were entangled in intermittent warfare elsewhere, e.g., in Safavid Persia, and in Habsburg Hungary. Cf., Itzkowitz,Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition (University of Chicago 1972) at 66, 68–71.
- Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1961; London 1970) at 280–281, 292, 301–302.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of North Africa (1971) at 166, 177–178.
- In Turkish, the western provinces were called "Garb-Ojaklari". Bohdan Chudoba, Spain and the Empire. 1519–1643 (University of Chicago 1952) at 66. Cf., Cherif (1992, 1999) at 123: "odjaks of the west".
- Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1961; London 1970) at 301–302.
Julien (1961; 1970) at 301–302 (quotation, emphasis added). For iyala see Cherif (1992, 1999) at 123.
"[T]he sultan judged the moment suitable to bring the African conquests within the normal framework of the Ottoman organization, and he transformed Tripolitania, Tunisia, and Algeria into three regencies [Trk: Ayala] administered by pashas subject to periodic replacement. These measures involved the abolition of the beylerbey of Algiers... [replaced] by a pasha on a three-year posting. The Barbary provinces ceased to be a bastion of the Turkish Empire against the Spanish Empire: they became ordinary, only more remote provinces."
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (1976) at 119.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of North Africa (1971) at 177–178.
- M. H. Cherif, "Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya: The Ottomans and their heirs", 120–133, at 124, in General History of Africa, volume V: Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century (UNESCO 1992, 1999).
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 55–57.
- Cherif, "Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya: The Ottomans and their heirs", 120–133, at 126–127, in General History of Africa, vol. V (1992, 1999). After being "stripped of any real power" by the military, "the Tunisian pasha was retained as a symbol of Ottoman allegiance."
- Abun-Nasr, A History of North Africa (1971) at 178–179.
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 56–57.
- Glasse, The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam (1989), "Caliph" at 84.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of North Africa (1971) at 177–178, quote at 178.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of North Africa (Cambridge University 1971) at 178.
- Charles-André Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1931, 1961; London 1970) at 303–305, 304.
- Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of North Africa (Cambridge University 1971) at 178–179.
- Compare: Kenneth J. Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 56–57.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of North Africa (1971) at 177–179, quote at 178.
- Charles-André Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1931, 1961; London 1970) at 303–305.
- Cf., Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 56–57.
- Murad Curso's name indicates his Corsican origin ["Curso"]. A Spanish intelligence report in 1568 estimated that there were 10,000 renegades in Algiers, of whom 6,000 were Corsicans. Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II. (1949, 1966, 1973) at I: 159–160.
- Laroui, The History of the Maghrib (1970, 1977) at 255–256.
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 56–58, 60.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 178–180.
- Government control of the economic wealth was common in the region during the 16th century. Cf., Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World (1949, 1966, 1973) at I: 449–451. The Mercantilist economic theory would later emerge from such systematic policy in practice.
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 58–61.
- Bosworth, Clifford Edmund (1996). "The Husaynid Beys". The New Islamic Dynasties: A Chronological and Genealogical Manual. Edinburgh University Press. pp. 55–56. ISBN 9780748696482.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (Cambridge University 1971) p. 180.
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 61–62.
- In Tunisian practice, non-Muslim slave youths were purchased in Ottoman markets, educated with royal scions in high government service and in the Muslim religion, converted, given high echelon posts, and often married to royal daughters. Mamluks would number about 100. Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 63.
- Cf., Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (1971) at 182–185.
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 62–63, 66.
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 64.
- Cf., Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1931, 1961; London 1970) at 328.
- Lucette Valensi, Le Maghreb avant la prise d'Alger (Paris 1969), translated as On the Eve of Colonialism: North Africa before the French conquest (New York: Africana 1977); cited by Perkins (1986) at 67.
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 64–67.
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 42.
- Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, History of the Maghrib (Cambridge University 1971) at 278–279, and 353–354.
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 61–67, 85.
- Cemal Kafador, Between Two Worlds. The Construction of the Ottoman State (University of California 1995) at 62–90.
- Cf., Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge University 1976) at I: 1–9 (history); 139–143 (literature).
- Stories of such intermittent warfare may compare to those of the Spanish medieval frontier, i.e., Al-Andalus, e.g., the 12th-century Poema de Mio Cid (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Zig-Zag 1954, 1972), edited by Juan Luveluk, text established by Menéndez Pidal.
- Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge University 1976) at I: 103–104, 134–139, 146. Shaw discusses earlier Ottoman law-making at 22–27 and 62.
- Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge University 1976) at I: 62.
- Colin Imber, Ebu's-su'ud. The Islamic legal tradition (Stanford University 1997) at 269. Ebu us-Suud Efendi's legal writings are in both Arabic and Turkish, but his fatwas were in Turkish, which is the language of the elite. Imber (1997) at 14–15.
- The state-crafted laws qanun were often ultimately derived from customary usage 'urf. Cf., Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge University 1976) at I: 22.
- Turkish was then written in an Arabic script and contained words borrowed from Arabic and Persian. "634 words of Turkish origin [are] used today in Algeria." Spencer, Algier in the Age of the Corsairs (1976) at 70. The then street lingua franca called 'Franco' or 'Sabir' (from Spanish saber, "to know") combined these languages: Arabic, Spanish, Turkish, Italian, and Provençal. Ibid.
- Najib Ullah, Islamic Literature (New York: Washington Square 1963) at xi–xii. "Each of the three languages of the Islamic world belongs to a different language group. Turkish is a Ural-Altaic language." Ullah (1963) at 370.
- Cf., Wayne S. Vucinich, The Ottoman Empire: Its record and legacy (Princeton: C. Van Nostrand 1965) at 70–73.
- Vucinich, The Ottoman Empire (1965) at 76–77, 65–66, 122–123. Coffee derived from Turkish Yemen, ultimately from Ethiopia.
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 55 (quotation).
- M. H. Cherif, "Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya: the Ottomans and their heirs" 120–133, at 124, in General History of Africa, Volume V (UNESCO 1992, 1999), edited by B. A. Ogot.
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 55–56.
- Abdallah Laroui, The History of the Maghrib (Paris 1970, Princeton 1977) at 252–253.
- Cf., Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 169.
- Abun-Nasr, A History of North Africa (1971) at 177.
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 56.
- The janissaries probably originated in the preexisting Ghulam practice of the Abbasids, which was then adopted by the Seljuk Turks, and later by the Ottomans. It began with the treatment of captured enemy soldiers. "A Ghulam was a slave highly trained for service in the ruler's palace and state structure." Eventually, instead of captured enemy soldiers, the recruits were taken from the levy on children of Christian subjects. Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition (University of Chicago 1972) at 49.
- J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam (Oxford University 1971) at 68, 80–83.
- Wayne S. Vucinich, The Ottoman Empire: Its record and legacy (Princeton: C. Van Nostrand 1965) at 30–33, 135–138, quotations herein are found at 137 and 138 (taken from Panzer). Vucinich at 135–138 provides a descriptive excerpt on the Janissaries taken from N. M. Penzer, The Harem (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, n.d.) at 89–93; the full title of Penzer's book being The Harem. An account of the institution as it existed in the Palace of the Turkish Sultans with a history of the Grand Seraglio from its foundation to modern times (London: George P. Harrap 1936); reprints, e.g., Dorset 1993; Dover 2005. The Palace being the Topkapi in Istanbul.
- Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1931, 1961; London 1970) at 284.
- Cf., Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (1976) at 21–22. The janissary ruling class in Algiers was strictly organized to retain power in their hands alone. Spencer here describes an aspect of their government leadership:
"Authority was vested in the ocak (literally, "hearth" in Turkish) the military garrison.... Not only were native North Africans excluded from positions in the military government, but equally excluded were the kul oğlari, sons of members of the ocak by native women."
- Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (Cambridge University 1971) at 166–167.
- Cf., Charles-André Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1931, 1961; London 1970) at 284–285.
- William Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (University of Oklahoma 1976) at 46.
- The certificate the pirate lacks is the Letter of marque (in European law) issued by a sovereign state which here grants the recipient limited right to capture a specified class of vessels. Cf., Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (Paris 1949, 1966; New York 1973, 1976) at 866–868.
- The word corsair evidently derives from Italian: il corso or "the course", a reference to the act of running down a merchant ship to capture it. Cf., Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (1976) at 46.
- Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World during the Age of Philip II (Paris 1949, 1966; New York 1973) at 870, 877–891.
- Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World during the Age of Philip II (Paris 1949, 1966; New York 1973) at 873. Later, in the 17th century, Protestant renegades (Dutch and English) assisted Algiers in getting pirate vessels that could strike merchant ships in the Atlantic. Braudel (1973) at 884–885
- Perkins, Tunisia (Westview 1986) at 50–51 (1550s), 56 (mid-16th), 59 (late 17th), 64 (1819).
- Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World during the Age of Philip II (Paris 1949, 1966; New York 1973) at 873.
- The U.S.A. also then became involved in various negotiations, and its Navy with suppression activities along the Barbary coast, chiefly against Tripoli and against Algiers. Clark, Stevens, Alden, Krafft, A Short History of the United States Navy (Philadelphia: Lippincott 1910; Alden's revised edition 1927) at 43 (1793), 61–92 (1800–1805), 204–206 (1807, 1812–1815); 61, 206 (treaties with Tunis mentioned).
- Cf., William Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (1976) at 46, 47, et sequentia.
- Abdullah Laroui voices the common complaint that, in light of their importance, too often too much is made of the Barbary Corsairs. Larouri, The History of the Maghrib (Paris 1970; Princeton 1977), e.g., at 244.
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (University of Oklahoma 1976) at 47–48.
- Cf., Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World during the Age of Philip II (Paris 1949, 1966; New York 1973) at 884, which describes the foreign population (the source of renegade crews) in 16th-century Algiers, and a brief view of the city's business life, it is dependent on corsair activity.
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (University of Oklahoma 1976) at 48–49.
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (University of Oklahoma 1976) at 48.
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (University of Oklahoma 1976) at 49–50.
- Ellen G. Friedman, Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Age (University of Wisconsin 1983), "Part 3. The Redemption" at 105–164. The Trinitarians (founded 1201) and the Mercedarians (founded 1218) (Sp: merced, "favor, grace, mercy") were two prominent religious orders, among others—Friedman (1983) at 106.
- Employed mostly in hard and difficult work (e.g., rowing oars in galleys [at 63–65], mining [at 65–66], and general slave labor [67–68]). A few managed better positions (trades, even management) [69–70]; wealthy captives might offer bribes [70–71]. Ellen G. Friedman, Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Age (University of Wisconsin 1983).
- Ellen G. Friedman, Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Age (University of Wisconsin 1983). Captive prisoners might enjoy "exceptional" religious privileges [at 77–90], including churches and liturgies, although sometimes the permitted clergy were subjected to retaliation for reports of anti-Muslim actions in Spain [at 87–88]. Later, the Trinitarian Order set up hospitals to care for the sick and dying [at 91–102]. In 1620, the Spanish founded a hospital with the help of the ruling Bey of Tunis [at 101–102]. Ellen G. Friedman, Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Age (University of Wisconsin 1983).
- Spencer, Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs (University of Oklahoma 1976) at 50, 127.
- Julien, History of North Africa (Paris 1931, 1961; London 1970) at 308. "Important though piracy was to the economy of Tunis, it never acquired such exclusive importance as at Algiers." Julien (1970) at 308. Slave markets, where mute human captives are auctioned, now appear inherently indecent, whether in the East or the West.
- Jane Soames Nickerson, A Short History of North Africa (1961) at 86: "The capture of Christian ships and the enslavement of Christian crews was not only a profitable enterprise but also a holy war against the infidel who had driven the Moors out of Spain."
- Bloom, Jonathan M. (2020). Architecture of the Islamic West: North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula, 700–1800. Yale University Press. ISBN 9780300218701.
- Bloom, Jonathan M. (2020). Architecture of the Islamic West: North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula, 700–1800. Yale University Press. ISBN 9780300218701.
- "Faiencetiles". The National Bardo Museum. Archived from the original on 12 January 2022. Retrieved 12 January 2022.
- Binous, Jamila; Baklouti, Naceur; Ben Tanfous, Aziza; Bouteraa, Kadri; Rammah, Mourad; Zouari, Ali (2002). Ifriqiya: Thirteen Centuries of Art and Architecture in Tunisia (2nd ed.). Museum With No Frontiers, MWNF. ISBN 9783902782199.