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The Gulf carriers, sometimes known as the ME3 (short for "Middle East 3") or the Big Three,[1] are three major airlines—Emirates, Etihad Airways, and Qatar Airways—based along the Persian Gulf. The rapid rise of these airlines in the early twenty-first century has led to a significant disruption in the air transport market. Several US and European airlines allege that the Gulf carriers have been subsidized by the governments, through discriminatory fees in favor of local airlines and favorable fuel contracts.

Gulf carriers edit

The phrase Gulf carriers refers to airlines (which are also known as carriers) based in one of Arab states bordering the Persian Gulf, which are typically referred to as the Gulf states. In practice, however, the term is almost exclusively used to collectively refer to three major airlines based in the region:

Airline Founded Hub Government owner Destinations Passengers carried, 2016 (in millions)[2] Scheduled Passenger Kilometres, 2014 (in millions) Revenue (FY 2016-17)[a] Profit (FY 2016-17)[a]
Emirates 1986 Dubai International Airport,Dubai, United Arab Emirates Dubai[b] 161 55 230,855[3] 94.684 billion dirham (US$25.78 billion)[c][4] 3.659 billion dirham (US$996.3 million)[c][4]
Etihad Airways 2003 Abu Dhabi International Airport, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates United Arab Emirates over 100[5] 18 ? ? ?
Qatar Airways 1993 Hamad International Airport, Doha, Qatar Qatar[6][d] over 150[7] 31 91,800[3] QR 39.4 billion (US$10.8 billion)[2][e] QR 1.97 billion (US$541 million)[2][e]

In 2014, Emirates was the world's leading airline in international passenger-kilometres flown[3] and fourth among airlines in terms of international passengers carried.[9]

Other large airlines in the region include flydubai (based in Dubai),[f] Gulf Air (the flag carrier of Bahrain), Kuwait Airways (the national carrier of Kuwait), Oman Air (the national carrier of Oman), and Saudia (the flag carrier of Saudi Arabia).[12]

Background edit

Founding and expansion edit

Open skies agreements edit

Position in the air transport market edit

The airlines significantly benefit from the geographic location of their hubs, which are centrally located between Europe, Africa, Asia, and Australia. The Gulf carriers rely on sixth freedom passenger traffic—passengers flying from one country to another via a third country, in the Gulf carriers' case via the UAE and Qatar—to a much greater extent than most of the world's major airlines.[13] Roughly three in five passengers on Emirates are only connecting through Dubai.[14] The region is within an eight-hour flight of more than 4 billion people, including many of the world's fastest growing economies.[15][13]

The Gulf carriers are a major contributor to the economies of the UAE and Qatar. In the emirate of Dubai, aviation accounts for nearly a third of the GDP and 30% of employment.[16] A Washington Post writer dubbed the two countries emerging "aerostates", alluding to the term 'petrostate', as states "where world-class aviation is a critical economic engine deeply integrated with the state itself."[16]

Effects on the air transport market edit

Australia edit

The kangaroo route between Australia and Europe is too great to support any economically-viable non-stop flights. Most travelers on this route stopped in Southeast Asia, typically Singapore or Bangkok.[17] In 2013, Dubai overtook Singapore as the most frequented stop for air travel between Australia and Europe.[17] Of the 150,000 passengers between London and Sydney in October 2013, 55,000 traveled through Dubai, while 40,000 traveled through Singapore.[17] The increased competition between Australia and Europe has led to lower prices while the number of passengers between these regions has not increased.[17] Since traffic between Australia and Europe supported many Southeast Asian carriers' flights to Europe, lower profit margins have resulted in a decrease in capacity between Western Europe and Southeast Asia.[17]

In April 2013, Qantas formed an alliance with Emirates to cooperate on services between Australia and Europe.[18] As of November 2015, the two airlines operate a total of 14 daily flights between Dubai and Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth, and Sydney.[19] Most major European cities are now a one-stop journey from these cities.[18] Qantas broke a 17-year alliance with British Airways on the route.[17][18]

Europe edit

Air France-KLM and Lufthansa Group have lost considerable amount of traffic to Asia as a result of the Gulf carriers and have lobbied their governments to hinder further expansion of the Gulf carriers in Europe.[20] The new carriers have taken away business travelers at a time when major European carriers are faced with stiff competition from low-cost carriers for regional flights.[21]

However, the trade group for European airports, Airports Council International Europe, and travel, the European Travel Commission, support the expansion of Gulf carriers in Europe. Its president claims it is a lack of support for European carriers, not the support of Gulf carriers by their governments, that has caused European carriers to lose to their Gulf competitors.[20]

Indian subcontinent edit

India is the largest market for the Gulf carriers, each of which serve at least ten destinations within India.[22] For passenger traffic between the Indian subcontinent and U.S., in 2013, the Gulf carriers surpassed the market share of US carriers and their joint venture partners in Europe.[13][g] In 2016, nearly half—1.3 million of 2.7 million—of passengers between India and the U.S. were carried by Gulf carriers, although a ban on in-flight electronics imposed by U.S. on flights from various Middle Eastern airports, including the hubs of the Gulf carriers, for part of 2017 increased traffic for Air India.[24]

In 2013, Etihad acquired a 24% stake in Jet Airways, India's second-largest carrier.[22] In 2017, Qatar Airways and the Qatar Investment Authority announced plans to launch a domestic airline in India.[25]

Southeast Asia edit

As of 2015, two-fifths of traffic on Gulf carrier flights to Southeast Asia was primarily to or from Western Europe, the largest origin or destination on their Southeast Asia routes.[26] Between 2005 and 2015, the number of routes operated by Gulf carriers to Southeast Asia increased from 14 to 54.[26] The rise of the Gulf carriers and Qantas' partnership with Emirates at Dubai has shifted traffic on the Kangaroo route between Europe and Australia, which is too long to be flown non-stop, from major hubs in Southeast Asia (eg. Bangkok and Singapore) to the hubs of the Gulf carriers.[17] Increased competition between Australia and Europe has led to lower prices while the number of passengers between these regions has not increased.[17] Since traffic between Australia and Europe supported many Southeast Asian carriers' flights to Europe, lower profit margins have resulted in a decrease in capacity between Western Europe and Southeast Asia.[17] The combination of the rise of the Gulf carriers and the growth and expansion of airlines in mainland China has led to increasingly lower profit margins for Singapore Airlines and Cathay Pacific.[27][28]

United States edit

The arrival and expansion of the Gulf carriers has improved access between the US and Africa, India, and Southeast Asia—regions where US carriers have traditionally had limited services and where most traffic passed through European airports.[29] Between 2008 and 2014, Gulf carriers' share of booked seats between Dallas-Ft. Worth International Airport and Mumbai rose from 2.8% to 69.9%, while the share carried by US and EU carriers fell from 81.1% to 28.7%.[21]

Dispute over unfair competition edit

The three major legacy carriers in the United States—American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and United Airlines—along with several major labor unionsAir Line Pilots Association, International; Allied Pilots Association; Southwest Airlines Pilots’ Association; International Brotherhood of Teamsters; Association of Flight Attendants-CWA; Association of Professional Flight Attendants; Communications Workers of America—have formed the Partnership for Open and Fair Skies to "restore a level playing field under the Open Skies agreements with Qatar and the UAE."[30] On 28 January 2015, the Partnership for Open Skies released a white paper claiming that the Gulf carriers had received substantial subsidies; the same day, the CEOs of the three airlines began to lobby for a freeze in capacity of the Gulf carriers to the US and an investigation into the allegations.[31]

The dispute has pitted several major airlines against rival airlines that benefit from partnerships with the Gulf carriers as well as many industry trade groups. JetBlue, which has a codeshare partnership with Emirates, and FedEx, which operates a cargo hub in Dubai, have both supported the open skies agreements the US has with the UAE.[32] The Airports Council International-North America, a trade group for airports, has also strongly supported open skies agreements that attract foreign airlines to airports underserved by domestic airlines, stating that airports "should not be held hostage by U.S. airline decisions regarding which markets to serve".[32] Meanwhile, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and the US airline trade group, Airlines for America, have not taken a position on the issue, whose members count support for both sides of the issue.[33][32]

Subsidies edit

The Partnership for Open and Fair Skies, along with another coalition, Americans for Fair Skies, contend that the Gulf carriers have received $42 billion in subsidies since 2004 and has called for a US government review of these allegations that, if true, would contravene the fair competition aspects of the open skies agreements the US has with the UAE and Qatar.[34][35][36] They claim that the Gulf carriers have received substantial no-interest loans and subsidized ground services.[37] Commenting on the alleged subsidies, the CEO of United Airlines remarked: "We’re not competing against airlines. We’re competing against the treasuries of Gulf nations, and that’s an impossible task."[38]

Emirates has publicly stated that it has not received government funding beyond an initial US$10 million funding to start operations in the 1980s and US$88 million invested in infrastructure around the same time.[39] The airline also contends that favorable bankruptcy provisions in the US are essentially a subsidy to the three major US legacy carriers—United, Delta, and American—which all restructured through Chapter 11 bankruptcy between 2005 (United & Delta) and 2011 (American) and which have been vocal in their claims that the Gulf carriers have received subsidies. Similarly, Etihad, based on a report it commissioned, has contended that American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and United Airlines have received a collective $71.48 billion in subsidies since 2000, consisting of $29.4 billion saved through pension termination (including $23.08 billion in pensions paid by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation), $35.46 billion of debt saved through bankruptcy ($30.96 billion in one-time debt relief and $4.5 billion in annual cost savings), $5.6 billion in fuel subsidies, and $0.99 billion in other subsidies and cost savings;[40][41][42]: 5  The report also notes that the three US airlines benefit from restrictive cabotage laws in the US (foreign carriers can't carry passengers solely within the US) and the Fly America Act (giving preference to US carriers for travel funded by the US government), but such benefits are difficult to quantify.[42]: 13  The industry trade group US Travel Association, citing a 1999 report by the Congressional Research Service, contends that domestic US airlines received $155 billion in subsidies between 1918-1999.[43]

Unequal operating environment edit

Labor unions are not legal in Qatar or the UAE. Based on data from 2010, Emirates' labor costs are half those of US-based American Airlines and United Airlines and just 40% those of European-based Lufthansa and Air France-KLM.[39] Additionally, the Gulf carriers benefit from the lack of corporation and income taxes in their home states.[15]

Profitability edit

Of the three carriers, only Emirates has publicly disclosed its financial earnings and profit. In fiscal year 2014-2015 (ending 31 March 2015), Emirates had a 4.555 billion dirham (US$1.240 billion)[c] net profit on 88.819 billion dirham (US$24.185 billion)[c] in revenue.[45] According to the airline, it was 27th consecutive year of profitability for Emirates.[46]

Landing rights restrictions edit

In May 2015, the Netherlands froze the expansion of landing rights of Gulf carriers at Schiphol Airport, near Amsterdam, due to concerns about unfair competition.[21][47] The move prevents them from increasing to twice-daily flights, but has been criticized by shippers in the region for its detrimental effect on air cargo capacity.[21][47]

Notes edit

  1. ^ a b The fiscal year 2016-2017 was from 1 April 2016 to 31 March 2017.
  2. ^ Emirates is wholly owned by The Emirates Group, which is wholly owned by the Investment Corporation of Dubai, a sovereign wealth fund owned by the government of the emirate of Dubai.
  3. ^ a b c d The United Arab Emirates dirham (AED) has been pegged to the US dollar at a rate of 3.6725 AED per US dollar since 1997.[44]
  4. ^ Qatar Airways is wholly owned by the Qatar Investment Authority, the Qatari government's sovereign wealth fund.[6]
  5. ^ a b The Qatari is fixed to the U.S. dollar at 3.64 to 1.[8]
  6. ^ In 2017, Emirates announced plans to merge with flydubai, which was also founded and owned by the government of Dubai, by the end of 2018.[10] Flydubai will begin operating short-haul flights for Emirates in May 2018.[11]
  7. ^ Joint ventures operated between US and European airlines include, as of May 2016:[23]

References edit

  1. ^ Huang, Clement (8 March 2016). "Turkish Airlines emerging as threat to ME3". Business Traveller. Retrieved 7 April 2017.
  2. ^ a b c Powley, Tanya; Kerr, Simeon (5 September 2017). "A hard landing for the Gulf's airlines". Financial Times. Retrieved 10 October 2017. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |subscription= ignored (|url-access= suggested) (help)
  3. ^ a b c "Scheduled Passenger - Kilometres Flown". International Air Transport Association. Archived from the original on 16 October 2015. Retrieved 5 November 2015.
  4. ^ a b "The Emirates Group Annual Report 2016-2017" (PDF). The Emirates Group. p. 6. Retrieved 10 October 2017.
  5. ^ "Aerolíneas Argentinas and Etihad Airways sign codeshare agreement" (Press release). Abu Dhabi: Etihad. 28 August 2017. Retrieved 2017-10-10.
  6. ^ a b Dron, Alan (23 May 2014). "Qatar Airways becomes state-owned". Air Transport World. Archived from the original on 23 May 2014. Retrieved 5 November 2015. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |subscription= ignored (|url-access= suggested) (help)
  7. ^ "Group Chief Executive's message". Archived from the original on 10 October 2017. Retrieved 10 October 2017. Qatar Airways currently flies 177 aircraft to more than 150 destinations across six continents.
  8. ^ "The World Factbook: Qatar". Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved 10 October 2017.
  9. ^ "Scheduled Passengers Carried". International Air Transport Association. Archived from the original on 17 November 2015. Retrieved 5 November 2015.
  10. ^ Shakeel, Shayan (22 June 2017). "Paris Air Show: Plan to combine Emirates, Flydubai into one unit within 18 months: Tim Clark". Aviation Business. ITP Digital Media, Inc. Retrieved 10 October 2017.
  11. ^ Shakeel, Shayan (26 September 2017). "Flydubai to operate Emirates shorthaul flights from May 2018". Aviation Business. Retrieved 10 October 2017.
  12. ^ Kenny, Regina (19 January 2015). "Top Ten Middle East Operators by Fleet Size for 2015". MRO-Network.com. Aviation Week Network. Retrieved 10 October 2017.
  13. ^ a b c "Alice in Wonderland goes to India (via the Gulf)". CAPA. 21 May 2015. Retrieved 10 October 2017.
  14. ^ Kamel, Deena (5 January 2017). "Is Emirates Airline Running Out of Sky?". Bloomberg BusinessWeek. Retrieved 10 October 2017.
  15. ^ a b Critchlow, Andrew (21 March 2015). "Gulf airlines are winning the battle for the skies". The Telegraph. Retrieved 5 November 2015.
  16. ^ a b Gerchick, Mark (30 April 2017). "The rise of the aerostate: U.S. carriers scramble as Persian Gulf rivals emerge". Washington Post. Retrieved 10 October 2017.
  17. ^ a b c d e f g h i Raghuvanshi, Gauravo (1 December 2013). "Asian Carriers Go Easy on Kangaroo Route as Competition Mounts". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 5 November 2015. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |subscription= ignored (|url-access= suggested) (help)
  18. ^ a b c Flynn, David (2 April 2015). "The Qantas-Emirates alliance: two years on..." Australian Business Traveler. Retrieved 5 November 2015.
  19. ^ "Qantas and Emirates: Together connecting the globe". Qantas. Retrieved 5 November 2015. Qantas and Emirates fly 14 times a day from Australia to Dubai, and provide 'one-stop' access to destinations across Europe, the Middle East and North Africa...Flying through Dubai on Qantas and Emirates' 98 A380 and B777 flights per week from Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney, you can then connect to more than 65 cities in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa.
  20. ^ a b Wall, Robert (25 June 2015). "European Airports Back Persian Gulf Airlines' Growth". Wall Street Journal.
  21. ^ a b c d "EU carriers battle Gulf airlines' expansion". DW. 28 May 2015.
  22. ^ a b Rai, Sarita (17 June 2015). "U.S. Airlines Badly Losing U.S.-Gulf Airline Brawl Over India Air Traffic". Forbes. Retrieved 10 November 2015.
  23. ^ "Airline Alliances Operating with Antitrust Immunity" (PDF). U.S. Department of Transportation. 17 May 2016. Retrieved 10 October 2017.
  24. ^ "Air India gains from US laptop ban on Gulf carriers". Aviation Business. ITP Digital Media, Inc. 9 April 2017. Retrieved 10 October 2017.
  25. ^ Chowdhury, Anirban (8 March 2017). "Qatar Airways, Investment Authority plan fully owned Indian airline". Economic Times of India. Retrieved 10 October 2017.
  26. ^ a b "Gulf airlines continue Southeast Asia push. Should Lufthansa & Singapore Airlines respond with a JV?". CAPA. 20 August 2015. Retrieved 10 October 2017.
  27. ^ Fickling, David (19 January 2017). "The Decline and Fall of Asia's Airline Empires". Bloomberg Gadfly. Retrieved 10 October 2017.
  28. ^ Kyunghee, Park (28 July 2016). "Southeast Asia's Biggest Airlines Face Increased Competition". Skift. Retrieved 10 October 2017.
  29. ^ "US-Gulf airline dispute - Europe Part 2: market share in dispute. Does anyone "own" the passenger?". CAPA Centre for Aviation. 24 September 2015. Retrieved 2 January 2016.
  30. ^ "Who We Are". Partnership for Open and Fair Skies. Retrieved 14 November 2015. The Partnership for Open & Fair Skies is a coalition composed of American Airlines, Delta Air Lines and United Airlines, along with the Air Line Pilots Association, Int'l, the Allied Pilots Association, the Airline Division of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, the Association of Professional Flight Attendants, the Communications Workers of America and the Southwest Airlines Pilots' Association...The goal of the Partnership for Open & Fair Skies is to restore a level playing field under the Open Skies agreements with Qatar and the UAE. We strongly support U.S. Open Skies policy and are calling on the Obama Administration to begin consultations under the two agreements to address the flow of subsidized Gulf carrier capacity to the United States. We are also seeking a freeze on new passenger service during the consultations.
  31. ^ Unnikrishnan, Madhu (21 April 2015). "Airline CEOs Disappointed U.S. Has Not Frozen Gulf Carrier Capacity". Aviation Daily. Retrieved 14 November 2015. Specifically, Anderson, Smisek and Parker want capacity frozen at the level it was on Jan. 28, when they first asked the cabinet secretaries to investigate the subsidies issue.
  32. ^ a b c Mouawad, Jad (16 March 2015). "Expansion by Mideast Airlines Sets Off a Skirmish in the U.S." New York Times. Retrieved 14 November 2015. The issue has become so divisive within the American travel industry that the domestic airlines' trade and lobbying group, Airlines for America, has been unable to take a position, since its members are split.
  33. ^ Bryan, Victoria (4 June 2015). "Gulf subsidies row in focus at annual airline CEO meeting". CNBC. Reuters. Retrieved 14 November 2015.
  34. ^ "The Deck is Stacked". Partnership for Open and Fair Skies. Retrieved 14 November 2015. Since 2004, the governments of Qatar and the UAE have provided $42 billion in subsidies and other unfair benefits to Qatar Airways, Etihad Airways and Emirates
  35. ^ "Open Skies Frequently Asked Questions". Americans for Fair Skies.
  36. ^ "Open Skies rifts roil airline industry". The Hill. 19 March 2015. Retrieved 14 November 2015.
  37. ^ Jansen, Bart (30 June 2015). "'Outrageous': Emirates CEO says airline isn't subsidized". USA Today. Retrieved 14 November 2015.
  38. ^ Mangla, Ismat Sarah (18 March 2015). "Cold War Between US Airlines And Gulf Carriers Turns Hot At DC Conference". International Business Times. Retrieved 2 January 2016. American Airlines CEO Doug Parker didn't mince words in his address to conference attendees. "[Emirates, Etihad and Qatar Airways] are not just owned by their governments -- these airlines are arms of the state," he said. "Qatar and the UAE [United Arab Emirates] are violating the aviation trade agreements between the U.S. and those countries by providing enormous subsidies to Qatar Airways, Emirates Airline and Etihad Airways -- subsidies in amounts that are unprecedented in the history of international trade."...United Airlines CEO Jeff Smisek echoed Parker's sentiments, telling reporters at the conference, "We're not competing against airlines. We're competing against the treasuries of Gulf nations, and that's an impossible task."
  39. ^ a b Riva, Alberto (15 November 2013). "Emirates Airline Is Eating All The Other Airlines' Lunch. But Is It Here To Stay?". International Business Times. Retrieved 5 November 2015. Alan Bender, who teaches Aeronautical Science at Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, considers Emirates a low-cost airline: "Their costs per available seat-kilometer are very low," he said, citing the standard measure in the industry. According to 2010 data from the forecasting firm Oxford Economics, labor cost per employee at Emirates is about 40 percent of Lufthansa's and Air France-KLM's, and half of American Airlines and United Airlines.
  40. ^ Lindenberger, Michael (14 May 2015). "Etihad Airways: U.S. airlines get billions in government help, too". The Dallas Morning News. Retrieved 14 November 2015.
  41. ^ Geewax, Marilyn (15 May 2015). "Big 3 Airlines Say Foreign Competitors Are 'Dumping' Seats In U.S." NPR.
  42. ^ a b Financial and Other Governmental Benefits Provided to American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and United Airlines (Report). Risk Advisory. 14 May 2015.
  43. ^ Laing, Keith (8 April 2015). "Airlines accused of hypocrisy on international flight subsidies". The Hill. Retrieved 14 November 2015. U.S. airlines are being accused of hypocrisy for arguing that foreign carriers' subsidies are ruining competition for international flights. The Washington, D.C.-based U.S. Travel Association said Wednesday that domestic airlines received $155 billion in subsidies from 1919 to 1998, citing a report from the Library of Congress's independent Congressional Research Service (CRS).
  44. ^ "UAE Dirham Will Remain Pegged To US Dollar - Central Bank". Gulf Business. 30 November 2014. Retrieved 14 November 2015. [T]he policy of the fixed peg of the dirham against the US dollar will remain in place...The UAE dirham has been fixed at a rate of 3.6725 to $1 since 1997.
  45. ^ The Emirates Group Annual Report 2014-2015 (Report). The Emirates Group. 2015. p. 5.
  46. ^ "Annual Report". Emirates. Archived from the original on 16 October 2015. Retrieved 5 November 2015. The financial year ending 31 March 2015 saw the Group achieve its 27th consecutive year of profit
  47. ^ a b Woods, Randy (21 May 2015). "Dutch government imposes Gulf carrier freeze at Schiphol". Air Cargo World. Retrieved 2 January 2016.

External links edit