Wikipedia:Featured article candidates/Knowledge/archive1

The following is an archived discussion of a featured article nomination. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the article's talk page or in Wikipedia talk:Featured article candidates. No further edits should be made to this page.

The article was archived by Ian Rose via FACBot (talk) 2 April 2024 [1].

Knowledge

Nominator(s): Phlsph7 (talk) 18:17, 6 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Knowledge is one of those everyday phenomena that seems relatively straightforward to grasp but is very difficult to precisely define. It is the main topic of epistemology and plays a key role in many fields, including the sciences. Thanks a lot to Thebiguglyalien for their detailed GA review, to Z1720, GuineaPigC77, and Tom B for their peer reviews, and to Biogeographist for all the improvement ideas and talk-page discussions. Phlsph7 (talk) 18:17, 6 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Comments from Generalissima

Reserving a spot to review this later! Generalissima (talk) 22:37, 6 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Oh gosh dang it I have been slow to get back to this. Dearest apologies! I will try my hardest to do a prose review over the next few days. Generalissima (talk) 17:36, 16 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

@Generalissima 750h+ (talk) 14:07, 29 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Comments from Tim riley

This looks an impressive article, but as I am to abstract concepts what walruses are to needlework I can't venture to comment on its balance or comprehensiveness. I have only three comments on the prose:

"Sources of knowledge are ways how people come to know things" – "ways how" is awkward. Something like "ways in which" or "ways by which", perhaps?
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:00, 14 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]
"an infinite amount of reasons" – can one have an amount of reasons? One might expect "number of reasons" here.
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:00, 14 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]
"Johanes Gutenburg" – forename and surname both misspelled.
I fixed the image alt-text and the description on the image page. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:00, 14 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Good luck with the FAC, and I hope someone better equipped than I am to comment meaningfully shows up soon. – Tim riley talk 15:21, 14 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for taking a leap to venture into this difficult territory and for the helpful comments. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:00, 14 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I would really love to add my support for promoting the article to FA, which I am fairly sure it deserves, and I shall watch this page to see if editors more competent than I on such topics give it the thumbs-up, in which case I'll be happy to add my support. Bonne chance! Tim riley talk 19:31, 14 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Image review (pass)

File:Saraswati - Raja Ravi Varma.jpg has a dead link as a source. I've gone ahead and added a archived version of the url.
Everything else looks good.

Pass Sohom (talk) 18:10, 16 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for the image review and for taking care of the source link. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:17, 17 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

SC

Putting down a marker for now. - SchroCat (talk) 11:50, 19 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Pass for a prose review. Rather like Tim, above, I have limited knowledge (both in the subject and more generally), so I'll hold off a full support until someone more qualified than me comes along to support, at which point I will happily follow suit. Cheers - SchroCat (talk) 19:41, 20 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for doing the prose review! Phlsph7 (talk) 09:06, 21 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Support from Jens

This is an excellently written article. I like the many examples that really help with understanding. Only a few nitpicks, and questions that came to me while reading the article:

Introspection allows people to learn about their internal mental states and processes. Other sources of knowledge include memory, rational intuition, inference, and testimony. – What about the knowledge how to ride a bicycle? Where does this knowledge come from? Is it perception?
Experience is required to learn how to ride a bicycle but I'm not sure about the details. I would assume that various different sources are involved with perception probably playing a key part in that experience to get familiar with all the sensory information involved in the process. Generally speaking, knowledge-how can depend on various sources, including testimony. For example, if someone gives you an accurate description of how to walk from A to B then you know how to walk from A to B based on that testimony. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:56, 20 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Testimony – In the lead, maybe add examples, to make clear that this includes books etc.
I added an explanatory footnote to clarify this point. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:56, 20 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Is knowledge restricted to humans? Can plants have knowledge? Is genetic information knowledge? Can we say that anything that is able to learn has knowledge?
That depends on whom you ask and how they define knowledge. The example with the ant knowing how to walk in the subsection "Non-propositional" is taken from Pritchard 2013. This source also suggests that some sophisticated creatures other than humans may have propositional knowledge. I don't think the term "know" is usually applied to plants. For example, saying that a plant "knows how to grow" sounds strange. The overview sources that I'm aware of give very little attention to animal knowledge and do not mention plant knowledge. Genetic information could be responsible for some forms of a priori knowledge, for example, by structuring our brains in a way that we automatically know basic arithmetic truths. I'm not sure about whether being able to learn implies knowledge. Computer programs and websites can learn things about users by gathering information. Is storing this information in a databank sufficient to say that they know things? The answer to that question probably depends mostly on how one defines learn and know. Some epistemologists hold that there is innate knowledge, that is, knowledge that is inborn and does not need to be learned. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:56, 20 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Apparently, in some way trees can learn from mistakes, so I would say they "know" things [2]; that's where I am coming from. I am not asking to add that to the article, of course. Jens Lallensack (talk) 21:29, 20 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

The article states that knowledge is a justified belief, and that knowing how to ride a bicycle is knowledge. What exactly is the belief when riding a bicycle?
There are different views on the details. According to one view, the belief concerns the procedure of riding a bicycle, i.e., the different steps involved in the process. But not everyone accepts the traditional characterization of knowledge as justified belief and it is controversial to what extent this characterization fits knowledge-how. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:56, 20 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

For example, an ant knows how to walk – I am not sure about this example. It is like saying that humans know how to breath – but this is a reflex and not learned, so it it really knowledge?
The example is taken from Pritchard 2013 and a similar example involving ants is found in Pavese 2022. I added a footnote to include this concern. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:56, 20 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Some types of knowledge-how do not require a highly developed mind, in contrast to propositional knowledge, and are more common in the animal kingdom. – Why restricting this to the animal kingdom and not life in general?
I answered this in part in the earlier response: this is how the academic sources deal with the issue and it also seems to reflect how ordinary language mostly uses the term know. A more interesting answer might be that knowledge is related to mind or higher cognition and that animals have it while plants don't. But it is controversial where mind starts and ends so we would have to be careful about including this type of claim in the article. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:56, 20 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

to understand the claim in which the term is expressed – I don't understand this wording. Wouldn't just "to understand the claim" enough? What is the "in which the term is expressed" adding?
You are right, the original formulation was unclear so I reformulated it. If we wanted to have a shorter version, your suggestion would also work. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:56, 20 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Some conscious phenomena are excluded in this context, like rational insight into the solution of a mathematical problem – I first thought that "this context" refers to a priori/a posteriori, i.e., that some claims are neither a posteriori nor a priori. Maybe replace "this context" with "relevant experience" for clarity. --Jens Lallensack (talk) 01:27, 20 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:56, 20 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

@Jens Lallensack: Thanks for the review and the thought-provoking questions. I tried to answer them as best as I could. I fear that at least some responses raise more questions than they answer, which is often the case with philosophy. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:56, 20 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for your replies! --Jens Lallensack (talk) 21:45, 20 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

PJW

To begin, it must be acknowledged that this is an article of extraordinary generality. Knowledge as such cannot be adequately covered in a monograph, much less an encyclopedia article. This, as far as I can see, makes it almost impossible to assess with respect to FAC criterion 1.b on comprehensiveness—and also, at least for me, with respect to 2.b on appropriate structure. If there exist any policies or previous discussions directly relevant on this point, it would be appropriate to link out to them here.

That said, I nevertheless have serious reservations about supporting this promotion. These reservations are, on my reading, a consequence of the intrinsic difficulty of covering such a broad topic for a general audience. But I am not sure how best to treat this. An obvious possibility would to commit, instead, to summary style. This, however, would be a massive project for which no one is volunteering—and which would outright obviate this entire discussion. So, let not the best (should it be even that!) be the enemy of the better.

Hello PatrickJWelsh and thanks for your detailed comments. I've pushed back on several of them and we'll have to explore where the middle ground lies. You are right that the topic of knowledge is vast, which makes comprehensiveness a key challenge. As I understand it, the FA criteria should not be applied to the topic in general, like its intrinsic difficulty, but to the article. The main reason is that, as Wikipedia editors, we can't do much about the topic itself. We can only try to properly cover it. This is also implied by the FA instructions: Each objection must provide a specific rationale that can be addressed. If nothing can be done in principle to address the objection, a coordinator may disregard it. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:56, 26 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

HI @Phlsph7, thanks for your point-by-point responses! I welcome the push-back. I've responded to some in turn, and there is at least one more that I intend to address. I also have a few other notes on "In various disciplines" to contribute to this process.

I should add that I understand and support the policy point you cite. My standard of comprehensiveness for an article like this is probably unreasonably high (my own emphasis here on myself). I would request other editors assess my comments accordingly.

Although I doubt that I will support promotion, I do not oppose it. If this were not a good article, that would be immediately apparent to me, and I would not be shy in actively speaking out against promotion. My comments are presented for the consideration of others and, most importantly, as a possible impetus to further improvements. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 19:06, 26 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

General comment 1: It is too long. (And I would submit that I probably have a longer attention span than most readers.) If it is possible without compromising the content, this article would benefit from an aggressive round of cuts.

The article has a readable prose size of 8152 words. According to the rules of thumb explained at WP:SIZERULE, starting for articles with over 8000 words, they May need to be divided or trimmed; likelihood goes up with size.. If you feel strongly about this rule of thumb, I could try to shave of those 152 words. But this length is not uncommon for articles on topics with this kind of scope and an aggressive round of cuts would impact comprehensiveness negatively. So I think there is a strong case for why the length of the article itself is not a problem. I had a look but I didn't feel that any of the sections should be spun off into a new child article so it seems to me that the article follows WP:Summary style. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:02, 26 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

If it's not of concern to other referees, y'all should please just disregard this comment. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 18:43, 26 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

General comment 2: I am concerned that it is overly biased towards the concerns of philosophical epistemology. Point 2.1: some of the details in this area seem unlikely to be of general interest. And, more importantly, – point 2.2: — Is there not also an underrepresented literature on this topic grounded in the cognitive sciences? My own background is in philosophy, but we do not have a monopoly on what counts as knowledge, as this article might be taken to imply.

I wouldn't say "biased" but I agree that the epistemological perspective plays a central role in the article. The main reason is that epistemology is the main field of inquiry studying knowledge, similar to how biology is the main field of inquiry studying life. The article includes perspectives from many other fields, like history, religion, anthropology, and sociology. But the inquiry into the characteristics of knowledge is not the key concern of these fields. The cognitive sciences study cognitive processes, information, and the like, but, as far as I'm aware, the specific topic of knowledge in contrast to these related concepts is not a central research topic in this field. It would be possible to include a short explanation of Goldman's epistemics but my impression is that research under this label has not received that much attention so far. Some topics relevant to the cognitive sciences are discussed in the subsection "In various disciplines#Others". I'm open to more topic suggestions in regard to the cognitive sciences if you have expertize in this area. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:05, 26 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

My objection here – and it is my central objection – is that this article reads to me too much like an excellent article written from the highly relevant, but nevertheless quite specific, perspective of Anglo-American analytic epistemology.

It is my strong impression that there is a lot of empirical work being done by scientists who take themselves to be studying knowledge (for instance, its acquisition and reliability) that is not adequately represented by this – once again, in so many respects, excellent – article.

The source of this "strong impression", however, is many years of listening to long-form interviews and reading the sorts of publication that profile such scientists. That is to say that I cannot point you in the direction of anything that would be useful, should I even be correct in my assessment that this is, indeed, a genuine shortcoming with respect to the FAC criterion of comprehensiveness. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 18:41, 26 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Also, this just occurs to me. I am here because of a second request for participation on the WikiProject Philosophy noticeboard. Have you checked whether there are any active boards in the relevant empirical sciences? If so, have you posted there as well? Someone attesting (see that!) even just to being an undergrad research assistant, or something like that, signing off on the comprehensiveness of the article would considerably assuage my concerns. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 20:11, 26 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Sorry for being slow to comprehend but I'm struggling with how to make sense of your central objection. You say that the article lacks comprehensiveness but it's not clear what concrete topics this concerns besides the vague suggestion that they belong to the cognitive sciences.

In trying to better understand your concern, I did some digging and I had a look at the 8-volume APA Encyclopedia of Psychology: it does not have an entry on the topic Knowledge. I also had a look at the 4-volume Wiley Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science: it does not contain an article on the topic Knowledge but it does contain an article on the topic Knowledge representation, which focuses on the field of artificial intelligence. In our article, this is discussed in the 3rd paragraph of the subsection "In various disciplines#Others". Do you feel that this long paragraph is not sufficient to deal with the topic? Would the situation be improved by adding a second paragraph on that topic? (By the way, I now posted an FA notice to WikiProject Cognitive science.) Phlsph7 (talk) 09:06, 27 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

General comment 3: A major topic that this article does not address is the limits of knowledge. Because the nominating editor knows my own philosophical background and interests, I should say that I would support, at most, a short paragraph on Kant. Gödel's incompleteness theorems, however, as well as theories of quantum indeterminacy, present serious challenges to some of the most basic assumptions about the possibilities of knowledge. This is a matter of interest to a general audience that deserves to be addressed under its own heading.

The sections "Sources", "Philosophical skepticism", and "Religion" address various limits of knowledge but there is surely more to be said on this topic. As I understand it, Gödel's incompleteness theorems are about the relation between completeness and provability in formal systems of logic and belong to the field of metalogic. Given some additional assumptions, maybe some interesting conclusion about the characteristics of knowledge can be drawn from them but the theorems themselves are not about knowledge. The reliable overview sources on knowledge that I'm aware of don't discuss how quantum indeterminacy limits the possibility of knowledge. If you know of a high-quality source that present these issues as topics of vital importance to knowledge in general then I would be happy to include them. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:08, 26 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

General comment 4: The disciplinary sections filed under "Others" introduces massive issues entirely unaddressed by the article. Our computers "know" more than would ever even be possible for a human to know. This complaint predates even the Internet and, in this context, should be acknowledged—even if we are not in any position to draw any kind of conclusions. Technological advances and media coverage have been been exponentially exploding in even just the past few years. What computers can or do "know" – especially when it is beyond human possibility – is a topic that seems to me deserves to be acknowledged in this article.

Do computer "know" anything? This depends very much on your definition of knowledge. The claim that they store knowledge is less controversial, similar to how books store knowledge, as discussed in the subsection "In various disciplines#Others". The historical topic of the influence of the development of computers and the Internet on knowledge is covered in the last paragraph of the section "History". Phlsph7 (talk) 10:10, 26 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

My point here is just that I would have liked to see the article more directly address the opening interrogative of your response. My own intuitions are strongly opposed to this, but I do find them challenged by recent innovations in AI. I am afraid, however, that my primary source on this is regularly listening to the NYT Hard Fork podcast. So I do not have any good sources to which I can point you on this issue. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 18:26, 26 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I would assume this question belongs to the field of the philosophy of artificial intelligence. I don't think it's one of the key questions in this field but there are various related questions, for example, whether machines can have a mind and/or consciousness. I could try to do some digging here but the fact that digging is required gives me the impression that this is not a central topic. The overview sources on knowledge that I'm aware of do not address this specific problem. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:19, 27 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Specific comment i: Self-knowledge and its limits seem to me to deserve more detailed treatment than they are given as one "Type" among the "Others" and also, in more detail, as a general "Source". In contemporary philosophy, Nietzsche and Freud are probably the dominant figures on this point. It is, however, in no way an original insight on their behalves; they just happen to be prominent for pressing back against the excesses of the Enlightenment in recent history. Plato knew this, Augustine knew this, and it is abundantly supported by recent empirical research in psychology: we are not the authorities on ourselves that we so often take ourselves to be. And this seems to me to be the kind of thing that is likely to be of interest to the average reader of Wikipedia.

The term self-knowledge is used in various different senses. If we take self-knowledge as knowledge of the self then you can get self-knowledge from various sources. They even include testimony, for example, when someone tells you something about your character that you did not know before. As far as I'm aware, self-knowledge is not generally treated as a source of knowledge besides the other sources already mentioned in the section "Sources" but rather as a type of knowledge. For example, Steup & Neta 2020 discusses the sources of knowledge mentioned in our section "Sources" and does not mention "self-knowledge". Phlsph7 (talk) 10:14, 26 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

The work I had in mind writing this comment is Timothy Wilson's 2002 Strangers to Ourselves.

More generally, while I consider it obvious that our (seemingly privileged) claims to knowledge of ourselves are massively fallible, I have found, just in the ordinary course of conversation, that there are highly intelligent people who do not recognize this.

Maybe it is outside the scope of the article to say anything more about this, but it still seems relevant to me. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 18:07, 26 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks, the book looks interesting and I'll see what can be used. However, there is the danger of overemphasizing the importance of this topic. For example, right at the beginning of the preface, the book states that ...self-knowledge has not been a mainstream topic in academic psychology. There are few college courses on self-knowledge and few books devoted to the topic.... I don't think a much more detailed treatment of this topic is justified in our article. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:29, 27 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I found a way to use Wilson's book in short footnote. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:56, 27 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

This comment also ties into the concerns of another reviewer about know-how vs. knowledge-that, which I agree might be expanded with benefit to the article. We are strangers to ourselves, yet unthinkingly we rely upon proprioceptive self-knowledge, which rarely fails us—except when it fails us reliably due to head trauma. The kind of knowledge, however you describe it, that allows us to move through the world – so often, so effortlessly – seems to me to deserve more attention. Many in the phenomenological tradition of philosophy argue that propositional knowledge is parasitic on this more basic sort of pre-understanding upon the basis of which we are able to move through the world in a way that makes possible the sort of knowledge with which this article is primarily occupied. Not at all suggesting article-wide revisions in support of this point, which is not universally accepted, just that the article would benefit from better coverage in some appropriate section.

Do you have a specific source in mind in regard to the importance of the role of proprioceptive self-knowledge? I'm not opposed to covering this in more detail as long as we avoid giving too much emphasis to the phenomenological perspective. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:18, 26 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Yes, I do! Shaun Gallagher's How the Body Shapes the Mind. I've not read it since it came out in 2005, but "proprioception" has multiple entries in the index. So probably it should be possible to add this without reading the whole thing? If you want to look at it but can't find a copy, email me and I'll see what I can do. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 17:59, 26 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for the offer, I already have access to the book. I'll have a look through it but, form a first look, I don't think that self-knowledge is a central topic in it. According to this google book search, the term only comes up 3 times. All these matches are from the bibliography rather then the text of the book itself. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:39, 27 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Specific comment ii: Almost nothing in the section "Philosophical skepticism" is anything that anyone, per even just this article, takes seriously—or even pretends to take seriously in the seminar room. If my other related suggestions are found to have merit, I suggest that anything here that cannot be incorporated into a discussion of legitimate limits to knowledge should be removed entirely.

I have more notes, but this is more than enough for now. Please, anyone reading this, do not be shy about pressing back or expressing any other sort of view, supportive, contrary, or otherwise.

Cheers, all best, et cetera —

Philosophical skepticism is a central topic in the literature on knowledge and many overview sources on knowledge cover it in detail. Removing the section entirely would hurt comprehensiveness. Its influence is not so much from philosophers who explicity defended philosophical skepticism but from everyone else who felt the need to defend their own non-skeptical position against its central arguments. This is explained right at the beginning of the section. If you feel that the discussion is too detailed then I'm open to removing some details. Which claims would you remove or trim? Phlsph7 (talk) 10:21, 26 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Chipping in to deal with "Knowledge as such cannot be adequately covered in a monograph, much less an encyclopedia article". That's certainly not true. It's a topic covered in most encyclopaedias, including from the first editions of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. - SchroCat (talk) 10:37, 26 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Hi there, @SchroCat! I went to the version of Britannica currently online to see how its entry reads. I was expecting that this would allow me to go on the record saying that it was riddled with problems and that I would have opposed its promotion, were it to have been nominated here (although I was also very ready to be surprised!). However, it seems the editors reversed course: there no longer appears to be any such article. (Also, apparently Britannica is so unreliable that links to search queries there have been blacklisted.) Is "knowledge" just the wrong search term? I don't think it's relevant in either direction, but, if they had something and then proactively removed it, that would seem to support my general contention that it is stupidly difficult to write anything encyclopedic on a topic as general as knowledge. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 19:58, 26 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The online version of the EB is a joke that should be ignored. Use a library and the printed word - see here.
I reject your view completely (~~even though you are now saying "intelligence", on which is it also possible to write an encyclopaedic article~~ (Please don't change your comment after someone has replied to it - see WP:TALK#REVISE for the better course)). Not only is it possible to write an encyclopaedic article on any subject, the printed version of the EB did it a couple of centuries ago, and I'll certainly stick to their opinion on the subject. I think the best advice you can take right now is to focus any comments onto the FA criteria. That is what this nomination is being judged on, not any single individual's personal beliefs about whether a subject matter is valid. - SchroCat (talk) 20:19, 26 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Hi, and yikes! If I had realized anyone had responded to my comment, I would not have edited it. Sorry.

If, per your username, you have any sort of expert knowledge pertaining to quantum indeterminacy, that would be very welcome above.

To your general concern, all of my comments here are predicated on the general assumption of assessment by other editors according to any and all relevant policies. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 21:08, 26 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I would submit that the fact this appears as a central topic in the relevant literature is evidence that the literature under consideration is too narrowly field-specific. Do we seriously need to be addressing imaginary demons or The Matrix?

I strongly suspect that any argument that relies upon this sort of extreme skepticism (to arrive at any conclusion beyond that such skepticism is self-defeating) is probably a rubbish argument. If you have an example to the contrary, I would review it with interest, independently of what might be the best version of this article.

If you want to keep this as its own section, I would be happy to make cuts myself in a piecemeal way so that you could easily revert any with which you disagree. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 18:19, 26 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Both the dream argument and the brain in a vat thought experiment are widely cited and discussed, they are not restricted to some esoteric fringe circles. If the point is to shorten the section, then one option would be to remove one of them (or maybe put it as footnote rather than as part of the main text). If you edit this section, please be careful to not impose your personal view on which argument is a rubbish argument. The better approach might be to first get familiar with the relevant sources, like the ones cited, and then make adjustment to better reflect those sources. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:05, 27 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

The wikilink on the dream argument supports its inclusion. I was too quick to associate this extremely general sort of skepticism just with Descartes. The brain-in-a-vat stuff, however, I still think ought to go—just on the basis of "what does this add?" Plus there is a huge literature of far more compelling skeptical arguments, ancient and contemporary, that could be included instead. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 00:42, 3 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Continuation

I'm going to be more brief here because otherwise I am afraid I will not get to it at all. The new header is just because the above is already long—and it still awaits my own further response. Most of these comments are specific to "In various disciplines". I continue with my numbering system just on the chance it might be helpful for discussion.

Specific comment iii: I agree that science is taken to be an exemplary source of knowledge (and for excellent reasons!). I must confess, however, that I find the treatment here quite unsatisfying. It is indeed often worthwhile to really take apart basic concepts, and in this context it is entirely appropriate. But all we get here is three paragraphs that read as if addressed to a highly literate person who somehow has no concept of experimental science. And then the article just moves on to the next topic of history (very nice work on that one, by the way). How is this not its own higher-level section with sub-sections on, for instance, the natural and social sciences?

Most people, I believe, think that most of the best knowledge comes from science. The philosophy of science (as you of course know, perhaps even better than me) is its own field. It is considered separate from epistemology, not because it is not extremely relevant to the study of knowledge, but because it is so important and enormous and because it also touches other major branches of philosophy. (And this is even just setting aside the question of the relevance to this article of the work of scientists themselves.)

I agree, there is a lot to be said about science and there are many ways how this section could be expanded. The difficulty here is just to get the balance right while not trying to fit too much into the article. I could imagine making it a main section, maybe not with subsections, but adding one paragraph each on natural and social sciences. I'll wait a little to see if other people have an opinion on that before I get started. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:10, 28 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I expanded the subsection "Science" to make it a main section. I added a discussion of the natural and the social sciences. I also managed to mention Gadamer's outlook on truth/knowledge beyond the scientific method as discussed in his Truth and Method, which I assume is one of the concerns you had about including a hermeneutic perspective. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:52, 4 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

General comment 5: This is another one that is just genuinely hard, but which I need to raise even though I do not have a solution. My question is, Who is this written for? Apparently almost 2,000 people visit this article every day. Yet, unlike with other articles I've worked on, I do not have a sense of who they are or what they are looking for. This makes it quite difficult to comment upon—and I can only imagine how much more difficult it must have made it to write. Unfortunately, it also makes it sometimes hard to read.

For instance, we are told (with three supporting sources!) that "Knowledge contrasts with ignorance", which is just a massive "duh!", and then we are provided with an admirably concise and informative paragraph on the etymology of "knowledge" that is pitched at a completely different reader.

Everything is clearly written and fully grammatical, but the article seems to me to not know where it is rhetorically in a way that sometimes makes it hard to read. I suspect that this is the main reason that it feels too long to me—even as I am at the same time requesting the addition of a considerable amount of material. The "Science" section is an example of this.

I'm not sure who the typical reader is. Chances are that there is no one typical reader and people from all walks of life somehow find their way to the article. I usually write less with a specific reader in mind and focus more on certain criteria that the article should fulfill. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:17, 28 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

(I apologize, by the way, for my in places ungenerous characterization of your hard work on this article. However, you nominated it for promotion to FA-"the best Wikipedia has to offer" status, and you requested input from everyone on the WikiProject Philosophy board. So I am not pulling punches. As you know, I think your work is incredible, and I would not be commenting here at all if I did not think you could roll with those punches, or if I thought that it would discourage you from continuing to contribute to this project and other areas of Wikipedia. If you think that I am running up against the boundaries of civility, please tell me.)

We may not always be of the same opinion and it may take us a while to get on the same page but I appreciate your in-depth and candid feedback. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:24, 28 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Glad to hear! Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 00:42, 3 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Specific comment iv: Is there any reason to discuss specific religions in a general article on knowledge? It is great that the person writing this has this background, but I would cut the last two paragraphs.

Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 23:48, 27 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

For better or worse, religion is still an important part of the lives of many people and discussing the role of knowledge at least in the main religions helps make the text more concrete. I don't think the last 2 paragraphs are absolutely necessary but I also don't think that this subsection is overly long. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:34, 28 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Round two

I gave the article another read this morning and have a few more notes to share. Again, some are specific and probably easy to address, whereas others would require further research and would lengthen the article. I'll look again at your responses above, but, as much as I can, I will pursue my main points here at the bottom instead. If at any point something that I have neglected would benefit from my direct response, please just call it to my attention directly. (I find it very difficult to keep track of all the different threads in this unstructured format...)

The section lead of "Definitions" acknowledges several not necessarily incompatible definitions. Its subsections, however, focus upon one specific debate about just one of those definitions. My ideal article would expand in a similar manner upon some of the non-propositional definitions (or, actually, it would redirect out to child articles to this effect). The structural issue, however, could be addressed just by readjusting the levels of section headings.
This focus is intentional since there is just so much more discussion of these definitions. This is reflected, for example, in the fact that there is a whole area of epistemology, the analysis of knowledge, dedicated to this topic. I'm not aware of many in-depth debates about how to define knowledge-how. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:20, 5 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I very much like the article's presentation of the Gettier problem, which is highly relevant and of likely interest to even the majority of readers who have never heard of it. The second two paragraphs on responses, however, get too much into the weeds for readers who have not, in fact, heard of it until just having read the first two paragraphs. I suspect you might here lose a lot of the very few readers who actually began the article with the intention of reading the whole thing through. Consider cutting back?
I tried to simplify that part, I hope I didn't overdo it. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:37, 5 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

The a priori—a posteriori distinction is presented as if a matter of uncontroversial fact when, in fact, it has been directly challenged by philosophers as diverse as Hegel and Quine. There should be at least a sentence or qualifying clause to acknowledge this.
As I understand it, Quine's main challenge was directed at the analytic-synthetic distinction. Are you sure that he also challenged the a prior-a posteriori distinction? There is a close connection between the two distinctions but there are also some differences. As a naturalist, Quine may hold that there is no a priori knowledge but I don't think he denies the very distinction. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:50, 5 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I was probably confused about Quine, who I have not read since undergrad, and I withdraw this objection. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 02:16, 8 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Is metaknowledge really its own type of knowledge at all? Much less deserving mention in this context?
I don't think that there are strict criteria on what counts as a "type" of knowledge. In one sense, knowledge about cats is a type of knowledge. It's difficult to say whether metaknowledge is important enough to be mentioned. One of the cited articles is exclusively on this topic and metaknowledge is important in formal epistemology. Since we only have 3 sentences, I would tend to leave them as they are. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:00, 5 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I don't feel strongly about it, but I don't think you want to lean to heavily on there's a whole article devoted to this highly specific, but still relevant issue! Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 02:16, 8 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I would like to see more on situated knowledge. I suspect that I am not alone in finding it intrinsically interesting. This would also help to correct against what I perceive as a perhaps undo emphasis upon propositional knowledge. Further, I find the article's specific association of this kind of knowledge with feminism and postmodernism to be extremely weird. Is this not phenomenology 101? Probably also pretty basic to developmental psychology? (More on the political dimension to follow.)
Do you have specific claims or ideas associated with situated knowledge that you think should be mentioned? It's an important term in some feminist circles, specifically surrounding the work of Donna Haraway, and more could be said on that. The terms situated cognition and embodied cognition are associated with phenomenology but I'm not sure about situated knowledge. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:50, 5 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I was thinking about the issues denoted by the phenomenological terms, although I would also be happy to see Haraway covered. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 02:16, 8 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

The article to me seems to understate the unreliability of memory in even perfectly healthy and "normal" individuals. For instance, I believe there is good empirical evidence that we unwittingly fabricate memories upon the basis of photos or stories we have heard about ourselves—especially in childhood or the otherwise more distant past, and also that we become increasingly confident in them the more times we recount them. This can be an issue of considerable importance in legal contexts, among, I am sure, many others.
I added a short mention of confabulation. I don't want to overemphasize this point since memory is usually considered a reliable source despite its lapses. Phlsph7 (talk) 13:11, 5 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
That probably makes sense for an epistemology article. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 02:16, 8 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Do we really need the paragraph on knowledge management? Or, at minimum, could it be cut back? Unless it's directly building towards something, no one needs to be told that knowledge we wish to be retained should be stored in a reliable medium, of which there are several.
I shortened the passage in question. It might be good to keep the paragraph to ensure a variety of views from different disciplines. Phlsph7 (talk) 13:16, 5 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I'm fine with this. It's probably what some people are here looking for, which makes its lack of philosophical interest (at least, to me) irrelevant. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 02:16, 8 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

That is pretty much it in terms of minor edits. I exempt only a few quibbles with the lead that are best left until the body is, at least per this process, provisionally settled.

I'm going to follow up with a second post under this header on potentially larger issues, but I'm not sure I'll finish it tonight. (I call these issues "larger" just because, if they have merit, it would probably take a lot of work to address them. But they might not have merit!)

Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 00:11, 3 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Sorry, I'm probably not going to be able to get to this for a few days. Since I promised "potentially larger issues", however, I owe it to you to at least say what they are—even if I don't have time to make my case.

Basically, I think that an appropriately general philosophical article about knowledge needs full sections addressing the concerns of hermeneutics and those of critical theory (and various area studies: think, e.g., "feminist epistemology"). The SEP article[3] is a solid source on the first. Not sure about the second.

If you have access to Habermas's Knowledge and Human Interests, take a look at section V of the Appendix (pp. 308–11). He distinguishes three types of knowledge according to three basic human interests. This article focuses almost entirely on the first (hence my earlier allegation of bias towards the concerns of Anglo-American analytic epistemology). Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 20:04, 3 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

From his SEP article[4]: "According to Habermas, there are three knowledge-constitutive interests. The empirical and natural sciences are governed by the cognitive interest in the technical control of objectified processes. The historical-hermeneutical sciences are shaped by a practical interest in orienting action and reaching understanding, while self-reflection (and Erkenntniskritik) are determined by a cognitive interest in emancipation and in Mündigkeit—autonomy and responsibility (1968b [1971a: 313–314])." Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 20:17, 3 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Personally, I'm also interested in these fields and I know that you are closely associated with them. However, based on the high-quality overview sources that I'm aware of, they seem to be minor topics in regard to the subject of knowledge in general and dedicating a full section to each of them would be a violation of WP:PROPORTION. For example, I checked several sources (the IEP article on knowledge, the Oxford short introduction, and the SEP article on epistemology): none of them contains a section dedicated to these fields. I also searched for the terms "hermeneutics", "critical theory", "Habermas", and "feminism" (and their related forms): I got no hits in any of these sources, except for 2 mentions of feminist epistemology in the SEP article. I could look at more sources, like the article in the Routledge Encyclopedia article, but I assume the result would be similar. I'll see where it makes sense to mention these topics without going into a detailed discussion.

You seem to suggest that the article is biased because it "focuses almost entirely on" how "The empirical and natural sciences are governed by the cognitive interest in the technical control of objectified processes". I read through our main sections but I had a very hard time making sense of this objection. The only subsection explicitly focused on science is the subsection called "Science", which you thought should be expanded. Do you think that this potential bias of most of the article is obvious or is this the kind of bias that only becomes visible to readers who adopt a very particular interpretative perspective? Does this alleged bias affect only our article or does it affect most of the high-quality overview sources as well, like the ones mentioned above? Phlsph7 (talk) 09:13, 4 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Hi again,

Apologies in advance for the curmudgeonly tone. I've come down with something and am writing through a headache, as I also was yesterday.

I'm sorry to hear that you are unwell and I hope you get better soon. Apologies for adding to your malady by causing you exasperation. Phlsph7 (talk) 14:04, 5 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for the well-wishes. It was definitely just a cold virus, from which I am now recovered. If I seemed to in any way be blaming you, that most certainly was not my intent. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 02:16, 8 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Where I spoke of "bias" I should have spoke of an artificially "narrow" or "limited" perspective. Most certainly I am not accusing you of advancing any kind of agenda. My objection is just that I don't see how this passes the comprehensiveness criterion.
I did not mean to suggest that you were pushing some kind of instrumental conception of knowledge, as you understandably took my invocation of Habermas to suggest. My intention was only to point to kinds of knowledge (the second two) that respond to what are perhaps quite fundamental human interests (and so of likely interest to readers!), but that this article treats at most in passing.
I was thinking about including something about Habermas's theory of knowledge-constitutive interests in the article. But as I started doing the research, I got more and more the impression that this may not be a good idea. According to [5] and [6], this theory mainly belongs to his early philosophy. It was criticized from various angles and Habermas himself did not defend it and saw it instead as illicitly relying on assumptions in the philosophy of consciousness and Kantian transcendentalism. Maybe you know something that I don't but, to me, this does not seem to be a good topic for this type of overview article. Phlsph7 (talk) 13:50, 5 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I think it would be appropriate, but I do not think that it is necessary. My point was just that the article ignores two fields of philosophical inquiry into dimensions of knowledge barely addressed in the current version. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 02:16, 8 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I think you don't realize how exasperating it is to be told, in response to a content-based objection (e.g., self-knowledge, which I still think deserves its own section), to please just go review the high-quality sources and report back on those terms. If there is a problem with the content, that is a problem with the sourcing. Displacing the problem to sources only creates an unreasonably high barrier to participation. Are we all supposed to do literature reviews? Even if we were to do this, how would we demonstrate that we have? Stacking up citations against one another? Comparing author CVs? I think this should only be invoked as a last resort when a conversation is just obviously unproductive, but a decision still must be made. (Although I am not, of course, in any position to decide if that is not in fact here the case!)

Again, however, so far from alleging that you intend to short-circuit discussion, I gladly volunteer that I in fact commend your collaborative spirit and willingness to make sometimes serious revisions to your own quite recent hard work, which is just out-and-out hard for anyone do to. Just, please, be aware.

Since, however, you have pointed me to three specific overview sources (from the impressively long list of high-quality sources supporting this article), I can in fact respond on these terms. My central objection is that this article on the general topic of knowledge is written too much from the specific discipline of analytic epistemology. In defense, you directed me to three articles with four authors, all of whom are epistemologists trained in the analytic tradition and three of whom launched their (genuinely impressive) academic careers from the same highly ranked PhD program. I do not think too much should be read into the latter happenstance; nevertheless, this exacerbates rather than ameliorates my concern.

So, to your question of whether my complaint here extends to those sources, the answer is almost certainly yes. ("Almost" certainly only because I have not properly reviewed them and am operating on the entirely confident assumption that you present them accurately. Otherwise, just "yes".)

To your quite reasonable question, I do not think that this article would appear biased to readers who do not already have what I would default to regarding as an unjustifiable bias in favor of "Continental" philosophy. But to the extent that it just reflects back, for instance, the IEP article, I am concerned that a lot of readers will check out on the grounds that philosophy seems unnecessarily technical, self-absorbed, or irrelevant. Because I am operating on the assumption that folks who want an article on epistemology will find themselves at that page; folks who find themselves here want something more general.
Some of the philosophical issues that I have found to be best addressed in the literature on hermeneutics and critical theory include, just for example, the following:
- To what extent is knowledge just a matter of interpretation?
- If it's interpretation – as it almost certainly is, at least when it comes to individual (psychological) or collective (sociological) self-knowledge – does this not lead to epistemological relativism? If so (although I think not), what are the implications?
- Is there such a thing as a "view from nowhere", even in the natural sciences?
- Since the answer to the immediately above is almost certainly "no", at least in the social/human sciences, what are the social/ethical/political implications of that? How much of what we think is natural is actually a matter of historically contingent power-relations, and how can we tell the difference?

Obviously the article is not going to answer these questions, but they are just as directly related to knowledge – and they are of at least as much general interest — as, for instance, the Gettier problem.

I have not reviewed the edits, but I am quite glad to see you have expanded the article's treatment of the philosophy of science in response to feedback here. In this context, I would definitely place that above "How is there no Foucault!?" (per the immediately above) in terms of overall importance.
The reason that I call attention to these two sub-disciplines (hermeneutics and critical theory), which I perceive as omitted, is indeed my own interest in them, together with my considered view that they address a lot of stuff that is important and of general interest. They pertain directly to knowledge and – unlike with the empirical stuff that I really think has got to be out there and that I think would boost the article, but upon which point I can cite only my own individual conviction that "how could they not exist?" – I actually know the literature here. So if the question is, "has this been covered by reliable secondary sources?", I can not just confidently say "yes", but I can also cite sources that I believe to be representative and potentially of use in improving the article. On self-knowledge, for instance, I would rely heavily on the work of Charles Taylor. But there is also a SEP article[7] entirely devoted to this topic that does not even mention him (although he does somehow appear anyway in the bibliography).
Earlier you leaned on an analogy between the field of biology and the topic of life, and the field of epistemology and the topic of knowledge. The life article, however, is quite broad and it is, in my decidedly non-expert opinion, a legit GA article—in no small part because it relies heavily on summary style to keep it at a readable length, and because it does not restrict itself to just what appears in introductory-level handbooks on biology. Speaking as someone fully aware that he has done basically zero work on this article, that is a lot more what my ideal version of it would look like.

Stepping back, I want to acknowledge that I have cycled back to where I started. Also, I am veering away from the content of the article into matters of general editorial philosophy. For these reasons, I am going to do my best to refrain from further editorial interventions. I am satisfied that I have quite abundantly had my say—to be assessed on its merits. I will, however, most gladly continue to respond to any direct requests for clarification or comment.

Oh, and also, since I am at least half-way checking out, I cannot resist adding that – as you, @Phlsph7, should very well know! –: Without at least a dash of Hegel, this article will never be absolute!

(But no, more seriously, my actual expert opinion is that mention of Kant is easily justified, but the article does not need Hegel.)

Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 02:39, 5 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I probably should have explained better how mentioning the high-quality overview sources is related to the Wikipedia policies to avoid some of the exasperation on your side. My intention was not to steer attention away from the content of the article but to justify the selection of this content. According to WP:PROPORTION, An article should ... treat each aspect with a weight proportional to its treatment in the body of reliable, published material on the subject and according to WP:TERTIARY, Reliable tertiary sources ... may help evaluate due weight. The point about looking to reliable sources is built into these policies so I'm not sure if there is a good way to avoid that. This requirement has the advantage that we don't have to rely on our personal interests and individual convictions for crucial decisions on what should be covered. Two of the three sources I mentioned are directly available online and if you have questions about the other one then I'm happy to help.

As I see it, a Wikipedia article on subject X should provide an accessible summary of the academic discourse or the reliable sources on subject X. If topic Y gets a of lot of coverage in the academic discourse on subject X then the article should address topic Y in detail. If not then the article should not address it in detail. The point of my argument was to show that the latter point is the case for the topics you suggested. That means we don't need to worry about whether the majority of the high-quality overview sources are biased against topic Y. The encyclopedias and the book from the Oxford book series I mentioned are not explicitly associated with a particular school of philosophy. So we should not assume that they introduce some kind of bias. It's not our responsibility to fix what we think is wrong with the academic discourse as a whole. I guess you could call that an inherent limitation on the side of Wikipedia.

Thanks for breaking down the important points of what you think should be included from hermeneutics and critical theory. I managed to mention some of them without creating new main sections. Given the growing length of this discussion and the change in mood, I'm not sure that we will get to a point where we see eye to eye on these issues anytime soon. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:57, 6 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I believe that I understand the policy you describe. It served us well here, for instance, and I've since used it here. The problem that I see with applying it to this article, however, is that it is not clear that there is any high-level authority on knowledge. Or, if it really is the discipline of analytic epistemology, then we need to merge the articles. I've read both quite carefully in just the past few days, and the amount of direct overlap is massive. This is, in effect, the objection with which I began, and which was echoed by Shapeyness and Biogeographist, who I believe both also acknowledged the huge amount of work that would be required to address it. I was honestly surprised you didn't withdraw the nomination at that time. Nevertheless, I do consider the process so far a success in the most important respect: it has improved the article. But I still don't see how it can pass FAC criterion 1.b (is comprehensive) or 1.c. (built on representative survey of the relevant literature).

Other referees need to weigh in on this however. It was not my intention to so dominate this review process. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 02:16, 8 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Two minor items in closing:

If you are going to mention other languages having multiple words for knowledge (which I fully support), you should explain the distinctions they trace that are obscured in the English "knowledge"; otherwise I don't see how they inform the discussion and so should be simply deleted.
I'm not sure that there is an easy explanation and correct usage may be context dependent. The source mentions the difference but does not explain it. This was already mentioned below by Biogeographist. If you feel the claim should be removed then I would ping them. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:15, 9 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The mention of hermeneutics in Structure should clarify that the hermeneutic circle is virtuous, and this approach claims to show that knowledge does not need a metaphysical foundation. I'm pretty sure that is supported by the fourth source you provide, but I'd be happy to find another if it is not. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 02:16, 8 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I implemented the second part. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:04, 9 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Perhaps the SEP can assume knowledge of Latin and French (although I think they shouldn't); Wikipedia, however, cannot. I'm happy to ping @Biogeographist, but I think they were sufficiently clear above. If these terms are to be mentioned, they should be defined in English. No one is going to accuse you of synth for just referencing a dual-language dictionary.

The primary point, however, as I take it (although perhaps because it is an explicit endorsement of my own point) is that Barry Allen's purpose in the cited source is precisely to widen the scope of discussion of knowledge beyond epistemology, as PatrickJWelsh discussed above, starting with the different kinds of (what we call) knowledge that were named in ancient Greece.

Two of the four Greek terms from Allen's article have fallen by the wayside. I would be happy to see them restored (wherever we land on the Latin and French).

Also, the Barry Allen [8] entry [9] provides tertiary cover/justification for engaging with the secondary philosophical literature along some of the lines I have suggested above: feminism, Habermas, Foucault, and – although I didn't mention it – the role of language.

Allen's conclusion that "the only kind of knowledge there is" is "a human capacity for superlative artifactual performance" is obviously his own theory, rather than a report on the academic consensus. It's an attractive theory, however, and I'd also be happy to see this or something like it given some attention in the article.

Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 21:47, 10 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

@PatrickJWelsh: Thanks for the ping. I made sure that Allen's view is covered at Definitions of knowledge § Other definitions, which is a subsection of Definitions of knowledge § Responses and alternative definitions. Allen's view is far enough from the mainstream that I don't think it needs to be mentioned in this article. The last sentence of the section Knowledge § Definitions is: "There is still very little consensus in the academic discourse as to which of the proposed modifications or reconceptualizations is correct, and there are various alternative definitions of knowledge", with a link to that section with the views of Allen and others. I liked mentioning the Greek words, for reasons I gave elsewhere on this page, but I can live without them. At least there's a reference to Allen's article. Biogeographist (talk) 20:17, 11 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

There seems to be a preference for the sentence on the ancient Greek terms so I used it to replace the sentence on the Latin and French terms. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:16, 13 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Another minor item I just noticed: I think the article should acknowledge that Kuhn's incommensurability thesis has been widely criticized and that his latter work has been interpreted as backing away from some of its more radical implications. This is supported at §6 here.[10]

Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 21:24, 17 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I added a footnote to address this point. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:27, 18 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Another suggestion:

Should the section on science include a paragraph on medical knowledge? This is probably the specialized knowledge of the most interest to the general public. This would also be an opportunity to make a point about the sometimes false claims to universality in an uncomplicated way: medicine has history of conducting its studies on white male subjects, who are wrongly assumed to be generic human beings. This sometimes has adverse effects on the care of non-white, non-male patients. You could find sources for this in either of the first two volumes of IJFAB: International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics [11], among many other places. You could instead add a sentence about this after the mention of Foucault if you don't think a medicine paragraph is worth adding.

Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 19:01, 22 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

While the information is indeed interesting, it seems to me a little too specific to include in this overview article. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:39, 24 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Yes, I would strongly prefer an entire section be devoted to the societal/social justice implications of what officially counts as knowledge and its sometimes adverse implications. But since you rejected that request, this seemed like at least a small way to help make this important point by way of a specific example. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 01:25, 26 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I'll make an effort to see what can be done about your suggestion of discussing the exclusion of non-white, non-male patients as subjects of medical research in the section "Sociology". I took some time to have a look at the first paper of the journal you mentioned. Its main focus seems to be feminist bioethics. I was unable to find much that could be used to directly support a connection between the example you mentioned and the sociology of knowledge. I assume you saw something there that I missed so I look forward to learning which passage you had in mind. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:49, 27 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I don't have a specific passage in mind, and IJFAB is just one of many perfectly good secondary sources that make this general point, which I submit is relevant to the sociological dimension of knowledge in that it is an instance of a pattern of study-design that produces "bad knowledge" (i.e., error presented as scientifically verified fact) as a result of including only subjects of a non-representative segment of society. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 22:27, 29 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Even if you are right, I can't add this to the article as an example of the sociology of knowledge based on your personal conclusion without a source. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:22, 30 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

There is also disagreement about whether knowledge is a rare phenomenon that requires high standards or a common phenomenon found in many everyday situations. — You're already set up for a subsection on pragmatism!
See my response at #Shapeyness. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:05, 24 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Declarative knowledge can be expressed using declarative sentences stored in books. – Perhaps more simply, "Declarative knowledge can be stored in books."?
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:05, 24 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
One difficulty for a priori knowledge is to explain how it is possible and some empiricists deny that there is a priori knowledge. – Maybe: "It is difficult to explain how a priori knowledge is possible. Some empiricists even deny it exists." (Or else at least a comma between the two independent clauses.)
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:05, 24 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Individuals may lack a deeper understanding of their character and feelings and attaining self-knowledge is one step in the psychoanalysis. – no definite article, and maybe better to use the more general psychotherapy? (Also: I would still like to see way more than a footnote on this.)
Done. I left "psychoanalysis" since this is what the source says and it's not clear whether this is true for psychotherapy in general. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:05, 24 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The term is often used in feminism and postmodernism to argue that many forms of knowledge are not absolute but depend on the concrete historical, cultural, and linguistic context. If the source defines "postmodernism", that should be included. Otherwise I would consider cutting on the grounds of its being basically meaningless, but still somehow slightly pejorative.
The source is the APA Dictionary of Psychology and provides a link to its entry on postmodernism. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:05, 24 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Okay, now I'm genuinely curious. What is the psychological definition of "postmodernism"? I'm only asking for a footnote here. (For, in my experience, as someone who has actively sought clarification, this term becomes only more blurry and problematic the more you dig. If no specific meaning can be specified, it should not be used—however sloppy otherwise good sources may be.)
I'm not sure whether this is particularly relevant since our article does not cite the entry "Postmodernism" of the APA Dictionary of Psychology. But if that satisfies your curiosity, I'm happy to help: the entry is found here. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:52, 27 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Okay, that's a somewhat disappointingly boilerplate entry. I'd hoped for something from a specifically psychological point of view. Oh well!

In any case, however, the fact that the article does not currently cite the "postmodernism" entry is besides the point. If you think it's sufficiently clear and that the Wikilink is provides anything further that might be needed, then please say so. Otherwise, just add the missing source.

Also, separate point: I still think it is weird to pair feminism with postmodernism in this way, and the fact that a tertiary source on psychology did so is, in my view, quite a weak justification. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 22:39, 29 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Testimony can happen in numerous ways, like regular speech, a letter, a newspaper, or an online blog. — cut "online", maybe also change blog to podcast or vlog? (or just cut)
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:05, 24 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Some people may lack the cognitive ability to understand highly abstract mathematical truths — this is not merely an issue of limited cognitive capacity: Gödel's first incompleteness theorem proves that in a consistent formal system containing a certain amount of arithmetic there must exist some true sentence not provable (and so, I would submit, not understood) in that system. Maybe worth at least a footnote or something? (I'm looking, here, at Stewart Shapiro's Thinking about Mathematics, pp. 165–66.)
Do you have a suggestions of how this footnote should be worded and sourced? I'm not sure how to relate the connection between the metalogical properties of completeness and provability in certain types of formal systems of logic to the limits of knowledge in a way that is both accessible, concise, and directly supported by reliable sources. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:05, 24 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

If this doesn't speak for itself, then I am probably misconstruing the result of the proof, in which event, please disregard. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 01:25, 26 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

According to Duncan Pritchard, this applies to forms of knowledge linked to wisdom. — descriptor and wikilink on Duncan Pritchard
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:05, 24 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
found in Plato's Meno – I've seen it both ways, but I believe Plato's dialogues are usually given italics as titles
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:52, 24 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
They argue that knowledge has additional value due to its association with virtue. This is based on the idea that cognitive success in the form of the manifestation of virtues is inherently valuable independent of whether the resulting states are instrumentally useful. – I'm not seeing the argument. If this is more than just an assertion, a little bit more would be nice. Otherwise maybe don't call it an argument?
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:52, 24 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
A common critique of scientism, made by philosophers such as Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Feyerabend, is that the fixed requirement of following the scientific method is too rigid and results in a misleading picture of reality by excluding various relevant phenomena from the scope of knowledge – I haven't looked at the sources, but it is odd to associate Gadamer in particular with critics of scientism; he would have opposed it (and maybe did), but this is not what he is known for. Also, he and Feyerabend are an unlikely couple, based just on my very limited knowledge of the latter. If this mention is just a concession to me, please go ahead and take him out.
From Mahadevan 2007, p. 91: Hans-Georg Gadamer propounds hermeneutics as an alternative to the hegemony of scientism/technology. Gadamer and Feyerabend have their criticism of scientism and the scientific method in common. Our sentence does not state that their philosophy in general is similar. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:52, 24 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Doesn't state it, but does suggest it. I have not surveyed the work of either philosopher. If you have good reason to believe that this is not just a high-quality source in general, but a high-quality source with respect to these two thinkers, then definitely leave as is. If, however, it is maybe a tertiary source with respect to this specific point, then perhaps consider nixing the mention of Gadamer (whose work I know and admire, but on whom I am by no means an expert).

are commonly rejected by religious skeptics and atheists – "by people who are either religious skeptics or atheists" — or something like that. Otherwise it's tautological. (I would just cut except for the possible value of the wikilinks.)
I think it's a good idea to have those wikilinks in the text. Your suggestion makes the text longer but I don't see what it adds that is not already there. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:52, 24 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Such a view is reflected in a famous saying by Immanuel Kant where he claims that he "had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith." – It's a famous quote, but this context muddles the role the claim plays in his philosophical program. Leave it if you want, but I would cut.
It is used in the source in this context. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:52, 24 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I'm not questioning your fidelity to your cited sources. I am asking whether it is really your considered position that the benefits of citing Kant in this way are worth the costs of inviting misinterpretation of his intended meaning by placing the quote in this foreign context. What to include from a source is an editorial decision to which you, as I understand the process, invite challenge by nominated the article to FA status. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 01:25, 26 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

societies tend to interpret knowledge claims found – Doesn't "knowledge claims" need a hyphen?
I don't think so. See, for example, [12] and [13].
A related issue concerns the link between knowledge and power, in particular, the extent to which knowledge is power. The philosopher Michel Foucault explored this issue and examined how knowledge and the institutions responsible for it control people through what he termed biopower by shaping societal norms, values, and regulatory mechanisms in fields like psychiatry, medicine, and the penal system. — What Bacon meant by "Scientia potentia est" is very different from Foucault's project at any stage of his career. It would be entirely appropriate to mention Bacon at any number of places up above, but here it is out-of-place. I would cut the first sentence and change the second to read instead, "The philosopher Michel Foucault explored the interconnection of knowledge and power in his studies of how knowledge and the institutions responsible for it control people through..."

Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 22:14, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Our passage does not state that there is a link between Bacon and Foucault. Foucault is not the only one to investigate the relation between knowledge and power. Bacon is only one of the philosophers covered in the linked article. But if you feel strongly about this, we could removed the wikilink. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:52, 24 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Using the same word to refer to two extremely different concepts without in some way signaling this can hardly result in anything other than misunderstanding. It's very possible that you know Bacon better than me, but this claim seems to me to belong in any of the sections Science, Value, or History rather than in Sociology. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 01:25, 26 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I removed the wikilink and added a sources discussing how knowledge is power for Foucault. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:08, 27 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Summation

At this stage, I am mostly (if not completely) satisfied that the article does everything that it accepts as within its scope at the FA level. I am entirely unsatisfied, however, with respect to what I take to be the arbitrary and artificial restriction of this scope to (for the most part) the concerns of analytic epistemology. To elaborate:

In a response yesterday, with reference to R. J. Bernstein's presentation of pragmatism, I made the case that analytic philosophy cannot be accepted as the philosophical authority on knowledge; there is another family of theories that must also be covered. I believe, at minimum, that this requires its own subsection as a definition.

I think that, in addition to a section addressing my concerns in the prior bullet, the Definitions section should have as its first subsection something about the "knowledge-how" to, for instance, walk and converse in a natural language. Way more people (basically everyone who has had a baby) care way more about this than they do about anything professional philosophers have to say about anything. I am sure that developmental psychologists, pediatricians, and other researchers in this area use a different terminology than philosophers, but this should still be included with relevant wikilinks if for no other reason than this sort of knowledge is the precondition for all of the other more sophisticated sorts of knowledge discussed in the body of the article.

I am embarrassed to have missed this until now, but how is there no discussion of knowledge of what is right, what is moral, what is just, how best to live, et cetera? Someone writing an overview of analytic epistemology can excuse themselves from addressing such issues on the ground that these issues are better discussed under the separate heading of metaethics. A general article on knowledge, however, cannot take recourse to such an artificial excuse.

I continue to believe that individual self-knowledge deserves its own section. Even if this is not reflected in the indices of non-philosophical sources in the terms a philosopher would prefer, this is a huge issue in the psychotheraputic project. A section on this would also provide an opportunity to briefly discuss knowledge of others. It is a not uncommon theme in modern and contemporary literature and film that a protagonist discovers that they don't "really" know their spouse, or that they never "truly" knew a deceased friend or relative. So this could also be a nice occasion to mention the knowledge afforded by narrative art (even though I do not believe that this should be required for FA status).

I still think that a FA on knowledge needs a section on the various ways that apparently neutral or objective knowledge is sometimes anything but. I concede, however, that I have not made a knock-down case for the inclusion of anything specific. I'm not going to make any non-minor edits to the article while it is under FAC review. If, however, you would like me to edit what little is included about Foucault, I would be happy to do so—subject (of course!) to reversion, should anything be deemed for any reason not an improvement to the article.

In my first post to this discussion, I expressed considerable reservations (or, if you prefer, outright confusion) over what might constitute a "comprehensive" treatment of such a general issue. It has come to my attention, however, that there is an emerging consensus to replace this language with what is already policy elsewhere in terms of being unlikely to benefit from further additions.

I believe, however, that this article would benefit a great deal from the attention of editors approaching it from the perspectives of developmental psychology, speech or physical therapy, or pedagogy—among, I am sure, many other relevant disciplines. This is actually what I would most like to see.

Since, as far as I can tell, an expression of support for FA status is an endorsement of the completeness of the article, I regret that I must oppose its promotion for the reasons listed immediately above. I do apologize for taking an official stance on this when I initially said that I would not. At that time, however, I did not expect that I would spend as much time with this article as I since have. (Also, in my view, the nomination should have been withdrawn or otherwise suspended in response to much earlier objections. As I have directly said.)

Should the FA coordinator deem my objections to be in excess of the guidelines, I will withdraw it from consideration and, depending upon instruction, perhaps even change it to support. Or, should other editors reviewing have reason to reject my arguments, I am entirely happy to be overridden by a considered consensus against. I will probably move some of my objections to the talk page for the consideration of future editors, but I will not contest any promotion that proceeds along normal channels.

What is here is very good, and the nominating editor deserves nothing but the support and appreciation of the community—even if, as I contend, nominating this article to FA status was premature.

Cheers,
— Preceding unsigned comment added by PatrickJWelsh (talk • contribs) 00:42, 30 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for all the effort you have poured into this review and I'm happy that you changed your mind about the FA criteria. This article includes perspectives from many fields and traditions and does not restrict itself to any one. I didn't fully implement several of your suggestions because because I was unable to verify that they were supported by high-quality sources both concerning specific claims and the relative prominence of topics in the academic discourse which you want to see as main sections. I tried to stick to how high-quality sources present the subject rather than rely on personal conclusions. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:33, 30 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Hi @Phlsph7,

You are most welcome! I am genuinely sorry to be requesting such large changes so late in the process and, in the end (at least so far!), to have to oppose the nomination.

As an aside, I would submit for your consideration that you might be a bit too quick to categorize considered objections as "personal" opinions or conclusions. I do not see how it is problematically personal or subjective to point to a large tradition of thought that explicitly addresses the topic of the article, and which also has a sizable secondary academic literature accepting the premise that it does. Otherwise the premise of the theoretical part of this article would also be just a personal opinion, to be accordingly disregarded, i.e., that a tradition of thought overwhelmingly limited to departments of philosophy in the English-speaking world in the period subsequent to WWII is somehow the philosophical authority on what counts as knowledge.

Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 16:31, 30 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Shapeyness

Hi Phlsph7, sorry took me a while to get to this! I have to say, I have a similar worry to PatrickJWelsh above - the article does seem very philosophy-centric. It's hard to know where to go from here in terms of reviewing because (i) this is a very vague complaint (even worse, knowledge is such a broad concept that it's perhaps not explicitly covered as a central concern in many fields, so it's hard to know which other disciplines to point to as counterweights to the heavy focus on epistemology), but (ii) it would feel dishonest from my point of view to continue on with a normal review knowing that I had this reservation in the back of my mind. These are quite general ideas, but I'll try to give as solid suggestions as possible:

Shift weight away from philosophy by merging sections / cutting down content, while expanding on some of the themes from the In various disciplines section to create new top-level sections (new content could draw from e.g. sociology / anthropology / psychology / cognitive science / pedagogy and education / history)
Provide more of an interdisciplinary perspective throughout each section of the article (where possible!) so there is not such a strict cutoff between philosophy (which makes up the main body of the article) and everything else (which is left to the end) - this may require re-focusing some of the sections

I'm interested in what others think because if there is a general consensus against this (because epistemology is the main topic studying knowledge so it should have a special place in the article for example) then I'm happy to drop this and continue on with a more in-depth, granular review. Not sure this is the best place to discuss, could possibly take to the article talk page if there is a lot of discussion on this. Sorry, I know this has the potential to delay / complicate the nomination, but thought it's better to voice it here so an explicit consensus can at least be pointed to in future. Shapeyness (talk) 20:35, 27 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Oops, I should probably have put into words why I think the article being "philosophy-centric" is a problem! The two main issues I have are that this prevents the article from giving a truly balanced coverage on the topic (problematic for criteria 1b and 1d) and that it means this article has a lot of overlap with what I think an ideal epistemology article would look like (which creates more possibilities for there to be contradictory or unmatching coverage across articles and falls short of the goal of a single source of truth, see WP:CONTENTFORK). Shapeyness (talk) 20:45, 27 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Hello Shapeyness and thanks for doing this review. I've already responded to this concern above. One of the points is that epistemology is the main discipline studying knowledge. In order not to repeat everything here, it would be helpful if you could take a look at the discussion there.

I tried to find an overview source that is not directly associated with philosophy to assess your point. For example, the Oxford series A Very Short Introduction is a general series not specifically focused on philosophy. The book Knowledge: A Very Short Introduction seems to discuss the topic mostly from a philosophical perspective and focuses on issues like skepticism, rationalism and empiricism, internalism and externalism, and the analysis of knowledge. It acknowledges epistemology as the main discipline studying knowledge. It does not mention fields like anthropology and sociology.

Concerning your two reasons why it is a problem:

Giving a truly balanced coverage does not mean that every discipline gets the same weight. I think it means following WP:PROPORTION: An article ... should strive to treat each aspect with a weight proportional to its treatment in the body of reliable, published material on the subject. For example, giving the anthropology of knowledge the same weight as epistemology would be a violation of this principle. If we wanted to add a main section for every discipline that discusses knowledge somewhere then we would need to add main sections for all kinds of fields, maybe even including architecture, geography, biology, quantum physics, and linguistics.
The relation between epistemology and knowledge is similar to the relation between biology and life, psychology and mind, and anthropology and human. There is bound to be some overlap in all these cases but I don't think there is a serious argument for WP:CONTENTFORK#Unacceptable types of content forks for any of them. Phlsph7 (talk) 21:45, 27 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Generally speaking, I'm not opposed to including more information from other fields as long as we don't overdo it. One approach that could work as a middle ground would be to identify which additional information should be included and I could try to expand the sections in question. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:45, 28 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for the replies Phlsph7! I am still not 100% convinced, but it's probably not helpful to go back and forth here. More useful would be either (i) establish a solid consensus for status quo in which case no broader changes needed, or (ii) for me to give some more specific suggestions to discuss about this. I'm quite busy atm but will try to look over some sources and suggest possible changes soon. Shapeyness (talk) 13:11, 28 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

As I see it, we are in agreement that epistemology is the main field studying knowledge and that other fields to which knowledge is relevant should be included. The disagreement is in the details about how much weight the different fields should receive. I've tried to link my arguments to reliable sources but arguing about relative weight is not a trivial enterprise. Given that the issue about which fields and how much weight is still rather vague, it will probably be difficult to establish consensus one way or another. My suggestion in the conversation with Jens below about giving more prominence to knowledge representation might be one step in the direction you are envisioning. I'll keep your concern in mind as I work on the article and I look forward to your more specific suggestions. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:23, 28 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Ok a few quick unrelated pieces. Shapeyness (talk) 19:02, 28 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Knowledge is closely related to intelligence, but intelligence is more about the ability to acquire, process, and apply information, while knowledge concerns information and skills that a person already possesses. Knowledge contrasts with ignorance, which is linked to a lack of understanding, education, and true beliefs. Are these necessary for the definitions section? Perhaps move to See also
I moved ignorance to the see also section. Some people prefer to have links in the article rather than the see also section so let's see if someone complains. I left the part about intelligence since this was explicitly requested in the peer review. I can ping the reviewer if you feel strongly about this to get their view. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:15, 29 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The English word includes various meanings that some other languages distinguish using several words. For example, Latin uses the words cognitio and scientia for "knowledge" while French uses the words connaitre and savoir for "to know". In ancient Greek, four important terms for knowledge were used: epistēmē (unchanging theoretical knowledge), technē (expert technical knowledge), mētis (strategic knowledge), and gnōsis (personal intellectual knowledge). Are all these examples needed? Maybe replace part of this with more detail on etymology (if available)
Before I do something, I'll ping @Biogeographist: since there was a disagreement earlier about whether to include this part. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:18, 29 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I wasn't watching this discussion before the ping from Phlsph7 (thanks), so I haven't read everything above. I'm the one who added this sentence, and I reinserted it after it was removed once. The info is from a tertiary source, Allen, Barry (2005). "Knowledge". In Horowitz, Maryanne Cline (ed.). New Dictionary of the History of Ideas. Vol. 3. Charles Scribner's Sons. pp. 1199–1204. ISBN 978-0-684-31377-1. OCLC 55800981. Archived from the original on 22 August 2017. My interest in this sentence is not primarily etymological. I'm not interested in etymological trivia, but in what these different words can tell us about the nature of knowledge. My primary reason for thinking that this info is important is similar to concerns voiced above: PatrickJWelsh's I am concerned that [the article] is overly biased towards the concerns of philosophical epistemology and this article reads to me too much like an excellent article written from the highly relevant, but nevertheless quite specific, perspective of Anglo-American analytic epistemology, and Shapeyness's I have to say, I have a similar worry to PatrickJWelsh above – the article does seem very philosophy-centric. Barry Allen's purpose in the cited source is precisely to widen the scope of discussion of knowledge beyond epistemology, as PatrickJWelsh discussed above, starting with the different kinds of (what we call) knowledge that were named in ancient Greece. Now, it may be that without the extended philosophical discussion present in the cited source, this sentence comes across as irrelevant trivia. If that is what everyone else thinks, then I have no defense. But if anyone agrees that there is value in giving a nod to these ancient conceptions of knowledge, then there may be a way of editing the sentence to make it more clearly relevant. Biogeographist (talk) 17:48, 29 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks biogeographist, the main issue I have is that there are lots of examples here without analysis / commentary - I would prefer to replace some of the examples with either more information on etymological history or analysis on the significance of different languages having multiple words corresponding to different types of knowledge. Shapeyness (talk) 19:31, 29 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The most concise way to indicate the greater significance of the terms may be to connect them to related discussions later in Knowledge § Types. Allen said: "Where ancient philosophy distinguished a scientific epistēmē from the technē of art and craft, twentieth-century analysts discovered a "semantic" or "conceptual" distinction between knowing how and knowing that." Thus, the sentence in question could be followed by another sentence such as: "The distinction between epistēmē and technē has been called analogous to the distinction made by modern philosophers between knowledge-that and knowledge-how" (with reference to Allen). Likewise, connaitre and savoir may correspond in some contexts to some distinction between types of knowledge, but we would need a source for that claim since it's not in the SEP article by Steup & Neta. Biogeographist (talk) 20:25, 29 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

When I first added the sentence in question (and the sentence preceding it) in Special:Diff/1092863946, I added it at the start of Knowledge § Types, not at its present location, and I conceived of it as historical and multilingual background about types of knowledge, and also as a broader-scope replacement for the more restricted statement that had previously introduced that section: "Propositional knowledge is the paradigmatic type of knowledge and most academic discussions of knowledge focus exclusively on it." Biogeographist (talk) 22:20, 29 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I tried to implement a compromise by moving part of the discussion of the Greek terms to the section types. The point of the examples remaining in the section "Definitions" is mainly to illustrate that knowledge is a wide term in the English language so I don't think more analysis is required for that part. Feel free to revert if you have the impression that this does not help solve the disagreement. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:47, 1 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The main discipline studying knowledge is called epistemology or theory of knowledge should it be "the theory of knowledge"?
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:19, 29 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Some social sciences understand knowledge as a broad social phenomenon that is similar to culture. I think this would make more sense as part of the second paragraph
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:22, 29 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Methodological differences also cause disagreements... This paragraph is getting into the weeds a bit for a general overview, I would suggest cutting it out
I shortened it and merged it into the preceding paragraph. Please have a look whether this is sufficient or whether more cutting is required. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:33, 29 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks Phlsph7, that looks good. Can you point me to where the sources say some (infallibilists) think knowledge is a rare phenomenon? Descartes certainly thought knowledge was infallible, but my understanding was that he thought common everyday knowledge could be built up from indubitable foundations. In general, I'm not sure there is a connection between infallibilism and rarity of knowledge (apart from increased likelihood of radical scepticism, but that is quite a rare position even paired with infallibilism I believe). Shapeyness (talk) 19:36, 29 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]
From Hetherington 2022a, § 6. Standards for Knowing: The spectre of a sceptical conclusion is the most obvious philosophical concern about requiring knowledge to satisfy an infallibilist standard. If knowledge is like that, then how often will anyone succeed in actually having some knowledge? Rarely, if ever (is the usual reply). To me, the connection seems to be quite intuitive. For example, make a list of all the things you know. Then make a list of all the things you know infallibly. Now compare the lists. For me, the claim "the Eiffel tower is in Paris" is on the first list and not the second, just like the great majority of other things I know. I've seen this connection in several sources so I could do some more digging if there are serious concerns. Phlsph7 (talk) 20:11, 29 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

By the way, I adjusted the caption since the source does not explicitly ascribe the part about the rarity to Descartes. Phlsph7 (talk) 20:23, 29 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks, maybe it's worth removing the image now Descartes isn't explicitly mentioned in the prose there? Shapeyness (talk) 18:44, 3 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:55, 4 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Phlsph7 FYI, just realised you used the template tq above - I'm not sure about the technical details why but it is mentioned not to use that at the top of WP:FAC. I use {{green}} if that is useful. Shapeyness (talk) 16:25, 9 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for the reminder. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:59, 11 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I'll try to get back to some of my broader points later on. For now, I think it would help to condense down the sections "Justified true belief" and "Gettier problem and alternatives" as much as possible. For example, the paragraph on internalism/externalism is once again getting into the weeds and is more about justification than knowledge - I think this is part of why I think the article reads like an epistemology article sometimes, it seems as if it feels the need to expand on areas that are not as directly important to knowledge itself. In terms of the Gettier problem and alternatives section, I think there are areas where this can be simplified down further and some redundancies can be removed without losing too much substance. Let me know if any more detailed comments would be useful on that. Shapeyness (talk) 19:38, 3 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for pointing this out, I simplified this paragraph and merged into into the preceding paragraph. I cut some information but I didn't want to remove the explanation altogether since this is discussed in many sources. You are probably right that those two subsections are more technical than the rest. We can't skip this topic but I'm open to more ideas on how to simplify the presentation. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:05, 5 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
By the way, I simplified part the subsection "Gettier problem and alternatives" in response Patrick's comment above. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:38, 5 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks Phlsph7, I think this can be condensed down a little more still.
For example, a person who is convinced that a coin flip will land heads usually does not know that even if their belief turns out to be true Unrelated to cutting down, I think this needs rewording for clarity, perhaps simply by replacing "is convinced that" with "guesses that"
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:18, 9 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I still think the extra detail on justification is unneeded and prevents a nice flow into Gettier - it seems natural to me to move directly from "justification is in the definition of knowledge to prevent cases of epistemic luck" to "Gettier showed justification doesn't prevent cases of epistemic luck". This also keeps the focus on the concept of knowledge itself throughout the whole section. But I won't push on this one. However, perhaps these two subsections can be combined into one "Analysis of knowledge" as this explicitly tells the reader that this is all these parts are concerned about (and prevents the discussion from being sliced in half).
I merge the two subsections. I shortened the explanation of justification. I didn't want to remove it altogether since this point is often presented as important and I hope a single sentence on it is acceptable. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:32, 9 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I think most of the potential for pruning are the last two paragraphs, which I think can be slimmed down and combined - I would focus on cutting down on preparatory sentences and leaving it just to concise, substantive claims that stand on their own.

—Shapeyness (talk) 19:22, 8 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I managed to bring it down to one paragraph. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:52, 9 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I second this. (Alarm bells went off for me as soon as I saw an acronym introduced to such a general article. But this is an acknowledged pet peeve, and there was only one acronym; so I kept my mouth shut—so to speak.) Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 22:15, 8 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I removed the acronym. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:53, 9 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Sorry, finding it hard to find time to properly look through sources etc. so I'll just continue on through the article as it's currently written for now (instead of broader, more large-scale comments). Few bits below. Shapeyness (talk) 16:19, 9 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

While I would be interested to hear your take on how the article's comprehensiveness measures up to the presentation of the topic in high-quality overview sources, please don't feel obliged to that and your more specific comments are also helpful. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:47, 11 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

The Gettier problem is motivated by the idea that some justified true beliefs do not amount to knowledge I think this is the wrong way round - the Gettier problem provides motivation / justification for the idea that some justified true beliefs do not amount to knowledge
I reworded it. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:59, 11 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
... since they can be paraphrased using a that-clause Maybe an explanatory footnote spelling this out more (Knowing that X,Y people are coming, knowing that they are coming because...) would be useful - it is probably very obvious to everyone who will read this but can't hurt
Good idea. I slightly changed the example given in the source. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:59, 11 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
... and general laws, like that the color of leaves of some trees changes in autumn Not really sure if anyone would call this an example of an empirical law - maybe reword as "generalities"/"general rules" or replace the example
I used generalities since this is the term used in the source. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:09, 11 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
is exclusive to relatively sophisticated creatures, such as humans I thought that this was a hotly debated issue in philosophy of mind/philosophy of psychology - aren't there quite a few philosophers who think many animals have the ability to have beliefs (and thus knowledge), although obviously still a minority?
That is a difficult issue and depends on various factors, include the question of whether beliefs are representations. My hope was to avoid these problems by using the vague term "relatively sophisticated creatures", which is taken directly from the source and does not automatically exclude animals. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:09, 11 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
For example, by eating chocolate, one becomes acquainted with the taste of chocolate what do you think of this rewording?
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:09, 11 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Knowledge by acquaintance plays a central role in Bertrand Russell's epistemology Ok, but why are we getting into this here?
Mainly because he is at the center of many discussion on knowledge by acquaintance. For example the SEP article has its first section dedicated to him. We could shorten or remove that part of you see it differently. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:15, 11 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Ok, can we mention that he originated the concept? Just an easy way to highlight why his viewpoint is important to the reader. Also not sure if the reference to particulars vs universals is useful here. Shapeyness (talk) 13:55, 11 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:29, 12 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Mathematical knowledge ... belongs to a priori knowledge Maybe "is traditionally taken to be" instead
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:15, 11 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Some conscious phenomena are excluded from the relevant experience, like rational insight into the solution of a mathematical problem This might need another sentence to explain, just like the "all bachelors are unmarried" example does.
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:55, 11 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
One difficulty for a priori knowledge is to explain how it is possible It might be worth adding a brief mention in this paragraph that some philosophers deny the existence of a priori knowledge (or later on when rationalism/empiricism is brought up)
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:55, 11 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Plato and Descartes both need links here
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:30, 12 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The Others subsection doesn't flow very well but I'm not sure what to suggest - I might come back to that later.
The difficulty here is that we should cover these different types to be comprehensive but I'm not aware of many essential connections between them that could be used to tell a connected story. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:32, 12 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
On the discussion of direct/indirect realism, this is important to epistemology, but I'm not sure it's worth delving into in this article, it is a bit of a distraction into metaphysics and philosophy of mind - also, it's my impression that the idea that this has any relevance to the reliability of sense perception is a bit outdated (and isn't mentioned in the cited article as far as I can see), but I might be wrong about that
I managed to shorten it to one sentence. I didn't want to remove it altogether since this is a disagreement about what people perceive. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:54, 12 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Sorry to come back to this one, but I'm struggling to see the relevance to a broad overview article. There may be disagreement about whether external objects are perceived directly or indirectly, but how does this help to illuminate the subject of knowledge to the reader? Shapeyness (talk) 19:40, 25 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I removed the sentence and added instead a discussion of psychological aspects. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:16, 26 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for the responses so far. A few more comments below. Shapeyness (talk) 19:48, 12 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

There is also disagreement about whether knowledge is a rare phenomenon that requires absolute certainty This idea is repeated quite soon again Another view states that beliefs have to be infallible to amount to knowledge ... It is then repeated again in the limits section. I would remove at least one of these and ideally keep it to just a single occurrence (removing one and placing another in a footnote would also work).
I removed the critical comment in the subsection "Analysis of knowledge". I kept the other two since they make the claim from different angles (knowledge being rare vs cognitive capacities being fallible). Phlsph7 (talk) 10:02, 14 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Analysis of knowledge section still has Another view states that beliefs have to be infallible to amount to knowledge. Shapeyness (talk) 20:24, 14 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I reformulated the earlier sentence to mention high standards instead of absolute certainty, which is the more general term and the infallibility mentioned later would be just one type of high standards. Let me know if you think otherwise then I'll remove the remaining sentence in the subsection "Analysis of knowledge". Phlsph7 (talk) 08:07, 15 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Similarly, there is some repetition between 'A priori and a posteriori' and the sources of knowledge section.
I removed the part about the different explanations of pure reason from the section "Sources of knowledge". I kept the part about the mental faculty of rational intuition to establish the link which not all readers may be aware of. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:02, 14 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Still seems a bit repetitive, would this reframing be acceptable Some rationalists argue for rational intuition as a further source of knowledge that does not rely on observation and introspection. They hold for example that some beliefs, like the mathematical belief that 2 + 2 = 4, are justified through pure reason alone. Shapeyness (talk) 20:39, 14 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:11, 15 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
A weaker form of philosophical skepticism advocates the suspension of judgment as a form of attaining tranquility while remaining humble and open-minded Is Pyrrhonian scepticism (which I assume this is referring to) weaker than academic scepticism? Both call into question all knowledge.
That's correct, I changed the wikilink. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:02, 14 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Sorry, is "weaker" right here? Shapeyness (talk) 20:40, 14 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
It's weaker in the sense that it does not generally claim that knowledge is impossible. But I guess you could argue that it's position is different rather then weaker. I reformulated the expression. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:16, 15 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The three most common theories are foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. I don't think this is true. I might be wrong but my guess would be that there are more philosophers accept a mixed position such as foundherentism, or other more complicated positions, than philosophers who accept infinitism.
Our sources on this one are Klein 1998, Steup & Neta 2020, and Lehrer 2015. Klein has a separate section called "Foundationalism and coherentism", in which infinitism is also discussed. Steup & Neta 2020 have a section on the structure of knowledge, which has only subsections on foundationalism and coherentism but also discuss infinitism. Neither Klein 1998 nor Steup & Neta 2020 mention foundherentism. I could also look through Lehrer 2015 if there are further doubts. I reformulated the passage though I'm not sure that this is necessary. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:02, 14 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Sorry I wasn't clear enough. I don't think foundherentism should be included, or even that infinitism should be excluded. I just think infinitism should not be described as one of the most common theories. Indeed Klein states Foundationalism and coherentism have both been developed and defended, and there are well-known objections to each view. In contrast, the prima facie objections to infinitism have seemed so overwhelming that it has not been investigated carefully. Infinitism really has not had much literature produced on it outside of a few defenders as far as I know. Shapeyness (talk) 20:44, 14 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I reworded - hopefully that is ok. Shapeyness (talk) 20:53, 14 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
You are right about infinitism not being on par with the other two. Your suggestion works fine. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:18, 15 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Epistemologists who agree about the existence of basic reasons may disagree about which reasons constitute basic reasons This is redundant as differing views have already been discussed
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:02, 14 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I haven't read many sources on this but do you think it is worth giving a little more discussion to the idea that knowledge has intrinsic value (major views, arguments for/against, something like that) - only a little bit extra so it doesn't become unwieldly?
Good idea, I added a short passage. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:02, 14 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Great that's just the right level I think Shapeyness (talk) 20:45, 14 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The value of knowledge is relevant to the field of education... This feels slightly shoehorned in, but I think it is valuable to keep this here - are there any other fields/areas where the value of knowledge is important? Perhaps this is an opportunity to increase the coverage of disciplines outside philosophy with a short-ish paragraph (although let me know if there aren't the sources for it)
I'm working on something. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:02, 14 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:03, 15 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
One very simple change which could help make the article seem less like "philosophy, then everything else covered in a single section at the end" would be to make the history section a top-level section (even if it is not expanded at all)
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:02, 14 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

OK, I think I've got through the main sections now, I will look through the Others section next and then try to make suggestions on comprehensiveness. I like the science section, it already feels more multidisciplinary and has all the details from philosophy of science I would expect. I would also maybe include info on the sociology of scientific knowledge, which is an important development itself stemming from history & philosophy of science. Shapeyness (talk) 21:07, 14 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Sounds good. I'm open to including more information regarding the sociology of scientific knowledge. However, we also have a subsection on the sociology of knowledge below so I'll wait for your comments before I get started. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:22, 15 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Sorry meant to get back to this sooner - a few more comments below. Shapeyness (talk) 17:42, 22 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Sociology of scientific knowledge would work in the science section or the sociology section I guess
Done. I added a short paragraph to the subsection "Sociology". Phlsph7 (talk) 09:01, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Maybe the science section should be called "Scientific knowledge"?
I personally don't feels strongly about this either way but I fear that someone may complaint that a section called "Scientific knowledge" should be moved to the section "Types" as a subsection. This would go against the request in another review to have it as a main section. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:05, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I don't think we need to cover every "X knowledge" - I would consider moving common / general knowledge to see also
In the GA review, it was request that the coverage of common knowledge and general knowledge be expanded. Should we ping the reviewer to get their view? Phlsph7 (talk) 09:08, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
In some cases, it is possible to convert tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge into one another. seems slightly redundant to me
I removed the claim. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:17, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
It's possible that some of the other types of knowledge here could possibly be moved to other sections as well - the bit on spirituality would fit in to the religion section and situated knowledge could fall under sociology of knowledge
There are different ways to organize the topics into different sections and they usually have their advantages and disadvantages. Moving the part about higher knowledge to the subsection "Religion" might cause an unbalance by giving more emphasis to some religious traditions than to others. Regarding situated knowledge, I would have to check the sources whether this is seen as a major topic in the sociology of knowledge. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:25, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

If merely moving the text from one place to another would cause balance concerns, doesn't that indicate that there is already a due weight problem? Shapeyness (talk) 19:23, 25 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Not necessarily since due weight depends not just on what is said but also on where it is said. For example, moving the paragraph on skepticism in the section "Limits" to the lead as the second paragraph would cause undue weight even though nothing was added to or removed from the article. One of the advantages of mentioning the contrast between higher and lower knowledge in the types section is to underscore the diversity of relevant fields. Do you think the paragraph should be removed? Phlsph7 (talk) 09:22, 26 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
states that knowing something implies the second-order knowledge that one knows it Not very clear, would probably be better worded as "states that it is impossible for someone to know something without knowing that they know it". This then removes the need for the clarifying sentence afterwards.
I implemented your suggestion and moved the example to a footnote. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:29, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
There is pretty much no mention of transferal/reproduction of knowledge in the form of teaching or anything about pedagogy - this seems like quite a major gap.
- I agree that this is a major gap.
  The transfer of knowledge is covered in several sections, including the sections "Sources" (as testimony) and "History", the subsection "Anthropology", and the paragraph on knowledge management in the subsection "Others". But you are right that while they cover the transfer of knowledge from a variety of perspectives, they do not provide a systematical explanation of the pedagogical perspective since the history section only contains a few remarks on that. I'll see what I can do about that. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:35, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:48, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
"APA Dictionary of Psychology: Situated Knowledge" - should APA Dictionary of Psychology be the work and Situated Knowledge be the entry here
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:50, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Ashraf 2023 - Archway Publishing appears to be a self-publishing company, is that right?
I think you are right. I was initially under the impression that it should be fine since it is associated with Simon & Schuster but that alone is not sufficient. I replaced the source. Phlsph7 (talk) 13:13, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Attie-Picker needs publisher info
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 13:46, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Bosančić 2018 contains publisher location, other books don't
I removed it. Phlsph7 (talk) 13:46, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Bouquet 1962 - why CUP archive and not Cambridge University Press? Also this is a relatively old source, is it being used to source something not covered by anything else?
I replaced it with a newer source. Phlsph7 (talk) 13:46, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Chaudhary 2017 - is this missing a chapter title?
The chapter titles were given in the short citations. I moved them into the main citation template. Phlsph7 (talk) 13:46, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Delahunty & Dignen 2012 - "OUP Oxford" change to "Oxford University Press"
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 13:46, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Dodd, Zambetti & Deneve - is this a high quality source for philosophy of science? (semi-relatedly, should there be a footnote mentioning that the existince of a unified and distinctly scientific method for gaining knowledge is controversial?)
Elsevier is a high-quality academic publisher and the chapter targets specifically the "scientific method" and not the philosophy of science in general. Given that it is published in a book that primarily covers a field of clinical research, it would probably be not sufficient on its own, but there are two more sources that are directly associated with the philosophical perspective. Phlsph7 (talk) 13:46, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Is this source acting as a citation for anything not covered by the other sources, or just used as an additional supporting source? Shapeyness (talk) 15:02, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
It's quite representative of the mainstream story of what the scientific method is. It's a longer version of the following from the SEP source: Often, ‘the scientific method’ is presented in textbooks and educational web pages as a fixed four or five step procedure starting from observations and description of a phenomenon and progressing over formulation of a hypothesis which explains the phenomenon, designing and conducting experiments to test the hypothesis, analyzing the results, and ending with drawing a conclusion. If there are serious concerns then it could be removed. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:16, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
- I second the parenthetical Lewis Wolpert criticizes this in his The Unnatural Nature of Science. It is also a hobby horse of Mario Bunge, although I'm sure where to direct you in his enormous body of work. By I'm don't think this needs anything more than a footnote or slight rewording. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 18:23, 22 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  I added a corresponding footnote. Phlsph7 (talk) 13:46, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Hatfield 1998 is missing an ISBN
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:39, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Lanzer 2018 - is this a high quality source for history and philosophy of science?
It seems the source was missing the second author, Tim Thornton, who is a professor of philosophy. It's published by Springer Nature, an academic publisher. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:39, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Magee & Popper - what is the purpose of this source?
It's a supporting source about knowledge stored in libraries. It was added by Biogeographist. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:39, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Mahadevan 2007 - citation error as page number is in the wrong place
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:39, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
McGeer 2001 - does this need a publisher?
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:39, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Meirmans et al. - change "August 2019" to just "2019"
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 18:03, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Mishra 2021 - is K. K. Publications reliable? Just checking as I've never heard of it. The same goes for Vost 2016 and Sophia Institute Press. And also for Wilson & Cattell 2005 and Kogan Page Publishers.
I'm not sure about Vost 2016 and Wilson & Cattell 2005. I removed Wilson & Cattell 2005 since the passage is supported by the remaining sources. I replaced Vost 2016 since this is probably faster than making an in-depth reliability-research.

As for K. K. Publications: I added that one to cover a few non-Western publisher, which was criticized in some of my earlier nominations. The problem is that non-Western publishers are not as well-known so assessing their credentials can be more of a challenge. I'll ping @Jo-Jo Eumerus: since they may know more about this. Phlsph7 (talk) 18:03, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

It's pretty hard to tell, really. This publisher seems to have several major publications, so I guess it's reliable, but it's hard to tell. Jo-Jo Eumerus (talk) 08:52, 24 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Moore 1959 - this is quite an old source, are there more up-to-date sources that can be used?
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 18:23, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Olsson 2011 - Change "The Value of Knowledge: The Value of Knowledge" to "The Value of Knowledge"
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 18:23, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Ronald, Barnett (1990) - first and last name are switched here, also should it just be "McGraw-Hill" rather than "McGraw-Hill Education (UK)"?
Fixed. I changed the publisher to McGraw-Hill's subsidary "Open University Press". Phlsph7 (talk) 18:23, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Steinberg 1995 - is this a high quality reliable source, or are there better sources that could replace it?
This source was used at the FA for Communication with no objections. This also ties into the problem mentioned earlier about covering non-Western publishers. Phlsph7 (talk) 18:23, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Ok, wasn't sure what level the book was aimed at from the title, but looks like it is a university course textbook which is fine. Shapeyness (talk) 19:18, 25 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The Hindu article - would it be better to use an academic source instead?
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 18:42, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Walton 2005 - why is there a long excerpt?
I removed it. Phlsph7 (talk) 18:42, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Wilson 2002 - inconsistent capitalisation
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 18:42, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

@Shapeyness: Just checking whether you feel that your review is close to the finishing line. If not, I may have to ask Gog to archive the nomination. They allowed it some extra time but we probably shouldn't push it too far. Phlsph7 (talk) 18:42, 31 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
@Phlsph7: Sorry, I don't think I'll have the time to go through any sources in depth before the FAC is over. In terms of all of the specific comments I've already made, I'm happy that they've all been addressed.

Hopefully it's been clear that the only reason I have tried to aggressively push for cuts to content is to keep things focused and get the article as lean and light-weight as philosophy I don't think this article is quite as economical or succinct as that one, but I don't think it currently goes into excessive detail, so I'd say that it passes the FA criteria on length and prose.

On the focus and comprehensiveness of the article, it seems like there are quite a lot of views about what the article should focus on. I don't think there is any one right answer to that question, and I disagree that it is locked down by coverage in summary sources. Generally summary sources will have different goals to us and many will have more of a specialist focus than a general encyclopedia like Wikipedia.

Summary sources are a useful shorthand for assessing due weight, but can never be a substitute for assessing the literature at large. But with a topic as massive as knowledge, it is also pretty much impossible to even cover every area of study in the literature, never mind assess weight in the totality of high-quality reliable sources. For that reason, I think that the coverage of the article is (more than most other Wikipedia articles) a matter of editorial judgement and editor agreement.

That being said—while I would be more comfortable if I saw a greater consensus on the current focus of the article (and would personally like a more interdisciplinary approach)—the article is certainly comprehensive with regards to analytic epistemology (I can't speak to continental philosophy as I don't know much about it). It also does throw in aspects of other fields and a few of the sections are now more interdisciplinary than they were when the FAC began.

Therefore, I'm going to stay neutral but with the proviso that I would be happy to support the article in its current state if I had more confidence on wider consensus on the focus of the article. Sadly that is quite a hard thing to come to agreement on because it is quite a broad/vague question, but it is my only hangup at the moment, and hard to sharpen into a more specific question. Sorry it's not a support, but hopefully the comments have been useful nonetheless. Shapeyness (talk) 12:56, 1 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for all your in-depth comments and helpful suggestions! Phlsph7 (talk) 07:21, 2 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Comments by others

footnote c: "This view is rejected by relativism about truth, which argues that what is true depends on one's perspective and that there is no view from nowhere" without added context, probably best to remove reference to the view from nowhere
- On this one, I would be in favor or providing context rather than removing the mention. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 18:23, 22 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Perhaps a link to view from nowhere, sad there isn't a standalone article dedicated to this. Shapeyness (talk) 19:32, 22 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Yeah, there is an entry on The View from Nowhere, but it is not informative in its present state.

Another point about this footnote: it suggests relativism is the only alternative to objectivism. However there are lots of truth claims that are intersubjectively true. For instance, claims about the law–which, moreover, introduces a gray area of conflicting interpretations among experts.

Does the article need this note at all? Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 21:34, 22 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I removed the reference to the view from nowhere. The footnote was initially added in response to a request by Patrick that the article should cover the problem of relativism and the view from nowhere. The current formulation leaves it open whether there are other views besides relativism that reject the objectivity of knowledge. It's probably true that relativism is the most prominent of these views. Phlsph7 (talk) 18:42, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
- Further thought: this brought to mind Richard J. Bernstein's 1983 Beyond Objectivity and Relativism. Against these extremes, he contends, "The dominant temper of our age is fallibilistic" (p. 12). According to the IEP entry "Almost all contemporary epistemologists will say that they are fallibilists".[14] The term comes from Charles Sanders Peirce. (Bernstein gives a nice definition at pp. 36–37 of The Pragmatic Turn.) I think fallibilism might belong in the body of the article. A paragraph could be placed at the end of Structure. Or, what I would much prefer, a two or three paragraph subsection following Analysis of Knowledge in the Definitions section with a title maybe something along the lines of A Pragmatic Approach. The SEP article on Pragmatism has an entire section devoted to Pragmatist Epistemology.[15] This would considerably help to ameliorate my concern that the article sets too analytic of a tone from the beginning. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 15:25, 23 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  I added a paragraph on fallibilism and pragmatism to the section "Limits". There was a talkpage discussion with the conclusion that the article should not have subsections on the different schools in the history of epistemology. Having only a subsection for pragmatism and not for the others might be odd. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:36, 24 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  Is it your position (or, more to the point, the position of the article) that the section "Analysis of knowledge" presents anything more than an episode in the (actually very short) history of epistemology? For this is a position that has been actively contested by a hardly insignificant number of philosophers—to say nothing of folks working in empirical disciplines who could not care less about anything we philosophers have to say. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 01:39, 26 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  The talkpage discussion linked above is about schools of thought that defend a particular position. I don't think that the analysis of knowledge is considered a specific position in this sense. It's probably better characterized as a field of inquiry encompassing various positions, many of which are opposed to each other. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:15, 28 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  Okay, this might be helpful. Because what I have been asking for with reference to specific schools of thought is actually something more general. That is to say, I am in agreement with you and Biogeographist, and I believe my objection still stands.
  
  Near the beginning of this process, I questioned the comprehensiveness of the article with an allegation of Anglo-American analytic bias. In response, you cited the eminently sensible policy that Each objection must provide a specific rationale that can be addressed. If nothing can be done in principle to address the objection, a coordinator may disregard it. In response to this, I may have over-corrected by presenting, as it were, a number of specific trees—without explaining how they all belong to one forest.
  
  Speaking quite broadly, one can distinguish two major traditions in Western philosophy. One has its roots in Plato (esp. the theory of forms) and emerges in the modern period as Cartesianism (among other things). The other has its roots in Aristotle and emerges in the modern period as Hegelianism (among other things). What I submit is that the justified-true-belief theory of knowledge and its problems are situated very much in the former, and that this article does not adequately cover the mainstream alternatives stemming from or otherwise developing the latter.
  
  If I were writing this article, I would address this issue by including a treatment of philosophical hermeneutics, but that is mostly just because this is just what I know. It could likewise be addressed (although with greater difficulty) by way of phenomenology. It's not why I brought him up, but it could also be addressed with reference to the work of Habermas. Although I don't know American pragmatism very well, I happen to be reading R. J. Bernstein's 2010 The Pragmatic Turn, and I am struck by how clearly and directly this tradition (at least on Bernstein's reading), not only confronts the shortcomings of the Platonic-Cartesian tradition, but also strives to provide a positive alternative position. (On Peirce's theory, for instance, falliablism is not a limit of knowledge, but a characteristic of knowledge, i.e., a part of its definition.)
  
  If you'll indulge a blockquote:
  
  Pragmatism begins with a radical critique of what Peirce called “the spirit of Cartesianism.” By this Peirce meant a framework of thinking that had come to dominate much of modern philosophy – where sharp dichotomies are drawn between what is mental and physical, as well as subject and object; where “genuine” knowledge presumably rests upon indubitable foundations; and where we can bracket all prejudices by methodical doubt. This way of thinking introduces a whole series of interrelated problems that preoccupied philosophers: the problem of the external world, the problem of our knowledge of other minds, and the problem of how to correctly represent reality. The pragmatic thinkers called into question the framework in which these traditional problems had been formulated. They rejected what Dewey called the “quest for certainty” and the “spectator theory of knowledge.” They sought to develop a comprehensive alternative to Cartesianism – a nonfoundational self-corrective conception of human inquiry based upon an understanding of how human agents are formed by, and actively participate in shaping, normative social practices. (pp. ix–x)
  
  Bernstein goes on to link this impulse to Heidegger and Wittgenstein, who he claims were independently responding to the same deficiencies in the Cartesian tradition. He also mentions Quine, Davidson, and Sellars (among others, elsewhere in the book) as pursing this project from within the analytic tradition, as well as various philosophers developing these sorts of insights in Germany.
  
  It doesn't matter to me how, or with reference to what specific schools or figures, this tradition is represented, but it does matter that it is given due coverage vis-à-vis the tradition of analytic epistemology, which currently dominates the first section of the article—in spite of being a quite technical inquiry into an artificially narrow conception of knowledge. For this second tradition is also, in your words, a field of inquiry encompassing various positions, many of which are opposed to each other. Or so I submit and am willing to defend with reference to additional sources as appropriate.
  
  (Not sure it's necessary here, but in disclosure, but I knew Dick Bernstein. He allowed me to audit one of his seminars at the NSSR, and he served as the external reader for my dissertation. In referencing his work here I do not intend to advocate for the inclusion of any of his specific theses.)
  
  Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 20:38, 28 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  Thanks for clarifying your position. While I have doubts about your reductive division of Western philosophy into exactly two traditions and your claim that our article is focused on infallibilism and foundationalism associated with Cartesianism, I understand that you would like to see pragmatism also represented in the section "Definitions" so I added a short characterization. The pragmatist critique of infallibilism is explicitly discussed in the section "Limits" and various critiques of foundationalism are found in the section "Structure", including the critique by hermeneutics you requested. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:30, 30 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Fly-by comment: It seems like the article of the German Wikipedia [16] makes the attempt of a very broad coverage of the topic. The quality looks good to me. It can be easily translated with browser plugin, and might provide some ideas. For example, it has a long section on "knowledge presentation", which it claims is a central term in pychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics and cognitive neurosciences. It has also a long section on limits of knowledge (similar to the reviewer above, I also would like to see at least a mention of quantum physics). Maybe this helps. --Jens Lallensack (talk) 22:09, 27 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

That's an interesting find and the page may contain some useful ideas. We just have to be careful in regard to the language barrier and the accuracy of statements on Wikipedia articles. For example, the English sources mainly use knowledge representation as a technical term and may mean something different with knowledge presentation so we would have to check whether the same thing is meant. I'm open to mentioning quantum physics somewhere but I'm not sure what exactly you have in mind. I did I short google search but most of the results discuss knowledge about quantum physics, which I assume is not what you meant. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:14, 28 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

The only thing I can think of for QM is the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, but tbh not sure if that's worth more than a mention (if that). There are other things related to the epistemology of physics and the wavefunction in particular, but those are almost certainly not useful for a high level overview like this. Shapeyness (talk) 09:47, 28 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I was referring to the comment of Patrick J. Welsh above on Quantum indeterminacy in the context of limits of knowledge.

Yes, knowledge "representation", my mistake. But this confuses me a bit: You explicitly restrict "knowledge representation" to the field of artificial intelligence. The German Wikipedia states the concept is actually much broader, and not limited to artificial intelligence. The article semantic network, for example (to which you link) has substantial content on linguistics. And wouldn't simple means of knowledge organization (e.g., classification such as taxonomy; things such as glossaries) also be some form of knowledge representation? Jens Lallensack (talk) 10:20, 28 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

As far as I know, knowledge representation as a technical term is primarily associated with artificial intelligence. Since we currently only have one paragraph on it, I thought it best to focus on this aspect, which is also how the sources cited present it. As you stated, in a more general sense, anything that represents knowledge is knowledge representation. If we want to have a more interdisciplinary perspective, this would be one expansion idea. There a different formalisms for structuring a knowledge base used in automatic reasoning and semantic networks are one approach. Since semantic networks rely on natural language, there is an overlap with linguistics. I think they are also used in some psychological models. I would have to go through some more sources to figure out the details of how to best present the topic from this wider lens if we want to have this kind of expansion. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:29, 28 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

For the paragraph on representation, maybe an introductory sentence might be good introducing the term in the broad sense, before going into the artificial intelligence? Not sure if it needs more than that. However, I still agree with Patrick that a section "Limits of knowledge" would be good. Again, see German Wikipedia article for ideas. I think the quantum mechanics bit is relevant here, too; in science, it was long assumed that the universe can be precisely modeled (and predicted) if we only have enough knowledge/data about it. But this does not seem to be the case. To me, this seems to be a point of general interest. Jens Lallensack (talk) 15:46, 28 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I added an introductory sentence to the paragraph on knowledge representation. As for limits of knowledge, there may be a way to address several concerns at the same time. My current idea is to convert the section "Philosophical skepticism" into a section on the limits of knowledge, which fits together since skepticism is one position about the limits of knowledge. This would imply that the text on skepticism is reduced, as Patrick requested, and the focus is shifted in the process. Quantum indeterminacy is one way how knowledge may be limited so it could be included there as well. I would like to hear what your thoughts are and I'll also ping @PatrickJWelsh:. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:56, 28 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I think owe a bunch of responses here (the price of my own long-windedness!), but let me just say that I support the proposal to give this topic its own section. @Jens Lallensack captures my intention in mentioning quantum indeterminacy. Also, I do not oppose covering skepticism, which I consider extremely relevant. I just oppose focusing too much on a version of it that is too silly for anyone to take seriously. What I'm asking here is just to cut back on dreams and sci-fi thought-experiments to put in maybe a paragraph on Hume or something—unless brains in vats goes someplace interesting, in which case, don't leave that part out!

I will do my best to catch up with the rest tomorrow.

Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 22:51, 28 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

@Jens Lallensack and PatrickJWelsh: I made a first attempt to implement this idea, please let me know if this is roughly what you had in mind. The section includes an explanation of Kant's position and addresses the problem of Quantum indeterminacy via the uncertainty principle, which is probably more familiar to the reader. At the same time, the discussion of radical skepticism is shortened and moved to the end. I put the vat-example in a footnote so it's still there for readers who would like to learn more on this. Phlsph7 (talk) 13:07, 3 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Quick comment on the uncertainty principle part: which states that it is impossible to know the exact position and momentum of a particle at the same time - true, but it's not just position and momentum, other pairs of properties such as energy and time are also subject to the principle. Uncertainty principle words it better: "there is a limit to the precision with which certain pairs of physical properties, such as position and momentum, can be simultaneously known". Shapeyness (talk) 14:28, 3 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for pointing this out. I had thought that this more general principle was what the principle of complementarity was about but this is not my field of expertise. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:09, 3 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Yes, this looks good. I like the inclusion of chaos theory. That hadn't occurred to me, but it fits nicely. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 20:12, 3 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Coordinator comment

This has been running for a while now, with a lot of comment but little movement towards a consensus to promote. It more resembles a PR; which happens, especially with complex subjects. That said, I am inclined to archive it to let the various issues be sorted out off FAC, unless the reviewers to date feel that a consensus can swiftly be reached? @PatrickJWelsh, Jens Lallensack, Shapeyness, Generalissima, Tim riley, SchroCat, and Jens Lallensack: Gog the Mild (talk) 19:48, 17 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I've been watching this FAC from the start, and would like to see the discussions pursued to the end, and so I hope we don't have to archive this FAC yet, if at all. Tim riley talk 21:07, 17 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

The decisive issue, as I see it, is whether analytic epistemology provides an appropriately comprehensive account of knowledge. To me, it seems quite obvious that it does not. I have tried to be more specific about this above.

If, however, there were to emerge a consensus against me on this point, I would not put up a fuss beyond (maybe) a brief restatement of what I have already said. In such event, the nomination could close out fairly swiftly. Absent such a consensus, however, I don't see a timely path to promotion.

It's just an incredibly difficult topic to cover at a level consistent with the FA criteria. Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 21:11, 17 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I personally think that the article meets the FA criteria. The discussions above improved it significantly, especially with the new section on "limits". But I am not sure if much more is needed; I do think that the current focus on epistemology makes sense, and the coverage of other fields is reasonably extensive. This does not mean that the article should not be expanded further to be more comprehensive. For example, the observation that "knowledge is power" (scientia potestas est) could be mentioned (e.g., biopower), and the discussion about "freedom of knowledge" (e.g., open content) does not seem to be mentioned, too? That being said, I personally believe that such potential gaps can be filled within this FAC, but I acknowledge that the other reviewers have a much stronger background on the topic than I do. Jens Lallensack (talk) 23:29, 17 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for the ideas, I added a short passage about knowledge and power to the subsection "Sociology" and I added a footnote on free information to the section "History". Phlsph7 (talk) 10:43, 18 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

We are on day 42 of this nomination. As far as I can tell, there is one full support, one support on prose, a passed image review, two tending to full support conditional on how the other reviews go, one ongoing review, and one quasi-oppose (with two editors questioning whether the quasi-oppose is based on a misinterpretation of the FA criteria). My suggestion would be to wait for the ongoing review to finish before making a final call but I won't insist. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:08, 18 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

By all means let us give the discussion a little more rope. Gog the Mild (talk) 17:59, 19 March 2024 (UTC)[reply]

@Gog the Mild: Thanks for the extension. Unfortunately, there hasn't been much progress towards a consensus so it might be best to archive this nomination. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:23, 2 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Will action. I agree with Gog that this has become more of a peer review. I know you did try PR before FAC, but didn't attract much commentary there. It might be worth another go, involving the reviewers here and anyone else who shows up. Cheers, Ian Rose (talk) 08:16, 2 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Closing note: This candidate has been withdrawn, but there may be a delay in bot processing of the close. Please see WP:FAC/ar, and leave the {{featured article candidates}} template in place on the talk page until the bot goes through. Ian Rose (talk) 08:17, 2 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]

The above discussion is preserved as an archive. Please do not modify it. No further edits should be made to this page.