Wikipedia

Valence populism

Valence populism is a variant of populism that is assigned to political parties or politicians whose positions cannot be determined on the left–right political spectrum. Parties or politicians alike promote issues and themes that are non-positional, such as anti-corruption ideas, government transparency, democratic reform, and moral integrity. Valence populism is also an anti-establishment ideology, that rejects consistent ideologies unlike left-wing or right-wing populism.

The concept of valence populism has been largely built by political scientist Mattia Zulianello. It has usually been found in parties in the Central and Eastern Europe. Despite this, the most known example is the Italian Five Star Movement. Other parties include the Czech ANO 2011, Bulgarian GERB, Croatian Human Shield, Slovak OĽaNO, and Slovenian List of Marjan Šarec. Variants of valence populism include techno-populism and agrarian populism.

Definition

edit

Political scientist Mattia Zulianello has defined valence populism as a variant of populism that is attributed to parties that do not have a clear position on the left–right political spectrum, such as parties that campaign solely on anti-corruption ideas.[1] Political scientist Donald E. Stokes has identified corruption as a valence issue as early as in 1963.[2] Parties that espouse valence populism concentrate on issues and themes that are non-positional, such as combating corruption, increasing government transparency, democratic reform and integrity.[3] Issues that valence populists also concentrate on are also other non-positional issues that are widely approved by voters.[4] Such parties put more importance on these issues than positioned: left-wing, right-wing, or centrist populists.[5] Technocratic populism is a variant of valence populism.[3][6][7] It promotes apolitical experts that seeks to directly connect with "the people".[3][6][8] Despite the concentration on non-positional issues, some valence populists may adopt stances on a limited range of positional issues.[8]

Valence populist parties are neither left-wing, right-wing, or centrist;[3][9][10] they cannot be positioned on the political spectrum.[1] They also purposely avoid showing clear positions regarding socio-cultural and economic issues and are often anti-establishment.[1][11][12] "Their policy stances are primarily informed by an unadulterated conception of populism … and are therefore flexible, free-floating and, often, inconsistent", Zulianello has said.[3] Together with political scientist Petra Guasti, Zulianello said that valence populists lack a "thick ideology" such as nativism or socialism, which is not the case for positional populism.[6] Analyst Denys Gorbach has said that valence populism "rejects consistent ideologies".[13] This has also been agreed on by political scientists Robert A. Huber, Michael Jankowski, and Christina-Marie Juen.[14] Due to it not having a clear ideological position, valence populism is not exclusionary nor inclusionary.[15] Because of this, the ideology of valence populists is solely populism.[4] This has led the ideology to being described as a "purer form of populism".[16]

Zulianello has argued for the adoption of the term valence populism, considering that centrist populism "directly or indirectly refers to the ideological or geometric centre of the party system".[17] He has also said while issues such as anti-corruption are typically affiliated with centrist populism, he considers it misleading because valence issues lack a clear positioning, and thus cannot be located in the political centre.[18] Political scientists Vladimír Naxera and Ondřej Stulík agreed with Zulianello.[19] Zulianello built off the definition from political scientist Kenneth M. Roberts, who said in 2018 that "some [populist] parties offer little more than … valence considerations" and thus cannot be defined as either left-wing or right-wing.[20] Roberts has also said that "positional and valence competition are not mutually exclusive".[21]

Political scientist Dani Filc has said that Zulianello's and Guasti's approach and definition of valence populism is "enlightening" and that their argument is important because it emphasises the complexity of populism. Filc has also listed Peronism as a variant of populism that cannot be classified as either left-wing or right-wing.[22] Social psychologist Valerio Pellegrini has referred to valence populism as an "innovative category".[23] He has noted that valence populism could exploit the power that is inherent in the motives of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation.[24] Naxera, Stulík and social scientist Vojtěch Kaše have described valence populism as a "frequently discussed concept".[25] Political scientist Eliška Drápalová has argued that valence populism is "well suited" for local politics due to local politics being "more direct, personalised, and unmediated".[26]

History

edit

In political science, variants of populism such as left-wing and right-wing populism, and even centrist populism since the 2000s, have been discussed and distinguished.[1] Parties that cannot be identified as neither left nor right were sometimes attributed as centrist populist or were placed in the "residual category".[3] In regard to Europe, Zulianello has said that contemporary parties in political science are typically placed on two axes, an economic and socio-cultural one, and thus even populist parties "primarily engage in positional competition" among these axes.[3] Zulianello has noted that this approach means that populist political parties could be clearly positioned on the political spectrum, but he disagrees with this.[27]

Zulianello and another political scientist, Erik Gahner Larsen, have discussed the exception to positioning populist parties.[3] He has explicitly noted that their approach has been largely theoretical.[3] Valence populism has usually been found in political parties in Central and Eastern Europe.[18] A similar variant of non-positional populism to valence populism is agrarian populism, which primarily concentrates on rural issues; Zulianello and Guasti have listed Dutch Farmers' Party and Farmer–Citizen Movement, Finnish Rural Party, and Polish Self-Defence as examples of agrarian populist parties.[6]

Political scientists Matteo Giardiello, Manuela Caiani, and Enrico Padoan have referred to valence populism as hybrid populism.[28][29] In French, political scientists Chloé Alexandre and Gilles Ivaldi have called valence populism "consensual populism" (French: populisme consensuel).[30]

Considering that valence populism is more prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe, whose countries were not members of the European Union until the 1990s, valence populism was not present in the European Parliament until then.[31] First valence populist parties entered the European Parliament in the 2004 election.[32] These were the Austrian Hans-Peter Martin's List, which won 1 seat, and the Lithuanian Labour Party, which won 5 seats.[32] The 2009 election also saw Bulgarian GERB, another valence populist party, joining the European Parliament.[32] By 2014, valence populist parties had 28 seats in the European Parliament.[33] Valence populist parties achieved their best result ever in the 2019 election, when six parties gained representation.[34] During this period, valence populism also spread to Western Europe, particularly Italy and France, where the Five Star Movement (M5S) and La République En Marche ! (LREM) achieved success.[11][18]

Outside of Europe, political scientist Masaru Nishikawa has argued that populism in Japan is not associated with any political positions, and that neither left-wing or right-wing populism exist; he has also questioned the existence of valence populism.[35] Imran Khan, the former prime minister of Pakistan, has also been viewed as a valence populist due to him mostly focussing on issues such as corruption, transparency, governance reform, integrity, and social justice.[36]

During the COVID-19 pandemic, valence populist parties held varied positions regarding vaccination. In Europe, Slavi Trifonov of Bulgarian There is Such a People and Ivan Pernar, formerly affiliated with Croatian Human Shield (ŽZ), promoted conspiracy theories and opposed vaccination. On the other hand, in Australia, Jacqui Lambie of the Jacqui Lambie Network was supportive of COVID-19 vaccination.[37]

Political parties

edit
 
The Italian Five Star Movement is a common example of a valence populist party

Zulianello and Larsen have compiled a list of valence populist parties using their dataset of varieties of populism from 1979 to 2019 and the 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey on political parties.[5] Out of all listed political parties, the ŽZ had the highest rate of blurry positions on socio-cultural and economic issues in 2019.[38] Regarding the reduction of political corruption as a priority, Slovak OĽaNO is listed as the party which holds the highest priority on the issue, followed by the Italian Five Star Movement (M5S), and ŽZ. GERB is listed on the bottom, in regard to valence populist parties.[39] Zulianello and Larsen have also both argued that the term valence populism fits better than centrist populism for OĽaNO, M5S, and Czech ANO 2011.[40] In a 2023 article, Zulianello and Guasti listed ANO 2011, M5S, and OĽaNO as examples of valence populist parties.[6] In a separate article, they named Jacqui Lambie Network as a valence populist party.[37]

Regarding M5S, Zulianello has described it as "perhaps the best example" of valence populism; M5S cannot be positioned on the left–right political spectrum and is very ideologically flexible and eclectic.[18] Pellegrini has also agreed that M5S is valence populist.[41] Zulianello has also said that while GERB is a member of the European People's Party and defines itself as a centre-right and Christian-democratic party, it is still a valence populist party.[42] On the other hand, ANO 2011 has presented itself as a technocratic party.[42] Naxera, Stulík, and Kaše have agreed that ANO 2011 showcased technocratic populist and valence populist tendencies.[25] Together with author Kostiantyn Yanchenko, Zulianello also analysed the Ukrainian Servant of the People of Volodymyr Zelenskyy and concluded that SN is a valence populist party due to its focus on non-positional issues and blurry socio-cultural and economic issues.[43] Sociologists and researchers Michel Perottino and Petra Guasti also identified Emmanuel Macron's LREM as valence populist due to focusing on technocratic issues and rejecting being positioned on either the left, right, or the centre of the political spectrum.[11] Political scientist Dragoș Dragoman described Save Romania Union as a valence populist party.[44]

Huber, Jankowski, and Juen noted that the Norwegian Progress Party (FrP) also began as a valence populist party, having only campaigned on anti-tax and anti-elitist issues.[14] FrP later also began focusing on issues related to immigration and switched towards right-wing populism.[14] They argued the same for Alternative for Germany due to initially campaigning solely on an anti-Euro platform, before turning towards right-wing populism.[14]

The following list includes political parties that have been labelled as valence populist.[45][46][47]

See also

edit

Notes

edit
  1. ^ Trifonov is a politician, not a political party, though he formed his own political party, There is Such a People, in 2020. His previous project in 2019 was There Is no Such State, but was unregistered, thus Trifonov is listed instead.[48]

References

edit

Bibliography

edit

News articles

edit

Footnotes

edit
  1. ^ a b c d Zulianello & Larsen 2023, p. 190.
  2. ^ Stokes 1963, p. 372.
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h i Zulianello & Larsen 2023, p. 191.
  4. ^ a b Zulianello 2023, p. 62.
  5. ^ a b Zulianello & Larsen 2023, p. 192.
  6. ^ a b c d e Zulianello & Guasti 2023a.
  7. ^ Reiser & Hebenstreit 2020, p. 569.
  8. ^ a b Zulianello & Larsen 2021, p. 2.
  9. ^ Manucci 2021, p. 28.
  10. ^ Driscoll 2023, p. 148.
  11. ^ a b c Perottino & Guasti 2020, p. 547.
  12. ^ Bruno 2022, p. 117.
  13. ^ Gorbach 2024, p. 275.
  14. ^ a b c d Huber, Jankowski & Juen 2022, p. 1000.
  15. ^ Zulianello 2019, p. 332.
  16. ^ Pellegrini 2023, p. 27.
  17. ^ Zulianello 2019, p. 329.
  18. ^ a b c d Manucci 2019.
  19. ^ Stulík & Naxera 2022, p. 41.
  20. ^ de la Torre & Roberts 2018, p. 252.
  21. ^ de la Torre & Roberts 2018, p. 243.
  22. ^ Filc 2023.
  23. ^ Pellegrini 2023, p. 4.
  24. ^ Pellegrini 2023, p. 5.
  25. ^ a b Naxera, Kaše & Stulík 2023, p. 14.
  26. ^ Drápalová 2023.
  27. ^ Zulianello & Larsen 2023, p. 190-191.
  28. ^ Giardiello 2021, p. 346.
  29. ^ Caiani & Padoan 2023, p. 24.
  30. ^ Alexandre & Ivaldi 2023, p. 8.
  31. ^ Manucci 2021, p. 35.
  32. ^ a b c Manucci 2021, p. 30.
  33. ^ Manucci 2021, p. 31.
  34. ^ Manucci 2021, p. 37.
  35. ^ Nishikawa 2023.
  36. ^ Khalid 2020, p. 11.
  37. ^ a b Zulianello & Guasti 2023b, p. 9.
  38. ^ Zulianello & Larsen 2023, p. 194.
  39. ^ Zulianello & Larsen 2023, p. 196.
  40. ^ Zulianello & Larsen 2023, p. 197.
  41. ^ Pellegrini 2023, p. 13, 16.
  42. ^ a b Zulianello 2023, p. 65.
  43. ^ Yanchenko & Zulianello 2023, p. 253.
  44. ^ Dragoman 2020, p. 305.
  45. ^ Zulianello 2019, p. 330-332.
  46. ^ Zulianello & Larsen 2023, p. 193.
  47. ^ Zulianello & Larsen 2021, p. 10-12.
  48. ^ Spirova 2021, p. 55.

Further reading

edit
edit
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Valence_populism&oldid=1231611971"