Talk:Raid on Alexandria (1941)

Inline notes

Inline notes added on 18 September 2008.--Darius (talk) 13:01, 18 September 2008 (UTC)

Jervis

The text here says the four ships were sunk, and gives Sadkovitch as the source for this. Jervis was only damaged, so it needs changing; what does Sadkovitch actually say? the reference won't fit otherwise. Xyl 54 (talk) 15:06, 8 December 2008 (UTC)

This article is actually full of flaws. Valiant was not sunk, and Queen Elisabeth was merly grounded.

Queen Elisabeth was out of action for 9 months, but that was mostly because of a refit, while Valiant was back to support the landings in Sicily 6 months later. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Ormen (talk • contribs) 13:58, 20 December 2008 (UTC)

Operation Husky began in July 1943, not 1941, so Valiant was away for 19 months, not only for 6 months. Bubu, 2009-05-04 15:39 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.224.160.136 (talk • contribs) 13:40, 4 May 2009

OK, I've fixed it (finally!). I've not read Sadkovitch, but I've seen him quoted elsewhere and not been impressed.
I've checked Valiant at naval-histories; she had repairs at Alex, folowed by full repair at Durban. She was back in action in August 1942, but was assigned to the Eastern Fleet. She didn't return to the Med until a further refit in Britain, prior to Husky.
QE was in dock at Alex til June 1942, then moved to Norfolk for extended repairs til June 1943; then went for refit at Devonport til November, prior to moving to the Eastern fleet in February 1944. So she was out of the game for quite a while, but that would be due to her age; presumably she could have been back in action before then if neccessary. But by that time I suppose the crisis in the Med was over.
I'll put the links on their pages. Xyl 54 (talk) 11:13, 11 July 2009 (UTC)

Factual Errors

The article still contains errors about the "sinking" of the Queen Elizabeth. I will make a short alteration to correct it. Getztashida (talk) 12:35, 19 December 2011 (UTC)

It's OK, all what we can say per sources is that she was "crippled".--Darius (talk) 18:59, 19 December 2011 (UTC)

Decisive Victory?

I notice the infobox has just been modified to describe the outcome as a decisive Italian victory. I'm all in favour of giving the Italians the credit they deserve, but I hardly think this action could be described as decisive. Neither of the targeted battleships were permanently disabled and British subterfuge prevented the Italians realising that they had actually seriously damaged and disabled the ships so the Italian Navy did not exploit it's success. A victory? Most definitely, but not a decisive one. Getztashida (talk) 19:09, 26 December 2011 (UTC)

It certainly was a decisive victory. The Italians completed all their objectives with negligible losses; while the British utterly failed to prevent them from crippling two capital ships. Even if the ships were later recovered they were still put out of action for several months during a crucial period. Sounds pretty descisive to me.Mediatech492 (talk) 20:49, 26 December 2011 (UTC)

I'm sorry, but the Italian objective was to destroy the British battleships, not merely cripple them - and then they failed to exploit the partial success they did achieve. Further, all the Italian frogmen were captured, so describing the losses as negligible is a bit disingenuous - certainly the numbers captured are tiny (indeed negligible) in the overall scheme of things, but having 100% of your soldiers captured without fully completing their objectives does not a smashing success make. Ultimately, if the Italians had been aware that the British ships were crippled and sortied their heavy units and taken full control of the central Mediterranean, then the raid on Alexandria would very much have been a decisive victory - however, the fact that the Italians did not know they had been partially successful (and certainly successful enough to allow them to act decisively) meant they did not feel able to put their fleet out in force and the naval picture didn't really change. A raid that, in spite of it's success, does nothing to change the status quo can hardly be described as decisive. Getztashida (talk) 12:06, 27 December 2011 (UTC)

Cited sources claim that the action was decisive because the Italian navy gained naval supremacy in the central Mediterranean, and that there was a dramatic change in the strategic situation, no matter if the big ships were crippled or sunk outright, they were out of the game for several months.--Darius (talk) 12:26, 27 December 2011 (UTC)

Then how come the naval situation didn't substantially change? Malta was still relieved (albeit at serious cost), the Italian navy was still beaten back at Second Sirte and the vast majority of merchant losses were inflicted by aircraft, not surface action. Don't get me wrong, I don't subscribe to the popular history notion that the Italian Navy was a hopeless waste of space. They fought the Royal Navy bravely and effectively for three years, and the Alexandria raid definitely swung the balance of power in their favour - and perhaps even granted them naval supremacy - for a time but they were unable to prevent:

a) The resupply of the Allied forces in North Africa

b) The relief of Malta

c) The destruction of supplies bound for the Axis forces in North Africa

Further, during the period when the Royal navy was substantially weakened, where were the major Italian victories? There aren't really any to be honest, Operation Vigorous was turned back, but enough of Harpoon got through to keep Malta afloat until Pedestal. The major successes like the sinking of HMS York had already happened. If the raid on Alexandria had truly been decisive, why were the Italians unable to prevent the Royal Navy performing the three crucial tasks listed above. No question that the Raid on Alexandria was a victory, no question it greatly hindered the Royal Navies freedom of operation and even swung the balance of power in favour of the Italians, but it simply cannot be considered decisive when the Italian Navy subsequently failed to prevent the Royal Navy from achieving their key strategic goals - resupply the Allies in North Africa, relieve Malta and sink the Axis supplies crossing the Med. Getztashida (talk) 13:50, 27 December 2011 (UTC)

First of all, this isn't an online forum thus we have to rely on sources, not on personal analyses; on the other hand, while 1941 saw a strong opposition of Malta-based forces against axis convoys, from January to September 1942 there was a number of Italian successes (strategic victory at the Second Battle of Sirte, Operation Harpoon, Operation Vigorous and tactical victory against Operation Pedestal) all due to the Alexandria success. Your statement "The vast majority of merchant losses were inflicted by aircraft, not surface action" is in contradiction with the fact that two vital steamers (one of them a large American tanker) were lost during Operation Harpoon as a direct result of the Italian fleet intervention, and NONE of the freighters which made up convoy Vigorous reached Malta for fear of being intercepted by the Italian battleships. Italian MTBs also sank four merchantmen and the cruiser HMS Manchester in the attack on Pedestal convoy.

Large axis convoys passed unmolested to North Africa during the same period (the best prove that Malta was efectively neutralized), not to mention Italo-German victories on the ground which led them to the gates of Alexandria. Overstreched axis supply lines and American involvement turned the tide by November 1942, and Libya fell on allies' hands only in January 1943.--Darius (talk) 16:15, 27 December 2011 (UTC)

There was no American involvement to turn the tide, rather British involvement in the Mediterranean and continued success at Malta, as well as in North Africa, IE El-Alamein. As you said, personal analyses are not relevant here, so don't write one especially when it's nonsense.

In the Tactical sense, assessing only the units immediately involved, the attack was a remarkable success for the Italians. In the strategic sense, the loss of two major assets, even temporarily, was a major setback to British plans. The fact that the Italians ultimately lost the war is irrelevant to these facts.Mediatech492 (talk) 17:23, 27 December 2011 (UTC)

It's not about the Italians losing the war - it's that they failed to take advantage of the unquestioned tactical success of the Alexandria raid in the short term. Getztashida (talk) 18:51, 27 December 2011 (UTC)

...and it's not our own opinions what matters here, but the analysis made by published, reliable sources... Darius (talk) 23:30, 27 December 2011 (UTC) (signature, date added, Xyl 54 (talk) 12:05, 28 December 2011 (UTC))

I think if there are sources which specifically call this a decisive victory then we have to take notice of them; like Darius said, we have to go with the sources available, not our own evaluation of the events.

And I’m also keen to give the Italian Navy the credit it deserves.

But we shouldn’t be making the other guys chickens into turkeys. I’m personally not that happy with the use of the term “decisive”, as a shorthand for “major”, or “significant”; The word “decisive” implies something (a campaign, a conflict) was decided ie brought to an end, or marking a turning point on the road to an eventual victory. Midway was decisive; Trafalgar was, and Lepanto. But a lot of major victories never decided anything.

I’m also a bit iffy about the term "naval supremacy"; I can see the Italians gained naval superiority over the Allies in December 42, but "supremacy" implies the Allies were completely defeated. The Allies were on the back foot in the spring and summer of 1943 but I wouldn’t describe them as completely defeated. The Battle of the Mediterranean was a contest for naval supremacy, where the advantage went one way, then the other, but it wasn’t over until the end of 1943 (and at that point, it wasn’t the Allies that had lost!) Xyl 54 (talk) 11:59, 28 December 2011 (UTC)

PS I would suggest, gentlemen, the remedy (if one is needed) would be to find reliable sources that have a different assessment to Bragadins, and bring them here. Then they can be added to the Aftermath section as a counter-point. Agreed? Xyl 54 (talk) 12:17, 28 December 2011 (UTC)

The cited source is the only one that I have been made aware of that claims the raid on Alexandria was decisive - this means we could be giving undue weight to a minority viewpoint. I am compiling some proper reference go with this (most of my books pertain to WWI, so I've been ordering from the library) but it must be understood that most books don't outright state that the raid was "not decisive" but rather expand on how the British managed to prevent the Italians from fully exploiting their success. I have never previously encountered a claim that the raid was decisive and it should be unsurprising that most scholars have not devoted any time to countering an argument that nobody was making.Getztashida (talk) 00:42, 29 December 2011 (UTC)

What about this British source?? The statement came from no other than Winston Churchill before the Parliament. If you scroll up the page, you will find that the book's author concludes that after the frogmen assault 'Overnight, the sea had became an axis lake. And the Italian Navy held dominating power'. On the other hand, regarding the weak points of the naval supremacy, the same author stresses Borghese dissapointment in view of the axis failure to take Malta through the planned "Operation Hercules". Nevertheless, he clearly states the there was an Italian supremacy beyond any doubt.

There are three main points which show that after Alexandria the allies were unable to counter the Italian navy as they did during most of 1941; 1) The sharp drop of axis merchant losses on the sea lanes to Libya; 2) The neutralization of Malta as an offensive base against axis shipping and 3) The fact that the transit of allied shipping through the Central Mediterranean became a costly - if not impossible- bid for the British fleet until at least October 1942 (See Sadkovich, Chapter 7, "Axis Dominance", pp. 219-248). If the British (and Americans) later managed to curb the axis in the Mediterranean doesn't really matter at least for this article; in that case, we should also discuss the aftermath of the Battle of Taranto or even the Battle of Matapan on the grounds that the Italian fleet eventually recovered from these stunning blows and the thus term 'decisive' should also being removed from those pages.--Darius (talk) 01:36, 29 December 2011 (UTC)

P/S: I agree with Xyl 54 that the adjective 'decisive' is too liberally used in military infoboxes entries, but I guess we should raise this issue at WP:MILMOS, not here.--Darius (talk) 01:42, 29 December 2011 (UTC)

That's a fair point about Matapan, and Taranto; I wouldn't have described either of them as decisive (at least, no more so than the raid, here) though I've seen sources that do describe them thus. So the three should be treated even-handedly, I think. I've raised the issue at MILHIST (here), to see what they have to say about it.

As far as a lack of sources that say outright "this wasn't decisive" goes, I agree it's an awkward one (proving a negative?) but it was a different assessment to Bragadin I had in mind. For example, the Matapan page lists it as a decisive victory, but the Aftermath section examines that claim quite rigorously (in fact it comes right out and says "Matapan was Italy's greatest defeat at sea...but the battle was hardly decisive"). What do the sources say? Xyl 54 (talk) 20:25, 29 December 2011 (UTC)

I would also agree that Taranto and Matapan cannot be considered decisive battles. Xyl 54 is quite right to point out that the phrase is used far too often out of context. A victory is not decisive unless it represents a turning point in campaign - the beginning of the end if not the end itself. There have been many major battles and one sided victories that were not decisive because they didn't land the knockout blow that decided the campaign. Taranto, Matapan and the raid on Alexandria are all examples of this. Getztashida (talk) 22:59, 29 December 2011 (UTC)

Agreed, but remember that what matters here are published, reliable sources and not our personal assessments.--Darius (talk) 23:08, 29 December 2011 (UTC)

I'm also troubled by the equation of "major" or "substantial" for "decisive", but there is a sense where "decisive" means "clear & unequivocal". (This comes up in ref IJN's "decisive battle" doctrine.) What we need IMO is cross-project agreement on which meaning we're adopting (decisive as "tide turning" or as "clear"), & stick to it. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 23:28, 29 December 2011 (UTC)

British literature tend to give much importance to the "subterfuge prevented the Italians realising that they had actually seriously damaged and disabled the ships so the Italian Navy did not exploit it's success". But actually the subterfuge lasted only for few days (then the ships were drydocked), and, in all likelihood, had been completely useless. It's not that the Regia Marina would have done something extraordinary had they knew, a little earlier than they did, that the two battleships were out of action. The Italian Navy's task was to ensure the convoy traffic to N.Africa and prevent the Allied convoy traffic to Malta. The disabling of Q.E. and Valiant was important only as long as they were no more able to endanger the first and escort the second.

As for the "decisive" factor, it probably was, though temporary. Along with the torpedoing of the Nelson and the sinking of the Barham, it expelled the British major units from central and east mediterranean almost until operation Husky. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.226.108.169 (talk) 14:44, 1 September 2016 (UTC)

" it expelled the British major units from central and east mediterranean almost until operation Husky."

It did no such thing. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.24.171.177 (talk) 00:46, 25 April 2020 (UTC)

Map of Alexandria

The Map of the Grand Harbor is a map of the Hellenistic City, probably around 50 BC, not the present day one. I suggest changing it. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 146.60.52.232 (talk) 20:34, 4 September 2016 (UTC)

Good point. That map is useless for this article. I will remove it. • • • Peter (Southwood) ^(talk): 12:50, 5 September 2016 (UTC)

Good source of information

There is a good source of information here (including maps and photos): FROGMEN AGAINST A FLEET: The Italian Attack on Alexandria 18/19 December 1941; Vincent P. O’Hara and Enrico Cernuschi Farawayman (talk) 05:09, 6 February 2022 (UTC)

Recent edits

Remedied the worst defects in the article but at the cost of removing the main Italian source, much more to do to make it satisfactory. Regards Keith-264 (talk) 09:13, 17 February 2024 (UTC)