Song–Viet war

The Song-Viet war, also known as the Lý-Song War,[4] was a military conflict between the Lý dynasty of Đại Việt and the Song dynasty between 1075 and 1077. The war began was sparked by the shifting allegiances of tribal peoples such as the Zhuang/Nùng on the frontier borderlands, and increasing state control over their administration. In 1075, King Lý Nhân Tông ordered a preemptive invasion of the Song dynasty with more than 80,000 soldiers and razed the city of Yongzhou after a 42 day siege. The Song retaliated with an army of 300,000 in the following year. In 1077, the Song forces nearly reached Đại Việt's capital Thăng Long before being halted by general Lý Thường Kiệt at Như Nguyệt River in modern-day Bắc Ninh Province. After a prolonged stalemate and high casualties on both sides, Lý Thường Kiệt offered apologies for the invasion and the Song commander Guo Kui agreed to withdraw his troops, ending the war. Further negotiations were held in the following years that consolodated the border between the two empires.

Lý–Song War
Chien tranh tong viet en.jpg
Date1075–1077
Location
Result

Indecisive

  • Both sides agreed to withdraw
  • Captured territories held by both Song and Đại Việt were mutually exchanged in 1082, along with prisoners of war[1]
Belligerents
Song dynasty Đại Việt
Commanders and leaders
Emperor Shenzong of Song
Guo Kui (郭逵)
Zhao Xie (趙禼)
Zhang Shoujie (張守節) 
Su Jian (蘇緘) 
Lý Nhân Tông
Lý Thường Kiệt
Nùng Tôn Đản
Thân Cảnh Phúc
Lưu Ưng Ký (POW)
Strength

Viet invasion of Guangnan West Circuit:
Battle of Yongzhou: More than 2800 regular troops[2]
Reinforcements: 80,000 troops[3]

Song Counteroffensive: 50,000 soldiers[4]
100,000 supply train[4]
100,000–870,000[5][6] regular troops and people[7]

Viet invasion of Guangnan West Circuit:
63,000[8] to 80,000–100,000 troops[9]
[10]

Song Counteroffensive: 60,000 (estimate)[11]
Casualties and losses
Viet invasion:
14th c. Vietnamese source:[12] 100,000 killed in Guangxi[13]
Song counterattack:
12th c. Chinese source:[14] 200,000 deaths[15]
13th c. Chinese source: 150,000 deaths[16]
Modern sources: At least 250,000–400,000 troops and civilians (including massacre of Yongzhou): More than half of Song troops died from disease during the counteroffensive against Đại Việt[17][6]
Unknown

BackgroundEdit

Nong Zhigao rebellionsEdit

 
Nong Zhigao's movement in the Song dynasty

In the 1040s and 1050s, the rebellions of the Zhuang/Nùng leader Nong Zhigao in Quảng Nguyên (C. Guangyuan; now Cao Bằng Province) and his attempt to create an independent state on the borderlands of Đại Cồ Việt and the Song dynasty led to intensified relations between the two states. Nong Zhigao's failed rebellions and defeat by Viet forces and the Song general Di Qing (1008–1061) resulted in the removal of the tribal buffer zone between Đại Cồ Việt and the Song. Zhigao's final defeat by the Song also had the effect of subordinating a large portion of that zone to direct Song control. The Viet court did not intervene in the matter and for 20 years after the Nong Zhigao rebellions, there was general peace along the border. However the regional power balance had been lost. Han Chinese military settlers moved in and new leaders took over the surviving communities. Several influential Nùng leaders sided with the Viet court.[18] Crucial influences for the lead up to the event include the Song-court sponsored New Policies promoted by Wang Anshi and efforts by the Lý court to consolidate peripheral fiefdoms.[19]

The Song and Đại Cồ Việt treated their frontier borderland peoples in different ways. Traditionally the Chinese Jimi system sought to introduce "uncultured" barbarians to the benefits of the "civilized" center. Viet leadership on the other hand created "patron-client" relationships using marriage alliances and military expeditions to maintain "satellite" partners. Successive Viet courts saw the extraction of resources from frontier vassals as a measurement of their efficacy. However by the 11th century, both the Chinese and Viet courts saw the frontier as a source of available troops famed for their ferocity. By 1065, around 44,500 militia had been recruited from these communities by the Song.[20]

Song expansionEdit

Frontier unrest began anew in 1057 when Nong Zongdan (V. Nùng Tông Ðán), a kinsman of Nong Zhigao, entered Song territory. The frontier administrator Wang Han visited Zongdan's camp at Leihuo to discourage him from seeking inclusion in the Song dynasty since it would upset the Viet court. Instead he proposed that he stay outside Song territory as a loyal frontier militia leader. Wang feared that a resurgence of the Nùng clan would spell trouble for the frontier. The Song court ignored his apprehensions and offered the Nùng and other communities "Interior Dependency" status. By 1061, Emperor Renzong of Song (r. 1022-63) was regretting his decision and lamented that the "Nùng Bandit" and his kin had strayed far from their frontier duties and might never be incorporated into the Song administration. However in 1062 when Zongdan requested his territory be incorporated into the Song empire, Renzong accepted his request. According to The Draft Documents Pertaining to Song Official Matters, Zongdan was regarded by the Song as the prefect of Leihuo prefecture, renamed "Pacified Prefecture" (Shun'anzhou), and possessed the title "Personal Guardian General of the Right." Nong Zhihui (V. Nùng Trí Hội), the brother of Nong Zhigao, received the title "Personal Guardian of the Left." Other members of the Nùng clan in Temo such as Nong Bing, Nong Guang, and Nong Xiaqing swore loyalty to the Song.[21] Zhigao's former generals Lu Bao, Li Mao, and Huang Zhongqing were also granted official titles.[22]

In the view of the Song court, these titles were not merely honorary appointments. Local militia in the southwestern frontier zone was reorganized in 1065 under Guizhou prefect Lu Shen. The 45 grottoes along the You and Zuo rivers were assigned grotto militia leaders. A commissioner surveyed the region for able-bodied men to be organized under a guard commander selected from the area's prominent households, who received a specific signal banner to indicate their group's distinction. Groups of 30 men were organized into local governance units known as "tithings (jia)", which were organized in groups of five under a troop commandant (dutou), groups of ten led by an aboriginal commander (zhijunshi), and in groups of 50 led by a commander-in-chief (duzhijunshi). It was perhaps this intensification of border defense that the Viet court felt threatened by, as it saw its own systems of local control eroded.[23]

Scholars also note that there was a sharp increase in the population of the Song dynasty's southwest frontier by the end of the 11th century. At the end of the 10th c., this region counted only 17,760 households while the same area had increased to 56,596 households in 1078-85. Guangnan West Circuit's population in 1080 stood at 287,723 households, a 133% increase from the Tang census of 742. Some of the increase can be attributed to including indigenous populations and improved recording methods, but the trend of increased Han Chinese settlement is clear.[24] With the increase of Han Chinese population also came more northern-oriented cultural practices.[25]

Before the Tang, this county was settled by the Miao barbarian people. There were no traces of Han settlers. In 1053, The ‘Great Martial Leader’ Di (Qing) put down the rebellion of the Quang Nguyên barbarian Nùng Trí Cao, the troops following the general’s expedition remained in the region to open up and settle the wasteland. Their settlements extended throughout this county.[24]

— A Record of Fengshan County

Viet expansionEdit

The Lý court was also in the process of consolidating its frontier. In 1059, efforts were made to take direct control of the frontier and its manpower. The northern frontier in the Zuo-You river region was divided into new administrative units: Ngự Long, Vũ Thắng, Long Dực, Thần Ðiện, Bổng Thánh, Bảo Thắng, Hùng Lược, and Vạn Tiệp. Each of these units was assigned an official. Militia units were established among local communities conscripts had the character "Army of the Son of Heaven" (tianzi jun) tattooed on their foreheads. This reflected a distinctly Southeast Asian way of controlling regional manpower.[26]

Border conflictsEdit

In the early 1060s border conflicts began to occur along the Song-Viet frontier. In the spring of 1060, the chieftain of Lạng Châu and imperial in-law, Thàn Thiệu Tháị, crossed into Song territory to raid for cattle. Thiệu Tháị captured the Song commander Yang Baocai in the attack. In autumn of 1060, Song forces also crossed the border but were unsuccessful in recovering Yang. Fighting caused by the natives led by Thiệu Tháị claimed the lives of five military inspectors. The military commissioner Yu Jing sought aid from Champa for a joint attack on Quảng Nguyên. The Lý court caught wind of this and began directly courting local leaders.[27]

Despite increased military tensions, the Lý court sought to defuse the situation by sending a delegation led by Bi Gia Dụ to Yongzhou. The Song authorities requested the return of Yang Baocai but was denied. Emperor Renzong was also wary of further increasing tensions and instructed the local military commissions to refrain from assembling troops. On 8 February 1063, two tributary envoys from the Lý court presented to the Song emperor nine tame elephants. On 7 April 1063, the new Song emperor Yingzong (r. 1063-67) sent calligraphic compositions by Renzong as gifts to the Lý court.[28]

On the same day the Viet envoy Lý Kế Tiên prepared to depart Kaifeng, news arrived that Thàn Thiệu Tháị had attacked settlements in Guangnan West Circuit. A Guangnan official requested immediate retaliation against the southern intruders. However the Song court tried to distance Thiệu Tháị's actions from the Lý court. An envoy from Thăng Long arrived seeking forgiveness for the attack. Yingzong decided not to retaliate.[29]

On 18 November 1064, the Guizhou prefect Lu Shen reported that a military delegation from Thăng Long had crossed the border seeking Nong Rixin (V. Nùng Nậht Tân), the son of Nong Zongdan. He also reported that the delegation showed interest in encroaching on Song territory, including Wenmen dong (Hurun, a village in Jingxi, Guangxi). The Song court took no particular action but Lu was determined to expand Song military presence in the south. Lu raised 44,500 troops from 45 aboriginal leaders along the Zuo-You River region and ordered them to repair and fortify military defenses. To gain the local trust, he requested special seals be made for his militia leaders and that the Zuo-You region be exempt from taxes. The Viet officials became concerned about this development and sent a tribute envoy to Kaifeng to remind the Song court of the Viet role in settling frontier matters. Meanwhile Lu proposed a special training and indoctrination program for a local chieftain each year that would see them enter the official bureaucracy after three years.[29]

Shifting alliancesEdit

In late 1065, Zongdan switched allegiance from the Song and proposed an alliance with Lý Thánh Tông (r. 1054-72) and Quảng Nguyên chieftain Liu Ji (V. Lưu Ký). Lu Shen reported this to court, but Yingzong did not take any action other than to reassign Zongdan's titles.[30] To offset Zongdan's defection, the Song bestowed titles on Nong Zhihui and acknowledged him as the sole leader of Quảng Nguyên.[31]

Emperor Shenzong of Song (r. 1067-85) continued to pay special attention to Viet envoys in January and February 1067. He presented the envoys with a grand array of gifts: 200 liang of silver ingots, 300 bolts of silk, two horses, and a saddle with inlaid gold and silver plating. He called Lý Thánh Tông the "King of the Southern Pacified Region."[30] At the same time Song officials on the southern frontier were training for military action. By late 1067, the Guizhou prefect Zhang Tian reported that Liu Ji was in communication with Lu Bao, who had crossed into Song territory to seek personal glory. Zhang wished to attack Lu Bao but the Song court rejected this course of action. However by 1069, Lu Bao had offered his allegiance to the Song while Liu Ji remained in Quảng Nguyên and was nominally under the control of Thăng Long.[31]

In late 1071, the Guangnan military commissioner Xiao Gu reported that Liu Ji had been spotted near Shun'anzhou (in Quảng Nguyên) at the head of more than 200 men. The Song court expressed concerns that forces were being amassed by barbarians.[32]

On 2 February 1072, Lý Thánh Tông died. The new ruler, Lý Nhân Tông (r. 1072-1128), was only six years old. His regents, such as the defender-in-chief Lý Thường Kiệt, consolidated power by announcing a general amnesty for all outlaws in the protected prefectures. It was reported that the local chieftain of Lạng Châu, Dương Cảnh Thông, brought to court a white dear as tribute and was rewarded with the title "Grand Guardian."[33]

In 1073, a group from the "Five Clans" sent a large tribute embassy numbering 890 to the Song court.[34]

New PoliciesEdit

In the late 1060s, Wang Anshi's New Policies and the prevalent sentiment of irredentism in Shenzong's court led to new ways of governing. Wang's policies saw each part of society as part of a greater whole, and thus the state must take a more holistic and all-encompassing part in governance. One of Wang's reforms, the Balanced Delivery Law, called on fiscal intendants in six of the southern circuits to disregard quotas on tribute items and to buy and sell items according to prices on the open market. Loyal supporters were sought out to assist in the extraction of these resources. Lý Thường Kiệt viewed the changing economic relationship between the Song and its frontier people as an abandonment of the traditional tribute paradigm. Wang called for military action from Song imperial troops.[35]

In early 1075, Thăng Long requested the return of an upland chieftain who had gone over to the Song with 700 followers. The Song refused, saying that they had submitted to the Song.[10]

In the spring of 1075, Shenzong sent two officials, Shen Qi and Liu Yi, to govern Guizhou. They were instructed to train the locals in riverine warfare and forbid them from trading with subjects of the Viet court.[34] Thường Kiệt accused the Song of training soldiers for attacking Thăng Long.[10]

ConflictEdit

Viet invasionEdit

 
Viet forces invaded into modern day Nanning (Yongzhou) in Guangxi, highlighted in dark blue

In 1075, the Quảng Nguyên (C. Guangyuan) chieftain Liu Ji launched an attack on Yongzhou and was repulsed by Nong Zhihui, the chieftain of Guihua.[34]

Anticipating an attack from the north, Lý Thường Kiệt divided his army in two. The plan was for the first group, which included a strong contingent of uplanders and led by Nong Zongdan, to invade and attract the attention of troops at Yongzhou. The second group, the main army, was a coastal force intended to capture undefended places. In October 1075, Zongdan led 23,000 soldiers along the Zuo River into Song territory and captured Guwan, Taiping, Yongping, and Qianlong garrisons. Meanwhile, the naval force of Thường Kiệt captured Qinzhou and Lianzhou. Thường Kiệt presented himself as a liberator in search of a rebel and sought to free the Chinese from Wang Anshi's oppressive reforms.[36]

The two armies arrived at Yongzhou in the early spring of 1076. They defeated a milita force led by Zhang Shoujie, the governor-general of Guangnan West Circuit. He was beheaded at the battle of Kunlun Pass. They then laid siege to Yongzhou. After a 42 day siege, Yongzhou's defenses were breached on 1 March, and was taken in an assault. The 3,000 strong garrison was defeated and the city fortress razed to the ground. The city commander Su Jian killed his own family and refused to leave a burning building, committing suicide.[37][38] The governor Su Jian and 36 members of his family in the city died, with Su Jian stating "I won't die at the hands of those thieves."[39] Several sources estimate that the total number of people killed by the Viet troops during this campaign totaled 80,000-100,000.[17][40][41]

When a large Song army arrived, Thường Kiệt's forces retreated, taking with them an large amount of spoils and thousands of prisoners.[42]

Song counterattackEdit

 
Song forces reached Nhu Nguyệt River in Bắc Ninh Province (highlighted in red) near the capital of Thăng Long

Prior to the invasion of Song, Lý Thường Kiệt had fought a successful war against the Chams in 1069, so in 1076, the Song called upon the Khmer Empire and Champa to go to war against Đại Việt.[6]

In late 1076, the Song commander Guo Kui (1022–1088) started gathering forces on the Viet border. It took him one month to reach the border and another two months to gather his forces. The assisting officer Zhao Xie was critical of the slow campaign. He believed that a vanguard force should have advanced directly through the mountains towards Thăng Long (modern Hanoi), but his opinion was ignored. Finally near the end of the year, they led the combined Song force of 50,000 soldiers and 100,000 supply carriers into Đại Việt territory.[4] A contingent of cavalryman under Tao Bi (1015-78) entered the Zuo River region. The Song quickly took Quảng Nguyên and in the process captured Liu Ji, who had attacked Yongzhou in 1075. Liu Ji deployed elephants against the Song forces, who used scythes to cut their trunks, causing them to trample their own troops.[6] The dong settlements were razed.[42]

By 1077, the Song had defeated forces from Cơ Lang and Quyết Lý and marched towards the Đại Việt capital at Thăng Long. Song forces convened at the Nhu Nguyệt River (in modern Bắc Ninh Province). Thường Kiệt regarded the defense of this river as crucial to the war effort because it presented the last chance to protect the delta region, where the tombs of former rulers and the village of the dynasty's founder were located. Thường Kiệt ordered his men to erect on the river's southern bank a large earthen rampart protected by lines of bamboo piles. Meanwhile his fleet crossed the mouth of the Bạch Đằng River to block Song naval forces from supporting action.[42] There was also a "water barrier" that covered the Bạch Đằng estuary. No details of naval fighting survive except that "many sea battles" were fought starting months before any land battles occurred.[4]

Zhao Xie ordered his soldiers to build catapults and floating bridges. The Song army's gathered across the river from a hill where the Viets could not see them. Bombardment from the catapults cleared the river of Viet vessels, making way for the Song bridges. Several hundred Song soldiers managed to cross before the bridges were burnt. They set fire to the bamboo defense walls but there were too many layers to break through. A vanguard cavalry forces rode within several kilometers of Thăng Long.[43] As the Song forces took the offensive, the Viets strained to hold the front line. Lý Thường Kiệt tried to boost the morale of his soldiers by citing a poem before his army named "Nam quốc sơn hà".[40] The poem so invigorated his forces that the Viets made a successful counterattack, pushing Song forces back across the river. Song forces tried to cross again but Thường Kiệt had previously built a defense system of spikes under the Như Nguyệt riverbed, and they were again pushed back, sustaining 1,000 casualties. Meanwhile the Song naval attack was held back by the Viet coastal defense and failed to provide any assistance to Guo Kui.[42]

Guo Kui led the Song army in another direction towards the nearby region of Phú Lương, where they bombarded Thường Kiệt's positions. Thường Kiệt held out for a month, repulsing multiple attempts by Song forces to cross the river. He became overconfident and decided to make a frontal assault to disperse the Song army. He led his army under cover of night across the river and attacked the Song forces. As the Song front line was in danger of collapsing, reinforcements arrived and pushed back the Viet army back across the river. A Viet general was captured and two princes drowned in the fighting at Kháo Túc River.[5][43]

According to Chinese sources, "tropical climate and rampant disease" severely weakened Song's military forces while the Viet court feared the result of a prolonged war so close to the capital.[5][38] Song forces lost about 50%–60% before retreating, half of them dying to diseases.[44] However Song forces continued to occupy the five disputed regions of Quảng Nguyên (renamed Shun'anzhou or Thuận Châu), Tư Lang Châu, Môn Châu, Tô Mậu Châu, and Quảng Lăng. Viet forces also continued to occupy Yongzhou, Qinzhou, and Lianzhou.[5]

Peace agreementEdit

As a result of mounting casualties on both sides, Lý Thường Kiệt made peace overtures to the Song in 1077; the Song commander Guo Kui agreed to withdraw his troops but kept five disputed regions of Quảng Nguyên (renamed Shun'anzhou or Thuận Châu), Tư Lang Châu, Môn Châu, Tô Mậu Châu, and Quảng Lăng. These areas now comprise most of modern Vietnam's Cao Bằng Province and Lạng Sơn Province. Đại Việt held control of the Yongzhou, Qinzhou and Lianzhou.[5]

Minor clashes continued to occur. In the spring of 1077, Song soldiers raided a holy temple and seized an Amitābha sculpture but abandoned it in the forest when as they fled from a Viet ambush. The Buddha was thought to be lost until a fire during the dry season consumed that forest and villagers reported the miracle to the king, and he returned the Buddha statue to Phật Tích temple with great honors.[45] In 1079 the Song arrested and executed the Nùng leader Nong Zhichun (V. Nùng Trí Xuân) while taking his family as hostages.[46] In 1083, Viets attacked Guihua under the pretense of pursuing Nong Zhihui, the brother of Nong Zhigao. Zhihui plead to the military commissioner Xiong Ben for fresh troops to ward of Viet advances, but was taken in for questioning instead.[46]

In 1082, after a long period of mutual isolation, King Lý Nhân Tông of Đại Việt returned Yongzhou, Qinzhou, and Lianzhou back to Song authorities, along with prisoners of war, and in return Song relinquished its control of four prefectures and a county, including the Nùng clan's home of Quảng Nguyên, Bảo Lạc, and Susang.[5] Further negotiations took place from July 6 to August 8, 1084 at Yongping garrison in southern Guangnan, where Đại Việt's Director of Military Personnel Lê Văn Thịnh (fl. 1038–1096) convinced Song to fix the two countries' borders between Quảng Nguyên and Guihua prefectures.[47][48]

LegacyEdit

The war resulted in an agreement between both sides that fixed the two country's borders; the modern border is largely unmodified from the resulting line of demarcation.[49]

VietnamEdit

In Đại Việt, the war highlighted Viet independence and is considered the marking point of Vietnam's militaristic successes, as Guo Kui was banished for life over his failure, having stampeded to deep of modern days Guangxi and Guangdong in China. It remains the only time Vietnam managed to invade China in its history.[50]

Modern nationalismEdit

Revolutionary Vietnamese scholars in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have since 1954, almost without variance, depicted 11th century Vietnamese society as filled with Kinh and non-Kinh in a "United Front" against Chinese aggression. While at the same time they depicted the subjects under Chinese rule possessing a diversity of interests. Although such a conclusion can be easily drawn from existing sources, such an interpretation is undoubtedly colored by nationalistic bias. Patriotic 20th c. Vietnamese scholars were interested in countering the French colonial conception of a regional and ethnically divided Vietnam, which the French used to explain how they conquered it so easily. According to Patricia Pelley, "to overcome this characterization, revolutionary writers were supposed to recite haranguing clichés about the essential unity and homogeneity of (Vietnam) and its indomitable spirit in the fight against foreign aggression."[51]

One crucial expression of this was the work of historian Hoàng Xuân Hãn (1908–96), who wrote in 1949 his seminal work Lý Thường Kiệt, which attributed to the Lý dynasty a special ability to integrate uplands people and utilize them to advance Đại Việt's interests. In the book's conception, the Nùng clan was the local representative of the Lý court and the lands they occupied was sovereign Vietnamese territory. Although Nong Zongdan approached the Song dynasty and offered the settlements of Leihuo and Jicheng (both in Quảng Nguyên), this was still considered Vietnamese territory because "the family of Tông Ðán still maintained control of his old territory, which therefore was territory that still belonged to Vietnam."[52] Other Vietnamese historians emphasize the high position of Zongdan in the Lý army and his participation in the war against the Song dynasty. As a result, many scholars contend that the Lý leadership benefited more from their relationship with the uplanders than the Song. One dissenting opinion is James A. Anderson, who argues that the opposite was true, and the Lý court felt threatened by the Song's increasing ties with Nong Zhigao's followers, and thus chose a preemptive attack as their best military option.[53]

Vietnam's first Declaration of IndependenceEdit

According to the 14th-century Buddhist scripture Thiền uyển tập anh, during the Viet defense against the Song counteroffensive in which Song forces nearly reached the Đại Việt capital of Thăng Long, general Lý Thường Kiệt wrote a famous poem named Nam quốc sơn hà.[54] He recited the poem in front of his army in order to boost the morale of his men before the battle of Nhu Nguyệt River. The poem, dubbed retroactively as Vietnam's first Declaration of Independence asserted the sovereignty of Đại Việt rulers over its lands. The poem reads:[55][56]

Original Chinese Sino-Vietnamese English translation



Nam quốc sơn hà nam đế cư
Tiệt nhiên định phận tại thiên thư
Như hà nghịch lỗ lai xâm phạm
Nhữ đẳng hành khan thủ bại hư.
Over Mountains and Rivers of the South, reigns the Emperor of the South

As it stands written forever in the Book of Heaven
How dare those barbarians invade our land?
Your armies, without pity, will be annihilated.

According to K.W. Taylor, if the story of the poem is true, then the poem could not have been sung in the form it currently exists today. The poem is written in Classical Chinese following Tang-style rules that would have been hard to understand for Viet soldiers. It would also be the only literary work known to have been written by Lý Thường Kiệt, who was not a literary man. The story of singing in temples to boost military morale prior to battle is plausible, but whether or not it was this specific poem that was sung cannot be answered. It is possible that it was written after the event.[54]

ChinaEdit

Song China considered the expedition a success. The expedition caused loss of land for Đại Việt, as well as the death of their crown Prince in the hands of Guo Kui. Guo Kui was honored for his achievements in punishing Đại Việt.[50]

In China, the Siege of Yongzhou during the Vietnamese invasion was depicted in a Lianhuanhua book, which is a type of small palm-sized picture books containing sequential drawings developed in China during the early 20th century. The illustration on page 142, painted by Xiong Kong Cheng (熊孔成), describes the bravery of Su Jian, who, with only three thousand men was able to put up a fierce, forty-two day, resistance against Vietnamese forces before finally succumbing to vastly superior numbers.[37]

ReferencesEdit

CitationsEdit

  1. ^ Anderson 2008, pp. 208–209.
  2. ^ 脫脫等《宋史》,卷四百四十六,列傳第二百五,13157頁。
  3. ^ "宋史纪事本末 : 卷十五交州之变 - 中国哲学书电子化计划". ctext.org.
  4. ^ a b c d e Taylor 2013, p. 83.
  5. ^ a b c d e f Anderson 2008, p. 209.
  6. ^ a b c d Kiernan 2019, p. 158.
  7. ^ 李燾《續資治通鑑長編》卷二百七十四,6700頁。
  8. ^ "2 June 2020 LÝ THƯỜNG KIỆT ANH HÙNG VIỆT TỘC" (PDF).
  9. ^ 《越史略》(《欽定四庫全書·史部》第466冊),588頁。
  10. ^ a b c Taylor 2013, p. 81.
  11. ^ 潘輝黎等. 第一章 如月大捷. 《越南民族歷史上的幾次戰略決戰》. 戴可來譯. 北京: 世界知識出版社. 1980年: 26頁.
  12. ^ Đại Việt sử lược
  13. ^ 《越史略》載廣西被殺者“無慮十萬”。
  14. ^ Xu Zizhi Tongjian Changbian
  15. ^ Xu Zizhi Tongjian Changbian《長編》卷三百上載出師兵員“死者二十萬”,“上曰:「朝廷以交址犯順,故興師討罪,郭逵不能剪滅,垂成而還。今廣源瘴癘之地,我得之未為利,彼失之未為害,一夫不獲,朕尚閔之,况十死五六邪?」又安南之師,死者二十萬,朝廷當任其咎。《續資治通鑑長編·卷三百》”。
  16. ^ 《玉海》卷一九三上稱“兵夫三十萬人冒暑涉瘴地,死者過半”。
  17. ^ a b Chapuis 1995, p. 77
  18. ^ Anderson 2008, p. 195.
  19. ^ Anderson 2008, p. 191.
  20. ^ Anderson 2008, p. 194-195.
  21. ^ Anderson 2008, p. 196.
  22. ^ Anderson 2008, p. 196-197.
  23. ^ Anderson 2008, p. 197.
  24. ^ a b Anderson 2008, p. 198.
  25. ^ Anderson 2008, p. 198-199.
  26. ^ Anderson 2008, p. 199.
  27. ^ Anderson 2008, p. 199-200.
  28. ^ Anderson 2008, p. 200.
  29. ^ a b Anderson 2008, p. 201.
  30. ^ a b Anderson 2008, p. 202.
  31. ^ a b Anderson 2008, p. 203.
  32. ^ Anderson 2008, p. 203-204.
  33. ^ Anderson 2008, p. 205.
  34. ^ a b c Anderson 2008, p. 207.
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