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Paul Everett Meehl (3 January 1920 – 14 February 2003) was a clinical psychologist, Hathaway and Regents' Professor of Psychology at the University of Minnesota, and past president of the American Psychological Association.[1][2] A Review of General Psychology survey, published in 2002, ranked Meehl as the 74th most cited psychologist of the 20th century, in a tie with Eleanor J. Gibson.[3] Throughout his nearly 60-year career, Meehl made seminal contributions to psychology, including influential theorizing about construct validity, schizophrenia etiology, behavioral assessment and prediction, and philosophy of science.

Paul E. Meehl
Born
Paul Everett Swedow

(1920-01-03)3 January 1920
Died14 February 2003(2003-02-14) (aged 83)
CitizenshipAmerican
Alma materUniversity of Minnesota
Known forMinnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, Genetics of Schizophrenia, Construct Validity, Clinical v. Statistical Prediction, Philosophy of Science, Taxometrics
AwardsNational Academy of Sciences (1987), APA Award for Lifetime Contributions to Psychology (1996), James McKeen Cattell Fellow Award (1998), Bruno Klopfer Award (1979)
Scientific career
FieldsPsychology, philosophy of science
InstitutionsUniversity of Minnesota
Doctoral advisorStarke R. Hathaway
Doctoral studentsHarrison G. Gough, William M. Grove, Dante Cicchetti, Donald R. Peterson, George Schlager Welsh

Contents

BiographyEdit

ChildhoodEdit

Paul Meehl was born January 3, 1920 in Minneapolis, Minnesota, to Otto and Blanche Swedal. His family name "Meehl" was his stepfather's.[4] When he was age 16, his mother died as the result of poor medical care which, according to Meehl, greatly affected his faith in the expertise of medical practitioners and diagnostic accuracy of clinicians.[4] After his mother's death, Meehl lived briefly with his stepfather, then with a neighborhood family for one year so he could finish high school. He then lived with his maternal grandparents, who lived near the University of Minnesota.

Education and academic careerEdit

Meehl started at the University of Minnesota in March 1938.[4] He earned his Bachelor's degree in 1941[5] with Donald G. Paterson as his advisor, and took his PhD in psychology at Minnesota under Starke R. Hathaway in 1945. Meehl's graduate student cohort at the time included Marian Breland Bailey, William K. Estes, Norman Guttman, William Schofield, and Kenneth MacCorquodale.[4] Upon taking his doctorate, Meehl immediately accepted a faculty position at the University, which he held throughout his career. In addition, he had appointments in psychology, law, psychiatry, neurology, philosophy, and served as a fellow of the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science, founded by Herbert Feigl, Meehl, and Wilfrid Sellars.[4]

Meehl rose quickly to academic positions of prominence. He was chairman of the University of Minnesota Psychology Department at age 31, president of the Midwestern Psychological Association at age 34, recipient of the American Psychological Association's Award for Distinguished Scientific Contributions to Psychology at age 38, and president of that association at age 42. He was promoted to Regents' professor, the highest academic position at the University of Minnesota, in 1968. He received the Bruno Klopfer Distinguished Contributor Award in personality assessment in 1979, and was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 1987.[4]

Meehl was not particularly religious during his upbringing,[4] but in adulthood collaborated with a group of Lutheran theologians and psychologists to write What, Then, Is Man? (1958).[6] This project was commissioned by the Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod through Concordia Seminary. The project explored both orthodox theology, psychological science, and how Christians (Lutherans, in particular) could responsibly function as both Christians and psychologists without betraying orthodoxy or sound science and practice.

Later life and deathEdit

In 1995, Meehl was a signatory of a collective statement titled Mainstream Science on Intelligence, written by Linda Gottfredson and published in the Wall Street Journal .[7] He died on February 14, 2003 at his home in Minneapolis of chronic myelomonocytic leukemia.[5] In 2005, Donald R. Peterson, a student of Meehl's, published a volume of their correspondence.[8]

Philosophy of scienceEdit

Meehl founded, along with Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars, the Minnesota Center for the Philosophy of Science, and was a leading figure in philosophy of science as applied to psychology.[4] Early in his career Meehl was a proponent of Karl Popper's Falsificationism, and later amended his views as neo-Popperian.[4] Meehl was a strident critic of using statistical null hypothesis testing for the evaluation of scientific theory. He believed that null hypothesis testing was partly responsible for the lack of progress in many of the "scientifically soft" areas of psychology (e.g. clinical, counseling, social, personality, and community).[9]

Meehl with his colleague Lee J. Cronbach introduced the notion of construct validity in psychology, as well as the application of nomological networks to understand psychological test properties and scientific theorizing and practice.[10]

Minnesota Multiphasic Personality InventoryEdit

Meehl conducted research on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), including development of the K scale.[5][11][12] While Meehl did not directly develop the MMPI (he was a high school junior when Hathaway and McKinley created the item pool, for example), in the years after obtaining his PhD he contributed widely to the literature on interpreting patterns of the MMPI scores.[4][1] In particular, Meehl argued that the MMPI could be used to understand personality profiles systematically associated with clinical outcomes, something he termed a statistical (versus a "clinical") approach to predicting behavior.[13][14]

Clinical versus statistical predictionEdit

Meehl's proposalEdit

Meehl's 1954 book Clinical vs. Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence analyzed the claim that mechanical (i.e., formal, algorithmic, "actuarial") methods of data combination would outperform clinical (i.e., subjective, informal) methods to predict behavior.[15] Meehl argued that mechanical methods of prediction, when used correctly, make more efficient and reliable decisions about patient prognosis and treatment. His conclusions caused a considerable stir among clinicians and conflicted with the prevailing consensus about psychiatric decision-making.[16]

At present, mental health clinicians still commonly make decisions based only on their professional judgment (i.e., combining clinical information "in their head" and arriving at a prediction about a patient).[17] Meehl (1954) theorized that clinicians would make more mistakes than a mechanical prediction tool created to combine clinical data and arrive at conclusions.[15] Within his view, mechanical prediction would not have to exclude any type of data from being combined and could incorporate coded clinical judgments. Once the clinical information is quantified, Meehl proposed mechanical approaches would make 100% reliable predictions for exactly the same data every time. Clinical prediction, on the other hand, would not guarantee this.[18]

Defense of mechanical predictionEdit

Meta-analyses comparing clinical and mechanical prediction efficiency have supported Meehl's (1954) conclusion that mechanical methods outperform clinical methods.[19][20] In response to substantial objections from clinicians, Meehl continued to defend algorithmic prediction throughout his career and proposed that clinicians should rarely deviate from mechanically-derived conclusions.[21] To illustrate this, Meehl described a “broken leg” scenario in which mechanical prediction indicated that an individual has a 90% chance of attending the movies. However, the “clinician” is aware of the broken leg, which was not factored into the mechanical prediction and makes it impossible for the individual to attend. Therefore, the clinician can confidently refute the actuarial prediction. The broken leg is objective evidence determined with high accuracy and highly correlated with staying home from the movies across a wide range of individuals. In this case, overruling the mechanical prediction is theoretically sound. However, Meehl claimed that clinicians' arguments about having extra insight over mechanical formulas are usually unfounded under typical circumstances in psychiatric settings.

Meehl argued that humans introduce biases when making decisions during comprehensive clinical assessments of mental health symptoms.[16][22] For example, clinicians often seek out information to support their presuppositions, or miss and ignore information challenging their views. Additionally, Meehl described how clinical judgment could be influenced by overconfidence or anecdotal observations unsupported by empirical research. In contrast, mechanical prediction tools can be configured to use important clinical information and are not influenced by psychological biases. In support of this conclusion, Meehl and his colleagues found that clinicians still make less accurate decisions than mechanical formulas even when given the same mechanical formulas to help with their decision-making.[22]

SchizophreniaEdit

Meehl was elected president of the American Psychological Association in 1962. In his address to the annual convention, he presented his comprehensive theory about the genetic causes of schizophrenia.[23] This conflicted with the prevailing notion that schizophrenia was primarily the result of a person’s childhood rearing environment.[5] Meehl argued schizophrenia should be considered a genetically-based neurological disorder manifesting via complex interactions with personal and environmental factors. His reasoning was shaped by the writings of psychoanalyst Sandor Rado as well as the behavioral genetics findings at the time. He proposed that existing psychodynamic theory about schizophrenia could be meaningfully integrated into his neurobiological framework for the disorder.[24]

 
Paul Meehl's dominant schizogene theory of schizophrenia. Proposed effects across the human organism and the environment are displayed. CNS = central nervous system. (Adapted from Meehl PE, 1962, 1989, 1990)[23][25][26]

Dominant schizogene theoryEdit

Meehl hypothesized the existence of an autosomal dominant “schizogene” widespread throughout the population, which would function as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for schizophrenia.[23][26][25] The schizogene would manifest on the cellular level throughout the central nervous system and should be observed as a functional control aberration called “hypokrisia.” Cells exhibiting hypokrisia should contribute to a characteristic pattern of impaired integrative signal processing across multiple neural circuits in the brain, which Meehl termed “schizotaxia.” In response to typical rearing environments and social reinforcement schedules, this neural aberration should invariably lead to a collection of observable behavioral tendencies called “schizotypy.” Schizotypy indicators would include neurological soft signs, subtle differences in language usage (“cognitive slippage”), and effects on personality and emotion. Meehl believed many people in society exhibit signs of schizotypy as a result of the schizogene without showing signs of schizophrenia. Schizophrenia would only occur when individuals are carrying other non-specific genetic risk factors (“polygenic potentiators”) relevant for traits such as anhedonia, ambivalence, and social fear. These additional traits would be more likely expressed under stress (e.g., trauma) and inconsistent social schedules from parents. Given these combinations of conditions, decompensation from schizotypy to schizophrenia would result.

Meehl’s dominant schizogene theory had a substantial influence on subsequent research efforts.[27] His theorizing increased interest in longitudinal study of individuals at risk for psychosis and family members of people with schizophrenia who may be carrying the schizogene.[28] Meehl’s descriptions of schizophrenia as largely a neurological phenomenon and schizotypy as a genetically-based risk factor for schizophrenia have been supported.[29] However, researchers have not uncovered strong evidence for a single schizogene, and instead believe the genetic risk for schizophrenia is better explained by polygenic combinations of common variants and rare genetic mutations.[30][31]

TaxometricsEdit

Meehl developed taxometrics, a field concerned with using mathematical formulas to determine the natural groupings of biological or psychological variables.[5] Coherent Cut Kinetics (CCK) is Paul Meehl's method for taxometric analysis.[32]

Applied clinical views and workEdit

Meehl practiced as a licensed and board-certified clinical psychologist throughout his career.[2] He identified as "strongly psychodynamic in theoretical orientation," and used a combination of psychoanalysis and rational emotive therapy.[26] In 1958, Meehl performed psychoanalysis on Saul Bellow while Bellow was an instructor at the University of Minnesota.[33]

"Why I Do Not Attend Case Conferences"Edit

In 1973, Paul Meehl authored a widely referenced manuscript titled Why I Do Not Attend Case Conferences.[34] He shared about avoiding case conferences in mental health clinics after finding them to be boring and lacking intellectual rigor. In contrast, he recalled numerous illuminating case conferences within internal medicine or neurology departments, which often centered around pathologist reports and objective data about patients' pathophysiology. In other words, case conferences outside mental health disciplines were benefiting from including outside evidence against which the clinical observations could be compared. Meehl argued for creating a psychiatric analogue to the pathologist's report. Additionally, he outlined a proposed format for case conferences beginning with initial discussion of clinical observations, and ending with a reveal of a subset of patient data (e.g., psychological testing results) to compare with attendees' clinical inferences and proposed diagnoses.

Within Why I Do Not Attend Case Conferences, Meehl also elaborated upon the issue of clinical versus statistical prediction and the known weakness of unstructured clinical decision-making during typical case conferences. He encouraged clinicians to be humble when collaborating about patient care and pushed for a higher scientific standard for clinical reasoning in mental health treatment settings.[34] Meehl directly identified several common deductive problems he had observed among his clinical colleagues:

Common case conference fallacies[34]Edit

  • Barnum effect: Making a statement that is trivial and true of nearly all patients, but which is made as though it is important for the current patient.[35]
  • Sick-sick ("pathological set"): The tendency to generalize from personal experiences of health and ways of being, to the identification of others who are different from ourselves as being "sick".
  • Me too: The opposite of Sick-sick. Imagining that "everyone does this" and thereby minimizing a symptom without assessing the probability of whether a mentally healthy person would actually do it. A variation of this is Uncle George's pancake fallacy. This minimizes a symptom through reference to a friend/relative who exhibited a similar symptom, thereby implying that it is normal.[5]
  • Multiple Napoleons fallacy: "It's not real to us, but it's 'real' to him". "So what if he thinks he’s Napoleon?" There is a distinction between reality and delusion that is important to make when assessing a patient and so the consideration of comparative realities can mislead and distract from the importance of a patient's delusion to a diagnostic decision.[12] "If I think the moon is made of green cheese and you think it's a piece of rock, one of us must be wrong". For this, pointing out that the deviated cognitions of a delusional patient "seem real to him" is a waste of time. So, the statement "It is reality to him," which is philosophically either trivial or false, is also clinically misleading.[36]
  • Hidden decisions: Decisions based on factors that we do not own up to or challenge. An example is the placement of middle- and upper-class patients in therapy while lower-class patients are given medication. Meehl identified these decisions as related to an implicit ideal patient who is young, attractive, verbal, intelligent, and successful (YAVIS). He argued that YAVIS patients are preferred by psychotherapists because they can pay for long-term treatment and are more enjoyable to interact with.[citation needed]
  • The spun-glass theory of the mind: The belief that the human organism is so fragile that minor negative events, such as criticism, rejection, or failure, are bound to cause major trauma---essentially not giving humans, and sometimes patients, enough credit for their resilience and ability to recover.
  • Crummy criterion fallacy: This fallacy refers to how psychologists explain away the technical aspects of tests, using inappropriate and 'crummy' criterion that is observational instead of scientific, rather than incorporating the psychometric aspects into the interview, life-history, and other material being presented at case conferences.
  • Understanding it makes it normal: The act of normalizing or excusing a behavior just because one understands the cause or function of it, regardless of its normalcy or appropriateness.
  • Assumptions that content and dynamics explain why this person is abnormal: Those who seek psychological services have certain characteristics associated with the fact they are seeking services. However, not only do they have the characteristics of clients but also characteristics of being human. To attribute one’s complete life dysfunction to attributes that make one a patient ignores the fact that some problems are just human problems.[clarification needed]
  • Identifying the softhearted with the softheaded: The belief that those who have sincere concern for the suffering (the softhearted) are the same as those who tend to be wrong in logical and empirical decisions (softheaded).
  • Ad hoc fallacy: Creating explanations after we have been presented with evidence that is consistent with what has now been proven.
  • Doing it the hard way: Going about a task in a more difficult manner when an equivalent easier option exists; for example, in clinical psychology, using an unnecessary instrument or procedure that can be difficult and time consuming while the same information can be ascertained through interviewing or interacting with the client.
  • Social scientists’ anti-biology bias: Meehl argued that social scientists like psychologists, sociologists, and psychiatrists have a tendency to react negatively to biological contributors to abnormal behavior, and therefore tending to be anti-drug, anti-genetic, and anti-EST.
  • Double standard of evidential morals: When one is making an argument and requires less evidence for him or herself than does so for another.

Selected worksEdit

  • Paul E. Meehl (1945). The Dynamics of "Structured" Personality Tests.[37] Journal of Clinical Psychology, 1, 296–303.
  • Kenneth MacCorquodale, Paul E. Meehl (1948) on a distinction between hypothetical constructs and intervening variables Classics in the History of Psychology, retr. 22 Aug 2011.
  • Lee J. Cronbach and Paul E. Meehl (1955). "Construct validity in psychological tests". Psychological Bulletin, 52, 281-302.
  • Meehl, Paul E. (1956). "Wanted—A good cookbook". American Psychologist. 11: 263–272. doi:10.1037/h0044164.
  • Paul E. Meehl (Jun., 1967). "Theory-Testing in Psychology and Physics: A Methodological Paradox". Philosophy of Science, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 103–115
  • Paul E. Meehl (1973). "Some methodological reflections on the difficulties of psychoanalytic research". Psychological Issues, 8(2, Mono. 30), 104-117.
  • Meehl, Paul E. (1978). "Theoretical Risks and Tabular Asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the Slow Progress of Soft Psychology" (PDF). Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology. 46: 806–834. doi:10.1037/0022-006x.46.4.806.
  • Paul E. Meehl (new edition 2013) Clinical versus statistical prediction: a theoretical analysis and a review of the evidence. Echo Point Books & Media, ISBN 978-0963878496

ReferencesEdit

  1. ^ a b "Paul E. Meehl: Smartest Psychologist of the 20th Century?". Psychology Today. Retrieved 2018-02-14.
  2. ^ a b "Curriculum Vitae | Paul E. Meehl". meehl.umn.edu. Retrieved 2019-01-02.
  3. ^ Haggbloom, Steven J.; Warnick, Jason E.; Jones, Vinessa K.; Yarbrough, Gary L.; Russell, Tenea M.; Borecky, Chris M.; McGahhey, Reagan; et al. (2002). "The 100 most eminent psychologists of the 20th century". Review of General Psychology. 6 (2): 139–152. doi:10.1037/1089-2680.6.2.139.CS1 maint: Explicit use of et al. (link)
  4. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Paul E Meehl (2007). Lindzey G, Runyan WM, ed. A History of Psychology in Autobiography (PDF). 8. American Psychological Association. pp. 337–389. ISBN 978-1-59147-796-9.
  5. ^ a b c d e f Goode, Erica (19 February 2003). ""Paul Meehl, 83, an Example For Leaders of Psychotherapy"". New York Times. New York, NY. Retrieved 4 January 2017.
  6. ^ Meehl, Paul E. (1958). What, Then, Is Man?: A Symposium of Theology, Psychology, and Psychiatry. St. Louis (MO): Concordia Publishing House.
  7. ^ Gottfredson, Linda (December 13, 1994). Mainstream Science on Intelligence. Wall Street Journal, p A18.
  8. ^ Peterson, Donald R. (2005). Twelve Years of Correspondence With Paul Meehl: Tough Notes From a Gentle Genius. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
  9. ^ Meehl, Paul E. (1978). "Theoretical risks and tabular asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the slow progress of soft psychology". Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology. 46 (4): 806–834. doi:10.1037/0022-006X.46.4.806. ISSN 0022-006X.
  10. ^ Cronbach, Lee J.; Meehl, Paul E. (1955). "Construct validity in psychological tests". Psychological Bulletin. 52 (4): 281–302. doi:10.1037/h0040957. ISSN 0033-2909. PMID 13245896.
  11. ^ Meehl, P. E.; Hathaway, S. R. (1946). "The K factor as a suppressor variable in the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory". Journal of Applied Psychology. 30 (5): 525–564. doi:10.1037/h0053634. ISSN 0021-9010.
  12. ^ a b Konnikova, Maria. "The perils of hindsight judgment". Scientific American Blog Network. Retrieved 2018-02-15.
  13. ^ Starke Rosecrans Hathaway; Paul Everett Meehl (1951). An atlas for the clinical use of the MMPI. University of Minnesota Press.
  14. ^ Meehl, Paul E. (1956). "Wanted--a good cook-book". American Psychologist. 11 (6): 263–272. doi:10.1037/h0044164. ISSN 0003-066X.
  15. ^ a b Meehl, Paul E. (1954). "Clinical versus statistical prediction: A theoretical analysis and a review of the evidence". doi:10.1037/11281-000.
  16. ^ a b Meehl, P.E. (1986). "Causes and Effects of My Disturbing Little Book". Journal of Personality Assessment. 50 (3): 370–375.
  17. ^ Vrieze, Scott I.; Grove, William M. (2009). "Survey on the use of clinical and mechanical prediction methods in clinical psychology". Professional Psychology: Research and Practice. 40 (5): 525–531. doi:10.1037/a0014693. ISSN 1939-1323.
  18. ^ Paul Meehl (1 February 2013). Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence. Echo Point Books & Media. ISBN 978-0-9638784-9-6.
  19. ^ Grove, W.M.; Zald, D.H.; Hallberg, A.M.; Lebow, B.; Snitz, E.; Nelson, C. (2000). "Clinical versus mechanical prediction: A meta-analysis". Psychological Assessment. 12: 19–30. doi:10.1037/1040-3590.12.1.19.
  20. ^ White, M. J. (2006). "The Meta-Analysis of Clinical Judgment Project: Fifty-Six Years of Accumulated Research on Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction Stefania Aegisdottir". The Counseling Psychologist. 34 (3): 341–382. doi:10.1177/0011000005285875. ISSN 0011-0000.
  21. ^ Meehl, P.E. (1957). "When Shall We Use Our Heads Instead of the Formula". Journal of Counseling Psychology. 4.
  22. ^ a b Dawes, R.M.; Faust, D.; Meehl, P.E. (1989). "Clinical versus Actuarial Prediction". Science. 243: 1668–1674. doi:10.1126/science.2648573.
  23. ^ a b c Meehl, Paul E. (1962). "Schizotaxia, schizotypy, schizophrenia". American Psychologist. 17 (12): 827–838. doi:10.1037/h0041029. ISSN 0003-066X.
  24. ^ Meehl, Paul E. (March 1972). "Specific Genetic Etiology, Psychodynamics, and Therapeutic Nihilism". International Journal of Mental Health. 1 (1–2): 10–27. doi:10.1080/00207411.1972.11448562. ISSN 0020-7411.
  25. ^ a b Meehl, Paul E. (1989-10-01). "Schizotaxia Revisited". Archives of General Psychiatry. 46 (10): 935. doi:10.1001/archpsyc.1989.01810100077015. ISSN 0003-990X.
  26. ^ a b c Meehl, Paul (1990). "Meehl, Paul E. "Toward an integrated theory of schizotaxia, schizotypy, and schizophrenia". Journal of Personality Disorders. 4: 1–99.
  27. ^ Lilienfeld, Scott O.; Waller, Niels G. (2006). "S. O. Lilienfeld and N. G. Waller, "A great pioneer of clinical science remembered: Introduction to the special issue in honor of Paul E. Meehl". Journal of Clinical Psychology61(10) 2005, 1201–1207". Journal of Clinical Psychology. 62 (6): 777–777. doi:10.1002/jclp.20253. ISSN 0021-9762.
  28. ^ Lenzenweger, M. F. (1993). "Explorations in schizotypy and the psychometric high-risk paradigm". Progress in Experimental Personality & Psychopathology Research. 16: 66–116. ISSN 1056-7151. PMID 8293084.
  29. ^ Barrantes-Vidal, Neus; Grant, Phillip; Kwapil, Thomas R. (2015). "The role of schizotypy in the study of the etiology of schizophrenia spectrum disorders". Schizophrenia Bulletin. 41 Suppl 2: S408–416. doi:10.1093/schbul/sbu191. ISSN 1745-1701. PMC 4373635. PMID 25810055.
  30. ^ Consortium, The International Schizophrenia (2009). "Common polygenic variation contributes to risk of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder". Nature. 460 (7256): 748–752. doi:10.1038/nature08185. ISSN 1476-4687. PMC 3912837. PMID 19571811.
  31. ^ Sebat, Jonathan; Levy, Deborah L.; McCarthy, Shane E. (2009). "Rare structural variants in schizophrenia: one disorder, multiple mutations; one mutation, multiple disorders". Trends in Genetics. 25 (12): 528–535. doi:10.1016/j.tig.2009.10.004. ISSN 0168-9525. PMC 3351381. PMID 19883952.
  32. ^ "Taxometrics using Coherent Cut Kinetics | Paul E. Meehl". meehl.umn.edu. Retrieved 2018-02-15.
  33. ^ Menand, Louis (May 11, 2015). "Young Saul". The New Yorker. New York, NY. Retrieved October 18, 2016.
  34. ^ a b c Meehl, P.E. (1973). Psychodiagnosis: Selected papers. Minneapolis (MN): University of Minnesota Press, p. 225-302.
  35. ^ 1920-2003., Meehl, Paul E. (Paul Everett), (2006). A Paul Meehl reader : essays on the practice of scientific psychology. Waller, Niels G. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. ISBN 1134812140. OCLC 853240687.
  36. ^ 1920-2003., Meehl, Paul E. (Paul Everett), (1973). Psychodiagnosis : selected papers. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. ISBN 0816606854. OCLC 234368210.
  37. ^ Meehl, Paul E. (2000-03-01). "The dynamics of "structured" personality tests". Journal of Clinical Psychology. 56 (3): 367–373. doi:10.1002/(sici)1097-4679(200003)56:3%3C367::aid-jclp12%3E3.0.co;2-u. ISSN 1097-4679.

External linksEdit