Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia (GD),[a] also colloquially known as the Kotsebi,[b] is a populist political party in Georgia. It is currently the ruling party in Georgia. Irakli Garibashvili serves as the party chairman, while the former chairman Irakli Kobakhidze has served as the Prime Minister since February 2024. Bidzina Ivanishvili, widely considered the de facto leading person of the party, serves as its honorary chairman.

Georgian Dream –
Democratic Georgia
ქართული ოცნება –
დემოკრატიული საქართველო
ChairmanIrakli Garibashvili
Secretary-GeneralKakha Kaladze
Honorary ChairmanBidzina Ivanishvili
Executive SecretaryMamuka Mdinaradze
Political SecretaryIrakli Kobakhidze
Regional SecretaryDimitri Samkharadze
Relations with Political Parties SecretaryGia Volski
FounderBidzina Ivanishvili
Founded21 April 2012[1]
Registered7 May 2012[2]
Ideology
Political positionSyncretic[26][A]
National affiliationGeorgian Dream (coalition) (until 2016)
European affiliationParty of European Socialists (observer) (2015–2023)[29]
International affiliationProgressive Alliance
(until 2023)
Colors  Blue and   Amber
Sloganმხოლოდ მშვიდობით, ღირსებითა და კეთილდღეობით ევროპისკენ ('Only with peace, dignity, and prosperity to Europe')[30][31]
Seats In Parliament
83 / 150
Municipal Councilors
1,333 / 2,068
Seats In Supreme Council of Adjara
14 / 21
Seats In Tbilisi City Assembly
29 / 50
Seats In Kutaisi City Assembly
18 / 35
Seats In Batumi City Assembly
16 / 35
Municipal Mayors
63 / 64
Party flag
Website
gd.ge

^ A: The party has been variously described as centre-left,[32] fiscally centre-left but socially conservative,[33] nominally centre-left,[34] centre to centre-left,[35] and social democratic.[35][36] Some observers have also accused it of adopting some far-right ideas.[37]

The party was established on 19 April 2012 by billionaire businessman and oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili.[38] It won the general election in the same year, being part of an eclectic coalition also called Georgian Dream, which included both pro-Western liberal and anti-NATO nationalist parties.[39] Subsequently, the Georgian Dream party independently won the general elections of 2016, 2020 and 2024.[40]

Georgian Dream has declared itself and previously been described as a centre-left pro-European party, pursuing Euro-Atlantic integration.[41] However, it over time transformed into an explicitly culturally conservative illiberal Eurosceptic party. The main criticism labeled against the party has always been its alleged anti-Western and pro-Russia foreign policy, a characterization that the party fiercely denies. Furthermore, allegations of vote-bribing, democratic backsliding, authoritarianism and autocratic governance are also common.[c] It is today described as syncretic,[42] despite remaining to the left on fiscal matters.[45]

Georgian Dream has passed legislation considered by the United States and European Union to be contradictory to the country's EU and NATO membership bids. In June 2024 United States sanctioned Georgian Dream officials for "undermining democracy".[46] According to the party itself, it plans to make Georgia part of the EU whilst "playing by Georgian rules".[d]

Since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Georgian Dream has been associated with the dissemination of anti-Western narratives, including claims about a "Global War Party" that is attempting to embroil Georgia into a war against Russia.[53]

History

edit

Political context

edit

By 2011, the United National Movement government led by the President Mikheil Saakashvili had become increasingly unpopular during its rule since 2004 for its neoliberal economic policy, extremely punitive criminal justice system and confrontational approach to Russia. The violent dispersal of 2007 and 2011 demonstrations, scandals such as the 2006 Sandro Girgvliani murder case and the loss of territories through the 2008 Russo-Georgian War contributed to the party's increasing loss of support among the general populace. A range of other infringements on privacy and legal rights in combination with intimidation and coercion of the business sector added to the grievances.[54]

Given this context, Bidzina Ivanishvili, an oligarch primarily known for charity work and contributions to public projects, decided to step out of the shadow and lead the political opposition against Saakashvili by uniting the opposition, mobilizing popular support and subsequently capitalizing on the public discontent.[55]

Foundation

edit
 
Bidzina Ivanishvili, founder and since 2023 the Honorary Chairman of Georgian Dream

In December 2011, Ivanishvili launched the Georgian Dream movement as a platform for his political activities and staged several mass demonstrations against the Saakashvili government. Four months later, on 21 April 2012, Georgian Dream was launched as a political party. Since Ivanishvili was not a Georgian citizen at the moment of the party's inaugural session, lawyer Manana Kobakhidze was elected as an interim, nominal chairman of the party.[56]

The party also included several notable people such as the politician Sozar Subari, former diplomat Tedo Japaridze, chess grandmaster Zurab Azmaiparashvili, writer Guram Odisharia and famed footballer Kakha Kaladze, which helped it consolidate support.[57] The name of the party was inspired by a rap song of Ivanishvili's son Bera.[58]

On 21 February 2012, Ivanishvili announced the formation of a coalition centered around his party, together with Republican Party of Georgia, Our Georgia – Free Democrats, and National Forum, pledging to increase welfare spending and to pursue a more pragmatic approach with Russia while maintaining a pro-Western and pro-NATO foreign policy.[59][60] In subsequent months, two other opposition parties joined the coalition: the Conservative Party of Georgia and Industry Will Save Georgia.[61]

First term: coalition rule (2012–2016)

edit

The six-party Georgian Dream coalition led by Ivanishvili successfully challenged the ruling United National Movement in the 2012 parliamentary election.[57][62] It won 54.97% of the vote, while UNM received 40.34%, granting the coalition a majority of 85 seats in parliament. The remaining 65 seats went to UNM.[63] President Saakashvili conceded the loss and pledged to support the constitutional process of forming a new government.[64] This was the first democratic transfer of power in Georgia.[65] The election also marked the beginning of the transition from a presidential system to a parliamentary system of government.[66]

 
Giorgi Margvelashvili and Bidzina Ivanishvili in 2013

On 25 October 2012, Ivanishvili was elected as the prime minister of Georgia. He had requested Saakashvili to step down as president, but the latter decided to complete his final term, which meant an uneasy political cohabitation throughout 2013.[67] The new government introduced the State Universal Healthcare Program, making emergency surgeries and childbirth free of charge, increased welfare spending, and initiated reforms on self-governance, law enforcement agencies, and agriculture.[68][69] Georgian Dream additionally began to persecute former government and opposition officials on charges of corruption, abuse of power, and torture.[70][71]

In October 2013, Georgian Dream nominated candidate Giorgi Margvelashvili won the presidential election in the first round with 61.1% of the vote. Saakashvili soon left the country amid threats that too would be persecuted.[70] Having looked over the transfer of power, Ivanishvili stepped down as prime minister, formally quitting the political arena, while running the government from behind the scenes.[72]

 
PM Giorgi Kvirikashvili with State Secretary John Kerry in Tbilisi

Ivanishvili was succeeded by Irakli Garibashvili, under whose tenure Georgia made major steps towards European Union integration. In June 2014 Georgia signed the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, both of which were initiated under the Saakashvili-led government. Meanwhile, cracks appeared within the Georgian Dream coalition. Free Democrats left the coalition in November 2014 when Defence Minister Irakli Alasania, a member of the party, was fired by Garibashvili.[73] Soon after becoming president, Margvelashvili's relations with the parliamentary wing of the party became strained as he was critical of what he saw as Georgian Dream's consolidation of power.[74] He was the first president in Georgia's history not to seek reelection for a second term.[75]

Prime Minister Garibashvili was succeeded in December 2015 by Giorgi Kvirikashvili, whose government focused on economic growth as well as strengthening relations with the West.[76] The European Commission recommended visa-free travel for the citizens of Georgia to the Schengen Area, with the European Council and the European Parliament giving the final approval in 2017.[77][78]

Second term: absolute majority (2016–2020)

edit

Prior to the 2016 parliamentary election, it was announced in March 2016 that the Georgian Dream coalition would be dissolved as its members decided to run separately in the election.[79] Following this, the National Forum left the Georgian Dream parliamentary majority in April 2016, while four other parties formally remained in the majority group until the election.[80]

Despite the coalition falling apart, Kvirikashvili led Georgian Dream to a landslide victory in the 2016 Georgian parliamentary election, winning a constitutional majority of 115 seats out of 150. Utilizing their supermajority, Georgian Dream made grand amendments to the constitution, such as completing the transition to a parliamentary system and the abolition of the direct presidential elections.[81]

 
President Zourabichvili in 2019

In April 2018, Ivanishvili returned to politics when he was appointed the chairman of the Georgian Dream party. His comeback was taken for granted as he had retained overwhelming sway over the party ever since his formal resignation in 2013.[82] Prime Minister Kvirikashvili suddenly resigned in June 2018, claiming "disagreements with the leader of the ruling party" as the reason for his resignation.[83] He was succeeded by a political newcomer Mamuka Bakhtadze.[84]

In August 2018, the Chairman of the Parliament Irakli Kobakhidze announced that the party would not nominate a candidate for the 2018 presidential elections. Instead, it would endorse the independent candidate Salome Zourabichvili.[85] After a stronger than expected performance from the opposition in the first round, Ivanishvili put together a scheme in which the debts of 600,000 Georgians would be written-off and covered by his charity, in an attempt to secure Zourabichvili's victory. It was considered "an unprecedented case of vote-bribing".[86] The government supported scheme was enough to boost Georgian Dream's popularity and give Zourabichvili a victory in the second round.[87]

Gavrilov's Night

edit

The summer of 2019 set off a prolonged period of political unrest and civil discontent with Georgian Dream's rule. On 20 June 2019, Parliament of Georgia hosted the Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy, an organization set up by the Greek parliament to unite Orthodox Christian lawmakers worldwide. With both Russia and Georgia being members of the organization, the Russian delegation arrived to take part in the session in the Georgian parliament. The session was opened with a speech from Sergei Gavrilov, a Russian lawmaker from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, whilst sitting in the chair of the Head of Parliament.[88]

 
Gavrilov's Night protests, day 2

Opposition members said it was denigrating of Georgian sovereignty and completely unacceptable that Gavrilov presided over a session in Georgian parliament, as a representative of the occupying power with a history of casting anti-Georgia votes.[89] The opposition called for protests in front of the parliament building. Some representatives of Georgian Dream said the action of Gavrilov was a provocation and claimed the session should have been chaired by the Greek deputy Anastasios Nerantzis. Gavrilov however, insisted he was instructed by the protocol service of Georgian parliament.[90][91]

 
PM Mamuka Bakhtadze in 2019

That same day, a large protest took place in front of Parliament, which was violently dispersed by the orders of Interior Minister Giorgi Gakharia. It became known as Gavrilov's Night. Georgian Dream leader Ivanishvili said the protest was legitimate, but the situation was exploited by the opposition parties to storm the parliament building, thus the police measures were necessary to prevent a coup.[92] The protests continued for months, demanding electoral reforms, snap elections, and resignations from the ruling party. Despite some concessions from Georgian Dream, such as the resignation of the chairman of parliament and the partial electoral amendments, the protests did not stop.[93][94][95]

On 2 September 2019, Bakhtadze resigned from his position as prime minister. In a letter he published on Facebook, he stated that he "decided to resign because I believe I have fulfilled my mission at this point".[96] Ivanishvili personally nominated Gakharia as his replacement, praising him for his ability to manage crises. The opposition boycotted Gakharia's confirmation vote.[97]

Third term: Tensions with the West (2020–present)

edit
 
The cabinet of PM Giorgi Gakharia in 2020

Prime Minister Gakharia presided over the government's initially swift handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. It helped the party regain the support it had lost in the aftermath of the Gavrilov's Night scandal. Georgian Dream was able to re-create its 2016 performance in the popular vote but lost 25 seats under the amended electoral system. The number of single-mandate majoritarian districts was reduced and the threshold was lowered from 5% to 1%, to create a more proportional system, an internationally mediated compromise as a result of the protests.[98] The opposition decried the results as illegitimate and responded by organizing protests and refusing to participate in the new parliament.[99]

The OSCE-ODIHR election observation mission in its preliminary conclusions noted that the elections "were competitive and, overall, fundamental freedoms were respected", but it also said that the "pervasive allegations of pressure on voters and blurring of the line between the ruling party and the state reduced public confidence in some aspects of the process".[100] On 11 January 2021, amidst the 2020–2021 Georgian political crisis, Ivanishvili announced that he was decisively leaving politics and resigned as Chairman of Georgian Dream, stating that "he had accomplished his goal".[101]

Garibashvili's return

edit
 
Irakli Gharibashvili in 2021

Gakharia resigned as Prime Minister in February 2021, citing his opposition to the court-ordered arrest of his political rival UNM leader Nika Melia on charges of organizing violence in the 2019 protests. He shortly announced his departure from Georgian Dream. Several MPs from Georgian Dream joined him to form the For Georgia party.[102] Garibashvili was selected as his successor, heading the Second Garibashvili government, who immediately ordered the arrest of Melia.[103]

On 19 April 2021, Georgian Dream and the opposition signed an agreement mediated by Charles Michel, President of the European Council, which ended the six-month political crisis that stemmed from the contested 2020 parliamentary election. The agreement stipulated snap parliamentary elections if Georgian Dream would garner less than 43% of the vote in the October 2021 local elections. Most parties signed the agreement and most of the elected opposition MPs took up their parliamentary mandates which they had refused until then. However, the largest opposition party United National Movement refused to join the agreement, which led Georgian Dream to withdraw from the agreement two months before the 2021 local elections. According to the head of the Georgian Dream party Irakli Kobakhidze, the agreement "failed to accomplish its goals" because UNM refused to join it.[104][105]

Georgian Dream managed to secure victory in the 2021 local elections, gaining 46.75% of the vote. The mayoral candidates from Georgian Dream won in all municipalities except Tsalenjikha. However, the party lost its majority in 7 out of 64 municipal assemblies.[106]

Russian invasion of Ukraine

edit
 
Georgian Dream Faction in Georgian Parliament after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Georgian Dream aided Ukraine by providing humanitarian assistance and sheltering refugees, while also consistently supporting it at the diplomatic level.[107][108] As such, 245,000 refugees from Ukraine have crossed into Georgia, primarily from the heavily war-affected areas in the Eastern Ukraine.[109] The Georgian government responded by providing temporary accommodation and access to healthcare and education.[110] However, it did not join economic sanctions imposed on Russia by several Western countries and refused to provide military assistance to Ukraine.[111] Prime Minister Garibashvili argued in 2023 that sanctioning Russia would harm Georgia more than Russia, due to its dependence on Russian trade rather than vice versa.[e][112] He also accused the West of double standards, as it did not impose sanctions in 2008 when Georgia was invaded by Russia, and continuing "business as usual".[113]

Ever since the start of the war, Georgia has seen an increase in trade with Russia. Exports to Russia rose by 7% in 2022 while imports increased by 79%, making Georgia economically more reliant on Russia, as opposed to the trade between the EU and Russia, which decreased to a third of its original volume, with Russia's share in the EU's imports having fallen from 9.5% to 1.7%.[114][115] Additionally, the trade between the two countries rapidly grew in 2023 as well.[116] While Georgia did not take part in the economic sanctions against Russia, it initially did "act fully in accordance with the financial sanctions" imposed by the United States and others.[117] In 2024 reports surfaced however that the National Bank of Georgia was facilitating Russian importers to avoid Western financial sanctions by settling accounts in rubles.[116]

Russia abolished the visa regime for Georgians in May 2023 and lifted flight sanctions that were in place since July 2019.[118] Direct flights resumed within a few weeks, despite European and American objections.[119] Georgian Dream officials strongly defended the resumption of flights "as a step in the interests of the Georgian state and people".[120] The US ambassador to Georgia said the step undermined European sanctions and travel restrictions against Russia, by providing a "gateway for Russians to flood Europe".[121]

EU candidacy

edit
 
Georgian Dream celebrating the EU candidate status, 15 December 2023

During the 2020 election campaign, Georgian Dream pledged to apply for membership in the European Union in 2024. When Ukraine announced its application four days after the start of the Russian invasion, Georgian opposition politicians called for the country to do the same.[122] However, Georgian Dream reacted reluctantly, saying that not all commitments to apply had been fulfilled yet, and that Ukraine's case was rather a "political gesture" by the European Union amid the Ukraine war, a case that would not have applied to Georgia as it was not in the war. Thus, the party initially said that it would stick to its original schedule.[123] Nonetheless, it soon yielded to the pressure from the public and announced on 2 March 2022 to apply for EU membership, citing "the changed situation in the world".[124][125]

The relations with the EU soon deteriorated, a process that had already started when Garibashvili returned as Prime Minister in 2021. On 9 June 2022, the European Parliament adopted a six-page resolution that accused the government of Georgia of eroding press freedom in the country. It also recommended the European Council to sanction Ivanishvili for "his role in the deterioration of the political process in Georgia", the "level of control he exerts over the government and its decisions, including those on the politically motivated persecution of journalists and political opponents", and his "exposed personal and business links to the Kremlin, which determine the position of the current Government of Georgia towards sanctions on Russia".[126] In the same month, the European Union granted candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, but postponed it for Georgia, citing the need for reforms by the ruling party.[127]

In the second half of her tenure, President Zourabichvili became increasingly alienated from Georgian Dream, as she criticized the government for what she described as the lack of commitment to the EU candidacy and limited support to Ukraine. In response, the government of PM Garibashvili denounced the President on a few occasions for traveling abroad where she planned to visit Brussels and Paris without government authorization.[128] In the fall of 2023 Georgian Dream alleged Zourabichvili had violated the Constitution with these actions, but ultimately failed to impeach her due to lack of parliamentary support from the opposition.[129][130]

In December 2023, the EU granted Georgia candidate status and it first and foremost congratulated the Georgian people instead of the government.[131] Nevertheless, the Georgian Dream government had only fulfilled 3 out of the 12 priorities it got from the EU to earn the candidate status.[132]

On 30 December 2023 Ivanishvili declared his return to politics.[133] A month later, Garibashvili announced his resignation as Prime Minister, citing the importance of inter-party democracy and the need to "give others a chance". Garibashvili became the Chairman of the Georgian Dream party, while Irakli Kobakhidze replaced him as Prime Minister.[134]

"Global War Party"

edit
 
Irakli Kobakhidze who has frequently advanced the "Global War Party" conspiracy theory

Shortly after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, several Ukrainian officials made remarks suggesting Georgia and Moldova to open a "second front" against Russia.[135][136] Georgian Dream officials have heavily criticized those remarks, stating that a war with Russia would cause significant harm to Georgia.[137] Georgian Dream MP Gia Volski called on the EU and US to "distance themselves" from statements from some Ukrainian officials to "see Georgia engage in war".[138]

Soon after, Georgian Dream's rhetoric turned conspiratorial accusing the so-called "Global War Party" of being behind such calls with which several pro-Western opposition parties are allegedly affiliated.[139][140] The party has recently expanded the conspiracy theory to accuse the alleged organization of being behind the attempted assassination of Robert Fico and Donald Trump.[141][142][143] Kobakhidze has further alleged threats on his life as well as a plot to topple his government.[144][145] The Western officials has dismissed the government's claims, with the US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs James C. O'Brien referring to it as "Reddit page coming to life".[146]

Meanwhile, in 2022 a total of nine MPs left the Georgian Dream parliamentary faction to establish People's Power party. The MPs maintained their support for the government and are a part of the parliamentary majority. They explain their reasons for leaving as not being given the freedom to speak "the truth about the West" and its officials. The MPs expressed strong anti-western sentiments and spread conspiracy theories such as that in exchange for EU candidate status, the West ordered Georgia to partially give up its sovereignty and go to war with Russia.[147]

Foreign agent law

edit
 
Protest held on 8 March 2023

In March 2023, Georgian Dream supported the drafting of a so-called law on 'foreign agents' which was presented by the People's Power party. Supporters of the bill have argued that it is needed to prevent foreign influence in Georgian politics and uphold the country's sovereignty.[148] The law would label civil society and media organizations that receive more than 20% of their total funding from abroad as "foreign agents", similar to legislation introduced in Russia in 2012. Subsequently, it was denounced as a "Russian law" by the Georgian opposition and civil society. The proposed law was also criticized by the US State Department, the United Nations, and the European Union as it would stigmatize civil society and independent media organizations.[149] Major protests in March 2023 after forced Georgian Dream to pull its hands from the bill, promising they would not attempt to revive the legislation.[150] However, the promise was short-lived as Georgian Dream reintroduced and passed the 'foreign agent' bill in the spring of 2024.[151]

 
Standoff with the riot police during a protest held on 30 April 2024

The step triggered the largest protests in Georgia's post-independence history as well as widespread condemnation from Western officials, with President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen writing "the law on foreign influence transparency goes against core principles & values of the EU", the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell called the bill "incompatible with EU values and standards" and Danish Foreign Ministry bluntly stating "Georgia will not advance on the path to EU membership".[152][153] Afterwards, President Salome Zourabichvili referred to the ruling party as the "Russian Dream".[154]

 
A protestor after being beaten by riot police

The government has been widely condemned for the use of excessive and disproportionate force when dispersing protests.[155][156] Riot police has been accused of consistent use of violence and torture against protestors as well as opposition political figures, including UNM Chair Levan Khabeishvili as well as the Citizens chair Aleko Elisashvili.[157][158][159][160] Even though the law enforcement has claimed to have opened a case into the claims of the use of excessive force, no police officer has been charged yet.[157] Furthermore, Prime Minister Kobakhidze has thanked Georgian police for handling protests with "higher standards" than in Europe or the United States. He did, however, single out "a few isolated incidents".[161]

Georgian Dream has been accused of deploying what its critics are calling Titushkys. The so-called Titushkys have taken part in mass beatings of opposition, civil society, and protestors,[162][163][164][165] damaging and defacing the opposition parties and NGO's offices,[166][167] and disrupting public events organized by the opposition.[168] The opposition has accused the government of being directly involved in the violence, a claim that was virtually admitted by the Georgian Dream lawmaker Dito Samkharadze.[169][170][167] While investigations have started no charges have been given out.[171][172]

Sanctions against Georgian Dream

edit

United States Senate in May 2024 considered a bipartisan Georgia sanctions bill that would target the Georgian Dream lawmakers, their families, and others who "have material responsibility for undermining or injuring democracy, human rights, or security in Georgia".[173] Similar sanctions as well as suspension of visa-free travel for the country have been pushed by several EU countries.[174] Mamuka Mdinaradze, the parliamentary majority leader, has stated that threatening Georgian officials with sanctions over passing legislation is unacceptable and instead asked the US to take steps that will strengthen Georgia-US partnership, like the introduction of free economic relations, visa liberalization, and direct flights with Georgia.[175] The party has accused the United States of conducting a "policy of blackmail, intimidation".[176]

On 6 June the United States announced sanctions against Members of the Georgian Dream party, members of Parliament, law enforcement, private citizens, along their immediate family members, "responsible for or complicit in undermining democracy in Georgia, such as undermining the freedom of peaceful assembly and association, violently attacking peaceful protesters, intimidating civil society representatives, and deliberately spreading disinformation at the direction of the Georgian government".[46]

2024 parliamentary election

edit
 
Georgian Dream electoral billboard 'Only with peace, dignity, and prosperity to Europe'

Ahead of the 2024 parliamentary election Georgian Dream announced that it along with its more explicit anti-Western offshoot People's Power would run on the same list.[177][178] Georgian Dream presented the election as a choice between "war and peace, moral degradation and traditional values, Georgia's subservience to external powers and an independent and sovereign state". The party promised to ban "LGBT propaganda" and change the constitution in ways that it sees could make reunification with the separatist territories easier.[179]

Georgian Dream has urged its supporters to grant them a constitutional majority, promising to use it to initiate a ban on the "collective National Movement", a term they use to refer to nearly all the major pro-Western parties, and declare them unconstitutional. The party has gone on to specify the term includes United National Movement, Strategy Agmashenebeli, European Georgia, Ahali, Girchi – More Freedom, Droa, Lelo for Georgia, For the People, Citizens, Freedom Square, and For Georgia. Georgian Dream justifies the ban by accusing the parties of collaborating with UNM, which GD considers to have committed crimes during its rule, such as "dragging country in the 2008 war with Russia" and instituting "the system of violence and torture". The party has compared the process to the Nuremberg trials.[180][181][182][183] Analysts have warned that, if implemented, this move would mark "the end of Georgia's democracy".[184][185]

Ideology

edit

Despite positioning itself as a centre-left party,[186][187] Georgian Dream has governed amorphously and lacks a clear ideology like many parties of power.[188][189] Georgian Dream was initially considered a 'big tent' party, based on the different political strains that were present within the party, including social democracy, market liberalism and social conservatism.[187] Its origins as an all-encompassing front in opposition to the United National Movement government contributed to the opaque political ideology. Georgian political scientist Levan Lortkipanidze described Georgian Dream as "a party which is held together through loyalty to its charismatic leader and the opposition to the government of the 'Rose Revolution'" (UNM).[188] Ivanishvili's form of government in the early years was described as "popular oligarchy".[190] The party has been described as adhering to the "ideology-free" technocratic populism: transcending right–left ideological landscape.[3]

Lately, Georgian Dream has been characterized as being more ideologically consistent. It is commonly labeled as conservative,[191] ultraconservate,[195] national conservative,[198] or populist.[201] Its style of governance has been widely described as illiberal,[217] autocratic,[221] as well as authoritarian.[233] Additionally, allegations of democratic backsliding are common.[238] Its foreign policy is frequently described as anti-Western,[245] Eurosceptic,[246] and pro-Russian.[255] Political analyst and a former member of Georgian Dream Paata Zakareishvili, has described the party as "undemocratic but not anti-democratic, not Western but not anti-Western, not Russian but not anti-Russian."[256] Georgian Dream leaders maintain the party's official goal of Western integration stating that Georgia will become "a member of the big family called Europe with our own identity and sovereignty".[257] Shalva Papuashvili, Georgian Dream's chair of parliament, has positioned the party as the only political force in Georgia "merging Europeanism and patriotism".[258]

During its first election, Georgian Dream was described as the conciliatory alternative to the more resolutely anti-Russian government of Saakashvili.[259] The party strived to join the European Union and NATO, while at the same time building balanced and friendly relations with Russia.[260][261] Illiberal forces within the party gained the upper hand since mid-2019 in practice abandoning the officially expressed pro-European course in favor of a soft Eurosceptic approach of "joining the EU whilst playing by Georgian rules".[266] Political analysts describe this ideological shift in Georgian Dream as sovereigntism,[267] closely associated with Hungary and particularly Viktor Orbán, who has become Georgian Dream's key ally and ideological influence, fueling the "Orbanization of Georgia".[270]

Economic policy

edit

Georgian Dream espouses centre-left fiscal views combined with a number of centre-right economic policies. According to the Georgian Institute of Politics, Georgian Dream's economic policy by 2017 was a combination of the pre-existing free market model, created by their predecessor United National Movement party, with a comprehensive social safety net.[187] The party supports welfare state expansion.[271] Its social policies included the introduction of universal healthcare and a new labor code. However, a number of left-wing activists viewed the party as "ideologically amorphous", while Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili described himself as "more of a centre-right politician".[272]

In 2017, Georgian Dream deputies supported the removal of the constitutional ban on progressive taxation and the requirement to hold a referendum to raise corporate and income tax rates. These provisions were implemented in 2011 by the former ruling UNM party through its Economic Liberty Act. The proposal to amend the law was opposed by business groups and the political opposition, after which a compromise was reached that the ban would remain in place until 2029.[273]

The party also professed a commitment to "economic openness" and "market-driven growth", implementing both social democratic and neoliberal policies. The 2020 election manifesto contained a mix of centre-left and centre-right policies, with the main message being 'effective' government and 'social prosperity'.[43] The economic section of the 2020 election manifesto advocated the continuation of low taxes, free market, small government, and less regulation, effectively positioning itself more towards the centre-right.[274]

During his address to the Georgian Parliament in February 2021, Prime Minister-designate Irakli Garibashvili criticized the idea of a minimal state and the "invisible hand of the market". He said the "small state idea is a myth impeding the country's development" and called on the government to play an active role in the economy, emphasizing that Georgia should become economically more self-sufficient.[44] He criticized the previous government for its free-market approach to economics. The speech was described as "a remarkable rhetorical break from Georgian political orthodoxy", which was more or less always supportive of the free market economics and economic non-interventionism since its introduction by UNM and continuation by Georgian Dream.[275]

Social policy

edit

Despite the fact that Georgian Dream has always espoused rather conservative social views, the party has experienced a notable right-wing shift, with the party being accused of adopting far-right ideas on LGBT rights and other social and cultural issues.[276][15] The party is described as having progressive green values as well as a liberal position on the rights of ethnic minorities.[271]

LGBT rights

edit

Even though Georgian Dream had a largely socially conservative and religious base, as many priests of the Georgian Orthodox Church supported the party coming to power in 2012, Georgian Dream initially had a relatively liberal approach to LGBT rights.[277] Prior to a rally to mark the International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia in May 2013, Prime Minister Ivanishvili openly defended LGBT rights by saying they "have the same rights as any other social groups" in Georgia and that "society will gradually get used to it".[278] In a highly conservative and religious society, Ivanishvili became the first Georgian politician to openly make such statement.[277] However, the party failed to stop the rally being violently disrupted by tens of thousands of anti-gay protesters led by Orthodox Church clergy.[279]

As precondition for Georgia to obtain relaxed visa procedures with the European Union, the Georgian Dream government passed an anti-discrimination law in 2014,[280][281] which also provided protection against discrimination of sexual minorities, making Georgia the most LGBT-friendly country in the South Caucasus.[282] The law was highly criticized by the Georgian Orthodox Church.[283]

However, Georgian Dream opposes same-sex marriage in Georgia. In response to conservative criticism of the anti-discrimination law, Georgian Dream proposed to put a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage, despite an existing implicit ban in the Civil Code.[284] Prime Minister Garibashvili said this step was necessary to avoid confusion in society that the anti-discrimination law granted any new rights or privileges to any group and that it would lead to same-sex marriages in the future.[285] The constitution was eventually amended in 2018, defining marriage as "a union between a woman and a man for the purpose of creating a family".[286]

Over time, the party has grown more conservative and outspoken against what they perceive as "LGBT-propaganda" and has been accused of using homophobia as a political tool.[287] In July 2021, Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili argued against holding the gay parade on Rustaveli Avenue in Tbilisi as "unreasonable", offering alternative locations, saying it contains the risk of "civil confrontation" as the majority of the populace finds such a parade "unacceptable".[288] The parade was cancelled when the authorities did not provide safety guarantees.[289] Garibashivili's remarks prompted thousands of far-right radicals to attack the Tbilisi Pride office, activists and journalists, which led to dozens being injured.[290] Garibashvili dismissed the attack as "very unfortunate", but said that "violence happens everywhere", for which Tbilisi Pride criticized him as "homophobic" and "anti-state".[291]

Two years later, the party denounced "LGBT propaganda among children" and blamed it for increasing numbers of people who identify as LGBT in Western countries. In a speech at the ultra-conservative CPAC-conference, Garibashvili spoke of the importance of preserving "traditional values" and the inadmissibility of "violence by the minority against the majority" in a denunciation of "aggressive propaganda" as a tool to forcefully change the traditional values of the majority.[292][293]

Georgian Dream introduced constitutional amendments in 2024 to "protect family values and minors" and to allow marriage only of "a union of a single genetic male and a single genetic female", narrowing the marriage rights on top of the already existing ban on same-sex marriage. The amendments would further prohibit what the party calls "LGBT propaganda", gender transition and adoption of children by same-sex couples.[294]

Drug policy

edit

Georgian Dream has a liberal policy regarding marijuana.[295] In June 2017, the Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili scrupulously expressed his support for drug liberalization, saying that harsh drug policy goes against human rights.[296] However, the government made little progress on the reform, arguably because of its largely socially conservative base and influence of Georgian Orthodox Church in the country, which spurred the 2018 Georgian protests following a nightclub raid over illegal drug trade. As a result of a lawsuit by the members of Girchi party, the Constitutional Court of Georgia legalized the personal use of marijuana. Thus, the constitutional court spearheaded the reform promised by the prime minister.[296] Georgia became the first country the first post-Soviet country to legalize the consumption of marijuana.[297]

On 11 September 2018, it became known that Georgian Dream was considering a draft law to legalize medical marijuana cultivation and production.[298] However, the idea was abandoned following strong protests from the Georgian Orthodox Church. Therefore, while personal use of cannabis is legal in Georgia, large-scale cultivation and sale of cannabis is illegal.[299]

Gender equality

edit

The party had an ambiguous position on gender equality. In 2017, the party voted in favor of the ratification of the Istanbul Convention in Georgia and it launched an amendment to the Election Code introducing gender quota. This would require political parties that participate in elections to include women in every fourth position on their party lists, in order to increase female representation in politics. However, the initiative failed to pass through parliament.[300] Ahead of the 2020 Georgian parliamentary election, the gender quota for political parties was adopted, albeit under pressure of the European Union and the OSCE.[301][302] Further amendments to extend and expand the quota were adopted in February 2023.[303] However, in 2024 Georgian Dream backtracked on its earlier position and supported the initiative of the right-libertarian Girchi party to repeal the gender quota legislation.[304][305]

Green policy

edit

The party has consistently projected a progressive image on environmental issues.[306] The party advocates for banning old cars for their high carbon emissions and introducing a corporate green tax for businesses that cause environmental pollution.[271][307] Kakha Kaladze, the mayor of Tbilisi, has highlighted the importance of taking some "unpopular steps" in order to improve the existing ecological situation and create green spaces.[308] Nevertheless, some green activists have questioned the party's environmentalist credentials.[309]

Foreign policy

edit

On foreign policy, Georgian Dream positions itself in favor of joining NATO and the European Union, which the far majority of Georgians support,[310] while at the same time "restoring friendly relations with Russia", as outlined by Ivanishvili in January 2013.[261] However, the party's commitment to Euro-Atlantic aspirations is consistently questioned as is its alleged pivot towards Russia.[311][312][313]

European Union and NATO

edit
 
Semi-torn Georgian Dream election posters stating "fatherland, language, faith" at the top and "with dignity to Europe" at the bottom.

Although proclaiming a pro-European agenda, since the 2020s Georgian Dream's actual policy on the European Union has been described as Eurosceptic.[12][21][22][23] The party has positioned itself as combining Western values and Georgian traditional values, as well as being in favor of the European integration while safeguarding Georgia from what it considers as unnecessary and excessive encroachment on its sovereignty from the European institutions.[314][315] Critics have denounced this as "doublethink", stating the party says "they favor accession to the European Union, but their actions aim to purge EU values from the country".[316]

In its first ruling term, Georgian Dream achieved significant steps towards European integration, such as an Association Agreement and visa-free travel to the Schengen Area.[f] In its second ruling term, Georgian Dream focused on integration rather than accession of Euro-Atlantic structures as end-goal, in a "realistic" adjustment of its foreign policy.[187] However, the more Georgia advanced with European integration, requiring the need for judicial, rule of law, and anti-corruption reforms, the more strained the party's relationship with the EU leaders became.[317] This converged with increasing anti-western propaganda by Georgian Dream leaders, piloting what some consider pro-Russian narratives, "seemingly designed to offend" its Western partners.[318] The adoption of legislation which has been declared incompatible with EU membership on multiple occasions by the EU,[319] such as the "foreign agents" bill, is considered deliberate sabotage of the accession process by Georgian Dream.[6][320][321][322]

The party's official position regarding the European Union and its accession process is that it plans to make Georgia part of the European Union with the Georgian government "playing by Georgian rules" and maintaining its dignity.[262] The party has presented its view of the West and the European Integration in illiberal terms, claiming the support for the basic tenets of the constitutional democracy as the defining factors of the Western civilization, while opposing the "pseudo-liberal" agenda promoted by the NGOs and other "forces, which are challenging our national identity, traditions and the Georgian churches, as well as the forces, which are challenging the very same values in the U.S.", which "are unacceptable for us".[323] Irakli Kobakhidze maintained that Georgia "will become a member of the European Union with dignity, independence, freedom and sovereignty".[324] Amid discussion of the foreign agent law in 2023, Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili said that "time of Georgian authorities serving foreign interests is over", in particular, he denounced "MEPs and some corrupt bureaucrats" for their efforts to "dictate their rules to the Georgian people".[325] Georgian Dream members often criticize what they consider as unfair treatment from the European Union, such as the EU's rejection of Georgia's membership application in June 2022, which the PM Garibashvili called an "unfair decision". Garibashvili said that Georgia is ahead of both Moldova and Ukraine, which were granted the EU candidacy, in terms of reforms and performance, and that while Georgia was required the judicial, rule of law, and anti-corruption reforms before receiving the EU candidacy, Moldova and Ukraine were also given these priorities but they received the EU candidacy in advance.[326] The Georgian Dream officials often lament the EU for what they consider as the "lack of merit-based approach" regarding Georgia, instead being driven by what they consider as the unacceptable "political agenda".[327][328][329]

Georgian Dream has often criticized the EU and US for conducting foreign interference in Georgian domestic politics. As such, Garibashvili referred to Mikheil Saakashvili as "European Parliament's agent" who they wanted to see return to power and passed "shameful" resolutions to support Saakashvili, while "disregarding the opinion of the Georgian people" about Saakashvili who "tortured [and] killed people, terrorised the business and completely suppressed the media freedom".[325] In response to the comments made by the Western ambassadors that Georgia must not pass the foreign influence law, such as the statement by the United States ambassador Kelly C. Degnan that Georgia "does not need this law",[330] PM Kobakhidze slammed the "foreign diktat" and challenged foreign ambassadors to a TV debate. He stated that the ambassadors "are trying to assume the functions of the legislator, participate in the legislative process and dictate to the supreme body of the representative democracy which laws it should pass or not".[331] Kobakhidze further opined that Georgia will become a member of the European Union only as a part of a "unity of sovereign states".[332]

At first, Georgian Dream pursued NATO membership for Georgia, but in line with its political development, the party effectively abandoned this policy since 2020, which became most visible after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[333][334] In 2023 at the Global Security Forum, Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili blamed NATO enlargement as "one of the main reasons for Ukraine war".[334] Garibashvili later defended the statement by saying that he did not blame NATO for the war with this statement, but rather said that a desire to join NATO was the reason for war, and claimed that his statement was similar to that made by Ursula von der Leyen when she said that Ukraine was under attack for its desire to be part of "European family".[335][336]

Russia

edit

Georgian Dream's policy towards Russia is subject to debate among political analysts with some describing their approach as cautious, while a number of analysts see the party moving Georgia into the "Russian orbit".[339][340] In recent years, Georgian Dream has been widely described as pro-Russian.[341] However, the party rebukes this characterization and outlines their policy as "pragmatic and principled" describing their doctrine as "strategic patience".[342][343]

Georgian Dream supports the normalization of relations with the Russian Federation, strained after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. The party has stressed the importance of Georgia having "normal, peaceful relations" with its "largest neighbor" aimed at "avoiding harm to Georgia [and] its citizens".[343][344] In terms of normalization, the party has highlighted an economic and trade dimension rather than a political one.[345][346] During the 2012 election campaign the party vowed to restore economic relations with Russia hampered by the 2006 Russian ban of Moldovan and Georgian wines, citing the importance of the Russian market for Georgian citizens working in the wine industry as Russia was responsible for 80–90% of the total wine exports from Georgia before the ban. Nevertheless, Ivanishvili has ruled out Georgia joining the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union.[347]

In the political dimension, Georgia under the Georgian Dream party continued to have no diplomatic relations with Russia (with diplomatic relations being broken after the 2008 war and Georgia being the one among only five UN members to have no diplomatic relations with Russia along with Ukraine, Bhutan, the Solomon Islands, and Micronesia).[348] The party has also condemned the 2014 Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and Russian invasion of Ukraine.[349] According to some political commentators, the party supports "civilizational" and military alignment with the West rather than with Russia, however, its approach is not based on harsh anti-Russian rhetoric and uncompromising pro-Western policy, promising to combine pro-Western orientation with "normalization of relations" with Russia.[350]

In return Georgian Dream has been described by all major pro-Western opposition parties as pro-Russian. In the 2012 parliamentary election Ivanishvili was painted by the government as a "Russian stooge" and some analysts described the party as a "Russian project".[259][351] The critics claimed that the party's lax stance on Russia was proof of the government's pro-Russian politics.[352] The government's political and economic rapprochement with Russia, its increasing anti-western rhetoric, and the passing of the "foreign agents" bill, are viewed by a number of analysts and the opposition, including the President Salome Zourabichvili, as further proof of the party being pro-Russian and under the influence of Russia.[154][313][316][318][353][354]

Georgian Dream however dismisses the "pro-Russian" labeling, claiming that their approach is focused on a balancing act between Russia and other regional powers intended to maintain peace and stability in Georgia.[355][356] Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili described this in 2023 as "navigating through the turbulent situation to survive".[326] Critics of this position have called the approach "attractive and tempting in theory", but "unrealistic and superfluous" in reality.[357]

The launching of the normalization of relations was signified by the first two-way meeting of Russian and Georgian officials after the 2008 war held in Prague in December 2012. A "pragmatic" policy towards Russia, has been welcomed by Moscow.[358] However, since the Georgian Dream party opposed the restoration of formal diplomatic and political ties with Russia until the disputes with Russia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia were resolved,[359] a Georgian diploimat Zurab Abashidze was appointed as a Special Representative of the Georgian government to mend ties outside formal diplomatic relations by meeting periodically with his Russian counterpart Grigory Karasin on neutral ground in Prague.[360] The "Prague Format" of Russia-Georgia relations was not meant to facilitate the resolution of disputes regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as both sides remained at odds over these issues.[361] Abashidze emphasized that the question of its territorial integrity is Georgia's "red line" on which no concession is conceivable.[362] The Prague Format was rather focused on a pragmatic process on matters of mutual interest that are unrelated to the breakaways.[361]

The Georgian Dream government has also pressed for dialogue with Russia on the issue of breakaway regions, as the Georgian Dream party has stressed that the only viable option to solve the disputes is through negotiations.[363] In particular, the Georgian government asked Russia to include the issue of breakaway regions during the bilateral talks in 2014 and 2015,[361] while Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili has publicly appealed to the Russian government in 2018 for "reasonable steps for bringing the Georgian-Russian relations out of a vicious circle" caused by the 2008 war, which he called a "dramatic development that has left a deep imprint on the consciousness of the Georgian people and on the Russian-Georgian relations". He also criticized the previous government's policy as harming the prospects of normalizing relations, commenting that "even the slightest change of [policy] is regarded as treason by this so-called opposition".[364]

Georgian Dream officials have been particularly critical of what they consider as Saakashvili's confrontational approach to Russia, which Ivanishvili denounced for bringing only "negative results".[365] The party's official stance regarding the 2008 Russo-Georgian war is that it was provoked by the Saakashvili government. The party officials have accused UNM of committing treason against the Georgian people by provoking the 2008 war with Russia. Moreover, Ivanishvili elaborated that the war was "ordered from outside" by the Global War Party with UNM being its agents.[366][367][368] Ivanishvili has accused the previous government of "engulfing Ossetian people in the flames of fire" calling on Georgia to apologize for the war. The party has additionally promised to hold the "Nuremberg trials" against UNM for "starting the war".[369] Some analysts see Georgian Dream shifting the blame for the war to its opponent Saakashvili for the reason of normalizing relations with Russia.[370]

Ukraine

edit

Georgia–Ukraine relations became strained soon after Georgian Dream came to power. The primary conflict had to do with ex-President Mikheil Saakashvili being granted Ukrainian citizenship and being placed in various governmental positions, while the Georgian government sought his extradition and prosecution for abuse of power, embezzlement, and his implication in the attempted murder of an opposition MP.[g] The dysfunctional relationship continued after the start of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, with the Ukrainian government calling on sanctions against Ivanishvili.[371][372]

Georgian Dream ruled out imposing economic sanctions on Russia and providing military aid to Ukraine but vowed to support Ukraine in the diplomatic arena.[373] Nikoloz Samkharadze, Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee of Georgian Parliament argued Georgia is restricted to do more by the presence of Russian troops on its territory, not far from the capital.[374] Prime Minister Garibashvili allured to western hypocrisy by recalling that in the aftermath of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War no sanctions were imposed by the Western countries on Russia.[363]

When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, Georgian Dream imposed sanctions on Russian-annexed Crimea, which mirrored Ukraine's restrictions on trade and financial transactions with Georgia's breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and was meant to signal Georgia's support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine. However, it did not impose sanctions on Russia proper to avoid tensions and its reciprocal steps which would have undermined relations.[361]

International affiliation

edit

Since its inception Georgian Dream affiliated with European and global social democratic umbrella organizations, but in 2023 the ties were severed due to the divergent ideological development of the party in relation to the political values of these umbrella organizations. According to Georgian political analysts, Georgian Dream has never taken its international political relations seriously.[375]

At the global level, Georgian Dream was a member of the Progressive Alliance, the global umbrella organization of social democratic parties. However, the two silently parted ways sometime in the summer of 2023.[376] Until 29 June 2023, Georgian Dream was an observer member of the Party of European Socialists (PES), the pan-European social democratic party, when it was expelled from it.[27] The increasingly illiberal policies of Georgian Dream strained the relationship with PES, which began to review the partnership with GD by April 2023.[377]

 
Garibashvili on CPAC Hungary, May 2023

The final drop for PES was the opening speech of Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili at the conference of the conservative Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Budapest on 4 May 2023. On the same day PES released a statement denouncing the participation of the Georgian Prime Minister in the CPAC conference, with PES Vice President Kati Piri stating "the actions of Prime Minister Garibashvili are unacceptable and place him completely outside the values of our political family".[378] Anticipating expulsion, GD turned around the narrative and announced it was leaving PES itself.[377] Explaining its decision, Georgian Dream argued that the "ideological transformation of PES is unacceptable and incompatible with the values of the party and the Georgian people",[377] and that PES allegedly moved away from "classical social-democratic ideology and switched to a pseudo-liberal platform".[379]

Leadership

edit

The party is led by the Chair, who is the leader of the party's political council. The current chairman is Irakli Garibashvili.

Party chairs

edit

Electoral performance

edit

Parliamentary

edit
Election Leader Votes % Seats +/– Position Status
2012 Bidzina Ivanishvili 1,184,612 54.97
41 / 150
new 2nd Parliamentary majority
As part of the Georgian Dream coalition, which won 85 seats
2016 Giorgi Kvirikashvili 857,394 48.65
115 / 150
[h]
  74   1st Constitutional majority
2020 Giorgi Gakharia 928,004 48.22
90 / 150
  25   1st Parliamentary majority
2024 Irakli Kobakhidze 1,119,946 53.93
89 / 150
[i]
  1   1st Parliamentary majority

Presidential

edit
Election year Candidate 1st round 2nd round
Votes % Rank Votes % Rank
2013 Giorgi Margvelashvili 1,012,569 62.12 1st
2018 endorsed Salome Zourabichvili 615,572 38.64 1st 1,147,701 59.52 1st

Local

edit
Election Votes % Seats +/– Position
2014 719 431 50.82
1,370 / 2,088
new 1st
2017 838 154 55.81
1,610 / 2,058
  240   1st
2021 824 755 46.75
1,358 / 2,068
  252   1st

Presidents of Georgia from Georgian Dream

edit
Name From To
Giorgi Margvelashvili 17 November 2013 16 December 2018

Prime Ministers of Georgia from Georgian Dream

edit
Name From To
Bidzina Ivanishvili 25 October 2012 20 November 2013
Irakli Gharibashvili 20 November 2013 30 December 2015
Giorgi Kvirikashvili 30 December 2015 13 June 2018
Mamuka Bakhtadze 20 June 2018 2 September 2019
Giorgi Gakharia 8 September 2019 18 February 2021
Irakli Gharibashvili 22 February 2021 29 January 2024
Irakli Kobakhidze 8 February 2024 Present

Notes

edit
  1. ^ Georgian: ქართული ოცნება – დემოკრატიული საქართველო, romanized: kartuli otsneba – demok'rat'iuli sakartvelo
  2. ^ This nickname is a portmanteau, combining parts of the words "ქართული ოცნება" (kartuli otsneba), meaning "Georgian Dream."
  3. ^ See ideology section for further detail.
  4. ^ See ideology section for further detail.
  5. ^ PM said that Georgia's share in Russia's foreign trade turnover is only 0.3%, while Russia is Georgia's main trade partner
  6. ^ See history for specific achievements
  7. ^ See Georgia–Ukraine relations for the full history
  8. ^ Three parties (CPG, GPG, and SDDG) ran their candidates on GD's ticket and received 9 seats.
  9. ^ People's Power ran its candidates on GD's ticket and received 6 seats.

References

edit
  1. ^ Kartozia, Marika (13 January 2021). "Ivanishvili recollects his entry into politics". First Channel. Ivanishvili founded the Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia party on 21 April 2012.
  2. ^ "პოლიტიკური პარტიების რეესტრი". National Agency of Public Registry of Ministry of Justice of Georgia.
  3. ^ a b c David Aprasidze, David S. Siroky: Technocratic Populism in Hybrid Regimes: Georgia on My Mind and in My Pocket, Politics Gov., Vol. 8, No. 4 (2020).
  4. ^ a b c d Nino Samkharadze (1 June 2023). "Georgian Dream's Populist Conservatism: Fight to Legitimise and Hold On to Power". Georgian Institute of Politics.
  5. ^ a b Joshua KuceraJoshua Kucera (10 June 2024). "Interview: Georgian Dream 'Likely' To Try To Steal Election, But Its Support Is Deeper Than Many Think". Radio Free Europe.
  6. ^ a b c "Georgia's EU bid is being sabotaged by its own government, Brussels fears". Politico. 12 April 2024.
  7. ^ a b c d Bidzina Lebanidze (11 March 2019). "Rise of Nationalist Populism in Georgia: Implications for European Integration". Georgian Institute of Politics.
  8. ^ a b c d e Ani Chkhikvadze (7 May 2024). "How Georgia Sided With Its Enemy". Foreign Policy.
  9. ^ a b "The dangerous illusion of the Georgian Dream's "multi-vectoral" foreign policy". Global News. 27 February 2024.
  10. ^ a b c d Tamta Mikeladze (21 July 2023). "The erosion of democracy or the pivoting of foreign policy?". Ostwest Monitoring.
  11. ^ a b "The government's populism regarding the Pride is unconstitutional and antisocial". Social Justice Center. 5 July 2021.
  12. ^ a b c d e f Natalie Sabanadze (17 May 2023). "Who Is Afraid of Georgian Democracy?". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  13. ^ [3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12]
  14. ^ a b c d e "Georgia – Parties, Parliaments and Polling Averages". Europe Elects.
  15. ^ a b c "Georgian Dream's Conservative Drift Now Targets Schools". Civil Georgia. 14 December 2023.
  16. ^ a b "DRI: Homophobia and Anti-Gender Rhetoric Integral to Georgian Dream's Ultra-Conservative Turn". Civil Georgia. 4 July 2024.
  17. ^ a b Emil Avdaliani (10 June 2024). "The Rise of Socially Conservative Georgia". Center for European Policy Analysis.
  18. ^ a b Stefano Arroque (16 October 2023). "Crossroads and icons". Eurasia Magazine.
  19. ^ [4][7][10][12][14][15][16][17][18]
  20. ^ Sabaleuskaya, Kseniya (11 May 2024). "New Prime Minister of Georgia. Can we expect some changes?". Brussels Morning Newspaper. He is a founder of the "Georgian Dream- Democratic Georgia" party, which is staying for social democracy, social market economy, and social conservatism, however, its politics is different from Mikheil Saakashvili's "United National Movement" party.
  21. ^ a b c Eanna Mackey (30 April 2024). "Anti-Russian Sentiment Escalates as Georgians Seek European Dream". CEPA.
  22. ^ a b c d e "Hungary's illiberal influence on Georgia's European integration: a worrying pattern". Georgian Foundation For Strategic and International Studies. 8 November 2023.
  23. ^ a b c d "Anti-Western statements made by Georgian Dream leaders are an attempt to avoid political responsibility". Democracy Research Institute. 17 February 2023.
  24. ^ Natalie Sabanadze (29 October 2024). "As the ruling party claims victory in Georgia's disputed election, Western condemnation is no longer enough". Chatham House.
  25. ^ [14][21][22][23][24]
  26. ^ "More Than a Techno Club: Bassiani as a Political Frontier of Georgia – Berkeley Political Review". 14 February 2024. Retrieved 24 October 2024.
  27. ^ a b "PES Presidency strips Georgian Dream of observer membership". Party of European Socialists. 29 June 2023. Retrieved 4 June 2024.
  28. ^ "GD Says it Departs PES Due to Ideological Differences". Civil Georgia. 11 May 2023. Retrieved 11 September 2023.
  29. ^ [27][28]
  30. ^ ""ქართული ოცნების" წინასაარჩევნო კამპანია ბიძინა ივანიშვილმა "გლობალური ომის პარტიის" კონსპირაციაზე საუბრით გახსნა". Civil Georgia. 17 July 2024.
  31. ^ "Mamuka Mdinaradze: Let's ensure that the risk of war is reduced to zero under the conditions of our government – only to Europe with dignity, dignity and prosperity – this is our slogan, motto and the path we should follow". Interpressnews. 14 September 2024.
  32. ^ Fahlman, Fredrik (2 April 2024). "For EU-hopeful Georgians, this year's most decisive election is in October". The Parliament Magazine. And with a five per cent threshold to enter parliament, the dozen smaller parties opposing the government are likely to be left out of the legislature, leaving only one party – the centre-right United National Movement – to stand against the centre-left Georgian Dream.
  33. ^ ESI Team (30 May 2024). "Georgia's 'Foreign Agents' Law: Explained". Eurasia Strategy Insights. Whilst fiscally centre-left, Georgian Dream campaigned on a socially conservative platform, aiming to preserve Georgian traditions and religious culture as opposed to submitting to the liberal behemoth of the EU.
  34. ^ Martin, Liam (1 August 2024). "Whither Europe? Illiberalism in Georgia and the dilemma of Eastern Enlargement". Young Security Conference. As the relationship between Georgian Dream (still nominally a centre-left party) and its partners in the Party of European Socialists has largely ended through its exit from the parliamentary bloc, GD could still count on Orbán's Hungary to advocate for the country's candidacy into the EU.
  35. ^ a b Urushadze, Maia; Kiknadze, Tamar (4 July 2021). "The Relevance of the Actual Values of the Political Actors of Georgia with the Ideologies Declared by Them" (PDF). Social Sciences in the 21st Century. 3. Oxford: 69. ... and the ruling party "Georgian Dream" (Pro-Europeanism, Social democracy, Third Way, Social liberalism, Conservatism, political position: Centre to Centre-left).
  36. ^ Reguly, Eric (21 March 2022). "Georgia fears becoming the next victim of Putin's apparent effort to recreate the Soviet empire". The Globe and Mail. Georgia's government, led by Irakli Garibashvili of the social democratic Georgian Dream party, is being exceedingly careful on the geopolitical and military files for fear of provoking a fight with Russia.
  37. ^ Benakis, Theodoros (15 May 2024). "'Foreign Agent' bill and Tax Code reform compromise Georgia's freedoms". European Interest. Founded by the oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, a friend of Putin, the Georgian Dream lacks a clear ideology. Despite being labelled by some European media as a "centre-left" party, its leadership has adopted far-right ideas.
  38. ^ "Bidzina Ivanishvili: Georgia's billionaire 'puppet master' betting the house on Moscow". BBC. 16 May 2024.
  39. ^ "Georgian Dream Coalition: Fragile Unity". The Jamestown. 17 January 2013. Retrieved 6 June 2024.
  40. ^ "Among the 5 parties that passed the threshold, 148 mandates were distributed with the so-called real votes, and 2 undistributed mandates were shared by "Georgian Dream" with the best result and Gvaramia-Melia coalition". Interpressnews. 29 October 2024.
  41. ^ "Bidzina Ivanishvili, foreign agent?". Voxeurop.
  42. ^ "More Than a Techno Club: Bassiani as a Political Frontier of Georgia – Berkeley Political Review". 14 February 2024. Retrieved 24 October 2024.
  43. ^ a b c Bidzina Lebanidze; Elguja Khokrishvili, Salome Kandelaki, Nino Samkharadze, Givi Silagadze (29 April 2021). "Report 2021 – The First 100 Days of Georgian Dream Government: Reality and Challenges". Georgian Institute of Politics. pp. 12, 14. Archived from the original on 4 June 2024. Retrieved 7 June 2024. In line with their election promises, the ideological platform of the party program is partially left-centrist: "effective" government and "social welfare" remain the main message of the program.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  44. ^ a b "PM-Designate Garibashvili Prioritizes "Order," State Intervention in Economy". Civil Georgia. 22 February 2021. Archived from the original on 9 June 2021. Retrieved 14 February 2022.
  45. ^ [14][43][44]
  46. ^ a b "BREAKING: US State Department Implements First Tranche of Sanctions against Georgian Individuals". Civil.ge. 6 June 2024.
  47. ^ a b "Freemasons and 'global war party' conspiring against Georgia, ruling party claims". Politico. 19 May 2024.
  48. ^ "Georgian Dream Takes On The 'Global War Party'". Radio Free Europe RFE/RL. 15 May 2024. Retrieved 6 June 2024.
  49. ^ a b Gabritchidze, Nini (31 August 2022). "The four horsemen of Georgia's anti-Western conspiracy". Eurasianet.
  50. ^ Shoshiashvili, Katie (31 May 2024). "Georgia's ruling party intensifies disinformation tactics amid 'foreign agent' law standoff". Euractiv.
  51. ^ Shoshiashvili, Tata (30 April 2024). "Ivanishvili touts conspiracy theories at massive pro-government rally in Tbilisi". OC Media.
  52. ^ "Ivanishvili Launches GD Campaign with "Global Party of War" Conspiracy as its Pivot". Civil Georgia. 16 July 2024.
  53. ^ [47][48][49][50][51][52]
  54. ^ "Mikheil Saakashvili's Polarizing Legacy". Radio Freedom. 24 October 2013. Retrieved 11 September 2022.
  55. ^ Shaun Walker (8 September 2012). "Bidzina Ivanishvili: The billionaire with a Georgian dream". Independent.
  56. ^ "პარტია ქართული ოცნება დაფუძნდა". Tabula. 22 April 2012.
  57. ^ a b "Ivanishvili's Political Party Launched". Civil Georgia. 21 April 2012. Retrieved 6 June 2024.
  58. ^ "Georgia on Brink: Odd Parliamentary Election Leads To Angst Over Results". International Herald Tribune. October 2012. Archived from the original on 6 December 2022. Retrieved 7 December 2012.
  59. ^ "Ivanishvili Unveils Core Team of His Planned Party". Civil Georgia. 15 February 2012. Retrieved 6 June 2024.
  60. ^ "A Crucial Election in Georgia". Carnegie Europe. 11 September 2012. Retrieved 6 June 2024.
  61. ^ "Industrialists Party Joins Ivanishvili-Led Coalition". Civil Georgia. 11 April 2012. Retrieved 6 June 2024.
  62. ^ "Opposition Victory Signals New Direction For Georgia". NPR National Public Radio. 2 October 2012. Archived from the original on 13 September 2022. Retrieved 13 September 2022.
  63. ^ Stephen Jones (2015). "Preface to the Paperback Edition". Georgia: A Political History Since Independence. I.B.Tauris. p. 117. ISBN 978-1-78453-085-3.
  64. ^ Barry, Ellen (2 October 2012). "Georgia's President Concedes Defeat in Parliamentary Election". The New York Times. Georgia (Georgian Republic). Archived from the original on 25 May 2018. Retrieved 7 December 2012.
  65. ^ Paul Rimple. "Georgia" (PDF). Freedom House.
  66. ^ Levan Kakhishvili (March 2020). "From a Presidential to a Parliamentary Government in Georgia" (PDF). Social Science Open Access Repository.
  67. ^ "Ivanishvili Wants Saakashvili to Resign". Civil Georgia. 3 October 2012. Retrieved 6 June 2024.
  68. ^ "Georgia hails billionaire Ivanishvili as new PM". Times of Malta. 26 October 2012. Retrieved 6 June 2024.
  69. ^ "დაიწყო საყოველთაო დაზღვევის პირველი ეტაპი". Radio Freedom. 28 February 2013. Retrieved 6 June 2024.
  70. ^ a b G. Melvyn Howe; David Marshall Lang. "Independent Georgia". Britannica.
  71. ^ "Justice or Injustice in Georgia?: The First 100 Days after the Power Transfer". JSTOR. 1 March 2013. Retrieved 18 June 2022.
  72. ^ "Bidzina Ivanishvili: Georgia's billionaire 'puppet master' betting the house on Moscow". The Guardian. 16 May 2024.
  73. ^ "Alasania's Free Democrats Quit GD Coalition". Civil Georgia. 5 November 2014. Retrieved 6 June 2024.
  74. ^ Dunbar, William (19 December 2018). "A man of his own". Civil Georgia. Retrieved 6 January 2019.
  75. ^ "Margvelashvili won't run for president again, slams GD for animosity". Democracy & Freedom Watch. 31 August 2018.
  76. ^ "Keeping Georgia's NATO Dream Alive". Atlantic Council. 20 January 2016.
  77. ^ Schwartz, Robert (26 December 2015). "Visa-free travel for eastern Europeans". DW News.
  78. ^ Jozwiak, Rikard (2 February 2017). "European Parliament Approves Visa-Free Schengen Travel For Georgia". Radio Free Europe.
  79. ^ "GD Coalition Members Part Ways for Upcoming Elections". Civil Georgia. 31 March 2016. Retrieved 4 June 2024.
  80. ^ "National Forum Quits GD Parliamentary Majority". Civil Georgia. 4 April 2016. Retrieved 4 June 2024.
  81. ^ "New Constitution Enters into Force". Civil.ge. 17 December 2018.
  82. ^ DFWatch Staff (26 April 2018). "Ivanishvili to make political comeback, will head Georgia's ruling GD". Democracy and Freedom Watch. Archived from the original on 15 May 2018. Retrieved 24 May 2018.
  83. ^ "Georgian Prime Minister Kvirikashvili resigns". Reuters. 13 June 2018.
  84. ^ "Georgian Dream name political newcomer as candidate for PM". OC Media. 15 June 2018.
  85. ^ "Ruling party endorsed Zurabishvili wins Georgian presidency". www.intellinews.com. 29 November 2018. Retrieved 6 May 2024.
  86. ^ "Watchdogs: Signs of "Unprecedented Voter-bribing"". Civil Georgia. 19 November 2018. Retrieved 6 June 2024.
  87. ^ Giorgi Lomsadze (29 November 2018). "Opposition challenges results in Georgia's presidential election". Eurasianet.
  88. ^ "Georgia protests: Thousands storm parliament over Russian MP's speech". BBC. 21 June 2019. Retrieved 6 June 2024.
  89. ^ "Who is the Russian Orthodox communist who provoked protests in Tbilisi?". JAM News. 29 June 2019.
  90. ^ "ირაკლი კობახიძე გავრილოვთან გადაღებულ ფოტოს პროვოკაციად აფასებს". Netgazeti (in Georgian). 1 July 2019. Retrieved 17 February 2023.
  91. ^ "Sergei Gavrilov: I take a seat, where a host asks me to sit". Interpressnews. 21 June 2019. Retrieved 17 February 2023.
  92. ^ "From "peaceful protests" to "manifestation of depravity": How did the Georgian Dream present the June crisis to the public?". Georgian Institute of Politics. 14 November 2019. Retrieved 17 February 2023.
  93. ^ "Ivanishvili: 2020 Polls Proportional, Zero Threshold (detailed text)". Civil Georgia. 24 June 2019. Retrieved 4 October 2022.
  94. ^ "Georgia Ruling Party Head Announces Electoral Reform After Protests". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 24 June 2019. Retrieved 4 October 2022.
  95. ^ "Protests revived in Georgia following election reform failure". Eurasianet. 15 November 2019. Retrieved 4 October 2022.
  96. ^ "Georgian Prime Minister Resigns, Says He Has 'Fulfilled Mission'". RFE/RL. 2 September 2019. Retrieved 2 September 2019.
  97. ^ "Giorgi Gakharia Tapped New Prime Minister". Civil Georgia. 3 September 2019. Retrieved 17 February 2023.
  98. ^ "Georgian Dream, Opposition Reach Consensus over Electoral Reform". Civil Georgia. 8 March 2020.
  99. ^ Opposition parties in Georgia sign joint statement renouncing their seats in parliament Jam news, November 3, 2020
  100. ^ "Georgia, Parliamentary Elections, 31 October 2020: Final Report". OSCE-ODIHR. 5 March 2021. Retrieved 6 June 2024.
  101. ^ Balmforth, Andrew Osborn, Tom (11 January 2021). "Ex-Soviet Georgia's richest citizen, ruling party chief, quits politics". Reuters. Retrieved 15 January 2021.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  102. ^ "Former PM Gakharia Inaugurates New Political Party". Civil.ge. 29 May 2021. Archived from the original on 23 October 2021. Retrieved 25 October 2021.
  103. ^ "Georgia prime minister resigns over opposition leader arrest plan". dw.com. 22 February 2021. Archived from the original on 25 October 2021. Retrieved 25 October 2021.
  104. ^ "Ruling Georgian Dream leaves EU-mediated agreement". Agenda.ge. 28 July 2021. Archived from the original on 30 June 2021. Retrieved 5 September 2021.
  105. ^ "Georgian Dream Quits EU-brokered Deal". Civil.ge. 28 July 2021. Retrieved 5 January 2022.
  106. ^ "Ruling party loses majority in 7 out of 64 Georgian municipalities". Agenda.ge. 1 November 2021. Archived from the original on 11 September 2022. Retrieved 11 September 2022.
  107. ^ "Ruling party head vows to "defend Ukraine's interests" on "all int'l platforms to the end"". Agenda.ge. 25 February 2022. Retrieved 11 September 2022.
  108. ^ "Before Ukraine there was Georgia. In 2008 Russia invaded Georgia and occupied 20% of our territory – Irakli Garibashvili". Rustavi2.ge. Rustavi 2.
  109. ^ "Microcredit helps Ukrainian refugees start businesses in Georgia". United Nations Human Rights Council. 27 February 2024. Retrieved 24 March 2024.
  110. ^ "Ukraine one year on: Highlighting the needs of displaced Ukrainians in Georgia". People in Need. 24 February 2023. Retrieved 24 February 2023.
  111. ^ "PM calls on the international community to do everything possible to stop hostilities in Ukraine". Agenda.ge. 25 February 2022. Retrieved 11 September 2022.
  112. ^ "Georgian premier says joining sanctions against Russia to destroy country's economy". Anadolu Agency. Retrieved 6 June 2024.
  113. ^ "PM Garibashvili: we would destroy Georgia's economy if we imposed economic sanctions on Russia". Civil Georgia. 24 May 2023. Retrieved 9 June 2024.
  114. ^ "როგორია "ქართული ოცნების" ანტიდასავლური პროპაგანდა და რა არის რეალობა?". Publika. 6 September 2023.
  115. ^ "TI Georgia: Georgia's Economic Dependence on Russia Increased in 2022". Civil Georgia. 22 February 2023.
  116. ^ a b "How the Georgian Government, Once a US Ally, Became an Adversary, Against the Wishes of Its Protesting Citizens". Just Security. 14 May 2024. Retrieved 6 June 2024.
  117. ^ "2022 Investment Climate Statements: Georgia". US Department of State. Retrieved 6 June 2024.
  118. ^ "Russia Abolishes Visa Regime and Lifts Ban on Airline Flights with Georgia Starting May 15". Civil Georgia. 10 May 2023.
  119. ^ "EU on Georgia's Decision to Issue Permit for Direct Flights with Russia: "This is Very Regrettable"". Civil Georgia. 16 May 2024. Retrieved 6 June 2024.
  120. ^ "Analysis – Rapprochement with Russia: what now?". Civil Georgia. 20 May 2023.
  121. ^ "Ambassador Degnan's Remarks To Media At Community Fourth Of July Celebration". US embassy Tbilisi. 5 July 2023.
  122. ^ "Ex-PM Says Georgia Should Ask for 'Immediate' EU Membership". Civil Georgia. 28 February 2022. Retrieved 9 June 2024.
  123. ^ "No EU Application Before 2024, Kobakhidze Says". Civil Georgia. 1 March 2022. Retrieved 9 June 2024.
  124. ^ "Georgia, Moldova Formally Apply for EU Membership Amid Russia's Invasion of Ukraine". Radiofreeeurope/Radioliberty.
  125. ^ Joshua Kucera (3 March 2022). "Georgia formally applies for EU".
  126. ^ "EP's Georgia Press Freedom Resolution Calls for Ivanishvili Sanctions". Civil.ge. 9 June 2022.
  127. ^ "Georgia's EU Candidate Status Postponed, Pending Reforms". Georgia Today. 23 June 2022.
  128. ^ "Georgian government to file lawsuit against president for allegedly violating constitution". JamNews. 15 March 2022. Retrieved 30 July 2023.
  129. ^ "Georgian Dream Launches Impeachment Proceedings Against President". Civil Georgia. 1 September 2023. Retrieved 3 October 2023.
  130. ^ "Georgian parliament fails to impeach president over unsanctioned EU visits". Politico. 18 October 2023.
  131. ^ "Press Remarks by the EU Ambassador to Georgia, Pawel Herczynski on the Publication of the EU Enlargement Report". eeas.europa.eu. 8 December 2023.
  132. ^ Zaal Anjaparidze (19 October 2023). "Georgia Awaits EU Decision on Candidate Status". The Jamestown Foundation.
  133. ^ "Georgian billionaire ex-PM Ivanishvili returns to politics before election". Reuters. 30 December 2023.
  134. ^ "BREAKING: PM Irakli Garibashvili Resigns". Civil Georgia. 29 January 2024.
  135. ^ "Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine: If Transnistria and Georgia engage in returning their territories, it will definitely help us". Interpressnews. 27 March 2022.
  136. ^ "Calls for Georgia to open a "second front" against Russia fall flat". Eurasianet. 10 May 2022. Archived from the original on 10 June 2023. Retrieved 6 June 2023.
  137. ^ "Gov't Interest is to not 'Destroy' Georgia by Sanctioning Russia, Irakli Kobakhidze Says". Messenger Online. 10 February 2023. Retrieved 6 June 2024.
  138. ^ "Parliament vice speaker: US, EU must distance themselves from Ukraine gov't calls for Georgia to "engage in war"". Agenda. 21 September 2022.
  139. ^ "Georgia Pledges Peaceful De-occupation". Civil Georgia. 28 March 2022. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  140. ^ 15 June 2023 (15 June 2023). ""ნაცმოძრაობა", "ლელო", გახარია, "გირჩი", ვაშაძე – ესენი ყველანი არიან "გლობალური ომის პარტიის" საცოდავი აგენტები – ირაკლი კობახიძე". Ambebi.ge.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  141. ^ "კობახიძე: სლოვაკეთის პრემიერზე თავდასხმის უკან გლობალური ომის პარტია დგას". Tabula. 23 May 2024.
  142. ^ "Irakli Kobakhidze: The global war party does not change methods – in the 21st century, liberal fascism, radicalism, polarization, hatred and bloody attacks on politicians have become commonplace in the US and Europe". Inter Press News. 14 July 2024. Archived from the original on 14 July 2024. Retrieved 14 July 2024.
  143. ^ Tabatadze, Tamar (14 July 2024). "Majority leader condemns attack against President Trump". 1 TV. Archived from the original on 14 July 2024. Retrieved 14 July 2024.
  144. ^ Gavin, Gabriel (23 May 2024). "EU commissioner denies he threatened Georgia's prime minister". Politico.
  145. ^ "Reactions to SSSG Claims of Planned "Destabilization and Civil Unrest"". Civil.ge. 18 September 2023.
  146. ^ "ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS JAMES O'BRIEN REMARKS TO MEDIA IN TBILISI". U.S. Embassy Tbilisi. 14 May 2024.
  147. ^ Machaidze, Rusudan (2 March 2023). ""People's Power": anti-Western movement in the service of the ruling party of Georgia". JAM news.
  148. ^ "Georgian Parliament set to adopt controversial foreign agent law Tuesday". Washington Post. 13 May 2024.
  149. ^ "What is the 'Russian law' that has Georgians out on the streets in their thousands?". Sky News. 14 May 2024.
  150. ^ Ritchie, Rhea Mogul, Sophie Tanno, Niamh Kennedy, Hannah (9 March 2023). "Georgia withdraws 'foreign influence' bill but opposition vows more protests". CNN.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  151. ^ "Why is Georgian Dream reviving the foreign agent law?". OC Media. 5 April 2024.
  152. ^ "Thousands protest in Georgia after lawmakers pass controversial 'Russian law'". France 24. 14 May 2024.
  153. ^ Tabatadze, Tamar (28 May 2024). "European politicians express concern as parliament overrides veto on Foreign Influence Law". 1 tv.
  154. ^ a b ""Georgian Dream is Russian Dream"". Civil.ge. 13 April 2024.
  155. ^ Gabriel Gavin (15 May 2024). "EU condemns Georgia over brutal 'Russian law' crackdown". Politico.
  156. ^ "International Outcry over Police Crackdown on Protest against Foreign Agents Bill". Civil.ge. 3 May 2024.
  157. ^ a b Daniel Boffey (13 May 2024). "Georgia police accused of beating protesters against 'foreign influence' bill". The Guardian.
  158. ^ "CSOs: Physical Force Used Against Protesters Amounted to Torture". Civil.ge. 1 May 2024.
  159. ^ "UNM Chair Severely Beaten by Police During Rally Against Agents' Law". Civil.ge. 1 May 2024.
  160. ^ "Aleko Elisashvili: Police beat me, my rib is broken". Georgian Times. 18 April 2024.
  161. ^ "PM Vows to Adopt Foreign Agents Law, Pledges to Punish Violent Protesters". Civil.ge. 12 May 2024.
  162. ^ "დიმიტრი ჩიქოვანს საკუთარ სახლთან თავს დაესხნენ". Formula. 8 May 2024.
  163. ^ "ფრანკლინის კლუბის დამფუძნებელი: სახლთან წარწერები გააკეთეს, ტიტუშკები კორპუსთან მელოდებოდნენ". Formula. 9 May 2024.
  164. ^ "პრემიერის ლექცია თსუ-ში და "ტიტუშკები" სტუდენტების წინააღმდეგ". Formula. 18 May 2024.
  165. ^ ""ხშირად იმეორებდა კობახიძე ჩემ გვარს და აისრულა საწადელი", – ნიკო მანაგაძე". Formula. 8 June 2024.
  166. ^ "ტიტუშკები ენმ-ს ცენტრალურ ოფისს დაესხნენ თავს, ასამდე თავდამსხმელი მონაწილეობდა – ენმ". Tabula. 1 June 2024.
  167. ^ a b ""ოცნება" აღიარებს, რომ ტიტუშკები მათ დავალებებს ასრულებენ". The Ajara Times. 31 May 2024.
  168. ^ ""მოღალატე", "რეზიდენტი" – პრეზიდენტს ახალგაზრდებთან შეხვედრაზე ტიტუშკები მიუგზავნეს". Formula. 11 June 2024.
  169. ^ ""ტიტუშკების" თავდასხმა". Formula. 3 May 2024.
  170. ^ "სახელმწიფო ტერორი – ოცნების გზა რუსეთიზაციისკენ". Formula. 10 May 2024.
  171. ^ "შსს-მ ნაციონალური მოძრაობის ოფისზე თავდასხმის ფაქტზე გამოძიება დაიწყო". Tabula. 1 June 2024.
  172. ^ "ორგანიზებული ტერორი და დაუსჯელი მოძალადეები". Formula. 13 June 2024.
  173. ^ a b "US could sanction Georgia politicians to 'defend democracy'". Politico. 20 May 2024.
  174. ^ "EU countries push for sanctions on Georgia over 'Russian law'". Financial Times. 22 May 2024.
  175. ^ "Mamuka Mdinaradze: Strategic partnership and friendship means that visa-free travel, free economic relations and direct flights are opened without any trade and threats – the demand to give up transparency and independence in return is unacceptable". Interpressnews. 21 May 2024.
  176. ^ "Ruling party says US "policy of blackmail, intimidation" "in contradiction" with strategic partnership". Agenda. 24 May 2024.
  177. ^ "მამუკა მდინარაძე – "ქართული ოცნება" და "ხალხის ძალა" საპარლამენტო არჩევნებში საერთო სიით მიიღებენ მონაწილეობას". 1st Channel. 16 July 2024.
  178. ^ "People's Power Officially Registers Political Party". Civil.ge. 18 March 2024.
  179. ^ "GD declares 2024 elections referendum on war vs. peace, traditional values vs. moral degradation". 1st channel. 20 August 2024.
  180. ^ "მმართველი პარტია ასახელებს ოთხ მიზეზს, რის გამოც კონსტიტუციური უმრავლესობის მოპოვება სურს". Civil Georgia. 20 August 2024.
  181. ^ Mariam Bogveradze (23 August 2024). "კობახიძე აკონკრეტებს, რომელი პარტიების აკრძალვას გეგმავს "ქართული ოცნება"". Netgazeti.
  182. ^ ""Elections in Georgia should be a 'Nuremberg trial' for the National Movement" – Ruling party". JAM News. 20 August 2024.
  183. ^ "Speaker assesses reports on banning opposition parties as disinformation". 1tv.ge. 28 August 2024.
  184. ^ Gabriel Gavin (23 August 2024). "Georgia goes 'North Korea' with bombshell plan to ban main opposition parties". Politico.
  185. ^ "The final call for Georgia's democracy". The Washington Post. 5 September 2024.
  186. ^ "About party". Georgische Droom. Archived from the original on 18 November 2022. Retrieved 18 November 2022.
  187. ^ a b c d Kakachia, Kornely (2017). "The First 100 Days of the Georgian Dream Government: A Reality Check" (PDF). Georgian Institute of Politics. pp. 13, 18, 23–25. Archived from the original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved 9 June 2024.
  188. ^ a b Lortkipanidze, Levan. "Parliamentary Elections in Georgia". Heinrich Böll Foundation. Archived from the original on 15 September 2018. Retrieved 25 January 2018.
  189. ^ "Georgia – 3 Political Parties". European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity.
  190. ^ Lebanidze, Bidzina (2017). "Popular Oligarchy: Why the Public Still Supports Georgian Dream". Georgian Institute of Politics.
  191. ^ [4][7][10][12][14][15][16][17][18]
  192. ^ "DRI: Homophobia and Anti-Gender Rhetoric Integral to Georgian Dream's Ultra-Conservative Turn". Civil Georgia. 4 July 2024.
  193. ^ Kornely Kakachia; Bidzina Lebanidze (14 March 2023). "Georgia's Slide to Authoritarianism". Carnegie Endowment.
  194. ^ Giorgi Lomsadze (10 March 2023). "Georgian protesters win a battle, war may still be ahead". Eurasianet.
  195. ^ [192][193][194]
  196. ^ Cory Welt (4 September 2024). "Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy". Congressional Research Service.
  197. ^ Marcel Röthig (29 April 2024). "A trailblazer on the wrong track". Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
  198. ^ [196][197]
  199. ^ a b Kornely Kakachia; Bidzina Lebanidze (14 March 2023). "Georgia's Slide to Authoritarianism". Carnegie Endowment.
  200. ^ Giorgi Lomsadze (10 March 2023). "Georgian protesters win a battle, war may still be ahead". Eurasianet.
  201. ^ [3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][199][200]
  202. ^ a b "Georgia: Tracing the rise of illiberalism in Tbilisi". Eurasianet. 15 May 2024.
  203. ^ "Georgia Lurches Towards Illiberalism". Civil Georgia. 12 July 2021.
  204. ^ a b c "Georgian nightmare". Engelsberg Ideas. 21 May 2021.
  205. ^ "Illiberal Oligarchy Lurks Behind Georgia's Democratic Façade". Civil Georgia. 21 November 2019.
  206. ^ Lela Kunchulia (18 May 2024). "Georgian Dream Takes On The 'Global War Party'". Radio Free Europe.
  207. ^ "US diplomat says Georgian Dream actions put Tbilisi's Euro-Atlantic integration hopes at risk". Eurasianet. 16 July 2024.
  208. ^ Thomas de Waal (5 June 2024). "Opportunistic Georgia joins Europe's illiberal club". Financial Times.
  209. ^ Reinhold Brender (July 2024). "Georgia at a Crossroads: An Increasingly Illiberal Domestic Policy is Becoming an Obstacle to EU Accession" (PDF). Egmont Institute.
  210. ^ Zarina Burkadze. "Georgia's Illiberal Forces". The Illiberalism Studies Program (ILLSP).
  211. ^ Pjotr Sauer; Shaun Walker (16 May 2024). "Bidzina Ivanishvili: Georgia's billionaire 'puppet master' betting the house on Moscow". The Guardian.
  212. ^ Zarina Burkadze (16 May 2024). "Georgia's European Struggle". Italian Institute For Internartional Political Studies.
  213. ^ a b "Georgians Gear Up for 'Unprecedented' Election Mobilization". Civil Georgia. 1 June 2024.
  214. ^ Davit Zedelashvili (13 March 2024). "The Illiberal Regime Versus Liberal "Propaganda": Beyond an Instrumentalist Explanation" (PDF). Gnomon Wise.
  215. ^ Ghia Nodia (May 2024). "Why Georgia Has Erupted in Protest". Journal of Democracy.
  216. ^ Maria Katamadze (27 May 2024). "The oligarch behind Georgia's pivot to Russia". Deutsche Welle.
  217. ^ [22][173][202][203][204][205][206][207][208][209][210][211][212][213][214][215][216]
  218. ^ Natasha Lindstaedt (24 April 2024). "Georgia sliding towards autocracy". Social Europe.
  219. ^ "McCain Institute, George W. Bush Institute, Freedom House Call for Action Against Autocratic Georgian Dream Government". Freedom House. 22 May 2024.
  220. ^ "Importing Autocracy: a Dangerous Moment for Georgia". Center for Russian Studies.
  221. ^ [213][218][219][220]
  222. ^ Stefan Meister (10 March 2023). "Is Georgia on the Path to Authoritarianism?". Georgian Institute of Politics.
  223. ^ "Georgia taking authoritarian turn with adoption of foreign agents legislation". Eurasianet. 14 May 2024.
  224. ^ Robert Amsterdam (9 May 2024). "Press Release: Georgian Dream is creating an authoritarian nightmare, according to new report". Amsterdam & Partners LLP.
  225. ^ a b Joshua Kucera (17 July 2024). "Ahead Of Elections, U.S. And EU Signal That Patience With Georgia's Ruling Party Has Run Out". Radio Free Europe.
  226. ^ "Georgia's Slide to Authoritarianism: Can the International Society Save the Democracy Here?". Georgian Institute of Politics. 10 June 2024.
  227. ^ Lomsadze, Giorgi (11 May 2024). "Incumbents touting desire to turn Georgia into a one-party state". eurasianet. Bidzina Ivanishvili, is promising an authoritarian makeover for the country" party.
  228. ^ Ia Eradze. "Striving for Sovereignty?". Heinrich Boell Foundation.
  229. ^ a b Sergi Kapanadze (26 October 2023). "Georgia Bangs the Anti-Western Drum". Center for European Policy Analysis.
  230. ^ a b Atasuntsev, Alexander (7 May 2023). "Is Georgia's Ruling Party Really Pro-Russian?". The Moscow Times.
  231. ^ a b Nino Samkharadze (October 2023). "Georgian Political Parties in the European Context: Challenges and Opportunities" (PDF). Georgian Institute of Politics.
  232. ^ a b c Liana Fix; Caroline Kapp (21 June 2023). "The Dangers of Democratic Backsliding in Georgia". Council on Foreign Relations.
  233. ^ [199][204][222][223][224][225][226][227][228][229][230][231][232]
  234. ^ Laura Thornton (9 June 2024). "Georgia faces crucial vote: A future with the West or future allied with Russia". The Hill.
  235. ^ Laura Linderman (7 September 2024). "Rising Stakes in Tbilisi as Elections Approach". Civil Georgia.
  236. ^ Todd Prince (23 May 2024). "New U.S. Legislation Aims To Dissuade Democratic Backsliding In Georgia". Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.
  237. ^ "Georgian Dream's New Bill Reveals the Government's Severe Antidemocratic Stance". Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum. 5 April 2024.
  238. ^ [12][231][232][234][235][236][237]
  239. ^ Shota Kakabadze; Kornely Kakachia (12 September 2022). "What's Behind Georgian Dream's Anti-Western Rhetoric and Foreign Policy Behavior". Georgian Institute of Politics.
  240. ^ "Bidzina Ivanishvili Backs Anti-Western Policies, Threatens Repressions". Civil Georgia. 29 April 2024.
  241. ^ Nate Ostiller (30 April 2024). "Georgian government holds massive anti-West rally as it aims to pass 'Russian-style' law". The Kyiv Independent.
  242. ^ Faustine Vincent (2 May 2024). "Georgians face repression after anti-Western rhetoric from authorities". Le Monde.
  243. ^ Matthew Miller (1 May 2024). "Georgia's Western Trajectory at Risk". U.S. Department of State.
  244. ^ Régis Genté (21 December 2022). "Broken Dream: The oligarch, Russia, and Georgia's drift from Europe". European Council on Foreign Relations.
  245. ^ [8][23][47][49][225][229][239][240][241][242][243][244]
  246. ^ [14][21][22][23]
  247. ^ a b c "The Orbanizing of Georgia". carnegieeurope.eu. 31 August 2023.
  248. ^ a b "Is Georgia's New Government Shifting the Country's Geopolitical Course Toward Russia?". Jamestown. 13 November 2012.
  249. ^ a b "Who is running Georgia?". Politico. 26 April 2023.
  250. ^ a b Anastasia Mgaloblishvili (3 May 2024). "Is Georgian Dream Digging Its Own Grave?". German Marshall Fund.
  251. ^ a b Beka Chedia (1 May 2024). "Pro-Russian Ruling Elite in Georgia Announce West as Enemy and Hunt for 'Western Agents'". The Jamestown Foundation.
  252. ^ a b "Oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili – the real ruler of Georgia and the architect of Georgia's pro-Russian shift". Transparency International. 29 May 2024.
  253. ^ a b Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash (29 May 2024). "Georgian Dream Party has blown up Tbilisi's track to Europe". Observer Research Foundation.
  254. ^ a b Marie Jégo (28 May 2024). "Georgia's President Salome Zourabichvili is the last line of defense against 'Russian law'". Le Monde.
  255. ^ [8][247][248][249][250][251][252][253][254]
  256. ^ Olga Dmitrieva (4 October 2024). "The hijacking of Europa. Cutting ties with EU, Georgia's ruling party sees its ratings plummet but remains ahead of opposition". The Insider.
  257. ^ "GD Leaders Double Down on Anti-Western, Sovereignist, Conspiracy Rhetoric". Civil Georgia. 30 April 2024. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  258. ^ "Shalva Papuashvili: Georgian Dream is the only political force merging Europeanism and patriotism". 1st channel. 9 September 2022.
  259. ^ a b "Georgia's elections pit anti-Russian president versus conciliatory challenger". Christian Science Monitor. 28 September 2012. Retrieved 4 June 2024.
  260. ^ "Ivanishvili Addresses Congress of His GDDG Party". Civil Georgia. 16 February 2013. Retrieved 9 June 2024.
  261. ^ a b "Ivanishvili Speaks on Ties with NATO, Russia". Civil Georgia. 18 January 2013. Retrieved 4 June 2024.
  262. ^ a b "Kakha Kaladze: The Georgian government will play by Georgian rules – if a political decision is made regarding not granting the status, they can keep it for themselves". interpressnews. 15 February 2023.
  263. ^ "Russian Soft Power Fails, Pointing the Way to a New Georgian Consensus". Civil Georgia. 24 June 2019. Archived from the original on 9 August 2022. Retrieved 20 November 2022.
  264. ^ Burkadze, Zarina (2022). "Georgia's Illiberal Forces: Political Polarization against Democracy". Journal of Illiberalism Studies. 2 (1). Illiberalism Studies Program - George Washington University: 31–45. doi:10.53483/WCJU3536. Archived from the original on 31 March 2023.
  265. ^ "'Pro-Western' Georgia rapidly drifting towards illiberalism". Platform Raam. 12 October 2021. Archived from the original on 4 June 2024. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  266. ^ [262][263][264][265]
  267. ^ "Quick Take – Sovereignist Revival". Civil Georgia. 6 March 2023. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  268. ^ "EU Partners React to Announcement of Impeachment Proceedings against President". Civil Georgia. 1 September 2023.
  269. ^ Thomas de Waal (31 August 2023). "The Orbanizing of Georgia". Carnegie Endowment.
  270. ^ [22][202][204][247][268][269]
  271. ^ a b c "Georgia's Political Landscape". Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 18 October 2021.
  272. ^ Pertaia, Luka (16 February 2017). "Are Georgia's disparate left-wing protesters consolidating into a coherent political force?". OC Media. Georgia (Georgian Republic). Archived from the original on 14 November 2017. Retrieved 13 November 2017.
  273. ^ "Georgia to keep constitutional ban on tax rises for 12 years". Oc-media. 20 June 2017. Retrieved 14 December 2022.
  274. ^ Lebanidze et al, page 14: "The economic part of the Georgian Dream election program clearly did not belong on a left-centrist ideological platform, which was the openly stated view of the party. Rather, its economic program focused partially on messages such as maintaining low taxes, small government/less regulations, and a free market. By doing so, the ruling party is positioning itself more as a centrist (partially right-wing) party."[43]
  275. ^ "Georgian authorities arrest opposition leader". Eurasianet. 22 February 2021. Archived from the original on 18 June 2021. Retrieved 9 August 2022.
  276. ^ "Perspectives: Unpacking the Georgian government's understanding of "pseudo-liberal ideology", Georgian Dream co-opting far-right ideas". Eurasianet. 8 April 2024.
  277. ^ a b "Georgia's mighty Orthodox Church". BBC. 2 July 2013. Retrieved 9 June 2024.
  278. ^ "Georgian Prime Minister Says Sexual Minorities Have Equal Rights". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 15 May 2013. Retrieved 18 May 2013.
  279. ^ "Violence Against Anti-Homophobia Rally". Civil Georgia. 18 May 2013. Retrieved 9 June 2024.
  280. ^ "Georgia passes antidiscrimination law". Human Rights House. 6 May 2014. Retrieved 4 June 2024.
  281. ^ "Usupashvili: Anti-Discrimination Bill is About Choosing Between Europe and Russia". Civil Georgia. 30 April 2014. Retrieved 4 June 2024.
  282. ^ Jalagania, Lika (2016). "Legal Situation of LGBTI Persons in Georgia" (PDF). Heinrich Boell Foundation. Human Rights Education and Monitoring Center. Archived (PDF) from the original on 25 November 2018. Retrieved 25 November 2018.
  283. ^ "Georgian Church Speaks Out Against Anti-Discrimination Bill". Civil Georgia. 28 April 2014. Retrieved 9 June 2024.
  284. ^ Georgia's Civil Code already defined marriage as a heterosexual union, thus effectively preventing same-sex marriage.
  285. ^ "Govt Offers Setting Constitutional Bar to Same-Sex Marriage". Civil Georgia. 28 March 2014. Retrieved 9 June 2024.
  286. ^ "Georgia's Ruling Party 'Supermajority' Passes Unilateral Constitutional Reform". Jamestown. Archived from the original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved 17 May 2018.
  287. ^ "Influences of far-right groups on the political agenda". Democracy Research Institute. 5 September 2023.
  288. ^ "PM Says Pride March 'Unreasonable,' Organized by 'Radical Opposition'". Civil Georgia. 5 July 2021. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  289. ^ "Garibashvili on LGBT Pride: "95% Against Propagandistic Parade"". Civil Georgia. 12 July 2021. Archived from the original on 16 July 2021. Retrieved 14 February 2022.
  290. ^ "Homophobic violence shows the rise of illiberalism in Georgia". New Statesman. 16 July 2021. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  291. ^ "Garibashvili on LGBT Pride: "95% Against Propagandistic Parade"". Civil Georgia. 12 July 2021. Archived from the original on 3 July 2021. Retrieved 14 February 2022.
  292. ^ "Georgian Dream ramps up homophobic rhetoric as Pride Week approaches". OC Media. Retrieved 10 March 2023.
  293. ^ "Georgian Prime Minister Advocates for Conservatism and Slams "False" Values at CPAC". Civil Georgia. 4 May 2023. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  294. ^ "EU candidate Georgia wants to outlaw LGBTQ 'propaganda". DW News. 31 March 2024.
  295. ^ "The countries with liberal cannabis policies". Deutsche Welle. 15 October 2021.
  296. ^ a b Holland, Edward C. (April 2019). "The Georgian Dream? Outcomes from the Summer of Protest, 2018". The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization.
  297. ^ "Georgia Becomes First Former Soviet Country to Legalize Marijuana Consumption". Newsweek. Tbilisi. 31 July 2018.
  298. ^ "Govt Mulls Medical Cannabis Cultivation for Export". Civil Georgia. 11 September 2018.
  299. ^ "GDDG Backtracks on Cannabis Cultivation Law after Church Outcry". Civil Georgia. 17 September 2018.
  300. ^ "MPs Vote Down Mandatory Gender Quotas Bill". Civil Georgia. 23 March 2018. Retrieved 4 June 2024.
  301. ^ "Georgian Parliament Endorses Changes to Electoral Code in Final Reading". Civil Georgia. 3 July 2020. Retrieved 4 June 2024.
  302. ^ "Georgia takes on male-dominated parliament with gender quotas". Eurasianet. 13 July 2020. Retrieved 4 June 2024.
  303. ^ "Parliament Approves Amendments on Gender Quotas". Civil Georgia. 10 February 2023. Retrieved 10 February 2023.
  304. ^ "GD, Girchi Deal to Abolish Women's Quotas". Civil Georgia. 2 April 2024.
  305. ^ "Georgian Dream to abolish parliament gender quotas". 2 April 2024.
  306. ^ Kakhishvili, Levan; Keshelava, David; Papava, Giorgi; Sichinava, David (22 October 2021). "Georgia's Political Landscape: Diversity, Convergence and Empty Spots" (PDF). p. 23. Archived (PDF) from the original on 14 December 2022. Retrieved 14 December 2022.
  307. ^ Kakhishvili, Levan; Keshelava, David; Papava, Giorgi; Sichinava, David (22 October 2021). "Georgia's Political Landscape: Diversity, Convergence and Empty Spots" (PDF). library.fes.de. Georgia (Georgian Republic). Archived (PDF) from the original on 14 December 2022. Retrieved 14 December 2022.
  308. ^ "Kakha Kaladze: Green spaces is essential for the city and we have to take unpopular steps in some directions". 1tv. 13 June 2018.
  309. ^ ""პარტიზანი მებაღეები" სასტუმრო ბუდაპეშტის აშენების შესაჩერებლად ხელმოწერებს აგროვებენ". Net Gazeti. 25 January 2015.
  310. ^ "NDI poll: 82% of Georgians support EU, 74%- NATO membership". Agenda.ge. 16 January 2020. Archived from the original on 18 November 2022. Retrieved 4 June 2024.
  311. ^ "Why Georgia's government thinks it can scorn the EU and keep its grip on power". Politico. 3 May 2024.
  312. ^ Maria Katamadze (27 May 2024). "The oligarch behind Georgia's pivot to Russia". DW News.
  313. ^ a b c Joshua Kucera (11 June 2024). "Georgian Dream Plays Geopolitics To Shore Up Support At Home". Radio Free Europe.
  314. ^ "PM Vows to Renew Push for Defining Marriage in Constitution After Elections". Civil Georgia. 24 August 2016.
  315. ^ "Irakli Kobakhidze: Membership of the European Union is not possible at the expense of giving up dignity and independence, with a slavish attitude". Interpressnews. 14 March 2023.
  316. ^ a b c Giorgi Revishvili (26 April 2024). "Perspectives: Georgian Dream's doublethink may backfire in Tbilisi". Eurasianet.
  317. ^ Régis Genté (19 June 2023). "Georgia: terrible dilemma for Europe". Robert Schuman Foundation. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  318. ^ a b c Genté, Régis (21 December 2022). "Broken Dream: The oligarch, Russia, and Georgia's drift from Europe". European Council on Foreign Relations. Crucially, throughout the last 18 months, representatives of Georgian Dream and the government have increasingly begun to make hostile statements about their Western partners. News organization OC Media reports that, between February and July 2022, Georgian Dream chair Irakli Kobakhidze made only nine comments critical of Russia but a total of 57 negative remarks about the West and 26 about Ukraine. Georgian Dream leaders have often presented their criticism of the US and the EU in the last year as warnings against foreign interference in Georgian domestic politics. Yet the fact that they have done so in ways seemingly designed to offend suggests that they want to push representatives of Western powers to leave Georgia.
  319. ^ Tabatadze, Tamar (24 May 2024). "EU's Borrell: Georgia's 'Foreign Agents' Law incompatible with European aspirations". 1 tv.
  320. ^ "US Helsinki Commission: "Foreign Agent" Legislation – Self-Sabotage of Georgia's EU Candidacy". Civil Georgia. 6 April 2024. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  321. ^ "NATO warned Georgia that the law on "foreign agents" is incompatible with the course for membership". ABN Correspondence. 15 May 2024.
  322. ^ Will Neal (11 May 2024). "'Our Injuries Will Heal, but the Georgian Government's Reputation Will Not'". Byline Times.
  323. ^ "Parliament Speaker Slams Freedom House Report, 'Pseudo-Liberal' NGOs". civil.ge. Civil Georgia. Retrieved 16 April 2018. "We rest on values such as democracy, rule of law, human rights protection, justice, equality and tolerance, but at the same time, pseudo-liberalism and the forces, which are challenging our national identity, traditions and the Georgian churches, as well as the forces, which are challenging the very same values in the U.S., are unacceptable for us," he [Kobakhidze] said.
  324. ^ "PM: Agents' Law will Create a Better Basis for Ensuring Georgia's Accession to the EU". Civil Georgia. 28 May 2024. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  325. ^ a b "Georgian PM: time of Georgian authorities serving foreign interests "over"". Agenda. 7 May 2023. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  326. ^ a b "Keynote Speech Delivered at GLOBSEC 2023 Chat Series". Garibashvili.ge. 30 May 2023.
  327. ^ "PM laments lack of "merit-based" approach in Georgia's EU bid outcome". Agenda. 22 June 2022. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  328. ^ "Parliament official claims some EU officials "driven by political goals" towards Georgia in response to criticism over transparency bill". Agenda. 17 April 2022. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  329. ^ "Parliament Speaker denounces European Parliament's resolution on Georgia". Agenda. 26 April 2022. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  330. ^ "Ambassador Degnan on Foreign Agents bill: Georgia does not need this law". 1st channel. Archived from the original on 27 February 2023. Retrieved 22 April 2024.
  331. ^ "PM Slams U.S., EU Ambassadors for "Interference," "Diktat," Challenges Them for TV Debate on Foreign Agent Law". Civil Georgia. 14 April 2024. Archived from the original on 18 April 2024. Retrieved 18 April 2024.
  332. ^ "Irakli Kobakhidze: Influential forces imagine the EU as a unity of weak states that are devoid of identity, but the EU will be strong if it unites sovereign states". Interpressnews. 29 April 2022. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  333. ^ "What happened with Georgia's NATO ambitions?". Deutsche Welle. 7 December 2023. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  334. ^ a b "PM: NATO Enlargement "One of the Main Reasons for Ukraine War"". Civil.ge. 30 May 2023.
  335. ^ "ირაკლი ღარიბაშვილი – მე ახალი არაფერი მითქვამს, სულ რამდენიმე დღის შემდეგ, ქალბატონი ურსულა ფონ დერ ლაიენი გამოვიდა ბრატისლავაში, სხვა ფორმულირებით, უბრალოდ სიტყვა "ნატოს" მაგივრად, თქვა: "ევროპული ოჯახი"". Interpressnews. 1 June 2023.
  336. ^ "For the first time in our history, a country is under attack because of its desire to be part of the European family – Ursula von der Leyen on Ukraine". Rustavi 2. 31 May 2023.
  337. ^ Iulia-Sabina Joja (6 November 2020). "Georgian Elections 2020: A strong mandate for democratization and Westernization". Middle East Institute.
  338. ^ Almut Rochowanski; Sopo Japaridze (5 March 2024). "Stop Blackmailing Georgians Over EU Membership". Jacobin.
  339. ^ [230][337][338]
  340. ^ [313][316][318][232]
  341. ^ [8][247][248][249][250][251][252][253][254]
  342. ^ "Ruling party head: "pragmatic" policy with Russia aimed at avoiding harm to Georgia, its citizens". Agenda.ge. 17 May 2023. Retrieved 17 May 2023.
  343. ^ a b "Georgia has "pragmatic and principled" stance on Russia – PM". Agenda.ge. 28 May 2012.
  344. ^ Gabekhadze, Gvantsa (2 November 2012). "Special Representative to Russia appointed". The Messenger.
  345. ^ "ირაკლი კობახიძე – რუსეთთან გვაქვს სავაჭრო-ეკონომიკური ურთიერთობები და ამ ფარგლებს მიღმა არ გავდივართ". 1st channel. 20 June 2023.
  346. ^ "Georgia's Bold Peacenik, Prime Minister Ivanishvili". Daily Beast. 26 January 2013.
  347. ^ "Georgian, Latvian PMs Meet in Riga". Civil Georgia. 6 September 2013. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  348. ^ "Russia's lengthy list of diplomatic relations with other countries". TASS. 24 January 2023.
  349. ^ "Is Georgia's Ruling Party Really Pro-Russian?". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2 May 2023. Archived from the original on 4 May 2023.
  350. ^ Silagadze, Givi (2021). Eurosceptic, therefore, Pro-Russian?. Tbilisi, Georgia: Georgian Institute of Politics. p. 5. Furthermore, a unidimensional discourse explains why the Georgian Dream party is sometimes referred to as a pro-Russian party by political opponents. GD's approach is not based on harsh anti-Russian rhetoric or an uncompromising Western foreign orientation. Instead, the ruling party advocates for a "normalization" policy towards Russia (Kakachia et al. 2018). Even though GD's position is that the West is the civilizational choice for Georgia, and supports military alignment with the West, scores on the other two sub-dimensions, rhetoric and geopolitics, are not as close to the ideal type of pro-Western orientation.
  351. ^ Bibilashvili, Zaza (8 August 2012). "Reading between the Lines". Chavchavadze Center – originally published in Tabula.ge in Georgian. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  352. ^ "Five Years Since "Gavrilov's Night"". Civil.ge. 20 June 2024.
  353. ^ Bellamy, Daniel (16 December 2023). "Georgia celebrates gaining EU candidate status". euronews.
  354. ^ ""ქართული ოცნება" რუსეთის ზეწოლის ან გავლენის ქვეშაა" – სალომე ზურაბიშვილი". Euronews Georgia. 19 April 2024.
  355. ^ "Georgia pursued balanced policy aimed at restoring stability and establishing long-term peace in region: Darchiashvili". First Channel News Armenia. 7 February 2023.
  356. ^ "Parliament Adopts Foreign Policy Resolution". Civil Georgia. 29 December 2020. Archived from the original on 29 December 2020. Retrieved 29 December 2020.
  357. ^ "The Tricky Business of Courting Three Suitors". Civil Georgia. 8 August 2023. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  358. ^ "Lavrov: Georgia's New Govt 'Acts Pragmatically'". Civil Georgia. 25 February 2013. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  359. ^ "Georgia won't restore ties with Russia". United Press International. Tbilisi. 26 October 2012. Retrieved 1 February 2013.
  360. ^ "Georgian, Russian Diplomats Meet in Prague". Civil Georgia. 1 March 2013. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
  361. ^ a b c d "Georgia and Russia: Why and How to Save Normalisation". International Crisis Group. 26 October 2020. Retrieved 23 August 2022.
  362. ^ "PM's Envoy to Meet Russian Diplomat 'Informally'". Civil Georgia. 10 December 2023.
  363. ^ a b "Ruling party official: "peace, reconciliation and development" "only way" to restore territorial integrity". Agenda.ge. 23 May 2023. Retrieved 23 May 2023.
  364. ^ "Prime Minister Appeals to Russian Authorities, Offers Direct Dialogue with Sokhumi, Tskhinvali". Civil Georgia. 9 March 2018.
  365. ^ "Ivanishvili Speaks of Relations with Russia". Civil Georgia. 24 December 2012.
  366. ^ ""ქართული ოცნების" საპატიო თავმჯდომარის, ბიძინა ივანიშვილის სიტყვით გამოსვლა გორში, საარჩევნო შეხვედრაზე". 1tv.ge. 14 September 2024.
  367. ^ "The main reason for the Global War Party's aggression towards Georgia is that, despite great efforts, it could not turn Georgia into a 2nd front – Bidzina Ivanishvili". Rustavi 2. 29 April 2024. Archived from the original on 29 April 2024. Retrieved 29 April 2024.
  368. ^ "Bidzina Ivanishvili: It took us 12 years to give a political assessment to the tragedy of 2008 – today, without any evasion, we talk about the "National Movement" that started the war, because we have a lot of evidence of the worst crime committed by them". Interpressnews. 14 September 2024.
  369. ^ "Georgia to apologize for war that Saakashvili started against Ossetians — ruling party". Azerbaijani Press Agency. 14 September 2024.
  370. ^ "Georgian-Russian Relations: The role of discourses and narratives" (PDF). Heinrich Böll Foundation. 2021. p. 11.
  371. ^ "Ukraine calls for sanctions against Bidzina Ivanishvili". OC Media. 6 September 2022.
  372. ^ "Ukrainian MP Goncharenko calls for Kyiv impose sanctions on Georgian ruling party founder, its chair". Front News. 11 May 2023.
  373. ^ "GD Chair Kobakhidze: We can't and we won't impose sanctions on Russia. Our position is clear". Civil Georgia. 11 May 2023. Retrieved 11 May 2023.
  374. ^ "Russians Are Fleeing to the Country Putin Invaded Before Ukraine". VICE News. 16 April 2022.
  375. ^ "რატომ არ ჩანს "ოცნების" ევროპელი პარტნიორი პარტია". Netgazeti (in Georgian). 8 June 2022. Archived from the original on 15 August 2022. Retrieved 24 November 2022.
  376. ^ "Parties & Organisations – Political Parties and Associated Partners of the Progressive Alliance". Progressive Alliance. Archived from the original on 4 June 2023. Retrieved 7 July 2023.
  377. ^ a b c "Georgian Dream to leave the Party of European Socialists". Georgia Today. 14 May 2023.
  378. ^ "Garibashvili CPAC intervention contravenes European and progressive values". Party of European Socialists. 4 May 2023. Retrieved 4 June 2024.
  379. ^ Gabritchidze, Nini (11 May 2023). "Georgia: Ruling party thumbs nose at influential EU grouping". Eurasianet.
edit