Wikipedia:Reference desk/Archives/Humanities/2017 October 7

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October 7

Fallout from a nuclear bomb landing on Pyongyang

Would fallout land on China, South Korea, or Japan? Anna Frodesiak (talk) 00:53, 7 October 2017 (UTC)

The simple answer is "yes."

I suspect your real question is which country would get the largest exposure. In that case the answer is "it depends." Our article on nuclear fallout has some of the basics. Exposure will depend on the height of the burst, the size of the burst, the meteorology at the time, and distance. Let's assume an airburst. Prevailing winds in the middle latitudes are westerly, so one might suspect that Japan would be most at risk. But the distance from Pyongyang to the nearest coasts of Kyushu or Honshu is about 700 km, which would considerably reduce the exposure. The nearest point in China is about 160 km away, but it's more likely to be upwind than downwind. One might argue that China would be downwind during the summer monsoon; however, the monsoon wind reversal is mostly confined to the lower part of the atmosphere so it might not make that big a difference. The border with South Korea is about 150 km from Pyongyang and is generally to the southwest. Therefore both distance and prevailing winds would tend to favor (given the subject it might be best to say disfavor) South Korea.

As a parting comment there is existing capability to use atmospheric modeling to simulate this scenario, e.g. these folks. I am not aware of applications to this exact scenario but it would be surprising if it had not been done (or currently in progress). Whether the results would be publicized is an interesting question. Shock Brigade Harvester Boris (talk) 01:23, 7 October 2017 (UTC)

It's eerily fascinating that this is on the Humanities desk (Oh, the humanity!) rather than Science. -- Jack of Oz ^{[pleasantries]} 18:26, 7 October 2017 (UTC)

The 24-hour TV news is so fascinated by this nuclear speculation, I'm surprised it isn't considered Entertainment. InedibleHulk (talk) 18:54, 7 October 2017 (UTC)

The 24-hour TV news thinks only "...We are helping push the world toward WWIII with our sensationalist reporting, but should make some handsome profits between now and when we all die..." Anna Frodesiak (talk) 23:56, 7 October 2017 (UTC)

True, JackofOz. I'm not sure why I posted here. Maybe it was an "Oh, the humanity..." thing. Anna Frodesiak (talk) 23:59, 7 October 2017 (UTC)

• Fallout depends on the type of weapon and the burst height, then the spread of fallout depends on the weather. A simple pure fission bomb is quite 'dirty', wherever it explodes. Modern designs were first 'boosted' and then replaced by two-stage fission-fusion bombs (H bombs). Even though the H bomb was first invented to be incredibly powerful, it also became the route by which weapons became small and light enough to be placed on missiles.

There's also the question of burst height. A weapon detonated close to the ground will irradiate the ground, causing a range of reactions and contaminant production, which will then be pulled up into a large, dark mushroom cloud which rains out as fallout. In contrast an airburst can still cause huge damage by thermal radiation, but generates much less fallout.

So there is a general move for nuclear weapons to become 'cleaner' as they, and their delivery systems, become more sophisticated. We don't know what North Korea has, but we can assume that they won't be launching any nuclear weapon by missile until they have boosting working, and their posed publicity photos show a physics package which looks like a two-stage weapon (but could still just be a cardboard box).

Let's ignore (modulo Trump) the idea of a US first strike. So a US nuclear strike would be in reaction to a Northern first strike. It's entirely plausible that any nuclear attack on Pyongyang would be relatively clean for fallout, and would already be overshadowed by the fallout from the earlier attack(s) on the South. Andy Dingley (talk) 10:33, 8 October 2017 (UTC)

Thanks, Andy Dingley and Shock Brigade Harvester Boris. Enlightening. I cannot entirely ignore the possibility of a US first strike. I mean, Kim isn't suicidal, but Trump may go bananas and push the button against good advice. (That raises the question about possible deep state people quietly standing by to grab his wrist or something before he does.) Anyhow, that's not really part of the original question. I actually asked the question to know if fallout on uninvolved countries would further dissuade USA from using nukes on N. Korea in any circumstances. Many thanks again to all. Anna Frodesiak (talk) 19:44, 8 October 2017 (UTC)

Dont worrie about North Korea, USA or anyone using nukes. Watch this Video and try to understand! --Kharon (talk) 21:58, 8 October 2017 (UTC)

Blast radius

Blast radius is small and has no pics. Commons might need a category. Some images need creating showing small bombs, MOAB, Little Boy, Fat Man, and modern nukes. Anyone? Anna Frodesiak (talk) 19:47, 8 October 2017 (UTC)

Also, search "blast" at Thermonuclear weapon and Nuclear weapon. Links and images are needed, no? Anna Frodesiak (talk) 19:49, 8 October 2017 (UTC)

Public sector vs private sector

Is it generally a myth that public sector organisations are more bureaucratic, disorganised and slow compared to their private sector counterparts? Or is it true? 82.132.224.45 (talk) 12:52, 7 October 2017 (UTC)

It probably varies. British Rail was replaced by Railtrack and various train operating companies. Railtrack was liquidated mainly because after the Hatfield rail crash it imposed a low speed limit on all routes and rail transport descended into chaos. Its successor, Network Rail, is a public - sector organisation. Of the train companies, Southern (Govia Thameslink Railway) is so inefficient that there have been calls for it to be re - nationalised, and the transport department has said that it will never allocate such a franchise again. 92.8.220.234 (talk) 13:12, 7 October 2017 (UTC)

Yes but Network Rail kind of fits the public sector stereotype in my opinion. 82.132.224.45 (talk) 13:48, 7 October 2017 (UTC)

British Rail not "bureaucratic, disorganised and slow"? Really? Alansplodge (talk) 16:37, 7 October 2017 (UTC)

Well, it's certainly costing the British taxpayer more now to fund the railways than under BR: Money Talks, People Waiting For A Sunday Service Walk. — fortunavelut luna 17:26, 7 October 2017 (UTC)

Maybe, "Rail subsidies have increased from £2.4bn in 1992-93 to £3.2bn in 2015-16 (in current prices)" but "subsidy per journey has fallen from £3.3 per journey to £1.9 per journey". Also "Since privatisation, the amount of investment has gone up nine-fold, from £698m in 1994–95 to £6.84bn in 2013–14". Then there's "Passenger satisfaction according to the National Rail Passenger survey has risen from 76% in 1999 (when the survey started) to 83% in 2013" and "According to a Eurobarometer poll, satisfaction with rail of UK respondents is the second highest in the EU, behind Finland". See Impact of the privatisation of British Rail Alansplodge (talk) 20:03, 7 October 2017 (UTC)

This article has a useful graph which uses OECD data to compare the effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector in the OECD-member countries. The various links in the article may also be of interest. Nick-D (talk) 00:12, 8 October 2017 (UTC)

Its likely a myth. Bureaucracy developes with size and can be found in all big companies or organisations. Even Atilla The Hun had some established Bureaucracy.

The Public sector has one huge disadvantage compared to the Private. It usually has to be transparent and publicly accountable for everything, while organisations in the private sector can and usually will keep their failures and bad investments a secret until they have to file for bankruptcy. So they always seem to work stable at peak efficiency but that is usually much closer to what the managers want the shareholders to believe than to the truth. And of course therefor there cant be official Bureaucracy in a privat company. The shareholders would never accept that, would they? --Kharon (talk) 21:43, 8 October 2017 (UTC)

The proposition is an over-simplification. The British National Health Service is often quoted as having much lower admin costs than most private health systems. The French have publicly run train systems which are very efficient and popular. The BBC introduced 'market-like' internal mechanisms 20-ish years ago and the effect was to increase overheads with few benefits. There is a widespread modern obsession that 'public is bad, private is good'. It's too simplistic. Pincrete (talk) 22:40, 12 October 2017 (UTC)

Discharged soldiers and yet-to-be-prosecuted military crimes

Was reading the article Holohan murder case.

I quote Icardi and LoDolce were outside the jurisdiction of U.S. military authorities because they had been discharged, and U.S. Courts had no jurisdiction over offenses committed in Italy. ("Icardi offered to reenter the Army in order to submit to a court martial and clear up any questions", but for some reason, this never eventuated).

I am baffled! Does this mean that once you are discharged from the military (for reasons unrelated to military crimes - e.g. a "honorable", "medical" or "general" discharge), you're scot-free from being court-martialed and sent to jail or executed? It's really a case of '"no charge after discharge", even if, back during your time in the military, you committed serious war crimes or whatever???

I know in the Holohan case, Italy, as the jurisdiction where the alleged crime took place, attempted to prosecute, but I still remain baffled by the lack of powers on the part of the U.S. military to try or punish a discharged soldier for crimes committed during his service.

Is this a real loophole in attempts to enforce military justice? If yes, why does it exist? And has it been exploited by other "military criminals"? (My question is in no way limited to the Holohan case). Eliyohub (talk) 21:19, 7 October 2017 (UTC)

Courts-martial in the United States says it has to do with members of the military. ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 22:23, 7 October 2017 (UTC)

It's not a "loophole", it just means a change of venue/jurisdiction. I am pressed for time today so here's a short answer. Others may be able to fill in the blanks and/or provide the references. The Toth case provided the law in this area (unless it has been superseded). See Uniform Code of Military Justice (and maybe Military discharge) for background. The UCMJ was adopted in 1950. I'm not familiar with the case in question or the laws during WWII, but currently, the UCMJ applies only to service members (and certain civilians working for the military, immediate family members of military personnel and in martial law situations). For non-service members, crimes investigated by the military are referred to the relevant civilian jurisdiction for potential prosecution. If a service member is not charged before discharge, the case will be referred to the appropriate local civilian jurisdiction. However, discharged service members may still be subject to military jurisdiction for past crimes if they are subject to recall (e.g. retired officers, IRR, certain former Marine Corps and Navy personnel, etc.)

Article 3(A) used to require that "anyone charged with committing, while subject to the UCMJ, an offense that is punishable by confinement of five years or more, and which cannot be tried in any State or Federal court, shall remain subject to court martial even though he might otherwise be no longer amenable to military jurisdiction" but that was overturned by the Supreme Court in the Toth case. (see [http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1309&context=faculty_scholarship here. Toth is explained starting on pg 159.)--William Thweatt ^TalkContribs 23:10, 7 October 2017 (UTC)

I have to say it does seem like a bit of a loophole in the case referenced by Eliyohub. A murder is alleged to have been committed, with the accused still alive and not having passed any ordinary sort of statute of limitations, and yet they could not be prosecuted because no one had jurisdiction.

I think that's pretty rare, though. A lot more common is getting around double jeopardy by having the principals/facts subject to multiple jurisdictions. For example, Timothy Hennis was tried in North Carolina for a triple murder; he was found not guilty. He then re-enlisted in the Army and served out his term to retirement.

This proved to be a serious error; new evidence emerged, and the Army recalled him to active duty, put him on trial, and sentenced him to death. If he had simply found a different job after the state trial, I believe by that time he would have had his unconditional discharge, and it would have been impossible to retry him. --Trovatore (talk) 07:02, 8 October 2017 (UTC)

But our article (and Eliyohub) suggests they were prosecuted. And it suggests it was only the Americans who viewed the Italians as not having jurisdiction, not the Italians themselves. My impression is the US lacking jurisdiction when a murder of a non US national was committed outside the US, even if the murderer themselves is an American citizen isn't that uncommon. And actually it isn't that uncommon in general terms. Extraterritorial jurisdiction only tends to apply for something beyond a simple murder terrorism, war crimes etc and also see e.g [1] (and certain other things like child sex offences), or perhaps in cases where the victim of a citizen of the country claiming jurisdiction (the US is one obvious example here). It may be true that the US not recognising the country where murder accorded as having jurisdiction. But then again, extradition is complicated. Even if jurisdiction is recognised it's not like extradiction is guaranteed. There's little chance, for example, that the US will extradite someone who murdered an innocent person in North Korea, no matter that no one disagrees the crime happened. In fact, I'm not even convinced that the US will extradite the person if there is Korean re-unification and the part that is the North is under control of a government recognised for their respect of human rights and the rule of law. Nil Einne (talk) 11:47, 8 October 2017 (UTC)

Indeed, there are some countries (including Germany) which will not extradite their own citizens - see Extradition#Own_citizens. They may prosecute crimes committed abroad locally, however (and extradition typically only happens if the crime is punishable in both countries involved). --Stephan Schulz (talk) 15:41, 8 October 2017 (UTC)

I should add that I missed until now that the last section in our article, although unsourced appears to suggest there is dispute over whether one of the Americans (and probably both of them) were even involved in the murder. Also I missed that the murder victim was an American. If it were a crime committed now, my understanding is that 18 U.S. Code § 1119 would cover it. (I thought the US more generally claimed exraterritorial jurisdiction over run of the mill murders of American citizens by foreign nationals albeit only generally exercised when they didn't feel anyone else with jurisdiction was taking enough efforts. But it seems 18 U.S. Code § 2332 is the closest but doesn't apply go general murders.) Not legal advice obviously.

About the example for Germany I think in those cases the person can be tried for murder even if the victim was not a German national and the crime was committed outside Germany? Well assuming there is enough evidence etc. At least I know this happened with a Chinese citizen who committed a murder in NZ, see Trial of Xiao Zhen.

Anyway, one more thing is that even if you say the Holohan case show loophole, as I understand it the military angle is in some ways irrelevant here. You would have had the same if the the Americans who at one time were alleged to have been involved in the murder, were civilians when the murder occurred. It's not like the civilian jurisdiction was lost because they were in the military, but rather there never was any in the US because of the crime not being committed in the US. Albeit the reason the US didn't recognise the Italians as having jurisdiction was because they didn't control the territory which arose due to the war, and during a war like that it's likely that there won't be many American civilians running around free.

Nil Einne (talk) 18:57, 8 October 2017 (UTC)

BTW, one area where there has generally been a loophole is that of private military contractors operating on behalf of the US etc in other countries. Since in those cases the local governments have often been required to give them immunity, but legislation taking on jurisdiction in the US (or wherever) has often been limited [2] [3] [4] [5]. Nil Einne (talk) 19:09, 8 October 2017 (UTC)

The Italian government position in the Holohan murder case seems to be quite inconisistent with its position in the Enrica Lexie case... AnonMoos (talk) 22:00, 8 October 2017 (UTC)

I'd call that a very very strange statement. The Holohan murder case happened during war time, on Italian soil (but not in an area under effective control of the Italian government), and more than 70 years ago - in particular before the overhaul of international laws and treaties after WW2. The Enrica Lexi case happened in 2012, in international waters (that India makes some tentative claims over). And the Italians actually seem to acknowledge Indian jurisdiction, if only implicitly, because they have returned the soldiers to Indian custody. I think there are so many differences between the cases that it's hard to construct an analogy either way (and I have no opinion on the substance of either case). --Stephan Schulz (talk) 10:17, 9 October 2017 (UTC)

If the aggrieved country just sends agents to grab the accused, drug him, and fly him back to their country to face trial, do the circumstances of the capture constitute an effective defense? Edison (talk) 16:28, 9 October 2017 (UTC)

That would depend on how things work in that country. ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 16:40, 9 October 2017 (UTC)

From Adolf Eichmann: "In Eichmann's trial and subsequent appeal, the Israeli court determined that the circumstances of his capture had no bearing on the legality of his trial". Rmhermen (talk) 04:15, 10 October 2017 (UTC)

As opposed to the Osama bin Laden situation, where they simply plugged him where he stood. ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 06:06, 10 October 2017 (UTC)

...and a couple of bystanders of various, but certainly not legally determined, levels of innocence and guilt. Not one of the great examples of the civilised world living up to its ideals. --Stephan Schulz (talk) 07:44, 10 October 2017 (UTC)

Bin Laden was a marked man, so guarding him amounted to a suicide mission. ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 16:36, 10 October 2017 (UTC)

I completely fail to se the relevance of this comment. --Stephan Schulz (talk) 21:43, 10 October 2017 (UTC)

I assumed you were talking about others killed while Bin Laden was being hunted. If that's not it, then you need to explain. ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 23:28, 10 October 2017 (UTC)

Yes, I was. How is the fact that some of them may have been guarding him make extralegal killings any more civilised? We expect a legal process for a reason... --Stephan Schulz (talk) 06:38, 11 October 2017 (UTC)

There's also the case of United States v. Alvarez-Machain in the US although Humberto Álvarez Machaín ended up be acquited (probably) unrelated to the abduction. And the kidnappers weren't agents of, or hired by, the state. (But they were hired by agents of the state acting in their private capacity.) Nil Einne (talk) 17:44, 11 October 2017 (UTC)

See status of forces agreement and extraterritoriality for some of the concepts relevant in this kind of situation. Nyttend (talk) 23:42, 11 October 2017 (UTC)