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Romani ambush
Part of the Yom Kippur War/October War
Date October 7, 1973 Location Northern Sinai, near the village of Romani Result Egyptian objectives accomplished; Commando force decimated
Belligerents
Egypt	Israel
Commanders and leaders
Hamdy Shalabi	Natke Nir
Strength
unknown	162nd Division
Casualties and losses
70 dead	30 dead, 20 injured

The Romani ambush is an engagement that took place between the Egyptian Army and the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) on the morning of October 7, 1973, the second day of the Yom Kippur War, near the village of Romani in northern Sinai. It was carried out by Egyptian airborne infantry to delay the arrival of Israeli armored reserves to the Suez Canal in support of Operation Badr. The ambush succeeded in inflicting casualties and substantially delaying Israelis reserves, though the most of the Egyptian force was destroyed.

Background

On October 6, 1973, Egypt launched Operation Badr, crossing the Suez Canal into Israeli-occupied Sinai. Egyptian forces attacked the Israeli Bar-Lev Line, immediately located behind the canal. Taken by surprise, the IDF rushed its tactical and operational reserves (mainly armored forces) to the canal, most of which had been decimated by morning on October 7. Arriving on that day from Israel proper were the strategic reserves, among which was the 162nd Armored Division commanded by Major General Abraham Adan.

In support of the crossing operation, the Egyptian High Command had planned several operations to hamper the arrival of Israeli reserves until bridges could be set up, employing airborne forces to block strategic routes. Helicopters would be used to transport them, but once inserted there would be no evacuation, effectively making the operation a suicidal one. The Sa'iqa (lightening) forces, described alternatively as commandos or elite light infantry, were tasked with performing these missions, considered crucial by Egyptian commanders for the success of Operation Badr.

Prelude

The 183rd Battalion of the 139th Sa'iqa Group, commanded by Colonel Osama Ibrahim, was given a number of blocking missions on several strategic routes. One of these was the northern coastal road extending from el-Arish to Port Fouad. A reinforced company led by Captain Hamdy Shalabi was assigned to the northern road, tasked with stalling the advance of Israeli reserves between three to four hours until the Second Field Army has finished laying bridges. At 6:00 PM on October 6, the company was airlifted from Abu Soweir Airbase near Ismailia by six Mi-8 helicopters (each capable of ferrying 25 soldiers). The helicopters managed to safely land the company Sa'iqa at Tel el-Farma near the coastal road, the helicopters returning to base. From there the Sa'iqa advanced to Romani, over 30 kilometers east of the canal, and at midnight the company proceeded to set up blocking positions.

Captain Shalabi established his company on a single line just north of the road, the unit dispersed along a three kilometer area. Anti-tank mines were placed on and around the road. Shalabi organized his ambush force into several groups, and established a base for patrols in the rear, which the company could fall back upon. Having dug in, the Sa'iqa waited for the arrival of Israeli reserves.

Battle

Moving on the northern route on the morning of October 7 was Colonel Nathan "Natke" Nir's Armored Brigade of the reserve 162nd Division. At 6:00 AM, an armored column from one of the brigade's battalions began entering Romani. The columnn entered the designated ambush area, and the Israelis began unloading their tanks off the tank transporters. At that point, Shalabi ordered his men to engage, and the Egyptians opened fire. Using automatic weapons, AT-3 Sagger anti-tank guided missiles and RPG-7s, the Sa'iqa destroyed 18 tanks, APCs and transports and inflicted casualties in personnel. They had also managed to ambush a bus full of Israeli soldiers coming from canal and moving eastwards, destroying the bus and killing its occupants.

Nir reported the ambush to Adan, saying one of his units had been hit by a large Egyptian force dispersed among the sand dunes north of the road. Afterwards ordered one of his battalions, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Assaf Yagouri, to turn to the rear and clear the road. Organizing his battalion, Yagouri employed over 20 tanks and a small force of armored infantry. The Israelis attacked the Sa'iqa, closing on their positions from several directions, but the Egyptians put up a strong resistance, and the tanks found it difficult to move through the dunes. Israeli tanks employed machine guns and some resorted to running over the infantry, but a number of tanks were hit by mines placed the night before.

The fighting dragged on, and an Israeli infantry company was airdropped by four helicopters behind the Egyptian positions to help with the attack. As the fighting turned to close quarters, the Sa'iqa began using anti-tank grenades (either RKG-3 or RPG-6 grenades), while some managed to climb over the tanks themselves and throw grenades inside the turrets. The Israelis were eventually able to overcome the Sa'iqa after three hours of fighting, losing an additional twelve tanks and APC's, thirty men killed, and twenty wounded. For their part, the Sa'iqa lost 75 men killed throughout the battle. Captain Shalabi managed to regroup the few survivors left of the ambush force and fall back to the patrols organized further back. From there, the company trekked eastwards through the marshlands under cover of darkness, eventually making it back to friendly lines near Port Fouad at dawn on October 8.

Aftermath

After overcoming regaining control of the northern road, the Israelis proceeded to clear it, bringing up bulldozers to remove the debris to open the road for traffic again. Despite heavy casualties, the Egyptian ambush had succeeded in closing the northern road for over five hours, in the process inflicting losses as well. Of the various special operations conducted by Sa'iqa forces at the start of the Yom Kippur War, the Egyptian ambush at Romani was perhaps the most successful action, and the most famous. Israeli commander Adan would later comment on the significance of this ambush for Israeli reservists arriving to the front, saying: "Natke's experience fighting against the stubborn Egyptian commandos who tried to cut off the road around Romani showed again that this was no longer the same Egyptian army we had crushed in four days in 1967. We were now dealing with a well-trained enemy, fighting with skill and dedication."

Sources

• Heitan Haber, Zeev Schiff, Lexicon of the Yom Kippur War, Or Yehoda: Zemora-Bitan, Devir, 2003

References

Bibliography

• Dupuy, Trevor N. (2002). Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974. Military Book Club. ISBN 0965442802.
• Gawrych, George (2000). The Albatross of Decisive Victory: War and Policy Between Egypt and Israel in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 0313313024.
• Hammad, Gamal (2002). Military Battles on the Egyptian Front (First ed.). Dār al-Shurūq. ISBN 9770908665. (in Arabic)
• O'Ballance, Edgar (1997). No Victor, No Vanquished: The Arab-Israeli War, 1973. Presidio. ISBN 0891416153.
• Gawrych, George W. (1996). The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory. Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Retrieved 15 December 2010.

[[Category:Conflicts in 1973]] [[Category:1973 in Egypt]] [[Category:Battles of the Yom Kippur War]] [[Category:Battles involving Israel]] [[Category:Battles involving Egypt]]