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User:Gog the Mild/Fight for the beaches at Omaha Beach

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Lead and infobox

Background and preparations edit

Initial assault edit

 
Official history map showing first assault wave landings
 
Dog Green
 
Dog White
 
Dog Red
 
Easy Green
 
Easy Red
 
Fox Green

Despite these preparations, very little went according to plan. Ten landing craft were swamped by the rough seas before they reached the beach, and several others stayed afloat only because their passengers bailed water out with their helmets.[1][2] Seasickness was prevalent among the troops waiting offshore. On the 16th RCT front, the landing boats passed struggling men in life preservers and on rafts, survivors of the DD tanks which had sunk in the rough sea.[3] Navigation of the landing vehicles was made difficult by the smoke and mist obscuring the landmarks they were to use in guiding themselves in, while a strong current pushed them continually eastward.[4]

As the boats approached to within a few hundred yards of the shore, they came under increasingly intense fire from automatic weapons and artillery. The force only then discovered the ineffectiveness of the pre-landing bombardment. The bombers, facing overcast conditions, had been ordered to implement a pre-arranged plan to compensate for decreased accuracy. The center of targeting was displaced inland to assure the safety of the landing allied troops. As a result, there was little or no damage to the beach defenses.[5]

Tank landings edit

Because sea conditions were so rough, the decision was made for the 116th LCT to carry the DD tanks of the 743rd Tank Battalion all the way to the beach, after 27 of the initial 29 DD tanks of the 741st Tank Battalion were swamped while wading to shore. Coming in opposite the well-defended Vierville draw, Company B of the 743rd Tank Battalion lost all but one of its officers and half of its DD tanks. The other two companies landed to the left of B/743 without initial loss. On the 16th RCT front, the two DD tanks from the 741st Tank Battalion that had survived the swim ashore were joined by three others that were landed directly onto the beach because of their LCT's damaged ramp. The remaining tank company managed to land 14 of its 16 tanks (although three of these were quickly knocked out).[6][7]

Infantry landings edit

I was the first one out. The seventh man was the next one to get across the beach without being hit. All the ones in-between were hit. Two were killed; three were injured. That's how lucky you had to be.

Captain Richard Merrill, 2nd Ranger Battalion.[8]

Of the nine companies landing in the first wave, only Company A of the 116th RCT at Dog Green and the Rangers to their right landed where intended. E/116, aiming for Easy Green, ended up scattered across the two beaches of the 16th RCT area.[9] G/116, aiming for Dog White, opened up a 1,000-yard (900 m) gap between themselves and A/116 to their right when they landed at Easy Green instead. I/16 drifted so far east it did not land for another hour and a half.[10]

As infantry disembarked from the landing craft, they often found themselves on sandbars 50 to 100 yards (46 to 91 meters) out. To reach the beach they had to wade through water sometimes neck deep, and they still had 200 yards (180 m) or more to go when they did reach shore. Those that made it to the shingle did so at a walking pace because they were so heavily laden. Most sections had to brave the full weight of fire from small arms, mortars, artillery, and interlocking fields of machine gun fire.[11] Where the naval bombardment set grass fires burning, as it had at Dog Red opposite the Les Moulins strongpoint, the smoke obscured the landing troops and prevented effective fire from being laid down by the defenders.[9] Some sections of G/116 and F/116 were able to reach the shingle bank relatively unscathed, though the latter became disorganized after the loss of their officers. G/116 was able to retain some cohesion, but this was soon lost as they made their way westwards under fire along the shingle in an attempt to reach their assigned objectives.[12] The scattering of the boats was most evident on the 16th RCT front, where parts of E/16, F/16 and E/116 had intermingled, making it difficult for sections to come together to improvise company assaults that might have reversed the situation caused by the mis-landings. Those scattered sections of E/116 landing at Easy Red were able to escape heavy casualties, although, having encountered a deep runnel after being landed on a sandbank, they were forced to discard most of their weapons to make the swim ashore.[13]

Omaha Beach, Easy Red sector or environs.[14] At 0:39, this clip shows a large cadre of men running up a foggy beach covered in Czech hedgehogs.

Casualties were most severe among the troops landing at either end of Omaha. In the east at Fox Green and the adjacent stretch of Easy Red, scattered elements of three companies were reduced to half strength by the time they gained the relative safety of the shingle, many of them having crawled the 300 yards (270 m) of beach just ahead of the incoming tide. Within 15 minutes of landing at Dog Green on the western end of the beach, A/116 had been cut to pieces, the leaders among the 120 or so casualties,[12][15][16][note 1] the survivors reduced to seeking cover at the water's edge or behind obstacles. The smaller Ranger company to their right had fared a little better, having made the shelter of the bluffs, but were also down to half strength.

L/16 eventually landed, 30 minutes late, to the left of Fox Green, taking casualties as the boats ran in and more as they crossed the 200 yards (180 m) of beach. The terrain at the very eastern end of Omaha gave them enough protection to allow the 125 survivors to organize and begin an assault of the bluffs. They were the only company in the first wave able to operate as a unit.[17] All the other companies were, at best, disorganized, mostly leaderless and pinned down behind the shingle with no hope of carrying out their assault missions. At worst, they had ceased to exist as fighting units. Nearly all had landed at least a few hundred yards off target, and in an intricately planned operation where each section on each boat had been assigned a specific task, this was enough to throw the whole plan off.

Engineer landings edit

Like the infantry, the engineers had been pushed off their targets, and only five of the 16 teams arrived at their assigned locations. Three teams came in where there were no infantry or armor to cover them. Working under intense fire, the engineers set about their task of clearing gaps through the beach obstacles—work made more difficult by loss of equipment, and by infantry passing through or taking cover behind the obstacles they were trying to blow. They also suffered heavy casualties as enemy fire set off the explosives they were working with. Eight men of one team were dragging their pre-loaded rubber boat off the LCM when artillery hit; only one survived the resulting detonation of their supplies. Another team had just finished laying its explosives when the area was struck by mortar fire. The premature explosion of the charges killed or wounded 19 engineers, as well as some nearby infantry. Nevertheless, the engineers succeeded in clearing six gaps, one each at Dog White and Easy Green on the 116th RCT front, the other four at Easy Red on the 16th RCT front. They had suffered casualties of over 40 percent.[18][19]

Second assault wave edit

 
Official history map showing the second assault wave landings.

With the initial targets unaccomplished, the second and larger wave of assault landings brought in reinforcements, support weapons and headquarters elements at 07:00 to face nearly the same difficulties as had the first. The second wave was larger, and so the defenders' fire was less concentrated. The survivors of the first wave were unable to provide effective covering fire, and in places the fresh landing troops suffered casualty rates as high as those of the first wave. Failure to clear paths through the beach obstacles also added to the difficulties of the second wave. In addition, the incoming tide was beginning to hide the remaining obstacles, causing high attrition among the landing craft before they had reached the shore. As in the initial landings, difficult navigation caused disruptive mislandings, scattering the infantry and separating vital headquarters elements from their units.[20]

On the 116th RCT front, the remainder of the 1st Battalion, B/116, C/116 and D/116, were due to land in support of A/116 at Dog Green. Three boats, including their headquarters and beach-master groups, landed too far west, under the cliffs. Their exact casualties in getting across the beach are unknown, but the one-third to one-half that made it to shore spent the rest of the day pinned down by snipers. Not all sections of the badly scattered B/116 landed there, but those that did were quickly forced to join those survivors of A/116 fighting for survival at the water's edge.[21] Two companies of 2nd Rangers, coming in later on the edge of Dog Green, did manage to reach the seawall, but at the cost of half their strength.[22]

To the left of Dog Green sat Dog White, between the Vierville and Les Moulins strongpoints (defending draws D-1 and D-3); and here was a different story. As a result of earlier mis-landings, and now because of their own mis-landing, the troops of C/116 found themselves alone at Dog White, with a handful of tanks from the first wave in sight. The smoke from the grass fires covering their advance up the beach, they gained the seawall with few casualties, and were in better shape than any unit on the 116th RCT front so far.[23] Although the 1st Battalion was effectively disarmed of its heavy weapons when D/116 suffered a disastrous landing, the buildup at Dog White continued. C/116 was joined by the 5th Ranger Battalion almost in its entirety. The Ranger commander, recognizing the situation at Dog Green on the run-in, ordered the assault craft to divert into Dog White. Like the C/116, the smoke covered their advance, although the 2nd Rangers were caught out on the right flank of the Ranger's landing. This was where the 116th RCT regimental command group, including the 29th Division assistant commander Brig. Gen. Norman "Dutch" Cota, was able to land relatively unscathed.[22]

Further east, the strongpoint defenses were effective. On the Dog Red/Easy Green boundary, the defenses around the Les Moulins strongpoint took a heavy toll on the remaining 2nd Battalion, with H/116 and headquarters elements struggling ashore there. The survivors joined the remnants of F/116 behind the shingle, and here the battalion commander was able to organize 50 men for an improvised advance across the shingle. A further advance up the bluffs just east of Les Moulins was too weak to have any effect and was forced back down.[24] To their left, mainly between the draws on the Easy Green/Easy Red boundary, the 116th RCT's support battalion landed without too much loss, although they did become scattered, and were too disorganized to play any immediate part in an assault on the bluffs.[25]

On the 16th RCT front, at the eastern end of Easy Red, was another area between strongpoints. This allowed G/16 and the support battalion to escape complete destruction in their advance up the beach. Nevertheless, most of G/16's 63 casualties for the day came before they had reached the shingle. The other 2nd Battalion company landed in the second wave; H/16 came in a few hundred yards to the left, opposite the E-3 draw, and suffered for it – they were put out of action for several hours.[26]

On the easternmost beach, Fox Green, elements of five different companies had become entangled, and the situation was little improved by the equally disorganized landings of the second wave. Two more companies of the 3rd Battalion joined the melee, and, having drifted east in the first wave, I/16 finally made their traumatic landing on Fox Green, at 08:00. Two of their six boats were swamped on their detour to the east, and as they came in under fire, three of the four remaining boats were damaged by artillery or mines, and the fourth was hung up on an obstacle. A captain from this company found himself senior officer, and in charge of the badly out of shape 3rd Battalion.[27]

American situation edit

 
Assault troops of the 3rd Battalion, 16th RCT, from the first two waves, shelter under the chalk cliffs (which identify this as an area of Fox Red).

Along with the infantry landing in the second wave, supporting arms began to arrive, meeting the same chaos and destruction as had the rifle companies. Combat engineers, tasked with clearing the exits and marking beaches, landed off-target and without their equipment.

Many half-tracks, jeeps and trucks foundered in deep water; those that made it ashore soon became jammed up on the narrowing beach, making easy targets for the German defenders. Most of the radios were lost, making the task of organizing the scattered and dispirited troops even more difficult, and those command groups that did make the shore found their effectiveness limited to their immediate vicinity. Except for a few surviving tanks and a heavy weapons squad here or there, the assault troops had only their personal weapons, which, having been dragged through surf and sand, invariably needed cleaning before they could be used.[28]

The survivors at the shingle, many facing combat for the first time, found themselves relatively well-protected from small arms fire, but still exposed to artillery and mortars. In front of them lay heavily mined flats exposed to active fire from the bluffs above. Morale naturally became a problem.[29] Many groups were leaderless and witnesses to the fate of neighboring troops and landings coming in around them. Wounded men on the beach were drowning in the incoming tide and incoming landing craft were being pounded and set ablaze.[30]

German situation edit

By 07:35, the third battalion of the 726th Grenadier Regiment, defending Draw F-1 on Fox Green beach, was reporting that 100–200 American troops had penetrated the front, with troops inside the wire at WN-62 and WN-61 attacking the Germans from the rear.[31] From the German vantage point at Pointe de la Percée, overlooking the whole beach from the western end, it seemed that the assault had been stopped at the beach. An officer there noted that troops were seeking cover behind obstacles, and counted ten tanks burning.[32] Thus, as late as 13:35, the 352nd division was reporting that the assault had been hurled back into the sea.[33] Heinrich Severloh, a machine-gunner of 352 at WN62 got the soubriquet "The beast of Omaha": he claimed to have fired that day 400 rounds from two rifles and a staggering 13,500 rounds from his MG 42; an ammunition weight of over 560 kg. An NCO ferried ammunition from a nearby underground bunker. Low on ammunition, he even fired phosphorescent tracer rounds, which revealed his position.[34]

Casualties among the defenders were mounting. While the 916th regiment, defending the center of the 352nd zone, was reporting that the landings had been frustrated, it was also requesting reinforcements. The request could not be met, because the situation elsewhere in Normandy was becoming more urgent for the defenders. The reserve force of the German 352nd division, the 915th regiment, which had earlier been deployed against the US airborne landings to the west of Omaha, was diverted to the Gold zone east of Omaha, where German defenses were crumbling.[35]


Breakthrough edit

"Are you going to lay there and get killed, or get up and do something about it?"

Unidentified lieutenant, Easy Red.[36]

The key geographical features that had influenced the landings also influenced the next phase of the battle: the draws, the natural exits off the beaches, were the main targets in the initial assault plan. The strongly concentrated defenses around these draws meant that the troops landing near them quickly became incapable of carrying out a further assault. In the areas between the draws, at the bluffs, units were able to land in greater strength. Defenses were also weaker away from the draws, thus most advances were made there.[37]

The other key aspect of the next few hours was leadership. The original plan was in tatters, with so many units mis-landed, disorganized and scattered. Most commanders had fallen or were absent, and there were few ways to communicate, other than shouted commands. In places, small groups of men, sometimes scratched together from different companies, in some cases from different divisions, were "...inspired, encouraged or bullied..."[29] out of the relative safety of the shingle, starting the dangerous task of reducing the defenses atop the bluffs.

Assaulting the bluffs edit

 
Aerial view of Omaha showing the draws, left to right; Vierville (D-1), Les Moulins (D-3), St. Laurent (E-1), Colleville (E-3) and "Number 5 Draw" (F-1).

Survivors of C company 2nd Rangers in the first wave landed on Dog Green around 06:45; by 07:30, they had scaled the cliffs near Dog Green and the Vierville draw. They were joined later by a mis-landed section from B/116, and this group spent the better part of the day tying up and eventually taking WN-73, which defended draw D-1 at Vierville.[36][38]

At 07:50, Cota led the charge off of Dog Green, between WN-68 and WN-70, by forcing gaps in the wire with a Bangalore torpedo and wire cutters. Twenty minutes later, the 5th Rangers joined the advance, and blew more openings. The command party established themselves at the top of the bluff, and elements of G/116 and H/116 joined them, having earlier moved laterally along the beach, and now the narrow front had widened to the east. Before 09:00, small parties from F/116 and B/116 reached the crests just east of Dog White.[38][39] The right flank of this penetration was covered by the survivors of the 2nd Rangers’ A and B companies, who had independently fought their way to the top between 08:00 and 08:30. They took WN-70 (already heavily damaged by naval shells), and joined the 5th Rangers for the move inland. By 09:00, more than 600 American troops, in groups ranging from company sized to just a few men, had reached the top of the bluff opposite Dog White and were advancing inland.[40][41]

The 3rd battalion 116th RCT forced its way across the flats and up the bluff between WN-66 (which defended the D-3 draw at Les Moulins), and WN-65 (defending the E-1 draw). They advanced in small groups, supported by the heavy weapons of M/116, who were held at the base of the bluff. Progress was slowed by mines on the slopes of the bluff, but elements of all three rifle companies, as well as a stray section of G/116, had gained the top by 09:00, causing the defenders at WN-62 to mistakenly report that both WN-65 and WN-66 had been taken.[42][43]

Between 07:30 and 08:30 elements of G/16, E/16, and E/116 came together and climbed the bluffs at Easy Red, between WN-64 (defending the E-1 draw) and WN-62 (the E-3 draw). At 09:05, German observers reported that WN-61 was lost, and that one machine gun was still firing from WN-62. 150 men, mostly from G/16, having reached the top hampered more by minefields than by enemy fire, continued south to attack the WN-63 command post on the edge of Colleville. Meanwhile, E/16, led by Second Lieutenant John M. Spalding and Captain Robert L. Sheppard V, turned westward along the top of the bluffs, engaging in a two-hour battle for WN-64. His small group of just four men had effectively neutralized this point by mid-morning, taking 21 prisoners—just in time to prevent them from attacking freshly landing troops.[44] On the beach below, the 16th RCT commander, Colonel George Taylor had landed at 08:15. With the words "Two kinds of people are staying on this beach, the dead and those who are going to die – now let's get the hell out of here!"[45] he organized groups of men regardless of their unit, putting them under the command of the nearest non-commissioned officer and sending them through the area opened up by G/16. By 09:30, the regimental command post was set up just below the bluff crest, and the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 16th RCT were being sent inland as they reached the crest.[46]

On Fox Green, at the eastern end of Omaha, four sections of L/16 had survived their landing intact and were now leading elements of I/16, K/16 and E/116 up the slopes. With supporting fire from the heavy weapons of M/16, tanks and destroyers, this force eliminated WN-60, which defended the draw at F-1; by 09:00, the 3rd battalion 16th RCT was moving inland.[38][47]

Naval support edit

 
USS Frankford

The only artillery support for the troops making these tentative advances was from the navy. Finding targets difficult to spot, and in fear of hitting their own troops, the big guns of the battleships and cruisers concentrated fire on the flanks of the beaches. The destroyers were able to get in closer, and from 08:00 began engaging their own targets. At 09:50, two minutes after the McCook destroyed a 75 mm gun position in WN-74, the destroyers were ordered to get as close in as possible. Some approached within 1,000 yards (910 m) several times, scraping bottom and risking running aground.[31] An engineer who had landed in the first wave at Fox Red, watching the Frankford steaming in towards shore, thought she had been badly hit and was being beached. Instead, she turned parallel to the beach and cruised westwards, guns blazing at targets of opportunity. Thinking she would turn back out to sea, the engineer soon saw that she had instead begun backing up, guns still firing. At one point, gunners aboard the Frankford saw an immobilized tank at the water's edge, still firing. Watching the fall of its shot, they followed up with a salvo of their own. In this manner, the tank acted as the ship's fire control party for several minutes.[48]

German defenses inland edit

While the coastal defenses had not turned back the invasion at the beach, they had broken up and weakened the assault formations struggling through them. The German emphasis on this Main Line of Resistance (MLR) meant that defenses further inland were significantly weaker, and based on small pockets of prepared positions smaller than company sized in strength. This tactic was enough to disrupt American advances inland, making it difficult even to reach the assembly areas, let alone achieve their D-Day objectives.[49] As an example of the effectiveness of German defenses despite weakness in numbers, the 5th Ranger battalion was halted in its advance inland by a single machine gun position hidden in a hedgerow. One platoon attempted to outflank the position, only to run into another machine gun position to the left of the first. A second platoon dispatched to take this new position ran into a third, and attempts to deal with this met with fire from a fourth position. The success of the MLR in blocking the movement of heavy weapons off the beach meant that, after four hours, the Rangers were forced to give up on attempts to move them any further inland.[50]

Notes, citations and sources edit

Notes edit

  1. ^ Official estimates put the casualties for A/116 as high as two thirds, but of the more than 200 strong company Neillands and De Normann report that the unit "...had 91 men killed and almost as many wounded. Less than 20 men got across the beach." Stephen Ambrose reports that the company "...had lost 96% of its effective strength."

Citations edit

  1. ^ Marshall, Samuel (November 1960). "First Wave at Omaha Beach". The Atlantic. Retrieved October 3, 2021.
  2. ^ "D-Day: The Allies Invade Europe". The National WWII Museum. Retrieved October 3, 2021.
  3. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. pp. 38–39. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  4. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. p. 40. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  5. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. p. 41. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  6. ^ Badsey, Stephen; Bean, Tim (2004). Omaha Beach. Sutton Publishing. p. 61. ISBN 0-7509-3017-9.
  7. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. p. 42. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  8. ^ Bastable, Jonathon (2006). Voices from D-Day. David & Charles. p. 131. ISBN 0-7153-2553-1.
  9. ^ a b "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. p. 45. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  10. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. pp. 47–48. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  11. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. pp. 43–44. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  12. ^ a b "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. p. 47. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  13. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. p. 48. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  14. ^ "Guest Post 24: Charles Herrick on Capa's D-Day (e) Photocritic International". www.nearbycafe.com. Retrieved 2023-04-05.
  15. ^ Neillands, Robin; De Normann, Roderick (2001). D-Day, Voices from Normandy. Cassell Military Paperbacks. p. 189. ISBN 0-304-35981-5.
  16. ^ Ambrose, Stephen E. (2002). D-Day, June 6, 1944, The Battle for the Normandy Beaches. Pocket Books. p. 331. ISBN 0-7434-4974-6.
  17. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. pp. 48–49. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  18. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. pp. 42–43. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  19. ^ http://www.americandday.org/Veterans/Ross_Wesley.html eyewitness account
  20. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. p. 49. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  21. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. pp. 50–51. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  22. ^ a b "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. p. 53. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  23. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. p. 50. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  24. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. pp. 51–52. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  25. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. p. 52. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  26. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. pp. 53–54. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  27. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. p. 54. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  28. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. pp. 54–57. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  29. ^ a b "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. p. 57. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  30. ^ Omaha Beachhead, 6 June - 13 June 1944 (PDF). United States Army Center of Military History. 5 February 2015. pp. 47, 57, 82. ISBN 978-1-507-85568-3. Retrieved October 2, 2021.
  31. ^ a b Badsey, Stephen; Bean, Tim (2004). Omaha Beach. Sutton Publishing. p. 71. ISBN 0-7509-3017-9.
  32. ^ Badsey, Stephen; Bean, Tim (2004). Omaha Beach. Sutton Publishing. pp. 135–136. ISBN 0-7509-3017-9.
  33. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. p. 113. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  34. ^ Trigg 2019, pp. 78, 79.85, 86.
  35. ^ Harrison, Gordon A. (1951). "Cross-Channel Attack". Historical Division, War Department. pp. 320–321. Retrieved 2007-06-22.
  36. ^ a b "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. pp. 75–77. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  37. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. p. 58. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  38. ^ a b c Badsey, Stephen; Bean, Tim (2004). Omaha Beach. Sutton Publishing. p. 72. ISBN 0-7509-3017-9.
  39. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. pp. 59–62. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  40. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. pp. 77–78. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  41. ^ Badsey, Stephen; Bean, Tim (2004). Omaha Beach. Sutton Publishing. p. 73. ISBN 0-7509-3017-9.
  42. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. pp. 63–65. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  43. ^ Badsey, Stephen; Bean, Tim (2004). Omaha Beach. Sutton Publishing. pp. 73, 76. ISBN 0-7509-3017-9.
  44. ^ Badsey, Stephen; Bean, Tim (2004). Omaha Beach. Sutton Publishing. pp. 76–77. ISBN 0-7509-3017-9.
  45. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. p. 71. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  46. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. pp. 66–73. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  47. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. pp. 73–75. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  48. ^ Ambrose, Stephen E. (2002). D-Day, June 6, 1944, The Battle for the Normandy Beaches. Pocket Books. pp. 386–389. ISBN 0-7434-4974-6. The official history attributes a similar action to the Carmick: "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. p. 81. Retrieved 2007-06-10.
  49. ^ Harrison, Gordon A. (1951). "Cross-Channel Attack". Historical Division, War Department. p. 326. Retrieved 2007-06-22.
  50. ^ "Omaha Beachhead". Historical Division, War Department. 20 September 1945. p. 93. Retrieved 2007-06-10.

Sources edit

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