Talk:South West Africa campaign

portugal

Portugal was not a belligerent to after this campaign ended. I think we need sources for this.Slatersteven (talk) 13:11, 23 September 2010 (UTC)

Hermann Ritter

See Talk:Battle of Kakamas#Removed link as it is dubious that it is the same Hermann Ritter (referred to a musician and music historian

When I wrote the article Battle of Kakamas I used "Major Ritter" because the sources I used did not include his first name. The full name and link were added to the information box by another editor user:Nmillers with this edit. This is a new user name that has only made a few edits

That the link to the article Hermann Ritter was spotted as probably wrong by Mojowiha.

I also note that the name Hermann Ritter is also used in the article Battle of Otavi and a "Major Bitter" in the article Battle of Trekkopjes (Transcription error?). Now the question is do we have any reliable sources that say his name was Hermann Ritter and is Bitter anything more than a transcription error? -- PBS (talk) 23:33, 28 October 2011 (UTC)

I found a quite a number of references online to a 'Major Ritter' (no first name given) in google searches for 'ritter' and 'kakamas' (with or without 'major'). Unfortunately most of them cite this article (or parrot it)... Or they do not cite their sources.

I did find a few sources which do appear to be independent and original (both in German):

1) http://www.wfg-gk.de/geschichte14.html which claims to be based on 'Chronik von Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1883-1915' by H. E. Lessen (1966), see for instance: http://www.kuiseb-verlag.com/product_info.php?products_id=28

2) http://www.stahlgewitter.com/15_02_12.htm is based on ' Amtliche Kriegs-Depeschen nach Berichten des Wolff´schen Telegr.-Bureaus, Band 2, Nationaler Verlag, Berlin (1915)' which can be found on the Internet Archive: http://www.archive.org/details/amtlichekriegsde02contuoft (see pp. 404, report from February 12th)

So the name should most likely be Ritter, although I'm still lacking a first name.

Mojowiha (talk) 03:40, 29 October 2011 (UTC)

No first name in Max Schwarte: 'Der Weltkampf um Ehre und Recht' (1919-1933) either, [sobs] (http://wintersonnenwende.com/scriptorium/deutsch/archiv/weltkampf/wer0000.html see Vol. 4 on 'The War at Sea/The War for the Colonies/The War in Turkey/The Gas War/The Air War' at http://www.wintersonnenwende.com/scriptorium/deutsch/archiv/weltkampf/wer0422.html)

Mojowiha (talk) 04:32, 29 October 2011 (UTC)

I have left the 'Hermann' in place for now, but so far it seems it will have to go, unless someone can dig up a source. I'm not going to pursue this line of enquiry further myself now (got work & a deadline).

Mojowiha (talk) 04:37, 29 October 2011 (UTC)

I originally wrote the Battle of Otavi article and never finished writing the Trekkojes article. I too struggled with finding Major Ritter's first name but eventually found it, where i do not remember. Part of the difficulty in looking now is all the stupid content farm articles that have been created now clogging up the search results. I did find this "Biographies of Namibian Personalities" created five or six years ago that mentions a German South West Africa Schultztruppe officer named Hermann Ritter, though this doesnt appear to be the source i used it seems reliable and has a citation of Fischer 1935:79-80 which i cannot seem to find the book for.XavierGreen (talk) 17:39, 29 October 2011 (UTC)

I lost sources like this on older articles because back in the good old days there was less need to sources everything! As you say these mirror sites pollute searches and also of course the original link may be gone or if a book no longer available to preview (rip hair out !"$%^ &*). -- PBS (talk) 23:06, 29 October 2011 (UTC)

I am looking at the moment and have come across this which might be worth watching over the next few days. I have just completed a Google search and could not find his full name using in German or Afrikaans language options. But I did find and article that indicates that a Hermann Ritter was around and about:

• For Valour. The history of the Iron Cross and Wound Badge in German Southwest Africa 1914-1918

But the trouble is that the source indicates that there were several Ritters in the campaign and the following sources list several junior officers with the name Ritter from an list of officers in the secturity forces of South West Africa in 1904 one or more of them could have been majors in 1914.

• Security forces in German South West Africa (1904)

So these two sources indicate that there was more than one possible name for our Major Ritter. -- PBS (talk) 22:58, 29 October 2011 (UTC)

I really would like to find the Fischer 1935 book it would seem that the answer would definately be in it. Its too bad that the professor running the namibian history site passed away im sure he could have told us right away who it was. As for the Axis forum, i created that thread lol. It might be helpful to open one up at invasion zone as well. It from the sources you've provided that there were at least two oberleutnant Ritters there in 1904. I bet that "For Valour. The history of the Iron Cross and Wound Badge in German Southwest Africa 1914-1918" by Gordon McGregor could explain which of the ritters was in command since it gives details of their service in South West Africa though i cant seem to find a copy in the library systems near my humble aboad.XavierGreen (talk) 16:01, 30 October 2011 (UTC)

I'm almost sorry for all the fuss, I seem to have created ;-)

But on a more general note: Who inserts these automatic links in Wikipedia articles? This is not the first time I've come across a link to the 'wrong guy with the right name' so I just wondered.

I may be able to check this 1923 volume by Hans von Oelhafen next month (despite what WordlCat claims, it IS available in my country, although I'm not sure whether I can access it).

Also, I found this online 1999 Master's thesis from Hamburg University (in German) on the role of the Schutztruppen in German South West Africa.

Mojowiha (talk) 11:41, 1 November 2011 (UTC)

It is unusual for the links to be created automatically. These mistakes occur for several reason one may be carelessness (but as we assume good faith) sometimes a editor making a copy edit links a name to see if a title with that name exists, and then forgets to check it before making a save. Or sometimes the link is to the right article and then the linked article is moved, turned into a disambiguation page or whatever. Your sort of checking is something we all do and fix them when we see a mistake (if we can). -- PBS (talk) 12:21, 2 November 2011 (UTC)

Article in the Encyclopaedia Britannica 1922

I have found an unproof read version of this article in s:Page:EB1922 - Volume 31.djvu/263 (The campaign article starts at the top of the second column). I am sorting out a template so that we can include the text of it into this article. -- PBS (talk) 12:23, 2 November 2011 (UTC)

In the end I did not do that as it would have included cleaning the whole South West Africa Article. So here are the details and a collapse box including the text for anyone who wants to include any of it as the text is in the PD it can be included providing it is cited and attribution is given see WP:PLAGARISM. The author of the 1922 article is described in EB1922 as: Brigadier-General John Johnston, Late Chief of the General Staff, Union of South Africa.

• Collyer, John Johnston (1922). "South West Africa: Military Operations 1914-5". Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 31 (12th ed.). Cambridge University Press. pp. 229–231. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)

EB1922 article

MILITARY OPERATIONS 1914-5 For some time before the year 1914 the close proximity of the German Protectorate of South-West Africa, sharing a common frontier on its southern and eastern borders with the Union of South Africa, had been recognized by the Union Government of South Africa as an important factor in its military arrangements. The sudden outbreak of war in Aug. 1914 at once converted a hypothetical situation for which tentative measures had been devised into a problem calling for immediate action. On Aug. 6 1914 the Union Government undertook to assume all military obligations resting upon the British regular garrison in South Africa and to replace that force by Union troops. This offer was accepted by the Imperial Government, and the imperial military forces in South Africa became available elsewhere. On Aug. 10 the Union Government further undertook to send a military expedition of its own against German South-West Africa, and the seaports of that territory and the wireless installation at Windhuk were indicated by the British Government as the original objectives of the enterprise. The position of South Africa on the ocean line of communication between Europe and Asia, and the necessity for denying friendly harbours and long-range communication to the enemy naval squadron under Adml. von Spee in the South Atlantic were obvious and imperative reasons for early action on the lines suggested. This decision of the Union Government, however, produced strong opposition on the part of a portion of the Dutch population of South Africa, and the antagonism to the proposed expedition culminated in open rebellion in Oct. 1914. Though the opposition to the Government was numerically insignificant—only some 11,500 rebels took up arms—the sporadic nature of the outbreak and the extent of the territory in which it occurred necessitated the employment of 30,000 troops (of which two-thirds were of Dutch descent) for its suppression, and delayed all offensive action across the border for four months. Before the rebellion started the following preliminary movements had been carried out by Union troops for the prosecution of the campaign in South-West Africa. On Sept. 18 1914 a force, under Col. P. S. Beves, had been landed without opposition at Lüderitzbucht. On Aug. 31 a mixed force, under Brig.-Gen. H. T. Lukin, some 2,500 strong and including the regular mounted troops of the Union (the South African Mounted Riflemen), had begun to disembark at Port Nolloth, and, extending inland, was eventually disposed along the western portion of Union territory immediately adjoining the southern enemy border, with headquarters at Steinkopf. Farther eastward this line of observation was continued by another mixed force of approximately 1,000 rifles under Lt.-Col. Maritz with headquarters at Upington, and upon Maritz's desertion with the greater portion of his command to the enemy on Sept. 9 Col. Brits with another force took over the task which had been so shamefully abandoned. Col. Brits, called away to the Union, was soon replaced by Col. van Deventer, who, on the recall of Lukin's force on Oct. 23 to the Union, assumed sole command in the locality. Until the end of the rebellion, which was closed by the surrender of Kemp with his own and Maritz's rebel forces at Upington on Feb. 3 1915, the activities of all the forces first employed, with one exception, did not involve anything beyond outpost and reconnaissance work. A more ambitious undertaking ended in the capture of a strong advanced detachment of the South African Mounted Riflemen with two guns at Sandfontein, in enemy territory, on Sept. 26. The beginning of Feb. 1915 then may be taken as the time of the actual commencement of offensive action by the Union forces in and against German South-West Africa. The circumstances attending the problem which confronted the South African military commanders may be briefly summarized as follows: The greater portion of what was formerly German South-West Africa of which the area is 322,350 sq. m., or rather more than half as great again as that of the German Empire in Europe is a high plateau 3,500 ft. above sea level. From the coast and the border adjoining Union territory, until [End of page 229] the gradual ascent to the plateau begins, a barren waterless tract 40 to 100 m. broad in the first case and 200 in the second formed a serious obstacle to the advance of the South African forces. Water is extremely scarce throughout the country, and is almost entirely below the surface. The water-holes were well known and at long intervals, and an advance was thus restricted to several well-defined lines. The country is very sandy and often rough, and presented formidable difficulties for every kind of transport. The climate is in the main very dry and healthful for man and beast, though the semi-tropical conditions of the N. cause the usual malaria and other diseases in the wet season. Cattle at the time of the campaign were plentiful, 'but all other supplies, including fodder of any kind, were scanty. The theatre of operations, badly watered, difficult to move in, devoid of adequate supplies, and protected against an advance from the Union side or the coast by a desolate belt of desert, was a powerful aid to a protracted defence by a commander falling back upon his magazines. A railway of 3 ft. 6 in. gauge ran from Luderitzbucht to Keetmanshoop in the S., and thence N. to Windhuk, and from there westward to Karibib, with an extension to the southern portion of the Protectorate at Kalkfontein branching from the Luderitzbucht- Keetmanshoop section at Seeheim: a total length of broadgauge line of 800 miles. From Swakopmund, the northern port, a 2 ft. gauge railway ran to Karibib, and thence northward to Tsumeb and Grootfontein, with a total length of 420 miles. Much damage was done by the enemy to these lines and their bridges and culverts, and the Union engineers repaired 1,040 m. of railway and laid 340 m. of new line during the campaign. The enemy regular forces consisted of approximately 140 officers and 2,000 other ranks (artillery and mounted riflemen), while about 7,000 European males of military age, of whom many had military training, were also available. An efficient camel corps proved of value, and several hundred South African rebels were also at the enemy's disposal. His one aeroplane was active until its collapse, and, with the arrival of some Union aeroplanes towards the end of the campaign, the South African troops had such advantage as was to be derived from command of the air. Of military equipment and matériel the German commander had abundance, and he enjoyed a substantial numerical advantage in respect of artillery. The Union expeditionary base was formed at Cape Town, and from that place the Royal Navy conveyed, escorted and disembarked the whole of the forces and their supplies, which proceeded from South Africa to Luderitzbucht, Walvis (Walfish) Bay and Swakopmund without the loss of a vessel or a life. Naval armoured cars also served during the operations. Gen. Louis Botha, who, on the outbreak of the rebellion, had assumed supreme command of the forces of the Union decided personally to direct the operations in the N., and on Dec. 25 1914 the advance units of his force reached Walvis Bay under the command of Col. P. C. B. Skinner, who, on Jan. 13 1915, occupied and retained the port and town of Swakopmund. Gen. Botha reached Swakopmund, having visited the central force at Luderitzbucht, on Feb. n. On this date the position was as follows: The northern force—of which the greater proportion of the combatant troops was mounted, though a strong infantry force was included—occupied Walvis Bay and Swakopmund; the enemy, here controlled mainly by their chief command, holding an outpost line immediately outside the latter place. The central force, considerably augmented since its arrival in Sept. of the previous year, and now under the command of Brig.-Gen. Sir Duncan McKenzie, was at Luderitzbucht on the coast, with its most advanced detachments at Tshaukaib, 40 m. inland, in touch with the enemy under Maj. von Bauzus on the railway line to Keetmanshoop. On the southern border, based on Upington, and organized in four, and later five, columns was the southern force, commanded by Brig.-Gen. J. Van Deventer. To this force, which was mounted, was opposed the enemy under Maj. Ritter. The eastern force, considerably smaller than the rest—it consisted of four mounted regiments with two 12-pounder guns—which was to advance on enemy territory westwards from Kurumaii along the Kuruman and Molopo rivers, was in process of mobilization under Col. C. A. L. Berrange. Enemy detachments were on their eastern border at Rietfontein and Hasuur. To the Union forces heavy and field artillery were allotted as the supply available and the nature of the various tasks suggested. To clear his immediate front and gain power of reconnaissance was Gen. Botha's first concern, and on Feb. 23 an advance in force from Swakopmund cleared the country beyond for a distance of 20 m., and Rössing on the railway and Husab on the Swakop river were permanently secured. The formation of forward supply depots was now undertaken, and, after much labour and with considerable difficulty, a longer advance was carried out terminating in successful engagements on March 18 at Riet and Pforte, in the Swakop valley, where the enemy were heavily defeated and retired with a loss of 37 killed and wounded, and 2 field guns and 9 officers and 275 other ranks captured. The Swakop river was thus secured for a distance of 60 m., and a garrison was placed at Riet. Railhead was pushed to Arandis, 30 m. from Swakopmund. The bulk of the forces were withdrawn, in view of the supply difficulty, to Swakopmund, and preparations for a similar advance were again undertaken. The Swakop river route, recently visited by an unexpected and most welcome flood, had been selected for the main advance on Karibib and Windhuk. After a visit by the commander-in-chief to Gen. McKenzie, a second advance under Gen. Botha was made from Swakopmund and Riet on April 26, with the result that Karibib, the junction of the northern railway, was occupied on May 5 as the outcome of an advance from the Swakop river aided by a wide turning movement to the right by mounted troops, detached under Gen. Myburgh, by way of Otyimbingwe and Wilhelmstal. A determined enemy attack on the railhead at Trekkoppies on April 26 was beaten off by the garrison under Col. Skinner. The enemy opposite Gen. Botha, having withdrawn to the N. to avoid envelopment, Windhuk was occupied without opposition on May 12. The majority of the enemy European women and children were left to the care of the victors at Karibib and Windhuk. In the meantime the central force had occupied the strong position of Aus on March 30 without fighting. The enemy, evidently apprehensive of the trend of events in the N., had retired. After some preparation Gen. McKenzie pushed strong mounted reconnaissances in the direction of Bethany (Beth- anien), towards the Keetmanshoop- Windhuk railway, and, as a result of fine marching and vigorous action, engaged the only strong body of the enemy remaining in the S. at Gibeon station on April 26, the day of the second advance by Gen. Botha from Swakopmund. The enemy was roughly handled and escaped with loss and difficulty. The withdrawal of this southern enemy detachment had been prompted by the activity of the southern and eastern forces of the Union troops. The eastern force, having set out from Kuruman on March 6, engaged the enemy successfully at Rietfontein and Hasuur, and on April 20 joined hands at Kabus with a portion of the southern force. The advance of this eastern force had only been possible as a consequence of well-planned water arrangements. The columns of the southern force, in their advance from the southern border, defeated the enemy at Nabas on March 8, at Platbeen on March 27, and again at Kabus on April 20, when touch with the eastern force was established. These final operations in the S. were carried out under Gen. Smuts. With the fall of the capital the whole of the country S. of it fell into the hands of the Union forces, and the enemy retired to the N. retaining no town of importance and controlling less than 200 m. of narrow-gauge railway. A conference as to terms between Gen. Botha and Gov. Seitz at Giftkuppe on May 21 proved abortive, and the final stage of the campaign against the enemy, now wholly concentrated in the N., was begun. A large reduction of forces, reorganization, and settlement of the occupied territory were completed by June 17, and on the 18th Gen. Botha started on his final advance from Karibib. An infantry brigade, accompanied by two mounted brigades, [End of page 230] moved in the centre under the personal direction of the commander-in-chief, while strong mounted forces operated to the E. and W. commanded by Gens. Myburgh and Brits respectively. The enemy, constantly outflanked, retired rapidly, and on June 27 Brits was detached to make a wide and rapid detour through unknown country to the N.W. with orders to reach Namutoni before the enemy and head the latter off. Myburgh was instructed to press the enemy in towards the main advance and to swing in towards Tsumeb. Each of these movements, though communication ceased from the time of separation from the main advance, was carried out almost to the moment, and the enemy, defeated on July 1 at Otavifontein by the leading mounted brigade of the centre, forestalled at Namutoni by Gen. Brits, and having lost Tsumeb to Gen. Myburgh, surrendered to Gen. Botha on July 9 1915. The campaign had been won with little loss of life—127 Union soldiers were killed in the rebellion and in German South-West Africa—but it will repay study as an instance of the overcoming of difficulties in climate and terrain, and for the experience which it afforded of the value of fertility of resource and power of adaptation. Some of the difficulties which were surmounted seemed almost impossible to deal with, and the methods adopted in connexion with water supply are worthy of the closest attention. Some magnificent marching was a striking feature of all the operations. Brits's force on the final advance marched 340 m. in 20 days; McKenzie's mounted troops covered 200 m. in 12 days; while the infantry brigade in the centre on the final northern advance in 16 days marched 230 miles. Finally, the operations indicate clearly the extraordinary mobility of mounted riflemen, who are good horsemen and horsemasters, and whose frugal habits tend enormously to simplify the difficult problem of supply in a barren country, when they are directed by a master hand. (J. J. C.) [End of article on page 231]

--PBS (talk) 02:41, 16 February 2012 (UTC)

Portugal, again

I recently parcelled the information on German operations in Portuguese Angola (which was part of Aftermath section) into a separate section. This was reverted with this edit. Can anyone say why?
The actions described (such as they are) are certainly not part of any aftermath; they took place in October and December 1914, and so pre-date most of the events in the main action section. Nor do they fit well with those actions, being on a different front and with different combatants. The most logical arrangement (I would suggest) is a separate section or sub-section; what is the objection to doing that? Xyl 54 (talk) 13:04, 6 March 2012 (UTC)

The only reason for including a mention of the Angola campaign is because "the successful South Africa South-West Africa Campaign defeated [the Germans in south west Africa] and Portuguese control was restored." Therefore it is with the defeat of the Germans in South West Africa that the Angola campaign becomes relevant to this article and the defeat should be in the Aftermath. That is the only tie in, otherwise there is no reason to mention the campaign just as there is no reason to mention lots of other campaigns that were being fought simultaneously with this one. We mention the Boar revolt because it had a direct effect on this campaign (delaying the invasion). If we are to have a section other than a paragraph in the Aftermath section, it needs to be shown that like the Boer revolt, the Angola campaign had a direct influence on the South West Africa campaign (for example a reliable source claiming that German forces engaged in Angola could have had an affect on the SWA campaign). -- PBS (talk) 15:52, 6 March 2012 (UTC)

You seem to be suggesting that the German operations in Angola weren’t part of the SW Africa campaign; that isn’t the story the article tells ( at least, as regards the infobox and template).

If the ops aren’t part of the campaign we should probably take those mentions out and have the other article listed in a See also section. But they seem an integral part of the campaign to me; it was the same German forces that undertook the ops, and they counter-pointed the invasion of the Cape province shortly after. And Portugal was (eventually) one of the Allies; in fact it was German actions in Angola (and Mozambique) which contributed to her entering the war (consistent with the German war strategy of pissing off as many neutral countries as possible!)

At present it seems we have neither one thing nor the other here. Xyl 54 (talk) 17:07, 8 March 2012 (UTC)

I agree take them out of the info box. However I think that rather than putting it into the see also section the German campaign in Angola needs to be added to {{Campaignbox World War I}} -- PBS (talk) 17:34, 8 March 2012 (UTC)

If nothing further is to be said I shall act on the above consensus. -- PBS (talk) 12:46, 18 August 2012 (UTC)

Casualty relation: 10:1 for the allied side ?

Article claims more than 1,000 fatalities for the German side. Is there any source given for that ? It seems hardly believable, that relation of 1:10 in favour of the allied forces. Including deaths in captivity up to 1918, Gedenkbuch zum Kolonial-Ehrenmal Bremen (1932) names some 200 german dead for the SW african theatre, see: List of German Dead in South West Africa, WW I --93.104.188.110 (talk) 08:11, 27 October 2014 (UTC)

One reason for the discrepancy could be that the 200 German dead in the Gedenkbuch are all (as per their names), German citizens, not to mention that the vast majority are regular troops. By contrast, I think the 1,131 death toll is drawn from the total number engaged and so, I presume, likely includes the "7000 militiamen and settlers". Unless this latter group suffered very few casualties, it would seem odd that the Gedenkbuch has so few listed as "Kriegsfreiwilliger", not to mention that the Gedenkbuch didn't mention a single askari, which must have comprised the majority of the 3000 Schutztruppen engaged. That said, I think you're right that an exact source should be added. Mojowiha (talk) 02:23, 24 November 2014 (UTC)

Mojowiha: what have these askari to do with GSWA ? (they are related to German East Africa) One finds virtually not a single hint that any indigenous people fought with the German military in German South West Africa. Btw, German citizen (settlers) in GSWA were subject to conscription. ----212.114.233.8 (talk) 18:23, 22 July 2016 (UTC)

Strachan, H. (2001). To Arms. The First World War I. Oxford: OUP. ISBN 0-19-926191-1. p. 568 has Union:113 killed, 153 died of disease and accidents, 263 wounded; Germans, 1,188 casualties, of which 103 killed, 890 pow, 4,740 surrendered with 37 field guns and 22 m-g.Keith-264 (talk) 14:24, 24 November 2014 (UTC)

External links modified

Hello fellow Wikipedians,

I have just modified one external link on South West Africa campaign. Please take a moment to review my edit. If you have any questions, or need the bot to ignore the links, or the page altogether, please visit this simple FaQ for additional information. I made the following changes:

• Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20080517233724/http://www.anc.org.za/books/reich1.html to http://www.anc.org.za/books/reich1.html

When you have finished reviewing my changes, you may follow the instructions on the template below to fix any issues with the URLs.

This message was posted before February 2018. After February 2018, "External links modified" talk page sections are no longer generated or monitored by InternetArchiveBot. No special action is required regarding these talk page notices, other than regular verification using the archive tool instructions below. Editors have permission to delete these "External links modified" talk page sections if they want to de-clutter talk pages, but see the RfC before doing mass systematic removals. This message is updated dynamically through the template {{source check}} (last update: 18 January 2022).

• If you have discovered URLs which were erroneously considered dead by the bot, you can report them with this tool.
• If you found an error with any archives or the URLs themselves, you can fix them with this tool.

Cheers.—InternetArchiveBot (Report bug) 11:47, 10 December 2017 (UTC)

after the Aftermath

The following paragraph was in the Aftermath section, with no citations. It's subject matter is many decades beyond the direct aftermath of this campaign. I've deleted it from the article, but paste it here in case anyone wants to incorporate any of it in some other more relevant article.

After many unsuccessful attempts by the UN to persuade South Africa to agree to the implementation of UN Resolution 435, which had been adopted by the UN Security Council in 1978, as the internationally agreed decolonisation plan for Namibia, transition to independence finally started in 1988 under the tripartite diplomatic agreement between South Africa, Angola and Cuba, with the USSR and the USA as observers, under which South Africa agreed to withdraw and demobilise its forces in Namibia and Cuba agreed to pull back its troops in southern Angola, sent to support the MPLA in its war for control of Angola with UNITA. A combined UN civilian and peace-keeping force under Finnish diplomat Martti Ahtisaari supervised the military withdrawals, return of SWAPO exiles and the holding of Namibia's first one-person one-vote election, for a constituent assembly in October 1989. This was won by SWAPO, although it did not gain the two-thirds majority it had hoped for; the South African-backed Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) became the official opposition.

- ZuluKane (talk) 18:29, 2 March 2018 (UTC)

Sources

@ArbieP: If you're short of a Collyer, I have a copy of The Campaign in German South West Africa 1914–1915 by J. J. Collyer (1937 [1990]) Regards Keith-264 (talk) 17:53, 27 August 2021 (UTC)

Keith-264 Thankyou; I now see it's been traced and it's shown above.ArbieP (talk) 18:48, 27 August 2021 (UTC)

OK Keith-264 (talk) 19:12, 27 August 2021 (UTC)