Talk:Indo-Pakistani war of 1965/Archive 8

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The POV claim of Indian victory in Infobox

I am afraid the claim of Indian victory in the infobox is false, pushed through by adducing sources selectively. The most reliable sources, those of academic publishers, consider it a military stalemate:

Listed below are twenty (20) scholarly sources that make the case that the India-Pakistan wars of 1947 and 1965 were military stalemates. By "scholarly" I mean the university presses and in addition Routledge, Wiley, Palgrave, Springer, and Hurst. I have not included trade paperbacks published by Harper Collins, Vintage, and so forth. Here is the list, which I have collapsed on account of its length:

Twenty scholarly sources on the outcome of the wars of 1947–48 and 1965

In Nayar, Baldev Raj; Paul, T. V. (2003), India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status, Cambridge University Press, pp. 90–91, ISBN 978-0-521-52875-7 In regard to the element of exercising initiative in war-making, Pakistan launched the first violent conflict with India hardly three months after its creation in 1947 through supporting a tribal invasion of Kashmir and then directly participating in the consequent war with India. In the international negotiations at the UN over the war, Pakistan was able to get the support of the UK and the US; even though India retained nearly two-thirds of the state, the issue was not conclusively settled and remained a long-term cause for repeated future conflicts. About two decades later, Pakistan started armed skirmishes in the Rann of Kutch in order to test India's will and preparedness, and then induct-ed a massive force of commandos into Kashmir with the purpose of detaching that state from India; in the process, it precipitated the India—Pakistan War of 1965, the result of which was largely a military stalemate." In Chari, P R; Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal; Cohen, Stephen P (2003), Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990, Routledge, p. 41, ISBN 978-1-134-39680-1 Unlike 1947-8, the 1965 war was a short affair. The UN sponsored ceasefire became effective on September 23, 1965. Although both sides have since claimed victory in 1965, the war actually ended in a stalemate." In Snedden, Christopher (2015), Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris, Hurst, pp. 267–, ISBN 978-1-84904-622-0 1. May 1948-1 January 1949: India-Pakistan war; limited to J&K; ended with United Nations' brokered ceasefire on 1 January 1949; result was indecisive, although J&K divided thereafter by the 1949 ceasefire line; war followed fighting that began in J&K soon after the British withdrawal in 1947, particularly in the Poonch area of Jammu Province where 'rebels' fought the forces of Maharaja Hari Singh, then Indian forces after he acceded to India on 26 October 1947; the war is dated from May 1948 because Pakistan's armed forces only then officially became involved in J&K. 2. 20 October-21 November 1962: China-India war; fighting in Aksai Chin and north-east India; China won decisively; took place before China-Pakistan relations became intimate. 3. August-22 September 1965: India-Pakistan war; instigated by subversives sent into J&K by Pakistan; fought in J&K and across the western India-Pakistan border; it followed some serious India-Pakistan skirmishing in the Rann of Kutch in March—April 1965; ceasefire declared after international pressure; result was a stalemate." In Sisson, Richard; Rose, Leo E. (1991), War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh, University of California Press, pp. 8–, ISBN 978-0-520-07665-5 Similarly, the wars between India and Pakistan in 1947-49 and 1965 had been brought to a stalemate and mediated through international intervention." In Schofield, Julian (2007), Militarization and War, Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 52, ISBN 978-1-137-07719-6 "India's curtailing of military influence was in part a response to the fear of a military coup, but the relative remoteness of South Asia to third-party balancers made reliance on diplomatic strategy and neglect of military means dangerous. India's nonmilitarization led it to a traumatic military defeat in 1962 at the hands of China, to defeat against Pakistan in 1965 at the Rann of Kutch, and to stalemate against Pakistan in September 1965." In Cohen, Stephen P. (2013), Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum, Brookings Institution Press, p. 129, ISBN 978-0-8157-2187-1) "Their first war was purposeful: Pushtun raiders sent by the NWFP government invaded Kashmir. The incursion was met with an innovative Indian response, resulting in a military stalemate and a series of unsuccessful attempts to negotiate peace. India's encroachment on territory held by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 1962 was also purposeful, as was Pakistan's probe in Kutch and in Kashmir in 1965, and its 1999 Kargil gambit. Several near-wars were also purposeful: India's Brasstacks exercise was intended to provoke a Pakistani response, which in turn was to have led to a decisive Indian counterattack. One could add to this list India's seizure of the heights of the Siachen Glacier. Most of these operations ended in defeat or disaster." In Rudolph, Lloyd I.; Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber (1987), In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State, University of Chicago Press, pp. 133–, ISBN 978-0-226-73139-1 "Under syndicate leadership, Congress ideology was more than ever perceived as empty rhetoric, mantras without meaning, repeated in manifestos and important party occasions. In Delhi, state capitals, and district towns, the politics of persons and factions crowded aside the politics of national purpose and high policy. The ground was being prepared for the electoral and organizational crises of 1967 and 1969, in the face of two consecutive bad monsoons (1965 and 1966), a draw in a major war with Pakistan (1965), and an unsuccessful devaluation (1966). In the fourth general election of 1967, Congress lost power in eight large states and almost did so nationally; two years later, it split for the first time." In Montgomery, Evan Braden (2016), In the Hegemon's Shadow: Leading States and the Rise of Regional Powers, Cornell University Press, pp. 112–113, ISBN 978-1-5017-0400-0 "Second, despite the considerable relative power advantage that India seemed to enjoy on paper, it soon became apparent that New Delhi was not going to emerge as a local hegemon that could dominate South Asia, if it managed to achieve a victory at all. Rather, the Second Kashmir War demonstrated to U.S. officials that India would remain preoccupied with Pakistan because it was not yet strong enough to break free of the balance of power on the subcontinent. In short, the hegemonic power shift that was taking place was incomplete. This, in turn, forced Washington to revise its earlier assessments and reconsider its regional strategy. ... By mid-September, the conflict had devolved into a stalemate. In Washington, Komer reported to President Johnson that the military situation on the ground was "confused," that successful Pakistani counterattacks had New Delhi "quite worried," and that he and others believed that Pakistan "will do quite well militarily in the next week or so in the key Punjab sector," at least until its armed forces started to run short of supplies. With neither side able to achieve a decisive victory, senior U.S. officials began to take a much darker view of the region as a whole and India's prospects as a rising power." In Dittmer, Lowell (2015), South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China: India, Pakistan, and China, Routledge, pp. 114–, ISBN 978-1-317-45956-9 " In early 1965, after the death of Jawaharlal Nehru, Pakistan organized a border incident in the Rann of Kutch, which was resolved in its favor. Emboldened, the Pakistanis authorized Operation Gibraltar, infiltrating troops across the border in hopes of raising up a popular revolt. These efforts failed, and escalated into a more conventional military conflict that ended in stalemate. The net result for Pakistan, however, was particularly poor—it not only failed to accomplish its political aims, but also lost the aid and support of its U.S. ally." In Batra, Amita (2012), Regional Economic Integration in South Asia: Trapped in Conflict?, Routledge, pp. 83–, ISBN 978-1-135-12983-5 "1948-49: The first full-scale conflict between the two countries happened over Kashmir within a year after the two countries gained independence. The war began in 1947 and ended in December 1948. A UN-brokered ceasefire went into effect on January 1, 1949. 1965: The two countries clashed again in 1965 over Kashmir. The war began in August 5, 1965, and ended in September 22, 1965, by which time it had reached a stalemate and the two sides agreed to a UN-mandated ceasefire. In Shekhawat, Seema (2014), Gender, Conflict and Peace in Kashmir: Invisible Stakeholders, Cambridge University Press, pp. 57–, ISBN 978-1-139-91676-9 "India and Pakistan fought the second war in 1965. The Rann of Kutch issue preceded the outbreak of formal hostilities. ... In the first week of August 1965 under codename Operation Gibraltar the Pakistani military began infiltrating forces in Kashmir across the 470-mile-long Ceasefire Line. The first major engagement between regular armed forces of the two countries took place on 14 August 1965. India's early gains prompted Pakistan to mount Operation Grand Slam on 1 September to capture Akhnoor bridge and cut off supplies to the southwest of the Indian side of Kashmir. On 5 September 1965, the Pakistani army launched a major assault and penetrated 14 miles in J&K. Indian forces counter-attacked from Punjab and crossed the international border." By mid-September 1965, the war had reached a stalemate. The UNSC unanimously passed a resolution on 20 September 1965, calling for a ceasefire, which ended the impasse on 23 September 1965." In Fortna, Virginia Page (2004), Peace Time: Cease-fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace, Princeton University Press, pp. 63–64, ISBN 0-691-11512-5 "THE SECOND KASHMIR WAR, 1965 Infiltrations into Indian-controlled Kashmir by mujahedin increased over the first half of 1965, and in August at least a thousand raiders crossed the cease-fire line from Azad Kashmir. Though Pakistan denied it, by all impartial accounts, Pakistan instigated and coordinated this gue-rilla attack in the hopes of triggering a revolt on whose behalf it could then intervene. The Pakistani plan failed to produce the hoped-for rebellion, however; Kashmiris were increasingly unhappy with Indian rule, but they were not yet interested in armed revolt. India responded to the infiltration by attacking across the cease-fire line to cut off the guerillas. By the beginning of September regular forces from both sides were fighting each other, and on September 6 India attacked across the international border, escalating the war beyond the confines of Kashmir itself. The war quickly reached a military stalemate.There was strong diplomatic pressure for a cease-fire, as the United States and the USSR reached a rare moment of Cold War consensus. The UN called for a cease-fire on September 4 (Resolution 209)" In Carpenter, William M.; Wiencek, David G. (2000), Asian Security Handbook 2000, M.E. Sharpe, pp. 41–42, ISBN 978-0-7656-0714-0 "Kashmir, a princely state headed by a Hindu Maharaja filing over a largely Muslim population, probably would have gone to Pakistan, but when Pathan tribesmen invaded Kashmir in October 1947, the Maharaja sided with India as a condition for Indian military aid and his survival. Pakistan objected and full-scale fighting broke out between the two newly independent neighbors) Despite early Indian military gains, the forces of Azad Kashmir ("Free Kashmir," as the part of Kashmir under Pakistani control is called) seized the initiative and drove the Indian troops from the border. In spring 1948, India mounted another offensive to retake lost ground, but New Delhi soon recognized that the war would not end unless Pakistan withdrew support for the Azad Kashmir forces. On the advice of Earl Mountbatten (Britain's last viceroy in India and governor general from 1947 to 1948), India invited the United Nations to mediate the conflict. ... War broke out again over Kashmir when Pakistani-sponsored guerrillas infiltrated into Indian Kashmir in August 1965. Indian forces scored early victories and fighting quickly intensified throughout Kashmir. In September 1965, Pakistan widened the conflict by counterattacking in Punjab, where Indian forces were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. The war had reached a point of stalemate when the UN Security Council once again brokered a cease-fire, which India and Pakistan accepted after suffering nearly 3,000 battlefield deaths apiece. The cease-fire line, or "Line of Control," now serves as a quasi-border in Kashmir. In Lavoy, Peter R. (2009), Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict, Cambridge University Press, pp. 44–45, ISBN 978-0-521-76721-7 "Failure to resolve the Kashmir issue led to the first war between India and Pakistan in 1948. This conflict produced a military stalemate, but when the ground situation appeared to be going against India, Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru approached the United Nations Security Council in an attempt to resolve the political and territorial dispute over Kashmir.' The Security Council decided that the accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan must be decided by the Kashmiri people through a plebiscite.' Nehru and subsequent Indian leaders gradually reneged from their promise of a plebiscite (although, to be sure, other UNSC terms also remained unfulfilled), but continued to accept the disputed nature of Kashmir. ... India and Pakistan fought their second war over Kashmir in 1965, the outcome of which was another stalemate." In Wirsing, Robert (1998), War Or Peace on the Line of Control?: The India-Pakistan Dispute Over Kashmir Turns Fifty, IBRU: Centre for Border Research, Durham University, p. 12, ISBN 978-1-897643-31-0 "The plan, codenamed Operation Gibraltar, was aimed at provoking an uprising against Indian rule among the indigenous Kashmiri population. Indian forces stopped many of the would-be infiltrators at the border, however, and no uprising materialised to bolster those who made it across. The effort has been judged by most commentators, including the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan army at the time, a colossal failure (Musa, 1983: 35-44). It signalled the complete collapse of the Karachi Agreement and led directly to the second war between India and Pakistan, again without any formal declaration. ... Steady escalation of the fighting between Indian and Pakistani forces in Kashmir during the last two weeks of August was followed, on 1 September, by a major cross-border attack by regular Pakistani forces in the state's southern sector. That attack brought massive Indian retaliation on 6 September across the international border cast of Lahore. The fighting, which involved air as well as ground forces, reached a stalemate by mid-September. Soon thereafter, responding to a UN Security Council resolution demanding an unconditional ceasefire, the guns fell silent on 22 September. Indian battle deaths in the conflict numbered around 3,000, Pakistan's around 3,800. India had lost about 775km' (299 sq. miles) of territory, Pakistan about 1,865km' (720 sq. miles) (Ganguly, 1986: 59)." In Bose, Sumantra (2009), Contested Lands, Harvard University Press, pp. 174–, ISBN 978-0-674-02856-2 (Google scholar citation index: 193) "Stalled at the United Nations and rebuffed by the Indian leadership, the Pakistanis resorted to force to challenge the status quo in Kashmir. Encouraged by a flare-up of unrest with strong anti-Indian overtones in Indian-controlled Kashmir in 1963-1964, the Pakistani military regime, headed by the dictator Ayub Khan, formulated an ambitious plan, codenamed Operation Gibraltar, to seize Indian-controlled Kashmir. In August 1965 this plan was put into operation when several thousand Pakistani soldiers and armed volunteers from Pakistani-controlled Kashmir infiltrated the CFL, into Indian-controlled Kashmir with the intention of fomenting a mass uprising. That intention was foiled when the population proved largely indifferent and in some instances hostile to the infiltrators. Memories of the late 1947 tribal invasion from Pakistan still rankled in the Kashmir Valley, when the undisciplined raiders committed numerous atrocities against the fellow Muslims they had ostensibly come to liberate, and Sheikh Abdullah's pro-independence followers were not willing to collude with Pakistani designs. The crisis in Kashmir triggered a twenty-two-day inconclusive war between India and Pakistan in September 1965, not just along the CFL in Kashmir but along the entire international frontier between Pakistan's western wing and India (Bengali-speaking east Pakistan, which emerged as sovereign Bangladesh with Indian support in December 1971, was largely spared the hostilities). Operation Gibraltar was a strategic failure, and the territorial status quo continued." In Lowe, Vaughan (2010), The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945, Oxford University Press, pp. 335–, ISBN 978-0-19-958330-0 (Google Scholar Citation Index: 167 "THE SECOND INDIA—PAKISTAN WAR, 1-23 SEPTEMBER 1965 India's humiliating defeat against China in October–November 1962, combined with Nehru's death in May 1964, provided Pakistan with an opportunity to instigate a rebellion in Indian-controlled J&K. It was emboldened by the perceived lack of a vigorous Indian response in the skirmishes between the two countries in the disputed western region of the Rann of Kutch in spring 1965, with UK mediation leading India to accept international arbitration on its future status. Pakistan appeared to believe that as with the Rann of Kutch mediation, a mini-war in Kashmir would result in international mediation which would (in view of Pakistan's belief in the strength of its case) rule in its favour. In early August, in Operation Gilbratar, Pakistan began to infiltrate some 5,000–10,000 armed 'irregulars' and army personnel in disguise into Indian-controlled J&K to bring about a mass uprising against Indian rule. In this context, the UN Chief Military Observer, General Nimmo, noted that 'the series of violations that began on August 5 were to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the CFL from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side:" The infiltration was followed on 1 September by an attack on Indian territory in the Chhamb area of Jammu. The Indian response largely involved military operations in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and, from 6 September, escalation to a full-scale Indian offensive towards Lahore. After two weeks of bitter land and air warfare, the Indian and Pakistani armed forces reached a military stalemate." Amidst considerable US and UK pressure, including an arms embargo by both on India and Pakistan, both India and Pakistan agreed to abide by the Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire." The UN-mandated ceasefire that took effect on 23 September 1965 ended the Second Kashmir War." In Ganguly, Sumit; Scobell, Andrew; Liow, Joseph Chinyong (2009), The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies, Taylor & Francis, pp. 183–, ISBN 978-1-135-22961-0 "On 1 September 1965, after a series of skirmishes along the Ceasefire Line, Pakistani forces attacked Indian territory in the Bhimbar—Chhamb area of Southern Kashmir. The attack set off India and Pakistan's second Kashmir war. The Pakistanis advanced quickly in hopes of capturing Akhnur, which would have enabled them to cut off Indian Kashmir from the rest of the country. India responded by escalating horizontally, driving forces toward Lahore and Sialkot in Pakistan proper, and forcing Pakistan to abandon Akhnur. India's attack on Lahore eventually stalled when its forces reached the irrigation canal just outside the city. A number of inconclusive battles followed, and by the middle of September the war had bogged down in a stalemate. With India facing strong pressure from the international community to desist, and Pakistan failing to receive much-hoped-for assistance from China, the adversaries accepted a UN ceasefire resolution. By the third week of September, the 1965 war was over. Under the post-war settlement, known as the Tashkent Agreement, India and Pakistan agreed to return to the status quo ante, and to forswear the use of force in future disputes." In Moshaver, Ziba (1991), Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in the Indian Subcontinent, Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 20–21, ISBN 978-1-349-11471-9 "By mid-1965, a UN Kashmir observer reported an increase in violations of the cease-fire line by armed men crossing the line into India. On August 15 the Indian PM announced Pakistan's invasion of Kashmir and promised that aggression against India would never be allowed to succeed. Two weeks later, India reported having captured 200 square miles of Azad Kashmir. Pakistan sent forces into Kashmir's southernmost sector, hoping to cut off the rest of Kashmir (called Operation Grand Slam). In early September, Delhi, in turn, sent troops westward across the Punjab towards the Pakistani capital, Lahore. It was only then that Ayub Khan formally declared that Pakistan was at war and asked Washington for help. The US, having become a noticeable supporter of Delhi after its 1962 war with China, declined to support Pakistan and retained its initial policy of not supplying arms to either side of the conflict. The second war over Kashmir lasted no more than three weeks, without either side achieving any decisive victory. ... The 1965 war, however, brought neither a military nor diplomatic victory for either side. Pakistan was blamed for having started the war and India for having extended it into Pakistani territory. In the end it was only Moscow which achieved a diplomatic coup by mediating the Tashkent Declaration. At the invitation of Premier Kosygin, PM Shastri and President Ayub met in Tashkent to negotiate an agreement to end hostilities. On 10 January 1966, one day before Shastri's death, the Tashkent Declaration was signed. As neither party hoped to win, nor wished to resume hostilities, the Declaration was in the nature of a face-saving compromise. In concrete terms its main achievement was that the two sides agreed to withdraw, by 25 February 1966, 'all armed personnel' to the positions along the 1948 cease-fire line. This way the 1948 cease-fire line was again recognized as the de facto international boundary between the two countries. In Ganguly, Šumit (2002), Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947, Columbia University Press, pp. 53–, ISBN 978-0-231-50740-0 "Political developments within Pakistan in the mid-1960s would bring all these disparities and tensions between the two wings of the state to the fore. The problems started almost immediately after the second Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir. The military stalemate that resulted from the 1965 war proved costly for the Pakistani military regime of President Ayub. Ayub's foreign minister, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, one of the architects of the 1965 war, successfully stoked popular discontent against Ayub in the aftermath of the war. In 1967, Bhutto had formed a political party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which had a vaguely socialist agenda."

Fowler&fowler«Talk» 18:45, 25 March 2019 (UTC)

Please provide your input at Talk:Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts#Proposal. Thank you. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 09:47, 26 March 2019 (UTC)

Fowler&fowler, I would be interested to note your rebuttal of the sources provided over Talk:Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1965#Change_in_result_in_the_infobox by Sdmarathe. Regards, ∯WBG^converse 16:27, 29 March 2019 (UTC)

@Winged Blades of Godric:, @Sdmarathe: Sorry, just saw this. Will answer soon. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 17:24, 31 March 2019 (UTC)

Excessive quotations in "Assessment of losses" section

Fowler&fowler, the amount of quotes that you've added to the article is excessive. You've almost tripled the amount of quotes in "Assessment of losses" section. The twenty-nine quotes in the section take up roughly a third of the body's vertical length. Not only does this violate WP:QUOTEFARM, you also seem to be editing this section as a proxy for changing the result section in the infobox. Not every source that is useful to gauge the result needs to be quoted. There is no need to add repetitive quotes when they don't provide any new perspective about the losses to each side. I understand that the state of the section wasn't ideal even before you started editing, but this takes it too far. Let me propose a standard for adding quotes:

1. The quote needs to provide new information or perspective that is not provided by any other quote
2. The quote needs to be detailed enough to argue that it not possible to paraphrase it without losing important information

Everything else should be lumped into categories and paraphrased. —Gazoth (talk) 16:35, 29 March 2019 (UTC)

Dear @Gazoth: I am not done with the editing yet. That is why the underconstruction tag is still in place. My plan is to reduce this entire section to a paragraph of descriptive prose. I would like respectfully to suggest that the same principles be applied to the repetitive, drastically selective, quote farms that have been top loaded into the lead, with the paragraph beginning, "India had the upper hand over Pakistan ...," ones which have no precedent in a longer text in the article's main body, which they can aspire to summarize. Those are what I am primarily worried about—text-book examples as they are of WP:Lead fixation—not the infobox. (Let me state as an aside, as the major editor of the Wikipedia pages Indus Valley Civilization, Company rule in India, British Raj, and Kashmir, and of Wikipedia pages on their successor- or claimant states the FA India and History of Pakistan, I am wise to the various conceits and biases that Indian- and Pakistani-POV editors bring to controversial pages. I did not make the determination of India-POV bias in some of the daughter pages of Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts lightly.) Fowler&fowler«Talk» 18:17, 29 March 2019 (UTC)

Fowler&fowler, if you're unsure or need time to summarize the quotes, do it in a sandbox. Setting NPOV concerns about the lead aside, the quotes in the lead are placed inside ref tags and do not drastically affect the readability of the article. The excessive amount of quotations in the body on the other hand, does affect it. —Gazoth (talk) 19:32, 29 March 2019 (UTC)

@Gazoth:. Thanks. Will do so this weekend. Please bear with the unsightly mess until then. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 20:37, 29 March 2019 (UTC)

Fowler&fowler, thank you. Sorry if I came off as too harsh. I was just really annoyed by the mess. —Gazoth (talk) 21:18, 29 March 2019 (UTC)

I've restored the version before you introduced major changes to the article using the same sources that were rejected by a number of users in this thread. I'd therefore advise you to desist from making such edits that you haven't got consensus for, and while the discussion is ongoing. I haven't had the chance to go through the latest source of yours yet, but it's clear that majority of the rest of your sources are unreliable and mustn't be used in the article. Orientls (talk) 06:00, 1 April 2019 (UTC)

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A Commons file used on this page has been nominated for deletion

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Strengths need editing

http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,842104,00.html is a good neutral source about strengths of both militaries also https://www.nytimes.com/1965/09/07/archives/india-possesses-the-larger-army-pakistans-is-outnumbered-825000-to.html also gives good information about relative strengths. They are far better then indian sources in template. The indian strengths should also have (indian claim) written right next to them to avoid deception — Preceding unsigned comment added by سب سے بڑی گڑبڑ (talk • contribs) 15:57, 13 October 2019 (UTC)

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Semi-protected edit request on 24 June 2020

The 5th citation has been wrongfully attributed to the book which in the 2nd paragraph from right clearly mentions that Pakistan lost 75 Aircrafts and India 45 ,someone with malafide intentions has edited and cited to his own whims and fancy 117.212.114.159 (talk) 21:12, 24 June 2020 (UTC)

 Not done The 75 and 45 aircraft mentioned in the book are casualties in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. The figures for 1965 in the book are as given in the article. DrKay (talk) 07:13, 25 June 2020 (UTC)

Possible to add image

How to add a picture? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Ironman993 (talk • contribs) 21:59, 7 September 2020 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 7 November 2020

i want to make some changes kindly grant me permission Clatpolecola (talk) 15:05, 7 November 2020 (UTC)

Please specify the changes you want to make. DrKay (talk) 15:10, 7 November 2020 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 25 January 2021

Change

"At 3:30 hours, on 1 September 1965, the entire Chhamb area came under massive artillery bombardment. Pakistan had launched operation Grand Slam and India's Army Headquarter was taken by surprise.[54]"

To

"At 0330 hours, on 1 September 1965, the entire Chhamb area came under massive artillery bombardment. Pakistan had launched operation Grand Slam and India's Army Headquarter was taken by surprise.[54]"

In order to properly denote 24Hr/Military time. Asmarksaz (talk) 18:30, 25 January 2021 (UTC)

Formatted as 03:30 according to MOS:TIME. DrKay (talk) 20:11, 25 January 2021 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 15 March 2021

Pakistani Pilot MM Alam shot down 6 Indian planes in less than minutes and made world record {Book by Zahid Yaqoob Aamir a defense Analysit}Arslan739 (talk) 12:45, 15 March 2021 (UTC)

 Not doneThis template must be followed by a complete and specific description of the request, that is, specify what text should be removed and a verbatim copy of the text that should replace it. The request must be of the form "please change X to Y". DrKay (talk) 13:02, 15 March 2021 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 15 March 2021 (2)

The Indian army suffered 11,479 casualties in the 1965 war (including ceasefire violations) https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/1965-war-when-foot-soldiers-took-on-the-mighty-pattons-of-pakistan/amp_articleshow/49032326.cms Arslan739 (talk) 12:54, 15 March 2021 (UTC)

 Not doneThis template must be followed by a complete and specific description of the request, that is, specify what text should be removed and a verbatim copy of the text that should replace it. The request must be of the form "please change X to Y". DrKay (talk) 13:02, 15 March 2021 (UTC)

Casualty figures

Truthwins018, I am not happy with this edit. The President of India does not have executive responsibility. He was probably giving a guesstimate. It can't be used without validation from a WP:SECONDARY source. And later sources with better information take priority. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:46, 20 January 2021 (UTC)

The source mentions recorded conversation between Chester Bowles and president Radhakrishnan. I consider it a valuable source as a president is in direct talks with the military and has exclusive information to the casualties. Considering this, this remains a not made public remark which was only compiled in this book under foreign relations sources. Other articles on Indo-Pak wars directly mention politician claimed figures of casualties. Considering the lack of figures under Indian claims, this to me remains a good source to quote. Casualties not only refers to kills, it also refers to injuries, wounded etc. Truthwins018 (talk) 23:17, 20 January 2021 (UTC)

Whatever it may be. The Indian Army officially compiles the casualty statistics and those have been reported. Only those can be labelled as "Indian claims". The President's off-the-cuff conversations with diplomats don't belong here. You can take it to WP:RSN if you wish. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 23:54, 20 January 2021 (UTC)

Okay so if i consider your view, it would also be unwise to quote any political account of casualties. Then the infobox on Kargil War page should also be edited to remove the figures given by PM Nawaz Sharif Truthwins018 (talk) 17:09, 25 January 2021 (UTC)

I didn't say anything about any "political". -- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:07, 25 January 2021 (UTC)

If a president cannot quote casualties, your words, so cannot a PM according to your views Truthwins018 (talk) 12:11, 26 January 2021 (UTC)

I said, The President of India does not have executive responsibility. He was probably giving a guesstimate. No such crieria apply to a Prime Minister. I have also characterised your source as being WP:PRIMARY. I asked you for a WP:SECONDARY source. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:29, 26 January 2021 (UTC)

I request you to provide an official source saying that a Prime Minister is allowed to announce casualties to general public. If so, i find the president to be in a higher ceremonial position then a prime minister, and the remarks of a President are more trustworthy. We can maybe quote as approx. estimate by president radhakrishnan or remove the PM Nawaz Sharif figures on kargil war pageTruthwins018 (talk) 18:47, 29 January 2021 (UTC)

Do you have any idea what "ceremonial" means? I suggest you drop this issue. Or, you will end up at WP:AE. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:45, 29 January 2021 (UTC)

Casulaties on Indian side were much more higher than pakistani side.Whole Indian Tank brigade was destroyed in Chowinda by Pakistan Army suicide Bombers and chowinda is popularly known as graveyard of Indian tanks Reference-https://www.globalvillagespace.com/indo-pakistani-1965-war-battle-of-chawinda/://www.warhistoryonline.com/history/battle-chawinda-largest-tank-battle-since-wwii.html Arslan739 (talk) 13:19, 15 March 2021 (UTC)

Military Stalemate quotes in Neutral assessments

Hi, Listed below are twenty scholarly sources that should be added to the Neutral assessments section.

Twenty scholarly sources on the outcome of the wars of 1947–48 and 1965

In Nayar, Baldev Raj; Paul, T. V. (2003), India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status, Cambridge University Press, pp. 90–91, ISBN 978-0-521-52875-7(Google Scholar Citation Index: 374) In regard to the element of exercising initiative in war-making, Pakistan launched the first violent conflict with India hardly three months after its creation in 1947 through supporting a tribal invasion of Kashmir and then directly participating in the consequent war with India. In the international negotiations at the UN over the war, Pakistan was able to get the support of the UK and the US; even though India retained nearly two-thirds of the state, the issue was not conclusively settled and remained a long-term cause for repeated future conflicts. About two decades later, Pakistan started armed skirmishes in the Rann of Kutch in order to test India's will and preparedness, and then induct-ed a massive force of commandos into Kashmir with the purpose of detaching that state from India; in the process, it precipitated the India—Pakistan War of 1965, the result of which was largely a military stalemate." In Chari, P R; Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal; Cohen, Stephen P (2003), Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990, Routledge, p. 41, ISBN 978-1-134-39680-1(Google Scholar Citation Index: 57) Unlike 1947-8, the 1965 war was a short affair. The UN sponsored ceasefire became effective on September 23, 1965. Although both sides have since claimed victory in 1965, the war actually ended in a stalemate." In Snedden, Christopher (2015), Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris, Hurst, pp. 267–, ISBN 978-1-84904-622-0(Google Scholar Citation Index: 16) 1. May 1948-1 January 1949: India-Pakistan war; limited to J&K; ended with United Nations' brokered ceasefire on 1 January 1949; result was indecisive, although J&K divided thereafter by the 1949 ceasefire line; war followed fighting that began in J&K soon after the British withdrawal in 1947, particularly in the Poonch area of Jammu Province where 'rebels' fought the forces of Maharaja Hari Singh, then Indian forces after he acceded to India on 26 October 1947; the war is dated from May 1948 because Pakistan's armed forces only then officially became involved in J&K. 2. 20 October-21 November 1962: China-India war; fighting in Aksai Chin and north-east India; China won decisively; took place before China-Pakistan relations became intimate. 3. August-22 September 1965: India-Pakistan war; instigated by subversives sent into J&K by Pakistan; fought in J&K and across the western India-Pakistan border; it followed some serious India-Pakistan skirmishing in the Rann of Kutch in March—April 1965; ceasefire declared after international pressure; result was a stalemate." In Sisson, Richard; Rose, Leo E. (1991), War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh, University of California Press, pp. 8–, ISBN 978-0-520-07665-5(Google Scholar Citation Index: 450) Similarly, the wars between India and Pakistan in 1947-49 and 1965 had been brought to a stalemate and mediated through international intervention." In Schofield, Julian (2007), Militarization and War, Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 52, ISBN 978-1-137-07719-6(Google Scholar Citation Index: 18) "India's curtailing of military influence was in part a response to the fear of a military coup, but the relative remoteness of South Asia to third-party balancers made reliance on diplomatic strategy and neglect of military means dangerous. India's nonmilitarization led it to a traumatic military defeat in 1962 at the hands of China, to defeat against Pakistan in 1965 at the Rann of Kutch, and to stalemate against Pakistan in September 1965." In Cohen, Stephen P. (2013), Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum, Brookings Institution Press, p. 129, ISBN 978-0-8157-2187-1)(Google Scholar Citation Index: 59) "Their first war was purposeful: Pushtun raiders sent by the NWFP government invaded Kashmir. The incursion was met with an innovative Indian response, resulting in a military stalemate and a series of unsuccessful attempts to negotiate peace. India's encroachment on territory held by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 1962 was also purposeful, as was Pakistan's probe in Kutch and in Kashmir in 1965, and its 1999 Kargil gambit. Several near-wars were also purposeful: India's Brasstacks exercise was intended to provoke a Pakistani response, which in turn was to have led to a decisive Indian counterattack. One could add to this list India's seizure of the heights of the Siachen Glacier. Most of these operations ended in defeat or disaster." In Rudolph, Lloyd I.; Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber (1987), In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State, University of Chicago Press, pp. 133–, ISBN 978-0-226-73139-1(Google Scholar Citation Index: 1143) "Under syndicate leadership, Congress ideology was more than ever perceived as empty rhetoric, mantras without meaning, repeated in manifestos and important party occasions. In Delhi, state capitals, and district towns, the politics of persons and factions crowded aside the politics of national purpose and high policy. The ground was being prepared for the electoral and organizational crises of 1967 and 1969, in the face of two consecutive bad monsoons (1965 and 1966), a draw in a major war with Pakistan (1965), and an unsuccessful devaluation (1966). In the fourth general election of 1967, Congress lost power in eight large states and almost did so nationally; two years later, it split for the first time." In Montgomery, Evan Braden (2016), In the Hegemon's Shadow: Leading States and the Rise of Regional Powers, Cornell University Press, pp. 112–113, ISBN 978-1-5017-0400-0(Google Scholar Citation Index: 12) "Second, despite the considerable relative power advantage that India seemed to enjoy on paper, it soon became apparent that New Delhi was not going to emerge as a local hegemon that could dominate South Asia, if it managed to achieve a victory at all. Rather, the Second Kashmir War demonstrated to U.S. officials that India would remain preoccupied with Pakistan because it was not yet strong enough to break free of the balance of power on the subcontinent. In short, the hegemonic power shift that was taking place was incomplete. This, in turn, forced Washington to revise its earlier assessments and reconsider its regional strategy. ... By mid-September, the conflict had devolved into a stalemate. In Washington, Komer reported to President Johnson that the military situation on the ground was "confused," that successful Pakistani counterattacks had New Delhi "quite worried," and that he and others believed that Pakistan "will do quite well militarily in the next week or so in the key Punjab sector," at least until its armed forces started to run short of supplies. With neither side able to achieve a decisive victory, senior U.S. officials began to take a much darker view of the region as a whole and India's prospects as a rising power." In Dittmer, Lowell (2015), South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China: India, Pakistan, and China, Routledge, pp. 114–, ISBN 978-1-317-45956-9(Google Scholar Citation Index: 50) " In early 1965, after the death of Jawaharlal Nehru, Pakistan organized a border incident in the Rann of Kutch, which was resolved in its favor. Emboldened, the Pakistanis authorized Operation Gibraltar, infiltrating troops across the border in hopes of raising up a popular revolt. These efforts failed, and escalated into a more conventional military conflict that ended in stalemate. The net result for Pakistan, however, was particularly poor—it not only failed to accomplish its political aims, but also lost the aid and support of its U.S. ally." In Batra, Amita (2012), Regional Economic Integration in South Asia: Trapped in Conflict?, Routledge, pp. 83–, ISBN 978-1-135-12983-5(Google Scholar Citation Index: 12) "1948-49: The first full-scale conflict between the two countries happened over Kashmir within a year after the two countries gained independence. The war began in 1947 and ended in December 1948. A UN-brokered ceasefire went into effect on January 1, 1949. 1965: The two countries clashed again in 1965 over Kashmir. The war began in August 5, 1965, and ended in September 22, 1965, by which time it had reached a stalemate and the two sides agreed to a UN-mandated ceasefire. In Shekhawat, Seema (2014), Gender, Conflict and Peace in Kashmir: Invisible Stakeholders, Cambridge University Press, pp. 57–, ISBN 978-1-139-91676-9(Google Scholar Citation Index: 16) "India and Pakistan fought the second war in 1965. The Rann of Kutch issue preceded the outbreak of formal hostilities. ... In the first week of August 1965 under codename Operation Gibraltar the Pakistani military began infiltrating forces in Kashmir across the 470-mile-long Ceasefire Line. The first major engagement between regular armed forces of the two countries took place on 14 August 1965. India's early gains prompted Pakistan to mount Operation Grand Slam on 1 September to capture Akhnoor bridge and cut off supplies to the southwest of the Indian side of Kashmir. On 5 September 1965, the Pakistani army launched a major assault and penetrated 14 miles in J&K. Indian forces counter-attacked from Punjab and crossed the international border." By mid-September 1965, the war had reached a stalemate. The UNSC unanimously passed a resolution on 20 September 1965, calling for a ceasefire, which ended the impasse on 23 September 1965." In Fortna, Virginia Page (2004), Peace Time: Cease-fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace, Princeton University Press, pp. 63–64, ISBN 0-691-11512-5(Google Scholar Citation Index: 439) "THE SECOND KASHMIR WAR, 1965 Infiltrations into Indian-controlled Kashmir by mujahedin increased over the first half of 1965, and in August at least a thousand raiders crossed the cease-fire line from Azad Kashmir. Though Pakistan denied it, by all impartial accounts, Pakistan instigated and coordinated this gue-rilla attack in the hopes of triggering a revolt on whose behalf it could then intervene. The Pakistani plan failed to produce the hoped-for rebellion, however; Kashmiris were increasingly unhappy with Indian rule, but they were not yet interested in armed revolt. India responded to the infiltration by attacking across the cease-fire line to cut off the guerillas. By the beginning of September regular forces from both sides were fighting each other, and on September 6 India attacked across the international border, escalating the war beyond the confines of Kashmir itself. The war quickly reached a military stalemate.There was strong diplomatic pressure for a cease-fire, as the United States and the USSR reached a rare moment of Cold War consensus. The UN called for a cease-fire on September 4 (Resolution 209)" In Carpenter, William M.; Wiencek, David G. (2000), Asian Security Handbook 2000, M.E. Sharpe, pp. 41–42, ISBN 978-0-7656-0714-0([ Google Scholar Citation Index: ]) "Kashmir, a princely state headed by a Hindu Maharaja filing over a largely Muslim population, probably would have gone to Pakistan, but when Pathan tribesmen invaded Kashmir in October 1947, the Maharaja sided with India as a condition for Indian military aid and his survival. Pakistan objected and full-scale fighting broke out between the two newly independent neighbors) Despite early Indian military gains, the forces of Azad Kashmir ("Free Kashmir," as the part of Kashmir under Pakistani control is called) seized the initiative and drove the Indian troops from the border. In spring 1948, India mounted another offensive to retake lost ground, but New Delhi soon recognized that the war would not end unless Pakistan withdrew support for the Azad Kashmir forces. On the advice of Earl Mountbatten (Britain's last viceroy in India and governor general from 1947 to 1948), India invited the United Nations to mediate the conflict. ... War broke out again over Kashmir when Pakistani-sponsored guerrillas infiltrated into Indian Kashmir in August 1965. Indian forces scored early victories and fighting quickly intensified throughout Kashmir. In September 1965, Pakistan widened the conflict by counterattacking in Punjab, where Indian forces were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. The war had reached a point of stalemate when the UN Security Council once again brokered a cease-fire, which India and Pakistan accepted after suffering nearly 3,000 battlefield deaths apiece. The cease-fire line, or "Line of Control," now serves as a quasi-border in Kashmir. In Lavoy, Peter R. (2009), Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict, Cambridge University Press, pp. 44–45, ISBN 978-0-521-76721-7(Google Scholar Citation Index: 73) "Failure to resolve the Kashmir issue led to the first war between India and Pakistan in 1948. This conflict produced a military stalemate, but when the ground situation appeared to be going against India, Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru approached the United Nations Security Council in an attempt to resolve the political and territorial dispute over Kashmir.' The Security Council decided that the accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan must be decided by the Kashmiri people through a plebiscite.' Nehru and subsequent Indian leaders gradually reneged from their promise of a plebiscite (although, to be sure, other UNSC terms also remained unfulfilled), but continued to accept the disputed nature of Kashmir. ... India and Pakistan fought their second war over Kashmir in 1965, the outcome of which was another stalemate." In Wirsing, Robert (1998), War Or Peace on the Line of Control?: The India-Pakistan Dispute Over Kashmir Turns Fifty, IBRU: Centre for Border Research, Durham University, p. 12, ISBN 978-1-897643-31-0(Google Scholar Citation Index: 6) "The plan, codenamed Operation Gibraltar, was aimed at provoking an uprising against Indian rule among the indigenous Kashmiri population. Indian forces stopped many of the would-be infiltrators at the border, however, and no uprising materialised to bolster those who made it across. The effort has been judged by most commentators, including the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan army at the time, a colossal failure (Musa, 1983: 35-44). It signalled the complete collapse of the Karachi Agreement and led directly to the second war between India and Pakistan, again without any formal declaration. ... Steady escalation of the fighting between Indian and Pakistani forces in Kashmir during the last two weeks of August was followed, on 1 September, by a major cross-border attack by regular Pakistani forces in the state's southern sector. That attack brought massive Indian retaliation on 6 September across the international border cast of Lahore. The fighting, which involved air as well as ground forces, reached a stalemate by mid-September. Soon thereafter, responding to a UN Security Council resolution demanding an unconditional ceasefire, the guns fell silent on 22 September. Indian battle deaths in the conflict numbered around 3,000, Pakistan's around 3,800. India had lost about 775km' (299 sq. miles) of territory, Pakistan about 1,865km' (720 sq. miles) (Ganguly, 1986: 59)." In Bose, Sumantra (2009), Contested Lands, Harvard University Press, pp. 174–, ISBN 978-0-674-02856-2 (Google scholar citation index: 193)(Google Scholar Citation Index: 195) "Stalled at the United Nations and rebuffed by the Indian leadership, the Pakistanis resorted to force to challenge the status quo in Kashmir. Encouraged by a flare-up of unrest with strong anti-Indian overtones in Indian-controlled Kashmir in 1963-1964, the Pakistani military regime, headed by the dictator Ayub Khan, formulated an ambitious plan, codenamed Operation Gibraltar, to seize Indian-controlled Kashmir. In August 1965 this plan was put into operation when several thousand Pakistani soldiers and armed volunteers from Pakistani-controlled Kashmir infiltrated the CFL, into Indian-controlled Kashmir with the intention of fomenting a mass uprising. That intention was foiled when the population proved largely indifferent and in some instances hostile to the infiltrators. Memories of the late 1947 tribal invasion from Pakistan still rankled in the Kashmir Valley, when the undisciplined raiders committed numerous atrocities against the fellow Muslims they had ostensibly come to liberate, and Sheikh Abdullah's pro-independence followers were not willing to collude with Pakistani designs. The crisis in Kashmir triggered a twenty-two-day inconclusive war between India and Pakistan in September 1965, not just along the CFL in Kashmir but along the entire international frontier between Pakistan's western wing and India (Bengali-speaking east Pakistan, which emerged as sovereign Bangladesh with Indian support in December 1971, was largely spared the hostilities). Operation Gibraltar was a strategic failure, and the territorial status quo continued." In Lowe, Vaughan (2010), The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945, Oxford University Press, pp. 335–, ISBN 978-0-19-958330-0(Google Scholar Citation Index: 167) (Google Scholar Citation Index: 167 "THE SECOND INDIA—PAKISTAN WAR, 1-23 SEPTEMBER 1965 India's humiliating defeat against China in October–November 1962, combined with Nehru's death in May 1964, provided Pakistan with an opportunity to instigate a rebellion in Indian-controlled J&K. It was emboldened by the perceived lack of a vigorous Indian response in the skirmishes between the two countries in the disputed western region of the Rann of Kutch in spring 1965, with UK mediation leading India to accept international arbitration on its future status. Pakistan appeared to believe that as with the Rann of Kutch mediation, a mini-war in Kashmir would result in international mediation which would (in view of Pakistan's belief in the strength of its case) rule in its favour. In early August, in Operation Gilbratar, Pakistan began to infiltrate some 5,000–10,000 armed 'irregulars' and army personnel in disguise into Indian-controlled J&K to bring about a mass uprising against Indian rule. In this context, the UN Chief Military Observer, General Nimmo, noted that 'the series of violations that began on August 5 were to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the CFL from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side:" The infiltration was followed on 1 September by an attack on Indian territory in the Chhamb area of Jammu. The Indian response largely involved military operations in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and, from 6 September, escalation to a full-scale Indian offensive towards Lahore. After two weeks of bitter land and air warfare, the Indian and Pakistani armed forces reached a military stalemate." Amidst considerable US and UK pressure, including an arms embargo by both on India and Pakistan, both India and Pakistan agreed to abide by the Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire." The UN-mandated ceasefire that took effect on 23 September 1965 ended the Second Kashmir War." In Ganguly, Sumit; Scobell, Andrew; Liow, Joseph Chinyong (2009), The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies, Taylor & Francis, pp. 183–, ISBN 978-1-135-22961-0(Google Scholar Citation Index: 16) "On 1 September 1965, after a series of skirmishes along the Ceasefire Line, Pakistani forces attacked Indian territory in the Bhimbar—Chhamb area of Southern Kashmir. The attack set off India and Pakistan's second Kashmir war. The Pakistanis advanced quickly in hopes of capturing Akhnur, which would have enabled them to cut off Indian Kashmir from the rest of the country. India responded by escalating horizontally, driving forces toward Lahore and Sialkot in Pakistan proper, and forcing Pakistan to abandon Akhnur. India's attack on Lahore eventually stalled when its forces reached the irrigation canal just outside the city. A number of inconclusive battles followed, and by the middle of September the war had bogged down in a stalemate. With India facing strong pressure from the international community to desist, and Pakistan failing to receive much-hoped-for assistance from China, the adversaries accepted a UN ceasefire resolution. By the third week of September, the 1965 war was over. Under the post-war settlement, known as the Tashkent Agreement, India and Pakistan agreed to return to the status quo ante, and to forswear the use of force in future disputes." In Moshaver, Ziba (1991), Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in the Indian Subcontinent, Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 20–21, ISBN 978-1-349-11471-9(Google Scholar Citation Index: 66) "By mid-1965, a UN Kashmir observer reported an increase in violations of the cease-fire line by armed men crossing the line into India. On August 15 the Indian PM announced Pakistan's invasion of Kashmir and promised that aggression against India would never be allowed to succeed. Two weeks later, India reported having captured 200 square miles of Azad Kashmir. Pakistan sent forces into Kashmir's southernmost sector, hoping to cut off the rest of Kashmir (called Operation Grand Slam). In early September, Delhi, in turn, sent troops westward across the Punjab towards the Pakistani capital, Lahore. It was only then that Ayub Khan formally declared that Pakistan was at war and asked Washington for help. The US, having become a noticeable supporter of Delhi after its 1962 war with China, declined to support Pakistan and retained its initial policy of not supplying arms to either side of the conflict. The second war over Kashmir lasted no more than three weeks, without either side achieving any decisive victory. ... The 1965 war, however, brought neither a military nor diplomatic victory for either side. Pakistan was blamed for having started the war and India for having extended it into Pakistani territory. In the end it was only Moscow which achieved a diplomatic coup by mediating the Tashkent Declaration. At the invitation of Premier Kosygin, PM Shastri and President Ayub met in Tashkent to negotiate an agreement to end hostilities. On 10 January 1966, one day before Shastri's death, the Tashkent Declaration was signed. As neither party hoped to win, nor wished to resume hostilities, the Declaration was in the nature of a face-saving compromise. In concrete terms its main achievement was that the two sides agreed to withdraw, by 25 February 1966, 'all armed personnel' to the positions along the 1948 cease-fire line. This way the 1948 cease-fire line was again recognized as the de facto international boundary between the two countries. In Ganguly, Šumit (2002), Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947, Columbia University Press, pp. 53–, ISBN 978-0-231-50740-0(Google Scholar Citation Index: 459) "Political developments within Pakistan in the mid-1960s would bring all these disparities and tensions between the two wings of the state to the fore. The problems started almost immediately after the second Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir. The military stalemate that resulted from the 1965 war proved costly for the Pakistani military regime of President Ayub. Ayub's foreign minister, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, one of the architects of the 1965 war, successfully stoked popular discontent against Ayub in the aftermath of the war. In 1967, Bhutto had formed a political party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which had a vaguely socialist agenda."

All of these sources are taken from Talk:Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1965#Result_field because the consequences were already achieved for it that's why I decided to add it to the page directly but after @Fowler&fowler and other user told me to gain consequences from the talk page so that's why I have open this discussion. NomanPK44 (talk) 18:12, 11 February 2021 (UTC)

They should be added as the article seems away from being neutral at any pointTruthwins018 (talk) 12:22, 22 February 2021 (UTC)

Agree Yes they should be added.119.160.118.226 (talk) 13:10, 17 April 2021 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 19 May 2022

The all the sources of the war are taken from Indian army so that's not true I have sources from australia Abdhann (talk) 09:49, 19 May 2022 (UTC)

So state these sources and the request may be done. Animal lover |666| (talk) 10:46, 19 May 2022 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 25 May 2022

Nouman96 (talk) 10:05, 25 May 2022 (UTC) edit spelling mistakes and provide citation for information provided.

 Not done: this is not the right page to request additional user rights. You may reopen this request with the specific changes to be made and someone may add them for you, or if you have an account, you can wait until you are autoconfirmed and edit the page yourself. 💜  melecie  talk - 10:21, 25 May 2022 (UTC)

Feels like reading propaganda

You rarely encounter so biased language on the page, that claims to be an encyclopedia. 2A00:801:2D0:C410:0:0:804D:F6EC (talk) 22:47, 17 June 2022 (UTC)

Pakistan did not operate the Canadair sabre in the 1965 war

The first Canadair sabre Pakistan received was through iran from ex Luftwaffe stocks after the 1965 war when sanctions were placed by the US kindly remove that claim of the "sabre slayer" getting kills on man CF-86 Xtreme o7 (talk) 19:23, 27 June 2022 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 1 August 2022

The article says that India had upper hand over Pakistan when ceasefire was declared. However this RFC says that this line and citations should be removed so please remove it. 101.53.225.41 (talk) 15:52, 1 August 2022 (UTC)

Not done for now. The RfC at another page does not have any impact on what should go into this page. Please initiate a discussion and obtain WP:CONSENSUS. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:58, 1 August 2022 (UTC)

@Kautilya3:What are u talking about? the 1965 war section is copied from this page and previously RFC held on that page have also applied here like this one the irony is that this this RFC is also not implemented on the page that it actually happened 101.53.225.41 (talk) 16:13, 1 August 2022 (UTC)

Not in neutral point

8 number para of war section is saying a regiment Pakistan's pride. I think this para is written by a pakistani, it's not neutral pov? It should be removed.Rock Stone Gold Castle (talk) 13:27, 2 September 2022 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 23 September 2022

45.115.58.12 (talk) 13:31, 23 September 2022 (UTC)

can improve the picture quality

 Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. ― Blaze Wolf^Talk_{Blaze Wolf#6545} 13:32, 23 September 2022 (UTC)

text

to much text 82.194.193.194 (talk) 09:51, 4 October 2022 (UTC)