Talk:Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

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The article says: "a reviewing court determines (1) whether a statute permits or forbids an agency's interpretation". So when does a statute permit interpretation by an agency and when does it forbid interpretation?

Furtheron it says "the court decides whether the agency's interpretation of a statute is reasonable or permissible". What actually is the difference between "reasonable" and "permissible"? To me it sounds the same? And when is an interpretation reasonable and when permissible? Thanks. --141.53.209.148 22:20, 31 January 2007 (UTC)

The answer to your first question depends on the range of possible meanings of a particular statute. The art of finding such meaning is the arcane art of statutory interpretation, which is one of the skills taught to law students in a standard first-year Lawyering Skills class. There are entire books and treatises on statutory interpretation.

As for the difference between reasonable and permissible, if you read the actual opinion, you'll see that Justice Stevens uses both terms as if they are synonyms for each other. But if you're wondering what either of them actually means, that would take me about two hours and several thousand words to explain in writing. If you want to understand Chevron, go to law school. --Coolcaesar 05:31, 1 February 2007 (UTC)

Okay, so if interpretation is something you can learn, in general a lawyer from L.A. will interpret a statute in the same way a awyer from N.Y. would? Or is interpretation just a way to enable judges decide the way they like it?

Reasonable, permissible... and i thought law was something people should understand - i should have known better than that ;-) --141.53.209.148 11:02, 2 February 2007 (UTC)

...And a year later, here's your answer! Each state has its own laws regarding interpretation of statutes, as well as interpretation of contracts. Interpretation *is* just a way to enable judges to decide the way they like it; it's a procedure that's usually addressed by state case law, so the state Supreme Court can do whatever it wants. Lower state courts have to follow along. JSC ltd (talk) 02:25, 15 February 2008 (UTC)

Justices Marshall and Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor?

Notes indicate that Justices Marshall and Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision and that Justice O'Connor took no part in the decision. I assume that Justices had interactions or dealings with plaintiff/defendant. Is this correct? Thanks, Lazulilasher (talk) 17:34, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

That's the most likely reason, but one never knows for certain and we won't know for decades. Until some intrepid researcher goes to dig up the personal papers of the justices involved to figure out why they had to recuse. Only Marshall's papers are currently available (Rehnquist only died a few years ago and O'Connor is still alive) and to find the answer to that question one would have to dig through hundreds of boxes. But the few people with the time, interest, and training in legal history to actually answer that question are usually chasing after much bigger questions than the one you posed. Most lawyers like myself are too busy litigating on behalf of the paying clientele. --Coolcaesar (talk) 09:28, 4 September 2009 (UTC)

Ah, no matter. My attention piqued while reading the table, and I figured I would ask. This is an excellent article: concise, brief, and informative. Good work. Lazulilasher (talk) 02:16, 5 September 2009 (UTC)

Not to be super nitpicky, but the table on the side actually says that Marshall, Rehnquist, and O'Connor all had no part in the consideration or decision of the case, and O'Connor does seem to have taken part in the consideration, but not the decision. (That might make a difference, given how oral arguments are just the judges talking to each other and stuff). Can we fix that in the fancy table markup? I notice it just has like a general "not participating" tab. Heliopolisfirebirdii (talk) 19:40, 6 April 2016 (UTC)