Talk:Bengal famine of 1943/Archive 7

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Mass murder

As it was a man-made famine that happened because the British occupiers were stealing India's food, should the famine be called mass murder? (2A00:23C4:638C:D800:C1A1:7AD:37EE:A3FD (talk) 16:56, 5 July 2017 (UTC))

• There aren't any reliable sources that use that term. So "No"  Lingzhi ♦ (talk) 21:09, 5 July 2017 (UTC)

"There aren't any British-apologist sources using that term, so no". — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2001:4646:18D3:0:C86B:B8FF:C796:5139 (talk) 22:55, 5 July 2017 (UTC)

• Provide source to support your request, or "no". Mr rnddude (talk) 07:56, 7 July 2017 (UTC)

AN EXTRAORDINARY NUMBER OF ERRORS IN THE INTRODUCTION ALONE

There is an extraordinarily large number of errors in the brief introduction, some of which are set out below. This throws the rest of the page into doubt. It would take years to deal with all the errors and false statements in the 25,000-word page. One expects editors to be familiar with Wikipedia editing requirements.

• ‘An estimated 2.1 million’. It is extremely bad statistical, scientific, and historical practice, often considered tantamount to faking, to exclude the range of estimates, especially when, as in this case there are estimates more than 80% greater which are not ridiculous (and a lot that are both much higher and ridiculous). The more I read what observers saw, and the results of surveys, the clearer it is that the figure could well be much higher than the 2.1m. There are reports of the Bengal Government, politicians and traders concealing deaths, and even deliberately causing them. And very few contemporaries showed any interest in how many really died. Of those contemporary observers who were interested each seems to claim that the area they know about was the worst hit. I, personally, find that the 2.1 million guess seems to be based on careful research, but my personal belief is of no interest at all. I do, however, have the strongest objection to Wikipedia reporting a ‘consensus’ reached by Western European and US academics with a very narrow expertise 70 years after the observable facts and contemporary evidence vanished. WP:RS WP:ASSERT

• ‘which included cholera, malaria, smallpox, dysentery, and kala-azar.’ Totally incomprehensible to anyone who is not one of the half dozen experts in pre-antibiotic disaster medicine and totally misleading even to them, unless they are aware that quinine had suddenly became unavailable because of the Japanese occupation of the source countries. And it will bore anyone else silly, and stop many of them reading. Delete

• 'Other factors, such as malnutrition, population displacement, unsanitary conditions, and lack of health care, further increased disease fatalities.' Logic??? Repetition. Leave it until later discussion.

• 'Millions were impoverished as the crisis overwhelmed large segments of the economy and social fabric, accelerating a trend toward economic inequality.' Meaningless verbiage. Clearly unverifiable. OR. WP:ASSERT WP:VERIFY

• The second paragraph consists entirely of unverified and highly contentious statements, which have no place in Wikipedia. WP:ASSERT WP:VERIFY. Putting together a lot of statements from different sources to make an argument is not acceptable WP:SYNTHESIS. The suppression of mainstream views is not acceptable. The concentration on the editor’s OR is not acceptable. The distinction between proximate causes, later causes, and failures to deal with the crisis is fudged, which has the effect of supporting the editor’s stated POV.

• 'Underlying causes of the famine included inefficient agricultural practices, population and de-peasantisation.' Inefficient population? Inefficient de-peasantization? And what is de-peasantization anyway – I have spent 50 years working internationally on peasant and subsistence farming without encountering the word, so I suspect that one in a million readers would have come across what turns out to be Marxist jargon used in a completely different context.

• ‘localized natural disasters’ False. Neither the drought nor the fungus were localized. The editor has a stated objective of minimizing the evidence that the famine could have been caused mainly by the crop damage and food shortage. The editor has suppressed the evidence that the crop was considered well below average even before the cyclone and fungus, because of drought conditions early in the season. Yet this was believed to have caused a loss of several million tons of grain. The cyclone caused the loss of perhaps half a million tons, and the fungus was believed to have caused larger losses than the cyclone. WP:NPOVVIEW WP:OR WP:RS WP:VERIFY

• ‘initial, general war-time inflation’ Meaningless. “Wartime inflation” This editor’s take on it is not argued, orthodox, economics from reputable and appropriate sources. The most one can say is that it was a popular explanation at the time. WP:OR , WP:NPOVVIEW, WP:RS WP:VERIFY

We know vastly more about the economics of inflation, food and agriculture than we did 75 years ago. Most of the top international professionals have worked in a dozen countries with inflation rates higher than the modest rates observed in Bengal, and in a few countries with hyperinflation. They have observed the enormous differences in the effect on prices – sometimes food prices have not risen much compared with the prices of Mercedes Benz cars – and the differences in which groups are affected, urban workers producing for export, urban workers producing for home markets, large farmers or small, landless labourers, subsistence farmers, farmers getting significant parts of their income outside the sector or members of extended families relying on charity. They have analysed the factors involved, including the cause of the ‘inflation’, the effect of inflation on both the willingness and the ability of farmers to produce for sale, the system of land holding, the different, interlocking, marketing systems, government intervention, international organization intervention, and so on. It is extraordinarily complex, and only specialized economists are qualified to comment. There is a very large literature on this, notably in export reports to the countries involved, and reports produced for the World Bank, FAO, UNDP, EC and bilaterals, which are usually freely available to economists working in the country – reports which have been critically reviewed by international economists and local economists who know the subject. Accordingly, it is not acceptable to quote historians, politicians, development economists, economists specializing in the macroeconomics of rich countries, physicists, rocket scientists etc., still less to propagate lingzi’s point of view. In fact one should be very hesitant about quoting the views of anyone who has not worked in several poor or at least less rich, agricultural, countries during inflation. Wikipedia has strict rules on this.

• ‘demand pull and monetary origin’ WP:OR , WP:NPOVVIEW, WP:RS WP:VERIFY

• ‘Massive inflation brought on by repeated policy failures’ the editor’s take on it is not argued orthodox economics. Highly contentious. WP:OR , WP:NPOVVIEW, WP:RS WP:VERIFY

• ‘war profiteering’ WP:OR , WP:NPOVVIEW, WP:RS WP:VERIFYOR. There is a vast amount of evidence on corruption from top politicians down during this famine. This is not ‘war profiteering’ – a statement which is contentious and supports this editor’s declared point of view. The corruption described is the corruption that is usual in a famine situation anywhere in the world. It is usual, but less visible, in normal non-famine years in much of the world. And there is a large literature showing that many of these corrupt practices continued to be normal in food marketing in India for the half century after the famine.

• Links to Wikipedia pages on hoarding, price control etc. are unacceptable. ‘However, although Wikipedia articles are tertiary sources, Wikipedia employs no systematic mechanism for fact checking or accuracy. Thus, Wikipedia articles (and Wikipedia mirrors) in themselves are not reliable sources for any purpose WP:WPNOTRS’ The pages on hoarding and famine codes are stubs giving virtually no information, pages on vast subjects like ‘price control’ and ‘inflation’ are generalized and bear little relation to what happened in Bengal. The link to ‘humanitarian aid’ does not refer to anything remotely related to what the editor was referring to, nor does the link to ‘propaganda’. The link to ‘test works’ does not work. By contrast, purely factual links, such as ones giving biographical details about the Viceroys are informative.

• Relief efforts increased significantly when the military took control of crisis relief in October 1943. They did not ‘control crisis relief’ or increase the amount of food. They distributed relief to the countryside which had been ignored by the Bengal Government.

• ‘Raj’ Not what this editor says elsewhere. ‘Military’ seems more accurate.

• ‘Near total disruption’ Contradicted by all the evidence. Rice denial and boat denial policies were limited to coastal areas most threatened by invasion. The false statement supports the editors’ stated point of view. WP:OR , WP:NPOVVIEW, WP:PROVEIT WP:RS WP:ASSERT WP:VERIFY

• ‘the government’ There were a dozen governments in the act. Say which. The democratically elected Government of Bengal province. The editor’s declared aim is to take blame away from democratically elected governments and to put it onto ‘The British’ WP:OR , WP:NPOVVIEW,

• ‘Massive inflation brought on by repeated policy failures’ Not orthodox economics: editor’s own theory, not supported by hard theory then or since. Nor was the inflation massive: it was low compared with the levels many countries have experienced. We have enormous experience of inflation and hyperinflation and their effect on food supplies in poor countries round the world, and I have never come across the editor’s view. WP:OR , WP:NPOVVIEW, WP:PROVEIT WP:RS WP:ASSERT WP:VERIFYOR

• OMITS what all contemporaries considered important: a sharp fall in the carry-over stocks, meaning that perhaps a million tons less food was available. Again, the editor has expressed his intention to remove anything that supports the idea that the famine was caused by a sudden fall in the amount of food per head. WP:OR , WP:NPOVVIEW WP:UNDUE

• OMITS the fact that the population rose because of Burma Refugees and the Army, though their requirements were certainly a substantial part of Bengal’s agricultural marketed surplus. (up to half a million refugees plus an army on 4000 calories per day, plus army stocks). Population was also growing by at least 2% per annum (1941 census) indicating a population increase of 1.25 m to perhaps 1.6m a year if the unreliability of the census is taken into account. So the population to be fed rose sharply by more than 3m in the famine period, 1942-3. Virtually all sources mention this as significant. But the editor’s declared aim is to suppress evidence that the amount of food per head fell sharply. WP:UNDUE WP:OR , WP:NPOVVIEW,

• OMITS impact of breakdown of the social obligations of Bengal society which some commentators consider must have caused the famine if Bengal had plenty of food for its population. Again, this omission supports the editor’s stated beliefs, as nobody can blame the ‘British’ for this. WP:OR , WP:NPOVVIEW WP:UNDUE

• ‘All these factors were further compounded by’ Wordy. Inaccurate. Suppresses major causes, major players. WP:UNDUE WP:OR , WP:NPOVVIEW, Again, the editor has a stated objective of removing evidence which might suggest that it was not all the fault of the ‘British.’ YES, the Government of India made a big mistake by giving provinces the right to restrict exports of grain to other provinces, though they did it in consultation with the provinces. BUT they were also condemned by the Famine Inquiry Commission for not procuring grain and delivering it to Bengal, as they had the power to do under the Act. AND the commission condemned the Government of Bengal for restricting relief to save money (and a lot of other failings). AND the surplus provinces refused to supply Bengal with grain, first because they said they believed that Bengal did not need it, and then because the price was too low, and then because the farmers and politicians believed that they were sending cheap food to Bengal where wholesalers and politicians made black market profits from it. AND neighbouring, non-surplus provincial governments believed, with good cause, that opening their markets to Bengali traders would create a famine in their provinces AND SO ON.

• ‘Different analyses frame the famine against natural, economic or political causes’ Meaningless. No serious commentator excludes any of these. WP:OR , WP:NPOVVIEW

• 'The government was slow' Government of Bengal. Again, suppressing the fact that it was the elected government, not the ‘British’ government. WP:OR , WP:NPOVVIEW, WP:UNDUE

• ‘triggered a sizeable increase in aid’ Fantasy, you will be blaming the famine on Martians in spaceships next. Signing a bit of paper would not increase the amount of aid available, or the people and transport needed to deliver it. WP:OR , WP:PSCI

WP:NPOVVIEW,   WP:REDFLAG WP:FAILEDVERIFICATION

• 'Provincial Government'. No, Government of Bengal WP:NPOVVIEW,

• ‘as the crisis overwhelmed large segments of the economy and social fabric, accelerating a trend toward economic inequality’ Meaning???????? Evidence???? Point of view original research WP:OR , WP:NPOVVIEW, WP:ORIGINALSYN WP:VERIFYOR WP:FAILEDVERIFICATION

• Cites ‘Famine Inquiry Commission 1945a, pp. 73–74 & 77; A. Sen 1977, p. 36; A. Sen 1981a, pp. 55 & 215; S. Bose 1990, p. 701' for the statement that more died after the famine. Sen is not a source and cannot be referenced: he merely quotes the Famine Inquiry Commission, without doing any further research or analysis. To give three references when only one real one exists is misrepresentation. There is no shortage of solid evidence from reputable sources, including doctors, that supports the Commission on this. So why put in this nonsense? WP:FAILEDVERIFICATION WP:VERIFY AidWorker (talk) 18:43, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

VANDALISM

I rewrote a section that met NONE of the fundamental requirements of Wikipedia, and contains repeated falsehoods. My exit has been removed in its entirety. No explanation has been given. There have been no comments or criticisms of my detailed reasons. Yet I have been assured by two Wikipedia insiders and by Fowler and Fowler that I have full rights to edit any part of the page. It seems that a tiny sub group is writing the page to push their personal POV, with little regard for the verifiable facts.AidWorker (talk) 15:53, 6 June 2017 (UTC)

Hi AidWorker, I'm the one who reverted your edit. Yes, you have every right to edit any part, at anytime you want, in Wikipedia. I don't yet know if your concerns are genuine, since I felt it quite difficult to read the very long wall of text that you posted above. But you cannot make such sweeping changes to the article, especially when there are other editors who have been tirelessly working on this article. We all know that this is a very notable and important subject in Indian history. We need our best efforts for it. Learned and faithful editors are persistently working on this article, at present, through some agreed-upon round-wise approach. Please respect their relentless contributions, they're certainly not POV-pushers as you seem to be thinking. You may please help them in the process by reading all the sources that are being used. (I'm sure that's not an easy job. I tried doing it, but stepped back after looking at the amount of data there is to read upon. So I left it to the hands of reliable people that are working here.) If you still believe that your changes are needed immediately, please bring them one by one, i.e., one point at a time, to the talk page, explaining why you think your changes are needed, so that other editors understand clearly what you are trying to do. Then make changes after you gain consensus for your proposals on the talk page. If you dump so much stuff at a time, no one will be able to get an idea of what is going on here. Best wishes, Tyler Durden (talk) 17:33, 6 June 2017 (UTC)

Please keep in mind to take a chill pill while making changes. There is no deadline here. :-) --- Tyler Durden (talk) 17:38, 6 June 2017 (UTC)

Assertions require not only Reliable sources, but also an attempt to put those reliable sources in the greater context of the accumulated mass of scholarship on the topic. So while, for example, the FAD (food availability decline) analysis of Peter Bowbrick makes a strong (quite shrill, in fact) assertion that Amartya Sen's FEE (failure of exchange entitlements) analysis will lead to future famine deaths, the very clear majority of the published scholars disagree. Your assertions are in many ways identical to Bowbrick's.  Lingzhi ♦ (talk) 00:41, 7 June 2017 (UTC)

Tyler Durden has twice replaced an introduction on to the page, in the sure and certain knowledge that it does not meet the very basic fundamental Wikipedia criterion of verifiability in any way whatsoever, that its statements are highly contentious, indeed factually incorrect according to the standard sources. Anyone has an absolute right to remove such entries, indeed a duty.

He says that I should not "dump so much stuff at a time." I showed that there were some 20 very serious problems with a very brief introduction. The clear message is that this is a sign of gross failure in the editing process, and one that taints the whole page. Making edits one at a time would hide this serious problem. To me that constitutes faking.

It would also constitute faking to make lots of small edits when an extremely garbled and incoherent argument throughout the page, when the arguments are combined to push a POV.

He says that the editors are not "they're certainly not POV-pushers as you seem to be thinking." The person who produced most of this page openly says that he is pushing two views and removing statements that do not support him and swears, abuses and rants hysterically at anyone who disagrees with him. I should expect Durden to have read the talk page before making such comments.

Durden says "You may please help them in the process by reading all the sources that are being used." Yes, I have read the sources, very carefully indeed, and I have a much deeper understanding of what they say than the editors. And I have a vastly greater theoretical knowledge of the subject than the editors. And I have prevented famines. So I point out that this page misrepresents what is in the sources, repeatedly and systematically, as is my duty. As Durden would know if he had bothered to read the talk page.

Durden's suggestion that I use the talk page is astounding. He has not bothered to read my justification before removing my edit. If he had bothered to read previous discussion, he would have seen that nobody reads any comments that might challenge their preconceived ideas. My comments have not been read by anyone: on the contrary, I have been told by one editor that he refused to read them, and would delete any changes I made. The most I got was a stream of abuse, ranting and claims that I held the pro-British and FAD views (though anyone with any knowledge of the subject would know that they were contradictory).

Durden says "Learned and faithful editors are persistently working on this article, at present, through some agreed-upon round-wise approach." I see no evidence of it. I cannot believe that any scholar would agree to work under this bullying, dishonest approach - as Durden would know if he had bothered to read the talk page.AidWorker (talk) 20:22, 7 June 2017 (UTC)

Making edits one at a time would hide this serious problem. To me that constitutes faking. - Sorry, but that's how it works in contentious and sensitive pages like this. Irrespective of how that constitutes to you, if you don't raise your issues one at a time and make small edits, how can rest of the editors get a clear idea of what you're doing? Please see Wikipedia:Consensus. All I'm asking you is to corroborate with others in your work. If you have no trust in me and the editors who are working on this article, you're always free to take your concerns to WP:DRN or WP:NPOVN.

@Lingzhi: @Fowler&fowler: Any replies here, please? — Tyler Durden (talk) 05:01, 8 June 2017 (UTC)

F&F is traveling. I already did reply, above (see "Assertions require..."). If you use logic to read between the lines, I am suggesting (at the very least!) that the position AidWorker is very stridently pushing is a minority position in the related academic literature. It deserves to be dealt with as such. In fact, it already is dealt with as such.  Lingzhi ♦ (talk) 05:52, 8 June 2017 (UTC)

I am travelling, but now in one place I hope for a few weeks at least, and it seems I now have a stable internet connection. I should probably start editing again before the end of this weekend. Best, Fowler&fowler«Talk» 15:57, 23 June 2017 (UTC)

I hope you've had a pleasant trip. Glad you're back.  Lingzhi ♦ (talk) 01:38, 24 June 2017 (UTC)

@Lingzhi: I am not back in the US, please see my post above. Unfortunately, although the internet connection is set up, here in India where I am, but my sources have not arrived yet. They will this weekend. I will then return to editing the article. Thanks. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 03:50, 14 July 2017 (UTC)

editorializing?

Ummmmmm, yeah. Those are verified facts.  Lingzhi ♦ (talk) 00:10, 21 August 2017 (UTC)

Lingzhi, Best not to hover and taunt each edit I make. If I edit, you hover; if I don't edit—mainly reading the hard copies I have of the sources during travel—you accuse me of not editing. I have also already told you that the article has issues of source misrepresentation, extensive use of one primary source, the British-India Famine Enquiry Commission Report, whose sentences are supported with a changeable cast of secondary sources, and widespread sentence-synthesis (in which one sentence is attributed to six sources with many page numbers cited for each source, and no one source drawing the conclusion of the synthesis). The Famine Commission Report, moreover, even dissenting notes and description of witness evidence, have appeared in the article in monotone equalizing descriptive prose, giving the reader no clue as to which is a conclusion drawn by a secondary source, which a dissenting note, and which a witness statement. If I am having difficulties figuring out how to best to proceed, how do you think an average reader will fare? If you don't stop, I will be forced to write a detailed review of the article, that will sink the article, barring a major rewrite. This is not a threat, just an accurate assessment of the issues I am facing, none of which I had remotely imagined when I took on the responsibility of wading through this article. I know you have worked hard, but please be patient. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 00:50, 21 August 2017 (UTC)

• You're continually stretching and exaggerating one or two errors and posing as if the article is very poor scholarship. You're really also continually setting yourself up as an expert, when there's little proof you aren't another Essjay. Worst of all you are laboring mightily and indeed very successfully to obtain full WP:OWN over the entire process. Your edits always and everywhere blur all yes all chains of cause and effect. Let's repeat that: after assuming complete and total control, you have edited in a way that always blurs all chains of cause and effect. You claim it is because I'm a poor scholar, and I claim it is because you are editing (and disparaging my editing) with an underlying goal. Still hoping for proof that I am wrong. Haven't seen any.  Lingzhi ♦ (talk) 02:07, 21 August 2017 (UTC)

Not one or two, not even ten or fifteen. Many many more. People who make such errors don't make only one or two. It is a trait of their editing style, in your case driven by only partial readings of the sources, usually limited by your own admission, to the output of the program you have written which finds the blurbs in the different sources for an input of keywords. I'm making a list. You claim that you have also read the sources more generally, but that does not seem to be the case from my reading. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 02:19, 21 August 2017 (UTC)

• Are you making a list of actual verifiable fatal inaccuracies (errors) or of instances of my editing approach? The two lists would be meaningfully different in content and size. And you didn't respond about blurring chains of cause and effect. And yes I did read many many sources, some many times.   Lingzhi ♦ (talk) 02:48, 21 August 2017 (UTC)
  • There are errors of source representation and source synthesis whose effects are then used to posit a causal mechanism that is often not there in any one source. My point of expanding the sources, was simply to see under a magnifying glass the extent of your attempts to force a cause and effect reasoning in a non-linear multi-causal event, riddled with unresolved conditional probabilities, about which the best-known scholars of the field have reached no clear consensus. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 04:05, 21 August 2017 (UTC)
• Hmmmm. I thought most of your edits served to protect the reputation of the British military. But anyhow, as for causes, we've been over this before. First, there are different layers of causation ("ultimate" and "contributing"). The issue of "ultimate cause" will never' be completely settled, because the evidence in favor of "natural causes" (specifically, the fungal infestation) just was not collected to any useful extent at the time. The records were not kept. There was one paper at the time (mentioned repeatedly above) that presents strong evidence, and those who wish to argue against man-made famine hang their hats very very firmly on that one paper. But it was a research paper that did not (could not) measure the actual impact on the fields. As for contributing causes bot before and during the famine, they are listed in the paper, and there really is a consensus. But you just deleted some of them... and I restored.  Lingzhi ♦ (talk) 04:36, 21 August 2017 (UTC)

You will see the evidence when I present it. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 04:54, 21 August 2017 (UTC)

• You're acting as if you're gonna save everything up for one big blow. That an ANI tactic. Are you planning on ANI/ARB eventually? ... If you have points, make them as you go, so that they can be worked on. [Note that I showed everyone what I was doing in my sandbox for a whole year by posting multiple links to that page...] Meanwhile, don't delete things that are already there unless demonstrably false.   Lingzhi ♦ (talk) 09:32, 21 August 2017 (UTC)

Lingzhi. Let me be blunt with you. It is not just obvious to me, but to many people who have watched your antics from afar and warned you about them on your talk page, that you are not taking kindly to any sort of change. You are reverting every little sentence that hints at any change of interpretation, heaping abuse on me. And this is when I have not really made any changes of interpretation in the actual text, either discussing them here, or expanding the links in the causal chain without changing the conclusion. And please don't repeat that tired interpretation that I have a pro-British POV in matters Indian. Really, I do? And I would get away with writing the history, the geography, and biodiversity of the FA India? I just managed to fool everyone for 11 years. Someone such as I who has just spent 150 edits fine tuning the lead and first two sections of the article Raksha Bandhan, that you very likely don't know the first thing about, or just spent drawing three graphs with 62 links each in Cattle theft in India, is nevertheless riding the unbridled horse of a British POV, when it comes to a famine in Bengal. What I have stated before in the Milhist review, is that your article is the one that has a pro-British-POV. Again, your article. Not just I, others have interpreted me to say the same as well. See here and again here on your talk page no less. I am trying to help you out. It is me who is doing you a favor. I have a family, children, grandchildren, and I'm away from home, at the other end of the world. As you already know, I had to pester someone to carry a bag full of books for me on a long distant 17-hour flight so that I can work out the details of this article a little better. I don't need grief from someone who can't summarize sources accurately, leaving an enormous burden on me, and who has misinterpreted my own accusation of the article's pro-British POV so many times that it is beginning to border on deliberate. When was the last time I opened an ANI thread against anyone? If I did, it was at least ten years ago. My frank advice is to not waste my time. I'm doing what I can do under the circumstances. I will now go back to working on the article, and will not be responding to your persistent low-grade harassment. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 10:40, 21 August 2017 (UTC)

• You said you won't respond, but please do read:
• Pro-British POVs always and everywhere minimize the impact of WWII. They emphasize natural disaster and Britain's (perhaps, they admit, rather clumsy) powerlessness.
• The impact of WWII and Britain's policies based on WWII goals was (in very roughly descending order of importance): devastating, harrowing inflation ... (perhaps primed by the shock of the loss of Burma, but fundamentally consisting of both cost-push driven by war spending and simultaneous demand-pull from shunting "[n]early the full productive output of India's cloth, wool, leather, and silk industries... directly to the military"); inflation unmatched by wage increases for peasants drove real wages of rural peasants decisively and very fatally off an insurmountable cliff; selective British distribution of life-saving Indian goods into the hands of those who helped the UK war effort and far away from those who contributed relatively less; British reliance on price controls rather than goods distribution; British "boat denial" policy that threw the market system into disarray; British repeated and long-term refusal to permit imports. Did I miss one somewhere? Maybe... At the very least those last few are either fatally stupid or disgustingly callous, take your pick. Did I omit or gloss over even a single one of those aspects in the article? Emphatically "No". Did the original version omit or gloss over any? Emphatically (super-emphatically) "yes"; it wholly omitted inflation (!) and glossed over other aspects. The only really radically "pro-British" thing I did was to completely (and reprehensibly, I confess) forget to mention that Linlithgow always had the power in his grasp to simply say "OK, given the current emergency, no more inter-provincial trade barriers, just because I says so", but he (fatally!) declined to use it.
• Actively anti-British POVs always harp on how Satanic Churchill and (perhaps to a lesser degree) Linlithgow were. They also often dwell at length on the refusal of imports. Did I do any of those? Well, I wouldn't say I tilted things in that direction. And Churchill and Linlithgow escaped largely un-demonized.
• As I have repeatedly stated, I personally think the article comes off with a mild but wholly unavoidable latent anti-British tilt. That really is unavoidable because the "anti-British" evidence (of inflation etc.) was fairly well and fully recorded and documented at the time, and the "pro-British" evidence (of fungal infestation) was emphatically NOT well collected or documented at the time. The evidence that exists points in one direction, because any evidence in the other direction was simply never collected. I tried to say that in the article itself.
• You did find one... I'm not sure it was an "error" but rather an excessive (I do admit) attempt to cover every detail that others skipped over... in the connection between military/civilian Burma refugees and disease outbreak.. oh yes and in roughly the same passage I made one full-on error by misunderstanding the word "officers" to mean "military officers" rather than some sort of ranking civil servants, which did lead to an incorrect statement... but your descriptions of the extent of my errors are comically exaggerated.
• If you are an honest person whose character is supported by a ramrod of integrity, you will read whatever books you need to read and conclude that the article I originally posted (minus your later immaterial additions) is roughly 98% correct in both detail and emphasis, given the facts that we have.  Lingzhi ♦ (talk) 22:56, 21 August 2017 (UTC)

Cited solely to Famine Commission Report; note if you find dubious

As a constructive response to Sitush's criticism (and F&F's as well, though he has employed the source), below is a numbered list of lines that include assertions cited solely to the Famine Commission Report. Many of these are inside quoted or directly attributed text; I'll highlight those... Note any you find dubious, I'll verify in an additional source. Some of these are long; I'll break them up as well over time. @Sitush:@Fowler&fowler:

1. ) between 1901 and 1941, while India's population as a whole increased by 37% over the same period.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission | 1945a |pp=4 & 203}}
2. Aside from a great concentration of war factories in industrialised areas in Greater Calcutta,{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=5}}
3. enough to put it out of the reach of many and to bring large classes within the range of famine."{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission | 1945a |p=16}}
4. security, with landholdings barely adequate to provide for the dietary needs of the owner's family.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=6}}
5. less or land-poor agriculturalists in Bengal suffered from "serious undernourishment at all times",{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=184}} living ".
6. of Bengal's economic system: nearly irreplaceable for both the production and distribution of rice{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|pp=4-10}} and [[j
7. ive" branches of the railways were dismantled, with engines and rolling stock shipped overseas,{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=23}} and lines
8. malaria, which was the biggest killer during the famine.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p= 1}}
9. services was initially "not unsatisfactory" and "not disturbing", but became more alarming in 1941.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission | 1945a |pp=19-20}}
10. cases (for example, Bihar) was the trade imbalances directly caused by provincial price controls.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=24}}
11. throughout the east of India was slowly strangled, and by the spring of 1943 was dead."{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission | 1945a|pp=16-17}}
12. reserve rice paddy stocks in the hands of cultivators, consumers, and dealers were destroyed.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|pp=32, 65, 66, 236}}
13. Traders began to warn of an impending famine,{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=33}}
14. trade machinery could not be relied upon to feed Calcutta. The [food security] crisis had begun."{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission | 1945a |p=34, 37}}
15. amount of food relief, but not a deficit large enough to create widespread deaths by starvation.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=15}}
16. drive covered areas previously untouched. Both food drives failed to find significant hoarding.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|pp=55-58}}
17. Third, the government did provide various other types of relief efforts.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=98}}
18. of the thousands who died along roadsides or other areas while migrating away from rural villages.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission | 1945a |pp=108-9}}
19. , even though the relative shortfall in the rice crop was worst in the western districts of Bengal.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=87}}
20. es of quinine (the most common malaria medication), delivered to rural areas under armed guard,{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=137-38}}
21. =1945a|2p=136}}</nowiki> A similar smallpox vaccine campaign started later and was pursued less effectively;{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=136-37}}
22. or to the famine, there was very little looting and no organised rioting when the famine took hold.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=68}}
23. “ witness the skulls and bones which were to be seen there in the months following the famine."{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=109}}
24. In addition to the tens of thousands of children who were orphaned,{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=166}} many were
25. ead to widespread unsanitary conditions, catastrophic hygiene standards, and the spread of disease.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=118}}
26. was spectacularly inept,{{sfnm|1a1=A. Sen |1y=1977|1p=50|2a1=S. Bose|2y=1990|2p=717}} overwhelmed{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=195}}
27. starved ... corruption was widespread throughout the province and in many classes of society."{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=107}}
28. The Government of India's Famine Commission Report{{nbsp}}(1945) described Bengal as "a land of rice growers and rice eaters".{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=5}} ... {{efn-ua|Some land [[Multiple cropping|produced more than one crop a year]], sometimes rice in one season and other crops in another, reducing rice's yearly proportion of total crops sown <nowiki>{{harv|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=10}}.}}</nowiki>
29. Rice accounted for between 75 and 85% of daily food consumption.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=10}}
30. The wheat-eating enclave in Calcutta were industrial workers who had come there from other provinces {{harv|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=31}}.}}</nowiki>
31. The consumption of other foods was typically relatively small.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=10}}
32. Tank and river water, moreover, are readily susceptible to contamination by cholera; tube wells are much safer in this respect.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=128}}{{efn-ua|The strong link between tube wells and arsenic poisoning was not established or suggested until the 1990s, see <nowiki>{{harvtxt|Argos |Kalra |Rathouz |Chen|2010|p=252}} and {{harvtxt |Chowdhury |Biswas |Chowdhury|Samanta|2000}}}}</nowiki> However, landlords were often reluctant to sink tube wells for economic reasons, even when credit was extended for this purpose,{{sfn|Bhaduri|1973|loc=p. 136 ''note<nowiki>{{nbsp}}1}}</nowiki> and as many as one-third of the existing wells in war-time Bengal were in disrepair due to government inefficiency and the high cost of materials.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=128}} The national government urged an initiative to repair these wells in November 1943, but actual work was not begun until after the cholera epidemic had subsided.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=136}}
33. The outlook of the typical Bengali, particularly in the countryside, deteriorated into a general belief in the inevitability of famine and devastating inflation, a lack of faith in the government's ability to overcome the crises, and a mood of isolation and panic. In nearly every sector of the population, the overriding concerns were the lack of food and personal safety,{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission | 1945a|p=98}} though a small number secured record profits amidst the havoc.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=67}}
34. In India, according to the Famine Commission's, Final Report, "the areas most affected were parts of the provinces of Bombay and Madras and the States of Cochin and Travancore."{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945b|p=3}}
35. The imports from Burma normally met India's supply deficit in rice, which totaled 1,750,000 tons.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945b|pp=114-115}}
36. In Bengal, the net import for which actual receipts and despatch documents existed,{{efn-ua|"The figures of imports and exports ... are not estimates. They are based on the actual registration of receipts and despatches made by Port and Railway authorities, and the statistics compiled by the Department of Commercial Intelligence and Services, are far more accurate than estimates of yield of crops."<nowiki>{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=207}}</nowiki> was on average 50,000 tons annually for 1932-1937,{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=208}} and 159,000 tons annually for 1938-42,{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=208}} the highest levels being recorded for the years 1934 and 1939 at 364,000 tons and 382,000 tons respectively.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=213}} But, according to the Final Report, there was also unrecorded import into Bengal "by country boat from Assam and from Arakan in Burma" the extent of which was not known accurately.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945b|p=8}} The Commission proposed that this import was of the order of 50,000 tons annually for 1932-1937 and 100,000 tons annually for 1938-1942.{{efn-ua|"This will probably suffice to remove the possibility of the true extent of the dependence of Bengal on external supply being underestimated.”<nowiki>{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=208}}}}</nowiki> Aggregate consumption was also computed, not by a direct approach using census-based population statistics whose margin of error was too high,{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|pp=203-205}} but by indirect estimation from a combination of the available values of annual supply, net import, carry-over stock at the year's beginning, and the same at the year's end.{{efn-ua|"if information is available as regards (i) the stock in hand in Bengal at the beginning of the year, (ii) the stock added to it during the course of the year as a result of production and the balance of imports and exports, and finally (iii) the stock carried forward at the end of the year, then (i) + (ii) - (iii) represents consumption and seed."<nowiki>{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=205}}}}</nowiki>{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=205}} However, as carry-over stock in any individual year could not be accurately estimated, averages were computed for a longer periods under the expectation that the carry-over stock at the beginning and the end of the periods were negligible compared to the total consumption during the periods.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=205}} The commission also made adjustments in annual supply, which had errors stemming from the assessment of cultivated acreage under the permanent settlement in Bengal.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=205}} In this way, average consumption for the 15-year period 1928 to 1942 was computed to be 8.14 million tons annually for unadjusted acreage,{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=214}} and 9.18 million tons for the adjusted.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=216}} Annual consumption was then estimated by assuming that it veered off the unadjusted average by increments, or decrements, of 0.10 million tons every year,{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=206}}{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=214}} and off the adjusted average by those of 0.12 million tons.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=214}} Using these data in the Famine Inquiry Commission report, the percentage of net imports "either recorded only, or both recorded and unrecorded, computed relative to a 15-year- or 5-year time period, and to consumption- or supply averages, which were either unadjusted or adjusted" were found by scholars to be 1.1% and 1.4% in one instance,{{efn-ua|"According to the calculations of the Famine Enquiry Commission, during the five years from 1927/28 exports exceeded imports, but net exports accounted for only 2.1 per cent of total output in the official series and 1.6 per cent in the revised series. During the next ten years (i.e. up to 1941/42) there was a net import of 1.1 million tons ... which amounted to only 1.4 per cent of the domestic supply in the official series and 1.1 per cent in the revised series."<nowiki>{{sfn|Islam|2007b|p=56}}}}</nowiki> and "less than 4%" in another.{{efn-ua|"The extent of the Bengalis' dependence upon Burma rice, or the date from which dependence became a fact, cannot be precisely stated. The famine commissioners thought that Bengal became a net importer of rice in the 1930s. The net quantity being imported between 1934 and 1942 was, on the average, less than 300,000 tons annually, which was less than 4 per cent of the average annual consumption of rice in Bengal of about 8.5 million tons. Famine Inquiry Commission, ''Report on Bengal'' (New Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1945), Appendix 2, Statement 1".<nowiki>{{sfn|Greenough|1980|p=209}}}}</nowiki> Using different data, P. C. Mahalanobis estimated the net imports to be on average 1% of aggregate supply for the period 1934-39, estimating their highest value for a single year at 5% for 1934, and noting that "the physical quantities of net imports was never large."{{sfn|Mahalanobis|1944|p=70}} While acknowledging that the influx of Burma rice was a factor in stabilizing prices, as it prevented hoarding or cornering the market, he concluded that there was "chronic but a growing shortage of rice in Bengal," which had not affected prices or imports because a large number of people, lacking the money to buy enough food, often made do with less than what was enough.{{sfn|Mahalanobis|1944|p=70}}
37. Even before 1942, with uncertainty prevailing about the war, rice cultivators were proceeding with caution, and parting with their produce less readily.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=23}} Large-scale government investment in a war-related economy had created inflation.{{sfn|S. Bose|1982a|p=88}} The larger workforce, keen to secure its supplies, was buying more.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=23}} The price of rice in September 1941 was already 69% higher than in August 1939.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=23}} With the fall of Burma, there was increased demand on the rice producing regions from those regions which more critically relied on Burmese imports.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=28}} This, according to the Famine Commission, was occurring in a market in which the "progress of the war made sellers who could afford to wait reluctant to sell."{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=28}} The Japanese attack had not only provoked a scramble for rice across India,{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=23}} but had also caused a dramatic and unprecedented price inflation in Bengal,{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=29}} and in other rice producing regions of India.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=103}} In Bengal, the impact of the loss of Burma rice on price levels was vastly disproportionate to the size of the loss.{{sfn|S. Bose|1990|p=703 & 715}} Despite this, the export of Bengal rice to other regions of India increased during the first half of 1942.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=103}} In the first seven months of 1942, these exports totaled some 319,000 tons in contrast to 136,000 tons over the same period in 1941; the imports, however, had reduced by 300,000 tons in that same time.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=28}} Under pressure from the UK,{{sfn|Mansergh |1971| p= 544, Document no. 362}} Bengal continued to export rice to Ceylon{{efn-ua|Ceylon (now [[Sri Lanka]]) was a vital asset in the Allied war effort. It was "one of the very few sources of natural rubber still controlled by the Allies" <nowiki>{{harv|Axelrod|Kingston|2007|p=220}}. It was also a vital link in "British supply lines around the southern tip of Africa to the Middle East, India and Australia". {{harv|Lyons|2016|p=150}} Churchill noted Ceylon's importance in maintaining the flow of oil from the Middle East, and considered its port of Colombo "the only really good base" for the Eastern Fleet and the defense of India. {{harv|Churchill|1986|pp=152, 155 & 162}}}}</nowiki> for months afterward, even as the beginning of a food crisis began to become apparent.{{efn-ua| In late January 1943, for example, the [[Victor Hope, 2nd Marquess of Linlithgow|Viceroy Linlithgow]] wrote to the Secretary of State for India, [[Leo Amery]]: "Mindful of our difficulties about food I told [the Premier of Bengal, [[A. K. Fazlul Huq]]] that he simply ''must'' produce some more rice out of Bengal for Ceylon even if Bengal itself went short! He was by no means unsympathetic, and it is possible that I may in the result screw a little out of them. The Chief [Churchill] continues to press me most strongly about both rice and labour for Ceylon" <nowiki>{{harv|Mansergh|1971|p=544, Document no. 362}}. Quoted in many sources, for example {{harvtxt|A. Sen|1977|p=53}}, {{harvtxt|Ó Gráda|2008|pp=30-31}}, {{harvtxt| Mukerjee|2011|p=129}}, and {{harvtxt|J. Mukherjee |2015|p=93}}.}}</nowiki> The influx of refugees created more demand for food.{{sfnm|1a1=Famine Inquiry Commission|1y=1945a|1p=187|2a1=Maharatna|2y=1992|2p=206}} More clothing and medical aid were needed, further straining the resources of the province.{{citation needed|date=May 2017}} {{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|pp=23-24; 28-29; 103}} All this, together with transport problems that were to be created by the government's "boat denial" policy, were the direct causes of inter-provincial trade barriers on the movement of foodgrains,{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=24 }} and contributed to a series of failed government policies that further exacerbated the food crisis.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=29}}
38. The cutoff of Burma rice was not the only reason that normal trade channels failed to supply affordable rice to Bengal.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=103}} There was also the proximity of Bengal to the war front, and the new status of Bengal as the base for war-related operations in India.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=103}}
39. These, according to the Famine Commission, made the "material and psychological repercussions of war more pronounced" in Bengal than elsewhere in India.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=103}}
40. According to the Famine Commission, overall, those evacuated from their homes and land numbered more than 30,000 families,{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|pp=27}}{{efn-ua|In the dissenting note of its member, Sir Manilal Nanavati, forced evacuation was thought to have affected 35,000 homesteads.<nowiki>{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|pp=27}}</nowiki>
41. The Famine Commission thought that despite compensation being paid to the families, there was "little doubt" that many of their members became famine victims in 1943.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|pp=27}}
42. ... this increased the perception of food insecurity and led the enclave of wheat-eaters in Greater Calcutta to increase their demand for rice precisely when an impending rice shortage was feared.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=32}}
43. The Central Provinces prohibited the export of foodgrains outside the province two months later.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission | 1945a |pp= 23 & 193}}
44. ... the Government of Bengal and the Bengal Chamber of Commerce devised a Foodstuffs Scheme that provided preferential distribution of a number of goods and services to workers in essential war industries, to prevent them from leaving their jobs, stating, "the maintenance of essential food supplies to the industrial area of Calcutta must be ranked on a very high priority among the government's wartime obligation."{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=30, citing an August 1942 letter from the Government of Bengal to the Bengal Chamber of Commerce}}
45. Rice was directed away from the starving rural districts to workers in industries considered vital to the military effort - particularly in the area around Greater Calcutta.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=101}}
46. The Famine Commission report of {{harvtxt|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=101}} stated that "about two-thirds of the supplies of rice reaching Calcutta under the control of Government, much of which was secured from outside the province, was consumed in Greater Calcutta".</nowiki> }}
47. The steep inflation spread across the rest of Bengal, especially in May and June;{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=29}}
48. prices soon rose five to six times higher than they had been before April.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=104}}
49. In June, the Government of Bengal decided to establish price controls, but by the time the order took effect on 1 July, the fixed price was already considerably below market prices.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|pp=24 & 29}}
50. The principal result of the fixed low price was to make sellers reluctant to sell{{snd}}stocks disappeared, either into the black market or into storage. In the face of this obvious policy failure, the government let it be known that the price control law would not be enforced except in the most egregious cases of war profiteering.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=29}} This created about four months of relative price stability.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=33}}
51. In mid-October southwest Bengal was struck by a series of natural disasters that destabilised prices again.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=33}} The Famine Commission Report blamed the soaring inflation of that November and December on heavy speculative buying.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=33}} There was another rushed scramble in the rice market{{snd}}this time, to smuggle grain out of provinces with trade barriers to the black market in Calcutta.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission | 1945a |p=34}}
52. On 11{{nbsp}}March 1943, the provincial government officially rescinded its order fixing price controls,{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission | 1945a |p=58}} permitting buyers to purchase rice at any price.{{sfn|A. Sen|1977|p=38}} The results were immediate and dramatic: very sharp rises in the price of rice, {{sfn|A. Sen|1977|p=38}} including a doubling within two weeks.{{sfn|J. Mukherjee|2015|p=103, citing <nowiki>{{harvtxt |Greenough |1982 |p=115, Table 8}}.}}</nowiki> The period of inflation between March and May 1943 was especially intense;{{sfn|A. Sen |1976 |p=1280}} May was the month of the first reports of death by starvation in Bengal.{{sfnm|1a1=Famine Inquiry Commission |1y=1945a|1p=112 |2a1=Aykroyd |2y=1975|2p=74|3a1=Iqbal|3y=2011|3p=282}} Several neighbouring provinces promised food aid in March, but all backed out, except for Orissa.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=48}} Between April and May 1943, the provincial government attempted a propaganda drive to boost public confidence that there was enough rice in Bengal to feed all its people; it repeatedly asserted that the crisis was being caused almost solely by speculation and hoarding.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|pp=55 & 98}} The propaganda, which has been described as particularly inept,{{sfn|A. Sen|1977|p=50}} failed to dispel the widespread belief that there was a shortage of rice.{{efn-ua|See especially <nowiki>{{harvtxt|Ó Gráda|2015}}.}}</nowiki>
53. Price controls were reinstated in August.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission | 1945a |p=58}} Despite this, there were unofficial reports of rice being sold in late 1943 at roughly eight to ten times the prices of late 1942{{sfnm|1a1=A. Sen |1y=1977 |1p=36|2a1=S. Bose|2y=1990|2pp=716-17}}{{snd}}prices that had even then been many times higher than they were in 1941.{{efn-ua| [[Amartya Sen]] once again attributes most of this rise to heavy speculative buying (<nowiki>{{harvnb|A. Sen|1976|p= 1280 }}{{harvnb|A. Sen |1977|p= 50 }}, {{harvnb|A. Sen|1981a|p=76}}). However, {{harvtxt|Bowbrick|1985}} disagrees at length.}}</nowiki> Purchasing agents were sent out by the government to obtain rice, but their attempts largely failed. Prices remained high, and the black market was not brought under control.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=58}}
54. The Government of India dated the beginning of a food crisis to the consequences of the air raids on Calcutta in December 1942,{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission | 1945a |p=34, 37}} and the beginning of full-scale famine to May 1943 as the consequence of price decontrol two months earlier.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|pp=40-41}}
55. Some then felt the signs of incipient famine as early as December 1942, when reports from commissioners and district officers of various districts in Bengal began to cite a "sudden and alarming" inflation, nearly doubling the price of rice; this was followed in January by reports of distress over serious food supply problems.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=Appendix VI, Extracts of Reports from Commissioners and District Officers, pp. 225-27}}
56. Although no demographic or geographic group was completely immune to increased rates of death by disease, only the rural poor died of starvation.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=2}}
57. The famine saw two waves of excess mortality.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission | 1945a|p=116}}
58. Disease began its sharp upward turn around October 1943 and overtook starvation as the most common cause of death around December.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=118}} The two trends overlapped briefly in the closing months of the year. Disease-related mortality then continued to take its toll through early-to-mid 1944.{{sfn|Maharatna |1992|p=210}}
59. Malaria was the biggest killer.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p= 1}} From July 1943 through June 1944, the monthly death toll from malaria stood at an average of 125% over rates from the previous five years; in December 1943, the excess mortality was 203% over average.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p= 1}}
60. Moreover, since its symptoms often resemble those of other fatal fevers (such as kala-azar){{sfn|Ghedin |Zhang|Charest|Sundar|1997|p=530}} and since only a small proportion of victims received medical care and were examined, statistics for malaria deaths are almost certainly underestimated.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission | 1945a |p= 119}}

•   Lingzhi ♦ (talk) 16:26, 29 August 2017 (UTC)

Burma military/civil service refugees spread disease to general population

• Transport was delayed and crowded as refugees fleeing from Burma traveled around the countryside and spread diseases, and in general people were highly uncertain and anxious.52 Government spending on military construction only mildly mitigated this crisis. [Tauger 2009]
• the road itself was washed away in places and the refugees had to make their way on their knees through mud and along perilous precipices. The Government of India sent no help. They had now conceded Burma, and the fate of the British Indian citizens stranded in that country was not a priority. Those who survived the journey, according to a British Army Brigadier who witnessed their arrival in Bengal, were in a sate of "complete exhaustion, physical and mental, with disease superimposed...all social sense lost...they suffer from bad nightmares and their delirium is a babble of rivers and crossings, of mud and corpses...emaciation and loss of weight are universal." 174 But even [Mukherjee_hungry_2015]
• A continuous stream of refugees was arriving from Burma. They were finding their way through Assam, after an initial influx into Chittagong, and were moving into the country. They were arriving diseased, bringing in a virulent type of malaria FIC
• The Directors of Public Health send, in their weekly telegrams, only the total figures for their respective provinces for each of the diseases cholera, smallpox and plague; but, in view of the continuous flow of evacuees from Burma, the Directors of Public Health in Bengal and Assam are supplying, at our request, figures for districts in order to enable usto keep a watch on the progress of the epidemics. '21 [Bhattacharya 2002b]  Lingzhi ♦ (talk) 00:05, 1 September 2017 (UTC)

Relevance of Iqbal 2010 page 68?

With respect to the sentences:

Over the decades at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the early twentieth, the power and influence of the zamindars fell and that of the jotedars rose. The shift was caused by a rent crisis that was sparked by nineteenth century tenancy legislation,{{sfn|Das|2008|p=60}} and accelerated after the Great Depression.{{sfnm|1a1=Chatterjee|1y=1986|1p=200|2a1=Iqbal|2y=2010|2pp=68 & 172}}

Among the sources cited is Iqbal 2010 page 68. That page talks about zamindars and a worldwide depression, but one around 1830, not the Great Depression a hundred years later. I believe that page number should be removed because it is not relevant there. --Worldbruce (talk) 03:10, 11 September 2017 (UTC)

• Thanks for checking the article! Your time and trouble are greatly appreciated. Please do drop me a line either on my talk, by email or here on this talk if you cannot get a source. I have the vast vast majority of the sources (but alas some I sent back to the library many months ago).
• You are right; the 'page 68 from Iqbal needs to be dropped. But 172 seems relevant.
• The also-cited Chatterjee text says:

In the end a process of rapid decline in the economic viability of zamindari property culminated, in the face of growing peasant resistance, in what was to be a terminal rent crisis in the 1930s. On the other hand, attempts by the colonial state to reorganize and extend the process of extraction from agriculture led to a gradual strengthening of the position of primary surplus-appropriating agents. A new class of rich peasants operated to their advantage the lease market in peasant holdings, and by suitably altering the mode of rent from cash to kind payments and by combining usurious and trading activities, acquired an increasing control over the surplus product of the immediate producers, extending in some cases to a share in the costs of cultivation and a partial control over the labour process.

  Lingzhi ♦ (talk) 05:44, 11 September 2017 (UTC)

Peer review around the beginning of November. Then FAC

@Nick-D:@Fowler&fowler:@RegentsPark:@Ms Sarah Welch:@Ceoil:@Ian Rose:@Graham Beards:

• It has now been four months since the failed FAC. I will wait two more months, then I will put this article into WP:PR. After a healthy period residing in that forum (how long I leave it depends on how much activity it gathers, but I would say the reasonable minimum time would be 3 weeks to 1 month... If the discussion is active, then more time is warranted]. After that, I am putting it into FAC.
• If anyone has constructive criticism, this leaves at least three more months until FAC.   Lingzhi ♦ (talk) 02:43, 2 September 2017 (UTC)
  • @Fowler&fowler:@RegentsPark:@Ms Sarah Welch:@Ceoil:@Worldbruce:Editing in preparation for Peer review: there are a number of points listed above ("things I forgot to add" in a section above) that need to be added to the article. There are a few points currently within the article that are more or less peripheral. I will begin slowly adding the former and deleting the latter sometime soon-ish, within a week or so, in the slow run-up to the first week of November, when this goes into PR.  Lingzhi ♦ (talk) 23:08, 14 September 2017 (UTC)

Title should be changed

The famine continued well into 1944, so it should be called the Bengal Famine of 1943-44. (2A00:23C4:6384:FE00:5993:B0DC:3959:187B (talk) 20:41, 17 September 2017 (UTC))

• That wold be against Wikipedia's rules concerning Original Research. The relevant research papers/books always refer to it as the Bengal Famine of '43, but then they all go on to explain that it lasted through at least '44 as well. But if the research calls it the famine of '43, then we do too. We follow the research.  Lingzhi ♦ (talk) 21:16, 17 September 2017 (UTC)

Genocidal

The British government's handling of the famine has been called genocidal: http://globalavoidablemortality.blogspot.co.uk/2005/07/forgotten-holocaust-194344-bengal.html (2A00:23C4:6384:FE00:5993:B0DC:3959:187B (talk) 20:37, 17 September 2017 (UTC))

• One guy calls it genocide (he actually seems to tiptoe around calling the '43 famine genocide specifically, but let's just go ahead and say he calls it genocide)... This is very, very much a fringe view. Following his lead would violate WP:FRINGE. I would hesitate to even mention this fringe view, because Dr Gideon Polya teaches biochemistry in some minor college in Australia, but has a little side-industry of publishing activist papers. I have quite literally hundreds of sources about the famine of 1943 here on my computer. If I do a text-search through them, the name "Polya" is not cited even once. He has an article on Wikipedia (Gideon Polya), but for my perspective that's just proof that our standards for inclusion are way way way way too low.  Lingzhi ♦ (talk) 21:33, 17 September 2017 (UTC)