Problem of evil
The problem of evil refers to the question of how to reconcile the existence of evil with an omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent God (see theism). An argument from evil attempts to show that the co-existence of evil and such a God is unlikely or impossible. Attempts to show the contrary have traditionally been discussed under the heading of theodicy. Besides philosophy of religion, the problem of evil is also important to the field of theology and ethics.
The problem of evil is often formulated in two forms: the logical problem of evil and the evidential problem of evil. The logical form of the argument tries to show a logical impossibility in the coexistence of God and evil, while the evidential form tries to show that given the evil in the world, it is improbable that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good God. The problem of evil has been extended to non-human life forms, to include animal suffering from natural evils and human cruelty against them.
Responses to various versions of the problem of evil, meanwhile, come in three forms: refutations, defenses, and theodicies. A wide range of responses have been made against these arguments. There are also many discussions of evil and associated problems in other philosophical fields, such as secular ethics, and evolutionary ethics. But as usually understood, the "problem of evil" is posed in a theological context.
The problem of evil acutely applies to monotheistic religions such as Christianity, Islam, and Judaism that believe in a monotheistic God who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent; but it has also been studied in religions that are non-theistic or polytheistic, such as Buddhism, Hinduism, and Jainism.
Formulation and detailed argumentsEdit
The problem of evil refers to the challenge of reconciling belief in an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God, with the existence of evil and suffering in the world.[note 1] The problem may be described either experientially or theoretically. The experiential problem is the difficulty in believing in a concept of loving God when confronted by suffering or evil in the real world, such as from epidemics, or wars, or murder, or rape or terror attacks wherein innocent children, women, men or a loved one becomes a victim. The problem of evil is also a theoretical one, usually described and studied by religion scholars in two varieties: the logical problem and the evidential problem.
Logical problem of evilEdit
- If an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent god exists, then evil does not.
- There is evil in the world.
- Therefore, an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent god does not exist.
This argument is of the form modus tollens, and is logically valid: If its premises are true, the conclusion follows of necessity. To show that the first premise is plausible, subsequent versions tend to expand on it, such as this modern example:
- God exists.
- God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.
- An omnibenevolent being would want to prevent all evils.
- An omniscient being knows every way in which evils can come into existence, and knows every way in which those evils could be prevented.
- An omnipotent being has the power to prevent that evil from coming into existence.
- A being who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence, who is able to prevent that evil from coming into existence, and who wants to do so, would prevent the existence of that evil.
- If there exists an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God, then no evil exists.
- Evil exists (logical contradiction).
Both of these arguments are understood to be presenting two forms of the logical problem of evil. They attempt to show that the assumed propositions lead to a logical contradiction and therefore cannot all be correct. Most philosophical debate has focused on the propositions stating that God cannot exist with, or would want to prevent, all evils (premises 3 and 6), with defenders of theism (for example, Leibniz) arguing that God could very well exist with and allow evil in order to achieve a greater good.
Theism that forgoes absolute omniscience, omnipotence, or omnibenevolenceEdit
If God lacks any one of these qualities—omniscience, omnipotence, or omnibenevolence—then the logical problem of evil can be resolved. Process theology and open theism are other positions that limit God's omnipotence and/or omniscience (as defined in traditional theology). Dystheism is the belief that God is not wholly good.
Evidential problem of evilEdit
The evidential version of the problem of evil (also referred to as the probabilistic or inductive version), seeks to show that the existence of evil, although logically consistent with the existence of God, counts against or lowers the probability of the truth of theism. As an example, a critic of Plantinga's idea of "a mighty nonhuman spirit" causing natural evils may concede that the existence of such a being is not logically impossible but argue that due to lacking scientific evidence for its existence this is very unlikely and thus it is an unconvincing explanation for the presence of natural evils. Both absolute versions and relative versions of the evidential problems of evil are presented below.
A version by William L. Rowe:
- There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
- An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
- (Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.
Another by Paul Draper:
- Gratuitous evils exist.
- The hypothesis of indifference, i.e., that if there are supernatural beings they are indifferent to gratuitous evils, is a better explanation for (1) than theism.
- Therefore, evidence prefers that no god, as commonly understood by theists, exists.
Problem of evil and animal sufferingEdit
The problem of evil has also been extended beyond human suffering, to include suffering of animals from cruelty, disease and evil. One version of this problem includes animal suffering from natural evil, such as the violence and fear faced by animals from predators, natural disasters, over the history of evolution. This is also referred to as the Darwinian problem of evil, after Charles Darwin who expressed it as follows:
'the sufferings of millions of the lower animals throughout almost endless time' are apparently irreconcilable with the existence of a creator of 'unbounded' goodness.
The second version of the problem of evil applied to animals, and avoidable suffering experienced by them, is one caused by some human beings, such as from animal cruelty or when they are shot or slaughtered. This version of the problem of evil has been used by scholars including John Hick to counter the responses and defenses to the problem of evil such as suffering being a means to perfect the morals and greater good because animals are innocent, helpless, amoral but sentient victims. Scholar Michael Almeida said this was "perhaps the most serious and difficult" version of the problem of evil. The problem of evil in the context of animal suffering, states Almeida, can be stated as:[note 2]
- God is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good.
- The evil of extensive animal suffering exists.
- Necessarily, God can actualize an evolutionary perfect world.
- Necessarily, God can actualize an evolutionary perfect world only if God does actualize an evolutionary perfect world.
- Necessarily, God actualized an evolutionary perfect world.
- If #1 is true then either #2 or #5 is true, but not both. This is a contradiction, so #1 is not true.
Responses, defences and theodiciesEdit
Responses to the problem of evil have occasionally been classified as defences or theodicies; however, authors disagree on the exact definitions. Generally, a defense against the problem of evil may refer to attempts to defuse the logical problem of evil by showing that there is no logical incompatibility between the existence of evil and the existence of God. This task does not require the identification of a plausible explanation of evil, and is successful if the explanation provided shows that the existence of God and the existence of evil are logically compatible. It need not even be true, since a false though coherent explanation would be sufficient to show logical compatibility.
A theodicy, on the other hand, is more ambitious, since it attempts to provide a plausible justification—a morally or philosophically sufficient reason—for the existence of evil and thereby rebut the "evidential" argument from evil. Richard Swinburne maintains that it does not make sense to assume there are greater goods that justify the evil's presence in the world unless we know what they are—without knowledge of what the greater goods could be, one cannot have a successful theodicy. Thus, some authors see arguments appealing to demons or the fall of man as indeed logically possible, but not very plausible given our knowledge about the world, and so see those arguments as providing defences but not good theodicies.
Skeptical theism defends the problem of evil by asserting that God allows an evil to happen in order to prevent a greater evil or to encourage a response that will lead to a greater good. Thus a rape or a murder of an innocent child is defended as having a God's purpose that a human being may not comprehend, but which may lead to lesser evil or greater good. This is called skeptical theism because the argument aims to encourage self-skepticism, either by trying to rationalize God's possible hidden motives, or by trying to explain it as a limitation of human ability to know. The greater good defense is more often argued in religious studies in response to the evidential version of the problem of evil, while the free will defense is usually discussed in the context of the logical version. Most scholars criticize the skeptical theism defense as "devaluing the suffering" and not addressing the premise that God is all-benevolent and should be able to stop all suffering and evil, rather than play a balancing act.
"Greater good" responsesEdit
The omnipotence paradoxes, where evil persists in the presence of an all powerful God, raise questions as to the nature of God's omnipotence. Although that is from excluding the idea of how an interference would negate and subjugate the concept of free will, or in other words result in a totalitarian system that creates a lack of freedom. Some solutions propose that omnipotence does not require the ability to actualize the logically impossible. "Greater good" responses to the problem make use of this insight by arguing for the existence of goods of great value which God cannot actualize without also permitting evil, and thus that there are evils he cannot be expected to prevent despite being omnipotent. Among the most popular versions of the "greater good" response are appeals to the apologetics of free will. Theologians will argue that since no one can fully understand God's ultimate plan, no one can assume that evil actions do not have some sort of greater purpose. Therefore, the nature of evil has a necessary role to play in God's plan for a better world.
The problem of evil is sometimes explained as a consequence of free will, an ability granted by God. Free will is both a source of good and of evil, and with free will also comes the potential for abuse, as when individuals act immorally. People with free will "decide to cause suffering and act in other evil ways", states Boyd, and it is they who make that choice, not God. Further, the free will argument asserts that it would be logically inconsistent for God to prevent evil by coercion and curtailing free will, because that would no longer be free will. This explanation does not completely address the problem of evil, because some suffering and evil is not a result of conscious choice, but is the result of ignorance or natural causes (e.g. a child suffering from a disease), and an all-powerful and all-benevolent God would create a world with free beings and stop this suffering and evil.
Alvin Plantinga has suggested an expanded version of the free will defense. The first part of his defense accounts for moral evil as the result of human action with free will. The second part of his defense suggests the logical possibility of "a mighty non-human spirit" (non-God supernatural beings and fallen angels) whose free will is responsible for "natural evils", including earthquakes, floods, and virulent diseases. Most scholars agree that Plantinga's free will of human and non-human spirits (demons) argument successfully solves the logical problem of evil, proving that God and evil are logically compatible but other scholars explicitly dissent. The dissenters state that while explaining infectious diseases, cancer, hurricanes and other nature-caused suffering as something that is caused by the free will of supernatural beings solves the logical version of the problem of evil, it is highly unlikely that these natural evils do not have natural causes that an omnipotent God could prevent, but instead are caused by the immoral actions of supernatural beings with free will who God created. According to Michael Tooley, this defense is also highly implausible because suffering from natural evil is localized, rational causes and cures for major diseases have been found, and it is unclear why anyone, including a supernatural being who God created would choose to inflict localized evil and suffering to innocent children for example, and why God fails to stop such suffering if he is omnipotent.
Critics of the free will response have questioned whether it accounts for the degree of evil seen in this world. One point in this regard is that while the value of free will may be thought sufficient to counterbalance minor evils, it is less obvious that it outweighs the negative attributes of evils such as rape and murder. Particularly egregious cases known as horrendous evils, which "[constitute] prima facie reason to doubt whether the participant’s life could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good to him/her on the whole," have been the focus of recent work in the problem of evil. Another point is that those actions of free beings which bring about evil very often diminish the freedom of those who suffer the evil; for example the murder of a young child prevents the child from ever exercising their free will. In such a case the freedom of an innocent child is pitted against the freedom of the evil-doer, it is not clear why God would remain unresponsive and passive.
Another criticism is that the potential for evil inherent in free will may be limited by means which do not impinge on that free will. God could accomplish this by making moral actions especially pleasurable, or evil action and suffering impossible by allowing free will but not allowing the ability to enact evil or impose suffering. Supporters of the free will explanation state that that would no longer be free will. Critics respond that this view seems to imply it would be similarly wrong to try to reduce suffering and evil in these ways, a position which few would advocate.
A third challenge to the free will defence is natural evil. By definition, moral evil results from human action, but natural evil results from natural processes that cause natural disasters such as volcanic eruptions or earthquakes. Advocates of the free will response to evil propose various explanations of natural evils. Alvin Plantinga, following Augustine of Hippo, and others have argued that natural evils are caused by the free choices of supernatural beings such as demons. Others have argued
- • that natural evils are the result of the fall of man, which corrupted the perfect world created by God or
- • that natural evils are the result of natural laws or
- • that natural evils provide us with a knowledge of evil which makes our free choices more significant than they would otherwise be, and so our free will more valuable or
- • that natural evils are a mechanism of divine punishment for moral evils that humans have committed, and so the natural evil is justified.
There is also debate regarding the compatibility of moral free will (to select good or evil action) with the absence of evil from heaven, with God's omniscience and with his omnibenevolence.
- Free will and animal suffering
One of the weaknesses of the free will defense is its inapplicability or contradictory applicability with respect to evils faced by animals and the consequent animal suffering. Some scholars, such as David Griffin, state that the free will, or the assumption of greater good through free will, does not apply to animals. In contrast, a few scholars while accepting that "free will" applies in a human context, have posited an alternative "free creatures" defense, stating that animals too benefit from their physical freedom though that comes with the cost of dangers they continuously face.
The "free creatures" defense has also been criticized, in the case of caged, domesticated and farmed animals who are not free and many of whom have historically experienced evil and suffering from abuse by their owners. Further, even animals and living creatures in the wild face horrendous evils and suffering—such as burn and slow death after natural fires or other natural disasters or from predatory injuries—and it is unclear, state Bishop and Perszyk, why an all-loving God would create such free creatures prone to intense suffering. Another line of extended criticism of free will defense has been that if God is perfectly powerful, knowing and loving, then he could have actualized a world with free creatures without moral evil where everyone chooses good, is always full of loving-kindness, is compassionate, always non-violent and full of joy, where earth were just like the monotheistic concept of heaven. If God did create a heaven with his love, an all-loving and always-loving God could have created an earth without evil and suffering for animals and human beings just like heaven.
Soul-making or Irenaean theodicyEdit
The soul-making or Irenaean theodicy is named after the 2nd century French theologian Irenaeus, whose ideas were adopted in Eastern Christianity. It has been discussed by John Hick, and the Irenaean theodicy asserts that evil and suffering are necessary for spiritual growth, for man to discover his soul, and God allows evil for spiritual growth of human beings.
The Irenaean theodicy has been challenged with the assertion that many evils do not seem to promote spiritual growth, and can be positively destructive of the human spirit. Hick acknowledges that this process often fails in our world. A second issue concerns the distribution of evils suffered: were it true that God permitted evil in order to facilitate spiritual growth, then we would expect evil to disproportionately befall those in poor spiritual health. This does not seem to be the case, as the decadent enjoy lives of luxury which insulate them from evil, whereas many of the pious are poor, and are well acquainted with worldly evils. Thirdly, states Kane, human character can be developed directly or in constructive and nurturing loving ways, and it is unclear why God would consider or allow evil and suffering to be necessary or the preferred way to spiritual growth. Further, horrendous suffering often leads to dehumanization, its victims in truth do not grow spiritually but become vindictive and spiritually worse.
This reconciliation of the problem of evil and God, states Creegan, also fails to explain the need or rationale for evil inflicted on animals and resultant animal suffering, because "there is no evidence at all that suffering improves the character of animals, or is evidence of soul-making in them".
Thomas Aquinas suggested the afterlife theodicy to address the problem of evil and to justifying the existence of evil. The premise behind this theodicy has been that afterlife is unending, human life short, and God allows evil and suffering in order to judge and grant everlasting heaven or hell based on human moral actions and human suffering. Aquinas went further and suggested that the afterlife is the "greater good" that justifies the evil and suffering in current life. Christian author Randy Alcorn argues that the joys of heaven will compensate for the sufferings on earth.
The second failure of the afterlife theodicy is in its inability to reconcile the suffering faced by small babies and innocent children from diseases, abuse and injury in war or terror attacks, since "human moral actions" are not to be expected from babies and children. Similarly, moral actions and the concept of choice does not apply to the problem of evil applied to animal suffering from natural evil and the actions of human beings.
Deny evil existsEdit
In the second century, Christian theologists attempted to reconcile the problem of evil with an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God, by denying that evil exists. Among these theologians, Clement of Alexandria offered several theodicies, of which one was called "privation theory of evil" which was adopted thereafter. The other is a more modern version of "deny evil", suggested by Christian Science, wherein the perception of evil is described as a form of illusion.
Evil as the absence of good (Privation Theory)Edit
The early version of "deny evil" is called the "privation theory of evil", so named because it described evil as a form of "lack, loss or privation". One of the earliest proponents of this theory was the 2nd-century Clement of Alexandria, who according to Joseph Kelly, stated that "since God is completely good, he could not have created evil; but if God did not create evil, then it cannot exist". Evil, according to Clement, does not exist as a positive, but exists as a negative or as a "lack of good". Clement's idea was criticised for its inability to explain suffering in the world, if evil did not exist. He was also pressed by Gnostics scholars with the question as to why God did not create creatures that "did not lack the good". Clement attempted to answer these questions ontologically through dualism, an idea found in the Platonic school, that is by presenting two realities, one of God and Truth, another of human and perceived experience.
The fifth-century theologian Augustine of Hippo adopted the privation theory, and in his Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Love, maintained that evil exists only as "absence of the good", that vices are nothing but the privations of natural good. Evil is not a substance, states Augustine, it is nothing more than "loss of good". God does not participate in evil, God is perfection, His creation is perfection, stated Augustine. According to the privation theory, it is the absence of the good, that explains sin and moral evil.
This view has been criticized as merely substituting definition, of evil with "loss of good", of "problem of evil and suffering" with the "problem of loss of good and suffering", but it neither addresses the issue from the theoretical point of view nor from the experiential point of view. Scholars who criticize the privation theory state that murder, rape, terror, pain and suffering are real life events for the victim, and cannot be denied as mere "lack of good". Augustine, states Pereira, accepted suffering exists and was aware that the privation theory was not a solution to the problem of evil.
Evil as illusoryEdit
An alternative modern version of the privation theory is by Christian Science, which asserts that evils such as suffering and disease only appear to be real, but in truth are illusions, and in reality evil does not exist. The theologists of Christian Science, states Stephen Gottschalk, posit that the Spirit is of infinite might, mortal human beings fail to grasp this and focus instead on evil and suffering that have no real existence as "a power, person or principle opposed to God".
The illusion version of privation theory theodicy has been critiqued for denying the reality of crimes, wars, terror, sickness, injury, death, suffering and pain to the victim. Further, adds Millard Erickson, the illusion argument merely shifts the problem to a new problem, as to why God would create this "illusion" of crimes, wars, terror, sickness, injury, death, suffering and pain; and why doesn't God stop this "illusion".
Turning the tablesEdit
A different approach to the problem of evil is to turn the tables by suggesting that any argument from evil is self-refuting, in that its conclusion would necessitate the falsity of one of its premises. One response—called the defensive response—has been to assert the opposite, and to point out that the assertion "evil exists" implies an ethical standard against which moral value is determined, and then to argue that this standard implies the existence of God.
The standard criticism of this view is that an argument from evil is not necessarily a presentation of the views of its proponent, but is instead intended to show how premises which the theist is inclined to believe lead him or her to the conclusion that God does not exist. A second criticism is that the existence of evil can be inferred from the suffering of its victims, rather than by the actions of the evil actor, so no "ethical standard" is implied. This argument was expounded upon by David Hume.
A variant of above defenses is that the problem of evil is derived from probability judgments since they rest on the claim that, even after careful reflection, one can see no good reason for co-existence of God and of evil. The inference from this claim to the general statement that there exists unnecessary evil is inductive in nature and it is this inductive step that sets the evidential argument apart from the logical argument.
The hidden reasons defense asserts that there exists the logical possibility of hidden or unknown reasons for the existence of evil along with the existence of an almighty, all-knowing, all-benevolent, all-powerful God. Not knowing the reason does not necessarily mean that the reason does not exist. This argument has been challenged with the assertion that the hidden reasons premise is as plausible as the premise that God does not exist or is not "an almighty, all-knowing, all-benevolent, all-powerful". Similarly, for every hidden argument that completely or partially justifies observed evils it is equally likely that there is a hidden argument that actually makes the observed evils worse than they appear without hidden arguments, or that the hidden reasons may result in additional contradictions. As such, from an inductive viewpoint hidden arguments will neutralize one another.
A sub-variant of the "hidden reasons" defense is called the "PHOG"—profoundly hidden outweighing goods—defense. The PHOG defense, states Bryan Frances, not only leaves the co-existence of God and human suffering unanswered, but raises questions about why animals and other life forms have to suffer from natural evil, or from abuse (animal slaughter, animal cruelty) by some human beings, where hidden moral lessons, hidden social good and such hidden reasons to reconcile God with the problem of evil do not apply.
Previous lives and karmaEdit
The theory of karma refers to the spiritual principle of cause and effect where intent and actions of an individual (cause) influence the future of that individual (effect). The problem of evil, in the context of karma, has been long discussed in Indian religions including Buddhism, Hinduism and Jainism, both in its theistic and non-theistic schools; for example, in Uttara Mīmāṃsā Sutras Book 2 Chapter 1; the 8th century arguments by Adi Sankara in Brahmasutrabhasya where he posits that God cannot reasonably be the cause of the world because there exists moral evil, inequality, cruelty and suffering in the world; and the 11th century theodicy discussion by Ramanuja in Sribhasya.
Many Indian religions place greater emphasis on developing the karma principle for first cause and innate justice with Man as focus, rather than developing religious principles with the nature and powers of God and divine judgment as focus. Karma theory of Buddhism, Hinduism and Jainism is not static, but dynamic wherein livings beings with intent or without intent, but with words and actions continuously create new karma, and it is this that they believe to be in part the source of good or evil in the world. These religions also believe that past lives or past actions in current life create current circumstances, which also contributes to either. Other scholars suggest that nontheistic Indian religious traditions do not assume an omnibenevolent creator, and some theistic schools do not define or characterize their god(s) as monotheistic Western religions do and the deities have colorful, complex personalities; the Indian deities are personal and cosmic facilitators, and in some schools conceptualized like Plato’s Demiurge. Therefore, the problem of theodicy in many schools of major Indian religions is not significant, or at least is of a different nature than in Western religions.
According to Arthur Herman, karma-transmigration theory solves all three historical formulations to the problem of evil while acknowledging the theodicy insights of Sankara and Ramanuja.
Pandeism is a modern theory that unites deism and pantheism, and asserts that God created the universe but during creation became the universe. In pandeism, God is no superintending, heavenly power, capable of hourly intervention into earthly affairs. No longer existing "above," God cannot intervene from above and cannot be blamed for failing to do so. God, in pandeism, was omnipotent and omnibenevolent, but in the form of universe is no longer omnipotent, omnibenevolent.:76–77
The existence of evil creates not only a problem for existence, but also for belief in an all-good and all-powerful God, because if God were all-good and all-powerful then in theory such a god would be able to prohibit such evils from happening. In the biblical view, evil is all that is "opposed to God and His purposes" (i.e., sin) or that which, from the human perspective, is "harmful and nonproductive" (i.e., suffering).
Christian theologians have generally forwarded two defenses to reconcile the problem of evil and the existence of God: the greater good response and the free will response. Greater good responses explain that God allows evil acts in the world because they are part of God's plan and he does so to prevent a greater evil or for a greater good. The free will response, on the other hand, argues that if God prohibited evil, he would be interfering with free will and the natural laws of the world.
John Joseph Haldane's Wittgenstinian-Thomistic account of concept formation and Martin Heidegger's observation of temporality's thrown nature imply that God's act of creation and God's act of judgment are the same act. God's condemnation of evil is subsequently believed to be executed and expressed in his created world; a judgement that is unstoppable due to God's all powerful will; a constant and eternal judgement that becomes announced and communicated to other people on Judgment Day. In this explanation, God's condemnation of evil is declared to be a good judgement.
Irenaean theodicy, posited by Irenaeus (2nd century CE–c. 202), has been reformulated by John Hick. It holds that one cannot achieve moral goodness or love for God if there is no evil and suffering in the world. Evil is soul-making and leads one to be truly moral and close to God. God created an epistemic distance (such that God is not immediately knowable) so that we may strive to know him and by doing so become truly good. Evil is a means to good for three main reasons:
- Means of knowledge – Hunger leads to pain, and causes a desire to feed. Knowledge of pain prompts humans to seek to help others in pain.
- Character building – Evil offers the opportunity to grow morally. "We would never learn the art of goodness in a world designed as a hedonistic paradise" (Richard Swinburne)
- Predictable environment – The world runs to a series of natural laws. These are independent of any inhabitants of the universe. Natural Evil only occurs when these natural laws conflict with our own perceived needs. This is not immoral in any way
St Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE) in his Augustinian theodicy, as presented in John Hick's book Evil and the God of Love, focuses on the Genesis story that essentially dictates that God created the world and that it was good; evil is merely a consequence of the fall of man (The story of the Garden of Eden where Adam and Eve disobeyed God and caused inherent sin for man). Augustine stated that natural evil (evil present in the natural world such as natural disasters etc.) is caused by fallen angels, whereas moral evil (evil caused by the will of human beings) is as a result of man having become estranged from God and choosing to deviate from his chosen path. Augustine argued that God could not have created evil in the world, as it was created good, and that all notions of evil are simply a deviation or privation of goodness. Evil cannot be a separate and unique substance. For example, Blindness is not a separate entity, but is merely a lack or privation of sight. Thus the Augustinian theodicist would argue that the problem of evil and suffering is void because God did not create evil; it was man who chose to deviate from the path of perfect goodness.
St. Thomas AquinasEdit
Saint Thomas systematized the Augustinian conception of evil, supplementing it with his own musings. Evil, according to St. Thomas, is a privation, or the absence of some good which belongs properly to the nature of the creature. There is therefore no positive source of evil, corresponding to the greater good, which is God; evil being not real but rational—i.e. it exists not as an objective fact, but as a subjective conception; things are evil not in themselves, but by reason of their relation to other things or persons. All realities are in themselves good; they produce bad results only incidentally; and consequently the ultimate cause of evil is fundamentally good, as well as the objects in which evil is found.
Luther and CalvinEdit
Both Luther and Calvin explained evil as a consequence of the fall of man and the original sin. Calvin, however, held to the belief in predestination and omnipotence, the fall is part of God's plan. Luther saw evil and original sin as an inheritance from Adam and Eve, passed on to all mankind from their conception and bound the will of man to serving sin, which God's just nature allowed as consequence for their distrust, though God planned mankind's redemption through Jesus Christ. Ultimately humans may not be able to understand and explain this plan.
Some modern liberal Christians, including French Calvinist theologian André Gounelle and Pastor Marc Pernot of L'Oratoire du Louvre, believe that God is not omnipotent, and that the Bible only describes God as "almighty" in passages concerning the End Times.
Christian Science views evil as having no ultimate reality and as being due to false beliefs, consciously or unconsciously held. Evils such as illness and death may be banished by correct understanding. This view has been questioned, aside from the general criticisms of the concept of evil as an illusion discussed earlier, since the presumably correct understanding by Christian Science members, including the founder, has not prevented illness and death. However, Christian Scientists believe that the many instances of spiritual healing (as recounted e.g. in the Christian Science periodicals and in the textbook Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures by Mary Baker Eddy) are anecdotal evidence of the correctness of the teaching of the unreality of evil. According to one author, the denial by Christian Scientists that evil ultimately exists neatly solves the problem of evil; however, most people cannot accept that solution
Jehovah's Witnesses believe that Satan is the original cause of evil. Though once a perfect angel, Satan developed feelings of self-importance and craved worship, and eventually challenged God's right to rule. Satan caused Adam and Eve to disobey God, and humanity subsequently became participants in a challenge involving the competing claims of Jehovah and Satan to universal sovereignty. Other angels who sided with Satan became demons.
God's subsequent tolerance of evil is explained in part by the value of free will. But Jehovah's Witnesses also hold that this period of suffering is one of non-interference from God, which serves to demonstrate that Jehovah's "right to rule" is both correct and in the best interests of all intelligent beings, settling the "issue of universal sovereignty". Further, it gives individual humans the opportunity to show their willingness to submit to God's rulership.
At some future time known to him, God will consider his right to universal sovereignty to have been settled for all time. The reconciliation of "faithful" humankind will have been accomplished through Christ, and nonconforming humans and demons will have been destroyed. Thereafter, evil (any failure to submit to God's rulership) will be summarily executed.
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day SaintsEdit
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church) introduces a concept similar to Irenaean theodicy, that experiencing evil is a necessary part of the development of the soul. Specifically, the laws of nature prevent an individual from fully comprehending or experiencing good without experiencing its opposite. In this respect, Latter-day Saints do not regard the fall of Adam and Eve as a tragic, unplanned cancellation of an eternal paradise; rather they see it as an essential element of God's plan. By allowing opposition and temptations in mortality, God created an environment for people to learn, to develop their freedom to choose, and to appreciate and understand the light, with a comparison to darkness 
This is a departure from the mainstream Christian definition of omnipotence and omniscience, which Mormons believe was changed by post-apostolic theologians in the centuries after Christ. The writings of Justin Martyr, Origen, Augustine, and others indicate a merging of Christian principles with Greek metaphysical philosophies such as Neoplatonism, which described divinity as an utterly simple, immaterial, formless substance/essence (ousia) that was the absolute causality and creative source of all that existed. Mormons teach that through modern day revelation, God restored the truth about his nature, which eliminated the speculative metaphysical elements that had been incorporated after the Apostolic era. As such, God's omniscience/omnipotence is not to be understood as metaphysically transcending all limits of nature, but as a perfect comprehension of all things within nature—which gives God the power to bring about any state or condition within those bounds. This restoration also clarified that God does not create Ex nihilo (out of nothing), but uses existing materials to organize order out of chaos. Because opposition is inherent in nature, and God operates within nature’s bounds, God is therefore not considered the author of evil, nor will He eradicate all evil from the mortal experience. His primary purpose, however, is to help His children to learn for themselves to both appreciate and choose the right, and thus achieve eternal joy and live in his presence, and where evil has no place.
Islamic scholars in the medieval and modern era have tried to reconcile the problem of evil with the afterlife theodicy. According to Nursi, the temporal world has many evils such as the destruction of Ottoman Empire and its substitution with secularism, and such evils are impossible to understand unless there is an afterlife. The omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent god in Islamic thought creates everything, including human suffering and its causes (evil). Evil was neither bad nor needed moral justification from God, but rewards awaited believers in the afterlife. The faithful suffered in this short life, so as to be judged by God and enjoy heaven in the never-ending afterlife.
Alternate theodicies in Islamic thought include the 11th-century Ibn Sina's denial of evil in a form similar to "privation theory" theodicy. This theodicy attempt by Ibn Sina is unsuccessful, according to Shams Inati, because it implicitly denies the omnipotence of God.
According to Jon Levenson, the writers of Hebrew Bible were well aware of evil as a theological problem, but he does not claim awareness of the problem of evil. In contrast, according to Yair Hoffman, the ancient books of the Hebrew Bible do not show an awareness of the theological problem of evil, and even most later biblical scholars did not touch the question of the problem of evil. The earliest awareness of the problem of evil in Judaism tradition is evidenced in extra- and post-biblical sources such as early Apocrypha (secret texts by unknown authors, which were not considered mainstream at the time they were written). The first systematic reflections on the problem of evil by Jewish philosophers is traceable only in the medieval period.
The problem of evil gained renewed interest among Jewish scholars after the moral evil of the Holocaust. The all-powerful, all-compassionate, all-knowing monotheistic God presumably had the power to prevent the Holocaust, but he didn't. The Jewish thinkers have argued that either God did not care about the torture and suffering in the world He created—which means He is not omnibenevolent, or He did not know what was happening—which means He is not omniscient. The persecution of Jewish people was not a new phenomenon, and medieval Jewish thinkers had in abstract attempted to reconcile the logical version of the problem of evil. The Holocaust experience and other episodes of mass extermination such as the Gulag and the Killing Fields where millions of people experienced torture and died, however, brought into focus the visceral nature of the evidential version of the problem of evil.
The 10th-century Rabbi called Saadia Gaon presented a theodicy along the lines of "soul-making, greater good and afterlife". Suffering suggested Saadia, in a manner similar to Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 5, should be considered as a gift from God because it leads to an eternity of heaven in afterlife. In contrast, the 12th-century Moses Maimonides offered a different theodicy, asserting that the all-loving God neither produces evil nor gifts suffering, because everything God does is absolutely good, then presenting the "privation theory" explanation. Both these answers, states Daniel Rynhold, merely rationalize and suppress the problem of evil, rather than solve it. It is easier to rationalize suffering caused by a theft or accidental injuries, but the physical, mental and existential horrors of persistent events of repeated violence over long periods of time such as Holocaust, or an innocent child slowly suffering from the pain of cancer, cannot be rationalized by one sided self blame and belittling a personhood. Attempts by theologians to reconcile the problem of evil, with claims that the Holocaust evil was a necessary, intentional and purposeful act of God have been declared obscene by Jewish thinkers such as Richard Rubenstein.
Ancient Mesopotamia and EgyptEdit
The ancient Egyptian religion, according to Roland Enmarch, potentially absolved their gods from any blame for evil, and used a negative cosmology and the negative concept of human nature to explain evil. Further, the Pharaoh was seen as an agent of the gods and his actions as a king were aimed to prevent evil and curb evilness in human nature.
Ancient Greek religionEdit
The gods in Greek mythology were seen as superior, but shared similar traits with humans and often interacted with them. Although the Greeks didn't believe in any "evil" gods, the Greeks still acknowledged the fact that evil was present in the world. Gods often meddled in the affairs of men, and sometimes their actions consisted of bringing misery to people, for example gods would sometimes be a direct cause of death for people. However, the Greeks did not consider the gods to be evil as a result of their actions, instead the answer for most situations in Greek mythology was the power of fate. Fate is considered to be more powerful than the gods themselves and for this reason no one can escape it. For this reason the Greeks recognized that unfortunate events were justifiable by the idea of fate.
Buddhism neither denies the existence of evil, nor does it attempt to reconcile evil in a way attempted by monotheistic religions that assert the existence of an almighty, all powerful, all knowing, all benevolent God. Buddhism, as a non-theistic religion like Jainism, does not assume or assert any creator God, and thus the problem of evil or of theodicy does not apply to it. It considers a benevolent, omnipotent creator god as attachment to be a false concept.
Buddhism accepts that there is evil in the world, as well as Dukkha (suffering) that is caused by evil or because of natural causes (aging, disease, rebirth). The precepts and practices of Buddhism, such as Four Noble Truths and Noble Eightfold Path aim to empower a follower in gaining insights and liberation (nirvana) from the cycle of such suffering as well as rebirth.
Some strands of Mahayana Buddhism developed a theory of Buddha-nature in texts such as the Tathagata-garbha Sutras composed in 3rd-century south India, which is very similar to the "soul, self" theory found in classical Hinduism. The Tathagata-garbha theory leads to a Buddhist version of the problem of evil, states Peter Harvey, because the theory claims that every human being has an intrinsically pure inner Buddha which is good. This premise leads to the question as to why anyone does any evil, and why doesn't the "intrinsically pure inner Buddha" attempt or prevail in preventing the evil actor before he or she commits the evil. One response has been that the Buddha-nature is omnibenevolent, but not omnipotent. Further, the Tathagata-garbha Sutras are atypical texts of Buddhism, because they contradict the Anatta doctrines in a vast majority of Buddhist texts, leading scholars to posit that the Tathagatagarbha Sutras were written to promote Buddhism to non-Buddhists, and that they do not represent mainstream Buddhism.
The mainstream Buddhism, from its early days, did not need to address the theological problem of evil as it saw no need for a creator of the universe and asserted instead, like many Indian traditions, that the universe never had a beginning and all existence is an endless cycle of rebirths (samsara).
Hinduism is a complex religion with many different currents or schools. Its non-theist traditions such as Samkhya, early Nyaya, Mimamsa and many within Vedanta do not posit the existence of an almighty, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God (monotheistic God), and the classical formulations of the problem of evil and theodicy do not apply to most Hindu traditions. Further, deities in Hinduism are neither eternal nor omnipotent nor omniscient nor omnibenevolent. Devas are mortal and subject to samsara. Evil as well as good, along with suffering is considered real and caused by human free will, its source and consequences explained through the karma doctrine of Hinduism, as in other Indian religions.
A version of the problem of evil appears in the ancient Brahma Sutras, probably composed between 200 BCE and 200 CE, a foundational text of the Vedanta tradition of Hinduism. Its verses 2.1.34 through 2.1.36 aphoristically mention a version of the problem of suffering and evil in the context of the abstract metaphysical Hindu concept of Brahman. The verse 2.1.34 of Brahma Sutras asserts that inequality and cruelty in the world cannot be attributed to the concept of Brahman, and this is in the Vedas and the Upanishads. In his interpretation and commentary on the Brahma Sutras, the 8th-century scholar Adi Shankara states that just because some people are happier than others and just because there is so much malice, cruelty and pain in the world, some state that Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.
For that would lead to the possibility of partiality and cruelty. For it can be reasonably concluded that God has passion and hatred like some ignoble persons... Hence there will be a nullification of God's nature of extreme purity, (unchangeability), etc., [...] And owing to infliction of misery and destruction on all creatures, God will be open to the charge of pitilessness and extreme cruelty, abhorred even by a villain. Thus on account of the possibility of partiality and cruelty, God is not an agent.
Shankara attributes evil and cruelty in the world to Karma of oneself, of others, and to ignorance, delusion and wrong knowledge, but not to the abstract Brahman. Brahman itself is beyond good and evil. There is evil and suffering because of karma. Those who struggle with this explanation, states Shankara, do so because of presuned duality, between Brahman and Jiva, or because of linear view of existence, when in reality "samsara and karma are anadi" (existence is cyclic, rebirth and deeds are eternal with no beginning). In other words, in the Brahma Sutras, the formulation of problem of evil is considered a metaphysical construct, but not a moral issue. Ramanuja of the theistic Sri Vaishnavism school—a major tradition within Vaishnavism—interprets the same verse in the context of Vishnu, and asserts that Vishnu only creates potentialities.
According to Swami Gambhirananda of Ramakrishna Mission, Sankara's commentary explains that God cannot be charged with partiality or cruelty (i.e. injustice) on account of his taking the factors of virtuous and vicious actions (Karma) performed by an individual in previous lives. If an individual experiences pleasure or pain in this life, it is due to virtuous or vicious action (Karma) done by that individual in a past life.[page needed]
A sub-tradition within the Vaishnavism school of Hinduism that is an exception is dualistic Dvaita, founded by Madhvacharya in the 13th-century. This tradition posits a concept of God so similar to Christianity, that Christian missionaries in colonial India suggested that Madhvacharya was likely influenced by early Christians who migrated to India, a theory that has been discredited by scholars. Madhvacharya was challenged by Hindu scholars on the problem of evil, given his dualistic Tattvavada theory that proposed God and living beings along with universe as separate realities. Madhvacharya asserted, Yathecchasi tatha kuru, which Sharma translates and explains as "one has the right to choose between right and wrong, a choice each individual makes out of his own responsibility and his own risk". Madhva's reply does not address the problem of evil, state Dasti and Bryant, as to how can evil exist with that of a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.
According to Sharma, "Madhva's tripartite classification of souls makes it unnecessary to answer the problem of evil". According to David Buchta, this does not address the problem of evil, because the omnipotent God "could change the system, but chooses not to" and thus sustains the evil in the world. This view of self's agency of Madhvacharya was, states Buchta, an outlier in Vedanta school and Indian philosophies in general.
Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?— The Epicurean paradox, ~300 BCE
There is no surviving written text of Epicurus that establishes that he actually formulated the problem of evil in this way, and it is uncertain that he was the author. An attribution to him can be found in a text dated about 600 years later, in the 3rd century Christian theologian Lactantius's Treatise on the Anger of God[note 3] where Lactantius critiques the argument. Epicurus's argument as presented by Lactantius actually argues that a god that is all-powerful and all-good does not exist and that the gods are distant and uninvolved with man's concerns. The gods are neither our friends nor enemies.
"Is he [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?"
"[God's] power we allow [is] infinite: Whatever he wills is executed: But neither man nor any other animal are happy: Therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite: He is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: But the course of nature tends not to human or animal felicity: Therefore it is not established for that purpose. Through the whole compass of human knowledge, there are no inferences more certain and infallible than these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men?"
In his Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, the sceptic Pierre Bayle denied the goodness and omnipotence of God on account of the sufferings experienced in this earthly life. Gottfried Leibniz introduced the term theodicy in his 1710 work Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal ("Theodicic Essays on the Benevolence of God, the Free will of man, and the Origin of Evil") which was directed mainly against Bayle. He argued that this is the best of all possible worlds that God could have created.
Imitating the example of Leibniz, other philosophers also called their treatises on the problem of evil theodicies. Voltaire's popular novel Candide mocked Leibnizian optimism through the fictional tale of a naive youth.
Thomas Robert MalthusEdit
The population and economic theorist Thomas Malthus stated in a 1798 essay that people with health problems or disease are not suffering, and should not viewed as such. Malthus argued, "Nothing can appear more consonant to our reason than that those beings which come out of the creative process of the world in lovely and beautiful forms should be crowned with immortality, while those which come out misshapen, those whose minds are not suited to a purer and happier state of existence, should perish and be condemned to mix again with their original clay. Eternal condemnation of this kind may be considered as a species of eternal punishment, and it is not wonderful that it should be represented, sometimes, under images of suffering."
Malthus believed in the Supreme Creator, considered suffering as justified, and suggested that God should be considered "as pursuing the creatures that had offended him with eternal hate and torture, instead of merely condemning to their original insensibility those beings that, by the operation of general laws, had not been formed with qualities suited to a purer state of happiness."
Immanuel Kant wrote an essay on theodicy. He suggested, states William Dembski, that any successful theodicy must prove one of three things:  what one deems contrary to the purposefulness of world is not so;  if one deems it is contrary, then one must consider it not as a positive fact, but inevitable consequence of the nature of things;  if one accepts that it is a positive fact, then one must posit that it is not the work of God, but of some other beings such as man or superior spirits, good or evil.
Kant did not attempt or exhaust all theodicies to help address the problem of evil. He claimed there is a reason all possible theodicies must fail. While a successful philosophical theodicy has not been achieved in his time, added Kant, there is no basis for a successful anti-theodicy either.
Problem of goodEdit
Several philosophers have argued that just as there exists a problem of evil for theists who believe in an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent being, so too is there a problem of good for anyone who believes in an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnimalevolent (or perfectly evil) being. As it appears that the defenses and theodicies which might allow the theist to resist the problem of evil can be inverted and used to defend belief in the omnimalevolent being, this suggests that we should draw similar conclusions about the success of these defensive strategies. In that case, the theist appears to face a dilemma: either to accept that both sets of responses are equally bad, and so that the theist does not have an adequate response to the problem of evil; or to accept that both sets of responses are equally good, and so to commit to the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnimalevolent being as plausible.
Critics have noted that theodicies and defenses are often addressed to the logical problem of evil. As such, they are intended only to demonstrate that it is possible that evil can co-exist with an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent being. Since the relevant parallel commitment is only that good can co-exist with an omniscient, omnipotent and omnimalevolent being, not that it is plausible that they should do so, the theist who is responding to the problem of evil need not be committing himself to something he is likely to think is false. This reply, however, leaves the evidential problem of evil untouched.
Another general criticism is that though a theodicy may harmonize God with the existence of evil, it does so at the cost of nullifying morality. This is because most theodicies assume that whatever evil there is exists because it is required for the sake of some greater good. But if an evil is necessary because it secures a greater good, then it appears we humans have no duty to prevent it, for in doing so we would also prevent the greater good for which the evil is required. Even worse, it seems that any action can be rationalized, as if one succeeds in performing it, then God has permitted it, and so it must be for the greater good. From this line of thought one may conclude that, as these conclusions violate our basic moral intuitions, no greater good theodicy is true, and God does not exist. Alternatively, one may point out that greater good theodicies lead us to see every conceivable state of affairs as compatible with the existence of God, and in that case the notion of God's goodness is rendered meaningless.
Notes and referencesEdit
- Omniscient means "all-knowing", omnipotent means "all-powerful, almighty", and omnibenevolent refers to the quality of "all-good, all-loving".
- Nicola Creegan has presented the logical and evidential versions of the problem of evil when applied to animal suffering.
Quod si haec ratio vera est, quam stoici nullo modo videre potuerunt, dissolvitur etiam argumentum illud Epicuri. Deus, inquit, aut vult tollere mala et non potest; aut potest et non vult; aut neque vult, neque potest; aut et vult et potest. Si vult et non potest, imbecillis est; quod in Deum non cadit. Si potest et non vult, invidus; quod aeque alienum a Deo. Si neque vult, neque potest, et invidus et imbecillis est; ideoque neque Deus. Si vult et potest, quod solum Deo convenit, unde ergo sunt mala? aut cur illa non tollit? Scio plerosque philosophorum, qui providentiam defendunt, hoc argumento perturbari solere et invitos pene adigi, ut Deum nihil curare fateantur, quod maxime quaerit Epicurus.— Lactantius, De Ira Dei
But if this account is true, which the Stoics were in no manner able to see, that argument also of Epicurus is done away. God, he says, either wishes to take away evils, and is unable; or He is able and is unwilling; or He is neither willing nor able, or He is both willing and able. If He is willing and is unable, He is feeble, which is not in accordance with the character of God; if He is able and unwilling, He is envious, which is equally at variance with God; if He is neither willing or able, He is both envious and feeble, and therefore not God; if He is both willing and able, which alone is suitable to God, from what source then are evils or why does He not remove them? I know that many of the philosophers, who defend providence, are accustomed to be disturbed by this argument, and are almost driven against their will to admit that God takes no interest in anything, which Epicurus especially aims at.— Lactantius, On the Anger of God
- The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Problem of Evil", Michael Tooley
- The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Evidential Problem of Evil", Nick Trakakis
- The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Logical Problem of Evil", James R. Beebe
- Peter van Inwagen (2008). The Problem of Evil. Oxford University Press. pp. 120, 123–26, context: 120–33. ISBN 978-0-19-954397-7.
- Nicholas J. Rengger, Moral Evil and International Relations, in SAIS Review 25:1, Winter/Spring 2005, pp. 3–16
- Peter Kivy, Melville's Billy and the Secular Problem of Evil: the Worm in the Bud, in The Monist (1980), 63
- Kekes, John (1990). Facing Evil. Princeton: Princeton UP. ISBN 0-691-07370-8.
- Timothy Anders, The Evolution of Evil (2000)
- Lawrence C. Becker; Charlotte B. Becker (2013). Encyclopedia of Ethics. Routledge. pp. 147–49. ISBN 978-1-135-35096-3.
- Problem of Evil, Paul Brians, Washington State University
- Stephen D. O'Leary (1998). Arguing the Apocalypse. Oxford University Press. pp. 34–35. ISBN 978-0-19-535296-2., Quote: "As Max Weber notes, however, it is in monotheistic religions that this problem becomes acute."
- Peter Harvey (2013). An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices. Cambridge University Press. pp. 37, 141. ISBN 978-0-521-85942-4.
- Arthur Herman, The problem of evil and Indian thought, 2nd Edition, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 81-20807537, pp. 5 with Part II and III of the book
- Gregory A. Boyd (2003), Is God to Blame? (InterVarsity Press), ISBN 978-0830823949, pp. 55–58
- Peter van Inwagen (2008). The Problem of Evil. Oxford University Press. pp. 22, 26–30, 6–10. ISBN 978-0-19-954397-7.
- Linda Edwards (2001). A Brief Guide to Beliefs: Ideas, Theologies, Mysteries, and Movements. Westminster John Knox Press. p. 59. ISBN 978-0-664-22259-8.
- John Swinton (2007). Raging with Compassion: Pastoral Responses to the Problem of Evil. Wm. B. Eerdmans. pp. 33–35, 119, 143. ISBN 978-0-8028-2997-9.
- Susan Neiman (2004). Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy. Princeton University Press. pp. 119–20, 318–22. ISBN 978-0691117928.
- Micha de Winter (2012). Socialization and Civil Society. Springer. pp. 69–70. ISBN 978-94-6209-092-7.
- The formulation may have been wrongly attributed to Epicurus by Lactantius, who, from his Christian perspective, regarded Epicurus as an atheist. According to Mark Joseph Larrimore, (2001), The Problem of Evil, pp. xix–xxi. Wiley-Blackwell. According to Reinhold F. Glei, it is settled that the argument of theodicy is from an academical source which is not only not epicurean, but even anti-epicurean. Reinhold F. Glei, Et invidus et inbecillus. Das angebliche Epikurfragment bei Laktanz, De ira dei 13, 20–21, in: Vigiliae Christianae 42 (1988), pp. 47–58
- Rowe, William L. (1979). "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism". American Philosophical Quarterly. 16: 336–37.
- Draper, Paul (1989). "Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists". Noûs. Noûs, Vol. 23, No. 3. 23 (3): 331–50. JSTOR 2215486. doi:10.2307/2215486.
- Nicola Hoggard Creegan (2013). Animal Suffering and the Problem of Evil. Oxford University Press. pp. 44–55. ISBN 978-0-19-993185-9.
- Michael Murray (2008). Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering. Oxford University Press. p. 8. ISBN 978-0-19-155327-1.
- Michael J. Almeida (2012). Freedom, God, and Worlds. Oxford University Press. pp. 193–94. ISBN 978-0-19-964002-7.
- Michael Murray (2008). Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering. Oxford University Press. p. 2. ISBN 978-0-19-155327-1.
- Diogenes Allen (1990). Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams, ed. The Problem of Evil. Oxford University Press. pp. 204–06. ISBN 978-0-19-824866-8.
- William L. Rowe (2007). William L. Rowe on Philosophy of Religion: Selected Writings. Ashgate. pp. 61–64 (the fawn's suffering example). ISBN 978-0-7546-5558-9.
- Michael J. Almeida (2012). Freedom, God, and Worlds. Oxford University Press. pp. 194–95, for the complete context and alternate formulations see pages 194–217. ISBN 978-0-19-964002-7.
- Honderich, Ted (2005). "theodicy". The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. ISBN 0-19-926479-1.
John Hick, for example, proposes a theodicy, while Alvin Plantinga formulates a defence. The idea of human free will often appears in a both of these strategies, but in different ways.
- For more explanation regarding contradictory propositions and possible worlds, see Plantinga's "God, Freedom and Evil" (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans 1974), 24–29.
- Coined by Leibniz from Greek θεός (theós), "god" and δίκη (díkē), "justice", may refer to the project of "justifying God"—showing that God's existence is compatible with the existence of evil.
- Swinburne, Richard (2005). "evil, the problem of". In Ted Honderich. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. ISBN 0-19-926479-1.
- Ian Wilks (2014). "Chapter 31, for context see Chapters 29 and 30". In Justin P. McBrayer and Daniel Howard-Snyder. The Blackwell Companion to The Problem of Evil. Wiley. ISBN 978-1-118-60797-8.
- Trent Dougherty; Justin P. McBrayer (2014). Skeptical Theism: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 265–66. ISBN 978-0-19-966118-3.
- James Franklin Harris (2002). Analytic Philosophy of Religion. Springer. pp. 243–44. ISBN 978-1-4020-0530-5.
- Trent Dougherty; Justin P. McBrayer (2014). Skeptical Theism: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 265–73. ISBN 978-0-19-966118-3.
- Whitney, B. "Theodicy". Gale Virtual Reference Library. Gale. Retrieved 10 December 2014.
- Gregory A. Boyd, Is God to Blame? (InterVarsity Press, 2003) ISBN 978-0830823949, pp. 55–58, 69–70, 76, 96.
- Michael Lacewing (2014). Philosophy for AS: Epistemology and Philosophy of Religion. Routledge. pp. 239–42. ISBN 978-1-317-63583-3.
- Plantinga, Alvin (1974). God, Freedom, and Evil. Harper & Row. p. 58. ISBN 0-8028-1731-9.
- Meister, Chad (2009). Introducing Philosophy of Religion. Routledge. p. 134. ISBN 0-415-40327-8.
- Sobel, J.H. Logic and Theism. Cambridge University Press (2004) pp. 436–37
- Alvin Plantinga; Michael Tooley (2009). Knowledge of God. John Wiley & Sons. pp. 101–05. ISBN 978-1-4443-0131-1.
- Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Cornell University, 2000), 203.
- Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Melbourne University Press, 1999), 26.
- C. S. Lewis writes: "We can, perhaps, conceive of a world in which God corrected the results of this abuse of free will by His creatures at every moment: so that a wooden beam became soft as grass when it was used as a weapon, and the air refused to obey me if I attempted to set up in it the sound waves that carry lies or insults. But such a world would be one in which wrong actions were impossible, and in which, therefore, freedom of the will would be void; nay, if the principle were carried out to its logical conclusion, evil thoughts would be impossible, for the cerebral matter which we use in thinking would refuse its task when we attempted to frame them." C.S. Lewis The Problem of Pain (HarperCollins, 1996) pp. 24–25
- The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "The Problem of Evil," Michael Tooley at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/.
- "The Two Types of Evil," at http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/rs/god/chgoodandevilrev1.shtml. Accessed 10 July 2014.
- Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Eerdmans, 1989), 58.
- Bradley Hanson, Introduction to Christian Theology (Fortress, 1997), 99.
- Linda Edwards, A Brief Guide (Westminster John Knox, 2001), 62.
- Polkinghorne, John (2003). Belief in God in an Age of Science. New Haven, CT: Yale Nota Bene. p. 14. ISBN 978-0-300-09949-2. and also See esp. ch. 5 of his Science and Providence. ISBN 978-0-87773-490-1
- Richard Swinburne in "Is There a God?" writes that "the operation of natural laws producing evils gives humans knowledge (if they choose to seek it) of how to bring about such evils themselves. Observing you can catch some disease by the operation of natural processes gives me the power either to use those processes to give that disease to other people, or through negligence to allow others to catch it, or to take measures to prevent others from catching the disease." In this way, "it increases the range of significant choice... The actions which natural evil makes possible are ones which allow us to perform at our best and interact with our fellows at the deepest level" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 108–09.
- Bradley Hanson, Introduction to Christian Theology (Fortress, 1997), 100.
- Oppy, Graham. Arguing about Gods, pp. 314–39. Cambridge University Press, 2006. ISBN 0521863864
- Simon Cushing (2010). "Evil, Freedom and the Heaven Dilemma" (PDF). Challenging Evil: Time, Society and Changing Concepts of the Meaning of Evil. Inter-Disciplinary Press. Retrieved 10 April 2014.
- David Ray Griffin (1991). Evil Revisited: Responses and Reconsiderations. State University of New York Press. pp. 94–95. ISBN 978-0-7914-0612-0.
- John S. Feinberg (2004). The Many Faces of Evil (Revised and Expanded Edition): Theological Systems and the Problems of Evil. Crossway. pp. 94–95. ISBN 978-1-4335-1727-3.
- Nicola Hoggard Creegan (2013). Animal Suffering and the Problem of Evil. Oxford University Press. p. 48. ISBN 978-0-19-993185-9.
- Nicola Hoggard Creegan (2013). Animal Suffering and the Problem of Evil. Oxford University Press. pp. 48–51. ISBN 978-0-19-993185-9.
- John Hick (2016). Evil and the God of Love. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 201–16. ISBN 978-1-349-18048-6.
- John Hick, Evil and the God of Love , (Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edition 1977, 2010 reissue), 325, 336.
- The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Problem of Evil", James R. Beebe
- John Hick (2016). Evil and the God of Love. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 376–79. ISBN 978-1-349-18048-6.
- Nicola Hoggard Creegan (2013). Animal Suffering and the Problem of Evil. Oxford University Press. p. 185 with footnote 3. ISBN 978-0-19-993184-2.
- Eleonore Stump (2008). Daniel Howard-Snyder, ed. The Evidential Argument from Evil. Indiana University Press. pp. 49–52. ISBN 0-253-11409-8.
- Stewart Goetz (2008). Freedom, Teleology, and Evil. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 139–47. ISBN 978-1-4411-7183-2.
- Benjamin W. McCraw; Robert Arp (2015). The Problem of Evil: New Philosophical Directions. Lexington. pp. 132–33. ISBN 978-1-4985-1208-4.
- If God Is Good: Faith in the Midst of Suffering and Evil, published by Random House of Canada, 2009, p. 294; Quote: Without this eternal perspective, we assume that people who die young, who have handicaps, who suffer poor health, who don't get married or have children, or who don't do this or that will miss out on the best life has to offer. But the theology underlying these assumptions have a fatal flaw. It presumes that our present Earth, bodies, culture, relationships and lives are all there is... [but] Heaven will bring far more than compensation for our present sufferings.
- "Ordinary Morality Implies Atheism", European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1:2 (2009), 107–26, Quote: "... may stem from imagining an ecstatic or forgiving state of mind on the part of the blissful: in heaven no one bears grudges, even the most horrific earthly suffering is as nothing compared to infinite bliss, all past wrongs are forgiven. But "are forgiven" doesn’t mean "were justified"; the blissful person’s disinclination to dwell on his or her earthly suffering doesn’t imply that a perfect being was justified in permitting the suffering all along. By the same token, our ordinary moral practice recognizes a legitimate complaint about child abuse even if, as adults, its victims should happen to be on drugs that make them uninterested in complaining. Even if heaven swamps everything, it doesn’t thereby justify everything."
- Nicholas Jolley (2014). Larry M. Jorgensen and Samuel Newlands, ed. New Essays on Leibniz's Theodicy. Oxford University Press. pp. 64–68. ISBN 978-0-19-966003-2.
- Andrew Chignell; Terence Cuneo; Matthew C. Halteman (2015). Philosophy Comes to Dinner: Arguments About the Ethics of Eating. Routledge. p. 269. ISBN 978-1-136-57807-6.
- Joseph Francis Kelly (2002). The Problem of Evil in the Western Tradition. Liturgical Press. p. 42. ISBN 978-0-8146-5104-9.
- Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology, Second Edition, Baker Academic, 2007, pp. 445–46.
- R. Jeffery (2007). Evil and International Relations: Human Suffering in an Age of Terror. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 49. ISBN 978-0-230-61035-4.
- Joseph Francis Kelly (2002). The Problem of Evil in the Western Tradition. Liturgical Press. pp. 42–43. ISBN 978-0-8146-5104-9.
- Jairzinho Lopes Pereira (2013). Augustine of Hippo and Martin Luther on Original Sin and Justification of the Sinner. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. pp. 54–55. ISBN 978-3-647-55063-3.
- Jairzinho Lopes Pereira (2013). Augustine of Hippo and Martin Luther on Original Sin and Justification of the Sinner. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. p. 56 with footnote 25. ISBN 978-3-647-55063-3.
- Todd C. Calder (2007), Is the Privation Theory of Evil Dead?, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 371–81
- Stephen Gottschalk (1978). Christian Science. University of California Press. pp. 65–69. ISBN 978-0-520-03718-2.
- Millard J. Erickson (1998). Christian Theology. Baker Academic. pp. 446–47. ISBN 978-0-8010-2182-4.
- Paul Russell (2016). The Oxford Handbook of Hume. Oxford University Press. pp. 625–32. ISBN 978-0-19-974284-4.
- C. S. Lewis Mere Christianity Touchstone:New York, 1980 pp. 45–46
- Graham Oppy (2006), Arguing about Gods, pp. 17, 296. Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0521863864
- Daniel Howard-Snyder (2008). The Evidential Argument from Evil. Indiana University Press. pp. 305–06. ISBN 0-253-11409-8.
- Bryan Frances (2013). Gratuitous Suffering and the Problem of Evil: A Comprehensive Introduction. Routledge. pp. 110–23. ISBN 978-0-415-66295-6.
- Karma Encyclopædia Britannica (2012)
- Francis Clooney (2005), in The Blackwell Companion to Hinduism (Editor: Gavin Flood), Wiley-Blackwell, ISBN 0631215352, pp. 454–55
- Francis Clooney (1989), ‘‘Evil, Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom: Vedanta’s theology of Karma, Journal of Religion, Vol. 69, pp 530–48
- P. Bilimoria (2007), Karma’s suffering: A Mimamsa solution to the problem of evil, in Indian Ethics (Editors: Bilimoria et al.), Volume 1, Ashgate Publishing, ISBN 978-0754633013, pp. 171–89
- See Kumarila’s ‘‘Slokavarttika’’; for English translation of parts and discussions: P. Bilimoria (1990), ‘ Hindu doubts about God – Towards a Mimamsa Deconstruction’, International Philosophical Quarterly, 30(4), pp. 481–99
- P. Bilimoria (2013), Toward an Indian Theodicy, in The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil (Editors: McBrayer and Howard-Snyder), 1st Edition, John Wiley & Sons, ISBN 978-0470671849, Chapter 19
- B. Reichenbach (1998), Karma and the Problem of Evil, in Philosophy of Religion Toward a Global Perspective (Editor: G.E. Kessler), Wadsworth, ISBN 978-0534505493, pp. 248–55
- Yuvraj Krishan (1997). The Doctrine of Karma: Its Origin and Development in Brāhmaṇical, Buddhist, and Jaina Traditions. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. pp. 17–20. ISBN 978-81-208-1233-8.
- Ursula Sharma (1973), Theodicy and the doctrine of karma, ‘‘Man’’, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 347–64
- The Nyaya-Vaisesika school of Hinduism is one of the exceptions where the premise is similar to the Christian concept of an omnibenevolent, omnipotent creator
- G. Obeyesekere (I968), Theodicy, sin and salvation in a sociology of Buddhism, in Practical religion (Ed. Edmund Leach), Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0521055253
- Deism, Encyclopædia Britannica
- Lane, William C. (January 2010). "Leibniz's Best World Claim Restructured". American Philosophical Journal. 47 (1): 57–84. Retrieved 9 March 2014.
- Sarah K. Tyler, Gordon Reid, Revise for Religious Studies GCSE: For Edexcel: Religion and Life (Heinemann, 2004), 14.
- Holman Concise Bible Dictionary (B&H Publishing Group, 2011), s.v. Evil, 207; s.v. Sin, 252; s.v. Suffering, 584.
- Haldane, J.J. (2003). Atheism and Theism (Second ed.). Blackwell Publishing. pp. 102–05. ISBN 0-631-23259-1.
- Heidegger, Martin (2003) . Being and Time. Blackwell. pp. 426–27 (H 374) 458–72 (H 406–21). ISBN 0-631-19770-2.
- Summa Contra Gentiles III c. 7
- Summa Theologica Ia q. 49 a. 3
- Summa Theologica Ia q. 49 a. 1 and Summa Contra Gentiles III c. 10
- Luther, Martin (1525). On the Bondage of the Will.
- The Problem of Evil in the Western Tradition: From the Book of Job to Modern Genetics, Joseph F. Kelly, p. 94–96
- Robert Peel, 1987, Spiritual Healing in a Scientific Age, San Francisco, Harper and Row, 1987
- Ben Dupre, "The Problem of Evil," 50 Philosophy Ideas You Really Need to Know, London, Quercus, 2007, p. 166: "Denying that there is ultimately any such thing as evil, as advocated by Christian Scientists, solves the problem at a stroke, but such a remedy is too hard for most to swallow."
- "Why All Suffering Is Soon to End", The Watchtower, 15 May 2007, p. 21, "For some, the obstacle [to believing in God] involves what is often called the problem of evil. They feel that if God exists and is almighty and loving, the evil and suffering in the world cannot be explained. No God who tolerates evil could exist, they reason... Satan has surely proved adept at blinding human minds. ...God is not responsible for the wickedness so prevalent in the world." [emphasis added] 
- Penton, M.J. (1997). Apocalypse Delayed. University of Toronto Press. pp. 189–90. ISBN 9780802079732.
- "Why Does God Allow Evil and Suffering?", The Watchtower, 1 May 2011, p. 16, 
- "Why Is There So Much Suffering?", Awake, July 2011, p. 4
- Book of Mormon, 2 Nephi
- "Gospel Principles Chapter 4: Freedom to Choose". Https:. Retrieved 27 December 2015.
- "Chapter 10: The Purpose of Earth Life". Doctrines of the Gospel, Student Manual. Institutes of Religion, Church Educational System. 2000.
- Bickmore, Barry R. (2001), Does God Have A Body in Human Form? (PDF), FairMormon
- Webb, Stephen H. (2011). "Godbodied: The Matter of the Latter-day Saints". BYU Studies. 50 (3).
Also found in: Webb, Stephen H. (2011). "Godbodied: The Matter of the Latter-day Saints". Jesus Christ, Eternal God: Heavenly Flesh and the Metaphysics of Matter. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199827954. OCLC 696603512. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199827954.001.0001.
- Doctrine and Covenants
- Roberts, B. H. (1911). "Lesson 12". The Seventy's Course in Theology — Fourth Year: The Atonement. Salt Lake City: Deseret News. p. 70.
- Pearl of Great Price, Abraham
- Maxwell, Neil A. (March 1998), "The Richness of the Restoration", Ensign
- "Gospel Principles Chapter 47: Exaltation". Https:. Retrieved 27 December 2015.
- Hales, Robert D. (April 2006), "To Act for Ourselves: The Gift and Blessings of Agency", Ensign
- Mr Ibrahim M Abu-Rabi (2013). Theodicy and Justice in Modern Islamic Thought: The Case of Said Nursi. Ashgate. pp. 11–13. ISBN 978-1-4094-8095-2.
- Ayman Shihadeh (2006). Josef W. Meri and Jere L. Bacharach, ed. Medieval Islamic Civilization: L–Z, index. Routledge. p. 772. ISBN 978-0-415-96692-4.
- Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka; Nazif Muhtaroglu (2009). Classic Issues in Islamic Philosophy and Theology Today. Springer. pp. 117, 128–32. ISBN 978-90-481-3573-8.
- Shams C. Inati (2000). The Problem of Evil: Ibn Sînâ's Theodicy. Global Academic. pp. 67–71, 171–72. ISBN 978-1-58684-006-8.
- Henning Graf Reventlow; Yair Hoffman (2004). The Problem of Evil and its Symbols in Jewish and Christian Tradition. Bloomsbury Academic. p. 17. ISBN 978-0-8264-0085-7.
- Henning Graf Reventlow; Yair Hoffman (2004). The Problem of Evil and its Symbols in Jewish and Christian Tradition. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 16–18. ISBN 978-0-8264-0085-7.
... nowhere in this book is there a comprehensive concept of evil as such, let alone awareness of a theological problem of evil.
- Henning Graf Reventlow; Yair Hoffman (2004). The Problem of Evil and its Symbols in Jewish and Christian Tradition. Bloomsbury Academic. p. 26. ISBN 978-0-8264-0085-7.
- Nicholas Robert Michael De Lange; Miri Freud-Kandel (2005). Modern Judaism: An Oxford Guide. Oxford University Press. p. 315. ISBN 978-0-19-926287-8.
- Nicholas Robert Michael De Lange; Miri Freud-Kandel (2005). Modern Judaism: An Oxford Guide. Oxford University Press. pp. 314–15. ISBN 978-0-19-926287-8.
- Joseph Francis Kelly (2002). The Problem of Evil in the Western Tradition: From the Book of Job to Modern Genetics. Liturgical Press. pp. 219–20. ISBN 978-0-8146-5104-9.
- Nicholas Robert Michael De Lange; Miri Freud-Kandel (2005). Modern Judaism: An Oxford Guide. Oxford University Press. pp. 315–16. ISBN 978-0-19-926287-8.
- Daniel Rynhold (2005). Nicholas Robert Michael De Lange and Miri Freud-Kandel, ed. Modern Judaism: An Oxford Guide. Oxford University Press. pp. 315–17. ISBN 978-0-19-926287-8.
- Nicholas Robert Michael De Lange; Miri Freud-Kandel (2005). Modern Judaism: An Oxford Guide. Oxford University Press. pp. 314–18. ISBN 978-0-19-926287-8.
- Daniel Rynhold (2005). Nicholas Robert Michael De Lange and Miri Freud-Kandel, ed. Modern Judaism: An Oxford Guide. Oxford University Press. p. 317. ISBN 978-0-19-926287-8.
- Roland Enmarch (2008), Theodicy, UCLA Encyclopedia of Egyptology, Editors: Dieleman and Wendrich
- Homer (1990). The Iliad. NewYork: Penguin Books.
- Kirby, John. "Gods and Goddesses". Gale Virtual Reference Library. Retrieved 12 December 2014.
- Bolle, Kees. "Fate". Gale Virtual Reference Library. Macmillan Reference USA. Retrieved 12 December 2014.
- P. Koslowski (2001). The Origin and the Overcoming of Evil and Suffering in the World Religions. Springer. pp. 10–15. ISBN 978-1-4020-0187-1.
- Masao Abe (2007). Paul O. Ingram and Frederick J. Streng, ed. Buddhist-Christian Dialogue: Mutual Renewal and Transformation. Wipf and Stock. pp. 145–47. ISBN 978-1-55635-381-9.
- E. B. Cowell (ed.) (1895, 2000), The Jataka or Stories of the Buddha's Former Births (6 vols.), p. 110. Retrieved 22 December 2008 from "Google Books" at 
- Paul Williams; Anthony Tribe; Alexander Wynne (2012). "Chapter 2". Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition. Routledge. pp. 30–52. ISBN 978-1-136-52087-7.
- Paul Williams (2008). Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations. Routledge. pp. 103–09. ISBN 978-1-134-25056-1.
- S. K. Hookham (1991). The Buddha Within: Tathagatagarbha Doctrine According to the Shentong Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhaga. State University of New York Press. pp. 100–04. ISBN 978-0-7914-0357-0.
- Paul Williams (2008). Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations. Routledge. pp. 104–05, 108. ISBN 978-1-134-25056-1.
- Merv Fowler (1999). Buddhism: Beliefs and Practices. Sussex Academic Press. pp. 101–02. ISBN 978-1-898723-66-0.
Some texts of the tathagatagarbha literature, such as the Mahaparinirvana Sutra actually refer to an atman, though other texts are careful to avoid the term. This would be in direct opposition to the general teachings of Buddhism on anatta. Indeed, the distinctions between the general Indian concept of atman and the popular Buddhist concept of Buddha-nature are often blurred to the point that writers consider them to be synonymous.
- John Bowker (1975). Problems of Suffering in Religions of the World. Cambridge University Press. pp. 194, 206–20. ISBN 978-0-521-09903-5.
- Othmar Gächter (1998). "Evil and Suffering in Hinduism". Anthropos. Bd. 93, H. 4./6.: 393–403. JSTOR 40464839.
- Kaufman, Whitley R. P. (2005). "Karma, Rebirth, and the Problem of Evil". Philosophy East and West. Johns Hopkins University Press. 55 (1): 15–32. doi:10.1353/pew.2004.0044.
- Francis Clooney (2005), in The Blackwell Companion to Hinduism (Ed: Gavin Flood), Wiley-Blackwell, ISBN 0631215352, pp. 454–55;
John Bowker (1975). Problems of Suffering in Religions of the World. Cambridge University Press. pp. 194, 206–20. ISBN 978-0-521-09903-5.;
Chad V. Meister (2010). The Oxford Handbook of Religious Diversity. Oxford University Press. pp. 163–64. ISBN 978-0-19-534013-6.
- Francis X. Clooney (1989), Evil, Divine Omnipotence, and Human Freedom: Vedānta's Theology of Karma, The Journal of Religion, Vol. 69, No. 4, pp. 530–48
- NV Isaeva (1992), Shankara and Indian Philosophy, State University of New York Press, ISBN 978-0-7914-1281-7, p. 36
- James Lochtefeld, Brahman, The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 1: A–M, Rosen Publishing, ISBN 978-0823931798, p. 124
- S Radhakrishnan (1960), Brahmasutras: the philosophy of spiritual life, George Allen, pp. 363–65
- Arvind Sharma (2008). The Philosophy of Religion and Advaita Vedanta: A Comparative Study in Religion and Reason. Pennsylvania State University Press. pp. 30–32. ISBN 978-0-271-03946-6.
- Arvind Sharma (2008). The Philosophy of Religion and Advaita Vedanta: A Comparative Study in Religion and Reason. Pennsylvania State University Press. pp. 23–24. ISBN 978-0-271-03946-6.
- Arvind Sharma (2008). The Philosophy of Religion and Advaita Vedanta: A Comparative Study in Religion and Reason. Pennsylvania State University Press. pp. 25–27. ISBN 978-0-271-03946-6.
- Arvind Sharma (2008). The Philosophy of Religion and Advaita Vedanta: A Comparative Study in Religion and Reason. Pennsylvania State University Press. pp. 26–32. ISBN 978-0-271-03946-6.
- Swami Gambhirananda (1965). Brahma Sutra Bhasya Of Shankaracharya. Vedanta Press & Bookshop. ISBN 978-8175051058.
- Sabapathy Kulandran and Hendrik Kraemer (2004), Grace in Christianity and Hinduism, James Clarke, ISBN 978-0227172360, pp. 177–79
- Jones & Ryan 2006, p. 266.
- Sarma 2000, pp. 19–21.
- Sharma 1962, p. 361.
- David Buchta (2014). Matthew R. Dasti and Edwin F. Bryant, ed. Free Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 270–76. ISBN 978-0199922758.
- Sharma 1962, pp. 270, 370–71.
- Sharma 1962, pp. 270, 370–71, Quote: The problem of evil and suffering in the world is the most difficult one in Theism. We have explained Madhva's attitude to the allied problem of freedom and freewill, on the basis of the doctrine of natural selection of good or bad and of the tripartite classification of souls. It is not therefore necessary for Madhva to answer the question of the consistency of evil with Divine goodness..
- Justin P. McBrayer; Daniel Howard-Snyder (2014). The Blackwell Companion to The Problem of Evil. Wiley. p. 26. ISBN 978-1-118-60797-8.
- Hospers, John. An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis. 3rd Ed. Routledge, 1990, p. 310.
- Lactantius. "Caput XIII". De Ira Dei (PDF) (in Latin). p. 121. At the Documenta Catholica Omnia.
- Rev. Roberts, Alexander; Donaldson, James, eds. (1871). "On the Anger of God. Chapter XIII". The works of Lactantius. Ante-Nicene Christian Library. Translations of the writings of the Fathers down to A.D. 325. Vol XXII. II. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, George Street. p. 28. At the Internet Archive.
- Hume, David. "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion". Project Gutenberg. Retrieved 12 January 2012.
- Malthus T.R. 1798. An essay on the principle of population. Oxford World's Classics reprint. p158
- Thomas Malthus (1798), An essay on the principle of population, Oxford Classics, p. 123
- Making the Task of Theodicy Impossible?, William Dembski (2003), Baylor University, p. 11
- See Kant's essay, "Concerning the Possibility of a Theodicy and the Failure of All Previous Philosophical Attempts in the Field" (1791). Stephen Palmquist explains why Kant refuses to solve the problem of evil in "Faith in the Face of Evil", Appendix VI of Kant's Critical Religion (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000).
- Making the Task of Theodicy Impossible?, William Dembski (2003), Baylor University, p. 12
-  Cahn, Stephen M. (1977). Cacodaemony. Analysis, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 69–73.
-  Law, Stephen (2010). The Evil-God Challenge. Religious Studies 46 (3): 353–73
- Cacodaemony and Devilish Isomorphism, King-Farlow, J. (1978), Cacodaemony and Devilish Isomorphism, Analysis, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 59–61.
- Dittman, Volker and Tremblay, François "The Immorality of Theodicies". StrongAtheism.net. 2004.
- Stretton, Dean (1999). "The Moral Argument from Evil". The Secular Web. Retrieved 10 April 2014.
- Rachels, James (1997). "God and Moral Autonomy". Retrieved 10 April 2014.
- Bradley, Raymond (1999). "A Moral Argument for Atheism". The Secular Web. Retrieved 10 April 2014.
- Adams, Marilyn McCord and Robert M. Adams, eds. "The Problem of Evil". Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. The standard anthology in English. Contains classic papers by recent philosophers of religion in the analytic tradition. Deals with both the logical problem and the evidential problem.
- Adams, Marilyn McCord. "Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God." Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.
- Adams, Robert M. "Must God Create the Best?" in "The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology". New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Adams, Robert M. "Existence, Self-Interest and the Problem of Evil" in "The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology". New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Aquinas, Thomas. On Evil (De Malo), trans. Regan; ed. Brian Davies. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Beebe, James R. (2006). "The Logical Problem of Evil". In Fieser, James; Bradley, Dowden. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Boyd, Gregory A. (2003). Is God to Blame?. InterVarsity Press. ISBN 0-8308-2394-8.
- Carver, Thomas N. (1908). "The Economic Basis of the Problem of Evil," Harvard Theological Review, 1(1), pp. 97–111.
- Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. The Brothers Karamazov, 1881. Chapters "Rebellion" and "The Grand Inquisitor"
- Hick, John (1966). Evil and the God of Love. London: Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-06-063902-0.
- Howard-Snyder, Daniel, ed. The Evidential Problem of Evil. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indian University Press, 1996. Probably the best collection of essays in English on the evidential argument from evil. Includes most of the major players on the topic.
- Mackie, J. L. (1982). The Miracle of Theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-06-063902-0.
- Hume, David. Dialogues on Natural Religion (Parts X and XI), ed. Richard Pokin. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1980.
- Leibniz, Gottfried. (1710). Theodicy.
- Leibniz, Gottfried. (1765). "A Vindication of God's Justice...", ("Causa Dei") trans. Paul Schrecker and Anne Martin Schrecker. New York: MacMillan, 1965.
- Murray, Michael (1998). "Leibniz on the Problem of Evil". In Zalta, Edward N. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Ormsby, Eric. Theodicy in Islamic Thought (Princeton University Press, 1984)
- Palmquist, Stephen (2000). "Faith in the Face of Evil (Appendix VI)". Kant's Critical Religion. Aldershot, England: Ashgate. ISBN 0-7546-1333-X.
- Plantinga, Alvin (1974). The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ISBN 978-0-19-824414-1.
- Plantinga, Alvin (1977). God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. ISBN 978-0-8028-1731-0.
- Rowe, William L. (1990). "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism" in The Problem of Evil, ed. Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert M. Adams. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stewart, Matthew. The Courtier and the Heretic: Leibniz, Spinoza and the Fate of God in the Modern World. W.W. Norton, 2005.
- Streminger, Gerhard (1992). Gottes Güte und die Übel der Welt. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. ISBN 978-3-16-145889-7.
- Swinburne, Richard (1997). The Coherence of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ISBN 978-0-19-824070-9.
- Swinburne, Richard. (1998). Providence and the Problem of Evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tooley, Michael (2002). "The Problem of Evil". In Zalta, Edward N. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Trakakis, Nick (2006). "Evidential Problem of Evil". In Fieser, James; Bradley, Dowden. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Van Inwagen, Peter. (2006). The Problem of Evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wilson, William McF.; Hartt, Julian N. (2004). "Farrer's Theodicy". In Hein, David; Henderson, Edward. Captured by the Crucified: The Practical Theology of Austin Farrer. New York: T & T Clark International. pp. 100–18. ISBN 0-567-02510-1.
- Jones, Constance; Ryan, James D. (2006), Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Infobase
- Sharma, B. N. Krishnamurti (1962). Philosophy of Śrī Madhvācārya. Motilal Banarsidass (2014 Reprint). ISBN 978-8120800687.
- Sharma, B. N. Krishnamurti (2000). A History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature, 3rd Edition. Motilal Banarsidass (2008 Reprint). ISBN 978-8120815759.
- Sharma, Chandradhar (1994). A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy. Motilal Banarsidass. ISBN 81-208-0365-5.
- Sarma, Deepak (2000). "Is Jesus a Hindu? S.C. Vasu and Multiple Madhva Misrepresentations". Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies. 13. doi:10.7825/2164-6279.1228.
- Sarma, Deepak (2005). Epistemologies and the Limitations of Philosophical Enquiry: Doctrine in Madhva Vedanta. Routledge.
- Voltaire. (1759) Candide. Many editions. Voltaire's caustic response to Leibniz' doctrine that this is the best possible world.
- Tattersall, Nicholas (1998). "The Evidential Argument from Evil". Secular Web Library. Internet Infidels. Retrieved 12 April 2007.
- Project Gutenburg: Leibniz, Theodicy (English translation)
- Faith in the Face of Evil, Appendix VI of Kant's Critical Religion, by Stephen Palmquist.
- "The Logical Problem of Evil". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- "The Evidential Problem of Evil". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- "The Problem of Evil". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- "Leibniz on the Problem of Evil". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Evil—The Catholic Encyclopedia