Qari Mohammad Ayub Khalid (Pashto: قاری محمد ایوب خالد) is an Afghan Taliban leader who is currently serving as the provincial governor of Afghanistan's northeastern Badakhshan Province.

Qari Mohammad Ayub Khalid
Governor of Badakhshan
Assumed office
25 June 2023
Supreme LeaderHibatullah Akhundzada
Governor of Kunar
In office
4 May 2023 – 26 June 2023
Supreme LeaderHibatullah Akhundzada
Personal details
NationalityAfghan (Pashtun)

Career

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Prior to Ayub Khalid's provincial governor postings, he reportedly served as the commander of Taliban's eastern forces.[1]

Governor of Kunar

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Ayub Khalid began as governor of Kunar Province on 4 May 2023, nearly two years into the declared Taliban Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA).[1] His tenure in Kunar was short-lived, lasting only two months, before he'd be reassigned to Badakhshan following the assassination of acting governor Nisar Ahmad Ahmadi.[2]

Governor of Badakhshan

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Badakhshan Province

On 26 June 2023, Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada appointed Ayub Khalid to serve as the governor of Badakhshan Province, departing his former position as governor of Kunar Province with Mawlawi Qudratullah Abu Hamza replacing him (Abu Hamza transferred from governorship in Zabul).[3] Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid announced the inter-province transfer via Twitter alongside appointments to governorate posts in Kunar and Zabul.[3][4] Ayub Khalid's appointment as governor of Badakhshan shortly followed the assassination of the province's former acting governor, Nisar Ahmad Ahmadi, by the Islamic State's Khorasan Province (ISIS–K).[2][5] On 6 June 2023, an explosive-laden vehicle was driven into Ahmadi's vehicle while driving in the provincial capital of Faizabad killing Ahmadi, his driver, and injuring six nearby civilians.[6][7][8]

Projects

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In mid-January 2024, Ayub Khalid announced in an interview with the state-controlled Bakhtar News Agency both the completion of the Little Pamir Road connecting Afghanistan and the People's Republic of China and upcoming plans to pave the road with asphalt.[9] The road project was initiated by the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in order to open investment opportunities (primarily resource mining) in Afghanistan to the Chinese market.[10] While praising the improved opportunities for trade with China, Ayub Khalid made no comments regarding Chinese funding of the project.[11] Chinese critics, including Zhu Yongbiao, an international relations scholar from Lanzhou University, have expressed wariness towards the actual economic value of the road and the risks of Uyghur militants traveling between Afghanistan and Xinjiang Province, viewing the project's primary value as symbolic. In an interview with the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post, Zhu described the road as "largely devoid of practical access and economic value... It is not only too costly, it will not bring any economic value in the short term" adding "China must have its security considerations. The road is not economically worthwhile, but it must have security risks."[12]

Incidents

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At 7:00 PM AFT on 21 January 2024, a Dassault Falcon 10 business jet medically evacuating a woman[13][14] from Rayong, Thailand to Moscow along with her husband and a flight crew (all Russian nationals) crashed in the mountains of Badakhshan Province after attempting a emergency low-fuel landing in Tajikistan.[15][16][17] Afghan search teams, including the Afghan Air Force, located the downed aircraft and later a surviving nurse with minor injuries.[18] After reports surfaced of a supposed $1.2 million sum missing from the crashed plane, Ayub Khalid created an investigative commission to look into the reported theft.[19][20] The validity of the reports as well as the results of that investigation remain unclear.

From 3 to 13 May 2024, nearly a year into Ayub Khalid's tenure as provincial governor, a series of rare protests and demonstrations against Taliban public administration broke out in the Darayim and Argo districts of Badakhshan. Complaints presented by protestors included the Taliban's unpopular hardline policies and the Taliban's installation of provincial leaders from other provinces including a governor (Ayub Khalid) from Kandahar, a deputy governor from Takhar, a police commander from Parwan, and a security chief from Laghman. Protests began on 3 May in response to strong Taliban enforcement of bans on illicit drugs where many impoverished Badakhshani farmers draw sole income on opium-producing poppy crops. Opposing the burning of poppy fields, protestors shuttered shops and chanted against Supreme Leader Akhundzada who had issued the ruling against poppy cultivation. The Taliban dispatched a team of negotiators to meet with protesting farmers and eventually announced a peaceful end to the demonstrations. When protests returned on 13 May, the Taliban brutally cracked down and opened fire on protestors, killing two, wounding more than twelve others.[21][22][23]

Personal life

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Mohammad Ayub Khalid was born in the Pashtun-dominant southern province of Kandahar.[1] Ayub Khalid was reportedly once close to Mullah Dadullah, a former top Taliban military commander until his death in 2007, known as "The Butcher" for his extreme brutality and regionally-novel employment of beheadings.[1][24]

References

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  1. ^ a b c d "Mohammmad [sic] Ayoub Khalid". Afghan Biographies. 29 June 2024.
  2. ^ a b "Afghan provincial governor killed in car bombing".
  3. ^ a b "Taliban Appoints New Governors For Badakhshan, Kunar & Zabul Provinces". Afghanistan International. 26 June 2023.
  4. ^ @AfghanAnalyst2 (25 June 2023). "The #Taliban's new #appointments/reshufflings" (Tweet) – via Twitter.
  5. ^ "Taliban leader appoints three new provincial governors". Kabul Now. 26 June 2023.
  6. ^ "Afghan provincial governor killed in car bombing". www.aljazeera.com. Retrieved 10 June 2023.
  7. ^ "Car Bomb Kills Taliban Provincial Deputy Governor in Northern Afghanistan". 6 June 2023.
  8. ^ "Taliban official among 2 killed in Afghanistan blast: Report".
  9. ^ "Taliban Announces Completion of Construction of Afghanistan-China Connecting Road". Afghanistan International. 16 January 2024.
  10. ^ Shafaq, A. (29 January 2024). "The Little Pamir Road Dilemma: Security Concerns along the Afghanistan-China Corridor". Afghan Diaspora Network.
  11. ^ Siddique, Abubaker (19 January 2024). "The Azadi Briefing: The Taliban's War On Books". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
  12. ^ Ziwen, Zhao (26 January 2024). "Why China is wary of opening up Afghanistan's new road to Xinjiang". South China Morning Post.
  13. ^ "Reports of plane crash in Northern Afghanistan's Badakhshan province -police". Reuters. 21 January 2024. Retrieved 21 January 2024.
  14. ^ "Russia says four survive charter jet crash in Afghanistan, condition of two others unclear". Ariana News. 22 January 2024. Retrieved 26 January 2024.
  15. ^ "A Russian private jet carrying 6 people is believed to have crashed in Afghanistan, officials say". Associated Press. 21 January 2024. Retrieved 21 January 2024.
  16. ^ Jones, Sam (21 January 2024). "Four of six aboard private jet survive crash in Afghanistan". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 22 January 2024.
  17. ^ Culverwell, Dominic (21 January 2024). "Reuters: Russian plane crashes in Afghanistan". The Kyiv Independent. Retrieved 21 January 2024.
  18. ^ "Russian Plane Crashes in Afghan Mountains". The Moscow Times. 21 January 2024. Retrieved 21 January 2024.
  19. ^ "$1.2M stolen from Russian plane that crashed in Afghanistan". Report News Agency. 25 January 2024.
  20. ^ "Russia provides funding for the Taliban in Afghanistan". Robert Lansing Institute for Global Threats and Democracies Studies. 25 January 2024.
  21. ^ Siddique, Abubaker (15 May 2024). "Taliban's Drug Ban, Heavy-Handed Tactics Fuel Deadly Protests In Northern Afghanistan". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
  22. ^ Gul, Ayaz (5 May 2024). "Taliban face rare public uprising against their rule in northeastern Afghanistan". Voice of America.
  23. ^ "Widespread Anti-Taliban Protests Erupt in Argo District, Badakhshan". Afghanistan International. 4 May 2024.
  24. ^ Coghlan, Tom (2012). "The Taliban in Helmand: An Oral History". In Giustozzi, Antonio (ed.). Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field. Hurst Publishers. p. 138.