Farhud (Arabic: الفرهود) was the pogrom or "violent dispossession" carried out against the Jewish population of Baghdad, Iraq, on June 1–2, 1941, immediately following the British victory in the Anglo-Iraqi War. The riots occurred in a power vacuum following the collapse of the pro-Nazi government of Rashid Ali while the city was in a state of instability. The violence came immediately after the rapid defeat of Rashid Ali by British forces, whose earlier coup had generated a short period of national euphoria, and was fueled by allegations that Iraqi Jews had aided the British. Over 180 Jews were killed and 1,000 injured, and up to 300-400 non-Jewish rioters were killed in the attempt to quell the violence. Looting of Jewish property took place and 900 Jewish homes were destroyed.
|Part of Anglo–Iraqi War|
Mass grave for the victims of the Farhud, 1946
|Date||June 1–2, 1941|
|Deaths||175–780 Jews killed|
|Perpetrators||Rashid Ali, Yunis al-Sabawi, al-Futuwa youth.|
The Farhud took place during the Jewish holiday of Shavuot. It has been referred to as a pogrom which was part of the Holocaust, although such comparison has been disputed. It has also been called "the beginning of the end of the Jewish community of Iraq", propagating the migration of Iraqi Jews out of the country, although a direct connection to the 1951-2 Jewish exodus from Iraq is also disputed, as many Jews who left Iraq immediately following the Farhud returned to the country and permanent emigration did not accelerate significantly until 1950-51. According to Hayyim Cohen, the Farhud "was the only [such event] known to the Jews of Iraq, at least during their last hundred years of life there".
Iraq Jewish CommunityEdit
There were many instances of violence against Jews during their long history in Iraq, as well as numerous enacted decrees ordering the destruction of synagogues in Iraq, and some forced conversion to Islam.
Independence of IraqEdit
After the Ottoman Empire was defeated in the First World War, the League of Nations granted the mandate of Iraq to Britain. After King Ghazi who inherited the throne of Faisal I, died in a 1939 car accident, Britain installed 'Abd al-Ilah as Iraq's governing regent.
By 1941, the approximately 150,000 Iraqi Jews played active roles in many aspects of Iraqi life, including farming, banking, commerce and the government bureaucracy.
Iraq in World War IIEdit
Much of the population had retained significant anti-British sentiments since the 1920 Iraqi revolt, although the Jewish population was viewed as pro-British during World War II, contributing to the separation of the Muslim and Jewish communities.
In addition, between 1932 and 1941, the German embassy in Iraq, headed by Dr. Fritz Grobba, significantly supported antisemitic and fascist movements. Intellectuals and army officers were invited to Germany as guests of the Nazi party, and antisemitic material was published in the newspapers. The German embassy purchased the newspaper Al-alam Al-arabi ("The Arab world") which published, in addition to antisemitic propaganda, a translation of Mein Kampf in Arabic. The German embassy also supported the establishment of Al-Fatwa, a youth organization based upon the model of the Hitler Youth.
Events preceding the FarhudEdit
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The Golden Square coupEdit
In 1941, a group of pro-Nazi Iraqi officers, known as the "Golden Square" and led by General Rashid Ali, overthrew Regent Abdul Ilah on April 1 after staging a successful coup. The coup had significant popular support, particularly in Baghdad. Bashkin writes that "All, apparently, yearned for the departure of the British after two long decades of interference in Iraqi affairs".
Iraq's new government then was quickly involved in confrontation with the British over the terms of the military treaty forced on Iraq at independence. The treaty gave the British unlimited rights to base troops in Iraq and transit troops through Iraq. The British arranged to land large numbers of soldiers from India in Iraq to force the country to show its intentions. Iraq refused to let them land and confrontations afterward occurred both near Basra in the south and to the west of Baghdad near the British base complex and airfield. The Germans dispatched a group of 26 heavy fighters to aid in a futile air attack on the British airbase at Habbaniya which accomplished nothing.
Winston Churchill sent a telegram to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, warning him that if the Middle East fell to Germany, victory against the Nazis would be a "hard, long and bleak proposition" given that Hitler would have access to the oil reserves there. The telegram dealt with the larger issues of war in the middle east rather than Iraq exclusively.
On May 25, Hitler issued his Order 30, stepping up German offensive operations: "The Arab Freedom Movement in the Middle East is our natural ally against England. In this connection special importance is attached to the liberation of Iraq... I have therefore decided to move forward in the Middle East by supporting Iraq."
On May 30, the British-organized force called Kingcol led by Brigadier J.J. Kingstone reached Baghdad, causing the "Golden Square" and their supporters to escape via Iran to Germany. Kingcol included some elements of the Arab Legion led by Major John Bagot Glubb known as Glubb Pasha.
On May 31, Regent Abdul Illah prepared to fly back into Baghdad to reclaim his leadership. To avoid the reality of a British-organized countercoup, the regent entered Baghdad without a British escort.
Michael Eppel, in his book "The Palestinian Conflict in Modern Iraq" blames the Farhud on the influence of German ideology on the Iraqi people, as well as extreme nationalism, both of which were heightened by the Golden Square coup.
Antisemitic actions preceding the FarhudEdit
Sami Michael, a witness to the Farhud, testified: "Antisemite propaganda was broadcast routinely by the local radio and Radio Berlin in Arabic. Various anti-Jewish slogans were written on walls on the way to school, such as "Hitler was killing the Jewish germs". Shops owned by Muslims had 'Muslim' written on them, so they would not be damaged in the case of anti-Jewish riots."
Shalom Darwish, the secretary of the Jewish community in Baghdad, testified that several days before the Farhud, the homes of Jews were marked with a red palm print ("Hamsa"), by al-Futuwa youth.
Two days before the Farhud, Yunis al-Sabawi, a government minister who proclaimed himself the governor of Baghdad, summoned Rabbi Sasson Khaduri, the community leader, and recommended to him that Jews stay in their homes for the next three days as a protective measure. This may have been due to an intention to harm the Jews in their homes, or he may have been expressing his fear for the safety of the community in light of the prevalent atmosphere in Baghdad.
Farhud (June 1–2, 1941)Edit
According to Iraqi government and British historical sources violence started when a delegation of Jewish Iraqis arrived at the Palace of Flowers (Qasr al Zuhur) to meet with the Regent Abdullah, and were attacked en route by an Iraqi Arabic mob as they crossed Al Khurr Bridge. Iraqi Arab civil disorder and violence then swiftly spread to the Al Rusafa and Abu Sifyan districts, and got worse the next day when elements of the Iraqi police began joining in with the attacks upon the Jewish population, involving shops belonging to it being set on fire and a synagogue being destroyed.
However, Prof. Zvi Yehuda has suggested that the event that set off the rioting was anti-Jewish preaching in the Jami-Al-Gaylani mosque, and that the violence was premeditated rather than a spontaneous outburst.
Mordechai Ben-Porat, who later became the leader of the Iraqi Zionists, described his experience as follows:
We were mostly cut off from the center of the Jewish community and our Muslim neighbors became our friends. It was because of one Muslim neighbor, in fact, that we survived the Farhoud. We had no weapons to defend ourselves and were utterly helpless. We put furniture up against the doors and windows to prevent the rioters from breaking in. Then, Colonel Arif's wife came rushing out of her house with a grenade and a pistol and shouted at the rioters, ‘If you don’t leave, I will explode this grenade right here!’ Her husband was apparently not home and she had either been instructed by him to defend us or decided on her own to help. They dispersed, and that was that – she saved our lives.
The dean of Midrash Bet Zilkha Yaakov Mutzafi raced to open up the gates of the yeshiva to shelter the victims of the Farhud who were displaced from their homes, and secured money for their upkeep from philanthropists in the community.
Civil order was restored after two days of violence in the afternoon of June 2, when British troops imposed a curfew and shot violators on sight. An investigation conducted by the journalist Tony Rocca of the Sunday Times attributes the delay to a personal decision by Kinahan Cornwallis, the British Ambassador to Iraq, who failed to immediately carry out orders he received from the Foreign Office in the matter, and initially denied requests from British Imperial military and civil officers on the scene for permission to act against the attacking Arab mobs. Other testimonies suggest the possibility that the British delayed their entry into Baghdad for 48 hours because they had an ulterior motive in allowing a clash between the sectarian populations within the capital city.
The exact number of victims is uncertain. With respect to Jewish victims, some sources say that about 180 Jewish Iraqis were killed and about 240 were wounded, 586 Jewish-owned businesses were looted and 99 Jewish houses were destroyed. Other accounts state that nearly 200 were killed and over 2 000 injured, while 900 Jewish homes and hundreds of Jewish-owned shops destroyed and looted. The Israeli-based Babylonian Heritage Museum maintains that in addition to 180 identified victims, around another 600 unidentified ones were buried in a mass grave. An estimate published in Haaretz newspaper cites 180 killed and 700 wounded. Bashkin writes that "a constant element that appears in most accounts of the Farhud is a narrative relating to a good neighbour… Judging by the lists of the Jewish dead, it seems that Jews in mixed neighbourhoods stood a better chance of surviving the riots than those in uniformly Jewish areas."
When the forces loyal to the regent entered to restore order, many rioters were killed. The Iraqi Commission Report noted that: "After some delay the Regent… arranged for the dispatch of troops to take control… There was no more aimless firing into the air; their machine guns swept the streets clear of people and quickly put a stop to looting and rioting." The British Ambassador noted that second day was more violent than the first, and that "Iraqi troops killed as many rioters as the rioters killed Jews." The Iraqi Commission Report estimated the total number of Jews and Muslims killed at 130. Eliahu Eilat, a Jewish Agency agent estimated 1 000 as the total number of Jews and Muslims who died, with other similar accounts estimating 300–400 rioters killed by the Regent's army.
Iraqi Monarchist responseEdit
Within a week of the riots, on 7 June, the reinstated Monarchist Iraqi government set up a Committee of Enquiry to investigate the events. According to Peter Wien, the regime "made every effort to present the followers of the Rashid 'Ali movement as proxies of Nazism".
The monarchist government acted quickly to suppress supporters of Rashid Ali. Many Iraqis were exiled as a result, and hundreds were jailed. Eight men, included amongst them Iraqi Army officers and policemen, were legally sentenced to death in consequence of the violence by the newly established pro-British Iraqi government.
In some accounts the Farhud marked the turning point for Iraq's Jews. Other historians, however, see the pivotal moment for the Iraqi Jewish community much later, between 1948–51, since Jewish communities prospered along with the rest of the country throughout most of the 1940s, and many Jews who left Iraq following the Farhud returned to the country shortly thereafter and permanent emigration did not accelerate significantly until 1950-51. Bashkin writes that "In the context of Jewish-Iraqi history, moreover, a distinction should be made between an analysis of the Farhud and the Farhudization of Jewish Iraqi history—viewing the Farhud as typifying the history of the relationship between Jews and greater Iraqi society. The Jewish community strived for integration in Iraq before and after the Farhud. In fact, the attachment of the community to Iraq was so tenacious that even after such a horrible event, most Jews continued to believe that Iraq was their homeland."
Either way, the Farhud is broadly understood to mark the start of a process of politicization of the Iraqi Jews in the 1940s, primarily amongst the younger population, especially as a result of the impact it had on hopes of long term integration into Iraqi society. In the direct aftermath of the Farhud, many joined the Iraqi Communist Party in order to protect the Jews of Baghdad, yet they did not want to leave the country and rather sought to fight for better conditions in Iraq itself. At the same time the Iraqi government which had taken over after the Farhud reassured the Iraqi Jewish community, and normal life soon returned to Baghdad, which saw a marked betterment of its economic situation during World War II.
It was only after the Iraqi government initiated a policy shift towards the Iraqi Jews in 1948, curtailing their civil rights and firing many Jewish state employees, that the Farhud began to be regarded as more than just an outburst of violence instigated by foreign influences, namely Nazi propaganda.
On October 23, 1948, Shafiq Ades, a respected Jewish businessman, was publicly hanged in Basra on charges of selling weapons to Israel and the Iraqi Communist Party, despite the fact he was an outspoken anti-Zionist. The event increased the sense of insecurity among Jews. The Jewish community general sentiment was that if a man as well connected and powerful as Shafiq Ades could he eliminated by the state, other Jews would not be protected any longer, and the Farhud was no longer seen as an isolated incident. During this period, the Iraqi Jewish community became increasingly fearful.
- Martin Gilbert. The atlas of Jewish history, William Morrow and Company, 1993. pg. 114. ISBN 0-688-12264-7.
- "BBC News - Farhud memories: Baghdad's 1941 slaughter of the Jews". BBC News. Retrieved 19 January 2015.
- Tsimhoni, D. (2001). "The Pogrom (Farhud) against the Jews of Baghdad in 1941". In Roth, J. K.; Maxwell, E.; Levy, M.; Whitworth, W. (eds.). Remembering for the Future. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 0-333-80486-4.
- Bashkin 2012, p. 115:"The quick defeat of Rashid ‘Ali, after a short period of national euphoria, and the allegations that the Jews had aided the British, made for a volatile situation, which exploded violently on the first and second days of June."
- Kaplan, Robert. D. "In Defense of Empire." The Atlantic Apr. 2014: 13-15. Print.
- Wien 2014:"The presence of German troops on the war scene, however, gave way to interpretations of the pogrom as a racial anti-Semitic endeavor "in the fringes of the Shoah, the Jewish Holocaust." While this is surely an exaggeration in its comparative perspective, the apologetic approach of several Arab authors is insufficient as well. According to them, the outbreak of violence resulted from the anti-Zionist zeal of the public..."
- Bashkin 2012, p. 102: "As is to be expected, both Arab and Zionist national memories have silenced important aspects of the Farhud.... Zionist historiography... has highlighted the Farhud as a watershed in the history of the Iraqi-Jewish community. From the Zionist standpoint, the Farhud was the outcome of the anti-Semitism and Iraqi nationalist rhetoric in the 1930s. It was also viewed as having galvanized the Zionist movement in Iraq and ultimately as causing Iraq's Jews to recognize that their country had rejected their attempts at integration and assimilation. In some Zionist circles, the event came to be understood as an extension of the European Holocaust into the Middle East. This connection is made manifest today by the archiving of certain documents relating to the Farhud in Yad Va-Shem, the Israeli Holocaust Museum in Jerusalem."
- Remembering the Farhud, Abraham H. Miller, FrontPageMagazine.com, June 01, 2006
- Moshe Gat, The Jewish Exodus from Iraq, 1948-1951, quote(1): "[as a result] of the economic boom and the security granted by the government... Jews who left Iraq immediately after the riots, later returned.", quote(2): "Their dream of integration into Iraqi society had been dealt a severe blow by the farhud but as the years passed self-confidence was restored, since the state continued to protect the Jewish community and they continued to prosper.", quote(3): Quoting Enzo Sereni: "The Jews have adapted to the new situation with the British occupation, which has again given them the possibility of free movement after months of detention and fear."
- London Review of Books, Vol. 30 No. 21 · 6 November 2008, pages 23-25, Adam Shatz, "Yet Sasson Somekh insists that the farhud was not ‘the beginning of the end’. Indeed, he claims it was soon ‘almost erased from the collective Jewish memory’, washed away by ‘the prosperity experienced by the entire city from 1941 to 1948’. Somekh, who was born in 1933, remembers the 1940s as a ‘golden age’ of ‘security’, ‘recovery’ and ‘consolidation’, in which the ‘Jewish community had regained its full creative drive’. Jews built new homes, schools and hospitals, showing every sign of wanting to stay. They took part in politics as never before; at Bretton Woods, Iraq was represented by Ibrahim al-Kabir, the Jewish finance minister. Some joined the Zionist underground, but many more waved the red flag. Liberal nationalists and Communists rallied people behind a conception of national identity far more inclusive than the Golden Square's Pan-Arabism, allowing Jews to join ranks with other Iraqis – even in opposition to the British and Nuri al-Said, who did not take their ingratitude lightly."
- World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries (WOJAC): History and Purpose, 17 OCTOBER 2012, Heskel M. Haddad, "The turning point for the Jews in Iraq was not the Farhood, as it is wrongly assumed."
- Mike Marqusee, "Diasporic Dimensions" in If I am Not for Myself, Journey of an Anti-Zionist Jew, 2011
- Cohen, Hayyim (October 1966), "The Anti-Jewish "Farhūd" in Baghdad, 1941", Middle Eastern Studies, Taylor & Francis, Ltd., 3 (1): 2–17, doi:10.1080/00263206608700059, JSTOR 4282184
- Shenhav 2002, p. 29: "In 1941 a two-day pogrom (known as the farhud ) was perpetrated in Baghdad. It was the only pogrom in the history of Iraqi Jews and it did not spread to other cities: it was confined to Baghdad alone. Historians agree that this was an exceptional event in the history of Jewish-Muslim relations in Iraq (see Cohen 1996)."
- The terror behind Iraq's Jewish exodus by Julia Magnet (The Telegraph, April 16, 2003)
- Bat Ye'or, The Dhimmi, 1985, p.61
- Bashkin 2012: "The government seemed to have enjoyed a great deal of popular support in Baghdad, and was hailed by many intellectuals, who saw in the Kaylani movement a national and patriotic act of defiance against Britain and its influence in Iraq. Groups and individuals ranging from the communists to Haj Amin al-Husayni, who disagreed on almost every political issue, all backed the regime. Their reasons for doing so naturally varied greatly: some saw the Kaylani government as leading the fight against colonialism, while others hoped for a more sympathetic attitude toward Germany. All, apparently, yearned for the departure of the British after two long decades of interference in Iraqi affairs."
- Giladi, Naiem, Ben-Gurion's Scandals, p. 133.
- Bashkin 2012, p. 116:"The most convincing evidence, though, was Sab‘awi's warning to Rabbi Sasun Khaduri shortly before the Farhud that Jews should not leave their homes for three days and should have enough food to do so... Sab‘awi may well have intended to harm Jews, but it is also possible that he was indirectly expressing his fear that something bad might happen to the Jewish community because of the anti-Jewish atmosphere that was prevalent in Baghdad."
- Bashkin 2012, p. 114"Worse yet, it was thought that Jews were actively aiding the British war effort, despite the fact that they were serving in the Iraqi military. Jews, rumor had it, used their radios to broadcast information and to signal to British airplanes, and distributed British propaganda, especially the leaflets that the British dropped from their airplanes on Baghdad. There was no truth to these rumors, but they nonetheless circulated in the city."
- "Nehardea Magazine". Babylonjewry.org.il. 1941-06-01. Archived from the original on 2014-08-10. Retrieved 2015-07-17.
- Mordechai Ben-Porat, "Interview," in Iraq's Last Jews, 134-5
- Hakhmei Bavel, Yeshivath Hod Yosef Publishing House, ppg. 229-230.
- "Israel News - Haaretz Israeli News source". haaretz.com. Retrieved 19 January 2015.
- Shenhav 2002, p. 30: "For unclear reasons, the British themselves delayed their entry into the city by 48 hours. According to some testimonies, it is possible that the British wanted passions to boil over in the city and actually had an interest in a clash between Jews and Muslims. "
- Levin 2001, p. 6.
- Alwaya, Semha, "The Middle East's Forgotten Refugees", Jewish issues, Aish.
- "A distorted historiography". Haaretz. 29 October 2010. Retrieved 19 January 2015.
- Bashkin 2012, p. 122.
- Bashkin 2012, p. 121.
- Iraqi Commission of Inquiry.
- Gat 1997.
- Tejel 2012, p. 108: "This is not surprising if we consider that the Old Regime, once reinstalled after the war of May 1941, made every effort to present the followers of the Rashid 'Ali movement as proxies of Nazism."
- Gat 1997, p. 29: "The government – particularly after Nuri as-Said came to power in October 1941 – took swift action to suppress pro-Nazi elements and other supporters of Rashid Ali. They were placed on trial, many of them were exiled, hundreds were incarcerated in concentration camps and a very small minority were even executed. In parallel, the government acted swiftly to defend Jewish quarters and was resolved to prevent any similar events from occurring in the future. On the decision of the Iraqi government, a committee of enquiry was set up on 7 June a few days after the pogrom, to examine the facts and find who was culpable."
- Encyclopedia of Jews in the Islamic World ("Either way, the farhūd was a significant turning-point for the Jewish community. In addition to its effect on relations between Iraqi Muslims and Jews, it exacerbated the tensions between the pro-British Jewish notables and the younger elements of the community, who now looked to the Communist Party and Zionism and began to consider emigration.")
- The Jews of the Middle East and North Africa in Modern Times, p. 350
- Esther Meir-Glitzenstein's book on zionism in Iraq, p. 213
- Bashkin, Orit. New Babylonians : A History of Jews in Modern Iraq. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. ISBN 9780804778749.
- Bashkin, p. 138.
- Bashkin, Orit. New Babylonians : A History of Jews in Modern Iraq. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. pp. 141–182. ISBN 9780804778749.
- Gat, Moshe (1997). The Jewish exodus from Iraq : 1948-1951 (1. publ. ed.). London [u.a.]: Cass. pp. 23–24. ISBN 071464689X.
- Bashkin, Orit. New Babylonians : A History of Jews in Modern Iraq. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. pp. 189–190. ISBN 9780804778749.
- Friedman, Shlomo Hillel ; translated by Ina (1988). Operation Babylon. London: Collins. ISBN 978-0002179843.
- Moshe Gat (4 July 2013). The Jewish Exodus from Iraq, 1948-1951. Routledge. p. 36. ISBN 978-1-135-24654-9.
- Orit Bashkin (12 September 2012). New Babylonians: A History of Jews in Modern Iraq. Stanford University Press. p. 90. ISBN 978-0-8047-8201-2.
the general sentiment was chat if a man as well connected and powerful as Adas could he eliminated by the state, other Jews would not be protected any longer.
- Eugene L. Rogan; Avi Shlaim (2001). The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948. Cambridge University Press. p. 142. ISBN 978-0-521-79476-3.
During this time, the Iraqi Jewish community became increasingly fearful
- Sokol, Sam. "At UN, Jewish organizations mark seminal Iraqi pogrom - Diaspora - Jerusalem Post". Jpost.com. Retrieved 2015-07-17.
- "Farhud Day marks 'forgotten pogrom' of Jews in Arab lands | j. the Jewish news weekly of Northern California". Jweekly.com. Retrieved 2015-07-17.
- Rambam Mesivta (2015-06-11). "Rambam students join Farhud Day at U.N." The Jewish Star. Retrieved 2015-07-17.
- "International Farhud Day Declared at the United Nations on June 1, 2015". Standwithus.com. Retrieved 2015-07-17.
- Bashkin, Orit (2012), New Babylonians: A History of Jews in Modern Iraq, Stanford University Press, ISBN 978-0-8047-8201-2
- Cohen, Hayyim (1966) The Anti Jewish Farhud in Baghdad 1941 (Middle Eastern Studies, 3, 2–17).
- Gat, Moshe (1997), The Jewish Exodus from Iraq, 1948–1951, Frank Cass, ISBN 978-1-135-24654-9
- Kedouri Elie (1974) The Sack of Basra and the Farhud in Baghdad (Arabic Political Memoirs. London), pp. 283–314.
- Levin, Itamar (2001) Locked Doors: The Seizure of Jewish Property in Arab Countries (Praeger/Greenwood) ISBN 0-275-97134-1.
- Meir-Glitzenstein Esther (2004) Zionism in an Arab Country: Jews in Iraq in the 1940s (London and New York: Routledge).
- Shamash, Violette (2008, 2010) "Memories of Eden: A Journey Through Jewish Baghdad" (Forum Books, London; Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL, USA) ISBN 978-0-9557095-0-0.
- Shenhav, Yehouda (2002) Ethnicity and National Memory: The World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries (WOJAC) in the Context of the Palestinian National Struggle (British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 29 (1), 27–56).
- Tejel, Jordi (2012), Writing the Modern History of Iraq: Historiographical and Political Challenges, World Scientific, ISBN 978-981-4390-55-2.
- Wien, Peter (2014), Iraqi Arab Nationalism: Authoritarian, Totalitarian and Pro-Fascist Inclinations, 1932–1941, Routledge, ISBN 978-1-134-20479-3.
- Zvi Yehuda and Shmuel Moreh (ed.): Al-Farhud: the 1941 Pogrom in Iraq (Magnes Press and The Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism), 1992 Hebrew, 2010 English: plus the Babylonian Jewish Heritage Center as editor; ISBN 978-965-493-490-9, e-book: ISBN 978-965-493-491-6
- Nissim Kazzaz, "Report of the Governmental Commission of Inquiry on the Events of June 1–2, 1941," Pe’amim 8 (1981), pp. 46–59 [Hebrew].
- The Farhud of 1941 in Iraq.
- The Jews of Iraq
- Baghdad & Forgotten Pogrom by Edwin Black (The Jewish Times) October 5, 2004
- The terror behind Iraq's Jewish exodus, The Telegraph, 16 Apr 2003.
- Babylonian Jewry Heritage Center
- The Iraqi Jews
- Hebrew documentary video about the Farhud
- The expulsion that backfired: When Iraq kicked out its Jews