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Ethics

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Ethics (edit | talk | history | links | watch | logs)

As of 26 July 2024, 20:58 (UTC), this page is active and open for discussion. An FAC coordinator will be responsible for closing the nomination.
Toolbox
Nominator(s): Phlsph7 (talk) 08:52, 15 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Ethics is the philosophical study of moral phenomena. It examines competing theories about how people should act in general and in specific domains while considering the assumptions on which the theories rest. Thanks to 750h+ for encouraging this nomination and all the helpful suggestions during their GA review and to Patrick Welsh for their peer review. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:52, 15 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Review by Hurricanehink

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Big fan of the subject matter, so I thought I’d review it, especially as I have an ongoing FAC - Wikipedia:Featured article candidates/Hurricane Hilary/archive1 - so it would only be ethical to review this.

Hello Hurricanehink, thanks for doing the ethical thing   and reviewing this article! Phlsph7 (talk) 08:19, 18 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Supporting now! Thanks for all of the fixes and/or explanations, that all makes sense. Happy to support now. Hurricanehink mobile (talk) 18:06, 20 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for the improvement ideas and your support! Phlsph7 (talk) 10:35, 21 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Lead
  • I’m sure others are gonna mention that an image at the top-right would be nice for the page, like Aristotle, but at the same time I get not having one.
    I agree, it would be nice to have an image but I'm not aware of a representative image of ethics in general. Using an image of a philosopher for a general topic article can be tricky because it may favor a specific tradition. Maybe we could use the scales of justice but this is not that typically used for ethics per se. The image in Ethics#Basic_concepts was used earlier as the lead image but it was stated in the peer review that it was too complicated for the lead. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:19, 18 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • ”Ethics or moral philosophy is the philosophical study of moral phenomena.” - thats a bit self referential. Philosophical study could probably just be “study”, but I’m not a fan of just linking “moral” and letting the wiki link do the lifting. The second sentence of the lead is better, since that’s a better Explain-it-like-I’m-5 description for the topic.
    I moved the part about "moral philosophy" to the next sentence to make it less self-referential. I kept the "philosophical" to distinguish ethics form the non-philosophical study of moral phenomena, like moral psychology. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:19, 18 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • ”It is usually divided into three major fields: normative ethics, applied ethics, and metaethics.” - the “usually” sticks out to me (as does “fields”). Perhaps something like “The primary branches of ethics include…” I think “branch” is better than “field”, since that’s used in normative and metaethics articles.
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:19, 18 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • ”Applied ethics examines concrete ethical problems in real-life situations, for example, by exploring the moral implications of the universal principles discovered in normative ethics within a specific domain.” - not sure if I’m reading it wrong, but is the “for example” needed?
    This corresponds to the top-down methodology which is useful to establish the connection with normative ethics. With the "for example", we are on the safe side since some theorists also use a bottom-up methodology. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:19, 18 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • ”Moral psychology is a related empirical field and investigates psychological processes involved in morality, such as moral reasoning and the formation of moral character.” Three mentions of “moral” plus “morality.” Is there any way you could rewrite a bit to not use the five letters “moral” so many times? Like, could moral reasoning and moral character be piped to just “reasoning” and “character”?
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:19, 18 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Definition
  • The fourth paragraph seems like a repeat of the lead and what comes later, so it seems pretty redundant to mention normative/applied/metaethics again, particularly since you don’t go into the definition of “normative” or “meta.”
    I shortened the passage and merged it into the first paragraph. I don't think we can fully remove it since the lead section is supposed to summarize sourced text in the body of the article and the other sections don't discuss this division. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:26, 18 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • I was briefly looking for the etymology, and I think that should be higher up in the definition section.
    I moved it up as the third paragraph, which fits well since the following paragraph also discusses terminological issues. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:26, 18 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Normative
  • ”For example, given the particular impression that it is wrong to set a child on fire for fun, normative ethics aims to find more general principles that explain why this is the case, like the principle that one should not cause extreme suffering to the innocent, which may itself be explained in terms of a more general principle.” - eek, well, of course! As for why I brought this up, is the “for fun” part needed? Like, I’m not sure if it only applies as normative ethics if the argument is whether it is wrong to have fun doing that, or if it’s just wrong in general. Also, “given the particular impression that it is wrong” feels a bit off, but I’m not sure a better way to word it. Maybe it could be shorter and carry the same message? Like, “For example, the principle that one should not cause extreme suffering to the innocent explains why it is wrong to set a child on fire.” I feel like it has the same message, but it’s clearer and more succinct.
    The example is taken from Kagan 1998 p. 1, which explicitly mentions that it is done "for the mere pleasure". The difficulty here is probably to find a concrete example where everyone agrees. Without the "for fun", there could be cases where it is acceptable, possibly if it is not done for pleasure but to prevent a highly contagious supervirus in child from spreading. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:17, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • ”One difficulty for systems with several basic principles is that these principles may conflict with each other in some cases and lead to ethical dilemmas.” Such as the Trolley problem? I feel like it’s one of the best known ethical dilemmas, but maybe that’s just because I watched The Good Place. I see it appears later under “moral knowledge”, but it might be useful earlier in the article.
    I usually try not to repeat examples in the same article. The prime example for this one would be David Ross and his prima facie duties. I'm not sure if it's necessary, but if we wanted, we could include an example along the lines of the second paragraph of The_Right_and_the_Good#The_Right. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:17, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • ”Different theories in normative ethics suggest different principles as the foundation of morality.” - try rewording to avoid saying “different” twice
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:17, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • ”A more recently developed view additionally considers the distribution of value: It states that an equal distribution of goods is better than an unequal distribution even if the aggregate good is the same.” - recently as of when? 2020s? 20th century? After the fall of the Roman Empire?
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:17, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Is there a reason you to for “very unlikely” and “very limited knowledge” under the types subsection? The “very” feels borderline opinionated.
    Mainly to emphasize. I removed them. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:17, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • The image caption: “Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill are the founding fathers of utilitarianism.” - is there a source calling them the founding fathers? It feels a bit opinionated right now. A more neutral caption would be “Portraits of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, who developed the field of utilitarianism.”
    I added a source. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:17, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • ”Utilitarianism was initially formulated by Jeremy Bentham and further developed by John Stuart Mill.” - some date reference might be nice. Was this randomly out of nowhere, or part of a broader philosophical trend of the 1700s?
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:17, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • ”Some critics of Bentham's utilitarianism argued that it is a "philosophy of swine" whose focus on the intensity of pleasure promotes an immoral lifestyle centered around indulgence in sensory pleasures.” - few issues here. First, you should attribute the quote, if it’s even necessary at all to refer it to swine (I’m guessing an oblique reference to pigs having long lasting orgasms?) It feels a bit out of place without the context. Also, could you avoid saying “pleasure” twice in the same sentence?
    I removed the reference to swine and reformulated the passage to avoid the word repetitions. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:17, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • ”Today, there are many variations of utilitarianism, including the difference between act and rule utilitarianism and between maximizing and satisficing utilitarianism.” - I’m not a fan of using “today”. Is that going to change to yesterday in 24 hours? I’ll have to Chex back and find out :P Alternately, perhaps something like “In the centuries since Bentham and Mill, variations of utilitarianism have developed, including…”
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:37, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • ”For example, according to David Ross, it is wrong to break a promise even if no harm comes from it.” - maybe provide some context for who Ross is? You did that for Bentham and Mill, so that would be helpful. Also, maybe get rid of “for example” if you add something like “According to Scottish philosopher David Ross” (or however you think he needs to be introduced)
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:37, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • You don’t get into the difference of agent vs patient centered. Is that patient, like, having patience? Or a doctor’s patient?
    I tried to clarify the relevant passages. They now read Agent-centered deontological theories focus on the person who acts and the duties they have ... Patient-centered theories, by contrast, focus on the people affect by actions the rights they have. Should we add a footnote to clarify the differences between patient as being affected vs having patience vs a doctor's patient? Phlsph7 (talk) 08:37, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Is it worth adding a pic of Kant?
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:52, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • ”Divine command theory sees God as the source of morality.” - as an atheist, I’d rather not have “God” used here so matter of factly. Could you reword it to make it more neutral? God isn’t even linked here, and it’s written as if it’s an accepted fact that God exists.
    I reformulated the passage to not imply God's existence in wikivoice. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:52, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Metaethics
  • ”Obligation and permission are contrasting terms that can be defined through each other” - how come these are italicized?
    This is per MOS:WORDSASWORDS since we refer to them as terms. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:52, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • ”This position can be understood in analogy to Einstein's theory of relativity, which states that the magnitude of physical properties like mass, length, and duration depends on the frame of reference of the observer.” - idk if this is needed. I thought the previous sentence made complete sense already, and then when I got here I was wondering why it was here.
    I moved it to an explanatory footnote. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:52, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • ”An influential debate among moral realists is between naturalism and non-naturalism.” - you don’t really get into the debate, so is “influential” appropriate?
    I slightly reformulated it. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:52, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Under Cognitivism and non-cognitivism - what do you mean by “truth-apt”? I don’t think you used that term before.
    This is explained in the next sentence. I merged the two sentences to make this clear. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:52, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • ”Another thought experiment examines the moral implications of abortion by imagining a situation in which a person gets connected without their consent to an ill violinist. It explores whether it would be morally permissible to sever the connection within the next nine months even if this would lead to the violinist's death.” - ok this needs way more context. You should probably mention that the thought experiment is that it’s a pregnant ill violinist apparently? I was quite confused for a bit why it suddenly turned musical.
    I added an extra sentence to clarify that this is an analogy about the relation between mother and fetus without any fetuses present in the imagined situation. The musical turn is indeed confusing. This is part of the original formulation of the thought experiment but it's not essential that it is a violinist. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:52, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Applied ethics
  • Why is military ethics bolded in the middle of the paragraph?
    This is because of the redirect per MOS:BOLDREDIRECT. I added a corresponding comment
Related fields
  • ”For instance, the question of how nurses think about the ethical implications of abortion belongs to descriptive ethics.” - why nurses and not doctors who would actually be administering the procedure?
    Because that's the example of descriptive ethics used in the source. With a corresponding source about doctors, we could also change it. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:25, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
History
  • Some of this is covered elsewhere in the article, which makes me wonder, perhaps this should be the second main section, after “Definition”? The article on philosophy, for example, starts with “Etymology” and has a history section before getting into the branches.
    In principle, it could be done. Many overview works on ethics focus on the branches, concepts, and schools of ethics rather than the chronological development of the discipline. This indicates that the history is not the most important part of this article and should not come right at the beginning. Another difficulty would be that the history section uses various concepts that are explained in the other sections. If we wanted to have the history first, we might have to include a more detailed discussion of them already there, which could lead to various repetitions. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:25, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

One last comment. It’s a long read, at 8,941 words. Considering that this is an overview of the subject, and the many many links to various topics, I feel that the article should be condensed wherever possible. Perhaps remove redundant examples. Or, like the stuff in the history section that’s repeated elsewhere, you could trim it by having the history section first, and then removing the duplicate mentions of certain people.

Given the scope of the topic, I think we are not doing too bad length-wise. For a comparison, we are still below the 9000 mark of WP:SIZERULE. Except for the big names like Kant and Bentham, I don't think there is much overlap between the history and the rest. I'll keep a lookout for opportunities to condense the material as I respond to other reviews. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:25, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I really appreciated your work on the article, and I enjoyed the read, so it’s my ethical duty to finally wrap up my review that I’ve been working on for… several hours. So here it is. Lemme know if you have any questions, @Phlsph7:. Hurricanehink mobile (talk) 20:59, 17 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

@Hurricanehink: Thanks for your indepth review and the helpful suggestions. I implemented most and I hope I didn't miss any. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:30, 19 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Support from Femke

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Amazing you've tackled this article! First impressions are good. Except for a small module on morality among primates at uni and failing to read the The Ethics of Ambiguity, I know nothing of the topic, so feel free to disregard anything you're not sure about / disagree with.

  • In the lead, the order is applied ethics before meta-ethics. Would it make sense to follow this in the article too? Metaethics is a more scary difficult subject, so we may want to start easier in the body too.
    There has already been some discussion on the section order on the talk page and the peer review. Initially, meta-ethics was first to go from abstract to concrete. Then, because of the difficulty of its topic, it was moved to come after applied ethics. Then it was requested to have it before applied ethics since it "deals with much more general issues likely to be of interest to more readers". I don't feel strongly either way since there are good arguments for each approach. The order in the lead section was mainly chosen because it's easier to present the topics this way in a single paragraph. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:38, 20 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

As a general note: I'm moving in the direction of a support, but do want to do a second read to see if I can come up with more ideas on how to make the article understandable to a sufficiently broad audience. In particular, the bits around Kant are tough to explain, and not quite there yet in my view. I'll be on holiday, busy with work, and then hosting parents, so I might not come back till the 8th of July. I don't think I'll forget, but ping me if I do. —Femke 🐦 (talk) 19:22, 26 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I'm happy to hear that the article is moving in the right direction. I hope you enjoy your small wiki holiday. In the meantime, I'll see what I can do about the subsection "Kantianism" and I hope we can overcome this stumbling block. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:09, 28 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Second read
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Have been listening to In Our Time over the holidays and their episodes on moral philosophy over the last years. They were all about individuals of the wartime quartet (embarrasing red link, but Philippa Foot, Iris Murdoch etc), so hope I can say slightly more sensible things on the second read on the topic of language and virtue ethics.

  • The main branches of ethics include normative ethics, applied ethics, and metaethics. --> Do we need both "main" and "include" (rather than are). Are there further main branches?
    This is the most common division but some theorists prefer a different approach. Using this more careful formulation avoids upsetting them. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:19, 7 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Instead, he argues that there are universal principles that apply to everyone independent of their individual desires. --> is individual needed in the sentences? their desires may be sufficient.
    I removed the term. It was added to emphasize the contrast with "universal principles" but it's not necessary. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:19, 7 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • It asks whether moral statements can be true, how moral knowledge is possible, and how moral judgments motivate people. --> the examples --> I wonder if the first example makes sense for those who have not been schooled in truth tables and with a basic background in logic. Maybe the example of whether there are objective moral statements is more accessible. I find the second example somewhat vague to. What does it refer to?
    For the first example, I used objective moral facts instead. The second example refers to what is discussed in the subsection Moral knowledge, that is, foundationalism, coherentism, and the like. We could use a more specific example, but that would negatively impact generality. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:19, 7 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Virtue theorists see the manifestation of virtues, like courage and compassion, as the fundamental principle of morality. --> A pedantic point, but the episode on Philippa Foot made a distinction between a value theorist (who does the theory) and a value ethicist (who believe the above). Feel free to ignore, as alternative wording may make things uglier.
    I'm not sure that this distinction is generally accepted but it is an interesting point. I changed our formulation to "Virtue ethics" to be on the safe side without introducing verbal gymnastics. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:19, 7 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Ethics is closely connected to value theory, which studies the nature and types of value. --> This feels tautological. Can we say anything concrete about this?
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:19, 7 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Descriptive ethics provides value-neutral descriptions of the dominant moral codes and beliefs in different societies and considers their historical dimension. --> do we need the word value-neutral here? I don't think pure value-neutral discriptions exists, as most words in language are not perfectly neutral. —Femke 🐦 (talk) 08:40, 6 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    I removed the term. Its main point was emphasize that descriptive ethicists try not to pick sides about which moral code is correct. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:19, 7 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Brilliant, thanks. That's a support from me. Hope that a new reviewer will also look at how to simplify and make the article more concrete. —Femke 🐦 (talk) 09:00, 7 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks a lot for this in-depth review and the many improvement suggestions to make the article more accessible! Phlsph7 (talk) 10:50, 7 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Image review by Generalissima

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  • File:Head of Aristotle.jpg, File:EMB - Buddha stehend.jpg, and File:Head of Laozi marble Tang Dynasty (618-906 CE) Shaanxi Province China.jpg are all CC-BY-SA photos of a PD statue.
  • File:Jeremy Bentham by Henry William Pickersgill detail.jpg, File:John Stuart Mill by London Stereoscopic Company, c1870.jpg, File:Immanuel Kant - Gemaelde 1.jpg, File:Little boy.jpg, File:1914 George Edward Moore (cropped).jpg are all PD photos.
  • File:Philippa Foot 1939.jpg is not PD in the US. I've nominated it for deletion.
  • File:JuergenHabermas.jpg is CC-BY-SA
  • File:Trolley Problem.svg is CC-BY-SA
  • File:Cesarean section.jpg is CC-BY-SA
  • File:Battery hens -Bastos, Sao Paulo, Brazil-31March2007.jpg is CC-BY
  • File:Deontic square.svg is CC-BY

Alt-text is good. Images are directly applicable to the subject. Besides the Philippa Foot image, all seems good here. Generalissima (talk) (it/she) 22:48, 22 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

@Generalissima: Thanks for your image review and for catching the problem with the image of Philippa Foot. I removed the image and found a way to include an image of Simone de Beauvoir instead. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:39, 23 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Support on image review. Looks good, thank you! Generalissima (talk) (it/she) 18:10, 23 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Drive-by: Don't have time for a full review, but saw this while reading the page which stuck out and thought I'd add a comment An exception is J. L. Mackie's error theory, which combines cognitivism with moral nihilism by claiming that all moral statements are false because there are no moral facts - all error theory is an exception, not just that espoused by J. L. Mackie. Maybe Mackie should be mentioned in the history section instead. Relatedly Moral skeptics reject the idea that moral knowledge is possible by arguing that people are unable to distinguish between right and wrong behavior isn't that what they're arguing for, not the argument itself? I guess there isn't room to include questions about our access to moral facts or the (non)explanatory role of ethical concepts, but this could be worded better at least. Shapeyness (talk) 19:09, 24 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    Hi Shapeyness and thanks for taking a look at the article. I moved Mackie to the history section and I switched the explanation in the sentence on moral skeptics around. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:13, 26 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    Thanks Phlsph7, that fixes both of those. Shapeyness (talk) 18:45, 26 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Source review

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Spot-check upon request. Is there a logic why some page numbers are linked and others aren't, and some references give sections and others page numbers? I don't think that Springer DOI links need archives, and I am not sure that Google Books archives are useful, either. Some books with ISBN links have retrieval dates and others don't. Looks like sources are from prominent university publishers and journals ... but I notice that they seem to be mostly Western sources; even if sources about non-Western ethics are used they seem to be Western sources. Can't speak much about whether the sources picked are representative. Jo-Jo Eumerus (talk) 08:52, 10 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Hello Jo-Jo Eumerus and thanks for doing the source review! I usually use section titles for web sources and page numbers for books and journals. For some books in ebook format, I also use section numbers if they do not have page numbers or if the page numbers depend on the reading device. If I'm aware of a Google Books page offering a preview of the page, I usually add a link to it. But this is not possible for all books, which is why some page numbers have links while others don't.
I removed the Springer DOI archives. Let me know if you think the Google Books archive links also need to be removed. The problem is that IABot adds them automatically, so all the links would be re-added the next time it runs. I count 91 archived Google Books links so removing them by hand each time after IABot runs would be time-intensive.
Some books with an ISBN have a website added in the template, for example, because the website provides a preview of the book. These books have access dates for the website. Access dates are also automatically added by IABot. I included several sources from non-Western publishers before the nomination, such as Sinha 2014, Satyanarayana 2009, Nadkarni 2011, Murthy 2009, Fernando 2010, Dalal 2010, Dalai Lama 2007, Armour 2001, Junru 2019, Ntuli 2002, and Pera & Tonder 2005. High-quality English philosophy sources from non-Western publishers are a little hard to find but I can try to find more in case the current ones are not sufficient. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:29, 10 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
@Jo-Jo Eumerus: Do you have more comments? Phlsph7 (talk) 13:11, 14 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
No, that is all. Jo-Jo Eumerus (talk) 06:50, 16 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

750h

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I'll leave comments in a bit. 750h+ 12:33, 14 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

That's all I got. Fine work. 750h+ 05:52, 18 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

@750h+: Thanks a lot for your comments and for your earlier GA review! I hope I was able to address the concerns. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:34, 20 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
No problem. Happy to support 750h+ 07:35, 20 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

UC

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As ever, kudos for taking on one of the site's biggest and thorniest articles. I am very much not a philosopher, but I hope the below is useful.

  • Deontologists say morality consists in fulfilling duties, like telling the truth and keeping promises.: is the duties part of this always true? As I understand it, deontologists believe (and I'd use a word like that, rather than say, which is imprecise in this situation: someone might say something that is not fully in accordance with their beliefs) that the act itself determines its moral value -- granted, that can often (always?) be squeezed into a duty to e.g. obey God, follow key moral principles, promote one's own spiritual health, and so on, but what's the value in making that additional step here?
    Both characterizations are found in the literature and are used side by side. Descriptions focusing more deontology itself tend to talk about duties. Descriptions focusing on the contrast with consequentialism tend to talk about acts being good in themselves. Here are some examples:
    * From [1]: Deontology asserts that there are several distinct duties ... All [deontologists] agree ... that there are occasions when it would be wrong for us to act in a way that would maximize the good, because we would be in breach of some (other) duty.
    * From Crisp 2005: According to deontology, certain acts are right or wrong in themselves.
    * From the entry "Deontological Ethics" of the Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy: By the middle of the twentieth century, “deontology” acquired its more specific meaning, which refers to a particular conception or theory of our moral duties.
    * From the entry "Ethics" of the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy: [According to deontology,] some principles of right and wrong, notably principles of justice and honesty, prescribe actions even though more evil than good would result from doing them.
    The last source talks of "principles" rather than duties. We could also use this more general term but it would make the sentence more abstract. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:44, 21 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Happy here, then -- if it's good enough for the grown-ups in philosophy, it's good enough for us. Do any of their formulations rule out e.g. "the duty to maximise human happiness", though? Given that we are making an explicit contrast with consequentialism here, I think it might be helpful to get some form of words that says "it's about the act itself" in here. UndercoverClassicist T·C 07:50, 21 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
That's a good idea about mentioning the other characterization as well: why choose when we can have both? I added a short phrase.
The point about a "duty to maximise human happiness" is interesting because it mixes deontology and consequentialism/utilitarianism. Some deontologists have this principle as one of their duties among others. For example, this is the case for David Ross's duty of beneficence, see The_Right_and_the_Good#The_Right. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:22, 21 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I must admit that I get a bit lost working through the idea of a deontological duty to ensure the positive consequences of your actions by manifesting a virtue -- that seems to be all three ethical schools at once! -- but that's probably not the sort of thing we want to bother with in the lead. Is there anything to be said further down about "hybrid" philosophies, though, insofar as they exist, such as religious codes -- deontological -- that insist upon certain virtues? Again, I appreciate that I'm coming in with no expertise and that the answer may simply be "no". UndercoverClassicist T·C 08:52, 21 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
There would be something to said but I'm not sure that we should say it in this article. We hint to it in the section "Normative ethics": The three most influential schools of thought are consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics.[15] These schools are usually presented as exclusive alternatives, but depending on how they are defined, they can overlap and do not necessarily exclude one another. The standard treatments of these schools of thought usually only address this on the sidelines, if at all. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:25, 21 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Sounds like you've handled it well, then. UndercoverClassicist T·C 11:21, 21 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • I'd suggest reorganising the second paragraph of the lead so that we don't blur together modes of ethical study (e.g. Normative ethics, applied ethics, metaethics) with schools of ethical thought (e.g. deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics).
    The paragraph currently says:

    Normative ethics aims to find general principles that govern how people should act. According to consequentialists, an act is right if it leads to the best consequences. Deontologists say morality consists in fulfilling duties, like telling the truth and keeping promises. Virtue ethics sees the manifestation of virtues, like courage and compassion, as the fundamental principle of morality. Applied ethics examines concrete ethical problems in real-life situations, such as abortion, treatment of animals, and business practices. Metaethics examines the underlying assumptions and concepts of ethics. It asks whether there are objective moral facts, how moral knowledge is possible, and how moral judgments motivate people.

    We could change it something like:

    Normative ethics aims to find general principles that govern how people should act. Applied ethics examines concrete ethical problems in real-life situations, such as abortion, treatment of animals, and business practices. Metaethics examines the underlying assumptions and concepts of ethics. It asks whether there are objective moral facts, how moral knowledge is possible, and how moral judgments motivate people. Influential normative theories are consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. According to consequentialists, an act is right if it leads to the best consequences. Deontologists say morality consists in fulfilling duties, like telling the truth and keeping promises. Virtue ethics sees the manifestation of virtues, like courage and compassion, as the fundamental principle of morality.

    The main change is that the passage on consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics was moved to the end and one additional sentence needed to be added to reintroduce normative ethics. I slightly prefer the first option but the second option could also work. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:56, 21 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    I like the paragraph as you've written it on second go -- I think making the link between normative ethics and deontology/consequentialism/virtue ethics clearer is a good move. This version is much clearer as to the categorisation of the things we're talking about. UndercoverClassicist T·C 08:03, 21 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    It's a little bit longer but you are right that it makes the organization clearer. I implemented it. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:24, 21 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • the Ancient Greek word êthos (ἦθος), meaning "character, personal disposition". .... The term morality originates in the Latin word moralis, meaning manners and character. I would pick a lane for how we handle glosses in formatting -- two different styles on display here in the same paragraph.
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:52, 21 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • It was introduced into the English language through the Old French term moralité.: can we say (roughly) when?
    Done. It's still a little vague but the source is not sure either when exactly this happened. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:52, 21 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Link utilitarianism on first use (as classical utilitarianism)?
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:52, 21 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • A matter of taste, perhaps, but I'm not sold on "says" as a verb with an abstract idea as its "speaker": I can wear "the Pope says..." or even "the Bible says...", but I struggle with "Catholicism says...". Suggest "teaches", or alternatively talking about the people who believe it.
    The main advantage of the term is that it is simple to understand and keeps the text accessible. We could use alternatives terms like "affirm", "assert", and "state" if it is an issue. Some of our sources also use the term: from [2]: A consequentialist theory says that ... virtue theory says that ...
  • That's fair enough: I don't really have a concrete, policy-based objection here, and different people have different stylistics tastes -- I wouldn't want to impose mine any more than I'd want reviewers to impose theirs when I've got an article are up for review. UndercoverClassicist T·C 11:21, 21 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • A core intuition behind consequentialism is that what matters is not the past but the future and that it should be shaped to achieve the best possible outcome: could this be expressed more concisely thus?
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:19, 21 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • The act itself is usually not seen as part of the consequences. This means that if an act has intrinsic value or disvalue, it is not included as a relevant factor. Some consequentialists try to avoid this complication by including the act itself as part of the consequences.: I need a little more explanation here as to why this is a problem, or a complication.
    I added one sentence to better explain this point. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:19, 21 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Are there any suitable images for the consequentialism section? Perhaps not unrelatedly, I notice that we haven't talked about any concrete people or movements until we get down to utilitarianism (bar a very brief and slightly isolated mention of Mohism). Can we do anything to set the scene about where these ideas came from, and how influential they were (or weren't) until Bentham came along?
    The term "consequentialism" was first introduced in the 20th century by G. E. M. Anscombe. Her image would be a good choice but, as far as I'm aware, we have no free image of her other than an odd drawing. Most of the well-known consequentialists are utilitarians. We could use Henry Sidgwick or Peter Singer but they came after Bentham so it might be odd to present them before him. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:19, 21 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    I would definitely get Anscombe's name and chronology into the Consequentialism section, even if her image is tricky. From the article of the same name, it does seem that most consequentialists are late C19th and later (which, again, I think is worth flagging up), but then we also have Machiavelli mentioned there, and William Godwin. UndercoverClassicist T·C 11:25, 21 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    Good idea, I added a short historical clarification. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:27, 22 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • utilitarianism, which states that the moral value of acts only depends on the pleasure they cause.: pleasure or suffering, surely, unless we're talking about particularly sadistic utilitarians?
    I added this clarification. Utilitarians sometimes use the term "pleasure" in a wider sense to encompass both the positive and the negative but this could be confusing to the reader. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:11, 22 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Traditionally, consequentialists were only concerned with the total of value or the aggregate good.: not a fan of the word traditionally: we mean, here, "before the 20th century", not that it was a matter of any kind of tradition. I think it's wise to be precise.
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:11, 22 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • There are disagreements about what consequences should be assessed.: which consequences.
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:11, 22 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • . An important distinction is between act and rule consequentialism: this is a case for suspended hyphens: act- and rule-consequentialism, or else for repeating consequentialism. It's not obvious, to a reader who knows nothing about the topic, that the distinction isn't between rule consequentialism and something else called act.
    I went for the second option. Hyphens would also work but we would have to change the spelling of all the other instances as well. The terms are used both with and without hyphens in the literature. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:11, 22 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    At the risk of being terribly boring, this is a special case where you use hyphens irrespective of whether they are "normally" used for that term (so: "I made chocolate- and strawberry-cakes for the party" -- without the hyphens, you only made one type of cake), but it does look pretty weird when you do, so I think trying to rephrase to avoid the need is a good move. UndercoverClassicist T·C 07:41, 22 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • For example, if not lying is one of the best rules, then according to rule consequentialism, a person should not lie even in specific cases where lying would lead to better consequences: might be clearer in the positive: if telling the truth...?
    Changed. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:11, 22 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • If we're going to say that Mohism is early, can we give an idea of how early?
    Added. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:11, 22 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

More to follow -- I am very impressed by the clarity of the article so far, and how ably it helps me keep sight of the wood without getting too distracted by the trees. UndercoverClassicist T·C 19:30, 20 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

  • Unlike consequentialists, deontologists hold that the validity of general moral principles does not depend on their consequences: again, is that always true? Do any say, for example, "we should always follow the rule of not harming others because doing so leads to the best outcome/avoids us going to Hell?" Or is that when you've crossed the line and become a rule utilitarian? I know we say According to moral philosopher David Ross, it is wrong to break a promise even if no harm comes from it, but Ross means from breaking that specific promise, not (necessarily) from people generally breaking promises. I don't think many deontological theorists would argue that the world would be rosy if everyone broke the/their rules.
    I think you have point here. It's true for the typical forms of deontology and sources often present it this way, including the source of this statement. I changed it to "does not directly depend". This would also cover the duty of beneficence by Ross discussed earlier, so we should be fine. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:23, 22 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • save the life of several others: save the lives, I think?
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:23, 22 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Can we give any examples of agent-centred and patient-centred deontological theories?
    Many of the main deontologists combine elements of both, which makes it a little difficult to provide clear-cut and accessible examples of well-known philosophers. The examples often have to be qualified in some way, as in our example later: contractualism is often understood as a patient-centered form of deontology. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:06, 23 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • He states that moral action should not follow fixed goals that people desire, such as being happy. Instead, he argues that there are universal principles that apply to everyone independent of their desires.: I'm not sure I've quite grasped the meaning of "fixed goals that people desire", since he does say that people should follow fixed principles, and that wise people should generally desire to follow them. Is "fixed" quite right here, or is he saying that people shouldn't make decisions willy-nilly based on what feels right in that particular moment, but rather should follow consistent rules in every situation?
    I tried to reformulate it to get the idea better across. The main point is that, for Kant, it's not about desires or outcomes but about following principles, even if one does not like the principles and the outcomes they lead to. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:23, 22 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • I'd put a date on Kant. I'm not sure what I feel about putting him before divine command theory and the social contract, both of which are much older -- I think the structure works well, and I'm not sure that a strictly chronological one would be better, but it does slightly paper over the fact that deontological ethics, for most of its history, looked nothing like what Kant was talking about.
    I added the dates. The chronological approach is only really found in the history section of this article. One of the reasons for having Kant first is that, as far as deontology is concerned, he is significantly more important. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:23, 22 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Should we have a brief bit in the Kant section about post-Kant Kantian ethics?
    We have something on that in the history section, where it probably fits better. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:12, 22 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    I think that's true if you wouldn't describe anyone later than Kant as both a) important and b) Kantian -- so I can see, for example, why you wouldn't include Hegel or Nietzsche up here, but has anyone calling themselves a Kantian sharpened or otherwise shifted Kantian thought, in the same way that Mill did for utilitarian thought, or someone like Aquinas did for Christian ethics? UndercoverClassicist T·C 11:52, 23 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    Before Hegel, there would be Fichte and Schelling in the tradition of German idealism. There are also Schopenhauer, the Neo-Kantians, John Rawls, and Christine Korsgaard. However, I don't think the relation here is as close as the one between Bentham and Mill. For example, the article "Deontological Ethics" of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has its own subsection dedicated to Kant and mentions him in various other places, but it doesn't mention any of the ones listed above except for Rawls in one instance. Rawls fits better into the paragraph on social contract theory, where our article currently mentions him. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:08, 24 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    Sounds reasonable to me. UndercoverClassicist T·C 11:14, 24 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • On my recurring point about putting names on ideas -- I know that it's perhaps a dangerous game to choose a few out of a huge number, but if Kant gets a mention (and a picture!) for the categorical imperative, should e.g. Rousseau and Rawls get a name-check for the social contract?
    I added a short sentence. We could add a picture but we would probably have to remove Habermas's picture so it doesn't get too crowded. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:12, 22 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Similarly, I think we should put dates on the various schools of virtue ethics: when we say "Eudaimonism is the classical view", what do we mean by classical? Most readers will know that Aristotle was an ancient Greek, but not all will be able to date him beyond "a long time ago", and I think it's helpful to note that practically all of our surviving Stoics are centuries later than he is.
    I reformulated the passage to avoid the term "classical". I added dates for Aristotle and Stoicism. Originally, I mostly tried to have the historical context in the history section and use the remaining sections to focus more on the theories themselves rather than their historical context. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:12, 22 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • I would tread very lightly around "Indigenous belief systems" (isn't Greek philosophy an indigenous belief system of Greece?): I think we're on the right side of the line at the moment, but there's a real danger of tokenising or flattening them, or as presenting them as somehow simpler or less serious than "proper" philosophical movements, simply because we haven't found out the names of the people who came up with them.
    I'm not a big fan of the word "indigenous" either but that's the term used by the sources. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:55, 23 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    At the moment, I'm happy to grumble ineffectually on this one: I'm not personally a fan of the divide between "indigenous" art/culture/storytelling/philosophy/whatever and "proper" Western equivalents -- where possible, I think it's best to try to handle them together and to place them on equal footing. However, there's a difference between "I would do it differently" and "the way it's done here is wrong": as I said, I think we're on the right side of the line here, and are following a perfectly justifiable approach. UndercoverClassicist T·C 11:49, 23 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Another pause -- down to the end of "Normative ethics". UndercoverClassicist T·C 07:56, 22 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

  • is not interested in what actions are right: which actions are right, I think.
    Replaced. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:17, 25 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • It further examines the meaning of morality and moral terms: do we mean of the word "morality"? If so, should italicise per MOS:WORDSASWORDS.
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:17, 25 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Metaethical theories typically do not directly adopt substantive positions on normative ethical theories: it's difficult to avoid sounding abstruse in an article on metaethics, I know, but perhaps this would be clearer as something like "do not generally pass judgement on the quality of a given normative ethical theory" or something like that?
    I used a slightly different formulation to clarify this point. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:17, 25 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Ethics is concerned with normative statements about what ought to be the case, in contrast to descriptive statements, which are about what is the case: this is Hume's guillotine, isn't it? Philippa Foot, in particular, would be quite upset with us affirming it so baldly. Indeed, the article on the is–ought problem has a very chunky section of "responses" dedicated to people quibbling it.
    It's closely related to the is–ought problem or Hume's guillotine, which states that one cannot deduce a normative statement from a descriptive statement. I added a corresponding footnote and slightly modified the text. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:17, 25 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Obligation and permission are contrasting terms that can be defined through each other: to be obligated to do something means that one is not permitted not to do it and to be permitted to do something means that one is not obligated not to do it: I'm not really seeing how this definition is any different to the everyday meaning of those terms, and in turn what it's value is in this particular article?
    Maybe I'm underestimating our readers, but I'm not sure that they are aware of this precise relation. If we want to go deeper into it, we could give them the formula in deontic logic:   and  . But i'm not sure how helpful this would be. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:17, 25 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    In body text, I think that notation would be unhelpful, though I can see a better argument for it in a footnote (similar to how, for example, we often handle quotations in non-English languages: just give the translation in the text, give the original in a footnote). UndercoverClassicist T·C 13:12, 25 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • When used in a general sense, good contrasts with bad: italics on good and bad per MOS:WORDSASWORDS. Likewise, in the following, evil and bad.
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:17, 25 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • To be morally responsible for an action usually means that the person possessed and exercised certain capacities or some form of control.: present tense here, surely?
    Changed. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:55, 25 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • it is an objective fact whether there is an obligation to keep a promise just as it is an objective fact whether a thing has a black color: I'd stick a comma after promise for readability. I would also suggest picking a different example: after all, colour vocabulary is notoriously cross-culturally tricky (famously, in Homer, the sea is wine-coloured), and indeed many people have experience of arguing with a partner as to whether a shade of paint is really red rather than terracotta... that's before you ask if someone's skin is "black", which is a famous example of how linguistic categories are socially constructed.
    Good point, I changed it to "rectangular". Phlsph7 (talk) 11:55, 25 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • It implies that if two people disagree about a moral evaluation then at least one of them is wrong. This observation is sometimes taken as an argument against moral realism since moral disagreement is widespread in most fields: as written, this sounds a bit limp to me. If you give two people a difficult mathematical problem, they are likely to disagree on the answer, but nobody would argue that this means it doesn't have one, only that the problem is hard. In the same way, the fact that people disagree on whether climate change is real or the existence of an afterlife is not good evidence that neither argument has a true answer.
    I think the key point in this argument is that the disagreement is widespread. Personally, I agree with you that the argument is not a solid proof against moral realism. However, it still carries some force. For example, if everyone agreed on all moral evaluations, people would be less likely to doubt moral realism. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:55, 25 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    You're probably covered enough by "has been taken as" -- the structure of the eyeball has been taken as proof of the existence of God, after all, even though it's famously bad evidence for it. It's certainly not unrelated to the point it's trying to prove. UndercoverClassicist T·C 17:22, 25 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • suicide is permitted: suggest amending permissible: as written, this reads as a legal or a social statement rather than a moral one.
    Changed. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:55, 25 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • This position can be understood in analogy to: the usual idiom is by analogy to.
    Changed. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:55, 25 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • A different explanation states that morality arises from moral emotions, which are not the same for everyone: I would name Emotivism, rather than relegating its name to the link (WP:EASTEREGG might apply here).
    Changed. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:51, 26 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • They are opposed to both objective moral facts defended by moral realism and subjective moral facts defended by moral relativism: I'm not sure "are opposed to" means "don't believe in": I'm opposed to animal cruelty, but I'm fairly sure it exists. Suggest "they reject the existence both of objective moral facts..."
    Reformulated. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:51, 26 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Moral nihilism, like moral relativism, recognizes that people judge actions as right or wrong from different perspectives. However, it disagrees that this practice involves morality and sees it as just one type of human behavior: and/or as filling a social function? As we've written it, it sounds as though moral nihilists all think that making moral judgements is stupid and/or pointless: do any of them say something like "moral judgements are arbitrary, but the fact that we make them is important and interesting for our psychology/how our societies work?"
    I think the more common view among moral nihilists is that moral beliefs/practices are harmful. Nietzsche frequently makes this point. It's quite possible that some moral nihilists see morality as a useful fiction but I'm not sure that the article should get too much into this. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:51, 26 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • According to the traditionally influential view of natural law ethics, morality is based on a natural law created by God: traditionally, again -- but is it always "God"? Not, for example, "the gods", "a deity", "a divinely ordained natural law" or similar? To me, with the capital, we're narrowing ourselves to the Judeo-Christian one (and possibly the Muslim one, but not all readers will agree).
    You are right that this is a narrowed perspective. This is mainly because the view was mostly developed in Christian philosophy and is presented this way in the sources. For example, Murphy 2019a says that "the paradigmatic natural law view holds that (1) the natural law is given by God" and talks about "God’s will", "God’s eternal plan", and "God’s choosing". I reformulated the sentence to remove the "traditionally". Phlsph7 (talk) 11:51, 26 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    If we're going to implicitly case natural law as a Christian belief, we should be explicit about it and say something like "according to the Christian view of natural-law ethics". On the other hand, if we're not comfortable tying it to Christianity, we need to make sure that our framing works for non-Christian forms. UndercoverClassicist T·C 13:59, 26 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    I reformulated it. Please see if this works for you. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:37, 26 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Non-naturalism accepts that moral properties form part of reality: not sure about accepts that in this kind of phrase (MOS:SAID) -- this implies that the statement is true: "he accepts that she is dead" rules out, in normal speech, the possibility that she isn't. There are one or two other instances. Here, we could solve it by moving "argues" to this position.
    Changed. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:51, 26 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Down to "Cognitivism and non-cognitivism". UndercoverClassicist T·C 11:38, 24 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

  • Cognitivism only claims that moral statements have a truth value but is not interested in which truth value they have: not sure only... but... is idiomatic: it works fine if you cut only, or go for "have a truth-value: it is not ..."
    I removed the "only". Phlsph7 (talk) 12:12, 26 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • The semantic position of cognitivism is closely related to the ontological position of moral realism: I think the division between semantic ideas and ontological ideas is important to clarify this bit, and it would be worth spending a sentence or so at the outset to outline what makes the cognitivism–noncognitivism spectrum different from the realism–nihilism one. "Position" might be slightly ambiguous: it can mean "placement" (so 'semantic position' means 'where something is positioned in terms of semantics' -- something can, for example, have both a horizontal and a vertical) or, as here, "attitude of mind", where the options are usually mutually exclusive.
    I reformulated it with an expanded explanation to bring in the contrast between the meaning of moral terms and the existence of moral facts. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:12, 26 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • A different interpretation is that they express other types of meaning contents: other types of meanings? If "meaning contents" is intentional, I think we need a bit more handholding as to what it, well, means.
    I reformulated it. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:12, 26 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • According to this view, the statement "Murder is wrong" expresses that the speaker has a negative moral attitude towards murder or dislikes it: or disapproves of it? "Dislikes" can mean "derives negative pleasure from it", and we often dislike doing things we have positive moral views of (going for a long run in the rain, for example).
    Reformulated. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:12, 26 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • the statement "Murder is wrong" expresses ... general moral truths, like "lying is wrong", are self-evident: are we capitalising the first words of these compound-noun phrases? It's not consistent at the moment.
    Maybe we can go for the rule: start with uppercase if the text between quotation marks can stand as full sentence. I tried to implement it, I hope I didn't miss anything. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:12, 26 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • Moral skepticism is often criticized based on the claim that it leads to immoral behavior.: again, this isn't a particularly good criticism (atheism gets the same charge levelled at it), particularly as moral sceptics would presumably say that immoral behaviour doesn't exist in any way that human beings can recognise it? However, perhaps we're covered by presenting this as a "some people say...".
    Strictly speaking, we are just reporting what others say. The criticism-section of Sinnott-Armstrong 2019 starts with Opponents often accuse moral skepticism of leading to immorality.
  • Is it worth giving Philippa Foot and Judith Jarvis Thompson credit for their famous thought experiments?
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:37, 26 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • people can act against moral judgments: suggest adding their own moral judgements, so that we're clear we don't mean "people can do things that are disapproved of by their peers".
    Added. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:37, 26 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
  • psychopaths or sociopaths, who fail to either judge that a behavior is wrong or translate their judgment into action: the word sociopath is no longer considered meaningful in psychology: psycopathy, on the other hand, has quite a strict meaning, mostly centring around a lack of inhibitions and empathy. These might be philosophical psychopaths in the vein of philosophical zombies, but I'd suggest avoiding the weeds by just going for "people who fail either to judge...". Surely, though, quite a few of those metaethical theories we've just covered would take some sort of issue with the statement "he has failed to judge that his behaviour is wrong"?
    I removed the mention of socipaths. DeLapp, § 5. Psychology and Metaethics explicitly discusses psychopaths from the perspectives of internalism and externalism so I think it should be fine to keep the term. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:37, 26 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
    (How) does Delapp define psychopaths, in this context? If they simply use the word to mean "people who don't believe that (e.g.) hurting others is wrong", that's out of whack with the usual/"proper" meaning. Again, my point about zombies: philosophers will often use the word to mean "imaginary people who look like you and I but don't have any internal life", and that's fine, but we shouldn't do so without explaining that we're doing it, because our readers will take zombie to mean "brain-eating dead people". UndercoverClassicist T·C 20:36, 26 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Now down to "Applied ethics". UndercoverClassicist T·C 17:22, 25 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

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