User talk:Georgejdorner/User page: Work Area 6

Background edit

During the French Indochina War, the United States began supporting the French military effort in the Kingdom of Laos as early as 23 December 1950. As the First Indochina War ended, and the Kingdom of Laos moved towards independence, the departing French bureaucrats and soldiers were gradually replaced by Americans.^[2] As the Eisenhower administration reached its end, he had concluded that if communism overtook Laos, the rest of Southeast Asia would follow suit. He passed on this domino theory to incoming president John F. Kennedy.^[3]

Captain Kong Le, who was opposed to foreign involvement in his nation's affairs, staged a coup d'etat on 9 August 1960.^[4] A counter-coup by General Phoumi Nosavan would eclipse him on 16 December 1960 in the Battle of Vientiane. In the wake of Phoumi's ascension, James William Lair of the Central Intelligence Agency secretly entered Laos. On 9 January 1961, Lair helicoptered out to Ta Vieng on the Plain of Jars to meet a young Hmong lieutenant colonel of the Royal Lao Army named Vang Pao. A Thai officer with Lair arranged a later meeting. On 11 January, Vang Pao told Lair, "Either we fight or we leave. If you give me weapons, we fight," When asked how many troops he could raise, Vang Pao asked for equipment to begin training 10,000 recruits.^[5]^[6] As 200 Hmong villages had already relocated to one or another of seven mountaintops ringing the Plain of Jars, potential recruits were plentiful.^[7]

Lair knew that his superiors felt that the hostilities in Laos could be settled only one of two ways: either direct military intervention with American troops, or a surrender of Laos to communism.^[8] With this in mind, Lair took the offer back to his superior, Desmond Fitzgerald, with the observation that Vang Pao already had gathered 4,300 potential Hmong recruits.^[6] Lair's expressed opinion was that the Hmong were the only potential fighting force between the North Vietnamese invasion and Vientiane. He believed the Hmong would defend their way of life with ongoing guerrilla raids that would tie the Vietnamese down. Moreover, a functional guerrilla force would be best instructed by Thai PARU commandos because they shared a commonly intelligible language. The absence of Caucasian faces in the operation would guarantee plausible deniability for the covert operation. The only caveat in Lair's expertise was that the Hmong could never fight for fixed positions as light infantry; as guerrillas, they would always need a line of retreat^[9] for themselves and their dependents.^{[citation needed]}

The Battle of Vientiane and birth of Momentum edit

The proposition was approved; Lair was placed in charge, with funding coming direct from the office of the Director of Central Intelligence.^[10] Fitzgerald arranged for the first class of Hmong basic training for recruits. Project Momentum supplied the military gear necessary for equipping 2,000 soldiers as an experiment. As the Programs Evaluation Office was already in place in the U.S. Embassy, it was tasked with furnishing the needed equipment from Department of Defense stores. Trainers came from Lair's PARU cadre. The new troops became members of 100-man irregular units called Auto Defense Choc (roughly, Self Defense Shock (troops)).^[6]

The guerrilla training began on the plateau at Ban Pa Dong, a village which had been used previously by the French colonial military for training their Auto Defense Choc militia. Operation Momentum began with Air America's airdrop of arms and equipment for the guerrilla recruits on 17 January 1961. After three days training, the new "Secret Army" successfully fought its first action on the fourth day of their existence when it ambushed a communist patrol.^[11]

More CIA agents and Thai trainers were smuggled into Laos, and two more guerrilla training camps were set up between the Plain and the Vietnamese border. As the guerrilla force expanded, it scratched out rough runways for use by helicopters and STOL aircraft. Air support came from two "civilian" airlines--Air America and BirdAir. As the U.S. military was supplying the Hmong with small arms through their Programs Evaluation Office, they lobbied to have their own White Star training teams join the training effort, despite the language barrier.^[12]

By 1 April, the guerrilla force had expanded to 7,000 men; they surrounded communist forces on the strategic Plain of Jars (PDJ).^{[citation needed]}

Hmong villages across northern Laos began scratching out airstrips for STOL aircraft to receive munitions and supplies.^{[citation needed]}

External influences on Momentum edit

In mid-April 1961, the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba failed disastrously. In the U.S., the new president, John F. Kennedy, put a damper on covert operations. In Laos, the participants in Project Momentum were stunned; they disbelieved that a small nation could stand off the mighty U.S.A.^[13]

On 3 May 1961, as a result of international diplomacy, a ceasefire was declared for Laos. However, the Vietnamese communists were still closing in on Ban Padong. Taking advantage of their artillery, which included American-made guns captured from the Royal Lao Army, the communists shelled the guerrilla village at random intervals. The guerrillas had only a single mortar to return this indirect fire.^[14]

When the North Vietnamese infantry attacked the guerrilla training base in June 1961, the new Hmong force retreated. Its dependent children, women, and old men moved out first, followed by a covering force of guerrillas strewing booby traps along their axis of departure. Within days, its American and Thai advisers had resumed their training of the hill tribe guerrillas.^[15] Onset of the rainy season halted the Vietnamese. The war was falling into a pattern of Communist attacks during the dry season, guerrillas offensives during the wet.^[16]

By early 1962, as the guerrilla companies were being organized into ad hoc battalions dubbed Special Guerrilla Units, the secret army was being referred to as L'Armée Clandestine instead of Auto Defence Choc.^[17]

Meanwhile, coincident with the Ban Pa Dong fighting, diplomats from 14 nations gathered in Geneva, Switzerland in an attempt to settle the Laotian Civil War. Although the Vietnamese did not honor the ceasefire, the Americans made a pretense of doing so by ceasing to supply munitions to the Hmong guerrillas, beginning 27 June 1961. Food and medicine were still supplied, however.^[18] Nevertheless, guerrilla training continued, with an expansion in trainers assigned to the Hmong, and there were a series of skirmishes with both Pathet Lao and Kong Le's Forces Armées Neutralistes.^[19] The guerrilla force's main headquarters was established in the valley of Long Chieng. A farflung outpost was set up in Nam Yu in northwestern Laos near the Chinese border of Yunnan Province.^[20]

In March 1962, two U.S. officials were flown in a Russian airplane to the Plain of Jars. They sought cooperation between Vang Pao and Kong Le, as both were being supplied with American equipment and supplies. Kong Le appeared in spic and span parade uniform, freshly doused with perfume. Vang Pao came to the meeting in his field clothing, fresh from the battlefield. Kong Le insisted that the Hmong were animals incapable of rational thought. Vang Pao pointed out that Kong Le's troops were prone to flee combat instead of fighting. Faced with a choice between the two, the Americans chose to back Vang Pao as the better commander.^[21]

Continued fighting in neutral Laos edit

The diplomatic wrangling over Laos continued until 23 July 1962, when the International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos was signed. While the international community debated the future of Laos, Chinese construction troops began building roads southward from Yunnan Province. In turn, General Phoumi Nosavan decided to beef up border security at the nearby Lao garrison at Luang Namtha. He disregarded his American backers to do so. The resultant resulting battle demonstrated the weakness of the regulars of the Royal Lao Army. Despite having a two to one edge on their attackers, the routed Royalists fled south across the entirety of northwestern Laos, with many of them crossing the Thai border and surrendering to Thai authorities.^[22]^[23] Royalist losses amounted to a third of their maneuver battalions. With such RLA incapability exposed, the Americans concentrated more heavily on training guerrillas. In addition to the Project Momentum effort, a short-lived guerrilla training program mimicking Momentum began on the Bolovens Plateau in southern Laos.^[24]

A month after the Geneva Agreement was signed, the communists swept the Ban Ban area of about 6,000 hill-tribe civilians, mostly Hmong. About 400 communist troops attacked the fleeing children, women, and old men, slaughtering about 1,300 of them.^[25]

By late 1962, it became apparent that the latest neutrality agreement, like the prior 1954 one, was being honored in the breach.^{[citation needed]}

Curtailed support for the Hmong guerrillas continued until the Kennedy administration ended in November 1963, although more CIA workers were being trained in Arizona. Lyndon Baines Johnson would escalate support during his presidency.^[26]

In November 1963, Phoumi Nosavan again launched a Royal Lao Army offensive despite American disapproval. Allying his regulars with Forces Armee Neutralistes, he directed an attack aimed at blocking the communists invasion route through the Nape Pass from Vietnam onto the Nakay Plateau in Laos in early December 1963. Although the government troops were initially successful, the communists turned the tables on the Royalists and severely beat them. The RLA's lost its maneuver battalions, including its two crack paratrooper battalions. By 1 February 1964, the Communists occupied the entire Nakay Plateau.^[27]

The introduction of Thai mercenaries edit

Summer of 1964 saw another attempted Royalist offensive. Operation Triangle involved Royalist and Neutralist regulars, as well as Royalist volunteers and three companies of Hmong guerrillas. Operation Triangle was approved by President Johnson, and overseen by his subordinates in the White House. Its objective was two-fold: the capture of the strategic Sala Phou Khoun highway junction of Routes 7 and 13, and acquisition of the forward airfield at Muang Soui.^[28]

The attack was intended as a morale booster for the Royal Lao Army. For the first time, Royalist reinforcements were flown into Vang Pao's Military Region 2 from elsewhere in Laos. A close air support system coordinated air strikes with the ground assault. Thai artillerymen on loan through the new Unity program fired support. For the first time, the Royalists advance was preceded by preliminary air and artillery bombardment. When the RLA regulars were poised on the brink of victory, the Hmong guerrillas swooped in and captured Sala Phou Khoun, dampening RLA morale. However, the communists clung to the heights overlooking the Muang Soui airstrip.^[28]

Operation Triangle was overshadowed by the Tonkin Gulf Incident, which irrevocably shifted the focus of America's Southeast Asia operations to Vietnam.^[28]

Nevertheless, the Secret Army had progressed to the point that Hmong instructors were training fresh contingents of Hmong guerrillas behind enemy lines. By early 1965, these guerrilla strongholds dappled the map north of the Nam Bac Valley all the way to Phong Saly Province.^[29]

Operation Barrel Roll edit

In December 1964, Ambassador William H. Sullivan approved U.S. Air Force tactical air support for L'Armee Clandestine under the code name Operation Barrel Roll. This air support to the Hmong guerrillas would last as long as their army of irregulars.^[30]^[31]

First Battle of Nakhang edit

16 - 19 February 1966

As early as 1964, Hmong General Vang Pao established a number of guerrilla bases around the Nakhang airfield, using it to import needed materiel for his burgeoning "Secret Army". At about the time the United States began Operation Rolling Thunder, Nakhang's activities surged.^[32]

Its northerly location and its airfield made Nakhang a menace to the Communist-held Route 6 supply line.^[33] The U.S. Air Force (USAF) stationed its Jolly Green Giants there, using it as a forward base for combat search and rescue of American air crews. The airstrip, with 700 unpaved meters of runway, could accept Air America C-123 Provider cargo craft, as well as smaller airplanes. Nakhang's vital forward location near the Communist stronghold of Houaphanh Province served as an air bridge for stocking the airfield and resupplying Royalist guerrillas.^[34]

There were a series of skirmishes between the sides for possession of the outlying positions surrounding Nakhang throughout 1964 and 1965. In July 1965, Nakhang was the launching point for a successful offensive against Communist forces in the vicinity.^[32] By late November, Vang Pao had five weak Royal Lao Army (RLA) battalions to defend the entire north of Military Region 2. He reinforced them by posting three picket lines of Auto Defense Choc (ADC) skirmishers to screen any PAVN approaches. The five battalions plus the ADC militia troops numbered 5,120 strong. Another 5,500 Auto-Defense Ordinaire home guards were alerted in villages throughout the region.^[35]

Nevertheless, at 2330 hours on 16 February 1966, 1,000 North Vietnamese infantry besieged Nakhang. As the attack force settled in to mortar and assault the airfield, the Royalists fought back with howitzers, tactical air strikes, and AC-47 Spooky fire missions. The communists struck at 0430 hours 18 February, closing within 25 meters of defending Royalists. Vang Pao flew in, and was wounded. His medical evacuation demoralized the Hmong defenders. In a desperate attempt to stave off defeat, napalm was used for the first time in Laos. Nevertheless, by 1610 hours, the Royalists had departed. To prevent captured equipment being used by the communists, air strikes bombed, strafed, and rocketed the site.^[36]^[37] Royalist casualties were few, as the guerrillas had withdrawn timely. The Hmong guerrillas had served to attract the concentration of Communist troops, making them a worthwhile target for tactical air power.^[38] The American conclusion was that the PAVN had had suffered so severely they had actually lost the battle. They did not occupy the site until 21 February.^[38]

Second Battle of Na Khang edit

As soon as Vang Pao returned to duty in early May 1966, he directed his guerrillas to retake Nakhang. One guerrilla column attacked the airfield while another was helilifted to a hilltop position overlooking the battle. On 23 May, the communists retreated. Caught leaving over open ground, they took extensive casualties from tactical air support. The Secret Army troops retook Nakhang on 25 May 1966. They were then shuttled outward to reoccupy other Lima Sites that had fallen to the communists. As the Vietnamese receded into their own nation, the guerrillas extended their reach to the Lao/Vietnamese boundary.^[39]^[40]

However, by this time, the Vietnamese forces opposed to the Secret Army had been ramped up to 50,000 troops. There were scarcely 20,000 Hmong guerrillas opposing them. Nevertheless, the guerrillas' advances encouraged the Royalists to garrison the Nam Bac Valley in August 1966, leading to the siege at Nam Bac.^[41]

Battle of Nam Bac edit

RESEARCH: LAIR'S UNWILLINGNESS TO COMMIT HMONG TO NAM BAC edit

In August 1966, the Royal Lao Army moved a regiment into the Nam Bac Valley via helicopter. There was little opposition. The two Pathet Lao companies occupying the valley fled.^[42]^[43]

Bill Lair predicted that because Nam Bac was more accessible to North Vietnam than to Luang Prabang, the Communists could more readily supply and reinforce their troops than the Royalists, and so it proved. Lair also noted the need for RLA control of the airstrip needed for Nam Bac's resupply because it was in a valley within artillery range of surrounding high ground.^[44]

Although it took until 14 January 1968 for the final RLA defeat at Nam Bac, the resulting debacle was even worse than the defeats at Luang Nam Tha or Lak Sao. Five of the RLA's 11 regiments were destroyed. In the wake of the defeat, the RLA mustered only 1,400 survivors from the 7,500 troops committed. Lost to the Communists were seven RLA howitzers, 49 recoilless rifles, 52 mortars, and a huge bounty of small arms and munitions.^[45] With the RLA reduced to a defensive force, the Secret Army (Note here for MRIII guerrillas) became the nation's offensive force. (check for validity of this claim)^{[citation needed]}

Third Battle of Na Khang edit

A force of 600 to 800 communist troops infiltrated the vicinity of Nakhang on the night of 5/6 January 1967. Counting on an overcast ceiling of 500 meters to prohibit air support for the Royalists, the communists attacked. They breached the guerrillas' northern perimeter at 0630 hours.^[46]

Despite the low hanging cloud cover spiked by mountain peaks, the U.S. Air Force diverted tactical air support to the beleaguered garrison. Working dangerously low, the tactical aircraft sustained heavy battle damage while heroically repelling the attackers.^[47]

Battle of Lima Site 85 edit

10 - 11 March 1968

The U.S. Air Force began covert emplacement of TACAN and other flight guidance radar in Laos during 1966. Of these, Lima Site 85 (LS 85) was considered the most important because of its nearness to potential bombing targets in the vicinity of Hanoi. By November 1967, this covert installation was directing 55% of all sorties into North Vietnam.^{[citation needed]}

American Special Forces were originally considered to defend the site; however, it was thought their presence would be too conspicuous. Instead, Hmong forces were detailed to man fixed positions to protect Lima Site 85.^[48] The positions had been sited to repel attacks wherever cliffs did not prevent a Communist attack. Unfortunately for Lima Site 85, the successful Vietnamese attack of 11 March 1968 swarmed right up one of those "impassable" cliffs.^{[citation needed]}

Operation Pigfat edit

26 January 1968 - 7 January 1969

Fourth Battle of Na Khang edit

28 February 1969
As 1968 ended, the USAF cleared fire lanes around Nakhang, using defoliant. Constant air strikes ringed the installation. However, by 28 February 1969, elephant grass had grown back thickly enough to shelter an attacking regiment of communists. Although the initial communist assault was repelled, the guerrillas, faced by overwhelming force, began to evacuate.^[49]^[50]

Communist tactics thus far had depended on a horseshoe-shaped containment of friendly positions, leaving an open side for withdrawal. On 2 March, the communist tactics changed; the Royalist attempt to break out slammed into a complete encirclement of Nakhang. The Royalists suffered horrendous casualties; the least damaged of their five battalions suffered 50 percent casualties.^[49]

Kou Kiet (Operation About Face) edit

6 August - 30 September 1969

Notes edit

^ Castle, p. 79.
^ Castle, pp. 9-12.
^ Castle, p. 37.
^ Conboy, Morrison, pp. 32–33.
^ Warner, pp. 26–29, 33–34, 45.
^ ^a ^b ^c Conboy, Morrison, pp. 61–66.
^ Hamilton-Merritt, p. 92.
^ Warner, p. 46.
^ Warner, pp. 45–47.
^ Warner, p. 48.
^ Warner, pp. 51-52.
^ Conboy, Morrison, pp. 63 - 65.
^ Warner, p. 65.
^ Warner, pp. 66 - 67.
^ Warner, p. 69.
^ Hamilton-Merritt, p. 146.
^ Castle, p. 79.
^ Warner, p. 70.
^ Castle, pp. 42–43.
^ Warner, pp. 73–75.
^ Hamilton-Merritt, pp. 116–117.
^ Conboy, Morrison, pp. 72–73.
^ Stuart-Fox, p. 24.
^ Conboy, Morrison, p. 85.
^ Hamilton-Merritt, pp. 120–121.
^ Hamilton-Merritt, p. 120.
^ Conboy, Morrison, pp. 100–102.
^ ^a ^b ^c Warner, pp. 139–141.
^ Conboy, Morrison, p. 133.
^ Castle, pp. 88–89.
^ Warner, p. 120.
^ ^a ^b Conboy, Morrison, pp. 127–131.
^ Porter (1966), p. 1.
^ Ahern, p. 235.
^ Conboy, Morrison, p. 131.
^ Conboy, Morrison, p. 152.
^ Porter (1966), pp. 7–10.
^ ^a ^b Porter (1966), p. 10.
^ Conboy, Morrison, pp. 154–155.
^ Porter (1967), p. 1.
^ Hamilton-Merritt, p. 147.
^ Warner, p. 208.
^ Castle, p. 81.
^ Warner, pp. 208–210.
^ Conboy, Morrison, pp. 183–187, 199.
^ Porter (1967), pp. 2–4.
^ Porter (1967), pp. 3–10.
^ Castle, 87-88.
^ ^a ^b Conboy, Morrison, p. 209.
^ Ahern, p. 312.

References edit

Ahern, Thomas L. Jr. (2006), Undercover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos. Center for the Study of Intelligence. Classified control no. C05303949.
Castle, Timothy N. (1993). At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government 1955–1975. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-07977-X.
Conboy, Kenneth and James Morrison (1995). Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos. Paladin Press. ISBN 0-87364-825-0.
Hamilton-Merritt, Jane (1993). Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the SECRET WARS for LAOS, 1942–1992. Indiana University Press. ISBN 0-253-32731-8.
Porter, Melvin F. (1966). PROJECT CHECO REPORT THE DEFENSE OF LIMA SITE 36 25 MAY 1966. [1] HQ PACAF Tactical Evaluation Center. DOPEC-66-03504.
Porter, Melvin F. (1967). PROJECT CHECO REPORT SECOND DEFENSE OF LIMA SITE 36 28 April 1967. HQ PACAF Directorate, Tactical Evaluation. Reprinted (1997) by Dailey Book Service. ASIN: B0006QY5VS.
Stuart-Fox, Martin (2008) Historical Dictionary of Laos. Scarecrow Press. ISBN 0810864118, ISBN 9780810864115.
Warner, Roger (1995). Back Fire: The CIA's Secret War in Laos and Its Link to the War in Vietnam. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-68480-292-9, ISBN 978-06848-0292-3.

User talk:Georgejdorner/User page: Work Area 6

Contents