Siege of Villarrica
Part of Arauco War

Map of the ancient town of Villarrica, according to the Chilean scholar Tomás Guevara.
DateFirst months of 1599 - 7 February 1602
Location39°17′0″S 72°14′0″W / 39.28333°S 72.23333°W / -39.28333; -72.23333
Result Mapuche-Huilliche victory
Belligerents

Spain Spanish Empire

Mapuche-Huilliche tribes
Commanders and leaders
Spain Rodrigo de
Bastidas Executed
Spain Marcos Chavari (POW)
Spain Juan Beltrán 
Curimanque 
Cuminaguel
Pelantaro
Anganamón
Camiñancu
Diego
and other
Strength
600 between Spanish and Indian auxiliaries Forces variable in time, but much higher

The Siege of Villarrica was a prolonged siege that took place between the first months of 1599 and 7 February 1602, during the Arauco War. The Spanish settlers of the city of Villarrica and some indigenous auxiliaries were besieged by superior forces of the Mapuche-Huilliche tribes, encouraged by the uprising of 1598 in all of Araucanía, which endangered the entire south of the Captaincy General of Chile. For three years the defenders of Villarrica resisted, without receiving any reinforcement, with innumerable deprivations and continuous fights.[1] Villarrica was completely destroyed and very few Spaniards survived the event as captives of the natives, subsequently obtaining their liberation.

Chilean historiography considers it one of the most epic and tragic events of the war and the history of Chile.[1][2] The Spanish religious Tirso de Molina, who was a contemporary of the time, described Villarrica as «The Numantia of the Indies».[3]

Background

edit

Villarrica city

edit
 
Monument to the Spanish foundation of Villarrica.

Villarrica's history dates back to its foundation by the Spanish in 1552,[4] during Pedro de Valdivia's campaigns to conquer Araucanía, in the early years of the Arauco War. As the city was located at the bottom of the Mapuche territory, it went through several difficult times. Mapuche uprising of 1553 caused its depopulation and destruction, but in 1555 it was refounded by the Spaniards, after appeasing the area.[4] In 1575, an earthquake that affected the region, destroyed it almost completely, and was also threatened by the natives.[4]

After these events, the Villarrica began to grow in population and infrastructure.[5] Villarrica eventually became an important city for the Spanish due to the fertile valley it had to develop agriculture and livestock, the rich gold mines and land communications with Buenos Aires, which at that time was more feasible than the route of the Strait of Magellan.[6][7]

Mapuche uprising of 1598

edit
 
Portrait of Martín García Óñez de Loyola, royal governor of Chile.

On 23 December 1598, Mapuche warriors led by Pelantaro ambushed and annihilated a Spanish column at the Battle of Curalaba.[8] This Spanish force was led by the royal governor of Chile, Martín García Óñez de Loyola, who died in the battle, which caused a general uprising among the Mapuche-Huilliche in the south of the Captaincy General of Chile. This Spanish disaster occurred in a period of war in which the Spanish military and economic situation in Chile was precarious, which made it difficult to preserve the towns of the south in the face of the growing Mapuche threat, and without the continued support of the Viceroyalty of Peru and the Spanish Crown.[A] On the contrary, the Mapuche had strengthened their ability to wage war with new weapons and better tactics.[B] Added to this was the wrong strategy of Óñez de Loyola during his government to appease the indigenous rebels by peaceful means, who accepted the governor's peace but secretly prepared the uprising that finally ended his life.[12]

Beginning in 1599, the Spanish began to be attacked everywhere, with the aggravating factor of being scattered in various cities and forts where they could not communicate with each other because they were in the middle of a wooded and hostile territory.[13] The Mapuche uprising had spread rapidly throughout the region, from the Maule River to Osorno.[14] The Spanish were forced to lock themselves up and defend the place where they were, although on more than one occasion, they had to abandon indefensible positions.[13] The threatened cities were Angol, Concepción, Chillán, Santa Cruz, La Imperial, Villarrica, Arauco, Valdivía and Osorno, all of whom had few military resources to successfully face the attack of the natives.[15][C]

Prelude

edit
 
Current photograph showing the geography around Villarrica, where you can see the lake and volcano of the same name.

Situation of Villarrica

edit

As in other Spanish cities, in Villarrica the surrounding peaceful natives began to turn hostile. Due to its topographic situation, Villarrica was in greater danger than other Spanish cities. Located at the foot of the Andes mountain range, on the shores of the lake of the same name, it was completely isolated from other cities and far from the coast, making communication difficult and the possibility of helping the city.[18] One possibility for the settlers was to escape to the Governorate of the Río de la Plata through an easy passage through the mountain range, although there was a fear of being caught along the way by the native rebels.[19]

At the time of these events, Villarrica was under Captain Rodrigo de Bastidas, and his subordinates were Marcos Chavari and Juan Beltrán, the latter mulatto born in La Imperial.[20] Bastidas, aware of Loyola's death and the indigenous rebellion, began to prepare for defense. He gathered in Villarrica all the Spaniards who were scattered in the estancias, forbidding them to go out, stored food and improved the defenses of the fort that protected the city.[21][18] He also tried to ask for help from Loyola's successor, Pedro de Viscarra, but all roads were closed by indigenous rebels.[21]

Under these circumstances, three soldiers arrived in Villarrica, who had been saved from a disastrous defeat suffered by a Spanish detachment from La Imperial, making it clear to Bastidas the seriousness of the situation.[21][D]

Curimanque conspiracy

edit

Siege

edit

First attacks and destruction

edit

Spanish resistance and miseries

edit

Failed aid

edit

Final attack

edit

Aftermath

edit

Contemporary works on the siege

edit

In the culture

edit

See also

edit

Notes

edit
  1. ^ In Chile there was a shortage of resources and soldiers for the war, which was also not adequately addressed by the Viceroy of Peru and the Spanish monarch.[9] The prolongation of the war, the poverty of the treasure and the relaxation of the military discipline had demoralized the troops and produced a deficient military administration.[10] The recruits that could be brought from the Viceroyalty of Peru did not turn out to be of better quality either.[9]
  2. ^ They had improved their forces and weapons, leaving behind pitched battles for guerrilla tactics, proving to be competent in this new way of waging war. With each surprise attack they obtained a new quantity of military elements, especially horses, until they had a larger and better cavalry than the Spanish.[11]
  3. ^ According to Barros Arana, the military garrisons of some of the towns would have been sufficient to successfully defend them, had they not been found demoralized. Furthermore, these garrisons had little weaponry and ammunition, although they owned abundant livestock for their livelihood.[16] But it should be noted that, in the midst of Spanish discouragement, there was no shortage of commanders determined to carry out strong resistance to the uprising of the natives, obtaining partial successes.[17]
  4. ^ The corregidor of La Imperial, Andrés Valiente, left that city with a contingent of 40 soldiers chosen to reestablish Fort Boroa. But on 8 April 1599, they were annihilated by a superior force of Mapuche rebels. Only five Spaniards were saved, of which two managed to return to La Imperial and three escaped to distant Villarrica.[22]

References

edit
  1. ^ a b Ferrando Keun 2012, p. 196.
  2. ^ Barros Arana 2000, p. 284.
  3. ^ González Díaz, Guillermo (1986). Villa Rica: historia inédita (in Spanish). Temuco, Chile: Imprenta Telstar. p. 190.
  4. ^ a b c Estado Mayor General del Ejército 1980, p. 217.
  5. ^ Guarda 1978, pp. 47–48.
  6. ^ Ferrando Keun 2012, p. 178.
  7. ^ Errázuriz 1881, p. 247.
  8. ^ Ferrando Keun 2012, p. 172.
  9. ^ a b Estado Mayor General del Ejército 1980, p. 52.
  10. ^ Barros Arana 2000, p. 145.
  11. ^ Estado Mayor General del Ejército 1980, pp. 52–53.
  12. ^ Estado Mayor General del Ejército 1980, pp. 53–54.
  13. ^ a b Estado Mayor General del Ejército 1980, p. 54.
  14. ^ Barros Arana 2000, p. 183.
  15. ^ Lara 1889, pp. 277–278.
  16. ^ Barros Arana 2000, p. 184.
  17. ^ Barros Arana 2000, p. 185.
  18. ^ a b Lara 1889, p. 300.
  19. ^ Lara 1889, p. 301.
  20. ^ Errázuriz 1881, p. 248.
  21. ^ a b c Errázuriz 1881, p. 249.
  22. ^ Barros Arana 2000, p. 189.

Bibliography

edit