About me edit

I love [Arrested Development (TV series). It tells many funny jokes about the Iraq War.

I am a Libra (astrology).

My Myers–Briggs Type Indicator is ENFP.

I am a brunette. I also have Ear.

I also love Cheesecake.


Article evaluation edit

I read an article entitled "Collective action." Overall, I thought the article contained relevant information, although some sections could definitely be expanded on, especially those that are most relevant to political theory.

The article defines collective action as "action taken together by a group of people whose goal is to enhance their status and achieve a common objective." The article then goes on to detail some of the reasons people participate in collective action, such as a shared social identity or a shared perception of injustice. Afterwards, the article touches on some of the economic applications of collective action, the most important being the collective action problem.

After everything we have learned in class about the collective action problem, I found many ways that this section could be expanded on, such as including more real-world instances of collective action problems and mentioning the origin of the concept. The section also offers solutions to the collective action problem but does not explain how these solutions, some of which appear to contradict each other (the article mentions both "government regulation" and "privatisation"), would help to mitigate certain collective action problems that we see in the world today.

Moreover, the "In philosophy" section mentions many modern interpretations of collective action but does not mention anything abut Thomas Hobbes, whose ideas in Leviathan brought the idea of collective action problems to public attention. I also feel that this section could be divided up into smaller subsections, as it is all one chunk of text currently. Perhaps once more information is added about some of the earlier theorists on collective action, the section could be divided into earlier and later interpretations of the concept.

The Talk page of the article shows that four suggestions have been made as to how the article could be improved. The article has not been rated, though it is a part of both WikiProject Politics and WikiProject Sociology.

In examining the sources used, there appears to be a healthy mix of both older and more recent sources, and the ones that are linked to websites all have functional links. I skimmed through a few of the articles provided, and they appear to be reputable and unbiased accounts of collective action.

Overall, I thought the article was impartial and provided a fair amount of information on the topic at hand, but could have expanded on a few key concepts such as the collective action problem, something that is particularly relevant to this class.

Adding to an article edit

In 1997, Anita Borg, then a senior researcher at Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) complained that women "run into subtle sexism every day." At the time only one woman, Carol Bartz of Autodesk, was a chief executive officer (CEO) among the largest Silicon Valley technology companies, and only 5.6% of the area's 1,686 major tech firms were run by women. It was even harder for female entrepreneurs. Of the $33.5 billion in venture capital invested in tech from 1991 through the second quarter of 1996, only 1.6% went to companies launched or headed by women.[1]

The 2015 Crunchies award event, organized by Silicon Valley tech industry blogs, was criticized for its use of derogatory language towards women.[2]

Multiple gender harassment and discrimination lawsuits in Silicon Valley have received media attention. One of the most widely reported was Pao v. Kleiner Perkins, a discrimination lawsuit against Kleiner Perkins by then Reddit interim CEO Ellen Pao, which went to trial in 2015.[3][4] Pao's lawsuit, which alleged that Kleiner Perkins indulged in double standards and denied her the senior partner position, resulted in a verdict for the defendant. Three jurors cited Pao's "increasingly negative performance reviews" as the primary reason.[5]

On September 20, 2016, Tesla employee AJ Vandermayden filed a lawsuit against her company alleging sex discrimination, retaliation, and other workplace violations. Vandermayden brought about this lawsuit after learning her salary was lower than those of the eight other employees, all male, with whom she worked most closely, despite the fact that some of them had just finished college. She was also subjected to a much harsher standard in order to receive a promotion and pay raise that many of her male colleagues had received simply for working at the company for a certain period of time.[6]

Copied from Sexism in the technology industry

Collective action problem edit

A collective action problem is a situation in which all individuals would be better off cooperating but fail to do so because of conflicting interests between individuals that discourage joint action.[7] The collective action problem has been addressed in political philosophy for centuries, but was most clearly established in 1965 in Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action. The collective action problem can be observed today in many areas of study, and is particularly relevant to economic concepts such as game theory and the free-rider problem that results from the provision of public goods. Additionally, the collective problem can be applied to numerous public policy concerns that countries across the world currently face.

Prominent theorists edit

Early thought edit

Although he never used the words "collective action problem," Thomas Hobbes was an early philosopher on the topic of human cooperation. Hobbes believed that people act purely out of self-interest, writing in Leviathan in 1651 that "if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies."[8] Hobbes believed that the state of nature consists of a perpetual war between people with conflicting interests, causing people to quarrel and seek personal power even in situations where cooperation would be mutually beneficial for both parties. Through his interpretation of humans in the state of nature as selfish and quick to engage in conflict, Hobbes's philosophy laid the foundation for what is now referred to as the collective action problem.

David Hume provided another early, more well-known interpretation of what is now called the collective action problem in his 1738 book A Treatise of Human Nature. Hume characterizes a collective action problem through his depiction of neighbors agreeing to drain a meadow:

Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common; because it is easy for them to know each others mind; and each must perceive, that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is, the abandoning the whole project. But it is very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons should agree in any such action; it being difficult for them to concert so complicated a design, and still more difficult for them to execute it; while each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expence, and would lay the whole burden on others.[9]

In this passage, Hume establishes the basis for the collective action problem. In a situation in which a thousand people are expected to work together to achieve a common goal, individuals will be likely to free ride, as they assume that each of the other members of the team will put in enough effort to achieve said goal. In smaller groups, the impact one individual has is much greater, so individuals will be less inclined to free ride.

Modern thought edit

The most prominent modern interpretation of the collective action problem can be found in Mancur Olson's 1965 book The Logic of Collective Action.[10] In it, he addressed the accepted belief at the time by sociologists and political scientists that groups were necessary to further the interests of their members. Olson argued that individual rationality does not necessarily result in group rationality, as members of a group may have conflicting interests that do not represent the best interests of the overall group.

Olson further argued that in the case of a pure public good that is both nonrival and nonexcludable, one contributor tends to reduce their contribution to the public good as others contribute more. Additionally, Olson emphasized the tendency of individuals to pursue economic interests that would be beneficial to themselves and not necessarily the overall public. This contrasts with Adam Smith's theory of the "invisible hand" of the market, where individuals pursuing their own interests should theoretically result in the collective well-being of the overall market.[10]

Olson's book established the collective action problem as one of the most troubling dilemmas in social science, leaving a profound impression on present-day discussions of human behavior and its relationship with governmental policy.

In economics edit

Public goods edit

Public goods are goods that are nonrival and nonexcludable. A good is said to be nonrival if its consumption by one consumer does not in any way impact its consumption by another consumer. Additionally, a good is said to be nonexcludable if those who do not pay for the good cannot be kept from enjoying the benefits of the good.[11] The nonexcludability aspect of public goods is where one facet of the collective action problem, known as the free-rider problem, comes into play. For instance, a company could put on a fireworks display and charge an admittance price of $10, but if community members could all view the fireworks display from their homes, most would choose not to pay the admittance fee. Thus, the majority of individuals would choose to free ride, discouraging the company from putting on another fireworks show in the future. Even though the fireworks display was surely beneficial to each of the individuals, they relied on those paying the admittance fee to finance the show. If everybody had assumed this position, however, the company putting on the show would not have been able to procure the funds necessary to buy the fireworks that provided enjoyment for so many individuals. This situation is indicative of a collective action problem because the individual incentive to free ride conflicts with the collective desire of the group to pay for a fireworks show for all to enjoy.[11]

Pure public goods include services such as national defense and public parks that are usually provided by governments using taxpayer funds.[11] In return for their tax contribution, taxpayers enjoy the benefits of these public goods. In developing countries where funding for public projects is scare, however, it often falls on communities to compete for resources and finance projects that benefit the collective group.[12] The ability of communities to successfully contribute to public welfare depends on the size of the group, the power or influence of group members, the tastes and preferences of individuals within the group, and the distribution of benefits among group members. When a group is too large or the benefits of collective action are not tangible to individual members, the collective action problem results in a lack of cooperation that makes the provision of public goods difficult.[12]

Game theory edit

 
This chart illustrates the prisoner's dilemma, one of the most famous examples of game theory.

Game theory is one of the principle components of economic theory. It addresses the way individuals allocate scarce resources and how scarcity drives human interaction.[13] One of the most famous examples of game theory is the prisoner's dilemma. The classical prisoner's dilemma model consists of two players who are accused of a crime. If Player A decides to betray Player B, Player A will receive no prison time while Player B receives a substantial prison sentence, and vice versa. If both players choose to keep quiet about the crime, they will both receive reduced prison sentences, and if both players turn the other in, they will each receive more substantial sentences. It would appear in this situation that each player should choose to stay quiet so that both will receive reduced sentences. In actuality, however, players who are unable to communicate will both choose to betray each other, as they each have an individual incentive to do so in order to receive a commuted sentence.[14]

The prisoner's dilemma model is crucial to understanding the collective problem because it illustrates the consequences of individual interests that conflict with the interests of the group. In simple models such as this one, the problem would have been solved had the two prisoners been able to communicate. In more complex real world situations involving numerous individuals, however, the collective action problem often prevents groups from making decisions that are of collective economic interest.[15]

In politics edit

Voting edit

Scholars estimate that, even in a battleground state, there is only a one in ten million chance that one vote could sway the outcome of a United States presidential election.[16] This statistic may discourage individuals from exercising their democratic right to vote, as they believe they could not possibly have an impact on the results of an election. If everybody adopted this view and decided not to vote, however, democracy would collapse. This situation results in a collective action problem, as any single individual is incentivized to choose to stay home from the polls since their vote is very unlikely to make a real difference in the outcome of an election.

Despite high levels of political apathy in the United States, however, this collective action problem does not decrease voter turnout as much as some political scientists might expect.[17] It turns out that most Americans believe their political efficacy to be higher than it actually is, stopping millions of Americans from believing their vote does not matter and staying home from the polls. Thus, it appears collective action problems can be resolved not just by tangible benefits to individuals participating in group action, but by a mere belief that collective action will also lead to individual benefits.

Environmental policy edit

Environmental problems such as climate change, biodiversity loss, and waste accumulation can be described as collective action problems.[18] Since these issues are connected to the everyday actions of vast numbers of people, vast numbers of people are also required to mitigate the effects of these environmental problems. Without governmental regulation, however, individual people or businesses are unlikely to take the actions necessary to reduce carbon emissions or cut back on usage of non-renewable resources, as these people and businesses are incentivized to choose the easier and cheaper option, which often differs from the environmentally-friendly option that would benefit the health of the planet.[18]

Individual self interest has led to over half of Americans believing that government regulation of businesses does more harm than good. Yet, when the same Americans are asked about specific regulations such as standards for food and water quality, most are satisfied with the laws currently in place or favor even more strident regulations.[19] This illustrates the way the collective problem hinders group action on environmental issues: when an individual is directly affected by an issue such as food and water quality, they will favor regulations, but when an individual cannot see a great impact from their personal carbon emissions or waste accumulation, they will generally tend to disagree with laws that encourage them to cut back on environmentally-harmful activities.

  1. ^ Hamm, Steve (August 25, 1997). "Why Women Are So Invisible". Business Week. Bloomberg LP. Archived from the original on January 17, 1999.
  2. ^ Tiku, Nitasha (2015-02-09). "Sexism and consequences at TechCrunch's annual award show". The Verge. Retrieved 2015-03-21.
  3. ^ Rogers, Kaleigh (2015-03-10). "Why Ellen Pao's Gender Discrimination Suit Matters". Motherboard. Retrieved 2015-03-21.
  4. ^ "Sexual Harassment News". VentureBeat. Retrieved 2015-03-21.
  5. ^ Levine, Dan; Christie, Jim (2015-04-23). "Kleiner Perkins seeks almost $1mln in costs in Pao case". Reuters. Retrieved 2015-11-09.
  6. ^ Kolhatkar, Sheelah (2017-11-13). "The Disrupters". The New Yorker. ISSN 0028-792X. Retrieved 2018-03-05.
  7. ^ Brown, Garrett; McLean, Iain; McMillan, Alistair, eds. (2018). "Collective action problem - Oxford Reference". doi:10.1093/acref/9780199670840.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-967084-0. Retrieved 2018-04-11.
  8. ^ Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan.
  9. ^ Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature.
  10. ^ a b Sandler, Todd (2015-09-01). "Collective action: fifty years later". Public Choice. 164 (3–4): 195–216. doi:10.1007/s11127-015-0252-0. ISSN 0048-5829. S2CID 153361865.
  11. ^ a b c "Public Goods: The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics | Library of Economics and Liberty". www.econlib.org. Retrieved 2018-04-18.
  12. ^ a b Banerjee, Abhijit (September 2006). "Public Action for Public Goods".
  13. ^ "What is Game Theory?". levine.sscnet.ucla.edu. Retrieved 2018-04-18.
  14. ^ "Game theory II: Prisoner's dilemma | Policonomics". policonomics.com. Retrieved 2018-04-18.
  15. ^ "The Collective Action Problem | GEOG 30N: Geographic Perspectives on Sustainability and Human-Environment Systems, 2011". www.e-education.psu.edu. Retrieved 2018-04-18.
  16. ^ "Voting matters even if your vote doesn't: A collective action dilemma". Princeton University Press Blog. 2012-11-05. Retrieved 2018-04-18.
  17. ^ Kanazawa, Satoshi (2000). "A New Solution to the Collective Action Problem: The Paradox of Voter Turnout". American Sociological Review. 65 (3): 433–442. doi:10.2307/2657465. JSTOR 2657465.
  18. ^ a b Duit, Andreas (2011-12-01). "Patterns of Environmental Collective Action: Some Cross-National Findings". Political Studies. 59 (4): 900–920. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00858.x. ISSN 1467-9248. S2CID 142706143.
  19. ^ "A Majority Says that Government Regulation of Business Does More Harm than Good". Pew Research Center. 2012-03-07. Retrieved 2018-04-18.