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Another arbitrary break

I Carlo Veldema hereby do declare that the entry is valid. Not in bias by either friendship to Syamsu, or influence of liquor. The entry is valid, the reference to Ockham is indeed valid. Ockham insists on faith as a way of knowing what does the job of deciding (the soul) thereby all qualifications are met in the reference to Ockham. A duality of substance, soul and body A duality of a way of "knowing", faith and measurement. Furthermore that faith requires a choice in the way Ockham talks about is obvious, as he contrasts it with evidence. --Carloveldema (talk) 14:45, 31 March 2012 (UTC)

I'm afraid it does no good for you to just declare that it is valid, and re-insert the same text that has been repeatedly rejected William M. Connolley (talk) 15:04, 31 March 2012 (UTC)

Sorry is it your opinion that the reference to Ockham is not valid, because it is not valid? You must make argument why the reference is not valid. Make argument that "faith" in the reference to Ockham is not rightly interpreted as involving a choice. --Carloveldema (talk) 15:10, 31 March 2012 (UTC)

Please see all the preceeding discussion, which covers all these issues William M. Connolley (talk) 15:19, 31 March 2012 (UTC)

Pfhorrest, Syamsu and me have affirmed the citation of Ockham is valid to the point at issue. Pforrest has some additional minor points about the entry. All people who have said the citation is not valid have refused to engage in argument about the citation. The citation is found valid if Ockham establishes a duality of subjetivity and objectivity in respect to the duality of soul and body.--Carloveldema (talk) 23:11, 31 March 2012 (UTC)

I have said that the Ockham passage quoted supports something, but that that something is not what keeps getting added to the article, and that that something is not relevant to the article anyway.

Imagine a conversation, here:

1. User: Hey Wiki, tell me something about Free Will.
2. Wiki: William of Ockham believes that the agent of free will can only be known about by faith, which is a practical exercise of free will. Look, here's a quote...
3. User: That quote doesn't say anything about free will, it only says something about souls.
4. Wiki: Ok, well Ockham believes that souls can only be known about by faith.
5. User: O....k, that's an interesting thing about what someone believes about souls, but I didn't ask about souls, I asked about free will.
6. Wiki: Some people believe that the soul is what gives people free will.
7. User: Oh ok, that's an interesting thing about free will.
8. Wiki: And Ockham believes that souls can only be known about by faith...
9. User: Alright, alright, a lot of people believe a lot of things about souls, I'm sure. If I'm curious about souls, I'll ask. Just tell me about free will for now.
10. Wiki: But some people believe that the soul is what gives people free will...
11. User: You said that already.
12. Wiki: And it's obviously true!
13. User: It's not like you to say something like that, Wiki.
14. Wiki: And Ockham believes that it can only be known about by faith...
15. User: Do you have a point about free will to make here?
16. Wiki: That the agent of free will can only be known about by faith, which is a practical exercise of free will. Look, here's a quote...
17. User: We've had this conversation already.

Relevancy is not a "minor point". I'm tired of being too nice about this, when you keep citing me in support of you. Let me be clear: I do not support the addition of this material to this article. It does not say the same thing that its citation would support, and even if it did, that would not be relevant in this article. --Pfhorrest (talk) 01:01, 1 April 2012 (UTC)

go ahead look at the previous discussions. There is only say so that the reference is invalid, not argument--Carloveldema (talk) 16:09, 31 March 2012 (UTC)

Carloveldema has demonstrated free will by making an arbitrary declaration that is not related to anything that occurred previously. His declaration is the cause of itself. It is a first cause. It is not reasonable to ask Carloveldema to make an argument why the reference is not valid. With arbitrariness or freedom, there are no "why"s or "previous discussions."Lestrade (talk) 18:59, 31 March 2012 (UTC)Lestrade

Garamond, Lestrade, Vsmith, Pfhorrest et al. I have done enough to reach consensus, look at the the many pages of argument, many pages already deleted. The arguments are all already present, and further discussion is superfluous. Ockham and Reid, and many other libertarian philosophers treat the agency in a choice as a categorically subjective issue, samelike as beauty is treated like a subjective issue. This is obvious given the quotes. I request that you all desist from any further blocking of this entry.--Syamsu (talk) 20:55, 5 April 2012 (UTC)

You've not persuaded anyone here (excepting your short-lived sock puppet) that your edit is correct, much less valuable. It's not going to stay up. Garamond Lethe (talk) 00:01, 6 April 2012 (UTC)

I continue to maintain that it is obvious in the citation of Ockham that "prove" and "knowing" relevant to the physical, is contrasted with "faith and revelation" relevant to the agency in a choice. It is obvious and the denial of it is based on prejudice. I accuse Garamond, Vsmith, Lestrade, Pfhorrest, Connoley et al. of prejudicial surpression of an opinion they don't like, eventhough it is obviously notable among libertarian philosophers. I request that their accounts are deleted, and that they no longer are allowed to participate on wiki.

To establish that prejudice is at play take a look at a thread on talk.origins, which is where Garamond often posts. That is how free will is talked about there. http://groups.google.com/group/talk.origins/browse_thread/thread/941433749b76fef5/89d0b34b50e2b88c

Here's a very large group of people who are conditioned by school and university to arrive at a conclusion about what exists through evidence. When confronted with an opinion of Ockham that the agency in a choice can only be established as a matter of faith and revelation they react by oppressing the opinion, with meaningless appeals to wiki rules.

The above mentioned people never did try to reach consensus, I am the only one who tried to reach consensus. I also offered argument against my contribution, which is that the more colorful mention of Ockham of "through faith and revelation", is translated by me with the more generic and general "subjectively identified". Nobody addressed this weakness in my entry in rejecting the entry outright, which indicates the rejection is purely based on prejudice.

Evolutionists have a long history of intellectual thuggery of surpressing opposing opinions, notably creationism. No doubt that if wiki existed in the thirties and forties of the last century, it would be full of social darwinism, eugenics and the like. And that should be allowed ofcourse, it reflects the times, it reflected opinons of socalled experts at that time. But wiki makes it a point that when an issue is controversial, that different opinions are reflected. Now the evolutionist experts are at it again, and now the sign of the times is expert opinions like that love and hate can be identified in the brain with an mri brain scan. Eventhough free will is basically irrellevant in evolution theory, the ultra-Darwinist philospher Daniel Dennet much dominates the current wiki on free will with his compatibalist defnition of free will, whereby a thermostat can be said to have free will. Those are the times, and the opposing opinion stemming from the middle ages is that love and hate are relevant to the agency in a choice, and can only be identified subjectively, like beauty is categorically a matter of subjective opinion.

The act of opressing this different opinion violates wiki rules in the most grave manner requiring direct punishment of the perpetrators. I request that Garamond especially, but also Pfhorrest and the rest acknowledge their guilt and express remorse, and accept the punishment of their accounts being deleted, and to be barred from editing wiki indefinitely. --Syamsu (talk) 00:48, 6 April 2012 (UTC)

I'm sorry, I'm really trying to be civil here but I am literally laughing out loud at the above.

Syamsu, you obviously have no idea how Wikipedia works. By definition you cannot have "done enough to reach consensus" when everyone else disagrees with you. It doesn't mean you're wrong, but it means you have not, by any means, reached anything vaguely resembling a consensus. And like it or not, consensus is how Wikipedia operates. Might I suggest a different wiki-based online encyclopedia whose policies you might like better, where certain "facts" are decided ahead of time and editors don't "arrive at a conclusion [...] through evidence" like you so disdain.

Your calls to have other editors' accounts deleted are meaningless and laughable. If anyone is in danger of being banned it is you; you've already suffered several temporary bans and don't seem to have learned anything at all from them, and unless you have a complete change of attitude really soon now, I would not be at all surprised if a permanent one is forthcoming soon.

Your accusation that we "react by oppressing the opinion, with meaningless appeals to wiki rules" followed by your claim that "The act of opressing this different opinion violates wiki rules in the most grave manner requiring direct punishment of the perpetrators" is laughably, mind-bogglingly, bald-facedly hypocritical. Appeal to the rules is against the rules? But only when they are applied against you, I take it, since you're appealing to them now? (In theory... I haven't seen any specific rule you're appealing to).

Your rant about "evolutionism" and talk.origins is completely irrelevant, and that you keep relating that subject to this article betrays not only your own obvious bias, but your tendency to jump from one, perhaps well-supported point to a further, unsupported conclusion, which is the latest point at issue here.

You have been a single purpose account editing almost nothing but this article for over three years. You have shown your obvious bias that entire time, constant disdain for the principles that Wikipedia operates by such as neutrality, consensus, and verifiability, and despite that I have tried, very, very patiently, to tease out what exactly it was you had to contribute to this article and include it in an appropriate way. If you are now so tired of the standards of evidence here being too high that you have decided to screw the rules and edit as disruptively as you have lately, please do yourself and everyone else a favor and go away before you make an even bigger ass of yourself and get permabanned.

Or, better yet, calm down, listen to what people are saying and why they object and address those concerns instead of just repeating that you are obviously right, and maybe, just maybe, you might turn out to have something to contribute to this article after all, or failing that, gasp, maybe what you want to add would be appropriate in a different article. There is an entire encyclopedia here, you know!

--Pfhorrest (talk) 04:25, 6 April 2012 (UTC)

I am not going to address your "concern", after many pages of talking to you, that how the agency in a choice is identified is not relevant to the free will wiki. It is simply a tactic of yours, to drag things out indefinitely by bringing up ridiculous points to an audience of people who don't like the opinion of Ockham entered that some things are categorically established by faith and revelation. Justice is that you are banned. Even when a large group of people are acting against wiki rules to surpress an opinon, they simply must all be banned, and not because they are many be allowed to get away with it. --Syamsu (talk) 08:26, 6 April 2012 (UTC)

You evidently aren't listening closely to what the concerns are, since you clearly do not understand them. The passages you are citing to back up your material say nothing about agency or free will. That is the irrelevancy; if they said anything about "how the agency in a choice is identified", that would be relevant. But they don't. They speak only of how we might know about souls. That some people believe souls are the source of free will is relevant, and already noted. Further information about souls belongs in the article about them. If you had passages supporting something like your earlier contribution, to the extent of "evidence of free will would deny free will", that would be relevant, but that's not what your cited passages say.

I state again, you need several things together to warrant the inclusion of something in the article, among them:

1. It must be clear
2. It must be relevant
3. It must be neutral
4. It must be verifiable

You were, at one point, adding something which met 1, 2, and 3 there, after much back-and-forth with me. It did not meet point 4 yet, but I let it stand anyway pending eventual verification.

Now you have expanded that to something which is not phrased very clearly, relevantly, or neutrally, and others have challenged its inclusion on the grounds of point 4, verifiability. Since you do have cited passages, something is verifiable: but it is not what you keep adding to the article, and what is verifiable, when stated clearly, is not clearly relevant to this article, as outlined above.

Address this: Your quoted passage says "we can have no knowledge of an immaterial soul; nor can we prove its existence philosophically. Instead we must rely on revealed truth and faith" and "Reid staunchly refuses to speculate on the substance of the self,...he describes souls as beings of a quite different Nature than material bodies". How do those serve to support any statement about free will?

If you continue to staunchly refuse to address other editor's concerns and flagrantly edit war after several previous warnings, I'm going to have to call a WP:RFC/U about you. If you want the rest of us banned so badly, maybe you should call one of your own, but beware the attention it will bring on yourself.

--Pfhorrest (talk) 09:24, 6 April 2012 (UTC)

The entry:Accounts of libertarianism subdivide into non-physical theories and physical or naturalistic theories. Non-physical theories hold that the events in the brain that lead to the performance of actions do not have an entirely physical explanation, which requires that the world is not closed under physics. Such interactionist dualists believe that some non-physical mind, will, or soul overrides physical causality. In the dual categories the physical is established to exist by objective measurement, and the non-physical agency is identified through subjective opinion, requiring a choice on the part of the observer (samelike beauty is categoricaly a matter of subjective opinion).

Dualism The agency in a choice, such as love, hate, God, is subjectively identified resulting in an opinion. What is chosen, such as the body, is objectively measured resulting in a fact.

agency in a choice	what is chosen
subjectively identified	objectively measured
non-physical	physical
spiritual	material
soul	body
opinion	fact
God love hate self etc.
creator	creation

|}

The end (?) of the story

I expect anyone who cares will have figured this out already, but just in case: Syamsu is on indefinite ban and has returned to the hustings of talk.origins. Those of you who are missing your daily Syamsu fix may want to start with "intellectual thuggery of evolutionists on free will wiki". In the words of the Player King: "It costs little to watch, and a little more if you happen to get caught up in the action, if that's your taste and times being what they are."

More important, thank you all for the gentle introduction to Wikipedia editing and procedure. Garamond Lethe (talk) 18:54, 7 April 2012 (UTC)

You are welcome, and thanks for your efforts (and the link to the drama over there...) Cheers, Vsmith (talk) 21:51, 7 April 2012 (UTC)

About the Genetics section

I added some sentences that aid in avoiding bias. The following sentence was written as a last sentence in the section: "Moreover, it is not certain that environmental determination is any less threatening to free will than genetic determination". Although it may have been unintentional, the way the whole section was written, there is a subtle way of misleading the reader (and a bias was noted), since this may imply that there cannot be a state or condition where free will may be allowed- either the idea of free will is "completely determined" by genetics or it is "threaten" by environmental factors, but nothing else. There is no justification for avoiding the notion of a state in which neither genetics nor environmental factors impedes some sense or form of free will (even if it is not the classical/conventional notion held by some doctrines). If this were the case, no neuro-scientists or biologist would work in research regarding free will, but research is ongoing- it is evident that the question possibility of the existence of some form of free will is an unanswered one. The sentence "Moreover, it is not certain that environmental determination is any less threatening to free will than genetic determination" need not to be erased, just the section need more clarification on the reality of the conclusions drawn (in that there is not a definitive answer on the issue of free will coming from genetics; we should not imply otherwise). — Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.213.86.132 (talk) 22:15, 18 April 2012 (UTC)

Your edits don't seem especially harmful to me, but you should note that this article is currently undergoing a featured article review, and we just got done with a major conflict with a disruptive editor, so the bar for entry is pretty high here right now, and people are pretty quick on the revert button.

I'd recommend, if you're concerned about neutrality (which is admirable), making slight modifications to the existing text (qualifiers, attribution, etc), rather than adding a new block of text reprimanding the earlier text, which would call for citations on those wholesale claims.

I'll try to find time to check it for neutrality soon myself, too. --Pfhorrest (talk) 04:04, 19 April 2012 (UTC)

A Futurama episode about free will

The ninth episode of the seventh season of Futurama deals pretty well with the free will theme. Several interesting quotes developp the idea that free will is perfectly compatible with determinism. Such as:

« Our decisions do matter. The fact that they are predetermined makes them no less important »

Also at the end the link between lack of knowlegdge of the futur and free will is subbtely introduced with a clever placebo-like "free will unit" device with a claimed quantum incertity feature. I don't know where exactly such reference could fit in the article, but I guess it could somewhere. In a "free will in fiction" or something. --Grondilu (talk) 09:36, 9 August 2012 (UTC)

Relevance of mind-body problem

This edit removed the paragraph about the mind-body problem with the suggestion: "the mind-body problem is only relevant to a libertarian view of free will; not sure it deserves its own section either".

The libertarian view is that human actions lie outside of the deterministic part of the universe. But the mind-body problem is not limited to the suggestion that this separation is the case, but rather, includes the larger problem of whether such a separation exists or not. From this stance, the mind-body problem includes both the case that separation is valid and the case that it is not.

The mind-body problem in this general sense includes as a special topic all the questions about free will, and depending upon the answer to the mind-body problem one chooses, any of the possible versions of free will in this article are subsumed as subtopics of the mind-body problem.

On this basis, which certainly can be discussed further here if need be, I restored the deleted section on the mind-body problem. Brews ohare (talk) 06:04, 24 August 2012 (UTC)

These questions are somewhat linked, but I agree with the reverter that the problem of free will is more cleanly presented without discussing the mind-body problem. In the added section, the proposition "This dualism allows humans free will, because associated brain activity only is correlated with human action, and is not its cause" is stated in Wikipedia's voice, but this is just one POV. For example, Simon Blackburn argues (very convincingly) in Think that the dilemma of determinism also applies to non-physical cuasation, so I'm fairly certain many philosophers would disagree that monism/dualism is at all relevant to the free will debate. Vesal (talk) 09:34, 24 August 2012 (UTC)

Vesal: The quoted sentence is just one POV, as you state. However, the "dualism" referred to is not the "mind-body" problem, but Cartesian dualism which is only one of many proposals about the mind-body problem.

I believe that you have identified a possible misreading of this paragraph, which I hope a modified text can make more clear. Brews ohare (talk) 13:40, 24 August 2012 (UTC)

Among other changes, the revision splits epistemological pluralism and cognitive naturalism into two separate paragraphs to emphasize that there are several POV's involved in the mind-body problem. Brews ohare (talk) 13:58, 24 August 2012 (UTC)

To emphasize further the importance of cognitive naturalism, I've added links to various articles related to this view, for example, there are important questions about addiction and its relation to free will. Brews ohare (talk) 14:31, 24 August 2012 (UTC)

I believe the modified section on the mind-body problem provides a good introduction to later developments in Free will. It parallels the developments in this article that cover both the various logical possibilities and the empirical observations. Brews ohare (talk) 16:22, 24 August 2012 (UTC)

Growing bias toward incompatibilism, disorganization

I believe User:Brews ohare's recent edits (as well as the mind-body problem ones in the section above) are introducing a subtle bias toward incompatibilism in the organizational structure of the article. I attempted to mitigate that in response to the most recent edits, but he reverted that. WP:BRD would have us roll back to the last stable version before the contested edits while we discuss this, but I think they did add something of value so I'm about to roll back to my attempted compromise instead, to be charitable.

My problem with these latest edits are that they introduce the list of positions regarding free will be discussing different combinations of free will and determinism. This article is not exclusively about free will and determinism and it would bias the article toward incompatibilism to frame all positions on free will as having to do with determinism. Determinism is only relevant to incompatibilist positions; as the new copy itself says, compatibilist positions can occupy any of the nine positions in the table Brews added, because they do not necessarily see any conflict between determinism and free will.

Thus, I moved the new table to the bottom of the Incompatibilism main section, and fixed the other problem Brews introduced: outdenting all of the incompatibilist positions to the same outline level as the section on incompatibilism itself, while leaving all the compatibilist positions nested under compatibilism. That is an extremely biased way of organizing the article, giving all incompatibilist positions top billing and then lumping all compatibilist positions together as subheadings under compatibilism; that would be like composing a list of religions listing Christianity, Protestantism, Catholicism, Orthodox, and "Pagan", with subheadings therein for Hinduism, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Taoism, etc.

A neutral list would lump Protestantism, Catholicism, and Orthodox together under Christianity instead, and really ought to ungroup "Pagan" as well. I'd say from an ahistorical perspective the compatibilist positions would likewise deserve to be ungrouped, as they each have a different fundamental conception of free will, while all the incompatibilist positions are arguing about the implications of one conception of free will (being unrestrained by determinism). But, per WP:UNDUE, the fact that incompatibilism is such a prominent position in field field does I think warrant keeping the compatibilist positions grouped together; but ungrouping the incompatibilist positions goes too far in the other direction, and makes all compatibilist positions a mere footnote to the incompatibilist ones.

If Brews wants to move his new copy closer to the top of the incompatibilism head section, I don't think I would object to that, but I put it at the bottom because it, as he says, introduces the following positions. But it does so from a decidedly incompatibilist perspective, and so needs to be placed in that context. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:17, 11 September 2012 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: I don't understand how a table presenting all conceivable 9 positions involving any two choices of true, false, or undecided for determinism and/or free will in any way presents a particular choice. The table, of course, is not biased in any direction because it includes all the possible choices. Your discussion here seems to me to be contradictory to the logic just outlined, so I do not understand what you are after. Brews ohare (talk) 18:13, 14 September 2012 (UTC)

Brews: My objection is to framing all possible positions solely in terms of how they relate free will to determinism, where there is a large group of notable positions which says that that is an irrelevant issue. That relationship is only of interest to incompatibilists, and with respect to them yes it is neutral; to compatbilists though, framing all positions on free will in terms of determinism gives determinism undue relevance in the issue, since the compatibilist position is that determinism is not relevant to free will.

To modify the analogy above, it would be like categorizing religions by how they take the relationship of Jesus to the God of Abraham; Christians say he is the God of Abraham incarnate, Muslims say he's just a prophet of the God of Abraham, and Jews say he was just some guy with no special relation to the God of Abraham; and then there's those heathens who don't believe in the God of Abraham at all and so don't care what Jesus' relation to him was. Placing all the Abrahamic religions on one level and then lumping all non-Abrahamic religions together under one grouping on that same level is biased toward Abrahamic religions, and framing the question in terms of the relationship between Jesus and the God of Abraham likewise.

Similarly, placing all incompatibilist positions on one level and lumping all compatibilist positions together under one grouping on that same level is biased toward incompatibilist positions, and framing the question in terms of the relationship between free will and determinism likewise. --Pfhorrest (talk) 01:19, 15 September 2012 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: I don't follow your example. I'd say the analogy is more like this: one can say there are (i) those that believe in God, (ii) those that don't and (iii) those that are undecided. That is all the possibilities, and has the same role as the table in the article, which also lists all the possibilities. Your view is that to present all the possible attitudes is prejudicial because it appears to put them all on the same level of importance. However, that position is unwarranted. Stating the possibilities is in no way an assessment that they are all equal. Some may be more or less logical, some more or less commonly held, some more or less supported by evidence, or whatever. Just stating what are the possibles in no way reflects upon their interest or importance. It is just an enumeration. Brews ohare (talk) 17:07, 15 September 2012 (UTC)

My point is that positions on the relationship between free will and determinism are not coextensive with positions on free will simpliciter. As your own text says, compatibilists positions can be any of those nine combinations of free will and determinism, because compatibilists say "determinism has nothing to do with free will; you can have any combination of one or the other, it doesn't matter" -- so the whole chart is irrelevant to any compatibilist, and using it to introduce "all" positions on free will is thus biased toward incompatibilists.

The logical top-level organizational division on positions about free will starts with "what is it to have free will?". There are numerous answers to that question: it is to be (metaphysically) undetermined, it is to be (epistemically) unpredictable, it is to be (physically) unimprisoned, it is to be (socially) uncoerced, it is to be (psychologically) uncompelled, and so on. Because the first one of those is such a prominent opinion, we've tended to split positions up into two broad categories: the first of those positions and all of its varieties (incompatibilism), and all the rest (compatibilism). As your chart is only about the relation between free will and determinism, it is only of relevance to people who hold to the first position, incompatibilism. Anyone who holds to any of the other positions, which we lump together into "compatibilism" for historical reasons, would say that that relation is irrelevant. --Pfhorrest (talk) 21:38, 15 September 2012 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: Insofar as there may be those that never even considered that their view is not the only one, any list of alternatives undermines their position. A table of possible positions is in fact prejudicial to each of the positions listed in the table, because it suggests alternatives that never entered the minds of the unimaginative who thought there existed only their position and no other? Encountering alternatives, now they must marshal reasons for keeping their idea instead of switching to one of the others. Is that the basis for your de-emphasis of the table? Brews ohare (talk) 00:20, 16 September 2012 (UTC)

No, the basis of my de-emphasis is that it is not a table of all possible positions on free will, it is a table of all possible positions on the relationship between free will and determinism. That relationship is only of interest to varieties incompatibilism, because every other position on free will (which we lump together as "compatibilism") finds that relationship completely irrelevant.

Imagine an alternate universe where the most popular definition of free will was something like Frankfurt's: free will is the ability to control which of your desires are effective upon your actions, in effect something like rational self-control. Now imagine some people objected that that kind of rational self-control was only possible if people were not passionately moved by anything. A huge debate rages for centuries over whether people were all creatures of passion or whether they really had rational self-control, i.e. free will -- nobody is talking about determinism here, just psychology. We could then draw a table of positions on the relationship between passion and free will, with T, F, and ? in each column. But some people say that passion has nothing to do with free will -- they say free will is about being undetermined, or unimprisoned, or a bunch of different things ike that. Where do their positions fit on that table of the relationship between passion and free will? Wouldn't such a table be inherently biased toward this Frankfurt-like conception of free will?

That's what I'm saying is the problem with your table. It is a good overview of the possible relationships between determinism and free will, but only people who hold to an incompatibilist conception of free will care about that at all. Every different kind of compatibilist position could fit in to any of the boxes in that table, as your own copy states, so it does not serve to introduce their positions at all. --Pfhorrest (talk) 04:27, 16 September 2012 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: We agree that the table provides "all possible positions on the relationship between free will and determinism". Positions 3 (D,FW both true), 5 (D true and FW maybe), 8 (FW true and D maybe) in the table are not incompatibilist positions, because that position (of course) is that D and FW are not compatible at all. On that basis, the table goes beyond the incompatibilist position to look at three others. The breadth of the table therefore extends beyond incompatibilism and so is of wider interest than "only people who hold to an incompatibilist conception of free will."

We two also agree, as does Strawson (the original user of this table) that all the boxes in the table form one or another position taken as compatibilist. As such the table provides an introduction to nine "flavors" of compatibilism, so it indicates the wide variety of positions held within compatibilism. Consequently, I'd say the remark that "Every different kind of compatibilist position could fit in to any of the boxes in that table, as your own copy states, so it does not serve to introduce their positions at all." has a correct premise, but a wrong conclusion.

For the above reasons, it looks to me like the table has wide usefulness, introducing the restrictions of incompatibilism and the flavors of compatibilism. Perhaps you will reconsider? Brews ohare (talk) 12:46, 16 September 2012 (UTC)

Proposal

With the above discussion in mind, how about moving the table back to the start of the section and using it as an intro to all the subsections of the header "In Western philosophy" along with a preamble to clarify its role. Here is a possibility for this introductory material under the header "In Western philosophy":

In Western philosophy

In Western philosophy there are a number of different positions regarding free will and its opposite, determinism. For example, one may define these terms so they are logically incompatible, so one is faced with an either-or distinction. Or one may define them so they can co-exist in one form or another, a matter of degree or of range of applicability, rather than being logically opposed. Then the issue is whether free will or determinism do or do not exist in these forms, together or separately. One way to sort through the various points of view is with a table. Using T, F for "true" and "false" and ? for undecided, there are exactly nine positions regarding determinism/free will that consist of any two of these three possibilities:

Galen Strawson's table

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Determinism D	T	F	T	F	T	F	?	?	?
Free will FW	F	T	T	F	?	?	F	T	?

Incompatibilism may occupy any of the nine positions except (5), (8) or (3), which last corresponds to soft determinism. Position (1) is hard determinism,and position (2) is libertarianism. The position (1) of hard determinism adds to the table the contention that D implies FW is untrue, and the position (2) of libertarianism adds the contention that FW implies D is untrue. Position (9) may be called hard incompatibilism if one interprets ? as meaning both concepts are of dubious value. Compatibilism itself may occupy any of the nine positions, that is, there is no logical contradiction between determinism and free will, and either or both may be true or false in principle. However, the most common meaning attached to compatibilism is that some form of determinism is true and yet we have some form of free will, position (3). Below these positions are examined in more detail.

'References

---

I think this introduction works because all the positions are described below with their own sub-headers. Do you all have any suggestions that might make this proposal work? It seems desirable to have some kind of introduction before launching into all the possibilities. Brews ohare (talk) 02:32, 18 September 2012 (UTC)

I have mostly stayed out of this because my own views are so at variance with the published literature that it's hard for me to say anything sourceable. But I question the statement that most compatibilists believe in some sort of determinism -- I think that many simply feel that the idea that free will means making decisions by rolling dice is absurd, end of story. Looie496 (talk) 02:42, 18 September 2012 (UTC)

The problem I am objecting to is right there in the first sentence of your proposed new copy: "In Western philosophy there are a number of different positions regarding free will and its opposite, determinism." Emphasis added. Compatibilists say that free will and determinism are not opposites, any more than apples and oxygen are opposites. They are unrelated issues as far as compatibilists are concerned, and to frame the entire range of positions on free will as having to do with the relationship between them is to frame it in a way implicitly favoring the incompatibilist conception of free will; even if, within the range of positions on that relationship, one of them is "or maybe they're not incompatible at all".

Omitting for simplicity the ? values in the table, it has four positions: TF = metaphysical libertarianism (incompatibilist), FT = hard determinism (incompatibilist), FF = a variety of hard incompatibilism (incompatibilist, obviously), and one possible position that any compatibilist theory could (but doesn't necessarily) take, TT = soft determinism.

The notion that free will and determinism are opposites is lucky to be given the prominence it is here due to the historical significance of that concept. If we were to organize things here logically without regard to the historical importance, we would have something more like:

• Free will as lack of metaphysical determination:
  • Metaphysical libertarianism
  • Hard determinism
  • Hard incompatibilism
  • Etc
• Free will as lack of epistemic predictability
  • Positions within this concept of free will
• Free will as lack of physical restraint
  • Positions within this concept of free will
• Free will as lack of social coercion
  • Positions within this concept of free will
• Free will as lack of psychological compulsion
  • Positions within this concept of free will

Etc. Logically structured, all the different incompatibilist positions would be grouped together under their shared concept of free will -- as lacking metaphysical determination -- and every other conception of free will would get equal billing with that whole group. But since historically that conception of free will has been so prominent, we give things due weight by lumping all the alternative conceptions together as "compatibilism". But to maintain neutrality, we have to respect all those other alternate conceptions of free will, and can't frame the issue as free will and determinism being necessarily opposites or even related at all, outside the context of "...according to incompatibilist conceptions of free will". --Pfhorrest (talk) 05:24, 18 September 2012 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: Thanks for your explanation. For some, the contrast of free will with determinism is a logical distinction. If that logical contrast is abandoned, both can coexist or not. At that point one can attempt to answer to what extent do we have free will, or the perfectly identical question to what extent are our actions determined. Words like "predictability", "restraint", "coercion", are equally meaningful from either perspective.

Assuming this point, your formulation is a suggestion about what constitutes good presentation, the proposal that the article on free will is better understood if presented without the idea of determinism. That will work, but so does the other approach, which is more common in the literature. Brews ohare (talk) 15:34, 18 September 2012 (UTC)

I'm not clear if you're claiming it is, but I want to re-emphasize the point that it is not NPOV to claim "to what extent do we have free will" is a "perfectly identical question" to "to what extent are our actions determined". Compatibilists would disagree that those questions are identical. That is the whole issue at contention. All incompatibilists share a certain concept of what free will is, and argue about whether and how we have it or not. Compatibilists all disagree with that very concept of what incompatibilists say free will would be if we had it. So to maintain neutrality we cannot privilege the incompatibilist concept of free will, that of "not being determined", and frame all positions on free will as positions on whether or not we are. Compatibilists disagree with each other not over whether or how we are determined, but by what it means to have free will at all -- their only agreement that it doesn't mean "not being determined".

That said, I am not proposing "that the article on free will is better understood if presented without the idea of determinism". I am proposing that issues dealing with determinism need to be couched in the context of the set of positions which consider that relevant, namely incompatibilism. That is historically the dominant issue in the literature though, as you say, and we give that fact due weight by giving that position first billing and top-level billing while grouping all alternatives to it together in one second category. --Pfhorrest (talk) 20:15, 18 September 2012 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: There seem to be some subtleties at work here that need to be elaborated. You say: “it is not NPOV to claim "to what extent do we have free will" is a "perfectly identical question" to "to what extent are our actions determined".” I can agree with this point if you are drawing a distinction between will and action, which are not the same thing. However, this distinction has not come up before. Is that your point? Brews ohare (talk) 13:13, 19 September 2012 (UTC)

For what it's worth, I am in complete agreement with Pfhorrest here. Placing every possible point of view on a subject on level is actually introducing a hidden bias and is therefore compromising neutrality. As far as I am aware, the idea behind wikipedia is to present ideas with respect to their prominence in the literature. Furthermore, the categorisation (compatibility of free will and determinism) is only relevant to incompatibilism. Compatibilist free will is in fact disconnected from the determinism/indeterminism debate (for all intensive neurological purposes), and their claim stands irrospective of the fact some (eg hard incompatibilism) might wish to argue indeterminism undermines their position. The simplified taxonomy remains as it represents the historic/dominant free will positions, which so happen to be categorisable based on determinism.

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 17:33, 19 September 2012 (UTC)

"Placing every possible point of view on a subject on [one] level is actually introducing a hidden bias and is therefore compromising neutrality." If the listing of the options "Republicans are jerks" and "Republicans are not jerks" is so silly that any amount of discussion of one of the alternatives is too much, maybe a listing is prejudicial. But because all the positions on free will/determinism are discussed at some length, that is not the case here, and the argument about prominence in the literature is a non-starter as all views have reams of discussion.

The compatibility of free will with determinism can be viewed as a discussion of how we reconcile various ideas about mind with cognitive naturalism, and IMO that subject is the only one worthwhile. Brews ohare (talk) 18:58, 19 September 2012 (UTC)

There are an infinite number of possible points of view on a subject. But presuming just a sample of those are taken (those mentioned in the literature); for wikipedia to list all of them in the introduction with equal spacing is not representative of the literature. This is not the sum of all human knowledge, it is perhaps the normalisation of all human knowledge.

Points 1 to 9 are not discussed at some length, some are not even properly defined (the interpretation of the question mark is arbitrary - "it doesn't matter", "it is not known", etc). They are all certainly not discussed at length in the literature. Even if they were; they would certainly not be discussed at the same length.

That is an interesting discussion indeed ("reconcilation of mind with cognitive naturalism"), but this pertains to philosophy of mind, not free will.

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 05:35, 20 September 2012 (UTC)

It was not my intention with that comment to draw a distinction between will and action. I do maintain there is such a distinction, but I'm not sure what you take its relevance to this specific debate to be.

The point I keep trying to reiterate is this:

• There is a first question: "what would it mean to have free will?".
• That question has numerous notable answers. But one of those answers is so popular it is taken for granted by many people, apparently including you: "to have free will would mean, at least, to be not determined".
  • Among such people, there is a secondary question: "are we determined or not, and consequently, do we have free will or not?".
  • Every position on that second question, every position that agrees with the answer to that first question, is an incompatibilist position.
• Then there are positions which disagree about that first question. They get lumped together, from the viewpoint of the many who agree on the one answer to that first question, into "compatibilism", even though compatibilist positions disagree with each other on a more fundamental level than any incompatibilist positions disagree with each other.

Your chart lists positions by how they answer the second question, thus presuming an answer to the first question, and thus presuming an incompatibilist point of view. Even though it has positions which include "we might both have free will and be determined" (TT and any position with a ? in it), the way it frames the question is biased: to someone who answers the question like that, the question itself sounds presumptuous. It asks "which of these relationships between free will and determinism is correct?" and the compatibilist replies "there is no relationship", or at least "it doesn't matter". It's as if someone asked "Do you like rock music or are you drug-free? YN, NY, NN, YY?" And a drug-free rocker replies "Yes to both. What the hell are you implying about rockers and drugs by even asking that?" --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:59, 20 September 2012 (UTC)

The mind-body problem (dualism)

NB This first paragraph is referring to cartesian dualism - not non-reductive physicalism. In its new form, it is no longer mutually exclusive with the next paragraph on "cognitive naturalism" (which really should be generalised to "physicalism", as its diagram has correctly been labeled). I have therefore restored this first paragraph to its original form.

I appreciate your efforts in trying to bring everything together (encapsulating all mind-body problem approaches), but am strongly inclined towards your original categorisation. I have made some futher clarifications to my original updates, such that it is clear how these approaches differ (physicalist incompatibilism, non-physicalist incompatibilism, compatibilism). It is important in this section to clearly connect everything back to free will, as highlighted in my original updates - all mind-body arguments should be addressed in the context of one or more explicit free will models.

Thanks again for adding this section on the mind-body problem - it is a long needed overview.

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 05:00, 18 September 2012 (UTC)

NB cartesian dualism is not epiphenomenalism - is the Peruzzi reference relevant?

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 07:03, 18 September 2012 (UTC)

I appreciate you are trying to make some nice distinctions in this paragraph, but I find it very opaque and seemingly self-contradictory. For example, the sentence

"They are also forms of what is called epistemological pluralism, that is the notion that the mind-body problem is not ontologically reducible to the concepts of the natural sciences, although alternate forms exist with adherence to causal reducibility and therefore physicalism (e.g. non-reductive physicalism)."

is full of jargon and requires the reader to go off to two or three other articles to make any sense out of it. Can it be fixed? Brews ohare (talk) 16:02, 18 September 2012 (UTC)

I have deemed this jargon relevant to this section on the mind-body problem (in its current form) as libertarian free will models are not restricted to cartesian dualism. Epistemological pluralism {as it was defined} is not specifically relevant to cartesian dualism (cartesian/substance dualism is just one form of dualism - there are others like property dualism), so I had to expand this to make it clear cartesian dualism has no monopoly on epistemological pluralism {as it was defined}. I suggest removing the epistemological pluralism sentence entirely, or retaining it in an expanded form to take into account other dualist perspectives (eg like I have already done) {see my edit 06:31, 19 September 2012‎ for resolution to this problem: "The mind-body problem - epistemological pluralism is indeed likely limited to substance dualism/pluralism, although it implied the opposite based on how it was originally defined here"}.

In opposition to your claim, I really think the modifications you have made today 15:57, 18 September 2012‎ / 15:46, 18 September 2012 have further clouded the relationship between cartesian dualism and its resultant form of indeterminism (along with its corresponding incompatibilist model of free will). I think that "because associated brain activity may be only correlated with human action, and not its cause" should be reverted to "because associated brain activity only is correlated with human action, and is not its cause". Even this I would argue is slightly vague, as the concept of "correlation" is terminology commonly used in ephiphenominimalistic models (e.g. correlation between by-product mind and brain activity). Rather, cartesian dualism refers to brain activity/bodily action being product of an external mind, and requires some kind of break in the causal closer of the physical universe (hence my "non-physical" clarification you have since removed); else mind apparently becomes overdetermined again and we would again be admitting ephiphenominalism/property dualism - the problem Popper is trying to avoid. On this note, although I respect Poppers critque here a better ways to avoid overdetermination than to accept cartesian dualism - and so I am certainly not inclined to overemphasise this philosophy of mind, even if I were at liberty to do so.

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 17:28, 18 September 2012 (UTC)

Richardbrucebaxter: I had struggled further with this section before I read your comments here. It will take some time for me to digest your remarks, and I do not have time just now. I'll return to our discussion later. Thanks for your interest. Brews ohare (talk) 19:48, 18 September 2012 (UTC)

Richardbrucebaxter: I've read your present version, which reads pretty well. You removed the discussion of non-reductionist physicalism and its relation to supervenience and emergence and biological causality, a position entertained by many, so one could argue incompleteness. However, I regard this stance as misleading if not complete nonsense, so its omission is fine with me even though it is contrary to WP policy regarding a fair presentation of all viewpoints. Brews ohare (talk) 12:19, 19 September 2012 (UTC)

One approach to the emergent explanations is via the concept of order parameter, a term originally introduced in connection with phase transformations (see [this). An example is this discussion. The extension of this idea to "mind" is that mind is viewed (with no evidence at all) as a form of order parameter, both a product of neurological activity and a governor of that activity. The term circular causality is used to emphasize that this is not a causality in the sense of a preceding b, but of the two conjointly determining each others' fate. Perhaps something about this should be included? Brews ohare (talk) 14:47, 19 September 2012 (UTC)

I deleted the non-reductive physicalism (eg anomalous monism) reference because it is not relevant to the section (non-physical mind / cartesian dualism). It could perhaps be added as a subset of the physicalism section (in fact it is implied in all incompatibilist models that assert the existence of physical mind).

I think this is an interesting concept you have presented (regarding additional emergent explanations) - perhaps this could be added to a philosophy of mind wikipedia article (e.g Dualism/Property Dualism)?

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 16:36, 19 September 2012 (UTC)

The mind-body problem - irrelevant text?

I suggest moving all of this text out of the mind-body problem section, as it appears irrelevant (i.e, it is only relevant to either the mind-body problem or free will - not both):

1. Stemming from Cartesian dualism, a formulation sometimes called interactionalist dualism suggests a two-way interaction, that some physical events cause some mental acts and some mental acts cause some physical events. One modern vision of the possible separation of mind and body is the "three-world" formulation of Popper. [59] Cartesian dualism and Popper's three worlds are two forms of what is called epistemological pluralism, that is the notion that different epistemological methodologies are necessary to attain a full description of the world. Epistemological pluralism is one view in which the mind-body problem is not reducible to the concepts of the natural sciences.

2. Studies of the timing between actions and the conscious decision to act also bear upon the role of the brain in understanding free will. A subject's declaration of intention to move a finger appears after the brain has begun to implement the action, suggesting to some that unconsciously the brain has made the decision before the conscious mental act to do so. Some believe the implication is that free will was not involved in the decision and is an illusion. The first of these experiments reported the brain registered activity related to the move about 0.2 s before movement onset.[63] However, these authors also found that awareness of action was anticipatory to activity in the muscle underlying the movement; the entire process resulting in action involves more steps than just the onset of brain activity. The bearing of these results upon notions of free will appears complex.[64][65]

Some argue that placing the question of free will in the context of motor control is too narrow. The objection is that the time scales involved in motor control are very short, and motor control involves a great deal of unconscious action, with much physical movement entirely unconscious. On that basis "...free will cannot be squeezed into time frames of 150-350 ms; free will is a longer term phenomenon" and free will is a higher level activity that "cannot be captured in a description of neural activity or of muscle activation..." [66] The bearing of timing experiments upon free will still is under discussion.

3. Alternative to the above views, in violation of Cartesian dualism and possibly also cognitive naturalism, the view of some is that mind and neurological functions are tightly coupled in what is called circular causality, a situation where feedback between collective actions (mind) and individual subsystems (for example, neurons and their synapses) jointly decide upon the behavior of both. The adjective "circular" is intended to separate this interactive causation from simple stimulus-response and to express an extension of traditional feedback theory to cases where no obvious feedback loops can be identified.[67] An analogy is drawn between mind and some emergent behavior seen in inanimate nature, such as Rayleigh–Bénard convection.

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 06:59, 20 September 2012 (UTC)

I believe your view that these three items of text are not connected to free will is incorrect.

The clearest example is the text label #2, which explicitly refers to free will several times, and talks about Libet's observations (and others) much talked about in popular literature as to its implications for free will. It is hard to avoid the impression that if motor control entirely anticipates the conscious act of deciding to move, then the will to move is irrelevant and the causal efficacy of intention is nil, there is no free will.

The text labeled #3 also addresses the notion of causality, and its practitioners have a variety of opinion. Some believe emergence supports mind as in control of the body (clearly germane to free will) and some would argue the situation is more murky, hoping that free will has a role by analogy with the role of order parameters in collective phenomena. This area is part of the consideration of whether "causality" in the stimulus-response sense is what free will exercises, or some other "circular causality".

The text labeled #1 is a very sketchy outline of Popper's views and the realm of "epistemological dualism". There is little doubt that free will is part of this discussion, and some of this can be found in WP's article on Karl Popper.

These more recent discussions of free will tend to put out to pasture the historical free will debates over hypothetical logical positions, and replace them with ideas having practical implications for neurology, artificial intelligence, evolutionary theory and so on. Brews ohare (talk) 09:51, 20 September 2012 (UTC)

It might be worth re-reading what I wrote, as I don't think you understood me correctly. Content in this section should be relevant to both free will and the mind-body problem (not one or the other). If the references contain relevant content, then this should be added. It is great material of itself, there is nothing wrong with it, just perhaps its position.

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 14:37, 20 September 2012 (UTC)

It seems to me that both mind and brain are involved in all three items of text, as you require. Perhaps a rewrite to make the connection more obvious is in order? Brews ohare (talk) 17:09, 20 September 2012 (UTC)

I suggest being careful not to fog this article on free will with a) irrelevant and b) unclassifiable content.

a) eg "Popper takes the dualist view that the outside world (World 1) affects thoughts (World 2) and vice versa, but adds theoretical creations (World 3) as an additional reality interpreted by World 2, and would express the view that radio, for example, is a clear example of World 3 affecting World 1 by the intermediary of World 2."

b) eg All references/arguments added to the article on free will should be placed in the context of compatibilism/incompatibilism or else it is confusing for the reader.

Thirdly, please don't delete existing content unless you have a good reason to do so - I can't speak for all/any editors here, but from my perspective it takes an unnecessary amount of time to restore content after consecutive rewrites.

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 03:35, 29 September 2012 (UTC)

Distinction between freedom of action vs will

In this edit the observation that " Freedom of will and freedom of action are not the same thing" was deleted with the in-line comment: "current text regarding distinction between freedom of action vs will is not verifiable".

This distinction is first of all a logical distinction, and so needs no empirical verification. Secondly, there are clear barriers to the imposition of one's will.

""Philosophers who distinguish freedom of action and freedom of will do so because our success in carrying out our ends depends in part on factors wholly beyond our control. Furthermore, there are always external constraints on the range of options we can meaningfully try to undertake. As the presence or absence of these conditions and constraints are not (usually) our responsibility, it is plausible that the central loci of our responsibility are our choices, or “willings.” Timothy O'Connor, Free Will The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition)

The phenomenon of addiction demonstrates an empirical distinction between will and action, as addicts often express a desire to escape their addiction and yet have great difficulty or perhaps cannot break their addiction.(as I can personally attest to with regard to stopping smoking). The will has become decoupled from the ability to act, an observation correlated in brain imaging and attributed to hijacking of the production and distribution of dopamine.

I suggest this distinction be put back into the article. Brews ohare (talk) 12:12, 19 September 2012 (UTC)

Thanks for providing the reference - I think it should be placed back into the free will article also (with your excellent reference), although I am not sure if it relates directly to the mind-body problem. If you believe it relates to the mind-body problem, then perhaps it could be appended to the end of this paragraph (or a new paragraph), rather than being used as a replacement of the paragraph opening sentence of 'cognitive naturalism'. I have designed this opening sentence to clearly highlight the connection between compatibalist free will and physicalist philosophy of mind (an implication of commonly accepted neurological determinism).

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 16:15, 19 September 2012 (UTC)

I'm not sure where it best belongs, but I concur that freedom of will vs freedom of action is very important. It is especially important in Frankfurt's compatibilist theory (where freedom of action is being able to do what you want to do, and freedom of will is analogously being able to will what you want to will, where "to will" is to have a want effect what one tries to do), and in distinguishing some compatibilist conceptions of free will (e.g. Thomas Paine's "not imprisoned and in chains" conception of "freedom of will" would be called mere freedom of action by other types of compatibilists, and in fact Paine himself says something to the effect that freedom is not applicable to the will per se but rather to the man who wills). --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:28, 20 September 2012 (UTC)

I am finding some of your latest changes Brews to the introduction difficult to understand:

1. The quotation attempting to distinguish between freedom of action and freedom of will, and the description of it

This quotation may bear some weight in the explanation of specific definitions of compatibilist free will (eg freedom to overcome constraints that are against one's will/desire), however the textual dominance of this problem in the introduction is questionable.

a) this distinction is potentially irrelevant to either category proposed (both compatibilist and incompatibilist models). e.g. the statement "I didn't will it" is arbitrary; it could mean either internal (eg subconscious) or external (eg dictator) constraints - neither of which necessarily have any bearing on an incompatibilist or compatibilist model.

b) This kind of analysis (in its general sense) is dependent upon one's philosophy of mind / the mind body problem - e.g the external constraints of the hard determinist/indeterminist (brain) may been seen as [equivalent to] internal (mind) and hence irrelevant from another's perspective (the compatibilist). It therefore introduces an unnecessary bias in the definition/presentation of "freedom of action" - one which is limited to the physical world, and will later be contradicted in the article when discussing incompatibilism.

c) The phrase "freedom of choice is logically separate from freedom to implement that choice" needs to be clarified. "Freedom of choice" is not "free will". One can have both "freedom of choice" and the lack of "freedom to implement that choice", and still not have any free will (hence the compatibilist/incompatibilist debate). Secondarily, "Freedom of choice" can be misinterpreted here as "Freedom to choose something that would otherwise be prevented by external conditions", in which case it is equivalent to "freedom to implement that choice" (for the purposes of separating freedom of will/action).

2. "As a question of what actually is going on, rather than as a debate over hypothetical possibilities and logical distinctions"

informal

3. "the existence of free will can be cast in terms of how or whether conscious intention is a correlate of activity in the brain (seen as a physical construct of neurons, synapses, and their dynamical interactions), or is dictated by subconscious activities in the brain"

this is incorrect, the interpretation of these results are dependent upon (and may have implications for) one's model of free will (compatibilist/incompatibilist), but no researchers propose that free will is defined (cast) in terms of this correlation (unless you have a reference?)

4. "or how or whether intention exerts a causal influence over activity in the brain."

this is a completely different subject, and describes the problem proposed by incompatiblism (without declaring this fact, and therefore its connection with prior introductory text)

5. "These topics fall under the later discussion of the mind-body problem."

This is incorrect: they happen to do so currently however because the mind-body problem has been filled with irrelevant text (ie text not specifically relating to both the mind-body problem and free will).

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 03:35, 29 September 2012 (UTC)

I don't have the energy right now for a point-by-point reply but I'd like to just say that in general I concur with Richard here. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:37, 29 September 2012 (UTC)

Cartesian dualism

The article summarizes Cartesian dualism as follows:

"Under Cartesian dualism however, the higher order functions of the mind are only correlated with occurrences in the brain, and external mind is responsible for bodily action.[58] Cartesian dualism results in a form of physical indeterminism (where-by physical events can be determined by external mind), and provides a direct interpretation of incompatibilist free will."

I believe that this summary is broadly correct, but the suggestion of a correlation between mind and body may be too modern a statement, and the implication of a very particular mind-body interaction may be misleading. In its most primitive form, Cartesian dualism simply divides nature into res cogitans and res extensa, mind and matter, "two distinct and reciprocally autonomous levels of reality".

If one ventures beyond this simple separation into two worlds, there are many different approaches to the way the mind and body interact, and it becomes rather confusing to include such matters under the rubric of Cartesian dualism because there are many versions of this interaction all falling under this name. A rather lengthy discussion of various treatments of the interaction issue is found here. Brews ohare (talk) 13:17, 19 September 2012 (UTC)

This issue has been discussed here at free will Talk at length (around 2 years ago), and can be explained in one or two logical steps. Assuming one accepts substance dualism, if external mind has no influence on the body, then it is better classed as epiphenomenalism (or psycho-parallelism). An alternate approach being: if external mind has no representation in the brain (i.e. substance dualism), then one must explain its action on physical memory / bodily function. Thirdly, for external mind to be aware of its bodily surrounding, body must perform action on mind. Therefore cartesian dualism implies causal interaction. If there is dispute over the definition of cartesian dualism, then this should be addressed and referenced, though almost certainly not in the free will article.

The central claim of what is often called Cartesian dualism, in honor of Descartes, is that the immaterial mind and the material body, while being ontologically distinct substances, causally interact

Dualism (philosophy of mind)

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 17:05, 19 September 2012 (UTC)

I have attempted to fix this discussion; see what you think. Brews ohare (talk) 18:33, 19 September 2012 (UTC)

Some of your changes I judge less severe (for example the continued removal of any text relating Compatibilism to the mind-body problem)

However your attempt to redefine cartesian dualism is wrong and needs to be corrected. I am not keen on spending more time here, as I am concerned my modifications will be destroyed entirely with "have another go", "rewrite", "try again" etc.

How is inert "cartesian dualism" relevant to free will? Fortunately there are only three options (for inert substance dualism), neither of which are cartesian dualism; epiphenomenalism, psychophysical-parallelism, or mindless zombies.

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 05:49, 20 September 2012 (UTC)

Relation of Cartesian dualism to indeterminism and incompatibilsm

In this section it is stated:

"Cartesian dualism implies a form of physical indeterminism in which external mind controls (at least some) physical events, providing an interpretation of incompatibilist free will."

This sentence is unclear, confusing, and quite possibly incorrect.

The term incompatibilism is the position that one must choose between determinism and free will, presumably because they are logically (not just empirically) exclusive. Now Cartesian dualism proposes that mind sometimes controls matter. If mind incorporates free will, then this suggestion is that free will controls matter, or one might say free will exists and can influence the activity of the brain. It would seem then that one must accept free will, which is one choice of incompatibilism, but one also accepts causality as applicable not only within the sphere of the brain but also to the interaction of mind and brain. That is a middle ground, not an incompatibilist position. So the quoted sentence is a non-sequitor.

The term indeterminism does not have a section describing it in Free will. According to the article indeterminism, it is a doctrine that not all events are due to prior causes. To say that Cartesian dualism implies this doctrine appears to me unwarranted - Cartesian dualism posits mind and body are separate, and mind sometimes controls matter, but it is an extension to claim that an assertion that mind controls some of matter implies a failure of causality. This extension presumes that mind and by implication free will lies outside of causality, when all that is required by dualism is that the causes in the mental sphere be separate (at least to some degree) from those in the brain. In fact, this question of in what sense mind might control matter and vice versa is a much debated issue and seems compatible with Cartesian dualism.

At a minimum the quoted sentence is a conundrum requiring elaboration. At worst it is incorrect and should be deleted. Brews ohare (talk) 16:53, 20 September 2012 (UTC)

...

The term incompatibilism is the position that one must choose between determinism and free will, presumably because they are logically (not just empirically) exclusive. Now Cartesian dualism proposes that mind sometimes controls matter. If mind incorporates free will, then this suggestion is that free will controls matter, or one might say free will exists and can influence the activity of the brain. It would seem then that one must accept free will, which is one choice of incompatibilism, but one also accepts causality as applicable not only within the sphere of the brain but also to the interaction of mind and brain. That is a middle ground, not an incompatibilist position. So the quoted sentence is a non-sequitor.

"incompatibilist free will" (ie, metaphysical libertarianism) has been specified not "incompatibilism"

"physical indeterminism" has been specified not "indeterminism". The question of the internal determinism/causality of external mind is not addressed here. This problem has been discussed at Free will Talk before (was it Vesal who raised it?), and it may indeed prevent such a free will from being realised in practice. Regardless, the model would still be classifiable as a form of incompatibilist free will, and certainly does not negate the logical possibility thereof (hence "providing an interpretation of").

The term indeterminism does not have a section describing it in Free will. According to the article indeterminism, it is a doctrine that not all events are due to prior causes. To say that Cartesian dualism implies this doctrine appears to me unwarranted - Cartesian dualism posits mind and body are separate, and mind sometimes controls matter, but it is an extension to claim that an assertion that mind controls some of matter implies a failure of causality.

Again, "physical indeterminism" has been specified not "indeterminism"

If an external object (of system 2, eg CD mind) influences a local object (of system 1, eg CD matter), then no internal law can be given for system 1 that is deterministic.

This extension presumes that mind and by implication free will lies outside of causality, when all that is required by dualism is that the causes in the mental sphere be separate (at least to some degree) from those in the brain. In fact, this question of in what sense mind might control matter and vice versa is a much debated issue and seems compatible with Cartesian dualism.

Cartesian dualism asserts interaction (please see its definition again)

Cartesian/interactionalist dualism allows for incompatibilist free will - ie, freedom from physical determinism.

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 17:33, 20 September 2012 (UTC)

Looks like hairsplitting to me. In any event, making a simple matter into an argument over technical terms with fine differences in meaning denoted by small name changes or a string of indigestible adjectives seems not to be the path to clear exposition. Can't we do better? Brews ohare (talk) 01:35, 21 September 2012 (UTC)

False dichotomy

This edit removed reference to a false dichotomy with the in line comment " false dichotomy needs to be attributed for neutrality". There was already a source provided. I have restored this observation with yet another source. If there is further objection to this statement, please provide a better description of the objection and possibly a source to contradict the statement, preferably a recent source and not one harkening back to the hoary past. Brews ohare (talk) 15:26, 21 September 2012 (UTC)

My edit didn't move the reference, it moved it into a different sentence to attribute the view that it is a false dichotomy to compatibilists. Incompatibilists would disagree that it is a false dichotomy (their whole point is you really can only have one or the other, not both; that's what makes them incompatibilists), so the article can't state in its own voice that it is without being biased against them. Attribution is a different thing than citation.

Also, your citation was only supporting the claim that some random NYT article calls that dichotomy "naive dualism". I removed that in my edit because it seems like undue weight to care what some random newspaper editorial calls something which not even all serious scholars would consider a false dichotomy. I've left it in there after my more recent edits fixing some more biased phrasing and organization you introduced, but I really think it should be stricken, at least from the lede. (Your comment about "a recent source and not one harkening back to the hoary past" concerns me as well; a 400-year-old paradigm-setting text from a prominent philosopher studied in every philosophy program everywhere is far, far more valuable a reference than yesterday's newspaper editorial. Age has no impact on the value of a source; notability does). --Pfhorrest (talk) 17:44, 21 September 2012 (UTC)

"for instance" and "e.g."

It is my understanding that use of "for instance" is preferred in WP to the use of e.g., the latter being viewed as a less understood form, and quite possibly an archaic pedantry. So I replaced e.g. with "for instance", only to be reversed and rebuked by Pfhorrest as being unaware that the two have the same meaning. Brews ohare (talk) 15:36, 21 September 2012 (UTC)

This is basically a style issue, where no hard rule applies. "For instance" is less obscure, but "e. g." is shorter and therefore clutters the text less, especially when repeated. Note though that many style guides require "e. g." to be followed by a comma. Looie496 (talk) 16:07, 21 September 2012 (UTC)

What Looie said, plus I was lead to believe that Brews thought it meant something different because he didn't change all of them, apparently being fine with "e.g." on the third disjunct of that list. I would not strongly object to changing all three to "for instance", though I think that is a worse style because it makes an already long sentence needlessly longer. --Pfhorrest (talk) 17:47, 21 September 2012 (UTC)

Freedom of will and freedom of action

I placed O'Connor's quote early in the introduction as I find this to be logical distinction that colors the entire discussion. I later discovered that this quote was placed in the section Free will as illusion, which is not where it belongs, as it is quite a different matter to logically separate will and action and to claim that free will is an illusion.

The questions of addiction, brain washing, behavioral programming and so forth are empirical matters that reflect upon restrictions affecting the ability to act, not on the question of the will to act. Brews ohare (talk) 14:17, 25 September 2012 (UTC)

I've placed the discussion of Steiner's views under a separate header and removed this discussion from the Free will as illusion section where his views do not fit. I removed the repetition of O'Connor's quote, leaving it in the Introduction. Brews ohare (talk) 14:32, 25 September 2012 (UTC)

Indeterminism and quantum events according to Kane

This revision accompanied by the in-line comment "the indeterminism is proposed as resultant of quantum, not system complexity" referring to the observations by Robert Kane is a misreading of this author. On page 38 Kane discusses chance in general terms, and does not refer in any way to quantum events. The quote taken from p. 39 refers to obstacles to exercising one's choices and their role in summoning the will to overcome them. Again, nothing to do with quantum events. His discussion of quantum events is on p. 9, where he pooh-poohs their significance.

In The Significance of Free Will p. 128, Kane says: "Our efforts of will most likely correspond to complex processes in our brains that are macro processes involving many neuron firings and connections. Since we know that the effects of quantum fluctuations are usually negligible at the macro level..." In some other work, Kane has suggested that perhaps chaos theory provides a mechanism (the butterfly effect) to amplify these random quantum events, and elsewhere he has noted emergence and nonlinear mechanics as possible sources of free will. So he is all over the map and has no clear idea of what is going on.

I don't think this reversion has actually instated the wrong impression conveyed by the in-line edit comment, so no harm is done. However, it would be well if we all read this author correctly. Brews ohare (talk) 05:29, 29 September 2012 (UTC)

Chaos theory is deterministic (the fact we cannot predict the future using our limited computational power is irrelevant). Even our inability to measure in the input variables (eg as product of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle) does not imply indeterminism in of itself. Quantum events (and therefore their amplification via for example chaos theory) are perhaps intrinsically indeterministic - noting that hidden variable/multiple world interpretations have not (yet) been ruled out. Hence, "the indeterminism is proposed as resultant of quantum, not system complexity". The free will proposed may be resultant of the combination thereof, but not the indeterminism.

"It is notoriously difficult to predict how future science will turn out, and it might be useful to have an answer to the question in advance of the scientific issues getting sorted out. Second, even if the universe were not fully deterministic, determinism might hold locally (either as a matter of how local spacetime is constructed, or as a matter of how the physics for non-quantum physical objects operates)." (p2)

"The problem that provokes this widespread skepticism about the existence of libertarian free will has to do with an ancient dilemma: If free will is not compatible with determinism, as libertarians contend, free will does not seem to be compatible with indeterminism either (the opposite of determinism). Events that are undetermined, such as quantum jumps in atoms, happen merely by chance. So if free actions were undetermined, as libertarians claim, it seems that they too would happen by chance. But how can chance events be free and responsible actions? Suppose a choice was the result of a quantum jump or other undetermined event in a person\u2019s brain. Would this amount to a free and responsible choice? Undetermined effects in the brain or body would be unpredictable and impulsive \u2013 like the sudden emergence of a thought or the uncontrolled jerking of an arm \u2013 quite the opposite of what we take free and responsible actions to be. It seems that undetermined events in the brain or body would occur spontaneously and would be more likely to undermine our freedom rather than enhance it." (p9)

"Perhaps the nervous twitches or brain crosses are brought about by actual undetermined quantum jumps in our nervous systems. We can thus imagine that Austin’s holing the putt is a genuinely undetermined event. He might miss the putt by chance and, in the example, does miss it by chance. (Likewise, the assassin might hit the wrong target by chance and I might press the wrong button by chance.)... But even more important, since the outcome of this putt was genuinely undetermined, he might well have succeeded in holing the putt, as he was trying to do" (p17)

"To cite an example mentioned earlier, if a choice occurred by virtue of a quantum jump or other undetermined event in one’s brain it would seem a fluke or accident rather than a responsible choice. Such undetermined events occurring in our brains or bodies would not seem to enhance our freedom and control over our actions, but rather diminish our freedom and control." (p23)

"But some scientists have suggested that a combination of chaos and quantum physics might provide the genuine indeterminism one needs. If the processing of the brain does “make chaos in order to make sense of the world” (as one recent research paper puts it), then the resulting chaos might magnify quantum indeterminacies in the firings of individual neurons so that they would have large-scale indeterministic effects on the activity of neural networks in the brain as a whole. If chaotic behavior were thus enhanced in these neural networks by tension-creating conflict in the will, the result would be some significant indeterminism in the cognitive processing of each of the competing neural networks." (p29)

Be careful to read content exactly, to ensure that your interpretations are correct. Something that is 10% wrong is still wrong, but something which comments on only 10% of a subject is not necessarily wrong.

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 15:11, 29 September 2012 (UTC)

Kane The Significance of Free Will, p. 17: "Thus, in Part II, as part of the task of making sense of free will, I suggest some physical modeling in the brain with reference to neural network theory, nonlinear thermodynamics, chaos theory and quantum physics. This approach is in line with the general goal of putting the free will issue into greater dialogue with developments in the sciences and other disciplines." In sum, a grab-bag of non-specific speculations about the eventual content of theories that are still very uncertain. Brews ohare (talk) 15:17, 29 September 2012 (UTC)

Popper

Richardbrucebaxter: The recent deletion of comments about Popper simply explain the background of his 3-world picture. The connection to free will and to the mind-body problem is apparent in his work and the links provided, but is rather lengthy. Is it your position that all this must be presented to justify the inclusion of a link to this work with some context to guide the reader? Brews ohare (talk) 15:38, 29 September 2012 (UTC)

A philosophy of mind article is warranted

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 16:09, 29 September 2012 (UTC)

Libet's experiments

This edit moved the discussion of Libet's experiments and published commentary about them from the section on Mind-body with the observation "move non mind-body + free will specific content to section Neuroscience". In my mind the connection between the brain and free will is obvious in this material, and is very commonly discussed by published work in connection with the free will and mind-body problem. So I'd like some explanation of this change.

Perhaps the subsection Neuroscience should be made a subsection of Mind-body problem? Brews ohare (talk) 15:46, 29 September 2012 (UTC)

Much in this article is related to the mind-body problem - although not specifically dependent upon it. Where discussion on free will can be viewed independent of the mind-body problem, it should not be in the mind body section.

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 16:11, 29 September 2012 (UTC)

Richardbrucebaxter, here is the material. I've underscored words related to both "free will" and "body", indicating that this material is indeed discussing free will within the context of the mid-body problem.

Studies of the timing between actions and the conscious decision to act also bear upon the role of the brain in understanding free will. A subject's declaration of intention to move a finger appears after the brain has begun to implement the action, suggesting to some that unconsciously the brain has made the decision before the conscious mental act to do so. Some believe the implication is that free will was not involved in the decision and is an illusion. The first of these experiments reported the brain registered activity related to the move about 0.2 s before movement onset.

Benjamin Libet; et al. (1983). "Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential)" (PDF). Brain. 106: 623–642. {{cite journal}}: Explicit use of et al. in: |author= (help)

However, these authors also found that awareness of action was anticipatory to activity in the muscle underlying the movement; the entire process resulting in action involves more steps than just the onset of brain activity. The bearing of these results upon notions of free will appears complex.

Lars Strother, Sukhvinder Singh Obhi (2009). "The conscious experience of action and intention" (PDF). Exp Brain Res. 198: 535–539. doi:10.1007/s00221-009-1946-7.

A brief discussion of possible interpretation of these results is found in Rosenbaum.

David A. Rosenbaum (2009). Human Motor Control (2nd ed.). Academic Press. p. 86. ISBN 0123742269.

There is also this:

Some argue that placing the question of free will in the context of motor control is too narrow. The objection is that the time scales involved in motor control are very short, and motor control involves a great deal of unconscious action, with much physical movement entirely unconscious. On that basis "...free will cannot be squeezed into time frames of 150–350 ms; free will is a longer term phenomenon" and free will is a higher level activity that "cannot be captured in a description of neural activity or of muscle activation..."

Shaun Gallagher (2009). Susan Pockett, William P. Banks, Shaun Gallagher (ed.). Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?. MIT Press. pp. 119–121. ISBN 0262512572. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |chpater= ignored (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)

The bearing of timing experiments upon free will still is under discussion.

Richardbrucebaxter, I find this material satisfies your criteria that it refer to free will within the context of the mind-body problem. Can you explain why your objections apply here in more detail? Brews ohare (talk) 17:45, 29 September 2012 (UTC)

The interpretation of a conscious mental act as necessarily non-physical (or having a component thereof) is dependent upon philosophy of mind, and so this content does not necessarily relate to the mind-body problem.

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 18:09, 29 September 2012 (UTC)

The above text doesn't suggest that a " a conscious mental act is necessarily non-physical". I believe our discussion is somehow talking past each other. I'm tempted to view this problem as follows: you approach free will from the stance of terms like "compatibilism" and so forth. That is an historical position that carries on even today, but which I see as largely archaic. On the other hand, I see free will as a discussion of the autonomy (or not) of our decisions, and whether or not recent experimental results have a bearing upon this question. Although one can fit the autonomy (or not) of our decisions into the old philosophical terminology, that is not the most transparent way to do it.

The question arises: Are you at all interested in such a formulation? Do you see any reason to attempt that? Brews ohare (talk) 19:57, 29 September 2012 (UTC)

I am not suggesting that it does, and this therefore makes me suspect you have missed my point entirely. Even if this content assumed some position on philosophy of mind, and by implication of this position was related to the mind-body problem in some way, it would still not necessarily belong here. Furthermore, the fact it (the neuroscience) makes no comment on the mind-body problem again highlights its irrelevance to this section.

Regarding the general approach of the article, I think this is an interesting question you have raised, and perhaps it should be addressed below in "What is this article about"?

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 21:51, 29 September 2012 (UTC)

Introductory paragraph for mind-body problem

The deletion from the introduction of this paragraph introducing the material in the mind body problem:

As a question of what actually is going on, rather than as a debate over hypothetical possibilities and logical distinctions, the existence of free will can be cast in terms of how or whether conscious intention is a correlate of activity in the brain (seen as a physical construct of neurons, synapses, and their dynamical interactions), or is dictated by subconscious activities in the brain, or how or whether intention exerts a causal influence over activity in the brain. These topics fall under the later discussion of the mind-body problem.

appears unwarranted to me. This material is described in the article, so some indication of its presence in the Introduction seems warranted. Brews ohare (talk) 15:57, 29 September 2012 (UTC)

See our talk page edits above, eg Pfhorrest (talk) 06:37, 29 September 2012 (UTC)

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 16:07, 29 September 2012 (UTC)

Richardbrucebaxter: The discussion you refer to is not about this paragraph. This paragraph simply refers to later discussion, which is the normal use of a paragraph in the Introduction, and so seems unobjectionable to me. Perhaps you would address this paragraph directly? Brews ohare (talk) 17:56, 29 September 2012 (UTC)

? The talk entry directly addresses this text, line by line.

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 18:12, 29 September 2012 (UTC)