Talk:Free will

Preamble for the Metaphysical Libertarians

Metaphysical libertarians believe in free will and that individuals should be able to make their own choices without external constraints. As a result, they often view freedom and liberty as central values in their philosophy.

However, different people may have different understandings of what these terms mean. For metaphysical libertarians, freedom and liberty may be tightly linked to their belief in free will and individual autonomy. They may view any external constraints on an individual's actions or choices as an infringement on their freedom and liberty.

Therefore, to ensure that these concepts align with their philosophical beliefs, metaphysical libertarians may seek to control the meaning of the words "freedom" and "liberty." They may argue that the common usage of these terms does not accurately capture their specific philosophical views, and may therefore insist on defining these terms in a way that aligns with their beliefs.

Overall, the desire to control the meaning of these words is likely rooted in the deep-seated belief that freedom and liberty are fundamental to their worldview and that any deviation from their understanding of these concepts would threaten their philosophical beliefs. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Edunoramus (talk • contribs) 16:26, 17 April 2023 (UTC)

Causal Determinism

The text reads that Quantum Physics provides a serious counterpoint to determinism, yet there is no explanation given. I wanted to add a why? tag but it didn't work. Superposition of particles does not dispute causality. Desdinova (talk) 03:06, 25 November 2020 (UTC)

The first sentence of this article needs to be restated.

The way the opening sentence is worded, "free will" is a scientific fact, not a belief, feeling, or theory. 2600:8801:BE01:7C00:D7:BFCA:E351:6CA7 (talk) 19:41, 7 February 2023 (UTC)

D'accorde. I've edited it to suggest the ambiguity you refer to. AbominableIntelligence (talk) 08:19, 30 March 2023 (UTC)

As the article discusses numerous definitions of free will, shouldn't the first paragraph be a more general or historical introduction rather than one particular definition of free will? Citation Maven (talk) 05:33, 10 February 2024 (UTC)

Article issues and classification

Reassessed article as it fails the B-class criteria. About half the "Further reading" needs trimming. I read where only 3% of Wikipedia articles have this section and apparently, someone felt it should be exhaustive here. Otr500 (talk)

External links

I am cutting all but the top three "External links". Some future discussions may change these around. Three seems to be an acceptable number and of course, everyone has their favorite to add for four. The problem is that none is needed for article promotion.

• ELpoints #3) states: Links in the "External links" section should be kept to a minimum. A lack of external links or a small number of external links is not a reason to add external links.
• LINKFARM states: There is nothing wrong with adding one or more useful content-relevant links to the external links section of an article; however, excessive lists can dwarf articles and detract from the purpose of Wikipedia. On articles about topics with many fansites, for example, including a link to one major fansite may be appropriate.
• WP:ELMIN: Minimize the number of links. -- Otr500 (talk) 07:26, 14 February 2023 (UTC)

Proposing Changes to Structure of 'Incompatibilism' Section & Content of 'Metaphysical Libertarianism' Subsection

1. Organizational structure of 'Incompatibilism' section:

1a. Make the 3 causal theory sections into subsections of 'Metaphysical libertarianism': The current structure places non-causal, event-causal, and agent-causal theories as their own sections directly under 'Incompatibilism' (on the same tier as 'Metaphysical libertarianism'), rather than as subsections within/under 'Metaphysical libertarianism' (where it would seem to fit more logically).

1b. Remove 'Theological determinism' from 'Incompatibilism': The article places 'Theological determinism' under 'Incompatibilism', which seems off since most theological determinists believe in free will despite this determinism.

1c. Move 'Causal determinism' & 'Logical determinism' subsections from 'Hard incompatibilism' to 'Hard determinism': 'Causal determinism' & 'Logical determinism' are listed, and briefly explained, in 'Hard determinism', but then given subsections under 'Hard incompatibilism'.

2. Content of the 'Metaphysical libertarianism' section/paragraph seems unclear:

2a. Missing Physical Theories: The section outlines that libertarianism is divided into non-physical theories & physical/naturalistic theories, but the discussion only focuses on non-physical theories. There's a brief mention that physical determinism is incompatible with libertarian free will, but nothing on physical/naturalistic theories that support libertarian free will.

2b. Description of Causal Theories: The paragraph ends with "Incompatibilist theories can be categorised based on the type of indeterminism they require...", which seems a bit confusing, as it:

a) refers to these (libertarian) causal theories with the more broad label of "incompatibilist theories" (rather than a more specific 'libertarian causal theories'), and

b) the text categorizes the theories "based on the type of indeterminism they require" rather than the source (or philosophical underpinnings) of free will within libertarianism. Wouldn't it be more clear to rephrase this to highlight the theories' foundational principles related to free will, such as sourcehood or self-determination?

Proposed draft of 'Metaphysical libertarianism' section:

'...metaphysical libertarians draw upon both non-physical and physical theories of free will:

• Non-Physical Theories of Indeterminism: Many metaphysical libertarians argue that aspects of human existence, such as the mind, soul, or will, transcend the purely physical realm. From this perspective, our choices cannot be fully explained by physical laws. This view aligns with concepts like interactionist dualism, where a non-physical entity is believed to interact with and influence physical systems. This leaves space for the possibility that our non-physical selves can act as a cause of physical actions, allowing for freedom from physical determinism.
• Physical Theories of Indeterminism: Other metaphysical libertarians focus on physical indeterminism as a potential source of free will. They highlight the unpredictable nature of quantum events at the subatomic level. This indeterminacy creates openings within what might otherwise be a strictly deterministic universe, suggesting that future outcomes are not solely predetermined by prior events. This perspective raises the possibility that free will might be compatible with physical laws through a non-deterministic understanding of the universe.

Metaphysical libertarianism offers three approaches for understanding how free will might operate (based on the type of indeterminism they require):

• Agent-causal Theories (based on Agent-causation): Agents (self or soul) are a causal influence beyond that of their internal (mental/psychological) state, making them uncaused causes or originators of choice, rather than choices being solely determined by prior events, states or circumstances.
• Event-causal Theories (based on non-deterministically caused events): Decisions stem from a chain of events involving the agent's mental states (like reasons and desires), where indeterminism opens up the possibility of different outcomes. Unlike agent-causal theories, they don't insist on a uniquely irreducible power of the agent as the source of free will, instead emphasizing the causal influence of mental states within a non-deterministic framework.
• Non-causal Theories (based on uncaused events): Decisions may be inherently free and autonomous, as either uncaused or influenced nondeterministically, breaking the traditional chain of causality, thus enabling self-determination without the need for prior events or internal causal structures.'

Yaakovaryeh (talk) 09:44, 11 March 2024 (UTC)