Talk:Battle of Jutland/Archive 8

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F***ed up formatting

The formatting of the start of the artcile is screwed up in my internet explorer. I see a big white space betweem lure vice admiral sir david Beatty... and '...battlecruiser squadrons through a submarine picket'. Anyone know whats wrong and how to fix it? Sandpiper (talk) 20:33, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Hmm, I'm not seeing anything in Firefox or IE. What version of IE are you using? Parsecboy (talk) 11:58, 26 July 2010 (UTC)

Its working ok now. IE8. The old revision seems to load ok too. Yesterday i was trying to create a table (elsewhere) and the preview kept leaving out some of the horizontal lines between entries. Didnt understand what was going on there either. (cant swear that was IE, might have been firefox. well anyhow, magic restored.Sandpiper (talk) 18:50, 26 July 2010 (UTC)

Tactically inconclusive

The info box says the battle was tactically inconclusive. Here we go again, but what exactly does this mean, and what does anyone thing it would mean to someone who happened to have heard the radio quiz today so looked up the battle but otherwise is no military expert? Sandpiper (talk) 20:58, 18 January 2010 (UTC)

Nothing really changed by the Battle, would be the way I would take it as the most truthful. The HSF came into the battle fearful of the GF and ran like hell the once Scheer was certain he was really facing the entire Grand Fleet. Germany would continue to starve and political dissolution caused by the population's unrest thereby was part of the German surrender. Tirronan (talk) 17:23, 19 January 2010 (UTC)

The Oxford English Dictionary definition of tactics: "The art or science of deploying military or naval forces in order of battle, and of performing warlike evolutions and manœuvres." Surely "tactically inconclusive" could only possibly be accurate if the opposing fleets had circled each other all day and then each side had withdrawn. We know this did not happen.

And the battle did change things. Scheer became Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet with the intention of following a far more aggressive surface action policy. Jutland changed that as shown by his recommendation to concentrate on submarine warfare. As for the British, if you believe some sources the deficiencies in shell caused the Grand Fleet to pursue a far more passive posture. --Simon Harley (talk | library | book reviews) 18:07, 19 January 2010 (UTC)

Assuming that any of the current editors couldn't give you chapter and verse of who, what, and where, the battle took the fleets, for instance it is mentioned about 10 times that this battle resulted in the turning to the submarine war that leads directly to 2 million US soldiers on the battlefield with 4 million more in various stages of training/transport, at the very least on the archives if not on this page already. As already stated in the article, the HSF sortied a couple of times with the intention of catching part of the GF in isolation only to quickly retreat both times. Intentions aside the HSF spent most of its time residing safely at port and the GF didn't do much better refusing to expose itself to the torpedo threat. Intentions aside there is nothing that allowed a tactical decision, in this case used as a delineation between tactical and strategic, in this case but I am glad that you have an Oxford dictionary. The Germans wanted to run and run they did. Tirronan (talk) 18:24, 19 January 2010 (UTC)

We occasionally get trolls and Anglophobes in here suggesting that the battle was clearly a German victory because they suffered fewer losses.

On that basis, we should rewrite the Isandlwana and Little Big Horn pages as victories for the British and for Custer, right? After all, they inflicted the most casualties and in both cases the enemy force was superior in numbers. Actually, the losses inflicted by one-ninth of the British forces at Isandlwana knocked so much fight out of the Zulus that they failed to capitalise on their win and simply waited to get crushed, so although I say that as a joke it's almost a defendable view...

More seriously: 'tactical' can mean different things according to the noun being qualified with it. A tactical decision is one taken with regard only to the immediate circumstances. A tactical victory is usually one in which the fighting goes your way, but the wider issue of overall victory is either unresolved, or perhaps gets worse for you. In Napoleon's 1812 campaign, Borodino would be an example of a tactical victory. He chucked the Russians out of all their positions, but then advanced even further into Russia. Corunna in 1809 would be a British tactical victory, in that a French attack was handily repulsed, but the British still had to evacuate their whole army. New Orleans in 1815 was a similar American victory, but was clearly not decisive because the peace had already been signed.

IMHO, whoever won Jutland gained a pyrrhic (i.e. unaffordably costly) victory. The Royal Navy couldn't have fought endless Jutlands because losing 3 dreadnoughts for each German dreadnought they sank wasn't sustainable. Germany couldn't have fought more Jutlands because they were lucky to lose only one dreadnought and the RN was unlucky to lose as many as three.

Unfortunately 'pyrrhic' is a much-misunderstood term so I don't know if it would help the article to bring it up.Tirailleur (talk) 16:53, 21 January 2010 (UTC)

Good to see that you are still around my friend. I'd argue that Germany building large numbers of Dreadnoughts was a mistake unless it could field enough to really go after the the Grand Fleet. There was way too much effort put into a service that couldn't really do it much good. In all actuality what the GF lost that day wasn't much in terms of real fighting power and it was never going to suffer flash to magazines full of cordite again. Just a bit of good luck was all that stood between Sedlitz sinking was well, it was that close. Derflinger and Nassau were wrecks. Two Konig was badly torn up, she wouldn't be out of drydock till December. It doesn't take a genius to figure out that the German's did get a bit lucky that day. It is also beyond dispute that all they wanted was to get back to dock after seeing the Grand Fleet, that isn't a victor. Tirronan (talk) 00:18, 22 January 2010 (UTC)

Er, SMS Nassau wasn't in that bad of shape at the end of the battle; she was back with the fleet by 10 July. She'd only been hit twice by heavy-caliber shells, and the collision with Spitfire only tore a 3.5m gash in the side of the ship, above the waterline. For comparison, SMS Derfflinger, which was a wreck (having been hit by 17 large caliber and 9 secondary shells) at the end of the battle, was in dock until mid October. Parsecboy (talk) 00:29, 22 January 2010 (UTC)

Yup sorry about that brain fart on my part there. Derfflinger had both of her after turrets torn up and was pretty useless as a war fighting asset. Only Moltke was really able to fight after the battle. Tirronan (talk) 07:21, 22 January 2010 (UTC)

With hindsight Germany building a fleet was a terrible mistake. If they hadn't, and with careful diplomacy, they might have had England on their side, or at least standing neutral. The problem with such a judgement is that the fleet was a gamble and they did know it. They wanted to beat England too and following that course a fight became inevitable. There was a long term building program and who can say what might have happened if war had come earlier or later. It seems to be correct that what most critically went wrong for the RN on the day was the self igniting battlecruisers. Personally, I still havn't seen a good analysis of this which demonstrates whether the navy got on top of the issues so that in a re-run it would not have happened again. Beatty's ship handling didn't help, but still it was the German ships which were reduced to swiss cheese rather than the british ones. Sandpiper (talk) 19:48, 22 January 2010 (UTC)

There's an interesting analysis, I think by John Keegan, in which he argued that increasing the size of the German army of 1914 would not have increased the forces deployable in either the east or the west. This was because the railway system used to mobilise the army had finite capacity, it was all in use, and the German staff knew this. Had the HDF never been built, its 50,000 men couldn't have been used in the initial phase, and thereafter would have been neither here nor there. 50,000 men was one day's losses in a trench offensive.

This being so, it seems that the best use of these men may indeed have been at sea. They couldn't have been used on land in the initial fighting, and they'd have been of no account in the later fighting. At sea, they tied down more resources than they consumed.

This contrarian view doesn't undermine the fact that the HSF was a huge diplomatic mistake, because as you say, it ensured that a powerful combatant joined the alliance against Germany.

On the exploding battlecruisers - yes, three went up, but Lion took ten heavy hits and survived, which is respectable. Tirailleur (talk) 01:47, 26 January 2010 (UTC)

Remember, Lion nearly did explode. If it weren't for Francis Harvey's quick action, she very well could have joined Indefatigable, Queen Mary, and Invincible (and taken Beatty down with her too, in all likelihood). Parsecboy (talk) 03:50, 26 January 2010 (UTC)

To be scrupulously fair, the tendency to describe Jutland as a German tactical victory on the basis of heavier British losses is not restricted to "trolls and Anglophobes." Take one example:

Tactically the Germans secured a victory, sinking three British battle-cruisers at a cost of only one battle-cruiser and one old battleship.

– Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World p. 446

(This is very much a cherry-picked quote but we've all seen similar, and to pretend it doesn't exist in the scholarship is a little disingenuous.) The "British victory after all" school strikes me as the overzealous revisionism typical of First World War scholarship: swinging the pendulum too far the other way. To invoke Donald Rumsfeld's words of wisdom, "You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time." In other words, this interpretation does not make sufficient allowance for whether each navy's operational goals were at all realistic. Given the respective capacities of the HSF and GF, it's almost impossible to conceive an engagement which would not result in "British dominance of the North Sea [being] maintained." To associate this outcome with the actions at Jutland sui generis, and not simply as a structural and nigh-insuperable function of German naval weakness, is suspect in the extreme. While I do not explicitly call for a change to the article, I suppose I subscribe to the notion of a German tactical victory in the context of the possible. Albrecht (talk) 03:43, 26 January 2010 (UTC)

In fact (I'm not familiar with the article's edit history), a stable result such as the present one is to be infinitely preferred over a chronic edit-quasi-war over victories and half-victories. Albrecht (talk) 03:51, 26 January 2010 (UTC)

You'd never get it, one side or the other constantly picks at it, even if you were to say that the Germans won it, you'd be dealing with the "as they ran like hell" argument that is just as valid. One could make an argument that it was a tactical victory and a strategic loss, if not an outright disaster but its honest none the less. --Tirronan (talk) 04:44, 26 January 2010 (UTC)

Speaking as a physicist, one of the difficulties of assessing the outcome follows from the quantum nature of naval warfare. Either you lose a ship or you don't. If it makes it back home with no functional guns and water washing over the decks it tends to get counted as if the enemy never did it any harm. Your ship barely makes it back and the enemy doesnt, then you had a great victory. Thus German tactical victory. Clearly if you are a commander of a numerically inferior force then the whole business is about picking your best moment, but the result here didnt simply show the advantage of doing things right against an enemy who does things wrong, it also demonstrated the limits of that strategy (or tactic?).

Albrecht, in the context of the possible I think the Germans did very well at Jutland. But I also think they themselves privately (as opposed to propaganda claims of victory) acknowledged that there was little or nothing of victory about the state of their fleet after the battle as compared to before. How far can you go in dclaring parts of a process as victories when repeating those victories over and over could only bring you to defeat? As regards ability to fight the German battlecruisers were in a worse state than the british after the engagement, including the sinkings. But then as you say, they were outnumbered 2:1 so how can you fairly assess their performance?

Tirailleur (by the way, nice to see some unfamiliar names here), it seems to me Keegan is taking an unrealisticallly narrow view of what scrappping the navy might have meant. At its peak naval expenditure reached about half the amount being spent on the army, certainly exceeding 1/3 the amount being spent on the army for the 5 years before WWI. If the army was 1 million strong, that would equate to an extra 3-500,000 trained and fully equipped men, not just the 50,000 employed as sailors. Many more were employed building those ships than operating them and then there was the huge expenditure on the materials and equipment. This was occupying a significant proportion of German industrial output. Might have spent some of that on building some extra trains.

I'm very unhappy about Harvey's role in saving Lion, see discussion on that pages chat, but various accounts make me believe Harvey became the official hero because he was certainly dead doing his duty, heroes were needed and because the full story might very well have reflected badly on a number of people. It seems to be quite likey Grant was the guy who saved Lion and Beatty was the guy who put her in jeopardy (with the help of others in encouraging bad ammunition handling). Alternatively, it might be they were just lucky the shell took the turret roof off, which allowed the blast to escape upwards. For whatever reasons the ship did not explode because the initial fire did not spread down into the magazine. Flooding the magazine only saved them from the secondary fire 20 minutes after the initial fire which killed Harvey. Obviously people were busy because they were in the middle of a battle, but the fact that a secondary fire broke out after everything had been declared safe only illustrates further failings in their damage control procedures. Sandpiper (talk) 11:57, 26 January 2010 (UTC)

Interesting comments all. Albrecht: you're right and I was being a bit flippant. There is a certain tendency - here, on Usenet, and elsewhere - for a certain type of poster to argue that any British military victory was either a defeat, didn't matter, or was won by someone else. It is a bit of a "God of the gaps" theory, inasmuch as if one accepted it, one would then be short of an alternative explanation for how Britain came to rule a quarter of the world despite not winning any of the battles.

What I would observe is that the claim for a German victory is usually based on the balance of losses, while the argument that it was a British victory is usually based on who was pushing whom around and dictating the actual course of the battle. Nobody seriously maintains the battle went well for Scheer, who spent it trying to disengage; and nobody seriously maintains that Beatty failed comprehensively. Perhaps the most elegant compromise is the Andrew Gordon (or was it Massie's?) view that Hipper defeated Beatty and Jellicoe defeated Scheer.

I take your point about whether any conceivable result could have been judged a British defeat. I'd suggest however that there were occasions, before and after Jutland, when an unqualified British defeat very nearly happened. On at least one occasion beforehand, one British battle squadron nearly ran into the whole German fleet. Had Germany wiped out 4 or 5 British BBs for no or little reciprocal loss, that would unquestionably have been a tactical and strategic victory - but still an indecisive one. That is, they won the fighting and achieved exactly what they were playing for, but they still needed to win a few more like it to gain the upper hand. Napoleon taking out Mack at Ulm in 1805 is an instance: a tactical and strategic French victory, but it wasn't decisive because the Allies could afford the loss and were still stronger.

Sandpiper: Keegan (or whoever it was...!), was actually debunking the conjecture that, had the HSF not existed and those resources channelled to the Army, Germany would then have been strong enough to have won on land in the summer of 1914. His objection was that the German staff were up against hard limits of railway capacity, including that of the countries they attacked. Therefore, the army they mobilised was the largest feasible. More men could not have been physically deployed, and nor could more railways have been built - because they were needed in the invaded territory. In effect, Germany had surplus military capacity, and building a navy offered a way to apply it to the enemy. So it wasn't per se stupid. It was stupid because its very existence ensured more enemies. Your point about use of resources post-1914 is well made.Tirailleur (talk) 11:58, 28 January 2010 (UTC)

I don't know that the very existence of the HSF ensured more enemies. It had more to do with the fact that Tirpitz intended it to be the "dagger at Great Britain's throat" in the North Sea that pushed the British into the French/Russian camp. Had the Germans divided the fleet into smaller portions for its overseas possessions (as was the norm in the late 19th-early 20th centuries) instead of aiming it directly at the UK, then who's to say what Britain might have done. Parsecboy (talk) 15:05, 28 January 2010 (UTC)

I can't see it as anything but a rather stupid choice. If you play a game that you can't win, why are you playing at all? The only thing that Germany bought itself with the HSF was making an enemy of the British Empire when it didn't have to. Then again from a diplomatic stand-point nothing that the Germans did made a huge amount of sense to me during the early run up to the war. Personally I would have told Austria to back down or else and declared that Germany would defend it's own boarders and nothing else. She got dragged into a war she was ready for but didn't actually want.--Tirronan (talk) 16:29, 28 January 2010 (UTC)

The problem was they apparently thought Britain would have to retain its dispersed fleet structure even in the face of German naval expansion; Fisher's reorganization threw a wrench into Tirpitz's plans, but by then, the gauntlet had been thrown. You are right in your opinion of German diplomacy; Wilhelm II basically threw away the coalition of European powers that isolated France Bismarck had assembled in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War. I think plenty of Germans wanted the war though; all of Europe had been convinced that the speed and completeness of the Prussian victory in 1870-71 was the norm for modern warfare rather than the exception it truly was. Parsecboy (talk) 16:48, 28 January 2010 (UTC)

There are, unfortunately, 2 parts to a devastating victory (Franco-Prussian war, Battle of France, Desert Storm, French Empire vs Prussia, etc.), in that one side has to be very very good, however it also requires the other side to have made some very very bad choices or just be plain bad. The problem becomes when you assume that the other side will play the part assigned, and the French of 1914 just were not that bad at all and most capable of learning and adapting. To tie this back to the article though the Germans proved to be very well trained and her fleet performed about as well as could be expected. But unless Germany could float a fleet the size of the Grand Fleet and keep the army to the size that it had to be it didn't make sense to play the game at all. It doesn't show much understanding of the British who feared an invasion by a continental army most of all and who would have done anything to prevent it. To me it is telling that within a few weeks all that that GF lost to damage/sinking was more than replaced by new construction ships dreadnoughts and a new battle-cruiser coming into the line. --Tirronan (talk) 18:48, 28 January 2010 (UTC)

[Deindent] To be fair to the German surface fleet, the British felt obliged to continue building warships throughout the war which meant they were not building cargo ships which were desperately needed. The destroyers reserved for grand fleet screening could have been released for convoy work and likely convoys would have got underway much sooner (both because of ship availability and because the admiralty would not have had its mind set on the vital importance of fleet work). Then there was German coastal protection and control of the Baltic hindering the Russians, all of which had some impact on the land war. I have not looked at the details of the land war, but although the british army was pretty small at the start, it did have some troops to throw into northern France. German planning was based upon a quick war, meaning the immediate British contribution to a land war would be small and hopefully Britain would not get its act together in time to make any difference. German planning supposedly allowed for worst-case of the British managing to send what troops they had, and being able to deal with this.

I remain in two minds over the German fleet. Bismark opposed it, which was one reason Wilhelm got rid of him. More seriouly I think, Wilhelm wanted to be his own man and thus could not stand inheriting Bismark, though obviously Bismark was getting on a bit by then and probably past his best. Mostly Wilhelm wanted a fleet, and thus chose Tirpitz for high office as someone like minded who wanted to build one and could make it happen. The fleet was the most obvious challenge to BRitain pushing Britain into becoming an enemy, but it was not the only one. It is fine to be friendly to a small state which is not a threat, but once they get bigger they become rivals. Whether or not Germany had a fleet it was manoeuvering for control of the continent and working on acquiring colonies. Coming late to the game maybe made it all the more a rival because all the best spots were already taken. Even without the threat to its control of the high seas, Britain by WW1 was coming round to the idea that it could not live with a German empire occupying most of Europe. Of course, without the obvious threat to its fleet, it might have been difficult for the politicians in Britain to have justified taking part in the war.

Tirronan, I think ultimately the reason the Germans chose to have a fleet despite knowing it would make Britain an enemy was that they were going for broke. They had to beat Britain too and this could not be done without a fleet. Strategically, I think they would have been better off hanging on to Bismark for longer and confining their territorial interest to continental europe. But sooner or later Britain was going to jump ship from neutral/friend to rival to enemy, so at some point they had to start shipbuilding. Could they have smashed France and Russia and then have started from scratch to build a navy with Britain hostile from the start? It is is quite weird listening to British politicians now discussing the legality of invading Iraq, when 100 years ago they would have done as they pleased.

Tirailler, My own concern about switching resouces from the German navy to the army was not that they could not have figured how to use them, but that France would have felt obliged to try to match any further increases in the German army with increases of its own. I don't know whether this would have been possible? Lloyd George noted that the French did not believe the German army could move by road through Belgium, which it did. Perhaps they might have surprised Keegan if they had been given more resources. They had time as well as money if they had chosen to take it. Although the British contribution might have been small, it seems to have been well placed to arrive at the most critical area of the battlefront. The Germans failed to take the British army seriously in their planning, and despite their claimed intent before the war to fight the british with whatever fleet they had and thereby inflict whatever damage they could, in practice they drew back from doing this once the war had started. Does anyone have views on what the military position might have been if the Germans had done well, and managed to whittle down most of the British dreadnoughts at the cost of their own? I guess the answer is that in such a a case, the British would have brought up their reserve pre-dreadnoughts which would then have been the most powerful ships remaining. So being saddled with a useless fleet, perhaps the best use of it was to leave it to rust quietly and therefore keep the british wrong footed in fear of it. I think at the point of decision the Germans knew they had made a mistake in underestimating Britain, but by then it was too late to draw back and too late to change plans. Again, it sounds rather like the recent American invasion of Iraq. Sandpiper (talk) 21:21, 29 January 2010 (UTC)

Is there any historian claiming this was tactical inconclusive? why inconclusive in the box? how is it possbile that such see fight becomes "inconclusive" at wiki. in every language u get tactical victory. this battle is an example for a tactical victory. nobody achieved his objectives, status quo maintained. German won tactical victory. I read the notice in the box now 6 months later i see no reason why it should be not called german tactical victory. Blablaaa (talk) 05:43, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

i was reverted but i see no response here. i ask please for a exact answer why inconclusive? i could understand disputed or something like zhis but inconclusive is the same direct assertion than german victory or allied. We have no sources claiming inconclusive. So we should take the commons sense, and outside the uk german tactical victory is the common sense. So please give a reason for inconclusive. I already mentioned that every wiki has german tactical victory. Why does the english wiki give inconclusive which is nowhere said. If u have no outcome than write disputed but not inconclusive. inconclusive is dubios compared to german tactical victory. I want to remind that english wiki is the only wiki giving tactical inconclusive for the outcome. An GB participated in this battle this looks pretty unfavorable for me. Blablaaa (talk) 20:11, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

If one reads the "conclusion" sections of the German and French wikipedia articles, for example, there is nothing which supports the "deutscher taktischer Sieg" or "Victoire tactique allemande" in their respective infoboxes. The German article has one whole footnote. The French fifteen. Are you honestly trying to claim those are well-referenced articles?

And please, do enlighten us with your reading list regarding the battle, upon which you base your understanding of the tactical implications. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 21:12, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

A straight comparison of numbers of ships sunk does give Germany an edge over the UK, but that's a very superficial assessment. If you'd like a quote from a historian, how about this: "The Grand Fleet had failed to achieve a victory over the High Seas Fleet—but it was itself far from defeated" (V.E. Tarrant, Jutland: The German Perspective, p. 273). Tarrant goes on to say "From the tactical point of view, since neither fleet was able to inflict a crippling blow on the other, Jutland belongs to the series of inclusive battles...which are the rule in naval warfare" (p. 278). Parsecboy (talk) 21:19, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

And that verdict was so popular Tarrant copied it word for word from Marder (1978). From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. III. p. 252. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 21:30, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

One question to both. What makes the battle tactical inconclusive? Beside the fact somebody found a book out there which claims this. Also we forget the fact that the entire world sees this battle as german tactical victory. Can someone of u please explain to me why this battle should be considered inconclusive with allied losing twice the BRT ? Blablaaa (talk) 21:37, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

parcey: : " A straight comparison of numbers of ships sunk does give Germany an edge over the UK, but that's a very superficial assessment ", no thats exactly what tactical means, strategic factors are unimportant at the tactical scale -.- Blablaaa (talk) 21:41, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

simon : "The German article has one whole footnote. The French fifteen. Are you honestly trying to claim those are well-referenced articles? , no i claim that it is the common sense everywhere only at the english wiki its different. I see a link , u not? Blablaaa (talk) 21:44, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

simon : "And please, do enlighten us with your reading list regarding the battle, upon which you base your understanding of the tactical implications. " my english is not perfect i dont fully understant the intention of this sentence but i guess its kinda provocating, isnt it? So thanks to you that you start the discussion this way. I think its better if i leave the discussionBlablaaa (talk) 21:54, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

maybe i will come back if i have some sources to provide. Blablaaa (talk) 22:09, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

What can I say, the English language Wikipedia leads by example. As to a link, Blablaaa, all I see is that various editors on other language Wikipedias have, ignoring the somewhat dubious content or their respective articles, incorrectly summarised the battle in the infoboxes.

As to your other question, "Can someone of u please explain to me why this battle should be considered inconclusive with allied losing twice the BRT ?" The Royal Navy could afford the losses in ships and men far more than the Germans could. The day after Jutland the Royal Navy could easily put twenty-four dreadnoughts to sea for the Germans' ten. Scheer's Chief of Staff had to admit that "the battle-cruisers were no longer operational." For the three British battle cruisers lost, two more powerful ones were a few months away from completion, and another one had been refitting anyway. The Germans had to wait alot longer for the replacement for their lost battle cruiser.

As to tactics, Holger Herwig writes in his well-regarded history of the Imperial German Navy, "It is generally accepted that Hipper outskirmished Beatty during the initial phase of the battle, and that Jellicoe outmaneouvred Scheer badly on two occasions. During the latter, the German received seventy hits while scoring twenty against the Grand Fleet." --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 22:22, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

simon: "The Royal Navy could afford the losses in ships and men far more than the Germans could" , this clearly indicates you didnt fully understood the difference between tactical and operational/strategic scale. Blablaaa (talk) 22:41, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

simon: "German received seventy hits while scoring twenty against the Grand Fleet" overall german scored 227 hits, british "only" 142. german had 3.3% hit ratio, british "only" 2,1% . Your point seems selective u picked a partial figure instead of the overall figure which says exactly the opposite and contratics your argumentation. Like i said i cant provide sources so iam out of the discussion Blablaaa (talk) 22:45, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

so i found at least 15 books sying german tactical victory and no book glaiming british tactical victory. So i will change it soon. Blablaaa (talk) 10:10, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

And you will find us ready to revert it.Tirronan (talk) 10:27, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

, :-) , you are member of MILHIST ? Blablaaa (talk) 10:53, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

i added tactical german victory now. Feel free to reduce the amount of refs to a degree which you consider appropriate.Blablaaa (talk) 11:12, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

No one is claiming it was a British tactical victory; we're saying that it was tactically inconclusive, which it was. Explain to me how being forced to retreat is a tactical victory? Parsecboy (talk) 11:48, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

After i brought 30 books claiming german tactical victory, and said i can bring plenty more, you ask for my opinion why this can be called a tactical victory? are you serious? Consider striking your comments. I will not use them then. Blablaaa (talk) 12:01, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Nothing is going to change the fact that the German fleet ran for its very life and NOTHING changed.Tirronan (talk) 12:07, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Ok so it was no tactical victory? Blablaaa (talk) 12:09, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

First it was 15 books, now it's 30? We gave you several sources as well, and certainly more reliable than "The complete idiot's guide to World War I." And yes, there was no tactical victory for anyone at Jutland. Parsecboy (talk) 12:11, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Actually it were 22. I can bring more. Can you give the books which claim tactical inconclusive? Blablaaa (talk) 12:13, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Did you guys ever consider the possibility that you not fully understand what tactical means?Blablaaa (talk) 12:18, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

I sure understand trolling, consider this your 1st warning.Tirronan (talk) 12:39, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

The sources

Here's some more sources:

"The inconclusive result was a great disappointment [to the British]...the Germans came within sight of victory after Jutland, not because they won the battle, but because they recognized that there was nothing to gain by repeating it." - A.J.P. Taylor, English History, 1914-1945 p. 63

"A clearer picture of Jutland as emerged over the years. Both sides could claim tactical advantages at differing stages in the battle but overall it was a strategic in inconclusive victory for the Grand Fleet. Fawcett & Hooper, The Fighting at Jutland p. 9

"The only major fleet action of the war, Jutland had been disappointingly inconclusive" Jones, US Battleship Operations in World War I" p. 23

Parsecboy (talk) 12:43, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

your quotes simply say it was strategical operational inconclusive, which is also not common but far more reasonable then tactical inconclusive.Blablaaa (talk) 21:09, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

please give sources which claim tactical inconclusive and not overall inconclusive. Please unterstand what tactical scale means. look here "tactical victory" that are correct quotes:

1. Winston S. Churchill, 1874-1965 : "In fact, the battle was a strategic victory for the British, but a tactical victory for the Germans"
2. The Royal Navy and the capital ship in the interwar period:"utland proved a tactical victory for the Germans"
3. World War I: encyclopedia. M - R, Volume 3:"Over the German claim to tactical victory there can be little disagreement"
4. Command at sea: naval command and control since the sixteenth century: "The Germans declared, and achieved, a tactical victory"
5. The Marshall Cavendish illustrated encyclopedia of World War I:"The Germans could claim a tactical victory in terms of ships sunk,"
6. Strategy in the contemporary world: an introduction to strategic studies:"Jutland was a tactical victory for the German fleet,"
7. War, peace and international relations: an introduction to strategic history:"The German High Seas Fleet won a tactical victory at Jutland"
8. Dubious battles: aggression, defeat, and the international system:"as the Germans won a tactical victory over the Royal Navy"
9. The complete idiot's guide to World War I:"Battle of Jutland, a tactical victory for the Germans"
10. Cruisers and battle cruisers: an illustrated history of their impact:"Although the Germans could claim a tactical victory, since they inflicted more damage than they received"
11. Churchill and Hitler: essays on the political-military direction of total war:"In fact, the German High Seas Fleet won a minor tactical victory at Jutland"
12. Illustrated Encyclopaedia of World History - Page 4764:may not unfairly describes as tactical victory for germany
13. The Nordic way: a path to Baltic equilibrium:"When the German High Seas Fleet finally tried to force its way out of the Baltic Sea on May 3 1 , 1 9 1 6, its tactical victory"
14. Fighting the Great War: a global history:"On the tactical level, Jutland could be counted a German victory"
15. Europe and naval arms control in the Gorbachev era:"The battle was seen as a tactical victory for the German naval force"
16. The good Nazi: the life and lies of Albert Speer:"virtually confined to port since its tactical victory but strategic defeat at the Battle of Jutland"
17. Power at Sea: The age of navalism, 1890-1918:"As for Jutland itself, the outcome is clear enough. Scheer achieved a tactical victory; "
18. The Second World War: The war at sea:"On paper, it was a tactical victory for the Germans"
19. Count not the dead: the popular image of the German submarine:"Germany had in fact won a tactical victory"
20. The First World War: a very short introduction:"and so were able plausibly to claim a tactical victory"
21. American sea power since 1775:"he Germans won a tactical victory at Jutland"
22. A Companion to World War I:"a German claim for victory. The claim could be justified only on tactical grounds."
23. Researching World War One:"hat the Battle of Jutland was a German victory "
24. USS Yorktown at Midway:"again like Jutland — was a strategic victory even while it was a tactical defeat"
25. Transformation under fire: revolutionizing how America fights:"ater at Jutland, it turned out to be armor and striking power that tipped the tactical outcome in favor of the Germans"
26. The strategy of the Lloyd George coalition, 1916-1918:"a tactical triumph for the Germans"
27. Magill's Guide to Military History:"A tactical victory for the Germans"
28. The Saturday review of politics, literature, science and art:"force the Germans to leave their ports, and did make tactical victory possible both at Jutland"
29. Erich Raeder: Admiral of the Third Reich:"German naval force to date and the Imperial Navy had won an indisputable "quantitative" victory"
30. The American historical review:"It is plain that our author awards the tactical victory at Jutland to the Germans"
31. The nation and the navy: a history of naval life and policy:"Scheer could claim a tactical victory
32. President Wilson fights his war::"The Battle of Jutland may be regarded as a strategical draw for the British and a tactical victory for the Germans"
33. Hitler's northern war::"the Battle of Jutland, Germany won a tactical victory"
34. Sea battles in close-up:"was a strategic victory even while it was a tactical defeat"
35. The Living age:"Germans may have won a tactical victory"
36. A history of civilization:"Although Jutland was a tactical victory for the Germans"
37. The naval strategy of the World War:"It is generally agreed today that Jutland was a German tactical victory"
38. Worst enemy:"he High Seas Fleet fought only one major action with its dreadnoughts, winning a tactical victory at Jutland. "
39. Deutsche seegeschichte:"durchaus als ein taktischer Sieg zu werten"
40. Scapa Flow: die Selbstversenkung der wilhelminischen Flotte:"Taktisch, so das inzwischen einmütige Urteil, war die Schlacht ein Sieg für die Deutschen"
41. Frankfurter Hefte:"Ihr taktischer Sieg über die britische »Grand Fleet« "
42. Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte: Deutsche Geschichte der ...:"Flotten endete mit einem deutschen taktischen Sieg"
43. BILD-Wissensbibliothek 7. Altertum und Neuzeit. Das große ... - Page 190:"bei dem die Deutschen einen taktischen Erfolg, aber keinen entscheidenden Sieg errangen"
44. die Entwicklung der Typenfrage im Ersten Weltkrieg: "Der taktische Erfolg der Hochseeflotte"
45. Die Technik im Weltkriege:"Der Sieg vordem Skagerrak ist nach dem Vorhergehenden in erster Linie ein Sieg der deutschen Taktik"
46. Seegeltung in der deutschen Geschichte:"großer taktischer Erfolg der Hochseeflotte"
47. Der weltkrieg, 1914-1918: dem deutschen volke dargestellt:"So groß der taktische Erfolg in der Schlacht vor dem Skagerrak "
48. Brockhaus, die Bibliothek: Aufbruch der Massen, Schrecken der ...:"taktisch erfolgreichen deutschen Hochseeflotte am Skagerrak"
49. Geschichte des europäischen Kriegswesens:"endete die Schlacht mit einem taktischen Sieg der Deutschen"
50. Die Verteidigung des Westens:"Taktisch war es zwar ein deutscher Sieg"
51. Schlachtschiffe und Schlachtkreuzer 1921-1997:"Mai 1 9 1 6 in der Skagerrak- schlacht, der mit einem taktischen Sieg über die britische Grand Fleet endete"
52. Kaiserliche Marine: "So ist die Skagerrak-Schlacht deswegen als ein deutscher Sieg anzusehen, weil die taktische Überlegenheit eindeutig bei den Verbänden von Hipper und Scheer lag."
53. Der Seekrieg, 1939-1945":Trotzdem wurde er taktisch ein deutscher Sieg,"
54. Gebhardts Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte:"Marine einen „taktischen, technischen und moralischen Sieg"
55. Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrier:"einen taktischen Sieg über die zahlenmäßig überlegene Grand Fleet der Briten in der Schlacht vor dem Skagerrak "
56. Velhagen & Klasings Monatshefte:"Diese Schlacht ist taktisch nicht ganz durchgeschlagen, aber als unbestrittener Sieger ist die deutsche Marine daraus hervorgegangen"
57. Das buch von der kriegsmarine:"Ein großer taktischer Erfolg der beträchtlich schwächeren deutschen Flotte über die Engländer"
58. Allgemeine schweizerische militärzeitschrift:"welche die Hochseeflotte nach ihrem taktischen und materiellen Erfolg in der Schlacht vor dem Skagerrak"
59. Irrfahrt: ein Tatsachenroman:"Die deutschen Autoren, bezeichneten diese Schlacht als einen überragenden Sieg der kaiserlichen Flotte"
60. Brockhaus, die Bibliothek: Aufbruch der Massen, Schrecken der ...:"Nach der Seeschlacht zwischen der britischen und der taktisch erfolgreichen deutschen Hochseeflotte am Skagerrak"
61. Dictionnaire des batailles navales franco-anglaises:"à la Bataille du Jutland qui fut une victoire tactique pour les Allemands
62. Les erreurs stratégiques pendant la Première Guerre mondiale:"L'amiral Scheer a donc remporté une victoire tactique"
63. Polybiblion: Revue bibliographique universelle:"La rencontre du Jutland fut la victoire de l'artillerie allemande"
64. La paix armée et la grande guerre (1871-1919):"Mais s'il est certain que la flotte allemande a eu un succès tactique,"
65. Histoire de la marine française:"La bataille du Jutland, victoire stratégique anglaise mais succès tactique allemand"
66. Building the Kaiser's navy:"tactical success at Jutland"
67. The New Century Cyclopedia of Names:"hough it can be considered a German tactical success"
68. The indecisiveness of modern war: and other essays."Further, a tactical success gained by the weaker side may avail little. At Jutland the Germans gained suoh a success"
69. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow:"skilful tactics, and extraordinary gunnery had won a tremendous tactical success for the Germans"
70. Collier's encyclopedia:"as a German tactical success. "
71. Trident:"Despite a tactical victory in 1916 at Jutland, the German High Seas Fleet retreated"
72. Naval officers under Hitler:"A tactical victory for the Germans"
73. Pocket battleships of the Deutschland class:"Jutland was a tactical German victory, but the Fleet now retired to its Baltic and North Sea hide-outs"
74. The German naval officer corps:"The morale of the executive officer corps, severely affected by naval inactivity and personal recriminations in the top command, was temporarily lifted by the tactical victory in the Skagerrak (Jutland)"
75. The Military engineer:"Big-scale naval battle, called a tactical victory for Germany, but a strategic victory for England"
76. Research guide to European historical biography, 1450-present:"Tirpitz rejoiced in Germany's tactical victory at the Battle of Jutland "
77. What the citizen should know about modern war:"In the battle of Jutland the Germans similarly achieved a tactical victory by outmaneuvering the British and inflicting heavier losses than they suffered"
78. Europe and the modern world:"The Germans won a tactical victory, the British losses in men and tonnage far exceeding those of the Germans"
79. Twentieth-century warriors: the development of the armed forces:"was a tactical victory for Scheer, whose losses were less "
80. Heroes never die: warriors and warfare in World War II:"The great naval battle of Jutland in mid-1916 resulted in a tactical victory for the Germans"
81. The age of total warfare:"the battle ended in a tactical victory for the Germans"
82. Imperial Britain: the empire in British politics, c. 1880-1932:"resulted in a tactical victory for the German High Seas Fleet - the Royal Navy suffered greater losses of ships and men"
83. History in Dispute: World War I, first series:"The German High Seas Fleet had won a tactical victory against the British at the Battle of Jutland"
84. The warship in history:"Jutland can be seen as a tactical victory for the Germans in that higher losses were inflicted than were sustained"
85. Sailor: a pictorial history :"The material results must be regarded as a tactical victory for Scheer"
86. The golden door: the United States from 1865 to 1918"The British lost more ships, with nearly twice the tonnage of the German losses, so that viewed in itself, the Battle of Jutland was a tactical German victory"
87. Historic warships:"It can probably be said that the British suffered a tactical defeat but won a strategic victory"
88. Germany and the Central Powers in the World War, 1914-1918:"the largest naval battle of two fleets in close order had ended in a tactical victory for the Germans"
89. Hitler's generals:"though it might be considered during certain phases a tactical German success"
90. Deception in war:"it achieved a marginal tactical victory over the British (in simple terms of losses) at the Battle of Jutland"

addition. even british imperial war museum states:"

Blablaaa (talk) 13:08, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

I didnt research the credentials of the historians who wrote the books, i dont claim all sources are suitable for wiki. I only give a short overview. I also add more books after editors already did reply below.Blablaaa (talk) 20:45, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

It would be nice to see page numbers, etc., for all of your citations, Blablaaa, but it looks as though you've done an impressive job of supporting your position in the face of some unjustifiably violent and at times scornful opposition (a nice welcome to the English Wikipedia, no?). I completely agree with you that the outcome at Jutland is best described as a German tactical victory and a British strategic victory - to me, that has always seemed to sum-up the battle just about perfectly. Unfortunately, as you may have noticed by now, it seems that that viewpoint (which, I believe you have demonstrated, is far from uncommon) will never be allowed to see the light of day on this page. Nonetheless, I do think you have made some valid points.

I also agree with you that some of the editors on this page at times do seem to misunderstand the meaning of a tactical victory. Whenever someone suggests that the Germans won a tactical victory at Jutland, counter-arguments usually seem to be that the Germans couldn't possibly have won any kind of a victory at Jutland because they spent the remainder of the war bottled-up in port, or that the British could better afford the losses they sustained at Jutland than could the Germans, or that Jutland led to the U-Boat war, which led to America joining, which led to Germany losing WWI, which led to the rise of Hitler, which led to WWII, etc. These are all really strategic considerations (or in the case of the last example, maybe geo-political considerations). When discussing the outcome of a battle from a tactical standpoint, one should consider the battle alone, and look at who won the fight, taken by itself. (Also, Simon, you must know that a tactical victory is not conferred on the basis of which side displayed the better tactics, right?)

However, at the same time that I argue for Jutland being considered a German tactical victory, I do have to stress that the battle was also clearly a British strategic victory. Cheers. Groundsquirrel13 (talk) 16:57, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

If one could separate the two segments of the battle (i.e., the runs to the south and north and the main fleet action), then yes, one could ascribe a tactical victory to the Germans for the first portion; it's much harder to make that argument for the second segment. As the German naval historian Holger Herwig pointed out, Jellicoe badly outmaneuvered Scheer twice and inflicted serious damage, particularly on SMS König and the battlecruisers. Like I said above, a straight counting of losses is far too superficial. A better (though also superficial) measure for victory is who held the "field" the following day. Scheer was forced to retreat by a superior force. According to Blablaaa's logic, the Battle of Chosin Reservoir should be labeled an "American tactical victory" because US forces inflicted, at bare minimum, double the number of casualties they sustained, despite having been forced to retreat. The Battle of Stalingrad must have been a German victory because they inflicted some 300,000 more casualties on the Soviets.

Moreover, the books that are actually about Jutland and the North Sea war as a whole (i.e., Marder, Tarrant, Herwig) call it tactically inconclusive. Books by experts on the specific topic hold more weight than general works that mention the topic in passing (for instance, the several encyclopedias and USS Yorktown at Midway). Parsecboy (talk) 18:00, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

FunnyBlablaaa (talk) 19:05, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Your sources not even claim tactical inconclusive. Parcey what you do at the moment is defending your opinion and making OR. You try to explain me why this battle was inconclusive. This Battle, always and everywhere, was considered a german tactical victory. The only place where this is not supported is the english wiki. You not even brought sources claiming tactical incnclusive. You wrote a long text explaining me your OR and SYN why this is no german tactical victory, clearly showing that you, in compariosion to the 50 books, did not understand what tactical means. Dear parceyboy, the problem is your understanding. You dont understand what tactical means all the books do understand but you not thats why you dont agree. Your own sources dont support you they not say "tactical inconclusive". Blablaaa (talk) 19:12, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Let me reproduce this for you, as you apparently missed it the first time:

From the tactical point of view, since neither fleet was able to inflict a crippling blow on the other, Jutland belongs to the series of inclusive battles...which are the rule in naval warfare." (Tarrant, p. 278)

Also, please learn how to spell my name. I took the time to spell yours right, do me the courtesy. And do not condescend to tell me what I do and do not know; I probably have a far better understanding of the Battle of Jutland than you do. Those historians who specifically study this battle and the naval war in the North Sea generally state that the battle was inconclusive tactically and a strategic British success.

Moreover, any historian who calls this battle inconclusive is of course referring to the tactical side. No one disputes that strategically the British won the battle. Parsecboy (talk) 02:11, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

^^ please look the full quote you forgot something: since neither fleet was able to inflict a crippling blow on the other, Jutland belongs to the series of inconclusive battles or partial victories which are the rule in naval warfare. From the strategic point of view, which is what .., why did you cut this words out? please tell me one reason why you cut this words out? ^^ regardeless the fact thats its only one source it only says both failed to cripple the the ofter but its doesnt say it was inconclusive, both had failed but still germany hat the tactical edge . The only quote which you have is not even supporting what you claim...Blablaaa (talk) 07:12, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

Sorry, Parsecboy, but this seems like yet another effort to avoid having to address the battle by itself. Now the argument is that if you divided the battle up into segments, the Germans would have won one, and the British would have won the other. Why not just look at the battle as a single, discrete occurrence? I think the reason might be that if you do so, it's hard to say why the Germans shouldn't be counted the victor (tactically speaking, of course).

No, the reason is that looking at the battle as a whole it's impossible to say one side won tactically. Scheer was badly outmaneuvered twice and the German fleet paid dearly for that. In the context of the wider fleet action, the three British battlecruisers that exploded are less relevant. I'm not denying Scheer credit for successfully extricating his forces from an unteneble position; far from it. I just won't go as far as saying he won tactically. Parsecboy (talk) 02:11, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

Also, you say that "a straight counting of losses is far too superficial" a way to judge the outcome of a battle from a tactical standpoint. I disagree with you. In a naval battle, taking or holding a particular square mile of sea is usually (but not always) of no importance at all. In general, the sea is the sea - it has no hills or crossroads or trench lines to be taken (I stress that I'm speaking only from a tactical standpoint - from a strategic perspective, holding a particular piece of sea can be very important). Thus, instead of comparing Jutland to land battles such as the Chosin Reservoir or Stalingrad, the more apposite comparison would be to a naval battle such as the Battle of the Coral Sea, where a tactical victory is traditionally ascribed to the Japanese solely because they sunk more ships.

Well, you're wrong. If we're going to play the numbers game, let's account for badly damaged ships, which surely figure into the casualty count. SMS Seydlitz and SMS Derfflinger were severely mauled; Seydlitz barely made it back to port. If one figures for the number of capital ships that required dry-docking and extensive repairs, both sides have ten (Germany: Seydlitz, Derfflinger, Von der Tann, Moltke, König, Markgraf, Grosser Kurfürst, Ostfriesland, and Helgoland damaged and Lützow sunk vs. Tiger, Princess Royal, Lion, Barham, Malaya, Warspite and Marlborough damaged and Indefatigable, Invincible and Queen Mary sunk). In basic terms, the casualties are equal, but the German figures are a much higher proportion of their forces (10 of 22 ships put out of action vs. 10 out of 45 dreadnoughts in commission). Nearly half of the German capital ship force was disabled for at a minimum of a month and a half; less than a quarter of the British dreadnoughts were. Parsecboy (talk) 02:11, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

First, the casualties at Jutland were not equal. You can't just equate a sunk ship, like Indefatigable, with a damaged ship, like Von der Tann. To put it simply, one was around to fight later that year, the other wasn't. Second, when you start talking about ratios of ships damaged at Jutland to ships in commission, you've retreated back to the realm of the strategic. Obviously, given the significantly smaller size of the High Seas Fleet, the losses suffered at Jutland were harder for it to sustain. But that doesn't have any bearing on whether or not Jutland was a tactical victory for one side or the other. To give another hypothetical to illustrate this point, just imagine a fight between a two-ship fleet and a one-hundred-ship fleet where the two-ship fleet sinks forty of the enemy but loses one in the process. The ratios are not in the smaller fleet's favor, and it maybe lost the battle from a strategic perspective, but it clearly won a smashing tactical victory. Groundsquirrel13 (talk) 04:23, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

And one more point. Take a hypothetical: pretend the Germans had attacked the Grand Fleet with a handful of torpedo boats, and that those torpedo boats sunk a few British battlecruisers before swiftly retreating back to port. Would you call that a British victory because they maintained possession of the "field"? Obviously, such an inferior force is not going to stick around to slug it out with the whole Grand Fleet, but that doesn't mean they didn't win a victory. In my opinion, what happened at Jutland is similar in character to this hypothetical. An inferior force came out, sunk a few British battlecruisers, ultimately found itself faced with overwhelming opposition, and retreated more-or-less safely. It didn't hold the field, but it still won a tactical victory. Groundsquirrel13 (talk) 19:11, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

To be honest i see only two explanations for this 1) it is not understood what tactical means, arguments like "they retreated" indicate this 2) somebody simply dont want to hear this battle was a tactical victory for the germans. Rergarding tactical, tactical is the handling of assets in the case like jutland where both failed to achieve their objectives the one who destroys more assets of the enemy is the tactical victor. its simply the very definition of tactical victoryBlablaaa (talk) 20:07, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Groundsquirrel, your hypothetical is completely irrelevant. You're describing a scenario where an inferior force categorically defeats a superior force in battle. Are you seriously trying to say that that is what the Germans achieved at Jutland? --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 20:32, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Obviously, Simon, I'm not saying that my hypothetical is exactly similar to what happened at Jutland. However, I think it is fundamentally similar. In my hypothetical, an inferior force comes out, sinks some ships, and then successfully retreats in the face of overwhelming force. At Jutland, an inferior force came out, sank some ships, and then successfully retreated in the face of overwhelming force. Clearly, Jutland wasn't as clean a victory as my hypothetical (the British managed to inflict some losses as well). But it is fundamentally similar, and thus I think it was a German tactical victory (notice the emphasis on the word "tactical"). Groundsquirrel13 (talk) 21:06, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

At all participants: I searched for neutral opinions and brought this issue here : [[1]], you may want to give an opinion there, i think its allowed to do that.Blablaaa (talk) 21:22, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

The Imperial War Museum claims the battle as a German tactical victory but a British Strategic victory -

Any analysis of ships lost and of casualties sustained shows that the Germans did indeed have a good superficial case for celebrating a victory. In all, the British lost three battlecruisers, three armoured cruisers and eight destroyers. The Germans lost one battlecruiser, one pre-dreadnought, four light cruisers and five destroyers. In addition some 6,094 British sailors lost their lives as opposed to 2,551 Germans. Most of the British casualties had been caused by the explosive detonation of the three battlecruisers - had the German battlecruisers displayed an equivalent volatility then the picture would have been very different.

Yet it remains a fact that the British won the Battle of Jutland. In the end the material successes of the High Seas Fleet fade into complete insignificance in comparison to the crushing strategic success of the British. The great question of the naval war had been answered. Although the High Sea Fleet would emerge again, they never again seriously threatened to dispute the command of the seas with the Grand Fleet. Their sole intention at Jutland had been to isolate a small portion of the British fleet and by destroying it allow a fleet action between relative equals to quickly follow. They had almost succeeded but they had in the end failed. The British loses were painful, but quickly replaced. The British margin of superiority was not affected in the slightest. There is no room for sentiment in war, the most brutal of sciences. The mere fact of the brave German fight against the odds does not materially change the result unless the morale of the Grand Fleet had been destroyed in the process. This was demonstrably not the case. Although proud of their achievements at Jutland, the more thoughtful German naval officers clearly acknowledged the legitimacy of the British strategic victory.

The English fleet, by remaining a 'fleet in being', by its mere continued existence, had so far fully fulfilled its allotted task. The Battle of Skagerrak did not relax the pressure exerted by the English fleet as a 'fleet in being' for one minute. Commander Georg von Hase, SMS Derfflinger, I Scouting Group, High Seas Fleet

Scheer understood this only too well. He had no intention of confronting the full strength of the Grand Fleet ever again and lost much of his enthusiasm for further surface adventures in the North Sea. Henceforth he advocated unrestricted submarine warfare as the naval panacea to the parlous strategic situation that entwined Germany. The morale of the German High Seas Fleet, which had briefly blossomed after the perceived German victory at Jutland, soon leached away as they realised that for them 'Der Tag' would never dawn. As the war finally staggered to a close two long painful years later, the High Seas Fleet mutinied rather than emerge to fight a last futile battle. The ultimate triumph of the Royal Navy was reflected in the humiliating surrender of the 70 ships of the High Seas Fleet on 21 November 1918. [2]--Jim Sweeney (talk) 22:07, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Glad to see the Imperial War Museum agrees with me! Groundsquirrel13 (talk) 22:44, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

they agree with the common view...Blablaaa (talk) 22:50, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Using google books and spending five minutes I have just found over 50 sources that support that this battle was inconclusive:

Ten sources that contain the term "tacticaly inconclusive" and over 30 that called the battle "inconclusive". Then i got bored counting as there was thousands of more results to look through; it would seem that historians calling the battle a German tactical victory are just as common as those calling it inconclusive or tactically inconclusive. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.4.87.120 (talk) 22:34, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

ARGH!!!! TACTICAL!!! they call the battle overall inconclusive. ARGH please unterstand what the point is !!!Blablaaa (talk) 22:38, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

and your conclusion is wrong. when u enter inconclusive and tactical you will get much books which say the battle was overall inconclusive but tacticla german victory... Blablaaa (talk) 22:43, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

@JimSweeney, nowhere in your quote does the word "tactical" occur, only the suggestion that the Germans had a "superficial case for claiming victory." That quote does make it clear that the German's did fail in their one tactical aim (unless we count retreat as a tactical aim as well). --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 08:47, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

Blablaaa, you are ignoring sources to benefit yourself. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.4.87.120 (talk) 10:47, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

please look the board for Fringe. I say there are sources which call it tactical inconclusive but far less than tactical german victory. You should also note that nearly all sources which call it tactical inconclusive, are british. I found in a quick search no german source claiming it was tactical inconlclusive ( i dont claim there is none ). Maybe you should look yourself. German call the battle : "Skagerrakschlacht" so use the word skagerrak. Tactical means "taktisch" inconclusive means "unentschieden". Good look searching i found no single book claiming this. While a near infinite amount of books claiming "taktischer deutscher sieg", You also should note that overall inconclusive and tactical inconclusive are two totally different things. If you take this into consideration your "50" sources will come down to 5 and some of them are the biographys of the british admiral... . Blablaaa (talk) 10:54, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

I ask you, what does inconclusive mean? One should consider when i looked through google books the snippets and pages generally talked about the strategic impacts seperatly? It does appear you are ignoring anything that does not agree with your POV. To me it seems both sides are pretty equal on the issue.

Please loose the sarcasim and airquotes, there are at least 50 sources i gave you the links to them. I only got up to about page 7 or 8 before i stopped so of course there is many many more. The two links are there for you and all to see.

A general rebuttal to your claim i lied about the number that state precisiley that the battle was "tactically inconclusive", please see and note that i do not believe any of them are British admirals:

1) Britain in the twentieth century, Charles More - Page 34 2) Fleet tactics and coastal combat, Wayne P. Hughes - Page 208 3) Hankey: man of secrets, Stephen Wentworth Roskill 4) Military heritage of America, Richard Ernest Dupuy 5) From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: Jutland and after (May ..., Arthur Jacob Marder 6) Britain in the century of total war: war, peace, and social ..., Arthur Marwick 7) Marshal Foch : a study in leadership, T. M. Hunter 8) The Political quarterly, OCLC FirstSearch Electronic Collections Online - 1962 9) The leverage of sea power: the strategic advantage of navies in war, Colin S. Gray 10) War in the modern world, Theodore Ropp —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.4.87.120 (talk) 11:34, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

Please stop bringing sources which claim stragical inconclusive, we talk about the tactical scale. You claim you brought 50 sources i told you, that after checking nearly all of the claim strategic inconclusive. I also explained that even if there are some sources claiming this i bring 10 which claim german tactical victory, thats what i call a minor/fringe view. Blablaaa (talk) 13:21, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

funny is when i insert "tactical inconclusive jutland" i get more books which claim "tactical german victory" than "tactical inconclusive" . so i search for inconclusive and get more hits to the opposite. Do you dispute this? please respond directly to my question if possibleBlablaaa (talk) 13:32, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

Lets talk honest now. When i search for tactical inconclusive jutland , i get 3 hist at the first 3 pages. But thereby i get 4 hits on german tactical victory. i search for one and get more for the other, if this is not convincing then i dont know. Most of the hists you get say the battle itself was inconclusive, which is maybe correct ( i tend towards british strategic victory ). But a inconclusive battle is no tactical inconclusive battle.Blablaaa (talk) 13:37, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

You are inventing conclusions to suite your own needs, the sources listed above specifically state that the battle was tactically inconclusive; you can see this for yourself if you follow the link already provided.

As for other countless books, so far not mentioned but are available in the second link that was provided, in which the historians have labelled the battle inconclusive; it is your own invention that this is in regards to the stategic field.

If the battle was inconclusive and countless historians are saying so, what do you think that means? How does that mean they are automatically talking about strategy and not the battle?

I think you need to admit that there appears to be equal wieght between either a tactical victory or an inconclusive battle. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.4.87.120 (talk) 14:33, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

No one disputes that this battle was a strategic victory for the British. If a historian refers to the battle as having been inconclusive, one can pretty safely assume they're talking about the tactical side. Parsecboy (talk) 14:49, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

Just one thing doing a Google search on a term Tactical Victory or anything else does not prove a thing. The term could well be in hundreds of books. but you have to read them to see what conclusion the author come to. --Jim Sweeney (talk) 15:21, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

@ip you didnt answer my question. if you search consense why you dont answer the question. Again when i stress google books and use "tactical inconclusive jutland" i get accidentely more books which claim german tactical victory. What does this say to you ? You claim there is a equal weight but you refuse to answer my important question. @parsecboy sorry thats nons****. Blablaaa (talk) 15:57, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

Who then claims this battle was a German strategic victory? Parsecboy (talk) 16:32, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

the battle itself was inconlusive nobody reached his operational objectives. Thats why they say "inconclusive". But germans won a tactical victory. Both can fail to reach their aims to assume this means tactical inconclusive is simple nonsense.Blablaaa (talk) 15:59, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

According to you, a battle has both strategic and tactical outcomes. No one disputes the fact that Jutland was a strategic British victory (other than yourself, apparently). If the authors are then not talking about the strategic component, they are then talking about the tactical one. This seems quite obvious. Parsecboy (talk) 16:32, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

According to me and according to common view of warfare. There are tactical scale ( the use of assets, destroying enemy assests achieving little objectives which allow to achieve operational objectives ) , then comes operational scale like: "lets destroy the enemy force" and then comes the strategic scale " i want to have controll over north sea to win the war". Both fleets failed to destroy the enemy , but german won a tactical victory because they destroyed twice the assets. But the battle/operation itself was inconclusive because the direct situation doenst changed and both failed, the following strategic implications were in favour to the british. A inconclusive battle in which both fleets failed, german won the tactical scale and british won a strategic victory. Blablaaa (talk) 17:04, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

We should wait for neutral opinions, you agree? Blablaaa (talk) 17:06, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

So...

Can everyone state what they actually think the infobox should say? Please try to keep it simple. Ranger Steve (talk) 18:34, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

keep it the way it is, otherwise we do this all over again for the folks that want to argue the other side. It is endless and more important a waste of time for 1 line in an info box.Tirronan (talk) 20:38, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

lost my interest in this. My research show clearly that more books say german tactical victory. Editors here want tactical inconclusive. Not willing to fight this till bitter end. Put your inconclusive in the box. Blablaaa (talk) 22:35, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

Having read through this, I'm still a bit puzzled by the idea that Jutland was a tactical victory for the Germans. Maybe it's just because I'm more familiar with land warfare than naval combat, but since when is a pure comparison of the magnitude of losses the best judgment of who won a battle tactically? The French lost more men at Verdun than the Germans, to take a contemporary example. That doesn't make Verdun a German tactical victory. Lee lost fewer men than McClellan at Antietam - does that make that battle a Confederate tactical victory? john k (talk) 03:31, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

Well, the problem is that now we are in an edit war with Blablaaa, and his friend or sock puppet Caden. I am guessing that they or he has decided to force a change to his liking.Tirronan (talk) 08:09, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

Personally, I'm deeply dis-satisfied with "tactically inconclusive" but it's the best consensus we'll get, and there's no way in Hell I'd support "tactical German victory" because the facts simply don't support it. It's interesting to note that since Ranger Steve has made this conciliatory move discussion seems to have nearly halted. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 09:20, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

He simply went to trying to force his way on the outcome box without discussion. The guy has been blocked more times than I care to count and Caden has as checkered a past. Blablaaa has a history of sock puppets as well so I don't know what is what. I notice that after 3 attempts, 2 by 1 account and 1 more by the other it ceased. We get much more and I think it is time to get the admin's involved.Tirronan (talk) 09:54, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

Why not just get rid of the tactically inconclusive and leave it at British dominance of the North Sea maintained which no one can argue with.--Jim Sweeney (talk) 09:31, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

Someone would have an argument with it. You should see some of the stuff we put up with in the War of 1812. It is the mentality that "I have to win" and being convinced that they are right. The fact that the German fleet had to run into port and that is had so few ships left in a condition to continue the fight at all seems to always escape notice. Scheer knew it and ran for the existence of his fleet, what was said behind closed doors to the Kaiser leaves no doubt that the German high command and the High Seas Fleet considered it a defeat. But that doesn't seem to matter to them either. You know I sure would like another shot at a better outcome than we have but its hard to do with a troll beating hysterically on your door.Tirronan (talk) 09:54, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

How about ignoring the military terms and not applying them to the result. I think this is one instant where the outcome should be described in layman terms. I suggest Loss ratio favour German forces, however British maintain dominance of the North Sea. Something to that effect. Dapi89 (talk) 11:10, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

i guess dapis advice is cool but iam sure tirronan will hate it. Blablaaa (talk) 11:19, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

john :" but since when is a pure comparison of the magnitude of losses the best judgment of who won a battle tactically? ", since this is the definition of a tactical victory when nobody achieved a tactical victory due to other reasons. Iam wondering that while there are 90 sources with tactical victory people say things like : "and there's no way in Hell I'd support "tactical German victory" because the facts simply don't support it." .  :-). thats how wiki works: fuck the sources i dont like this Blablaaa (talk) 11:22, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

So it's impossible for a battle to be tactically inconclusive unless the margin of losses is exactly equal? This is nonsense. john k (talk) 15:26, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

Indeed its nonsense you are correct but this is not my conclusion, its yours. And we dont talk of slight difference we talk of twice the BRT Blablaaa (talk) 17:19, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

Dapi, what on earth is "Loss ratio favour[s] German forces" supposed to mean? All it does is favour the claim that by sinking the most ships and killing the most men, the Germans could claim victory, which is a dubious enough assertion. The British losses were made good within a matter of months, while the Germans had to wait until 1917 before they got a replacement for the lost Lützow. Beatty still could go to sea with his battle cruiser squadrons, but Hipper certainly couldn't take out Scouting Group I. The damaged German capital ships we know about had to spend 644 days in dry dock while the Royal Navy's damaged ships spent 297 days in dock. (Yates. p. 217.) And as to military terms, the question of holding the field of battle came up earlier (someone saying it didn't apply to sea warfare). Jellicoe evidently disgreed, as he wrote on 6 June, 1916: --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 11:30, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

Hello Simon. I don't dispute the strategic outcome, which most of your post confirms. Hence I write that the British dominate the seas in place of using military terms such as strategic victory which it most certainly was. But this does not explain that losses were - during the course of the battle - in the IGN's favour. Ratio of forces means; the Germans suffered far fewer losses in relation to its size than the British. That is how I see it. I don't believe the battle can be claimed to be a German victory of any sorts, but the difference in losses merits a place in the result, even if we attribute no military victory to the Germans. Dapi89 (talk) 12:25, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

“ It is ludicrous for the Germans to claim a victory. Victory always rests with the force that occupies the scene of the action, and we did this for the greater part of the next day, until it was quite clear that they had all gone home or as many as were left to go. If they had been so confident of victory they would have tried to go on fighting instead of legging it for home. ”

fin3 simon harley you presented a quote of some somebody who falsly believe a tactical victory requieres "occupiing the scene" which contradicts warfare theories at all. Especially at sea where the ground is pretty irrelevant. And he says "we " so he seems not to be any kind of historian ^^ sooo no good quote. but what is with this quote:

“ Over the German claim to tactical victory there can be little disagreement ”

and now? Blablaaa (talk) 11:40, 24 July 2010 (UTC) simon :

“ he British losses were made good within a matter of months, while the Germans had to wait until 1917 before they got a replacement for the lost Lützow. ”

sorry but this is the undisputable proof that you dont understand what tactical means. I cant understant that editors which got 90 sources presented still are fighting for their desired outcome , how can you claim this is a clear inconclusive after 90 sources say other? sorry cant understand this Blablaaa (talk) 11:43, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

Well, obviously this is a contentious subject, so maybe the best solution is to forget about trying to declare who won and just give a dry, factual statement about what the results of the battle were. That way we can leave it to the readers to make whatever conclusion they want to make. I would suggest a statement along the lines of "Royal Navy suffered greater losses, but British dominance of the North Sea maintained." I don't believe either of those points can legitimately be disputed, and it avoids making a judgment about what those facts mean. If anybody likes this idea, we could work to come up with a statement that is more-or-less acceptable to both sides. Groundsquirrel13 (talk) 22:21, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

i like this compromise , but still think its not the best choise but far better then inconclusive which is not the common viewBlablaaa (talk) 22:32, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

BlaBlaa, my quote earlier (before Dapi disjointed in slightly in replying to me) was written by Admiral Jellicoe. I think he was a slightly greater expert on war than any of us here. As to my statement which you quoted part of, I'm merely pointing out that in order for the Germans to claim a tactical victory on the basis of ships sunk alone, they would have had to cripple the Grand Fleet, which they clearly did not.

Why is there an obsession with making a statement in the infobox that the Germans inflicted more losses? I sincerely doubt that whatever statement you come up with will be acceptable, as it will be a loaded statement. It would be similar to the suggestion that the infobox contain nothing but "Germans retreated twice, British dominance of the sea maintained." --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 07:55, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

It really wouldn't be similar at all. "Royal Navy suffered greater losses, but British dominance of the North Sea maintained" is a compromise. It shows that both sides have a basis for claiming victory, but it doesn't make any judgment about which is right. In contrast, "Germans retreated twice, British dominance of the sea maintained" is just a 2-0 whitewash for the British. It gives no indication that the Germans did anything at the battle but run away and lose.

In any event, a compromise is necessary if we're ever going to get a statement that's generally acceptable. I'm looking forward to serious suggestions. Groundsquirrel13 (talk) 16:30, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

From my point of view the article claimed inconclusive in the box what it at least not the common view. The only "obsession" here is that people want to have tactical inconclusive while they ignore many sources. I guess the compromise of dapi would be ok. groundquireel supports this. What do you suggest?Blablaaa (talk) 18:42, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

What about: "Both sides claimed victory. Royal Navy suffered greater losses, but British dominance of the North Sea maintained."?--Toddy1 (talk) 18:42, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

this would reflect the facts 2 Blablaaa (talk) 20:21, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Excellent. I'm fully in favor. Groundsquirrel13 (talk) 22:04, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Editing convenience break

Personally Ive always been happy with outcome: 'british control of the north sea maintained', and leave it at that because of the arguments. A week after the battle the Germans claimed victory on the basis of sinking more ships. This proved foolish, because they overclaimed and had to retract. In britain it was widely seen as a defeat, not least because just about anything short of total anihilation of the german fleet was generally seen as defeat. It was impossible for the british fleet to live up to public expectations. A propaganda war broke out not just between Germany and Britain, but in due course between jellicoe and Beatty (or their supporters) over exactly the outcome on the day. There are two parts to the battle: the battlecruiser action and the battleship action. It is arguable that on numbers the germans won the battlecruiser engagement, whereas they lost the battleship engagement. Overall, Germany lost the battle. Afterwards, British control of the north sea was indeed maintained. Moreover, the actual forces available to the two sides after the battle favoured the british more than before the battle. So, strategically the germans lost. What does 'tactical victory' mean? If it means that by some measure the germans improved their position with this battle, well tell me what it was. they didnt. Someone above claimed that the ratio of losses favoured Germany. No, it didnt. If the germans had continued having tactical 'victories' like Jutland the result would have been britain still had an effective fleet while Germany had none. How can you describe a result which makes your relative position worse as a tactical victory? In what sense is it a victory? A suicide raid?

The difficulty is that there is a tendency simply to count sunk ships. The Germans counted themselves very lucky they didnt lose a couple more, which were near to sinking. By only counting sunk ships you overlook the extent of damage to the remainder. The German tactical objective was to cut off a small number of British ships and destroy them with a localised superiority of numbers. You claim that they succeeded, yet they themselves felt they succeeded so well they vowed never, ever, to get into the same position again. The Germans understood this point that whatever you call this encounter, all they ccould achieve by repeating the same level of success would be to lose the naval war.

I would reiterate a comment made above, that it is impossible to 'google' books and get a reference on this. All the good books I have read have pages of discussion about the various losses on either side and their significance. it is all 'on the one hand...., but on the other hand...' and I have read books which while overall they state the result as inconclusive (which it was) they could easily be used to produce quotes either way by misquoting. Thats the trouble with referencing. Sandpiper (talk) 20:20, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Hear Hear --Jim Sweeney (talk) 20:33, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Actually I rather like that idea Sandpiper... no matter how you cut it the Grand Fleet still held the area and the blockade remained, every attempt at a sortie after Jutland was another attempt to engage part of the British fleet.Tirronan (talk) 03:28, 26 July 2010 (UTC)

WP:OR WP:SYN and a bit selective editing. Dont want to argue but read what you write and please understand that we present published information and dont create informations.Blablaaa (talk) 21:13, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Well you seem to have been a busy chap in the 5 months you have been editing: 2000 edits in 5 months, 1/3 in user talk and 1/4 in article talk. Even 10% in wikipedia talk, which I presume means admin. Blocked from editing 5 times in 5 months? I see you have been very busy reading up on rules too. I hope you understand their spirit, rather than the letter. On the whole I read what i write quite carefully, and I thought the last posting was to the point and rather good. I have yet to see a single one of your sources analysed in detail, and frankly they do not agree with the books I have read, which are broadly speaking the most generally recognised modern (ie last 50 years!) texts on the subject. I have read some frankly atrocious descriptions of the battle which continue to peddle the early mistakes produced by those either with their own axes to grind at the time, or just suffering lack of information. I'm sure there are thousands of books in existence which would agree with you, but quantity doesnt make them right.Sandpiper (talk) 23:01, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Oh he is doing much better than that, he is playing with an outright ban right now, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia_talk:Requests_for_comment/Blablaaa, and apparently thinks he is persuasive enough to argue his way out of it. Feel free to head over and make any of your views available. I find it amazing that you and I disagree as much as agree and never once got into it yet this guy... sheesh.Tirronan (talk) 23:44, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

This is a pretty well developed article which covers the basic ground. We are usually arguing about quite difficult points (such as the question of who won!). There is frequently no simple answer for something which happened 100 years ago but people are still arguing about. The problem with the infobox is its supposed to be a very very short statement, and you cant make one about who won. If hipper had managed to sink a couple of Queen elizabeth's instead of battlecruisers this would be quite a different matter, but he did not. He ran from the QE's.Sandpiper (talk) 19:27, 26 July 2010 (UTC)

i need 50 edits on jutland talk to do one edit at jutland because people are doing a little WP:OR because they dont like what sources say. Is this a good explanation for you? and yes share your thought at the RFC i will share mine about you then Blablaaa (talk) 00:07, 26 July 2010 (UTC)

Let me explain this to you in no uncertain terms, every editor here knows this battle, the technology, maritime warfare in general, and this battle in particular. There is not a bit of OR anywhere in this article and anyone attempting to do so is reverted very quickly. We watch this article like a hawk and will continue to do so. You are not going to tell me or any of the other editors what is OR and what is not. Every one of us has a long history of being an editor here and making valuable contributions. We can all stand up for the work here without a bit of embarrassment and I for one reject outright any claim of bias here. Good luck to you in your future endeavors.Tirronan (talk) 00:49, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

when you get sources presented which dispute the outcome in the box you start to talk about damaged ships and explain everyone why you think this was inconclusive, but nobody cares what you think about the outcome. we use reliable secondary sources for building articles and if there are enough sources to dispute the outcome which is not even cited then i must be changed. Regardless if you dont like it... Blablaaa (talk) 02:13, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

The genius got himself placed on indefinite block for trollingTirronan (talk) 16:51, 13 August 2010 (UTC)

Codes

The short statement on codes could do with being lengthened a little. In a history of decypherment (I'll find the source if anyone wants) in the lead up to Jutland and the knowledge of German orders the fact was that "intelligence" like "submarining" was not a role that a gentleman of any class would contemplate performing. So asking a Deck Officer Commander to find out from Room 40 what the latest intel was would have been rather like demanding he cleaned the ratings heads with his own toothbrush. So the Commander asked a stupid question, got a fatuous answer which he didn't understand and put the entire British Fleet as risk. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Drg40 (talk • contribs) 19:23, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

Actually, Drg40, you should really get your facts right. The "Deck Officer Commander" you refer to was one of the most able men in the Royal Navy at that time, Captain (later Admiral Sir) Thoams Jackson. He was present at Tsushima, where Togo had "eulogised [his] cool & gallant bearing during action." Alternating between shore and sea service, he completed the signal course and two war courses before spending four years in Naval Intelligence, first as Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence and then as Director of the Intelligence Division of the Admiralty War Staff, with service as Commodore Commanding a Light Cruiser Squadron and a dreadnought battleship on the side. As the historian Nicholas Black has pointed out in his history of the Naval Staff, Jackson's Admiralty service means he would have been kept abreast in the revolution in Strategic Command and Control and the importance of wireless telegraphy outlined by Nicholas Lambert in his article on the subject.

Captain Jason Hines, a United States Navy intelligence officer, had an article ["Sins of Omission and Commission" Journal of Military History] published two years ago which makes clear that the account of Jackson barging into Room 40 and asking an incorrect question is a vindictive fabrication, for the very simple reason that Room 40 was not yet aware that any callsign switch had been made, and wouldn't be until the battle was raging on the 31st. All the hype stirred up against Jackson was based on the post-war allegation of one Room 40 duty officer, which no historian decided to check for ninety years. So when the Admiralty told Jellicoe it didn't know that the Germans were at sea, it was because they couldn't know. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 20:38, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

Thankyou for your unnecessary opening insult. It's that sort of thoughtless specious unpleasantry that mars Wikipedia and your contribution. If your information is more up to date, good for you. Say so and be done with it. Is it or is it not true that "intelligence" like "submarines" was a service beneath contempt? Certainly my grandfather, who served in submarines was convinced it was. And, if you'd bothered to notice before excitement took over you fingers, my point was that the dismissal of this matter in a brief sentence hardly does justice to the issue. You, of course, from your Olympian position know all there is to know. I was rather looking for constructive contribution and correction. Drg40 (talk) 21:00, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

Consider it an insult if you wish, but it wasn't meant that way. You made a spurious reference to a "fact". I disproved your fact. If you found nothing informative or constructive about your post then I'm sorry for you. Your grandfather was evidently caught up in the esprit-de-corps of his branch, which is not necessarily a good thing, since it tends to cloud objectivitity at the best of times. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 07:36, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

I do consider it an insult, and despite your weasel words there is no other way of taking it. I resent your tone in reply to a reasonably mildly mannered remark and I consider further that the nature of your apology, if that is what you intended, which I doubt, is a disgrace. I'm not sorry for you, I'm sorry for Wikipedia. I did not give a spurious reference (in fact I didn't give any reference) but there are enough books referring to the problems of room 40 and intelligence (including the Wikipedia article on the subject, talk section, which perhaps might benefit from a light corrective touch) around before some USN intelligence officer published a rebuttal. The contents of the reference may be spurious, but the reference itself is not. If you're going to attempt to take a high moral tone, I suggest it is you who should carefully consider accuracy.

And I still mildly remark that the dismissal of the codes/rooom 40/Jutland issue in one short sentence without even a slight reference to any subsequent controversy seems unfortunate. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Drg40 (talk • contribs) 08:53, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

The reality seems to be that this matter is not a straightforward one of reporting facts, which is what makes life easy for us on wiki. The secret intelligence operations were firstly SECRET with few people allowed to know what went on, so little surprise if also no one regarded something they had never heard of very highly. The navy seems to have been surprisingly open at that time with regard to secrets in general, but information about the intelligence department was definitely something they did not want to get out. Their success gives rise to our difficulties in discovering what happened. The whole aftermath of this battle is chequered wih people explaining away their own failures by boosting those of others. So personally I dont know exactly what happened: only that there are at least two versions of events. The widely accepted explanation, which is certainly a nice story, and more recent analysis casting doubt on it. It is something anyone wanting to expand in greater detail needs to research with care to decide exactly what the current consensus is. Sandpiper (talk) 19:01, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Very well put. It seems also to me to be very difficult to understand Jutland (and I freely volunteer that I don't) unless you have some grasp of the class riddled nature of British society at the time and the way that was reflected in the RN, the huge numbers of deaths on the Western front and whether the RN longed for an engagement which would assuage their (perhaps irrational) guilt and establish that they were "doing their bit" and alone could achieve "the breakthrough" as befitted the Senior Service, and in this particular matter the nature of the management skills in the form of office politics that were practised and acceptable in the RN at the time.

As to whether all that stuff has a place in this article I doubt, perhaps a simple throw away remark might suffice?

Drg40 (talk) 10:07, 26 July 2010 (UTC)

Incidentally under the heading "British response", 2nd paragraph, commencing "The British Admiralty's Room 40 maintained..." at the end of the para I tried to add "The handling and distribution of these signals has been the subject of some subsequent controversy." The sentence has gone, but history doesn't show anyone has removed it, so I guess it got taken out automatically. Is there any objection if I try again? Drg40 (talk) 10:23, 26 July 2010 (UTC)

I took it out: there is a note against the edit saying so. Which signals were you referring to? At this point in the article we have only mentioned german signals intercepted before the british sailing which were used to alert the british fleet. Are these a source of controversy also? I inserted the 'citation needed' on 'a German signal on 28 May ordering all ships to be ready for sea on the 30th' because the detailed description I was reading at the time suggested these timings were incorrect. cant remember offhand whose version I was reading. Sandpiper (talk) 19:05, 26 July 2010 (UTC)

I see what you mean. It's this para:

"Jellicoe's ships proceeded to their rendezvous undamaged and undiscovered. However, he was now misled by an Admiralty intelligence report, advising that the German main battlefleet was still in port.[21] The Director of Operations Division, Rear Admiral Thomas Jackson had asked the intelligence division, Room 40, for the current location of German call sign DK, used by Admiral Scheer. They had replied that it was currently transmitting from Wilhelmshaven. It was known to the intelligence staff that Scheer deliberately used a different call sign when at sea, but no one asked for this information or explained the reason behind the query, to locate the German fleet.[22]"

in the article which I maintain to be of rather more importance that at first appears. There is a massive breakdown in communication revealed here. Whether Jackson was a Rear Admiral or a Captain (as Simon Harvey maintains above) at the time he would certainly not have acted as his own messenger so there is someone else in the loop. Contributor Simon Harvey maintains that the whole thing is a fabrication. As I understand it, "DK" was Wilhelmshaven and was the callsign used by the senior officer present. So Scheer was "DK" whilst he was in Wilhelmshaven and something else when he left. This was the system used in the RN and is certainly the system used in the USN now, witness Armstrong's famous report: "Tranquillity base here. The Eagle has landed." As he was the senior officer at "Tranquillity base" (although also commander of the lunar landing craft "Eagle") that was his callsign. So if Jackson did actually ask for the current location of DK he should have been surprised beyond measure if he got any other answer than that Wilhelmshaven was still where it always had been!

Seems to me like a hell of a risky game of Office Politics, worthy of note. Even if Jackson asked the wrong question, Room 40 must have known that was not the answer he sought. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Drg40 (talk • contribs) 08:49, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

Well I can't resolve your problems. Harley is hot on facts and has read some stuff about this, and posted about it in the past (somewhere!). He can be a bit abrupt, but he's good. Some observations though: The naval intelligence department was only created in the last quarter of the 1800s and was a lot more unknown than it is now. What may be convention now was not necessarily so then. There is an established story about what happened, as reported here and widely published in the literature, so we have included it. Whether its right or not is another matter. I don't find it strange that Jackson was his own messenger. As I understand it, a messenger would never have been allowed near room 40, so thats not strange. Second, I have the impression it was very small, so again, relatively few people involved at all. Third, Quite literally the naval staff was in the habit of going home and closing up for the night. There was very poor staff structure, So Jackson might literally have been the only person around with security clearance to go and find out what was happening. I dont know the history of this anecdote, who originated it or why. I suspect that some of the difficulties over intelligence reports stem from keeping back information deliberately so as to hide the source of that information. The British were not the only people listening to enemy wireless and decoding it. I dont know whether the germans really could read british codes, but the admiralty must have realised the possibility they might, given it was doing so to theirs.

I will add that this issue was not a serious mistake. Beatty et al. did not do anything different because of this information mixup. The serious errors came in the night, when the messages intercepted about german fleet movements failed to get through to jellicoe. Sandpiper (talk) 19:28, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

Ok, further to my last comments, I have been reading Roskill's biography of Earl Beatty p.152-155 where he has something to say about room 40. Roskill seems to be referring in particular to information obtained from W F Clarke, who it says worked for the cryptographic department for 30 years, who seems to have corresponded with Chalmers, who also wrote a biography of Beatty. Dont have Chalmers book handy at the moment to see what he says. Clarke wrote 'In room 40 we knew the exact composition and state of readiness of the German fleet from day to day, but J R J (Jellicoe) was not given this information and it was only after Jutland, when he raised the question, that we were allowed to tell him... we had up to then no means to communicate with the C in C nor did we know what he was being told.' Roskill says that jellico was advised by the admiralty to expect 27 or 28 german battleships (including the new bayern) and 6 battlecruisers (including new hindenberg), whereas actual numbers were 22 and 5. I presume he means that room 40 knew the correct numbers but this was not passed on. On the one hand, this might have caused Jellicoe to err on the side of caution a bit more, but totally failed to encourage Beatty to do so. He should have been expecting to meet 6 German battlecruisers, not 5, when he left the 5 BS behind. Roskill also quotes Cowan (princess royal) as saying he had feared that the 'damned 5th battle squadron is going to take the bread out of our mouths', and suggests this was the most likely explanation the 5BS was placed away from the enemy. The battlecruisers in general were overconfident.

Roskill also has something to say about the callsigns. He says that this was shifted to a shore station, presumably implying previously messages were coming from a ship, and that the normal wireless operator was also transferred ashore, so that his messages would have the same 'touch'. Information about this originating from kapitan zur see Kupfer who worked for B-Dienst (german room 40). The inference being the germans knew the british were listening, that they might detect the change and so the germans took special measures to prevent this happening. Roskill relates that Clarke visited the fleet and was asked to dine with Beatty, who accosted him with a copy of the erroneous report about the germans still being in harbour. Clarke was horrified that such a signal had been sent. Roskill reports the signal in question was originated by Jackson, but only says 'an officer' went to room 40 to ask where call sign Dk was coming from.

Roskill suggests two consequence of this failure to report correctly on sheers position. First, that Jellicoe proceeded more slowly than he otherwise would and allowed more space between himself and Beatty. So the battle might have happened earlier in the day with more time for the british to engage Scheer rather than breaking off for the night, and Beatty might not have been exposed for so long (or at all). Second, that the 3BS and 3CS from the Thames and Tyrwhitt's Harwhich destroyers could have been advanced and taken some part in the battle, whereas they were kept back to guard against Scheer making a move along the channel. These last forces were held back by the admiralty, not by Jellicoe, but Roskill doesnt comment on whether it was the admiralty itself which misundestood where Scheer was and thus kept back those forces, or whether the admiralty did properly understand what room 40 was telling it but felt it better to hold them back anyway. Tyrwhitt tried his damnest to disobey orders and join in anyway.

It strikes me that Jackson, who harley says was an experienced intelligence officer, might have been cautious of telling Jellicoe that Scheer had left port when he knew that the Germans were taking special pains to disguise this fact, and wanted them to think they were succeeding, whereas any reaction by Jellicoe to the specific knowledge might have given this away. I can't say what room 40's opinion of the whereabout of Scheer at this time might have been, nor whether Jackson might have been aware of any degree of doubt about his whereabouts. Given they were expecting Scheer to sail and that callsign switching was customary, even in the absence of specific evidence scheer had sailed I would think they would not assume he was definitely still in port. I have somewhere seen a summary of actual messages sent by the admiralty and Roskill says there is one, but I dont remember if it gives actual wording, or even if it does whether this might not have been edited for publication (possibly by Beatty). It is just possible that Jackson could have sent out a messages advising DK was still in port expecting Jellicoe to understand this was not conclusive evidence of anything. Sandpiper (talk) 06:20, 31 July 2010 (UTC)

Fantastic stuff. Where does it all belong? Here on in the Room 40 article which now looks all a bit too terse? Drg40 (talk) 10:31, 31 July 2010 (UTC) The room 40 article is where this belongs. If there were a writeup there it could be linked from here. We already give some mentions to intelligence failures somewhere. I would observes that roskill dates from 1980 and harley has some more recent stuff. Roskill also says room40 only became formally part of the naval intelligence unit in 1917, whatever that might imply about it being so secret it wasn't even part of naval intelligence. Sandpiper (talk) 15:51, 31 July 2010 (UTC)

>Room 40 only became formally part of the naval intelligence unit in 1917, whatever that might imply about it being so secret it wasn't even part of naval intelligence

Room 40 provided SIGINT. In the current UK intelligence set up, the GCHQ SIGINT organisation is not part of the Secret Intelligence Service.--Toddy1 (talk) 16:10, 31 July 2010 (UTC)