Talk:Battle of Jutland/Archive 5

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Windy Corner?

Hello, I've done a first pass at adding citations to the "Fleet Action" section. The only reference I could not find was for the "Windy Corner" bit. It seemed to me I've read about that as a more general period of confusion involving many more ships at some other time in the battle, but I couldn't locate the passage. Is it really just the Warspite's circling? Can anyone provide a reference for this sentence?

Also, is there any way to make footnotes be in a tiny font? They destroy the paragraph formatting, at least on my screen, by introducing unwanted line spacing. Rep07 (talk) 21:26, 16 May 2008 (UTC)

Both Harl and I both have sources for citation of both. Tirronan (talk) 22:19, 16 May 2008 (UTC)

Eh. One of those cryptic fellows. Rep07 (talk) 03:29, 17 May 2008 (UTC)

From what I gather "Windy Corner" does refer to Warspite's two complete circles under the fire of the German battle fleet, with Warrior making her way out of enemy fire. The thing is though that "Windy Corner" seems to have been an oft-used term for that kind of sticky situation. --Harlsbottom (talk) 20:41, 19 May 2008 (UTC)

OK, I found the passage in Massie where he describes "Windy Corner", p. 614, so I used that description (heavy traffic under fire on SW flank during deployment) and citation for now. If there's a different description that someone prefers and can reference, I'm sure they'll replace it... Rep07 (talk) 22:57, 27 May 2008 (UTC)

"Two points to port"?

Does anyone have a reliable citation for that Beatty comment. Massie dismisses it as apocryphal (p. 596 footnote) and Campbell of course doesn't mention it. If it can't be referenced, it should be removed as probably it's one of those things that someone made up later and that journalists popularized (like "the Guard dies but never surrenders" at Waterloo...) Rep07 (talk) 00:26, 19 May 2008 (UTC)

According to W.S. Chalmers, later Rear-Admiral, then Assistant Navigating Officer on H.M.S. Lion;

“ Beatty came into the Lion's chart-house. Tired and depressed, he sat down on the settee, and settling himself in a corner he closed his eyes. Unable to hide his disappointment at the result of the battle, he repeated in a weary voice, "There is something wrong with our ships," then opening his eyes and looking at the writer, he added, "And something wrong with our system." Having thus unburdened himself he fell asleep. ”

-Chalmers, The Life and Letters of David, Earl Beatty. p. 262. Gordon mentions but doesn't cite the "bloody ships" quote at all, and attributes the "two points nearer" part to Churchill, quite unreferenced, which always helps the scholar. Harlsbottom (talk) 01:07, 19 May 2008 (UTC)

Use of Massie

I should be clear, I have no issue with people who cite Massie, after all he is a very respected historian. However, being a good cynic I tend to distrust wildly most things a seventy-five year old part-time naval historian writes. Example;

“ Remarkably, the most powerful British ships of all (the 15-inch-gunned 5th Battle Squadron) directly observed German battleships crossing astern of them in action with British light forces, at ranges of 6,000 yards or less, and gunners on the HMS Malaya made ready to fire, but her captain declined, deferring to the authority of Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas—and neither commander reported the sightings to Jellicoe. ”

Actually, if one is going to pursue this further there is further blame to lay. The manner in which Captain Boyle of Malaya informed Evan-Thomas on Barham was, according to Marder (DTSF, Vol. III, p. 180) by shaded lamp to Valiant, who forwarded the message on. If the Navigating Officer of Valiant, Geoffrey Freyberg, is to be believed (writing in the Sunday Telegraph in 1966 - 50 years later) he fully expected the Fifth Battle Squadron to engage the German ships around midnight, which of course did not materialise.

It should be noted that the fighting observed by the Fifth Battle Squadron was also visible to the main battle fleet and to the ships in company with Jellicoe. Even Gordon suggests that the officers of 5BS can be forgiven for not reporting something they assumed could be seen by the Commander-in-Chief, but which due to mist and other factors wasn't. Having not invested in a copy of Massie I can only suppose that he doesn't mention all these other factors in his tome. Harlsbottom (talk) 10:55, 19 May 2008 (UTC)

Well he does include some quotes and remarks exploring the officers' point of view about that--the assumption that Jellicoe was aware of the situation, and the reluctance to use radio to report, to disturb the commander with signals, or to reveal position by firing. So it's not unbalanced.

re Massie in general--I agree he is not the best of all possible references, though by no means a hack. I will stand by Campbell as the most credible source for times, hits scored and by whom, damage done, and specifics of maneuvers. He drew on the lowest level original data available, some of which no one else had seen for 40 years or more. Obviously the article will never make GA if it relies mainly on one or two sources, so further work remains. I've done a first pass at citing all of the action narrative at this point; someone else probably should replace some of the citations with equivalent references from other good sources that they have, to add enough diversity that a GA review won't object. At this point on the specific issue of time stamps for events, the article is probably 95% standardized to Campbell's times, and I would recommend that we keep it that way, because sprinkling in (differing) times from other sources will create time sequence inconsistencies, and I defy anyone to provide more credible time references than Campbell. Also, the Notes section could contain brief comments on any cases of serious time conflicts between equally respected sources. Rep07 (talk) 20:15, 19 May 2008 (UTC)

Agreed on all points. Mind you, as much as I hate to say it Gordon has some good critiques on certain of Campbell's times/actions, but that's like a gnat vs. an elephant and Gordon blatantly had an argument to prove.

As for notes, I suggest à la HMS Royal Oak, and my own Kenneth Dewar, FA and GA articles respectively, that if there are notes to make that they have a separate section, so that issues as important as times can be included in a prominent enough manner without detracting from the narrative, and yet not being lost in the citations. --Harlsbottom (talk) 20:25, 19 May 2008 (UTC)

I'm afraid that after reading the start of this section a couple of times I still don't understand what exactly is being complained about re Massie, aside from his being the same age as Admiral fisher when appointed first sea lord for the last time. It just so happens that yersterday I was talking with a 93 year old who was entirely in possession of his marbles and debating the finer points of punctuation (a retired journalist). The posting just comments on something Massie said, and seems to say he might have gone further. What is objectionable? Sandpiper (talk) 12:43, 29 June 2008 (UTC)

Massie is writing at a higher level, summarizing and excerpting many other sources to create a dramatic narrative. I think some here would prefer the original sources be used as references, which makes sense. In some future referencing effort, no doubt someone will find better citations, from diverse sources, for some of the things that are backed up only by Massie now. In the meantime, any citations are better than none. Rep07 (talk) 19:19, 29 June 2008 (UTC)

Then i think you would have to disallow Marder also, for basing his writings in part on those that had gone before. The more of these books I read, the more I see similarities between the newer ones and older ones (for example, Corbett's near contemporary history). It comes down to accepting the repute of the person who wrote the book that they have fairly summarised the situation as of that time. Some of the earlier sources have very obvious flaws, essentially due to the absence of material which became available later, but importantly late works also draw upon the analysis of those who went before. Thus the comment above about Gordon's additions to Campbell's work: you could argue Gordon had little extra to say, but you could also argue he has checked over Campbell's contributions and verified them, except where he spots mistakes, thus Gordon is the better source for extracted summary. Whose opinion of which is best do we take? Sandpiper (talk) 23:44, 14 April 2009 (UTC)

More structure for "Fleet action"?

Hello, what do people think of breaking up the long and dense "Fleet action" section into several sub-sections (for readability and convenience of editing)? For example:

• The fleet action

• Jellicoe deploys the Grand Fleet (18:15) (or, "The fleets deploy" or "Preliminary maneuvers" or ?)
• Windy Corner (18:15 -- 18:30) (or, "Initial action" or ?)

(Defence Warrior Warspite Invincible etc.)

• Full fleet engagement (18:30 -- 19:15) (or, "Battleship action" or ?)

(main battleship actions)

• Disengagement (19:15 -- 20:45) (or, "Scheer disengages" or "Sunset" or...?)

(Scheer's 2nd turnaway, death ride, nightfall)

Rep07 (talk) 20:47, 21 May 2008 (UTC)

This looks to be an excellent idea, and so you know I have been rereading my sources for windy corner but I agree with Harl on that one as it appears a passing reference to a open patch of ocean with a lot of shells passing around, through, and into it. Tirronan (talk) 20:51, 21 May 2008 (UTC)

As they say, "Be bold". Name the last section Gefechtskerhtwendung - it describes what Scheer correctly did and if it doesn't interest people I'll be damned. "The Battle Fleets deploy" for the second title, perhaps? Bandie some more ideas around perhaps? --Harlsbottom (talk|library) 22:46, 21 May 2008 (UTC)

Crossing the T would come to mind rather quickly. Tirronan (talk) 02:12, 22 May 2008 (UTC)

Gefechtskerhtwendung hell yeah... then nobody could say "British-centric". Rep07 (talk) 02:53, 22 May 2008 (UTC)

This being the English Wikipedia, we should stick to English words where possible. ;-) The Land (talk) 09:11, 27 May 2008 (UTC)

"Destroyer" vs. "torpedo-boat"?

The German small ships seem to be referred to as torpedo boats often here, but as far as I can tell they were comparable in speed, size, and displacement to the British destroyers. Compare Acasta class destroyer to SMS V48. "Torpedoboot" was the literal German phrase, but for our purposes here wouldn't it be less confusing to the average reader to call them all destroyers? Technically, isn't a torpedo boat a smaller vessel (less than 600 tons), while the ships at Jutland on both sides were mostly in the 900-1200 ton range (more for the flotilla leaders like Tipperary)? So isn't it factually incorrect, or at least very misleading, to use this term here? Your average popular reader is going to think of a 50-ton speedboat going 60 mph when they read "torpedo boat" -- PT 109 in other words. Rep07 (talk) 20:31, 22 May 2008 (UTC)

The difference is I believe that the Germans themselves classified the majority them as "Coastal Torpedo Boats" due to range and armament inferiorities. I'll dig around for a cite on the classifications - while limiting confusion is always a good thing, accuracy is always nicer. --Harlsbottom (talk) 20:48, 22 May 2008 (UTC)

If memory serves, then the German Torpedo Boats were carrying larger torp load outs and lessor numbers of guns indicating a different concept in theory if not in use and remember British authors stating such but the terms were vague and I should like to have a source from the German side of things on that. Tirronan (talk) 00:00, 23 May 2008 (UTC)

@Rep07: If the average reader doesn't understand the difference between a torpedo boat 1890s style and a motor torpedo boat 1940s style, it's not our problem (at least not for this article). Navies at the time did treat the torpedo boat and the destroyer as distinct classes. Where they did, so should we. The Land (talk) 11:52, 23 May 2008 (UTC)

Its our problem if we are spouting instead of enligtening actually and reability/understandability is indeed a concept that I would hope that we hope to achive. I am not sugesting that we dumb down the article but it should be explained and not just thrown out there for the reader to misunderstand. From my reading the Germans expected their TB's be to be a leveler with the extra torp load and enough guns to defend themselves, while the British saw their Destroyers as a screen that offered a useful torp attack. While the differences are there they were in practice all but undiscernable. This need not be all that big a thing but a short paragraph should be done, and where it came to night fighting must be done. Tirronan (talk) 00:33, 27 May 2008 (UTC)

Might I humbly suggest a link to torpedo boat to clarify for the uninformed? Just a thought. Esseh (talk) 01:26, 27 May 2008 (UTC)

I think Tirronan is right, there should just be an explanatory sentence somewhere in "Orders of Battle" and/or a "reminder" maybe later in the article, that describes the difference, if "torpedeo boats" is going to be used consistently for all the German small ships. Which is fine w. me, if someone wants to make it consistent that way. And Esseh: the linking is already in there in some places. The linked article, though, covers a lot of history, and doesn't say much about WWI-era boats, so it does little by itself to resolve any confusion. Rep07 (talk) 18:06, 27 May 2008 (UTC)

Another German ship pic?

Hello, I've been looking through images associated with Category:Ships of the German Imperial Navy, etc. trying to find one more to add in for the German side (which has only one ship pic atm). Here are some images that seem to have "good" (non-deprecated) licenses. Any of these have appeal? Rep07 (talk) 01:07, 25 May 2008 (UTC)

HSF 2nd Squadron

HSF 1st & 2nd Squadrons

Kaiser

Ostfriesland (later as USS)

Posen

Thuringen

Rheinland

Nassau

Prinzregent Luitpold

Moltke

Lutzow

Wiesbaden

Largest Naval Battle?

The Battle of Jutland is not the larghest naval battle. I belive The Battle of Leyte Gulf is. Check the ship numbers. In Jutland, the Brits had 28 battleships,9 battlecruisers, 8 armoured crusiers, 26 light cruisers, 78 destroyers, 1 minelayer, and 1 seaplane carrier. The Germans had 16 battleships, 5 battlecruisers, 6 pre-dreadnoughts, 11 light cruisers, and 61 torpedo boats all adding up to 250 ships. In Leyte Gulf, the Americans had 8 fleet carriers, 8 light carriers, 18 escort carriers, 12 battleships, 24 cruisers, 141 destroyers, and also destoryer escorts, many P.T. boats, subs., and fleet auxiliaries. The Japanese had 1 fleet carrier, 3 light carriers, 9 battleships, 14 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 35 or more destroyers. That adds up to 279 not including destroyer escorts, P.T. boats, subs. and fleet auxiliaries. so, therefore I believe that The Battle of Leyte Gulf is the largest naval battle. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.131.233.119 (talk) 17:47, 8 June 2008 (UTC)

The article says Jutland "...was the largest naval battle of World War I ". Are you arguing with that? So far as I am aware, and I must confess I am not an expert in these things, Leyte Gulf was in WW2. In WW1 the Americans and the Japanese were on the same side, so I would be a little surprised to learn that they had a large naval battle against each other. It then goes on to say "It is also, by certain criteria, the largest naval battle in history". That is much more debatable, but the qualifier there rather makes it hard to argue with objectively. Personally I agree with you, the statement is borderline unencyclopaedic. Here's its entry on the relevant page "The largest battle in terms tonnage of ships engaged, and in terms of the total tonnage of ships involved in a single action. Possibly the largest battle-line action, in terms of numbers of ships engaged; certainly the largest in terms of the tonnage of ships engaged. The largest surface action and the largest ship-to-ship action, in terms of the tonnage of the ships engaged. The largest gun action in terms of the weight of fire of the guns involved, and the largest single action – surface or otherwise – in terms of the numbers of torpedoes launched." To which I can only add cite! cite! cite! Greg Locock (talk) 02:17, 9 June 2008 (UTC)

It was the largest naval battle of WW1 beyond a dispute I would think. Largest in history no but that is a can of worms just best left unopened. This is just another of those sticky trap discussions that talk pages devolve to. Tirronan (talk) 18:38, 13 June 2008 (UTC)

The "battle of Leyte gulf" consists of 3 related actions separated by hundreds of miles. Jutland remains the single largest contiguous naval action. I don't even care about the idiots that think an iron age galley battle in China is larger simply because it involved more raw manpower. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 116.125.84.170 (talk) 15:36, 24 December 2008 (UTC)

'great loss of life'

I note the article claims that there was 'great loss of life' in the battle. Actually, no, I don't believe this. The infobox says 9,000 killed. About 1000 per day die of natural causes in the UK. Considering the scale of the operation and its importance, several people saying while it might not have won the war, it could have lost it, and the general level of slaughter during actions in this war, it seems quite modest. Perhaps great loss of life on those ships sunk, approaching 100% in some cases, at maybe 1000 per pop. I would have just changed it, but maybe others do not agree? Sandpiper (talk) 20:24, 25 June 2008 (UTC)

As sea battles go the loss of 4 Battlecruisers and a Pre-dreadnought would seem to me to be rather high for a few hours work, but it is hard to hold a position on this given the loss of life in other large sea battles of WW2. I don't think that we need to take a position on this unless other editors agree. Tirronan (talk) 00:38, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

I fear I have come round to the conclusion that all you needed to do to sink the ships was chuck a fag end down on the dust in a gun turret and the flash would set of the whole magazine and destroy the ship. The article does take a position, it says it was a great loss of life, or did you mean we should moderate the phrase? Sandpiper (talk) 23:22, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

In the context it's in - "X ships were sunk with great loss of life" - I think it's ok. Normally that use suggests "lots of the people on the ship(s) concerned died" rather than "this incident is one of the greatest slaughters of all time". The Land (talk) 09:29, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

Well as can be inferred from my comment above, it did not strike me when reading it that it was great as a proportion of those onboard, rather great as in number dying from spanish flu in 1918 in britain, 250,000? It is a small number compared to noteable devastation incidents. Sandpiper (talk) 23:13, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

I wouldn't be averse to you changing it to something more specific like "with most of their crews losing their lives". Specific language is generally better! The Land (talk) 09:26, 27 June 2008 (UTC)

I fear I have come round to the conclusion that all you needed to do to sink the ships was chuck a fag end down on the dust in a gun turret and the flash would set of the whole magazine and destroy the ship.

If the article gives that impression then it needs drastic attention now. I will have a look-see at it. --Harlsbottom (talk | library) 12:09, 27 June 2008 (UTC)

It wasn't just this article which gave me that impression, rather the reading I have been doing. Three ships destroyed because a turret was hit. Yes, the shell had to penetrate, but the flames spread through the ship because of design/operating failures. It is not immediately obvious that a cigarette chucked through an open door by a crewman, just as in a 'carry on film', could not have sunk an entire ship. That is ridiculous. The Germans had similar problems, but had already fixed them before this battle, and their explosives were metal cased and less unstable. So, yes, this article does contain the information leading to that conclusion but I have not found any evidence it is wrong. Sandpiper (talk) 08:21, 4 July 2008 (UTC)

Just ask the ghosts of IJN Mutsu, fact is if cordite was laying around and you tossed a lit smoke at it yes the ship would be blown to hell. Yours truly remembers being in the magazine of a DDG 37 class Destroyer with some 800 rounds and charges with the smell of ether all over and we all made sure we left our lighters back in the bunks. Tirronan (talk) 21:17, 4 July 2008 (UTC)

Contrary to the twaddle which appears in this article (thanks to the good offices of the writing of Nicholas Lambert), Cordite MD and RPC/12 were both inherently stable if manufactured and stored correctly, a fact proven by the British when they tested both types to destruction after the war, before the Royal Navy switched to Cordite SC, a slightly less powerful but substantially safer propellant (i.e. it was made in such a way as the quality could not be so fickle as either the British or German propellants).

In what sense 'stable'? I interpret this a smeaning would not explode if you stamped on them, and would not chemcically decompose with time either into something dangerous, or something inert which would not work. Stable doe not necessarily mean it won't go bang if a match is applied. Sandpiper (talk)

Stable could mean ballisitic stability, chemical stability, or thermal stability; or all three. Sensitivity to stamping on them is not a batch problem, its a basic property of the propellant (or explosive); the technical term is Impact Sensitivity. Throwing a match on them is a criminal act, if the perpetrator lived, the he/she would be facing a criminal prosecution or a court martial. What may happen in a Carry on film, could cause death and destruction in real life - and its not possible to out run it, like they do in the films.Pyrotec (talk) 15:41, 7 July 2008 (UTC)

There are various points to be examined when looking at the loss of the battlecruisers. One is the fact that they were in the wrong place at the wrong time in light if their construction. Contrary to popular myth they were probably as well-built than their German counter-parts but less well-armoured, the Germans taking what can only be called risks when building their ships - stressing steels to relatively dangerous levels and using as thin materiel as possible.

These are different issues, the question is whether there was a problem with the explosive or its handling. Sandpiper (talk)

The storage of propellant is another point. British cordite was stored horizontally in brass cases, two charges to a case - with metal lids on - and therefore very safe. This is contrary to what some witnesses have called "Clarkson's bags" being in use at Jutland, leather charge cases which were phased out of service before WWI. For the record, whichever person put "brass" for the German cordite cases is wrong, as the Germans used zinc. Back to British charges, these were all stored in refrigerated magazines. Proper storage was extremely important however, as cordite was sent up in batches which were meant to be quickly identified if anything was found to be wrong with a particular batch of cordite.

You post a quote on your talk page explaining that an explosion on 'Lion' was due to eight charges in the handing room. No mention of whether in brass cases or not, but certainly they were ignited. They were however loaded 'loose', the explosive contained in silk bags designed to burn cleanly? Sandpiper (talk)

Which brings us to the manufacture of Cordite MD. Any chemical process should be done with the greatest care and the Royal Navy/Ordnance Board (the joint service committee which oversaw weapon design and production) had a good system to ensure that the best Cordite possible was sent up to the Grand Fleet, hence the batch system. However, that only works if samples from every batch were tested, which they were not, and therefore a substantial amount of very poor cordite got into the ships of the Grand Fleet, probably leading to the destruction of the three battlecruisers and also to the loss of Vanguard in 1917.

In what sense are you saying the cordite was defective leading to the losses, bad propellant causing inaccurate gunfire, or cordite in a dangerous chemical decay easily exploding? Isn't the technical issue of how difficult it is to properly manufacture cordite part of the whole issue of whether it is a better or worse material than the german equivalent? Not that I know enough about the german version to know how good it was. Sandpiper (talk)

It should be especially noted that flash protection varied wildly across the Battle Cruiser Fleet. For example in Invincible, between the magazines and the handing room outside the ammunition trunk one had to open a door to pass cordite through - and keep it open! (it should also be noted that this is the pattern that the German had in Baden and Bayern). Queen Mary and Lion were better, having flashtight scuttles on the magazine doors. However, it should again be noted that the only thing which saved Lion was the flooding of the magazines around "Q" turret, as the flashtight door probably wouldn't have held if the water hadn't been up against it.

This ends up on the point of "rate of fire". A high rate of fire helps establish the range and hitting the enemy as soon as possible. What the Grand Fleet practised was a high rate of fire. What Beatty had the Battle Cruiser Fleet do was just stupid, based on his idiotic conviction that the Germans were outshooting him 5 to 2 (five rounds to every two his ships could fire). However, unlike Lambert who takes the suggestion that because some ships in the BCF dogged open doors and removed hatches very seriously, it's not likely that three other ships in three different squadrons all under different officers and men would do the same, or stack cordite charges and shells here there and everywhere. Also to my knowledge noone has come up with any testimonies that the Grand Fleet battlefleet was in the habit of doing the same, which puts paid to these idiotic statements that historians endlessly repeat that "The Royal Navy had a doctrine of rapid rate of fire instead of slow accurate rate of fire". Frankly, that is just rubbish. --Harlsbottom (talk | library) 10:21, 5 July 2008 (UTC)

No, it does not put paid to it. An absence of information that something was or was not happening does not put paid to anything. Sandpiper (talk)

Which is what needs to be addressed, what was the actual cause then of the magazine explosions? In each case a turret roof was penetrated (given a 1" to 2" roof not suprising) followed by a magazine explosion. Now we have reports by divers in at least one wreck saying that doors were clipped open to the magazines so it would seem (all alligations of cordite being stacked where it shouldn't be aside) that flash/overpressure caused at the very least a sypathetic detonation (see USS Arizona) are you in fact proposing another cause and if so what would that cause be? SC Cordite was developed after WWI by the study of the RP series of propellents or so an article here proclaims. You are correct in that it was much more stable. Note should be made that a few German charges were enough to ensure that the entire crew of a turret died in almost every case of a turret penetration in that battle by the way. What I am asking Harl is that you tell us how you would approach this? Tirronan (talk) 17:57, 5 July 2008 (UTC)

I can understand your frustration (and tbh I'm getting frustrated with my own desire for the truth at all costs, which is somewhat at variance with Wikipedia and Verifiability). Unfortunately I managed to trash my copy of the Jutland dive TV programme, so I'll have to ask the friend who sent it to me for another one. The problem here is that as far as I'm aware among knowledgable sources (e.g. Bill Jurens, technical advisor on the Jutland dive/programme) the Jury is still out on what caused the ships to sink - other than a great big explosion, that is. The late D.K. Brown, who I had corresponded with in the past, suggested that British warships being too flashtight could have been a factor - whereas German warships had relatively draughty arrangements. There's a whole raft of materiel I have in my inbox and folders I need to have a look through (as well as currently reading through my stuff on British fire control, and torpedo defences, and British leadership, and so on and so on.) --Harlsbottom (talk | library) 18:20, 5 July 2008 (UTC)

I'm not frustrated Harl, just trying to get at where you are at with this. All I can tell you for sure is that the Brit navy went from unconcern to a level of flash protection that frankly made the US Navy blink. I have long paragraphs from a Naval Inspector going over the New York from Friedman's book discusing this. As for sealed vs. vented this really relates to modern propellents generating gas not exploding. The US WW2 pineapple grenade had smokeless powder in it tightly sealed and of course it exploded. The claim exists that Cordite would explode vs. RP which wouldn't, pure bullshit of course if the gas can't escape fast enough you get an explosion. Cordite will degrade over time at least some versions of it will and with the degradation you can have an outright explosion, ie Nitro comes out of solution. A large number of BB's suffered that fate the last that I know of being IJN Mutsu. In any case you are going to have a rather large burden of proof on your hands depending on where you are going with this. The Admirality seems to believe it was lack of flashtight fittings and/or handling proceedures given the way they were acting after Jutland, myself I think that the turret roof armor failures are to be held accountable in conjuntion with flash/overpressure and over sensitive propellent with possible propellent degradation involvment (a few pounds of cystralized nitro can spoil your whole day). However we can't be discounting everything that leads to a magazine explosion when we have pictures of exactly that happening... Tirronan (talk) 20:24, 5 July 2008 (UTC)

I've got some answers for some of this. From Warship By Anthony Preston, talks at some length on Cordite MD its instability and causes and in fact was the determinent cause of the loss of HMS Vanguard. Single base propellents almost always use nitrogylerine which can and will always come out of solution hence warnings about old dynamite. Cordite was a dual base mostly of Nitro and guncotton however impurities were always possible and could and would lead to self combustion. The Grand Fleet sailed with this as it primary propellent. If any of the batches had such inpurities they would have been very lible to explode when exposed to shock. Tirronan (talk) 21:59, 7 July 2008 (UTC)

Well if the books says precisely that, then its wrong, at least in part, possibly in whole. Single-base propellants don't use nitroglycerine - they only use nitrocellulose as the active ingredient. Its true about dynamite, but dynamite is not a single-base propellant, it is an explosive (blasting explosive). Impurities in nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine are carefully removed before they are used to make propellant. Nitroglycerine and and nitrocellulose are generally unstable over time, which is why stablisers are added (see Smokeless powder#Instability and stabilization) and those go into single-base, double-base and triple-base propellants. Lack of stabiliers, would tend to cause auto-ignition, i.e. the cordite catches fire; however, for dynamite, sweeting out of nitroglycerine could lead to denotation of the nitroglycerine by shock. It is possible (likely, even) that cordite did result in the loss of HMS Vanguard, but if your summary is accurate, then Preston's given the wrong reasons. However, I would like to read the book myself.Pyrotec (talk) 22:31, 7 July 2008 (UTC)

Which preston Warship book are you quoting. I put "Preston Warship" into Amazon (.co.uk) and came up with this list: [| three pages of listings].Pyrotec (talk) 22:45, 7 July 2008 (UTC)

ISBN:0870219766 hope that helps and I found it by doing a search on Cordite MD, btw he is claiming that it was the guncotton that was it issue.

Thanks, [| is this one|].Pyrotec (talk) 17:21, 8 July 2008 (UTC)

I am not a fan of the late Antony Preston's shoddy history and this is yet another example why. I've read the official Inquiry into the Loss of Vanguard (ADM 137/3681) and I've read the late D.K. Brown (an naval constructor and historian) and Ian McCallum's examination (Ammunition Explosions in World War I:A re-examination of evidence, Warship International (1) 2001.) of the loss of Vanguard - both concluded that Cordite Mk I was probably responsible for the loss. Not Cordite MD. Considering Preston spent years working at the National Maritime Museum and was friends with D.K. Brown how he could put such a blooper in print is beyond me. It should also be noted that when Vanguard blew up intact and partially burnt charges of cordite were found on other ships, which hardly suggests a completely unstable propellant.

Lambert's article has so many holes in it it's ridiculous. Brown and McCallum's article appeared three years after Lambert's, and beyond thanking him for the Alexander Grant memoirs they give his theory very little credence, which is telling. It should also be noted that the vast majority, if not all, of the Journal of Military History's articles on the Royal Navy have been inherently criticial of it. "Our Bloody Ships" is no exception.

With regards Cordite Mk I, Cordite MD and RPC/12 compositions;

Cordite Mk I: 58% nitroglycerine 37% nitrocellulose 6% petroleum jelly (lubricant and stabiliser) Heat output:1270 calories per gram.

Cordite MD: nitroglycerine 30% nitrocellulose 65% stabilser 5% Heat output 1020 calories per gram.

RPC/12: nitroglycerine 29% nitrocellulose 65% stabiliser 6%.

More info later... --Harlsbottom (talk | library) 08:09, 9 July 2008 (UTC)

"Lambert's article has so many holes in it it's ridiculous." "...flying in the face of 80 year's worth of accepted conclusions." Talk's cheap. Dig up the archival materials so as to prove it. As I've read your comments through here, you're are clearly not reading these (Lambert, Gordon, and Marder!) things closely but rather spouting off with your own half-baked ideas about this stuff. It isn't about the cordite itself, it's about what you do with it, as Sandpiper points out repeatedly in his comments here. Improper handling (not just jamming the doors open) can lead to very bad problems very quickly. The "coverup" (your comment above) is the Admiralty board's rebuke of the senior officers commanding, who bear ultimate responsibility for the safety of the ship (just ask the captain of the USS John F. Kennedy, so recently relieved). When the senior-most officer to take the blame is also a golden boy destined for fleet command, then the rebukers get drowned in a cover-up, and it becomes cordite and thin armor, about which nothing can immediately be done.Vermone (talk) 13:56, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

When: 1 you have pictures of magazine explosions, that part is pretty hard to dispute. 2. we have they fact that multiple explosions were clearly heard as one magazine then another detonated. 3. Every Dreadnought up to USS Nevada had thin turret armor. 4. Its been brought up by various authors that Cordite was one of the issues and this discussion was just about that. 4. After the war the UK switched to Cordite SC in emulation of the RP types the Germans were using. Ergo, they seem not to think that highly of it. I can't go to the archives and neither can you... because once you do you have crossed over into and in the truest sense of the word. Tirronan (talk) 23:00, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

Your latest comment confuses me. I have a copy of Lambert (from the Journal of Military History) - got it yesterday. Preston was the editor of Warship, but the three articles about cordite were written by Iain McCallum, under the title Riddle of the shells 1914-1918. Published in the 2002-3, 2004 and 2005 editions of Warship. I've not got hold of them yet. Why are you giving Preston a good kicking over cordite? P.S. I should be able to access Brown & McCallum next week - so I'll read it then.Pyrotec (talk) 22:14, 9 July 2008 (UTC)

If, as Tirronan says, Preston states that Cordite MD was responsible for the loss of Vanguard then he was wrong and flying in the face of 80 year's worth of accepted conclusions. You will find in p.22 of The Riddle of the Shells Part III McCallum reaffirm that Cordite Mk I was responsible for the loss of Vanguard and not Cordite MD. I can list numerous instances where Preston's historical accuracy is open to debate if not downright contradiction, however that is not for this discussion anyway. And the title of McCallum's articles really says it all - shells are the focus and not propellant so I wouldn't have my hopes up that there will be numerous references to cordite in them. --Harlsbottom (talk | library) 22:29, 9 July 2008 (UTC)

Cordite MD

From the 1911 Britannica:

“ CORDITE, the name given to the smokeless propellant in use in the British army and navy. The material is produced in the form of cylindrical rods or strings of varying thicknesses by pressing the material, whilst in a soft and pasty state, through dies or perforations in a steel plate by hydraulic or screw pressure, hence the name cordite. The thickness or size of the rods varies from about 1 mm. diameter to 5 or more mm. according to the nature of the charge for which it is intended. The smallest diameter is used for revolver cartridge and the largest for heavy guns. When first devised by the Ordnance Committee, presided over by Sir Frederick Abel, in 1891, this explosive consisted of 58% of nitro-glycerin, 37% of gun-cotton, and 5% of mineral jelly. This variety is now known as Cordite Mark I. At the present time a modification is made which contains gun-cotton 65%, nitro-glycerin 30%, and mineral jelly 5%. This is known as Cordite M.D. The advantages of Cordite M.D. over Mark I are slightly reduced rate of burning, higher velocities and more regular pressure in the gun, and lower temperature.

Cordite of either mark is a perfectly waterproof substance, containing only traces of water remaining from the manufacturing processes. It has a density of about 1.56 at the ordinary temperature (15° C.), and, as its coefficient of expansion is small, this density does not change to any serious extent under climatic temperature variations. A rod may be bent to a moderate extent without breaking, and Cordite M.D. especially shows considerable elasticity. It can be impressed by the nail and cut with a knife, but is not in the least sticky, nor does the nitroglycerin exude to any appreciable extent. It can be obtained in a finely-divided state by scraping with a sharp knife, or on a new file, or by grinding in a mill, such as a coffee-mill, but can scarcely be pounded in a mortar. Cordite is of a brownish colour in mass, but is much paler when finely ground or scraped. The rods easily become electrified by gentle friction with a dry substance. Like all colloidal substances it is an exceedingly bad conductor of heat. A piece ignited in air burns with a yellowish flame. With the smaller sizes, about 2 mm. diameter or less, this flame may be blown out, and the rod will continue to burn in a suppressed manner without actual flame, fumes containing oxides of nitrogen being emitted. Temperature appears to have an effect on the rate of burning. When much cooled it certainly burns more slowly than when at the ordinary air temperature, and is also more difficult to ignite. Rods of moderate thickness, say from 5 mm. diameter, will continue to burn under water if first ignited in air and the burning portion slowly immersed. The end of a rod of cordite may be struck a moderately heavy blow on an anvil without exploding or igniting. The rod will first flatten out. A sharp blow will then detonate or explode the portion immediately under the hammer, the remainder of the rod remaining quite intact. Bullets may be fired through a bundle or package of cordite without detonating or inflaming it. This is of course a valuable quality. The exact temperature at which substances ignite or take fire is in all cases difficult to determine with any exactness. Cordite is not instantly ignited on contact with a flame such as that of a candle, because, perhaps, of the condensation of some moisture from the products of burning of the candle upon it. A blow-pipe flame or a red-hot wire is more rapid in action. The ignition temperature may be somewhere in the region of 180° C.

All the members of this class of explosive when kept for some time at (for them) moderately high temperatures, such as the boiling-point of water (zoo° C.), show signs of decomposition; oxides of nitrogen are liberated, and some complex oxidation processes are started. Carefully prepared gun-cotton and nitroglycerin will, however, withstand this temperature for a long time without serious detriment, excepting that nitro-glycerin is slightly volatilized. When incorporated in cordite, however, the nitro-glycerin appears to be much less volatile than when free at this temperature. Under reduced pressure (3 or 4 in. only of mercury instead of 30) it is possible to distil away a considerable amount of nitro-glycerin from cordite at ioo° C. It is very doubtful whether at ordinary temperatures and pressures any nitro-glycerin whatever evaporates.

Cordite may be kept in contact with clean, dry metals, wood, paper, and a number of ordinary substances without deterioration. In contact with damp and easily oxidizable metals all the substances of the gun-cotton class are liable to a slight local action, but the colloid nature, and probably also the contained mineral jelly, protect cordite considerably in these circumstances. Ammonia has a deleterious action, but even this proceeds but slowly. Cordite does not appear to change when kept under water.

The manufacturing processes comprise: drying the guncotton and nitro-glycerin; melting and filtering the mineral jelly; weighing and mixing the nitro-glycerin with the gun-cotton; moistening this mixture with acetone until it becomes a jelly; and then incorporating in a special mixing mill for about three hours, after which the weighed amount of mineral jelly is added and the incorporation continued for about one hour or until judged complete. The incorporating or mixing machine is covered as closely as possible to prevent too great evaporation of the very volatile acetone. Before complete incorporation the mixture is termed, in the works, "paste," and, when finally mixed, "dough." The right consistency having been produced, the material is placed in a steel cylinder provided with an arrangement of dies or holes of regulated size at one end, and a piston or plunger at the other. The plunger is worked either by hydraulic power or by a screw (driven from ordinary shafting). Before reaching and passing through the holes in the die, the material is filtered through a disk of fine wire gauze to retain any foreign substances, such as sand, bits of wood or metal, or unchanged fibres of cellulose, &c., which might choke the dies or be otherwise dangerous. The material issues from the cylinders in the form of cord or string of the diameter of the holes of the die. The thicker sizes are cut off, as they issue, into lengths (of about 3 ft.), it being generally arranged that a certain number of these - say ten - should have, within narrow limits, a definite weight. The small sizes, such as those employed for rifle cartridges, are wound on reels or drums, as the material issues from the press cylinders, in lengths of many yards.

Some of the solvent or gelatinizing material (acetone) is lost during the incorporating, and more during the pressing process and the necessary handling, but much still remains in the cordite at this stage. It is now dried in heated rooms, where it is generally spread out on shelves, a current of air passing through carrying the acetone vapour with it. In the more modern works this air current is drawn, finally, through a solution of a substance such as sodium bisulphite; a fixed compound is thus formed with the acetone, which by suitable treatment may be recovered. The time taken in the drying varies with the thickness of the cordite from a few days to several weeks. For several reasons it is desirable that this process should go on gradually and slowly.

After drying, all the various batches of cordite of the same size are carefully "blended," so that any slight differences in the manufacture of one batch or one day's output may be equalized as much as possible. Slight differences may arise from the raw materials, cotton waste or glycerin, or in the making of these into gun-cotton or nitro-glycerin respectively. To help in controlling the blending, each "make" of gun-cotton and nitroglycerin is "marked" or numbered, and carries its mark to the cordite batch of which it is an ingredient. The history of each box of large-sized or reel of small-sized cordite is therefore known up to the operation of blending and packing. The final testing is by firing proofs, as in the case of the old gunpowders.

The gun-cotton employed for cordite is made in the usual way (see GUN-Cotton), with the exception of treating with alkali. It is also after complete washing with water gently pressed into small cylinders (about 3 in. diameter and 4 in. high) whilst wet, and these are carefully dried before the nitro-glycerin is added. The pressure applied is only sufficient to make the gun-cotton just hold together so that it is easily mixed with the nitro-glycerin. The mineral jelly or vaseline is obtained at a certain stage of distillation of petroleum, and is a mixture of hydrocarbons, paraffins, olefines and some other unsaturated hydrocarbons, possibly aromatic, which no doubt play a very important part as preservatives in cordite.

The stability of cordite, that is, its capability of keeping without chemical or ballistic changes, is judged of by certain "heat tests." The Abel heat test consists in subjecting a weighed quantity, 2 grams, of the finely divided cordite contained in a test tube, to a temperature of 70° C. maintained constant by a water bath. The test tube is about 6X4 in., and dips into the water sufficiently to immerse about 2 in., viz. the part containing the cordite. In the upper free portion a piece of filter-paper impregnated with a mixture of potassium iodide and starch paste is suspended by a platinum wire from the stopper of the tube. A portion of the test paper is moistened with a solution of glycerin to render it more sensitive than the dry part. A faint brown colour appearing on the moistened portion indicates that some oxides of nitrogen have been evolved from the cordite. This brown tint is compared with a standard, and the time taken before the standard tint appears is noted. The time fixed upon as a test of relative stability is an arbitrary one determined by examination of well-known specimens. Should the cordite or other explosive contain traces of mercury salts, such as mercuric chloride, which is sometimes added as a preservative, this test is rendered nugatory, and no coloration may appear (or only after a long exposure), although the sample may be of indifferent stability. It is now customary to examine specially for mercury, either by heating the explosive in contact with gold leaf or silver foil, or by burning the substance and examining the flame in the spectroscope.

The method of examination known as the vacuum silvered vessel process is probably not interfered with by the presence of very small quantities of mercury. It consists in heating s o grams of the finely divided explosive in a Dewar's silvered vacuum glass bulb to a rigidly constant temperature of 80° C. for many hours. A sensitive thermometer having its bulb immersed in the centre of the cordite shows when the temperature rises above 80°. Stich a rise indicates internal oxidation or decomposition of the explosive; it is accompanied by an evolution of nitrogen dioxide, N02, the depth of colour of which is noted through a side tube attached to the bulb: As all explosives of this class would in time decompose sufficiently to give these indications, time periods or limits have been fixed at which an appreciable and definite rise in temperature and production of red fumes indicate relative stability or instability. (W. R. E. H.)

”

It has also been given that the temp to ignite Cordite MD is 2375 C and here is my issue and this is what I am asking? Was Cordite MD sensitive to blast? Tirronan (talk) 04:03, 8 July 2008 (UTC)

I had forgotten the very important point that Cordite Mk I was carried as well as Cordite MD in British warships at Jutland. Indeed it was still carried in 1917 when HMS Vanguard blew up in Scapa Flow due to a magazine explosion attributable to the stocks of Cordite Mk I in the magazines. For it was recognised even when Mk I was being produced that it would deteriorate over time with the possibility that it would spontaneously combust. After the loss of Vanguard, at the Board of Inquiry into her sinking the assistant to the Director of Naval Ordnance (the navy's chief armaments officer) was asked directly whether he considered over-age cordite dangerous, and refused to answer. This should be taken into account when examing the fact that when fire swept through "Q" turret on Lion, no less than eight full charges of cordite - sixteen silk bags of the stuff, each with an igniter at each end (totalling thirty-two igniters) were set alight and none exploded - even after an explosion tore through the place. More later...

Quickly, in response to your question Tirronan, MD was only sensitive if improperly manufactured which it would appear happened at the start of the war. Cordite Mk I after a certain amount of time (and I reckon that to still be in ships in 1916 it must have been very old) would have been susceptible. --Harlsbottom (talk | library) 09:12, 8 July 2008 (UTC)

If someone is claiming that the temperature to ignite Cordite MD is is 2375 C, that is a ludicrous figure; I don't have the figures to hand, but it is certainly below 237 C, probably between 160 and 200 C. However, the Britainnica quote above gives the value as 180 C. I would accept that the flame temperature of cordite is 2375 C.Pyrotec (talk) 17:15, 8 July 2008 (UTC)

For the record, my last comment (immediately above) was not intended as personal criticism of any particular editor. There was an article quoted above - Lambert (1998) ""Our bloody ships" or "Our Bloody System?" Jutland and the loss of the Battle cruisers, 1916"". In: Journal of Military History, Vol 62, No. 1, PP 29-55 - which I've just read. It makes a convincing case that the system was at fault. Cordite was removed from its storage locker and placed ready for use, without protection from flash. He suggests that 25 charges equates to 3 tons (page 54). Now I have seen waste cordite burned in the open, in trenches no more than 2 inches deep; and it was suggested that I time it. My timing said 7 seconds, but I suspect it was more like 5 seconds; and that was 1 tonne of cordite.Pyrotec (talk) 18:44, 8 July 2008 (UTC)

Lets try some simple physics: one gramme of cordite will burn to give about 1 litre of gas (at room temperature), so one kilogramme will give one cubic metre of gas. [Someone might argue its only 0.7 or 0.8 Litre per gramme - but so what!]. So three tonnes of cordite will produce three thousand cubic metres of gas (at room temperature) - in say seven seconds. Well this cordite is burning at a flame temperature of 2375 C in a closed room, so the temperature will be hotter than room temperature - so the volume will be greater; possibly by a factor of nine. Cordite is oxygen-deficient, so not all the "carbon and the hydrogen" in cordite burns to produce water and carbon dioxide; some remains "partially burnt" as carbon monoxide and hydrogen - hence muzzle flash. When this hot gas gets out, muzzle flash will occur. I suspect that producing at least three thousand cubic metres of hot gas, containing some hydrogen and some carbon monoxide, in under seven seconds will produce the sort of damage quoted in the article. And note: this is not detonation, its just burning Deflagration.Pyrotec (talk) 18:44, 8 July 2008 (UTC)

Gents, nothing to appologise for I am assuming all of us are just trying to get to the bottom of the issue and there is enough bad info on the internet to choke a herd of cattle. Cordite needing over 4500 F to burn would seem on the face of it rather high for a propellent to me and one would have to burn through a brass container with a blowtorch to set it off if that was the case hence I am asking questions. As per gas expansion, any attempt to contain a modern propellent will result in said explosion (or however you care to term it) ie US Mk 1 grenades worked with a bit of smokeless powder. I am assuming then we are agreed that it was flash that set off the magazines? Tirronan (talk) 21:06, 9 July 2008 (UTC)

I can't give a definitive yes/no answer. It contains nitroglycerine (which is in colloidal form); and nitroglycerine can be made to detonate, ditto nitrocellulose. The qualified answer is "yes", provided you use the correct "detonator".Pyrotec (talk) 21:18, 9 July 2008 (UTC)

Then I am proposing that the British Admiralty's assessment, that flash tight fittings and poor handling proceedures, both in writen aftermath reports and in practice of flash tight fittings introduced after Jutland with improved handling proceedures, further in the light of Dogger Bank and German flash protection measures and the fact that German turrets were burned out without magazine detonation/deflageration that we are indeed left with flash/overpressure/sypathitic detonation, was the likely cause and move on. Tirronan (talk) 21:19, 11 July 2008 (UTC)

Ordering problems

This article has some serious problems with chronological ordering. For example, in the first few sections of the battle "The Run to the South" and "Sudden death" are skewed pretty badly. In the second paragraph of the first section, it goes from Beatty's order to engage the German BCs in a line and failing to engage Derfflinger to all of a sudden the QE class has arrived, while singularly failing to explain the reason the QE class was able to arrive at that moment (i.e., when Beatty temporarily pulled back, which gave the QEs time to catch back up). What? And then all of a sudden there's a paragraph giving the results of the battlecruiser engagement. And then towards the end of that section, it describes the 5th BS finally coming into range. What? I thought they did that back in "The Run to the South"! Here's another question; why does the caption for the position map say "15:30: Beatty sights Hipper"? It implies the British saw the Germans first, which is most certainly not the case. I'll be doing some revamping of the section in question, and perhaps the others if they suffer from the same kinds of problems; no wonder it was de-FA-ed. Parsecboy (talk) 13:34, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

Some other problems:

• Can someone figure out why the link to HMS Engadine in the OoB section isn't italicizing? I've checked it in both IE6 and Firefox, and both are showing it not italicized, even though it has the correct markup.
• Why does the article criticize the German U-boats (in the "Prelude to big guns" section, when their failing was in that the British already knew the German plan, and were past the U-boats picket line before they were on station? That doesn't make any sense.

As I find more problems, I'll bring them up here for discussion. Parsecboy (talk) 17:31, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

The U-Boats had been on station since the 23 May with orders to return on 1 June. Also, the British didn't know the German plan - they only suspected something was afoot. The appearance of Scheer was as much of a surprise to Jellicoe as he was to Scheer. One U-Boat did spot a "battle squadron" if memory serves, but very little else and therefore failed in their reconnaissance duties as well. --Harlsbottom (talk | library) 19:51, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

""15:30: Beatty sights Hipper"? It implies the British saw the Germans first"

Actually it doesn't imply anything... just a simple fact. Though the diagrams are somewhat British-centric and in some cases the timepoints are out of sync with their positions on the diagrams. The diagrams do need to be revised. Ideally the timepoints on the diagrams would be the ones that mark the beginnings and ends of phases identified in the narrative. Adding more timepoints (like the earlier German sighting) risks overloading the diagrams at their current size. There is certainly a place for larger and more detailed (full-page) diagrams, perhaps in a sub-article? Rep07 (talk) 19:02, 29 June 2008 (UTC)

5th BS caught up to the fight in the run to the south towards the end of the run to the south, when Beatty learned of the HSG and whipped around for the run to the north the 5th BS remained in firing range of the Hipper the entire run to the North as far as my sources go. Tirronan (talk) 20:35, 5 July 2008 (UTC)

(→Assessments: Expand indecisive assessment)

Ah gee we seem to have editors that feel free to add content without citation or trying to explain what they are doing on the talk pages... just great. Never the less, I am trying to scratch another itch which is the blockade of Germany and the aspects of starvation that was staring the Germans in the face. They were well aware what would have to happen should the blockade not be broken and this indeed was proven to be true by the measure of time with the populace in various stages of rebellion. This was a large part of why the HSF was trying to catch a squadron or two and pound it to scrap. In the final assessment it is the blockade that did much to end the war and to this end it is a failure in the HSF visa vis it's outcome in Jutland. I by no means wish to start the "who won" crap again but this needs to be explained as it was indeed one of the primary drivers of this battle. Tirronan (talk) 00:14, 20 July 2008 (UTC)

I've been doing a vast amount of reading on Jutland as an adjunct to research on Admiral Jellicoe - so I've been re-reading "The Jutland Perspective", "The Sword Bearers", "The Rules of the Game" (spits at the last two), "The Jutland Scandal", Scheer's memoirs and far too many issues of "The Naval Review". Hell I've even been re-reading Massie. So this is what strikes me...

"Despite numerical superiority, the British had been disappointed in their hopes for a decisive victory, comparable to Trafalgar, and the central objective of the influential strategic doctrines of Alfred Mahan. "

Quite apart from this being unsourced, Mahan's ideas were much discredited by WWI and hardly "central" to the aims of the Royal Navy. The British public were arguably disappointed, however the navy was far more realistic - the battle had been fought late in the day and the battle fleet had suffered only in its poor AP shells. The BCF is an entirely different matter. It should perhaps be pointed out that Nelson was drawing upon nearly a century of unbroken maritime warfare (which even Gordon admits to) and at Trafalgar was confident that a fleet as large as his was in reserve in Britain. Even the most vicious of anti-Jellicoe thinkers in the Royal Navy, Captain Herbert Richmond went on record saying that to expect a victory on the lines of Trafalgar was foolish as very rarely were complete victories possible. This suggests that British "hopes" need to be properly covered in the article.

I agree it's important to look at the hopes of the British public (and politicians). But the reference to Trafalgar here is pretty much a restatement of the view attributed to Beatty elsewhere in the article. And Alfred Mahan, not surprisingly, puts the view that "Mahan influenced the naval portion of the Spanish-American War, and the battles of Tsushima, Jutland, and the Atlantic." Not that Wikipedia articles are reliable sources, but I find the treatment of sources here ("even Gordon", "even the most vicious of anti-Jellicoe thinkers" to imply more editorial judgement than is appropriate in an encyclopedia. JQ (talk) 09:58, 21 July 2008 (UTC)

What I put on a Wikipedia talk page is entirely different to what appears in an article mainspace. And if you had read all the criticism of Jellicoe then you would know that the only word which springs to mind is "vicious". That's not to say that there's stringent criticism of Beatty, but by and large he has come off smelling of roses other than his reputation for being "something of a bounder". And quite frankly your editorial judgement might want to be more thorough. I just checked "the view attributed to Beatty" - as usual some fool has read Massie (p. 670) and grossly misinterpeted it - there is absolutely NO mention of Trafalgar on that page, let alone attributed to Beatty. Instead it reveals that Beatty was under the illusion that he had won a great victory which Jellicoe had failed to carry through. From what I gather (and I don't know if anyone who frequents talk pages is an expert) Mahan advocated more concentration of force than decisive battle - in any case that's what the Grand Fleet practised under both Jellicoe and Beatty. --Harlsbottom (talk | library) 12:21, 21 July 2008 (UTC)

"The High Seas Fleet survived as a fleet in being. Most of its losses were made good within a month — even Seydlitz, the most badly damaged ship to survive the battle, was fully repaired by October and officially back in service by November. On the Germans had failed in their objective of destroying a substantial portion of the British Fleet. No progress had been made towards the goal of allowing the High Seas Fleet to operate in the Atlantic Ocean."

Seydlitz was actually repaired by 16 September (Tarrant, p.277). Derfflinger was the last to be repaired, on 15 October. I have to admit that I've never seen anything as to what the Germans hoped to achieve other than their Kräfteausgleich (equalising) measures. Their admirals were under no illusions that such a process would be very drawn-out, which begs the question what would they do had they actually gained superiority over the Grand Fleet? I'm not sure "operate in the Atlantic Ocean" really cuts it, as then the British would have ended up in the German position of resorting to submarine warfare, and so on and so on...

Re the blockade, Tirronan, I think Tarrant in his coverage of the German perspective chooses very well a quote from the British Globe newspaper - "Will the shouting flag-wagging [German] people get any more of the copper, rubber and cotton their Government so sorely needs? Not by a pound. Will meat and butter be cheaper in Berlin? Not by a pfennig."

In fact, re-reading the whole "Outcome" section it's still enough to give me a headache but I'm still too busy with Jellicoe to want to give it a rewrite. I have a quote on my Jutland draft about the battle forcing the Germans to resort to unrestricted submarine warfare which might make a sensible short-term addition;

"Scheer himself was under no illusion about the future conduct of naval operations. In his report to the Kaiser, he wrote "there can be no doubt that that even the most favourable issue of a battle on the high seas WILL NOT COMPEL ENGLAND to make peace in THIS war." Instead, he stated that a "victorious termination of the war within measurable time can only be attained by destroying the economic existence of Great Britain, namely by the employment of submarines against British commerce". This after informing the Kaiser that "the LARGE WAR VESSEL, battleship and cruiser, is and remains, therefore, the foundation of Sea Power."" --Harlsbottom (talk | library) 01:27, 20 July 2008 (UTC)

An interesting example of the need to insist on the official primacy of battleships even while recognising their obsolescence (at least given Germany's position).JQ (talk) 06:30, 22 July 2008 (UTC)

Ah Gawd, please don't start that again! Germany didn't have enough BB's to effect the outcome was the problem not that the ship type was obsolescent. The mere fact that 40 of them were out on the same day pounding the crap out of each other gives that for a lie. In WW2 I could make a pretty good argument that in most open oceans that CV's and Subs ruled the waves but in the North Sea even that point is contestable. In that Germany followed a stratigic path that didn't make much sense, unwilling to build enought BB's and supporting elements to really contest with Great Britain, while only irritating GB into a rivalry that helped fuel a war while national treasure was poured into an institution that couldn't win yes that is a blunder it is not a obsolesence Dreadnought. Tirronan (talk) 21:08, 24 July 2008 (UTC)

I will steer clear of that one above as I'm too busy with RL and my Jellicoe article (although I'm inclined to agree with you Tirronan). This may be of interest to all concerned though - the infamous letter which Jellicoe wrote concerning his turn away, and which every historian seems utterly incapable of quoting in its entirety, and also Jellicoe's own critique of the British part in the battle, and written in 1932. I thought it was time they were transcribed and put online, so here they are;

. I will get round to adding more Jellicoe papers when I can. --Harlsbottom (talk | library | book reviews) 01:31, 26 July 2008 (UTC)

The turn away was just something for Jellico Haters to get at him about. To my knowledge no commander of a major surface unit ever turned into a torp attack, and certainly none before he had to make his decision. Torpedo defense and mine resistence was not in the cards when his ships were built, nor for that matter plunging fire, you turn away to give yourself every chance of out running and out turning the torps, since they were straight running a course change could steer you clear. Massey goes into this, but in essence if you turn INTO the attack you change a 10 knot closing speed into a 40 knot closing speed and you will not out run and perhaps not out turn a torp. There were dozens if not 100 plus torps in the water, now what commander would do that? Tirronan (talk) 19:44, 6 August 2008 (UTC)

article running order

I have moved some of the material relating to shell design and gunnery to the end of the article in the section on conclusions from the battle. This section at the start was already talking about some of the action in the battle before it had been explained. It was not something a reader needed to know before reading the battle description, nor something which affected the combatants thinking either. Also, having it mentioned at the start meant we had to come back to it half an hour later when everyone has forgotten what was said initially. So, logically it belongs in one place at the end. I have left the part about the German/English philosophy of ship design at the start: I think it adds to the fun giving the reader a bit of a difference between the fleets rather than simply big fleet vs little fleet, although this could also be moved down into the section considering battlecruiser design faults later on. The benefit of this as I see it would be to cut out some of the less essential guff padding placed before a reader gets to the real action. But, as I said, I think it runs sensibly as part of the discussion of general tactics.

Now, this article is quite long. It would be arguable that the section on 'the outcome' ought be split into a sub-article. The difficulty would be whether we can comeup with a one paragraph placeholder for all that lot which could be left her as a taster inviting people to the sub article banquet. Sandpiper (talk) 17:20, 13 August 2008 (UTC)

Concise Opener

This article is in desperate need of a concise opener, briefly describing the who, the what, the where, and why. I'm not the one to do it. As it is, this important historical event is far too imposing for any casual reader. Try and move 90% of the opener into the body if possible.--Lindsay (talk) 00:46, 9 November 2008 (UTC)

I'm afraid I don't agree: The total wordage written about this subject is enough to create libraries on this one battle alone. The main article itself is a summary of the highlights of the battle, leaving out vast available layers of detail. I do agree with you that the article is daunting, but the intro is meant to be a meaningfull mini article in its own right, as well as a summary of what follows. I think it does that. I think the structure of the intro leads in quite well by setting the abstract noteability of the battle, the countries, the admirals, the overall strategies, and then a quick summary of the main stages. there are a couple of factual points I would, quibble about, but not overall. Someone has tacked on a final sentence about the controversy the battle kicked up, which may be a good point to make, but which I think needs re-wording. Sandpiper (talk) 22:18, 15 November 2008 (UTC)

Contraversy

Why in God's name are we putting this into the article?

The Battle of Jutland (German: Skagerrakschlacht (Battle of the Skagerrak); Danish: Søslaget ved Jylland / Søslaget om Skagerrak) was the largest naval battle of World War I and the only full-scale clash of battleships in that war. It was the second (after Tsushima in 1905) and also the last major fleet action between steel battleships in any war. It is also, by certain criteria, the largest naval battle in history.

The Salvo Island Campaign and the Phillipine Sea battle give this for a lie, and talk about opening a can of worms the largest naval battle in history? I guess whoever put that in never read about the task force 38/58 where one fleet was larger than this... I plan to remove both but I am opening this to comment 1st. --Tirronan (talk) 09:54, 28 December 2008 (UTC)

The possibility of it being the largest naval battle in history is perhaps valid - so long as someone can dig up some references for this article, and not for the largest naval battle article.

As you say, it certainly wasn't the "last major clash between steel battleships in any war" (Who the hell wrote that anyway?), o most of that last part can probably be removed. The emphasis ought to be on that it was the only fleet action of the First World War. --Harlsbottom (talk | library | book reviews) 14:54, 28 December 2008 (UTC)

I am puzzled about this. Aside from the fact that on closer inspection, the wording does not entirely make sense, in what way was jutland second after Tsushima? A quick look at the Tsushima page says there were 15 battleships and 35 cruisers compared to 44 battleships and 65 cruisers at Jutland (counting the battlecruisers as cruisers, though they were probably at least as powerfull as the battleships at tsushima). More people were killed at Jutland, I don't know about the tonnage sunk as it doesnt say. Can someone point out the appropriate articles for battles considered contenders for greater or later? Salvo islands didnt seems to mean much, nor really does the general reference to philippines. I take it the emphasis is upon actual battelships being engaged, rather than aircraft or their carriers, which took a major role in ww2. The 'largest naval battle in history artcile says no WW2 battle involved more than 8 battleships.Sandpiper (talk) 12:27, 21 February 2009 (UTC)

On reflection, perhaps i am misunderstanding the language? I read the sentence as 'Jutland is the the second biggest battle with Tsushima being bigger, whereas perhaps it was meant to mean the later occurring?. If so, then I will change this to make it clearer? Sandpiper (talk) 08:09, 3 March 2009 (UTC)