Tributary system of China
The tributary system was a network of loose international relations focused on China which facilitated trade and foreign relations by acknowledging China's predominant role in East Asia. It involved multiple relationships of trade, military force, diplomacy and ritual. The other nations had to come to China on schedule, kowtow to the Emperor as a form of tribute, and acknowledge his superiority and precedence. The other countries followed China's formal ritual in order to keep the peace with the more powerful neighbor. At home they did not accept China's claims of hierarchy and subordination/ Political actors within the tributary system were largely autonomous and in almost all cases, virtually independent. Although generally applied to all Chinese polities, this system only existed in the late Ming and early to middle Qing dynasties.
The "tribute system" as a term is strictly speaking, a Western invention. There was no equivalent term in the Chinese lexicon to describe what would be considered the "tribute system" today, nor was it envisioned as an institution or system. John King Fairbank and Teng Ssu-yu created the "tribute system" theory in a series of articles in the early 1940s to describe "a set of ideas and practices developed and perpetuated by the rulers of China over many centuries." The Fairbank model presents the tribute system as an extension of the hierarchic and nonegalitarian Confucian social order. The more Confucian the actors, the more likely they were to participate in the tributary system.
The "tribute system" is often associated with a "Confucian world order", under which neighboring states complied and participated in the "tribute system" to secure guarantees of peace, investiture, and trading opportunities. Actors engaged in the "tribute system" by performing "symbolic obeisance". One member acknowledged another's position as superior, and the superior would bestow investiture to confirm their status as a part of the system. Actors within the "tribute system" were virtually autonomous and carried out their own agendas despite sending tribute, as was the case with Japan, Korea, Ryukyu Kingdom, and Vietnam. Nor did they necessarily subscribe to a sinocentric world or mimic Chinese institutions in cases such as the Inner Asians who manipulated Chinese tribute practices without adopting China's political system.
The Ming founder Hongwu Emperor adopted a maritime prohibition policy and issued tallies to "tribute-bearing" embassies for missions. Missions were subject to limits on the number of persons and items allowed.
In 1404, Shogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu accepted the Chinese title "King of Japan" while not being the Emperor of Japan. The Shogun was the de facto ruler of Japan. The Emperor of Japan was a weak, powerless figurehead during the feudal shogunate periods of Japan, and was at the mercy of the Shogun. For a brief period until Yoshimitsu's death in 1408, Japan was an official tributary of the Ming dynasty. This relationship ended in 1549 when Japan, unlike Korea, chose to end its recognition of China's regional hegemony and cancel any further tribute missions. Yoshimitsu was the first and only Japanese ruler in the early modern period to accept a Chinese title. Membership in the tributary system was a prerequisite for any economic exchange with China; in exiting the system, Japan relinquished its trade relationship with China. Under the rule of the Wanli Emperor, Ming China quickly interpreted the Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598) as a challenge and threat to the Imperial Chinese tributary system. 
The Manchus invaded Joseon (Korea) and forced it to become a tributary in 1636, due to Joseon's continued support and loyalty to Ming, and then conquered China to establish the Qing dynasty. However, the Manchus, whose ancestors had been subordinate to Korean kingdoms, were viewed as barbarians by the Korean court, which, regarding itself as the new "Confucian ideological center" in place of Ming, continued to use the Ming calendar in defiance of Qing, despite sending tribute missions. Meanwhile, Japan avoided direct contact with Qing China and instead manipulated embassies from neighboring Joseon and Ryukyu to make it falsely appear as though they came to pay tribute.
According to a 2018 study in the Journal of Conflict Resolution covering Vietnam-China relations from 1365 to 1841, the relations could be characterized as a "hierarchic tributary system". The study found that "the Vietnamese court explicitly recognized its unequal status in its relations with China through a number of institutions and norms. Vietnamese rulers also displayed very little military attention to their relations with China. Rather, Vietnamese leaders were clearly more concerned with quelling chronic domestic instability and managing relations with kingdoms to their south and west."
Thailand was always subordinate to China as a vassal or a tributary state since the Sui dynasty until the Taiping Rebellion of the late Qing dynasty in the mid-19th century. The Sukhothai Kingdom established official relations with the Yuan dynasty during the reign of King Ram Khamhaeng. Wei Yuan, the 19th century Chinese scholar, considered Thailand to be the strongest and most loyal of China's Southeast Asian tributaries, citing the time when Thailand offered to directly attack Japan to divert the Japanese in their planned invasions of Korea and the Asian mainland, as well as other acts of loyalty to the Ming dynasty. Thailand was welcoming and open to Chinese immigrants, who dominated commerce and trade, and achieved high positions in the government.
Kingdoms along China's North-Western Frontier often struggled to enter the Imperial tributary system. Beijing often rejected tribute missions, and then lavished gifts and benefits to help soothe the drawn-out and complex conflicts now known as the Ming-Turpan Border Wars.
Mansur then abandoned large-scale military expeditions, though he continued to sanction raids on China to attain his objectives. Instead he offered tribute, occasionally dispatching a dozen or more embassies a year. He was apparently eager to obtain the Chinese gifts granted to foreign embassies, and therefore limited his incursions.
Warfare between tributary states was arbitrated by the Chinese emperor. Malacca and Vietnam were both tributaries to China. Malacca sent envoys to China again in 1481 to inform the Chinese that while going back to Malacca in 1469 from a trip to China, the Vietnamese attacked them, castrating the young and enslaving them. The Malaccans reported that Vietnam was in control of Champa and also that the Vietnamese sought to conquer Malacca, but the Malaccans did not fight back because of a lack of permission from the Chinese to engage in war. The Chinese Emperor scolded them, ordering the Malaccans to strike back with violent force if the Vietnamese attacked.
The Ming dynasty declined to intervene under the isolationist and anti-interventionist Hongwu Emperor when the Vietnamese attacked Champa, giving only a rebuke. The Chinese again did not intervene in the 1471 Vietnamese invasion of Champa, when Vietnam destroyed Champa. Both Vietnam and Champa were tributary states.
Members of the Chinese "tributary system" were often invested with patents of authority. As early as ancient China, investiture was given to non-Chinese neighbors as a concrete expression of the loose reign policy. The rulers of Joseon in particular sought to legitimate their rule through reference to Chinese symbolic authority. On the opposite side of the tributary relationship spectrum was Japan, whose leaders could hurt their own legitimacy by identifying with Chinese authority.
The tribute system also functioned as international trade with China and could be profitable to tributary members, as was the case with Korea. Thus, there was an economic incentive to be a member of the tributary system.
Replicating the tribute systemEdit
During the Nguyễn Dynasty (1802–1945), Vietnam's rulers copied the Imperial Chinese system, declaring themselves Emperors on the Chinese Confucian model and attempting to create a Vietnamese Imperial tributary system.
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