In modal logic and the philosophy of language, a vivid designator is a term which is believed to designate the same thing in all possible worlds[1] and nothing else where such an object does not exist in a possible world. It is the analogue, in the sense of believing, of a rigid designator,[2] which is (refers to) the same in all possible worlds, rather than is just believed to be so.

Willard Van Orman QuineEdit

Willard Van Orman Quine credits David Kaplan (who in turn Montgomery Furth) for the term "vivid designator" in his 1977 paper "Intensions Revisited". He examines the separation between de re and de dicto and does away with de re statements, because de re statements can only work for names that are used referentially.[3] In fact, both rigid designators and vivid designators are similarly dependent on context and empty otherwise. The same is true of the whole quantified modal logic of necessity because it collapses if essence is withdrawn.[4]

See alsoEdit

ReferencesEdit

  1. ^ Quine, W.V.O., Quintessence: Intensions Revisited, 2004, pp. 356–357
  2. ^ D. Kaplan, Quantifying In, 1969
  3. ^ Andrea Bonomi, On Quine: Transparency and Specificity in Intentional Contexts, 1995, p. 183.
  4. ^ Quine, W.V.O., Quintessence: Intensions Revisited, 2004, pp. 356–357.