User talk:MagdalenaMorales/sandbox

Latest comment: 6 years ago by MagdalenaMorales in topic Corruption in North Korea

Article Evaluation

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I chose a Wikipedia article detailing the Narcosobrinos incident[1], in which the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) arrested the nephews (narcosobrinos) of Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores for narcotics trafficking.

In the overview paragraph, one sentence distracted me as I found it unclear: “[…] the two nephews were found guilty, with the cash allegedly destined to “help their family stay in power””. Although there is a source by Reuters for the statement in quotes, nothing is mentioned about the cash, which leaves the reader wondering about the amount and the provenance of it. Numbers would give insight into what kind of amount of money can help a political family stay in power. Additionally, in the image at the very top of the page, the narcosobrinos are shown with police forces, but the description does not include who arrested them. Even though it is mentioned in the overview paragraph, the arresters’ information should be included in the picture’s description for consistency, as the date, location and suspects are all repeated.

When checking the citation links, I found varied quality sources. Out of forty citations, three are from La Patilla and one is from DolarToday, which are sources of information similar to blog posts. As mentioned in the Talk section of the Wikipedia article “Corruption in Venezuela”[2], DolarToday is a biased source that does not fact-check articles properly. The same goes with La Patilla, as opening links lead to articles that do not cite their information’s provenance, showing facts and images with no source. Both sources are also heavily biased, with an explicit mission to oppose the government of Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro. La Patilla, for instance, was founded by the co-founder and former CEO of Globovision, a then pro-opposition media[3]. DolarToday is a government critic and the main source for Venezuelans seeking information about the black market’s dollar price, which goes against governmental interests[4]. These biases are not mentioned in the Wikipedia article. Other sources include Reuters, The Guardian, The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times, which are international newspapers with a global reputation for reliability. I found the links of the article to be working and to be consistent with the claims made. Fourteen citations come from Spanish articles, which can make it harder to an English reader to double-check the sources. However, with the Hispanic nature of the article, this can hardly be prevented.

Due to the political nature of the article, I also found the writing to be a little biased. The point of view faulting the government for drug trafficking is overrepresented. The statements accusing them are left without the official’s response, leaving an impression that the accused did not defend themselves. The only responses found are at the very end of the article in the “Reactions” section, which is a short paragraph compared to the lengthy accusations that dominate. For more neutrality, both sides should be quoted next to each other throughout the text. There is also a constant reference to the narcosobrinos possibly assisting Maduro’s campaigns financially. The tone of doubt surrounding these accusations are biased towards a pro-opposition viewpoint, creating a sense of mystery and moving away from proven facts. There is also some information missing concerning the final verdict of the narcosobrinos. Their sentence is not mentioned in the “Trial” part, leaving an impression that the trial is not over when it actually is.

Because this is a fairly recent event, the oldest source cited is from 2014. I believe there should be more representation of local Venezuelan sources. For instance, in the section “Reactions” by academics and scholars, only an American scholar is quoted. The narcosobrinos being Venezuelan, I believe local academics should primarily be cited to move away from American’s value dominance and show that such behaviour is disapproved of in the Venezuelan society. There are no conversations going on in the Talk page of the article and it has not been rated yet. However, there is relevant discussion on the Talk page of “Corruption in Venezuela”[5], a related topic, which criticizes false content following a portrayal of Chavez as a “champion against corruption, while reality is quite different”. Discussion focuses around strong political bias and criticizes a lack of neutrality. I believe this recurrent tendency is due to the sensitive nature of the topic, which has polarized lives of Venezuelans as we have entered a dictatorship. The narcosobrinos article is part of the WikiProject Crime, WikiProject United States and WikiProject Venezuela, the last one being rated of high-importance.

Wikipedia discusses differently of the corruption topic compared to what we do in class. Despite the narcosobrinos situation being an evident case of corruption, it is not discussed in length. There is no mention of the word “patronage”, even though family ties are evident. There is also no additional explanation as to why the nephews had access to diplomatic passport and why they were allowed to use the Terminal 4 of the airport, which is exclusively reserved for the president. Many details are mentioned throughout the article, but are yet not directly linked to the theme of corruption. There is also little information concerning the accusations that drug money would be used to finance congressional and presidential campaigns, despite the seriousness of this claim. When reading, one can almost forget that this article is about corruption, as it is not framed like it. Many corrupt acts are disregarded as such; almost making this drug trafficking situation like any other non-politically related one. Again, this might be due to the fact that there are few fact-checked sources discussing this specific theme, which is heavily censored in Venezuela.

Project Proposal: Possible Topics

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Vote buying in Venezuela during Chavez’s presidency
I would like to cover vote buying since Chavez’s arrival in office in 1999 until his death in 2013. There is no specific page made on that on Wikipedia. There is one called “Elections in Venezuela”[6], but it does not address corruption issues found in the country in terms of vote buying during Chavez's presidency. I have found so far a total of 6 reliable sources on World Cat on the subject. In the Talk page of “Elections in Venezuela”, rated as “Start”, the main critics are the lack of neutrality and the need for independent reviews. It accuses Westerners of hating Chavez and moving away from unbiased sources to promote their agenda. I believe my sources extensively cover vote buying in Venezuela and present facts rather than opinions, which means that I would be able to write a new and complete section on the subject.

Media censorship in Venezuela during Chavez’s presidency
I would like to cover the increased media censorship since Chavez took office in 1999 until his death in 2013. There is no specific page made on that on Wikipedia, there is only a general page called “Censorship in Venezuela”[7]. I would like to make a whole new page concerning media censorship during Chavez’s presidency adding on the basic information that is already there. I have so far found 4 reliable sources on World Cat. On the Talk page of “Censorship in Venezuela”, rated as “Start”, the main critics are towards impartial sources and the use of opiniated reviews, accusing the agenda advanced to be a propaganda tool for US foreign policy agenda. The sources I have found are fact-checked and peer-reviewed, which would improve the article greatly.

Bribery in North Korea since the famine of the 90s
The article of "Corruption in North Korea"[8] is very incomplete. I would like to add a whole new section on bribery practices triggered by the famine of 1994-1998, which are now at the heart of North Korean society. I have found so far 6 reliable sources on World Cat. In the Talk page, the main critic is that the article is written on guesses rather than factual sources. It says the text looks like anti-communist propaganda and that the links are not all working. The three sources date from 2012-2013. Fortunately, I believe I could improve that as I found many recent sources with solid research and unbiased facts. This article is also rated as “Stub”, meaning it only has very basic information.

Corruption in North Korea

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An overview
Corruption in North Korea is a widespread and growing problem in North Korean society. With a recent study on bribery in North Korea finding that half of the respondents had given a bribe at some point[9], the practice has become commonplace with the years following the famine of 1994-1998. Although bribery is prevalent on the different areas of society, it is most common in the informal sector. Individuals selling goods, but especially those working in informal foreign trade, are the most likely to bribe officials in order to be able to conduct their business[10]. That is because sanctions against the informal importation of foreign goods are severe if caught. However, because bribery is so prevalent, sellers can almost always avoid the consequences when seized, allowing them to pursue their activities with little repercussions except a bribe to the official. North Korea is ranked 175 out of 177 countries in Transparency International's 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index (tied with Somalia and Afghanistan).[11]


Bribery during the famine
From 1994 to 1998, a devastating famine ravaged North Korea, killing from six hundred thousand and one million people, representing between three to five percent of the country's population[12]. Referred to as the "Arduous March"[13], the origins of the famine are rooted in a combination of events that happened in the 1990s. As North Koreans were dependent on the Public Distribution System (PDS), a centralized farming system created in the 1950s, they could not cultivate plots of land for individual use. Therefore, when a series of floods and natural disasters hit in 1995, 1.5 million tons of grain were destroyed and the country's infrastructure was greatly damaged[14]. It is estimated that up to 15% of North Korea's farmable land could no longer be used[15]. This massive loss of the nation's reserves had a significant impact on the regime's ability to evenly distribute food to its completely dependent citizens. Additionally, three years before, in 1991, the collapse of the USSR had brought onto North Korea a decrease in Soviet and Chinese foreign aid. By the time the floods arrived, the aid had completely ceased. However, the regime was highly dependent on it to sustain its damaged centralized farming system and feed its citizens[16]. The combined effects of the floods and the decrease in foreign aid to maintain the DPS were then both causes of the tragedy, cutting the basic ration from 450 grams to 128 grams per day and starving the masses[17].

An important consequence of this large-scale famine was the widespread practice of bribery. Now that North Koreans could no longer rely on the state to provide food, individuals had to turn to illegal markets to purchase basic products. When the international community mobilized itself, food shipments arrived and brought down the prices of available products from 25 to 35 percent, making the private market more accessible to citizens[18]. Another consequence the tragedy had was to make poorer sections of the population independent from the regime's food distribution, which had been one of the most prevalent forms of control. More specifically, by 1994, the regime had completely shutdown the food distribution program in the northern regions of North Korea due to their geographical remoteness. Only 6 percent of the country's population was receiving food, meaning that the vast majority resorted to private markets[19]. As mentioned in a paper by the United States Institute of Peace, "public anger is more typically reflected in growing corruption, black market activities, and other anti-system behavior" in North Korea[20].

Even though the famine occurred more than two decades ago, bribery practices still remain nowadays. The famine has normalized illegal actions that were initially caused by a need for survival. As such, individuals still cultivate illegal plots of land to grow a limited amount of crops. Most officials take advantage of the illegality of it and use their power to bribe farmers and get a share of the harvest[21]. The fact that these practices are still prevalent in North Korean society nowadays, although the famine had now ended, reinforces the idea that the centralized farming system has broken "the social contract between farmers and the rest of society"[22]. Individual food production is now tolerated, as citizens no longer trust the regime to provide for them.


Bribery and political stability
Just like its citizens, the regime also takes advantage of some bribery practices. Examples can be found in the infrastructure sector, in which resources flow from the informal sector to the formal one. Because some products to undertake projects are hard to find in the official system, a simpler way to proceed is to engage in illegal activity[23]. A similar situation is found within the bureaucracy, where bribes incentivize employees to be more efficient[24]. To obtain legal government permits to visit China, for instance, giving a bribe of US$50-100 to the employee will allow to have it the same day[25]. To visit Pyongyang, the bribe paid will be around US$15-30[26]. As both managers, entrepreneurs and workers engage in bribery, there is no longer a sense that hard work is rewarded or valued. However, the economic incentives of engaging in corrupt acts are high enough to maintain the masses content, with corruption and criminality being seen as "the most lucrative career path"[27]. In some cases, however, bribery practices do undermine the stability of the government. Individuals, for instance, can bribe their way into working less formal hours to spend more time in the informal market. As of 2010, 62 percent of North Korean defectors had worked in the informal market[28]. Even though this allows them to make more money out of the illegal system, it is done at the expense of the regime's stability, as workers are no longer productive in official projects [29]. These assessments are consistent among different demographic groups surveyed, even those that had a favourable position within the regime[30].

Nonetheless, the existence of the informal market is important for the stability of the regime, as it fills in the gaps left by the official system. With citizens being able to find elsewhere products that the government does not provide, significant discontent is less likely. Basic needs can be met fairly easily through illegal market structures and bribes. The regime thus tolerates the existence of corruption among its society to keep control and prevent an uprising of the masses. Plus, the era of globalization has affected everyone, including North Koreans, who now want to acquire foreign goods and private property as well[31]. Tolerance and a slow opening towards market privatization are thus needed to maintain stability, despite the communist ideology of the regime. However, as the scholars Haggard and Noland, authors of Witness to transformation: refugee insights into North Korea, mention: "this divergence could create substantial risks for the regime over the longer run, particularly as repression is harnessed not to ideological objectives (...) but to private gain by government"[32].


Bribery and the media
Media control is important for the North Korean regime. Used to spread propaganda and maintain ideological control, news are carefully selected and all mentions of economic hardships are avoided in order to paint a glorified picture of Kim Jong-un[33]. In 2008, the launch of Koryolink, a national cellphone service, had a significant effect on society. Even though it allows the regime to monitor conversations, it also allows some individuals to connect to the Chinese mobile networks[34]. The latter being strictly illegal, the punishments if caught can be commonly evaded by offering bribes to police officers [35]. Many citizens also access foreign media by modifying radio and television receivers[36]. The desire to access foreign information shows a lack of trust in the government, as citizens are increasingly conscious that the information it provides is not always accurate. As of 2010, 27 percent of North Korean defectors had listened to a foreign radio[37]. Plus, accessing one has become crucial to illegal trading practices close to borders. Thanks to their use, traders can now know market prices more accurately and sell items at a fairer price[38]. Not owning a radio for a trader has become a serious obstacle, as the lack of information would make that person less competitive in the market.

More recently, North Korea’s state media has also admitted to widespread corruption in the country. When executing Jang Sung-taek in December 2013, then second most powerful man in North Korea and Kim Jong-un's uncle by marriage, the official statement mentioned accusations of bribery, deviation of materials, selling resources and land, securing funds and squandering money for private use by organizations under his control.[39]. It is unusual for the regime to admit corrupt practices of such high-ranking members of the party, which illustrated Kim Jong-un's need to reaffirm his place as leader and representative of the morale. As such, the public execution of Jang Sung-taek was a significant event that undermined the change he represented within North Korean society. Being a figure of progress compared to Kim Jong-un, his death discouraged further challenges to the regime’s leadership [40].

Bribery and punishment
As bribery is a common practice with North Korean society, approaches to punishment have evolved through time. Before the famine of 1994-1998, it was not as tolerated by society and being sent to a North Korean prison camp when caught could not easily be avoided. In recent years, there have been two revisions to the criminal code, in 2004 and 2007, which have criminalized economic activity and set new standards for officials[41]. It is now common practice that the amount of the bribe will vary according to the severity of the crime committed and the individual's capacity to pay, which could range from a pack of cigarettes to hundreds of dollars[42]. As such, bribery is now accessible in the sense that a poor individual will not be asked to pay an unreasonable amount. In a 2010 survey, the most frequently cited motives for bribery were "being permitted to trade" and "avoiding punishment"[43]. This is especially true in regions or geographically remote places, where Pyongyang's control is weaker and the fear of officials is not as strong [44].

In some cases, individuals might not be able to pay the bribe or the official might not be tolerant. For petty crimes committed by teenagers, a correction from the parents might be considered enough[45]. However, when an individual is found guilty of a political crime, the most serious offence in the eyes of the regime and the hardest one to bribe, incarceration in the prison camps is almost assured[46]. In these cases, the careful attention that is usually paid to the judiciary process is disregarded. This process is usually easily corrupted, but still present due to the bureaucratic nature of North Korea. For political crimes, the country's National Security Agency (NSA) handles these cases individually behind close-doors, which is a contrast when compared to the "people's court" of smaller crimes[47][48]. As such, bribery allows individuals to avoid punishment for small crimes. For more serious offences to which the sentence is a prison camp, however, the probability of succeeding is lower.


MagdalenaMorales (talk) 22:05, 25 April 2018 (UTC)Reply

Peer Review - Maya Krishna-Rogers for Corruption in North Korea

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Strengths: The article draft is well-organized and clear. It follows a logical progression through ideas that makes it easy for readers to follow. Sources are academic and non-biased. The majority of claims are supported by reliable source material. It provides a comprehensive overview of bribery in North Korea.

Changes to make: The phrase "considered less important by the authorities," in the Roots of bribery section could be reworded to be more neutral/encyclopedic in tone.

"Despite the famine having took place more than two decades ago, bribery practices did not disappear with time." This sentence is not grammatically correct. Potential rephrase: "Although the famine occurred more than two decades ago, bribery practices have remained."

"The famine encouraged self-interested actions to survive and people started cultivate illegal plots of land to grow a limited amount of crops. Because of the illegality of it, officials, also starving, started to bribe farming individuals in order to get a share of the harvest and eat." A citation here would help prove the validity of this claim.

"Individuals can bribe their way into working less formal hours to spend time at the informal market, allowing them to make money out of the illegal system and weakening the stability of the government in exchange for a simple bribe." This sentence is confusing. Are individuals paying bribes in order to take bribes at the informal market? Try rephrasing.

"More progressist than Kim Jong-un and daring to challenge his leadership, he still ended up being a victim of the corrupt power of his superior." Statement should be more neutral (I think). Also, "progressist" should be replaced by "progressive."

Other Comments It would be very interesting to include a full section on the regime's different responses to corruption. For example, you talk about how the regime responded to Jang Sung-taek, but it would be interesting to see if there is any information on low level prosecution of corruption. Although the regime allows corruption in some cases to keep stability, I would think that there are some instances of the regime taking action against civilians or low-ranking officials who engage in corruption. If there is research available on this topic, I think it would help provide a more comprehensive overview of the problem of bribery. Also, does research about other forms of corruption exist or is it too difficult to find? It could be interesting to include information about other forms of corruption if you can find sources for it.

Peer Review - Kashif Ahmed

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For one of the most corrupt countries, all of the improvements you made are very relevant and interesting to read about. You did well in representing all sections in equal amounts too.

I like the lead section; it offers a succinct summary. The fact about North Korea's Corruption Perceptions Index is repeated because it is already in the main article.

Some facts, if available, about the incidence of bribery, average bribe costs, or the percentage of North Koreas who reported paying a bribe could have impact in the Roots of Bribery section. Also, are there a wide range of estimates for the amount of people who died from famine? 2 million is quite different from 3 million. In regards to the sentence "Most importantly, it made the working sector of the population, considered less important by the authorities, independent from government's food aid, one of the most prevalent forms of control" I'm just wondering if there are other sectors of the population if most people are poor in North Korea. I like how this section concludes by introducing how officials starting bribing too because of the famine and how corruption spread.

The flexibility of the regime for open markets is also very interesting.

The Jang Sung-taek addition is a great improvement.

The sources are very good, with quality academic papers to reference the analysis behind North Korea. Perhaps finding a non-American source on famine could help, since the United States is very anti-North Korea. The citations could have links or be fixed a bit, some say missing or empty.

I think the section titles could be made simpler, like Bribery during Famine, Media in North Korea, and Effects of Bribery.

The article does well with bias on a country generally viewed negatively by the world, by offering positive aspects of corruption in North Korea like admission of corruption by the regime with the vice-president execution and some positive aspects of bribery that help poor people under the regime.

I am not sure if this sentence "They rather intensified to the point that a participant in a research project mentioned that "Nothing can be achieved without bribery in North Korea" is neutral or free of bias, however. May not be necessary. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Kashif.sa96 (talkcontribs) 02:24, 26 March 2018 (UTC)Reply


Manuel Balan Review

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This is off to a very solid start. I agree with the comments and suggestions above. Please move your draft to your sandbox rather than your talk page. Other than that, continue to research and expand your use of sources. Good work so far. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Manuelbalan (talkcontribs) 15:45, 26 March 2018 (UTC)Reply

  1. ^ "Narcosobrinos incident". Wikipedia. 11 January 2018.
  2. ^ "Talk:Corruption in Venezuela". Wikipedia. 8 October 2017.
  3. ^ "Venezuela". freedomhouse.org.
  4. ^ Mundo, Patricia Sulbarán BBC. "Quiénes están detrás de Dólar Today, el sitio web al que Nicolás Maduro acusa de hacer la guerra económica a Venezuela". BBC Mundo (in Spanish).
  5. ^ "Talk:Corruption in Venezuela". Wikipedia. 8 October 2017.
  6. ^ "Elections in Venezuela". Wikipedia. 5 January 2018.
  7. ^ "Censorship in Venezuela". Wikipedia. 19 January 2018.
  8. ^ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corruption_in_North_Korea. {{cite web}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  9. ^ Byung-Yeon Kim; Yu Mi Koh (2011). "The Informal Economy and Bribery in North Korea". Asian Economic Papers (10, no. 3): 108.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  10. ^ Byung-Yeon Kim; Yu Mi Koh (2011). "The Informal Economy and Bribery in North Korea". Asian Economic Papers (10, no. 3): 109. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Missing or empty |title= (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  11. ^ e.V., Transparency International. "Corruption Perceptions Index 2017". www.transparency.org.
  12. ^ Haggard, Stephan; Noland, Marcus (2007). Famine in North Korea : markets, aid, and reform. New York : Columbia University Press.
  13. ^ Tudor, Daniel; Pearson, James (2015). North Korea confidential : private markets, fashion trends, prison camps, dissenters and defectors. Tokyo ; Rutland, Vermont ; Singapore : Tuttle Publishing.
  14. ^ Tudor, Daniel; Pearson, James (2015). North Korea confidential : private markets, fashion trends, prison camps, dissenters and defectors. Tokyo ; Rutland, Vermont ; Singapore : Tuttle Publishing.
  15. ^ Weissmann, Jordan. "How Kim Jong Il Starved North Korea". The Atlantic.
  16. ^ Andrew S Natsios; United States Institute of Peace. (1999). "The politics of famine in North Korea" (Special report (United States Institute of Peace)): 2. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  17. ^ Tudor, Daniel; Pearson, James (2015). North Korea confidential : private markets, fashion trends, prison camps, dissenters and defectors. Tokyo ; Rutland, Vermont ; Singapore : Tuttle Publishing.
  18. ^ Andrew S Natsios; United States Institute of Peace. (1999). "The politics of famine in North Korea" (Special report (United States Institute of Peace)): 9. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Missing or empty |title= (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  19. ^ Tudor, Daniel; Pearson, James (2015). North Korea confidential : private markets, fashion trends, prison camps, dissenters and defectors. Tokyo ; Rutland, Vermont ; Singapore : Tuttle Publishing.
  20. ^ Andrew S Natsios; United States Institute of Peace. (1999). "The politics of famine in North Korea" (Special report (United States Institute of Peace)): 1. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Missing or empty |title= (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  21. ^ Tudor, Daniel; Pearson, James (2015). North Korea confidential : private markets, fashion trends, prison camps, dissenters and defectors. Tokyo ; Rutland, Vermont ; Singapore : Tuttle Publishing.
  22. ^ Andrew S Natsios; United States Institute of Peace. (1999). "The politics of famine in North Korea" (Special report (United States Institute of Peace)): 3. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Missing or empty |title= (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  23. ^ Byung-Yeon Kim; Yu Mi Koh (2011). "The Informal Economy and Bribery in North Korea". Asian Economic Papers (10, no. 3): 111. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Missing or empty |title= (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  24. ^ Byung-Yeon Kim; Yu Mi Koh (2011). "The Informal Economy and Bribery in North Korea". Asian Economic Papers (10, no. 3): 108. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Missing or empty |title= (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  25. ^ Tudor, Daniel; Pearson, James (2015). North Korea confidential : private markets, fashion trends, prison camps, dissenters and defectors. Tokyo ; Rutland, Vermont ; Singapore : Tuttle Publishing.
  26. ^ Tudor, Daniel; Pearson, James (2015). North Korea confidential : private markets, fashion trends, prison camps, dissenters and defectors. Tokyo ; Rutland, Vermont ; Singapore : Tuttle Publishing.
  27. ^ Haggard, Stephan; Noland, Marcus (2011). Witness to transformation : refugee insights into North Korea. Washington, DC : Peterson Institute For International Economics.
  28. ^ Tudor, Daniel; Pearson, James (2015). North Korea confidential : private markets, fashion trends, prison camps, dissenters and defectors. Tokyo ; Rutland, Vermont ; Singapore : Tuttle Publishing.
  29. ^ Byung-Yeon Kim; Yu Mi Koh (2011). "The Informal Economy and Bribery in North Korea". Asian Economic Papers (10, no. 3): 115. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Missing or empty |title= (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  30. ^ Haggard, Stephan; Noland, Marcus (2011). Witness to transformation : refugee insights into North Korea. Washington, DC : Peterson Institute For International Economics.
  31. ^ Daniel Tudor; James Pearson (2015). North Korea confidential : private markets, fashion trends, prison camps, dissenters and defectors. Tuttle Publishing.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  32. ^ Haggard, Stephan; Noland, Marcus (2011). Witness to transformation : refugee insights into North Korea. Washington, DC : Peterson Institute For International Economics. p. 99.
  33. ^ "North Korea's tightly controlled media". BBC News. 19 December 2011.
  34. ^ Tudor, Daniel; Pearson, James (2015). North Korea confidential : private markets, fashion trends, prison camps, dissenters and defectors. Tokyo ; Rutland, Vermont ; Singapore : Tuttle Publishing.
  35. ^ Daniel Tudor; James Pearson (2015). North Korea confidential : private markets, fashion trends, prison camps, dissenters and defectors. Tuttle Publishing.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  36. ^ "North Korea's tightly controlled media". BBC News. 19 December 2011.
  37. ^ Tudor, Daniel; Pearson, James (2015). North Korea confidential : private markets, fashion trends, prison camps, dissenters and defectors. Tokyo ; Rutland, Vermont ; Singapore : Tuttle Publishing.
  38. ^ Daniel Tudor; James Pearson (2015). North Korea confidential : private markets, fashion trends, prison camps, dissenters and defectors. Tuttle Publishing.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  39. ^ Gale, Alastair (13 December 2013). "What North Korea Said About Jang Song Thaek". WSJ.
  40. ^ "What does purge say about North Korea's stability?". BBC News. 12 December 2013.
  41. ^ Haggard, Stephan; Noland, Marcus (2011). Witness to transformation : refugee insights into North Korea. Washington, DC : Peterson Institute For International Economics.
  42. ^ Tudor, Daniel; Pearson, James (2015). North Korea confidential : private markets, fashion trends, prison camps, dissenters and defectors. Tokyo ; Rutland, Vermont ; Singapore : Tuttle Publishing.
  43. ^ Haggard, Stephan; Noland, Marcus (2011). Witness to transformation : refugee insights into North Korea. Washington, DC : Peterson Institute For International Economics.
  44. ^ Tudor, Daniel; Pearson, James (2015). North Korea confidential : private markets, fashion trends, prison camps, dissenters and defectors. Tokyo ; Rutland, Vermont ; Singapore : Tuttle Publishing.
  45. ^ Tudor, Daniel; Pearson, James (2015). North Korea confidential : private markets, fashion trends, prison camps, dissenters and defectors. Tokyo ; Rutland, Vermont ; Singapore : Tuttle Publishing.
  46. ^ Haggard, Stephan; Noland, Marcus (2011). Witness to transformation : refugee insights into North Korea. Washington, DC : Peterson Institute For International Economics.
  47. ^ Tudor, Daniel; Pearson, James (2015). North Korea confidential : private markets, fashion trends, prison camps, dissenters and defectors. Tokyo ; Rutland, Vermont ; Singapore : Tuttle Publishing.
  48. ^ Haggard, Stephan; Noland, Marcus (2011). Witness to transformation : refugee insights into North Korea. Washington, DC : Peterson Institute For International Economics.