R. v. W. (1998) B.C.C.A.

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Facts

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The defendents were two youths who suffered from a psychologial disorder characterized by a form of delusional thinking. They allegedly had fantasies of starting a new world ordeer - a new society - on Baffin Island in Northern Canada. In this fantastic society, they were attempting to find and acquire nuclear weapons. These two young men even developed a backup escape plan if they got caught: they would perfect their magical and musical talents while locked away in the isolation of solitary confinement in prison.

Issues

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The major issue in the case was whether the trial judge erred in failing to find the two accused youths of being not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). Today NGRI is equivalently known as NCRMD - not criminally responsible due to a mental disorder.

Holding

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It was found that the trial judge did not err in failing to find the two young men not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) by way of section 16 of the Criminal Code of Canada, which offers the accused such a defence.

Reasoning

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The majority of the Court read down the case of R. v. Oommen, iterating that it did not change or alter the second branch as originally interpreted and explained by C.J. Lamer in R. v. Chaulk. In that case, based on s.16 of the Criminal Code, it was decided that, “It must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the part accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.” [1] There was, and has continued to be concern over the meanings of the words “know” and “wrong” in this context.

Definitions of the words “know” and “wrong” have been determined over the years by the Supreme Court of Canada. It was determined that “know” meant “incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of the act or omission or of knowing that it was wrong." [2] The definition of “wrong” has been of even more debate. It was first taken to mean “according to the law." [3] This was revised twice more, once in the case of R. v. Chaulk [1990], where 6 out of 9 judges held that this word meant “morally wrong” as opposed to “legally wrong." [4] Again, this interpretation was further refined by the SCC in the case of R. v. Oommen [1994]. The decision established that “the accused must possess the intellectual ability to know right from wrong in an abstract sense. But he or she must also possess the ability to apply that knowledge in a rational way to the alleged criminal act." [5] In other words, R. v. Oommen appeared to expand the scope of the s.16 defence by allowing another avenue for the defence itself ("capacity angle" as opposed to the "morality angle" of the crime). The accused must lack the rational capacity to realize society's moral standard of conduct to satisfy the second branch of this legal test. Knowledge of moral standards is insufficient.

Essentially, the majority held that W and his co-accused were able to perceive how others would perceive their actions. They evidently were aware that society would disapprove of their "rebellion". It is not possible for individuals to plead that societal values are considered wrong.

Due to the reinterpretation of Chaulk, it was not sufficient to decide that the accused's actions were a result of their delusions. [6] Even if the act was motivated by delusional thinking, the defendants would be convicted if they were capable of knowing that the act was wrong, despite their delusions. Regardless of the circumstances, the two young men would have been morally condemned by most reasonable members of society.

The Court examined how the accused and co-accused altered and adjusted their plans and goals in order to infer that they had the rational capaity to decide upon the course of their actions.

Rationale

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Where the accused has the capaity to know what reasonable persons perceive to be wrong (legally wrong or morally wrong), the accused cannot benefit from the second branch of this legal test (knowing the act in question was wrong). The accused could appreciate that their act was wrong, regardless of their psychological delusions. They were able to understand and comprehend society's moral condemnation of their conduct. In other words, both young men were well aware that their conduct did not conform to normal and reasonable standards of society, breaching a standard of moral conduct.

Additional Comments

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The ability to alter the various strategies in the course of the commission of an offence is not indicative of the accused's abilities to determine what is right from what is wrong. At the end of the day, the accused were not aware of society's moral standards or moral disapprobation of their actions and conduct; thus, they should have been found not guilty by reason of a mental disorder (NGRI or NCRDM).

The accused did not specifically choose a deviant path or deviant moral code. They did not have the choice as they were unable to personalize social mores and socially accepted standards, because of their disordered and delusional thinking patterns.

To explain further, if the accused knew that society condemned their behaviour and actions, they would not be able to satisfy the second branch of the test in Chaulk. If, however, the accused did not know that society disapproved, but lacked the capacity to follow society's moral code, they could potentially be acquired under the test in Oommen. [7] Therefore, the test in Oommen has the effect of widening the scope of the test itself.

References

  1. ^ R. v. Chaulk [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303.
  2. ^ Criminal Code of Canada, section 16 (R.S., 1985, c. C-46).
  3. ^ R. v. Schwartz, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 673.
  4. ^ R. v. Chaulk [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303.
  5. ^ R. v. Oommen, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 507, at p.516.
  6. ^ R. v. Chaulk [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303.
  7. ^ R. v. Oommen, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 507.