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Dixon Plan

The 1950s saw the mediation by Sir Owen Dixon, the UN-appointed mediator, who came the closest to solving the Kashmir dispute in the eyes of many commentators. Dixon arrived in the subcontinent in May 1950 and, after a visit to Kashmir, proposed a summit between India and Pakistan. The summit lasted five days, at the end of which Dixon declared a state-wide plebiscite was impossible. Nehru then proposed a partition-cum-plebiscite plan: Jammu and Ladakh would go to India, Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas to Pakistan, and a plebiscite would be held in the Kashmir Valley. Dixon favoured the plan, which bears his name till this day. The sticking point was that Dixon proposed, following Liaquat Ali Khan's objections, that Sheikh Abdullah administration should be held in "commission" (in abeyance) while the plebiscite was held. This was not acceptable to India. At that point, Dixon lost patience and declared failure. Dixon concluded that India would not agree to provisions governing the plebiscite that guard against influence and abuse ensuring a free and fair plebiscite. The US ambassador Loy Henderson reported, "Dixon, however, had offered no alternative. He had taken [the] position there could be no fair plebiscite under Abdullah regime. It was on this issue and nothing else [that] discussions had broken down. [Government of India] was still willing to discuss direct with [Government of Pakistan] ... solution involving partition with plebiscite in Vale..." Dixon's premature withdrawal has been criticised, but perhaps Dixon had not realised how close he had come to solving the dispute.

Background

http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1921/stories/20021025002508200.htm

Australian scholar of impeccable credentials. Major William Alan Reid was an Observer with the U.N. Military Observers Group in Kashmir (UNMOGIP).

Vishnu Sahay, Secretary for Kashmir Affairs in the MEA, had informed the Australian High Commission (AHC) in New Delhi before Dixon's arrival that both Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel were "even prepared to risk public opinion, if the need arose" to get the plebiscite-cum-partition plan through. Before the end of 1948 — if not earlier — Nehru had developed second thoughts on a plebiscite in Kashmir(vide the writer's article "India-Pakistan summit, 1955"; Frontline, August 8, 2001). But he told the British High Commissioner Archibald Nye on September 9, 1949 that a proposal for "a plebiscite being confined to the Valley and the area north of it [excluding Gilgit] was worthy of consideration" (SWJN; Volume13; page 225).

At the MEA, Bajpai told the U.S. Ambassador, Loy Henderson, on April 8, that during the Nehru-Liaquat talks that month on the refugee influx from East Pakistan, the Secretary-General of Pakistan's Cabinet, Mohammed Ali "suggested that it would be helpful if Pakistan and India could come to an understanding re Kashmir before arrival of mediator. Bajpai agreed and outlined various methods for settlement or dispute including his own favourite method which he described to Ali as `Lippmann's suggestions', that is, partition plus plebiscite in Vale of Kashmir. All said Pakistan was so deeply committed to `over-all plebiscite' he did not see how any other method could be approved at this time" (Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1950; Volume V, S. Asia; 1978; page 1,407).

• http://ikashmir.net/storm/chapter10.html

Sir Owen Dixon's report was the first judicial report on the state of affairs in Jammu & Kashmir as it had developed since the beginning of the Kashmir conflict in October, 1947. He was the first U.N. representative to state in unequivocal terms that the crossing of the frontier of Jammu & Kashmir State by Pakistani invaders on October 22, 1947, and the entry of regular Pakistan Army into Kashmir in May, 1948 were contrary to international law. He was again the first U.N. representative to clearly grasp the fact that Jammu & Kashmir State is just a heterogeneous conglomeration of territories under the political power of one Maharaja and that it was not really a unit geographically, demographically or economically.

Legality of accession

http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1921/stories/20021025002508200.htm

Here was also the issue of sovereignty. Reid discloses that "in 1949, the dispute's legal underpinnings became potentially far more complicated: the U.K. government accepted a legal opinion questioning the validity of Kashmir's accession to India. The opinion was circulated to the U.S., Australia and Canada" in 1950. Dixon was also given a copy. It was dated February 6, 1950.

The State Department's Legal Adviser agreed with the opinion by the Attorney-General Sir Hartley Shawcross as well as the legal advisers of the British Foreign Office. They held the accession to be "perhaps invalid". The State Department's Legal Adviser gave the opinion that "execution of an Instrument of Accession by the Maharajah in October 1947, could not finally accomplish the accession of Kashmir to either Dominion, in view of the circumstances prevailing at that time; the question of the future of Kashmir remained to be settled in some orderly fashion under relatively stable conditions; this question is an important element in the dispute; and, in proceedings before the Security Council, neither party is entitled to assert that rights were finally determined by the Maharajah's execution of an instrument of Accession." (FRUS, 1950, Vol. V, page 1,379).

The correct view was set out in 1948 in the Government of India's White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir. It was valid but "purely provisional" (page 3). It was also called "conditional". Mountbatten's letter of October 27, 1947 to the State's ruler mentioned the condition: "The question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State."

Dixon knew that "a just and enduring settlement could be achieved only through a pragmatic agreement which recognised the situation as it now stood". Dixon met Nehru, first on May 27, 1950 when "Nehru reiterated that confirmation of the accession of Kashmir to India ought to be done through a Constituent Assembly" (emphasis added, throughout). It was elected in 1951.He met on June 8 and several times later socially, Sheikh Abdullah who ran his fiefdom as a "police state". Erik Colban (Dixon's aide) met Abdullah who "claimed that he was keen to bury the past and try to work `hand in hand' with the leaders of the Azad Kashmir government. Moreover, they should push for a `united' Kashmir that could determine to which country it would accede, `or to other forms of cooperation' with both states. Abdullah wanted Dixon to propose a joint meeting to discuss this." He complained of the UNCIP's failure to negotiate with him and of the omission of the option of independence in the plebiscite.

Maulana Azad met Dixon in Kashmir: "He raised, as Nehru had done, the question of determining the disposal of Kashmir by a Constituent Assembly. Dixon replied that the actual communication accepting the instrument of accession did not use any such term but said that the fate of Kashmir should be decided by an expression of the people's will. Also, in any number of speeches, Nehru had said that this meant by plebiscite, and that was what India and Pakistan had agreed to. Azad, although claiming that India would win a plebiscite, still recommended Partition with a vote only in the disputed areas. This would minimize any migration of refugees and avoid the need for demilitarisation... When Azad concluded by stating that Pakistan's army must be withdrawn, Dixon replied pointedly: `I could say no more than that you did not take votes where there were troops who might be used as instruments of coercion'."

Diplomatic efforts and meetings

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=7Q7WCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA170#v=onepage&q&f=false

Though Sir Owen's report makes no mention of the fact, there is no doubt that his work was made intensely difficult by the further deterioration of the situation in the Far East. The Korean War broke out in June 1950, and the Indian government, which had recognized the government of Communist China, was more than cautious in its policy on the Korean affair. More than this, it made elaborate comparisons between the attitude of the United Nations toward Korea and toward Kashmir. If the North Korean Communists had invaded South Korea, they argued, so had the Pakistanis invaded Kashmir. Why, then, were they not condemned as were the North Koreans? Why had the United Nations failed to take action against Pakistan?

India her opposition upon a number of things—the need of assuring the defense of Kashmir and of maintaining law and order. But she objected most vehemently to any proposal which either treated Pakistan as an equal or failed to take into account the violation of Kashmir territory by the Pakistanis.

http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1921/stories/20021025002508200.htm

Back in New Delhi, Dixon proposed to Nehru a summit with Liaquat. Nehru agreed after much persuasion, so did Liaquat but wondered if Nehru was agreeable to plebiscite. Dixon assured him that he was. The summit was held in Delhi from July 20 to 24 without aides. They spent 18 hours, Nehru holding forth for 10. Nehru found his main interlocutor Dixon, "a patient listener... " Liaquat spoke for less than 30 minutes saying "little or nothing except by way of intermittent protest against Mr. Nehru's statements". The possibility of a partition-cum-plebiscite "had been raised". Liaquat's silence preserved his options.

On July 29, Henderson reported to Acheson (US Secretary of State) that an informant "sent to me by one of most powerful political figures" (was it Patel?) told him: "a. Indian Cabinet was extremely anxious for settlement of Kashmir in near future on basis which will leave as little bitterness as possible. b. It was absolutely out of question, however, for India to permit Jammu with its heavy Hindu population and its geographical position to go to Pakistan. c. Cabinet believed only solution was that of partition plebiscite as advanced by Dixon and believed that if Pakistan accepts this solution, GOI should be extremely liberal in making concessions redemilitarisation and U.N. control in Vale during course plebiscite even though it was confident that plebiscite under such conditions would yield Vale to Pakistan. In other words, Cabinet prepared now abandon idea of Vale going to India provided Jammu and Ladakh would be retained and decision re Vale would be based on plebiscite. d. Nehru, although somewhat reluctant, was willing go along with Cabinet in this regard... " (FRUS; page 1,417). Nehru expected to get "concessions from Pakistan in other spheres" as part of the deal. Dixon, on August 15, won Liaquat's clearance for his plan.

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=YNMQNnW_QRgC&pg=PT24&lpg=PT24#v=onepage&q&f=false

ZONAL PLEBISCITE

Plebiscite in entire Jammu and Kashmir to determine region by region allocation to Pakistan or India. Sir Owen Dixon proposed to trifurcate the State in 1950. He suggested that the state be divided into three zones and plebiscites be conducted separately for the three zones. The three zones were to be

1)Kashmir valley plus the Muslim areas of Jammu - Poonch, Rajouri and Doda. Moreover, Kargil would form part of the Valley.

2) Jammu with the remaining district of Ladakh.

3) Pakistan controlled Kashmir plus the Northern Areas.

Dixon's proposals on the overall plebiscite were rejected by Nehru on the grounds he recorded in his report. "But he was in no doubt why they were put," as he mentioned privately in a letter: "If such a plebiscite were taken freely and fairly (India) would undoubtedly lose it." Bajpai agreed, expressing his "personal view".

Dixon even explored "the possibility of removing the ceasefire line as the political boundary" so that the State could be brought under one administration. He did not favour a coalition comprising Abdullah and Ghulam Abbas of the Pakistan administered Kashmir. But the proposals he made were starkly unrealistic. Any competent political adviser would have warned him against making it. He proposed putting the State "Government in commission"; that is, "replacing the regular constitutional administrators with appointed persons". Ministers would continue to hold office "but they would be relieved of their responsibilities. No Indian Prime Minister could possibly have accepted that. It went beyond the terms for plebiscite in the UNCIP's Resolution of January 5, 1949. This was to prove fatal, eventually, on the limited plebiscite. "Before the conference adjourned, Dixon sought an indication about India's attitude towards Partition, with a limited plebiscite (the Valley and some adjacent country), or plebiscites in specified areas. Nehru proffered `great interest' and, despite the disadvantages of being seen to compromise, undertook to provide India's view. Although not liking it, Liaquat did not object to the proposal being raised, so long as it came from India..."

Proposal

• http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1921/stories/20021025002508200.htm

After the collapse of the summit, Dixon received from Nehru a tentative proposal: "In Jammu the ceasefire line would become the boundary, Azad Kashmir going to Pakistan, the remainder to India. Since the latter included territory north of the Chenab River, India would also agree not to reduce `sensibly, substantially or materially' its flow. The Northern Areas would be conceded but Buddhist Ladakh in the east would remain with India. As to the Valley, which Nehru defined generously, he agreed that prima facie it was in doubt and that a plebiscite must be taken... This would, inter alia, minimise refugee movement while simplifying demilitarisation and administrative arrangements. The Valley, overwhelmingly Muslim but also Sheikh Abdullah's power base, would be subject to a vote. The major difference that arose was about the territory that India claimed automatically. Because of strong pro-Pakistan areas to the east of the ceasefire line in Jammu, Dixon felt it both unwise and mistaken to follow this closely and warned that he would argue against it." The 1941 Census was to be taken as the basis "modified by demographic, geographic and other features and `present conditions' " in order to minimise refugee movement. Dixon met Patel on July 30 who opposed a plebiscite ("an impracticable solution (that) had never been possible.") They discussed a partition line in Jammu. 

Dixon was informed by Francis Stuart, the Acting Australian High Commissioner, that before the Prime Ministers' summit, the Cabinet had "unanimously" agreed that a solution must be found quickly; rejected an overall plebiscite; but "a settlement which gave Kashmir substantially Pakistan, provided it included settling satisfactorily other outstanding issues, would be acceptable; but Jammu must remain in India while losing Ladakh would be resisted. The Army also supported an immediate political solution."

Dixon went to Karachi, the then capital of Pakistan, and proposed another summit to discuss a limited plebiscite. Mohammed Ali was skeptical whether Nehru would agree to conditions for a fair poll; Liaquat, facing a divided Cabinet, proposed outright partition, with the Valley going to Pakistan. Dixon returned to Delhi on August 9 and secured Nehru's agreement on a new course of action. Dixon would propose a "definite" plan for limited plebiscite with "the territorial boundaries India might not like". Nehru would attend a conference provided Liaquat did not reject the idea itself. Dixon proposed to give Pakistan "much of Jammu west of the Chenab river". The plebiscite area would be defined precisely. Dixon went to Karachi to secure Liaquat's consent to this. He spent a week there (August 11-18). Liaquat accepted the plan, provided Nehru would agree to a neutral administration for the Valley. In an exchange of cables, Nehru rejected the idea — to Dixon's annoyance. They are annexed to the Report. Dixon was being unrealistic and impatient. Reid writes: "Although the plan was similar in concept to that which Nehru had dismissed at the conference, in practice it would be much different — yet it had been rejected without any detail being sought." None with any political awareness would have proposed it in 1950, either; mechanically perfect, politically impossible. "The Government in Commission" was a concept for which the great jurist would have found hardly any precedent. He even envisaged participation of Pakistan's troops. Reid records that Dixon reminded Nehru that "when he, Dixon, had first used it Nehru had requested an explanation — and then opposed the concept strongly. Bajpai then pointed to a paper given to Nehru during the conference and asked why its provisions would not do: this was what the (Indian) Cabinet had expected Dixon to propose and it would not unduly interfere with the process of Government. Dixon pointed out that that paper was now `entirely insufficient' as its proposals applied to the whole State and dealt only with controlling the police... He had understood from post-conference discussions that India accepted that measures would be necessary in the Valley to ensure a vote free from intimidation and unfairness, but it had now denied him any chance to explain them."

• http://ikashmir.net/storm/chapter10.html

He suggested the following two alternatives to an overall plebiscite:

(1) A plebiscite be taken "by sections or areas" and the allocation of each section or area be made according to the result of the vote.

(2) Without holding a plebiscite, areas certain to vote for India and those certain to vote for Pakistan "be allotted accordingly and the plebiscite be confined only to the uncertain area". The "uncertain area" according to Sir. Dixon appeared to be the "Vale of Kashmir and perhaps some adjacent country."

This plan of holding a partial plebiscite in a limited area consisting of United Nations officers headed by the Plebiscite Administrator with powers to "exclude troops of any description. If however, they decided that for any purpose troops were necessary, they could request the parties to provide them."

He further suggested that the Security Council should pull itself out of the dispute and let the initiative pass to the parties concerned. He, however, stressed the necessity for the reduction in armed forces holding the cease-fire Line to the normal needs of a peace time frontier.

They left the gains of aggression which included three out of the four Muslim majority regions of the State in the hands of Pakistan and gave her a fair opportunity to secure control over the fourth- the Valley of Kashmir - if the people of that region really wanted to put their lot with her. They gave India an un-disputed control over Jammu and Laddakh and provided her an opportunity to put the loyalty of Sheikh Abdullah and Kashmiri Muslims for whom she had done so much, to a fair test. To confine the plebiscite to the Valley with its small and compact area was definitely to be preferred to an overall-plebiscite in the whole of the State from every point of view.

Reasons for failure

• http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1921/stories/20021025002508200.htm

Even after Dixon gave up on August 23, what Bajpai told Henderson on August 25 was significant. The U.S. Ambassador reported to Acheson: "I said it had been my impression GOI really desired solution of partition-plus-plebiscite and that if it could have most of Jammu and Ladakh it would be willing agree to conditions for plebiscite in Vale. Bajpai... said that had been GOI position and still was its position. GOI did not believe however, it would be necessary replace present Government Kashmir with UN administration in order have fair plebiscite... Public reaction in India would be so sharp that no government which had agreed to such arrangement could survive. This had been opinion not only of Nehru but also of other members of Foreign Committee of Cabinet — Patel, Rajagopalachari and Ayyangar. Dixon, however, had offered no alternative. He had taken position there could be no fair plebiscite under Abdullah regime. It was on this issue and nothing else discussions had broken down. GOI was still willing to discuss direct with GOP or under auspices SC solution involving partition with plebiscite in Vale under conditions which reasonable observers U.N. must consider fair" (FRUS; page 1,426).

One wishes that Dixon had persisted and amplified on the UNCIP's formula. Reid asks why Nehru rejected the idea though "the Cabinet wanted a genuine settlement". The Cabinet would have rejected any proposal for ousting Abdullah's government. Dixon's angry comments on Nehru later were unjust. Nehru, to be sure, reneged on his commitment on a plebiscite as this writer demonstrated (Frontline, August 3, 2001). But it is unfair to blame him for rejecting a "Government in Commission". Dixon's distrust of Abdullah's repressive regime was justified. Not so his impatient refusal to see the merit of Nehru's view.

Nehru, true to form, caustically dragged in Pakistan's "original sin" while arguing sensibly. But the record does not suggest that he was insincere on the Dixon plan. He reminded U.S. Ambassador Chester Bowles on July 8, 1952 that "India had always been interested in partition possibility as outlined in Dixon Report," provided that Sheikh Abdullah's continuance in office was not affected (SWJN; Volume 18; page 430).

• http://ikashmir.net/storm/chapter10.html

But there was one snag in these proposals. The suggestion to replace the lawfully constituted authority in the Valley by the U.N. administrators with the right to invite troops of both India and Pakistan if necessary for the purpose of maintenance of law and offer could not be justified on any ground. It amounted to absolute repudiation of India's special position emanating from the lawful accession of the State to her and bestowal upon Pakistan, the aggressor who had already obtained rich spoils, an equal status and right over Kashmir.

The Pakistan Government rejected the Dixon proposals on the plea that they "meant a breach on India's part of the agreement that the destinies of Jammu & Kashmir State as a whole should be decided by a plebiscite taken over the entire state". But this rejection was more tactical than genuine because there could not have been a better proposal from the Pakistan point of view.

But it was not so easy for India to accept these proposals. It would have amounted to an implicit acceptance by her that the accession of the State to India had no legal and constitutional validity and that the State should be partitioned on the same basis on which British India had been partitioned earlier. Further, doubts had begun to assail the mind of Pt. Nehru as well about the advisability of putting the Kashmiri Muslims into the ordeal of a plebiscite in which, whenever held, religious and communal considerations would outweigh all other considerations. Taya Zinkin, the representative of "Manchester Guardian" of London, reported Pt. Nehru as having told her on June 30, 1950, in answer to her question whether he would accept the "status quo" with plebiscite confined to the Valley of Kashmir, that he would not agree to a plebiscite so long as Pakistan held a part of the State because the people of Kashmir were "timorous." Pakistan had agreed that it would not canvass in Kashmir on religious grounds but he could not run the risk of their breaking this understanding. Compared with the risk of communal conflagration he did not care about world opinion, but added that "of course if the Kashmiris want a plebiscite to be fought on economic and not mind you, religious grounds, they can have it. But I shall never allow so long as I live a plebiscite over cow's urine and all that. It would undo the whole of communal harmony."

However, according to Sir Owen Dixon, the Prime Minister of India was in agreement with the general principles underlying his proposals, viz., area where there was no doubt as to the wishes of the people going to India or Pakistan and plebiscite being confined to the areas where there was doubt about the result of voting provided the demarcation line was drawn with due regard to geographical features and requirements of an international boundary.

• http://www.nihcr.edu.pk/Latest_English_Journal/Pjhc%2025-1%202004/4-KASHMIR%20DISPUTE.pdf (p 95)

In his report the Security Council Sir Dixon stated: .... In the end I became convinced that India’s agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any such form or to provisions government the period of the plebiscite of any such character, as would in my opinion permit of the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled

Feasibility

• http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1921/stories/20021025002508200.htm

In Srinagar, Henderson "had two secret discussions" with Sheikh Abdullah, at his request in September 1950. He "was vigorous in restating that in his opinion it (Kashmir) should be independent" (FRUS; page 1,434).

In 1952, V.K. Krishna Menon told the Australian High Commissioner that Nehru still favoured the Dixon Plan. Reid rightly holds: "Dixon came much closer to creating the conditions necessary for a lasting settlement than has previously been recognised. Moreover, his mission did provide some hope for a future settlement by outlining a sensible approach." 

At the outset Dixon felt handicapped by the lack of a political adviser "thoroughly familiar" with India. It proved fateful.

On August 28, Henderson gave his formula to Acheson. "present government of Kashmir could remain in office during period plebiscite so long as in opinion administrator it was loyally cooperating in facilitating fair plebiscite. Administrator would have authority, however, to appoint U.N. officials to arrange for and conduct plebiscite. He would also be empowered to appoint observers to local military units and to civilian institutions, including juridical and police, in order to make sure there was no direct or indirect intimidation of population, Kashmir Government would be required accept administrator's recommendation for removal of any of its officials who in opinion administrator were not loyally cooperating in order bring about fair plebiscite and to revoke any administrative or judicial order which in opinion administrator was likely interfere with fairness of plebiscite. Such Indian military establishment as might remain in Kashmir would also be required to remove or replace any of its personnel who in opinion administrator were not giving proper cooperation. Administrator should also be provided with sufficient U.N. civilian and military personnel to replace local personnel in case in his opinion such replacements would be advisable." This was negotiable (FRUS; page 1,428).

When British and American officials met on September 18, J.J.S. Garner of the Commonwealth Relations Office "pointed out that Dixon's efforts did, after all, break down on a rather narrow point and that, if there really a will on the part of the two sides to settle the problem, it should not be impossible to devise a formula that would, on the one hand, avoid the complete withdrawal of the Abdullah Government, and, on the other, allow proper U.N. supervision of the plebiscite.

"Mr. McGhee, pointing out that partition-plus-plebiscite seemed to be the most likely solution ultimately, thought we might use Dixon's report as the basis for consolidating efforts in this direction" (FRUS; page 201).

When British and American officials met on September 18, J.J.S. Garner of the Commonwealth Relations Office "pointed out that Dixon's efforts did, after all, break down on a rather narrow point and that, if there really a will on the part of the two sides to settle the problem, it should not be impossible to devise a formula that would, on the one hand, avoid the complete withdrawal of the Abdullah Government, and, on the other, allow proper U.N. supervision of the plebiscite.

• http://ikashmir.net/storm/chapter10.html

There are reasons to believe that had Sir Dixon and afterward the Security Council adopted a flexible approach in regard to the suggestion about suppression of lawful Kashmir Government and admission of Pakistan's troops into the valley if the Plebiscite Administrator so desired, his proposals might have proved a workable basis for a final settlement in spite of the immediate adverse reactions of India and Pakistan to it.

But the Security Council which met on February 21, 1951 to consider the report of Sir Owen Dixon instead of finding out ways and means of making the Dixon proposals acceptable to the two parties, decided by a resolution sponsored jointly by the UK and the USA to send another U.N. representative to India and Pakistan in succession to Sir Owen Dixon "to effect the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the demilitarization proposals made by Sir Dixon in his report with any modifications which the U.N. representative deems advisable, and to present to the Government of India and Pakistan detailed plans for carrying out plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir". This resolution was passed with slight modification in spite of the opposition of India by a majority vote on March 30, 1951. None voted against it but the USSR and Yugoslavia abstained.

Public Opinion

Kashmir

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India

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Pakistan

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Support

• http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1921/stories/20021025002508200.htm

When they met in London three years later, Nehru told him, as Dixon recorded in his diary (June 1, 1953), that "of all the people who had dealt with the Kashmir question, I was the only man who came to grips with it". In 1952, V.K. Krishna Menon told the Australian High Commissioner that Nehru still favoured the Dixon Plan. Reid rightly holds: "Dixon came much closer to creating the conditions necessary for a lasting settlement than has previously been recognised. Moreover, his mission did provide some hope for a future settlement by outlining a sensible approach."

President Rajendra Prasad endorsed the Dixon Plan in a note to Nehru on July 14, 1953. "Last year, Dr. Radhakrishnan, (Vice-President) on his return from a visit to Kashmir, came and told me that even Sheikh Abdullah thought that we would lose in a plebiscite as Sheikh Abdullah himself had told him that ... but whether we win or lose in a plebiscite, with our commitments it is not possible to say that we shall not have a plebiscite if the other side presses for it." He feared a refugee influx. And preferred "the suggestion of Sir Owen Dixon and have plebiscite only in an area about which there is any doubt as to which way it would vote. It proceeds upon the assumption that the result of plebiscite in the areas which are left out of plebiscite is a foregone conclusion, and therefore both as a matter of expediency and convenience, the plebiscite should be confined to doubtful areas... One of the implications of this may be that we may lose the Kashmir Valley, but we shall be assured from the very beginning about getting Jammu and Ladakh, and Pakistan similarly about the Azad area" (Dr. Rajendra Prasad: Correspondence and Select Documents; Volume 16; pages 91-92).

The Dixon Plan figured in discussions in the National Conference's Working Committee on June 9, 1953, "among the alternatives discussed was — a Dixon plan with independence for the plebiscite area" — Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed was "emphatically of the opinion" that this should be put up "as first and the only practicable, advantageous and honourable solution of (sic.) the dispute" (For text vide A. G. Noorani; The Kashmir Question; 1964; page 63).

Criticism

• http://www.esamskriti.com/essay-chapters/Dixon-Plan~-Moves-afoot-to-divide-Jammu-on-communal-lines-1.aspx

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=yXrwKA8GkU8C&pg=PA145&lpg=PA142#v=onepage&q&f=false

(Another partition violence)

The plan met with opposition from those with pro-independence sentiments, but it had a more serious flaw. The large wave of migration caused by the imposition of such a border would involve the displacement of many thousands of people, which could itself lead to violence. It seems unlikely that the international community would back a plan of this sort, which would involve the segregation of Hindus and Muslims who have been living for a long time as neighbours in many areas.

Other solutions

• https://books.google.co.in/books?id=vLwOck15eboC&pg=PA159#v=onepage&q&f=false

Asia Society Proposal

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Four Point Formula

• http://www.frontline.in/the-nation/four-point-formula/article7809494.ece#test

Chenab Formula

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JKLF Proposal

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Andorra Solution

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Miscellaneous

• http://panunkashmir.org/kashmirsentinel/aug2002/2.html

Text of the summing up and concluding portion of the report of Sir Owen Dixon, UN Representative for India and Pakistan on Kashmir, submitted to the Security Council in September, 1950

It will be seen that two main lines have been pursued in the attempts which have been made to settle the dispute between the two countries about the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The attempt to find a solution by taking a plebiscite over the whole state and so decide by a majority to which country the entire state shall go has its origin in the first proceedings before the Security Council. It would be recalled that by the Resolution of 21 April 1948 the desire of both India and Pakistan that the question of accession of the state to one of them should be decided by free and impartial plebiscite was noted with satisfaction. In the agreed resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, January 5, 1949 there is a recital of the acceptance by the Government of both countries of the principles that the question of the accession of the state to India or Pakistan would be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite.

From the date of this resolution until the present there have been continual efforts to bring about conditions in which the preparations for taking a poll might go forward. No one has supposed that they could even begin while much of the respective territories on either side of the cease-fire line were occupied by opposed armies and their base units. There are in addition many other obstacles to the holding of a free and fair plebiscite which must be removed before the state would be ready for the organisation and machinery which the taking of a poll would make necessary. Unfortunately all this has been made to depend upon the agreement of the parties. It is enough to refer to paragraph 2, 6(a) and 10 of the Resolution of 5 January 1949 and to the provisions of the Resolution of 13 August 1948 upon which these paragraphs hang.

There is, I believe on the side of India a conception of what ought to be done to ascertain the real will of the people which is not that tacitly assumed by me. Doubtless it is a conception which Pakistan does not share. The resolution of January 1949 contains some rather general provisions in relation to the holding of the plebiscite and the antecedent steps, and about these more general provisions the parties were able to agree. But to apply propositions of this kind a programme of practical acts and physical events must be agreed on. Without that it is impossible for the Plebiscite Administrator to begin the extensive and difficult work of organising the taking of a poll. It is the practical measures which have proved the obstacle, not the mere general propositions.

Pakistan has complained of India’s failure to agree on the practical measures which must precede the preparations for the actual taking of a poll, and has maintained that this failure is the result of a deliberate policy. But the fact remains that under the resolutions the agreement of India to the course to be pursued in these matters is a condition-precedent to carrying out a plebiscite of the state, and there is no such agreement. Moreover, the United Nations Commission failed in its efforts to secure an agreement upon them; I failed in mine; neither party put-forward any other proposals and both appeared to concur in the view that the possibility of agreement has been exhausted.

The contention of Pakistan that it was incumbent on India to agree did not advance the matter practically. It was in these circumstances that I decided to turn away from a plebiscite of the whole state, an “over all” plebiscite, as a method of solving the problem of Kashmir. Partition of the whole state between the two countries is of course an obvious alternative. But unfortunately the Valley of Kashmir cannot itself be partitioned and it is an area claimed by each side. Pakistan claims it not only because it is predominantly Muslim but also because the Jhelum river flows from it and Pakistan will not readily give up her claim. India is just as insistent upon her claim and has the advantage of possession. Some method of allocating the Kashmir valley to one party or the other is, therefore, essential to any plan of partition.

I am inclined to the view that no method of allocating the Valley to one or other of the contending parties is available except a poll of the inhabitants. By the inhabitants I mean those of them who fulfill whatever may be fixed as the test of eligibility to vote. The difficulty of using the expedient of a plebiscite appears to lie entirely that the plebiscite is held in conditions which make it an effective means of ascertaining the real will of the people independently formed and freely expressed and, on the other hand, certain conceptions or preconceptions of the Indian government. These are based, in part, on what India conceives to be the origin and course of the fighting in 1947 and 1948 and part on her unwillingness to have any interference to the civil administration. In addition, it may be, as I have suggested that a different conception exists of the process of ascertaining the will of the people. Although I myself found no reconciliation of this conflict possible, it may be that with India’s help some resolution of the conflict may be discovered. She may come to realise the necessity of practical measures which will really secure the freedom and fairness of a plebiscite which must be paramount over these conceptions. At all events I have formed the opinion that if there is any chance of settling the dispute over Kashmir by agreement between India and Pakistan it now lies in partition and in some means of allocating the Valley rather than in an overall plebiscite. The reason for this may be shortly stated (emphasis added).

The State of Jammu and Kashmir is not really a unit geographically, demographically or economically. It is an agglomeration of territories brought under the political power of One Maharaja. That is the unity it possesses. If as a result of an overall plebiscite the state as an entirety passed to India, there would be large movements of Muslims and another refugee problem would arise for Pakistan who would be expected to receive them in very great numbers. If the result favoured Pakistan a refugee problem, although not of such dimensions, would arise of India, because of the movement of Hindus and Sikhs. Almost all this would be avoided by partition. Great areas of the state are unequivocally Muslim. Other areas are predominantly Hindu. There is a further area which is Buddhist. No one doubts the sentiment of the great majority of the inhabitants of these areas. The interest of the people, the justice as well as the permanence of the settlement, and the imperative necessity of avoiding another refugee problem all point to the wisdom of adopting partition as the principle of settlement and of abandoning that of an overall plebiscite . But in addition the economic and geographic considerations point in the same direction. The difficulty in partitioning the state is to form a sound judgement where the line should be drawn.

While what I have said ideals broadly with the state as a whole, it is by no means easy to fix the limits on each side. That is because it is necessary that the territory allocated to each side should be continuous in itself and should be continugous with that country, because there are pockets of people whose faith and affiliations are different from those of people by whom they are cut off, because the changes in the distribution of population as the result of the troubles cannot be completely ignored and because geographical features remain important in fixing what may prove an international frontier.

I shall not deal with the matter with more particularly, and I say so much only in case the Security Council should be of opinion that it should take further steps to effect a settlement between the parties. But for myself I doubt whether it may not be better to leave the parties to themselves in negotiating terms for settlement of the problem how to dispose of Jammu and Kashmir between them. So far the attitude of the parties has been to throw the whole responsibility upon the Security Council or its representatives of settling the dispute notwithstanding that except by agreement between them there was no means of settling it.

When actual fighting was going on between them it was natural, if not necessary, that the Security Council and the Commission as its delegate should intervene between them and propose terms to stop the hostilities and the question came to be how to settle the rival claims to Kashmir, the initiative was still left with the Security Council and the Commission. The whole question has now been thoroughly discussed by the parties with the Security Council, the Commission and myself and the possible methods of settlement have been exhaustively investigated. It is perhaps best that the initiative should now pass back to the parties. At all events I am not myself prepared to recommend any further course of action on the part of the Security Council for the purpose of assisting the parties to settle between them how the state of Jammu and Kashmir is to be disposed of.

The continued maintenance of two armies facing one another across a ceasefire line is another matter. A danger to peace must exist while this state of things continues. Except for mutual distrust and fear, one of another, there is no reason why the two countries should go on maintaining armies separated only by the ceasefire line. It is a boundary which might be kept by check posts and the like in the same way as any frontier between countries at peace. It is hard to believe that the Indian and Pakistan chiefs of staff would have any difficulty in arranging for a concurrent reduction of forces or in effecting the necessary changes in the manner in which the ceasefire line is held, if they were instructed by their respective governments to meet for the purpose.

Before leaving the subcontinent I addressed to the Prime Minister severally a request that this should be done. It is a matter in which the Security Council is directly concerned because it involves a proximate danger to peace.

I recommended that the Security Council should press the parties to reduce the military strength holding the ceasefire to the normal protection of a peace-time frontier.

In the meantime it is my recommendation that the party of United Nations Military Observers be retained on the ceasefire line. They cannot continue their indefinitely but after a time the question of their withdrawal might be settled in consultation with the two governments.

Broadly speaking, Sir Owen Dixon proposed that:

(a) The southern parts of the state comprising Kathua, Jammu and parts of Udhampur districts (now being predominantly Hindu areas) may be annexed with India.

(b) The area, now known as Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan being exclusively Muslim be annexed with Pakistan.

(c) The Valley of Kashmir along with the adjoining areas across Banihal (i.e. the district of Doda and the Niabat of Arnas, Gulab Garh) to be allowed to decide its future through a plebiscite. Leh is to follow the result of plebiscite, held in this territory (Kargil being exclusively Muslim in population to go with the Valley).

Pending Links

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• https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v06p2/d109
• http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/46-51/Chapter%208/46-51_08-16-The%20India-Pakistan%20question.pdf

References

Category:Kashmir conflict