The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785) is Immanuel Kant's first contribution to moral philosophy, written in order to establish the a priori fundamental basis for morality. Where the Critique of Pure Reason laid out his metaphysical and epistemological ideas, this relatively short work was meant to outline and define the concepts and arguments that he planned to write about more in the years to come. Thus, the book is broken into Kant's preface, followed by three sections. He first works from common reason up to the supreme unconditional law, in order to identify its existence. He then works backwards from there to prove the relevance and weight of the moral law. Notably, Kant waits to mention the now famous Categorical Imperative explicitly until the second section, despite making allusions to it earlier. The third and final section of the book is famously obscure, and it is partly because of this that Kant later, in 1788, decides to publish the Critique of Practical Reason.

The Groundwork in Kant's oevre edit

Tasks of Groundwork (vindication of ordinary morality; critique of practical reason) edit

Near the end of Kant's preface, he states his sole aim for the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals as "nothing more than seeking out and establishing the supreme principles of morality."[1] Following from his non-empiricist critique of rationalism, found in his magnum opus, he explains that insofar as there is a distinction between philosophy based on experience and philosophy based on reason, then there must be a dichotomy of metaphysics: one of nature, and one of morals. Whereas, he reasoned, physics must have two parts, empirical and rational, so too should ethics be divided; the empirical study of ethics is practical anthropology, and the rational counterpart is morality.[2] This distinction is important for Kant to make because it constitutes his justification for composing a Metaphysics of Morals: since the empirical realm of science depends on its metaphysical foundation (found in the Critique of Pure Reason) to determine its scope and medium, so too should anthropology, that is, practical reason, depend on a rational critique of ethics for the same.

In addition, the preface explains why it is possible to engage in a rational critique of morality. Kant explains that a metaphysics of morals must be purged of any anything empirical (or anthropological) and so if a pure universal law is to be used as the foundation for morals, it must also command absolute necessity. To frame his work this way is significant because it demonstrates that this pure universal law which informs the morals cannot be found in human nature, or the physical world - but with a priori reason alone. Doing so clears the field of all extraneous motivations, inclinations, and conveniently "moral" acts. Considering morality from reason a priori focuses the critique squarely on the point that humans are rational beings, and as such are necessarily connected to the moral law; eliminating, in addition, the possibility for contingent moral claims to rise.


Chapter 1 - "Transition from the Ordinary Rational Knowledge of Morality to the Philosophical" edit

Kant's first section is dedicated to explaining how to find the supreme moral law, by beginning with an analysis of our average rational capacity - otherwise known as common sense. It's main themes are that of the good will, duty, and the conditions for moral worth.

Chapter 2 - "Transition from Popular Moral Philosophy to a Metaphysics of Morals" edit

Kan't second section is concerned with the elucidation of the universal moral law as a categorical imperative. It's main themes are the law's a priori foundation, the will, the forumalae of the categorical imperative, and autonomy.

Chapter 3 - "Final Step from a Metaphysics of Morals to a Critique of Practical Reason" edit

Kant's third and final section is known for being an abstruse outline of his 2nd Critique, concerned with the themes of autonomy and freedom.

Significance and influence edit

Prominent criticisms edit

In his book On the Basis of Morality (1840), Arthur Schopenhauer presented a careful analysis of the Groundwork. Schopenhauer's criticism is an attempt to prove, among other things, that actions are not moral when they are performed solely from duty. Schopenhauer specifically targeted the Categorical Imperative, and labeled it cold, repetetive and egoistic. While Schopenhauer publically called himself a Kantian, and made clear and bold criticisms of Hegelian philosophy, he was quick and unrelenting in his analysis of Kant's inconsistencies throughout his long body of work.

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References edit

  1. ^ Kant, Immanuel Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, (1785) Trans. James Ellington Cambridge: Hackett, 1981. p.5; Ak.392
  2. ^ Kant 1981, Ak.388

External links edit