Forecast of Libya 19/07/2011 edit

Forecast of the situation in Libya made in the decision workshop of 19 July 2011 in Schrivenham

I have attempted to express all the things that happened in the workshop as a series of yes/no forecasts that can be said to happen or not happen. As we mentioned at the time, some of these events are contingent on earlier events occuring. If something higher in the structure does not occur then the other forecasts will not be valid. (So if Gaddafi does not openly offer to withdraw his troops from Tripoli then that is one false prediction not 20). As the future unfolds we will be able to mark this forecast and see how well we have done.

  • Gaddafi openly offers to withdraw his troops from Tripoli in exchange for a ceasefire.
    • The ceasefire is accepted by the NTC + International Community
      • After a few days delay
      • Gaddafi goes into internal exile
        • Gaddafi goes to desert oasis in south of country near the Chad border
      • Under cover of the ceasefire Saif withdraws remaining Gaddafi military forces to Sirte
      • NATO bombing stops
        • "No fly Zone" remains
      • Majority of Gaddafi’s forces in Tripoli melt away during cease fire
      • Under cover of the ceasefire Gaddafi actually does withdraw his forces
      • Almost bloodless occupation of Tripoli
        • The forces that arrive in Tripoli are small and symbolic
        • NTC forces arrive
          • on ship from Benghazi
        • A small contingent of UN peacekeeping forces arrives
          • (from HMS Ocean and French Carrier).
          • UN forces are delayed as the Russians and Chinese initially block their deployment at UN
        • Small contingent of Berbers arrive
        • Citizens of Tripoli take some power
          • Temporarily
        • Gaddafi loyalists do not prevent Tripoli occupation
        • Power vacuum outside Tripoli in rest of Tripolitania
  • Berbers later occupy Zuwarah (but it is now a ghost town)
  • Many representatives added to the on NTC,
    • representing Tripoli,
    • (representing Fezzan if ceasefire)
    • Representing the Berbers.
    • The new members dilute the NTC’s power base somewhat, but in many ways at first the representatives have more symbolic than real power, which in maintained at the top of the NTC.
  • In-fighting within the NTC
    • Some members sacrificed, others retain much of their power (Clear winners and losers)
      • Jalil loses power
      • Khalifa loses power
    • Regional representatives gain some power at the expense of the old guard, but not in proportion to population, and not enough to fully make Tripoli Citizens happy
  • Request for Adrian Pelt style initiative (UN to run country and for NTC to surrender power to UN for two years)
    • Tony Blair involved in this request
    • This request refused by the NTC
  • Saif asks to be on the NTC.
    • He is refused at first
    • He later given observer (non-voting) status
  • NTC members allowed to retain power in exchange for Oil and Mineral concessions
  • Support for reconstruction for favorable contracts
    • Support given by Sarkozy’s Mediterranean Union