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Article Evaluation: State Capture

·      The article provides relevant information with a neutral standpoint towards the topic of state capture

·      There are no biases in favour of a particular position, just simply stating the relevant facts

·      From the research that I have done on state capture for the purposes of the seminar, there are many views that are underrepresented

·      The article only identifies 3 cases of state capture: Bulgaria, Latin America and South Africa

·      It only provides 1 or 2 sentences for Bulgaria and Latin America

·      There is more information on South Africa but it is still lacking in much of the events that have contributed to state capture in the country

·      Overall, there could be analyses of far more case studies, and the 3 that are present could be written about with much more detail and information

·      The citations seem to be done accurately and with relevant sources

·      The sources are mostly scholarly articles and news articles, all of which are relevant, credible and neutral

·      The information is now out of date because the President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma has just been forced to resign this week and has been replaced by Cyril Ramaphosa

·      Moreover, it lacks information on certain instances of state capture that have already occurred in South Africa

·      Additionally, there is much lacking information about state capture in many other countries

·      E.g. Moldova, the Soviet Union, The United States and so on

·      There are no conversations on the Talk page for this article

·      However, a user who is not the author suggested that the definition of state capture be revised and more detailed

·      The article is of interest in the following WikiProjects

·      WikiProjects Economics

·      “" Business

·      “” Finance

·      “”Politics

·      “” Crime

·      We have not yet discussed the topic in class

·      Based on my research, the discussion of state capture in the article simply lacks adequate information in terms of detail and breadth

POTENTIAL TOPICS

1. State Capture https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_capture#South_Africa

  • I believe that this article lacks a more detailed definition of what state capture is and how it manifests itself in various societies
  • If I were to re-write this Wikipedia article, I would include various new case studies of different countries who have experienced state capture
  • I would probably start with that of the Soviet Union, because this is a prime historical example of where state capture was an extremely prominent and dominating feature of society
  • I would then update the current case studies on South Africa to include the further details that I learned through my research for the seminar, as well at the very small sections on Bulgaria and Latin America for which I am sure there is far more information than is included in the current article
  • Additionally there are various other countries such as Tunisia, and Moldova for example for which I have found many academic sources that discuss state capture in these countries in depth


2. Vote Buying and Turnout Buying https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electoral_fraud#Vote_buying

  • There is no article on turnout buying and the only article on vote buying is within an overall article about election fraud
  • The section in the above article on vote buying gives a decent definition of the concept in historical context

- However if I were to tackle this subject I would definitely include a more all-encompassing picture of what vote buying looks like

  • With this I would make half the article about vote buying and the other half about turnout buying and highlight the similarities and differences between the two in the academic literature
  • The section about vote buying does not include any implication of this practice, so this is something I would add when creating the new article about both topics
  • Additionally, I would include a few case studies about instances in which vote buying and/or turnout buying has taken place and what the implications of this practice are for different stakeholders

Vote Buying and Turnout Buying

VOTE BUYING

Definition

Vote buying occurs when a political party or candidate seeks to buy the vote of a voter in an upcoming election. Vote buying can take various forms such as a monetary exchange, as well as an exchange for necessary goods or services.[1]This practice is often used to incentivize or persuade voters to turn out to elections, and to vote in a particular way. Despite the fact that this practice is illegal in many countries such as the United States, Argentina, Mexico, Kenya and Nigeria, its prevalence remains worldwide.

Examples

1. Latin America

a) Argentina

Vote buying and the overall practice of clientelism is widespread in Argentina. One of the main perpetrators of these illegal activities were the Peronist party.[2] The relationship between voters and Peronist candidates are such that voters are offered particular goods, services, favours or monetary compensation in exchange for their political support for the party. These rewards could include a job, medicine, a roof, clothing, foods, and other goods or services. The case of Argentina is particular in that it relies heavily on face-to-face and day-to-day interactions between “brokers” who act as middle men and voters.[3] Since many of the communities in Argentina are ridden with poverty and are in need of these particular resources, it is these communities that have proven to be the demographic that are targeted for voted buying. Additionally, vote buying in this region focuses on citizens who are not strongly in favour or opposed to the political machine, and whose political loyalty does not necessarily lie with one party or another.[4] In this way, vote buying acts as a mechanism to sway the decisions of weakly opposed voters. In a study done by Susan C. Stokes, she finds that the brokers in these communities are known to all the citizens and have access to the necessary resources from the municipality. They maintain relationships with the voters and grant them rewards and favours continuously in order to keep the party they work for in office. This is one main explanation for why many lower-income voters are seen voting for populist leaders, as well as authoritarian ones.[5] Many citizens view these brokers as positive pillars in their lives and have the utmost respect for the help they distribute. However, others view them as hands of corruption. Stokes further explains that the capacity of these brokers is constrained due to the fact that they can only maintain this type of transactional relationship with a limited number of voters.[6] Furthermore, the brokers have the additional responsibility of maintaining trusting and solid relationships with their resource suppliers. Without these strong ties, they will have no means through which to carry out vote buying practices.[3]

b) Mexico

The prevalence of vote buying in Latin America varies from country to country. Mexico is another Latin American country in which vote buying takes place in a significant way. Similarly to Argentina, it has been found that it’s occurrence in Mexico is most likely in rural and poor regions of the country.[7] There are many instances of vote buying that have occurred in the history of Mexican elections, however there are two main instances fund in the literature that occurred in the last two decades. The first was the 2006 Mexican election, where it was found that 8.8% of the population who is not a beneficiary of a social program was offered compensation for their vote. [8] Secondly, the years 2007 and 2013 were governed by the Party of the Democratic Revolution in Mexico. During this time, Andres Granier, a Mexican politician was responsible for the government’s budget under Governor Tabasco. It was found that the government’s budget was being diverted to alternate causes by Granier. Granier was later found to be engaging in many corrupt acts such as giving government jobs to friends and family. But he was also found to be engaging in vote buying activities in the form of handing out loads of cash to voters who promised to garner their political support for the party.[9]


2. Africa

a) Nigeria

Much of the politics in Africa is characterized and influenced by material inducement in the form of vote buying or political intimidation [10] On a self-reported survey that was conducted, 1 in 5 Nigerian has experienced an offer for their vote. The rewards offered by Nigerian politicians include money, commodities such as food and clothing, or a job.[11] This number indicates that vote buying in Nigeria is relatively common. In countries such as Nigeria where vote buying is common, researches often conduct studies about the perception of such corruption among the local population. The study done by (citation) had an interesting finding in that although the practice of vote buying is widespread, 58% of Nigerians surveyed at the time of the 2007 election viewed vote buying as immoral. [12] An even more interesting finding however was that even though so many Nigerians viewed the practice as immoral, when asked if they thought it was wrong to accept rewards or monetary compensation for your vote, 78% said no.[13] One factor that needs to be iterated when it comes to studies that are based on surveys is that since vote buying is illegal is most countries, a researcher’s ability to collect accurate data is hindered. This is because many citizens may not feel comfortable revealing their experience or involvement with corrupt activities, or fear that they will suffer repercussions from their governments for coming forward with such information.[14]


b) Kenya

Since the 1990s, Kenya has had regular multiparty elections in which vote buying has played a central role in each of them. In his article, scholar Eric Kramon states that: "According to the data gathered by the Coalition for Accountable Political Finance in Kenya, cash handouts to voters represents around 40% of the average parliamentary candidates’ campaign budget, making up the largest budget item."[15] These handouts are made in various ways including stops on the campaign trail, and at large campaign rallies. "In the 2002 election, 40% of surveyed adult Kenyans reported having accepted a bribe in exchange for their vote, and 22% for the 2007 elections.”[16] It is noted by Kramen that access to information is a huge factor in determining the success of vote buying in Kenya. If the voters have little access to political information, or lack political knowledge then they are more likely to be swayed towards clientelistic reasoning.[17] Moreover, if the voter does have access to information about an incumbent, then the price to sway their vote is more likely to go up. Additionally, Kramon notes that citizens of Kenya tend to value candidates who provide rewards because their ability to do so points to how great their abilities will be once they are in office.[18]

Considerations

A) Who to target

One of the main concerns with vote buying lies in the question of which population or group of voters are most likely to be susceptible to accepting compensation in exchange for their vote. Scholars such as Stokes argue that it is the weakly opposed voters are the best ones to target for vote buying.[19] This means that in a situation in which there are two parties running for office for example, the voters who are not inclined to vote one way or the other are the best to target. Other scholars argue that it is people of lower income status who are the best group to target, as they are the most likely to be receptive to monetary or other forms of compensation.[4] This has proven to be the case in both Argentina, and Nigeria. Since the wealthy are presumably not in need of money, goods or services, it would require a much larger compensation in order to sway their vote. However as seen in the case of Argentina for example, citizens who reside within poor communities are in great need of income, or medical services for example to feed their families and keep them in good health. With that being said, a much smaller sum of cash or a medical prescription would be of much greater value and thus their political support can e much easier to purchase.

B) How to monitor

The main concern when engaging in vote buying for the party involved is how to ensure that the votes you are buying are being casted in your favour. For example, in Argentina as in many other democratic countries, there is a secret ballot that is used to cast votes.[4] The question thus remains; how do the parties get around this? In smaller cases, there have been instances of voter tickets, or monitoring by individuals.[20] This would entail for example, providing specific voter ballots, or having to fold your ballot in a particular way in order to indicate that you voted for the candidate you were paid to vote for. Monitoring could also include taking attendance at campaigns rallies, or keeping track of who took party transportation to voting booths.[21] Many scholars hold that this strategy of accountability works best in smaller communities as there is less anonymity, thus more incentive to vote as you are directed for fear of repercussion. Another strategy has been to invoke personalized social norms to make voters honour their contracts at the voting booth.[22] Such social norms could include personal obligation such as moral debts, social obligations to the buyers, or a threat of withholding or ceasing to produce necessary resources. This is made more effective when the rewards are delivered personally by the candidate or someone close to them, in order to create a sense of gratitude on behalf of the voters towards the candidate. A third strategy is informal sanctions. These are placed on voters who refuse material offers or who don’t vote as instructed. This type of sanction relies however on the ability to discern who voted as instructed and who did not.[23] This issue of monitoring is of ongoing concern for political parties, and new ways to do so are constantly being developed.


Consequences

There are several negative consequences that arise from the practice of vote buying, which contribute to the reasons for which it has been made in illegal in many countries. Firstly, vote buying occurs in democratic states in which elections occur to determine who runs the country. However, the presence of vote buying in democratic states poses a threat to democracy itself.[24] Since votes are being bought from largely lower income citizens, their real political interests are not being represented. In the case of Argentina, it is noted that citizens will often vote for populist parties that hold ideologies that are not in line with their values and beliefs, just to obtain some necessary cash or goods.[3] Such corrupt behaviour greatly inhibits the ability of a democracy to run in the way it was intended to.

Another noted consequence is that the autonomy of voters is undermined. Since getting paid or receiving rewards for their votes generates a form of income that they may need to support themselves or their families, they have no autonomy to cast the vote that they truly want.[25] This is extremely problematic because if it is the most corrupt politicians who are engaging in vote buying, then it is their interests that remain the ones that dictate how the country is going to be run. This in turn perpetuates corruption in the system even further creating an unbreakable cycle.

Thirdly, vote buying can create a dependency of voters on the income or goods that they are receiving for their votes, and can further perpetuate a type of poverty trap. [26] If they are receiving medicine from their communities’ broker for example, if this tie is cut off then they may no longer have access to this necessity. It can be true that the broker in that community has no interest or incentive to actually increase the standards of living of the community members, as it is very possible that they are only interested in getting whatever share of the profit they are entitled to for working for the party.[27] Additionally, if the goods or money are coming directly from a candidate, this candidate’s only wish is to maintain their power. That being said, they may provide services but their real interest may lie in keeping the voters dependent on the rewards they are providing in order to stay in power.

TURNOUT BUYING

Definition

Turnout buying occurs when a political party or candidate offers citizens compensation in order for them to turn out to the election, but does not monitor who they voted for specifically.[28] Turnout buying came about as a potential solution to the ails of vote buying, and working around the secret ballot. It is often difficult to monitor whether or not a person will in fact vote for the candidate that he or she was paid to vote for, but monitoring turnout is much more reliable.[28]

Examples

1. USA

According to research done by Nichter, the United States has seen its fair share of turnout buying in recent elections. During the 2004 election, 5 Democratic Party operatives in East St. Louis were convicted in federal court for offering cigarettes, beer, medicine and 54 or 10$ reward to increase turnout of the poor.[29] One operative pleaded guilty and stated that if they didn’t provide rewards, “they” being the poor wouldn’t come out. A local election in Oakland is another example. Campaign workers handed out thousands of coupons for free chicken dinners in an explicit and targeted effort to draw voters to the polls.[30] More generally, there have been various reports from all over the country of politicians giving out small amounts of cash as well as transporting voters to booths for free as incentive.

2. Argentina

In Susan Stokes’ article on corruption in elections in Argentina, she describes the case as being an example in which vote buying is taking place. This is further discussed in the section in vote buying above. Although this case was originally thought of as vote buying, another scholar by the name of Nichter believes that it is in fact a case of turnout buying. Nichter simplifies Stokes’ original model that favours vote buying, and finds that the populations who are actually being targeted in Argentina are in fact strong supporters of the party. This contradicts Stokes’ theory of weakly opposed voters being targeted, and points to a situation of turnout buying instead. [31]

Advantages

One advantage of turnout buying is that it has the potential to increase political participation. The practice of vote buying is extremely corrupt which only hurts the state of a democracy. However, Nichter argues that turnout buying is arguably less corrupt than vote buying.[32] Since it increases the likelihood of voter participation, we may see a more accurate representation of what the citizens want for their country’s politics. This could in turn enhance the quality of the country’s’ democracy and the prevalence of the opinions and wishes of the voters. Since there is no direct monitoring of who an individual votes for, as long as they turn out to the voting booth then they will receive the compensation they were promised, but can still vote for whomever they desire.

Disadvantages

Although it is easier by far to monitor the turnout of an election over which votes were casted for which politicians, large problems still remain with turnout buying. Firstly, even though it has been said that turnout buying is less corrupt, this may not be the case. The practice of turnout buying, similarly to vote buying, can undermine voter autonomy. If a voter is given some type of compensation for turning out to an election to vote, this compensation and who it came from may play a part in who they vote for. [33] Since the poorer demographics are largely the ones being targeted by turnout buying, they are also more likely to accept the rewards. For example, if Candidate A paid Voter B to turn out to the upcoming federal election, they may feel a subconscious loyalty to Candidate A, and this may sway their vote even if they are more aligned with the ideologies and policy of Candidate B. Even though the compensation is simply given for turning out to the voting booths, the politicians or broker giving the compensation may still have an agenda which is made clear to the voter. Meaning that turnout buying could still be inadvertent vote buying.[34]


Many scholars have noted that the capacity of the politicians to monitor their brokers is the means through which turnout buying becomes effective or not.[35] This can be problematic as we have seen with vote buying, as monitoring can be difficult. If the mechanisms put in place to monitor the turn out that the party has paid for aren’t effective enough, then there will be no way of knowing if their resources are generating the results they want.


As with vote buying, turnout buying undermines the legitimacy of democracy. Only the wealthiest of political parties have the resources to buy turnout from voters. This leaves less wealthy but potentially more qualified parties at a loss, and democracy is no longer pure. In connection with the first disadvantage, a voter who is paid to turnout may feel as if they owe it to whoever compensated them to cast their vote in their favour. This can then skew their real wishes and desires for who is to be in political power.[36]

  1. ^ "Lynne Rienner Publishers | Elections for Sale The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying". www.rienner.com. Retrieved 2018-04-25.
  2. ^ Nichter, Simeon (2008). "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot". The American Political Science Review. 102 (1): 19–31. doi:10.1017/S0003055408080106. JSTOR 27644495. S2CID 54757367.
  3. ^ a b c Stokes, Susan; Brusco, Valeria (2004). "Vote Buying in Argentina" (PDF). Latin America Research Review. 39 (2): 66–88. doi:10.1353/lar.2004.0022. S2CID 154003297 – via Project Muse.
  4. ^ a b c Stokes, Susan C. (2005/08). "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina". American Political Science Review. 99 (3): 315–325. doi:10.1017/S0003055405051683. ISSN 1537-5943. S2CID 36014179. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  5. ^ Stokes, Susan (August 2005). "Preverse Accountability" (PDF). American Political Science Review. 99.
  6. ^ Stokes, Susan C. (2005/08). "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina". American Political Science Review. 99 (3): 315–325. doi:10.1017/S0003055405051683. ISSN 1537-5943. S2CID 36014179. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  7. ^ Vilalta, Carlos (2010-12-01). "Vote-buying crime reports in Mexico: magnitude and correlates". Crime, Law and Social Change. 54 (5): 325–337. doi:10.1007/s10611-010-9260-7. ISSN 0925-4994. S2CID 154628413.
  8. ^ Serra, Gilles (2016-05-10). "Vote Buying with Illegal Resources: Manifestation of a Weak Rule of Law in Mexico". Journal of Politics in Latin America. 8 (1): 129–150. doi:10.1177/1866802X1600800105. ISSN 1868-4890. S2CID 54518533.
  9. ^ Serra, Gilles (2016-05-10). "Vote Buying with Illegal Resources: Manifestation of a Weak Rule of Law in Mexico". Journal of Politics in Latin America. 8 (1): 129–150. doi:10.1177/1866802X1600800105. ISSN 1868-4890. S2CID 54518533.
  10. ^ Bratton, Michael (2008-12-01). "Vote buying and violence in Nigerian election campaigns". Electoral Studies. 27 (4): 621–632. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2008.04.013. ISSN 0261-3794.
  11. ^ Bratton, Michael (2008-12-01). "Vote buying and violence in Nigerian election campaigns". Electoral Studies. 27 (4): 621–632. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2008.04.013. ISSN 0261-3794.
  12. ^ Bratton, Michael (2008-12-01). "Vote buying and violence in Nigerian election campaigns". Electoral Studies. 27 (4): 621–632. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2008.04.013. ISSN 0261-3794.
  13. ^ Bratton, Michael (December 2008). "Vote Buying and Violence in Nigerian Election Campaigns". Electoral Studies. 27 (4): 621–632. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2008.04.013.
  14. ^ Bratton, Michael. "Vote Buying and Violence in Nigerian Election Campaigns" (PDF). ac-els-cdn-com.proxy3.library.mcgill.ca. Retrieved 2018-04-25.
  15. ^ Kramon, Eric (2016-12-01). "Where is vote buying effective? Evidence from a list experiment in Kenya". Electoral Studies. 44: 397–408. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2016.09.006. ISSN 0261-3794.
  16. ^ Kramon, Eric (2016-12-01). "Where is vote buying effective? Evidence from a list experiment in Kenya". Electoral Studies. 44: 397–408. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2016.09.006. ISSN 0261-3794.
  17. ^ Kramon, Eric (2016-12-01). "Where is vote buying effective? Evidence from a list experiment in Kenya". Electoral Studies. 44: 397–408. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2016.09.006. ISSN 0261-3794.
  18. ^ Kramon, Eric (2016-12-01). "Where is vote buying effective? Evidence from a list experiment in Kenya". Electoral Studies. 44: 397–408. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2016.09.006. ISSN 0261-3794.
  19. ^ Stokes, Susan C. (2005/08). "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina". American Political Science Review. 99 (3): 315–325. doi:10.1017/S0003055405051683. ISSN 1537-5943. S2CID 36014179. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  20. ^ Nichter, Simeon. "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot" (PDF). www-cambridge-org.proxy3.library.mcgill.ca. Retrieved 2018-04-25.
  21. ^ Larreguy, Horacio; Marshall, John; Querubín, Pablo (2016/02). "Parties, Brokers, and Voter Mobilization: How Turnout Buying Depends Upon the Party's Capacity to Monitor Brokers". American Political Science Review. 110 (1): 160–179. doi:10.1017/S0003055415000593. ISSN 0003-0554. S2CID 48033502. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  22. ^ "Lynne Rienner Publishers | Elections for Sale The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying". www.rienner.com. Retrieved 2018-04-25.
  23. ^ "Lynne Rienner Publishers | Elections for Sale The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying". www.rienner.com. Retrieved 2018-04-25.
  24. ^ "Vote-Buying and Reciprocity". Econometrica. 80 (2): 863–881. 2012. doi:10.3982/ecta9035. ISSN 0012-9682.
  25. ^ Stokes, Susan C. (2005/08). "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina". American Political Science Review. 99 (3): 315–325. doi:10.1017/S0003055405051683. ISSN 1537-5943. S2CID 36014179. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  26. ^ Gersbach, Hans; Mühe, Felix. "Vote Buying and Growth" (PDF). www-cambridge-org.proxy3.library.mcgill.ca. Macroeconomic Dynamics. Retrieved 2018-04-25.
  27. ^ Auyero, Javier (1999). "From The Client's Point of View: How Poor People Perceive and Evaluate Political Clientelism" (PDF). Theory and Society. 28 (2): 297–334. doi:10.1023/A:1006905214896. JSTOR 3108473. S2CID 141606279. Retrieved 2018-04-25.
  28. ^ a b Gans-Morse, Jordan; Mazzuca, Sebastian (April 2009). "Who Gets Bought? Vote Buying, Turnout Buying and Other Strategies". Weatherhead Centre for International Affairs. Harvard University.
  29. ^ Nichter, Simeon (2008). "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot". The American Political Science Review. 102 (1): 19–31. doi:10.1017/S0003055408080106. JSTOR 27644495. S2CID 54757367.
  30. ^ Nichter, Simeon (2008). "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot". The American Political Science Review. 102 (1): 19–31. doi:10.1017/S0003055408080106. JSTOR 27644495. S2CID 54757367.
  31. ^ Nichter, Simeon (2008). "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot". The American Political Science Review. 102 (1): 19–31. doi:10.1017/S0003055408080106. JSTOR 27644495. S2CID 54757367.
  32. ^ Nichter, Simeon (2008). "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot". The American Political Science Review. 102 (1): 19–31. doi:10.1017/S0003055408080106. JSTOR 27644495. S2CID 54757367.
  33. ^ Larreguy, Horacio; Marshall, John; Querubín, Pablo (2016/02). "Parties, Brokers, and Voter Mobilization: How Turnout Buying Depends Upon the Party's Capacity to Monitor Brokers". American Political Science Review. 110 (1): 160–179. doi:10.1017/S0003055415000593. ISSN 0003-0554. S2CID 48033502. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  34. ^ Nichter, Simeon (2008). "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot" (PDF). www-cambridge-org.proxy3.library.mcgill.ca. University of California, Berkeley: American Political Science Review. Retrieved 2018-04-25.
  35. ^ Larreguy, Horacio; Marshall, John; Querubín, Pablo (2016/02). "Parties, Brokers, and Voter Mobilization: How Turnout Buying Depends Upon the Party's Capacity to Monitor Brokers". American Political Science Review. 110 (1): 160–179. doi:10.1017/S0003055415000593. ISSN 0003-0554. S2CID 48033502. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  36. ^ Nichter, Simeon (2008). "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot". The American Political Science Review. 102 (1): 19–31. doi:10.1017/S0003055408080106. JSTOR 27644495. S2CID 54757367.
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