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Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 (1852). [1]
Cardozo on the case: (writing in MacPherson v Buick Motor Co. -- open source)
The question to be determined is whether the defendant owed a duty of care and vigilance to any one but the immediate purchaser.
The foundations of this branch of the law, at least in this state, were laid in Thomas v. Winchester (6 N. Y. 397). A poison was falsely labeled. The sale was made to a druggist, who in turn sold to a customer. The customer recovered damages from the seller who affixed the label. "The defendant's negligence," it was said, "put human life in imminent danger." A poison falsely labeled is likely to injure any one who gets it. Because the danger is to be foreseen, there is a duty to avoid the injury. Cases were cited by way of illustration in which manufacturers were not subject to any duty irrespective of contract. The distinction was said to be that their conduct, though negligent, was not likely to result in injury to any one except the purchaser. We are not required to say whether the chance of injury was always as remote as the distinction assumes. Some of the illustrations might be rejected to-day. The principle of the distinction is for present purposes the important thing. Thomas v. Winchester became quickly a landmark of the law. In the application of its principle there may at times have been uncertainty or even error. There has never in this state been doubt or disavowal of the principle itself. The chief cases are well known, yet to recall [*386] some of them will be helpful. Loop v. Litchfield (42 N. Y. 351) is the earliest. It was the case of a defect in a small balance wheel used on a circular saw. The manufacturer pointed out the defect to the buyer, who wished a cheap article and was ready to assume the risk. The risk can hardly have been an imminent one, for the wheel lasted five years before it broke. In the meanwhile the buyer had made a lease of the machinery. It was held that the manufacturer was not answerable to the lessee. Loop v. Litchfield was followed in Losee v. Clute (51 N. Y. 494), the case of the explosion of a steam boiler. That decision has been criticised (Thompson on Negligence, 233; Shearman & Redfield on Negligence [6th ed.], § 117); but it must be confined to its special facts. It was put upon the ground that the risk of injury was too remote. The buyer in that case had not only accepted the boiler, but had tested it. The manufacturer knew that his own test was not the final one. The finality of the test has a bearing on the measure of diligence owing to persons other than the purchaser (Beven, Negligence [3d ed.], pp. 50, 51, 54; Wharton, Negligence [2d ed.], § 134).
Summary (open source - from the header of the case)
editA dealer in drugs and medicines, who carelessly labels a deadly poison as a harmless medicine, and sends it so labeled into market, is liable to all persons, who, without fault on their part, are injured by using it as such medicine in consequence of the false label.
The liability of the dealer in such case arises, not out of any contract or. direct privity. between him and the person injured, but out of the duty which the law imposes upon him to avoid acts in their nature dangerous to the lives of others. He is liable therefore, though the poisonous drug with such label may have passed through many intermediate sales before it reaches the bands of the person injured.
Where such negligent act is done by an agent, the principal is liable for the injury caused thereby.