User:Geo Swan/Andrew Ledford -b

At some point in the past I started an article on Andrew Ledford, a graduate of the US Naval Academy, a former Captain in the US Marines, a former Lieutenant in Navy SEALs, who was court martialed over his role in the death during interrogation of Manadel al-Jamadi.

Ledford was acquitted.

The article was {{prod}}ded in January 2010. The individual who prodded it did not observe the recommended courtesy of leaving a heads-up on my talk page. The entry in the deletion log said "Expired PROD, concern was: This article is slightly slanderous in light of the guy being found innocent."

Ledford was found innocent. at a court martial -- where two CIA officials kept interrupting sat ready to interrupt the proceedings when they thought the testimony was going to breach a "national security" secret.

What was the secret? Respected journalists speculated that the SEAL team commanded by Ledford, together with attached elements of the CIA, had waterboarded al-Jamadi in 2003, in their "Romper Room"

Is it possible that the initial article lapsed from neutrality? Sure. I aim for neutrality, try hard for it, but I never claimed I would succeed 100 percent of the time. As I write this comment, I have no idea what I actually wrote, over two years ago. The administrator who deleted the article has told me they would email me a copy, but they haven't done so yet.

So, what does our obligation to write from a neutral point of view require of us with regard to Ledford?

  1. Of course it should say he was charged;
  2. Of course it should say he was tried and acquitted;
  3. However, should multiple knowledgeable, authoritative commentators have speculated about his role, I think the article should include a neutral reflection of those comments.

It seems to me that so long as that coverage of what RS have said was neutrally written, I would question whether it is fair to call that coverage "slanderous". Geo Swan (talk) 00:50, 27 May 2012 (UTC)

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The deleting administrator has emailed me the source text for the original article. They said it only had two edits, my original edit, and the edit from the {{prod}} placer.

I strongly disagree that the article was even "slightly slanderous". It eschewed provocative language, and it did not use the frightening pictures we have of the corpse of the victim, Manadel al-Jamadi.

I assembled a list of some references, below. I also drafted a list of two dozen things we know about Ledford. Possibly it is an excess of caution, even though I tried to draft that list using neutral wording, I will not include it here in user space.

The way I see it Lieutenant Ledford's acquittal is of limited meaning, for various reasons I won't list here. I see important parallels between how I think his role in Al-Jamadi's death should be covered and how we should cover OJ Simpson's murder trial. Both men were acquitted. But we wouldn't let OJ's acquittal prevent us from giving appropriate neutral coverage to questions authoritative reliable sources raised about his trial, his acquittal. I think exactly the same principle should apply to Lieutenant Ledford's role.

Does Ledford merit an individual article? Or doesn't BLP1E say that as someone known only for "one event" whatever is notable about him should be covered in the article about that event?

My reading of BLP1E is that it has room for exceptional cases -- instances where although the individual is only known for one event that event is sufficiently important they merit an individual article. This is further complicated by our failure to define "one event".

An acquittal, under the circumstances of Lieutenant Ledford's court martial, is of limited meaning -- particularly when there are lots of highly authoritative reliable sources that raise questions about his role.

Here in Canada the Police investigate a couple of hundred murders a year. In the USA it is tens of thousands. Almost none of the victims or suspects ever merit an individual wikipedia article. This is due to the "dog bites man -- man bites dog" principle. Dog bite men, women and children all the time, and such bites are practically never remarkable. Similarly almost all murders are processed in the same way -- the law enforcement and justice systems working as per usual -- and that is practically never remarkable. When there is something really different about a murder, and there are reliable sources to cover it, we should cover it -- just as the rare instance of "man bites dog" is remarkable.

Ledford's court martial is remarkable. I believe it is remarkable in just the same way OJ Simpson's murder trial was remarkable. OJ Simpson was also acquitted. OJ's acquittal should not keep us from neutrally covering the opinions of reliable sources that questioned that verdict. Neither, I believe, should it keep us from neutrally covering the opinions of reliable sources that raised questions about Lieutenant Ledford's role.

Doesn't BLP1E say we have to cover Ledford's role in an article about the event? I don't think so, for two reasons.

First, BLP1E recommends that we should usually cover the noteworthy details in the article about the event. In particularly significant instances we do provide individual articles about individuals known only for one event.

Second, personally, I think this section of BLP should be rewritten -- as it is not whether one EVENT is involved that matters. Rather, I suggest that when an individual's participation in a single evnt is relevant to multiple TOPICS that is grounds for there to be an article about that individual. I think the topic of Lieutenant Ledford is relevant to a number of topics.

We have an article on Manadel al-Jamadi, and we have an article on Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse. We shouldn't try to shoehorn the topic of Manadel al-Jamadi into the article on Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse for various reasons, including that (1) he was also abused in the SEAL HQ at BIAP, and it seems that this is where the fatal blow was inflicted; (2) other articles should link to the Manadel al-Jamadi article where it is not relevant to link to Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse.

Authoritative RS have compared al Jamadi's death during interrogation with that of another Iraqi officer Abed Hamed Mowhoush. And authoritative RS have compared the role of Lieutenant Ledford with that of Warrant Officer Lewis E. Welshofer Jr. who was convicted in Mowhoush's death. Both the article about Welshofer and that about Mowhoush need work. Both should be able to link directly to articles about Lieutenant Ledford and al-Jamadi. Geo Swan (talk) 18:52, 28 May 2012 (UTC)

Newspapers

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  1. David S. Cloud (2005-05-27). "Navy Officer Retracts Confession in Death of Iraqi Prisoner". New York Times. Retrieved 2012-05-28. The prosecutors have been forced to build their case around the confession Lieutenant Ledford now disavows and on a photograph, taken soon after Mr. Jamadi's capture, showing the defendant and his men surrounding Mr. Jamadi, who was hooded and bound but still alive, in the back of a Humvee at an Army base. Other photographs taken around the same time show Seals with their guns drawn around Mr. Jamadi, but Lieutenant Ledford is not present in the pictures. mirror
  2. David Johnston (2006-12-19). "U.S. Inquiry Falters on Civilians Accused of Abusing Detainees". New York Times. Retrieved 2012-05-27. Mr. Spinner, a defense lawyer who has specialized in military cases and who represented Lieutenant Ledford and Chief Warrant Officer Welshofer, said the Jamadi case in particular had raised questions about the role of the C.I.A. "The evidence was clear," Mr. Spinner said. "Let's have equal justice. If you're going to try Ledford and try the Seals, then you have to go after the C.I.A. guys." mirror
  3. David Johnston (2006-12-19). "Inquiry into abuses ends with no U.S. civilian indictments". International Herald Tribune. Retrieved 2012-05-27. In the Jamadi and Mowhoush cases, military prosecutors brought charges against members of the armed forces. But they had no jurisdiction over civilians working alongside their military counterparts. A court-martial of Lieutenant Andrew Ledford, the leader of the Navy Seal unit that captured Jamadi, ended with an acquittal. A court-martial in the Mowhoush case ended with a conviction of Chief Warrant Officer Lewis Welshofer Jr., who was fined $6,000 and confined for 60 days to his barracks. mirror
  4. Seth Hettena (2005-05-28). "Navy SEAL acquitted in prisoner abuse case". Free Lance-Star. p. 6. Retrieved 2012-05-28. During a brief stop at an army base, members of Ledford's SEAL platoon testified that they punched, kicked and struck al-Jamadi with muzzles of their rifles. Instead of ordering his men to halt the beating, Ledford accepted a subordinate's offer to "give this turd a knock" and punched the bound prisoner in the arm, Navy prosecutor Lt. Chad Olcott said.
  5. Jane Mayer (2005-11-07). "A DEADLY INTERROGATION: Can the C.I.A. legally kill a prisoner?". The New Yorker. Retrieved 2012-05-27. By late last spring, the SEALs' reputations had been tarnished by the exposure of their rough treatment of Jamadi, but they were cleared of the gravest abuse charges. The question of who was responsible for Jamadi's death remained unanswered. Milt Silverman, one of the defense attorneys, told me, "Who killed Jamadi? I know it wasn't any of the SEALs. . . . That's why their cases got dismissed." Frank Spinner, a civilian lawyer who represented Ledford, said, "There's a stronger case against the C.I.A. than there is against Ledford. But the military's being hung out to dry while the C.I.A. skates. I want a public accounting, whether in a trial, a hearing before a congressional committee, or a public report. There's got to be something more meaningful than sticking the case in a Justice Department drawer."
  6. John McChesney (2005-10-27). "Q & A: The CIA's Record on Detainee Treatment". National Public Radio. Retrieved 2012-05-27. Attorney Frank Spinner, who successfully defended Navy SEAL Lt. Andrew Ledford against court-martial charges that he allowed his men to beat Jamadi, says the CIA did ask the SEALS to rough up detainees at the sand pit. mirror
  7. John McChesney (2005-10-27). "The Death of an Iraqi Prisoner". National Public Radio. Retrieved 2012-05-27. The SEALs denied hitting Jamadi with enough force during his capture and transport to cause any lethal injury. The leader of the SEAL platoon, Lt. Andrew Ledford, was acquitted on charges of dereliction of duty for allowing his men to beat Jamadi. Careers were wrecked but no one was convicted of a crime. No action has been taken by the CIA. mirror
  8. Bill Salisbury (2005-09-15). "We Did the Dirty Work". San Diego Reader. Retrieved 2012-05-27. A SEAL admiral charged Lieutenant Ledford, another officer, and several enlisted men with assaulting an Iraqi who they suspected had planned the deadly attack on the Red Cross headquarters in Baghdad. The attack took place in late October 2003. The SEALs were members of a platoon that captured Manadel Jamadi at the request of the CIA. According to SEALs who testified at Lieutenant Ledford's trial, they "poked and prodded" the combative Jamadi because the spooks wanted him "softened up" for interrogation. Lieutenant Ledford punched the Iraqi in the arm after another SEAL invited Ledford to "give this turd a knock." In an act that can best be described as felony stupid, the SEALs gleefully photographed their fun. mirror mirror
  9. Susan Ho. "Bush Chortles While Navy SEAL Is Hung Out to Dry". Daily Kos. Retrieved 2012-05-28. As Bush warned the Navy cadets about "the dangers ahead," I wondered if the cadets thought of the fate of their Navy SEAL brothers -- including Andrew K. Ledford, a "32-year-old U.S. Naval Academy graduate," reports the Bakersfield Californian newspaper. The C.I.A. and civilian contractors are getting off while a Navy Seal, who was not adequately trained for the Iraq mission -- and who did not kill Manadel al-Jamadi -- is in the dock. mirror
  10. Tony Perry (2005-05-28). "SEAL Officer Not Guilty of Assaulting Iraqi". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 2012-05-28. Prosecutors had accused Ledford, a platoon commander, of a failure of leadership in not stopping his men from assaulting prisoners, including Jamadi. Ledford denied hitting Jamadi and said he never saw the men in his Foxtrot Platoon assaulting prisoners. mirror

Books

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  1. Nicolas J.S. Davies (2010). Blood on Our Hands: The American Invasion and Destruction of Iraq. Nimble Books. p. 194. ISBN 9781934840986. Manadel al-Jamadi died under CIA interrogation at the Abu Ghraib on November 4, 2003. He had six broken ribs and a bullet wound to the spleen, but was killed by an Israeli technique known as a "Palestinian hanging." He was detained by Navy SEALs and CIA personnel and taken to the "Romper Room" at Baghdad Airport, where he was doused with cold water, beaten, and tortured. At Abu Ghraib, he was a "ghost" prisoner, hidden from the ICRC. The Palestinian hanging involved a sort of crucifixion, hanging from a window frame with his hands outstretched so that he could neither stand, sit, nor kneel without pain. His body was found with his arms "almost coming out of their sockets" and blood gushing from his mouth. Navy Seal Lieutenant Andrew Ledford was acquitted of all charges in his death, and Mark Swanner, Jamadii's CIA interrogator at Abu Ghraib, was not charged and was still working for the CIA in 2006.
  2. Christopher Graveline, Michael Clemens. The Secrets of Abu Ghraib Revealed: American Soldiers on Trial. Potomac Books. ISBN 9781597974417. Military medical personnel in Iraq conducted an autopsy of the man, Manadel Jamadi, and found that a blood clor in his head, probably the result of an injury received during apprehension, was the cause of death. The Navy charged the SEAL team's leader, LT Andrew Ledford, for his actions surrounding Jamadi's death. Ledford was charged with assult, dereliction of duty, conduct unbecoming and officer, and false statements. The prosecution's theory was that Lefford and his team used excessive force to subdue Jamadi and then lied to investigators to cover their actions. A military jury acquitted Ledford of all charges on May 25, 2005. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |pae= ignored (help)
  3. Dick Couch (2003). The Warrior Elite: The Forging of Seal Class 228. Random House Digital. p. 192. ISBN 9781400046959. Lieutenant Andrew Ledford, also a Naval Academy graduate, was a captain in the Marine Corps before deciding he wanted to become a Navy SEAL. These two full lieutenants lead thirty-three trainees from Class 226 through BUD/S and into the teams.
  4. Jane Mayer (2009). The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned Into a War on American Ideals. Random House Digital. pp. 251–252. ISBN 9780307456298. In May of 2005, Ledford was acquitted of any wrongdoing; but during the hearings, which were open, a number of troubling facts spilled out, hinting at the CIA's role in Jamadi's death.
  5. By the numbers: Findings of the Detainee Abuse and Accountability Project (PDF). pp. 11–12. As of April 10, 2006, only five officers had been criminally charged in connection with the cases of abuse detailed in this reports, and none under the doctrine of command responsibility. Christopher Beiring, an Army captain, was charged for dereliction of duty in a case involving the death of two detainees in Afghanistan in December 2002; charges against him were dropped. Andrew Ledford, a Navy lieutenant, was charged with assault and dereliction of duty, among other counts, for his involvement in the November 2003 interrogation at Abu Ghraib of Manadel al-Jamadi, an Iraqi detainee who died in custody; Ledford too was acquitted. Three other officers -- a lieutenant, a captain, and a major -- were convicted at count-martial for their involvement in detainee abuse; in all three cases the officers were charged for direct participation in the criminal acts, and had taken part in abuses themselves or had ordered troops to commit abuses. One was sentenced to only two months in prison, another to forty-five days, and the third was discharged and received no prison sentence.
  6. Stephen Grey (2007). Ghost Plane: The True Story of the CIA Rendition and Torture Program. Macmillan. pp. 161, 167. ISBN 9780312360245.