Foreign Policy Implications

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From the outset of the First Chechen conflict, Russian authorities struggled to reconcile new international expectations with widespread accusations of soviet-style heaviness in their execution of the war. For example, Foreign minister Kozyrev, who was generally regarded as a western- leaning liberal, made the following remark when questioned about Russia's conduct during the war; "‘Generally speaking, it is not only our right but our duty not to allow uncontrolled armed formations on our territory. The Foreign Ministry stands on guard over the country’s territorial unity. International law says that a country not only can but must use force in such instances ... I say it was the right thing to do ... The way in which it was done is not my business. [1]" These attitudes contributed greatly to the growing doubts in the west as to whether Russia was sincere in it's stated intentions to implement democratic reforms. The general disdain for Russian behavior in the Western Political establishment contrasted heavily with widespread support in the Russian public[2]. Domestic political authorities arguments emphasizing stability and the restoration of order resonated with the public and quickly became an issue of state identity. The Western powers, however, remained relatively noncommittal. Despite frequent reports of war crimes being committed by Russian soldiers against ethnic Chechens, the United States decided not to take any form of decisive action in response. This was a unique reaction, as the United States and allied powers were, during that period, seemingly ready and willing to utilize military force in the name of defending human rights. Examples of that behavior would be interventions in Somalia from 1992-1995 and Bosnia-Herzegovina starting in 1993 and the later NATO- led bombing of Kosovo in 1999[3].

This inaction is attributed to multiple contributing factors which are A combination of confusion over territorial integrity, the relatively low strategic value of Chechnya for the United States, concerns about democracy promotion in Russia, post-Cold War security interests, the need for a partner in the War on Terror, a lack of moral authority to condemn Russia’s behavior, and a sense of helplessness has prevented the United States from intervening in a meaningful way in the Russo-Chechen wars. Essentially, strategic interests have rendered it unwilling to condemn Russia’s actions[3]. Another factor that led a muted response from the international community was the common desire to make sure that Russia does not once again become an adversary. In a statement from Clinton's secretary of State Madeleine Albright regarding the Chechen conflicts, she said "the last thing we should be doing right now is trying to turn Russia back into an enemy"[4].

One view on the unfolding events in the region comes from Political Scientist Richard Pipes who stated that he sees "deep continuities running through and even largely determining the course of Russian history from the middle ages, to the Tsarist empire to the Soviet Union to the post Soviet present"[5]. In his opinion, the influence of past events on modern decisions comes from many sources and may have engendered hostility between Russians and other ethnic groups and even though these feelings may not have remained naturally, elites on both sides may utilize references and imagery to cause popular anger or influence public opinion[6].



~~~~Dominick Battistone



























  1. ^ Smith, Hanna (2014). Russian Greatpowerness: Foreign policy, the Two Chechen Wars and International Organisations. University of Helsinki. {{cite book}}: line feed character in |title= at position 8 (help)
  2. ^ Horga, Ioana. "Cfsp into the Spotlight: The European Union's Foreign Policy toward Russia during the Chechen Wars". Annals of University of Oradea, Series: International Relations & European Studies.
  3. ^ a b Bagot, Eliziberth (Fall 2009). "US Ambivalence and the Russo-Chechen Wars: Behind the Silence". Stanford Journal of International Relations. {{cite journal}}: line feed character in |title= at position 37 (help)
  4. ^ James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose. 275.
  5. ^ Shelton, Kay (1998-12). "Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998, xii, 436 pp. + notes, index, illustrations. U.S.$35.00 (hbk)". Nationalities Papers. 26 (4): 804–805. doi:10.1017/s0090599200008205. ISSN 0090-5992. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); line feed character in |title= at position 54 (help)
  6. ^ Pack, Tyler (Spring 2011). "Chechnya, Georgia, and Theories of Foreign Policy". Utah State University.